AGUIRRE VS RANA one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission

EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ] had practiced law without a license.
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
VS.
lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
Facts: become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
scheduled mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Attorneys.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s
oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as
counsel for a candidate in an election.
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a
municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act
as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George
Bunan without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims
that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the
winning vice mayoralty candidate.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar
Ruling:
the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are
usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice
law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge
or skill.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment,
and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate
does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.

Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission
on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of
law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since
Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
CRUZ VS CABRERA
SECOND DIVISION[ A.C. No. 5737, October 25, 2004 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part
of 2001, he instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for
and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the
counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge
Caridad Cuerdo.
Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling
the court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to
malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant
is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior
cases; respondent’s imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a
lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to
threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the
manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words “appear ka ng appear,
pumasa ka muna!” were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex
and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before
the public.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Whether or not complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his
cases
Whether or not complainant is engaged in the practice of law
Ruling:
1. We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka
muna” does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such
magnitude as to warrant respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a
product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an
argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to
too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of
chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even
contemptuous language.
2. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from
litigating personally his cases. A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is
recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By
whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney,
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member
of the bar.
3. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the
exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by
acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to
others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent
or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it
is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees
of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in
private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or
habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she
demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the
practice of law.
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed
officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend;
and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by
law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain
obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they
must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Though a lawyer’s language
may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language
and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.
CRUZ VS MINA Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend
THIRD DIVISION of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS

Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as
private prosecutor, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his
appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v.
Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an
agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the
prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission
for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No.
19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the
ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for
continuation of trial.
Issue:
whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as
an agent or friend of a party litigant
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior
court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts,
a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a
lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the
peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
IN RE: EDILLON functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the
AC 1928 12/19/1980 Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing

Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the
Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the
Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the
IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment
of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his

constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition
to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are
void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay
his membership fee to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must
be a member of as distinguished from bar associations in
which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to
comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including
payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of
Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of
the regulatory program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.

The right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as
a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has
jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from
Payment of IBP Dues, B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Sec. 5, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Facts:
Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC requesting for exemption from payment
of his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends
that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Civil Service Commission
then migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is
that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law profession
and he did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion that he
pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status
as a lawyer. His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the
same constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process
of the law.
the power to impose such exaction.
The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP,
of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment
of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains
regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is
engaged in.
2. No. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not
here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of
the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate
its existence, the respondents right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but
a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of
the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of
membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such
privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

Issues:
1. Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time
that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil
Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?

2. Does the enforcement of the penalty of removal amount to a deprivation of

property without due process?

Held:

1. No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation. If

the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an
incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It
would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to
defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it
Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay 540
SCRA 424

FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He

practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical
attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to
avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and
he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
In July 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.
On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to
the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still resume practice?
RULING: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for
admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years
of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must
also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character
and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or
are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss
thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the
privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as
a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225.
This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen
of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this
Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
• the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;
• the payment of professional tax;
• the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing
legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of
legal developments and
• the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.