Republic of the Philippines There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
SUPREME COURT Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity
as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would
indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national
existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age
and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes
practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and
all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney
engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held
out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for
services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is
also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to
settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs
any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of
their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to
their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts
either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil.
173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of
work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation
to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution
of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3
[1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194
N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing
for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even
broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment
in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of
a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such
as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of
the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation
which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the
Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by
Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am
quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the
Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like
to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members
of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the
COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission
on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice
of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer
is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the
Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it
is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal
work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would
have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that
the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of
auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private
practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as
commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are
often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is
usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders.
In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most
firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
"associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which
lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.:
Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of
any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law.
(State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863,
870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623,
626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too
global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most
publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average
lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage
spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless,
many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history,
not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a
corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business
counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose
concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is
transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who
do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business
counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the
planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a
number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such
as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client
before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of
the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-
giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that
the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and
a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is
constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it
some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the
most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are
imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these
roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are
emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional
concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires
an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the
corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such
improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-
making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the
inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of
major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated
concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic
data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably,
an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component
of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative
courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in
predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized
attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become
a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those
trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early
introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with
either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making
now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques
of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems
would require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex
legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in
securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously
referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer,
earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and
magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could
not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number
of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size
and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations
farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have
in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff
large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles
the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction
may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research,
acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in
both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability
to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than
the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as determining policy and
becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated
from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into
the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who
needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in
the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the
few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the
international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working
in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area
coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs
go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm
of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce
Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a
good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the
arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law
teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code
and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3)
types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which
are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with
a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting
managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the
counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that
the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to
think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of
the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within
the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has
gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through participation on
boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as
barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental
policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New
collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms
of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to
be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively
revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In
general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate
lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged.
Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found
an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning
and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of
feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to
simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic,
managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques
now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers
— including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law
department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation,
aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models
can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations.
All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective
negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be
used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal
function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They
differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned
with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are
being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences
attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving
economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive
in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of
"law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in
trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The
general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most
vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with
an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public
decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law
is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give
him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And
even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's
effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a
working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp
not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem
 corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991,
p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have
more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of
their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional
security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will
he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to
the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat
of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of
office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed
the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation
and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73.
He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten
years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the
bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for
about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986,
has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant
or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer
and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod
also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a
quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and
public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.
(pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to
be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and
which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that
arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved
in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing
Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it
lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the
meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3)
conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development
policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty.
(Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International
 Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by
the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). (
Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in
legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or
an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the
advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of
the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is
the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual
remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract.
A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the
other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring
represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of
law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no
banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle
and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See
Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments,"
Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA
327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should
have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis
supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and
all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested,
subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of
four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission
by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated
by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a
term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
 years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in
a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that
his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped
notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the
practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended
by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice
Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is
far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in
my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means
nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people
ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by
way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice
by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on
what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we
should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different
from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or
petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed
disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings
on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in
the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise
of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant
the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be
incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S.
Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that
giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea
asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah
agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed
an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's
eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved,
Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused
the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any
blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was
clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only
in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing
that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the
appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof,
be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with
the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore
vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the
Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the
Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC
Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the
office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and
even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for
respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent
Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more
convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten
(10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration
because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper
construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership
of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987
Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions
are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that
such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to
the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere
possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or
pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing
the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A
certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his
profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a
business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a
Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to
be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent
or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment
for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ...
(emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a
Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a
particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of
a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of
his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words,
it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State
v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal
knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño,
Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People
v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders
an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay
for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing
Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls
for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice
of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law
presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a
lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but
involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of
his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining
whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of
practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the
practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the
records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which
constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the
drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such
were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as
"practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General
in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the activeand continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public
for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent
Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment
to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must
dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him
while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications
of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we
are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made
on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it
were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of
the appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who
both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we
said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this
Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot
disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on
Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in
an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by
no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be
examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified
to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that
the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice
of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous
activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that
one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as
long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally.
The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the
definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become
involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main
occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an
incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the
Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the
ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not
affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know
about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even
have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so
deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as
these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such
transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he
must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy
Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say
that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial
and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or
at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even
if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The
possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom
dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade
me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by
the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance,
in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist
and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various
positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a
businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused
on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in
Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests)
and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his
activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual
practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions
worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice
Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law
as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly
definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod
engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while
on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically
stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with
no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in
the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the
work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to
look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the
Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into
grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief
that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability,
proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international
banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance
with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty.
He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of
the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational
limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his
life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar
is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the
practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC
chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts.
What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee,
working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law,
whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in
the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is
active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental,
seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years
requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's
decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one
is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year
period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent
Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has
never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar
examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice
must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph.
D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period.
How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of
Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department;
Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia
and Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e.,
Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation,
Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development
Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989
Coup Attempt — Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that
respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of
commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the
claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working
as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that
legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an
executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to
equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in
various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an
ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined
meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment
has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal
knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor,
barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and
student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as
such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for
at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection
with litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the
giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of
legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other
instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions
involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901,
and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or
definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has
been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according
to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or
rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when
the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of
any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that
definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex
rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not
only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed,
habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather
evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the
parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent.
He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many
times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one
years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would
be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he
did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had
prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't
recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember
saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and
contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he
was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so,
that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in
preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker,
he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books
as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he
has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate
transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged
in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or
employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one
of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or
defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled
"attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an
attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another,
without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law,
legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on
the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be
true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client
with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the
state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ...
His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law
Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by
Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually;
to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on
in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to
 exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or
medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a
succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA
109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted
as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself
recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of law
in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of
a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of
his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent
or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09
citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from
his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of
isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law.
Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the
Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup
Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr.
Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations
as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing
business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing
business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of
appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the
Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity,
and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President,
Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the
specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less
than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave
abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only
in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing
that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the
appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof,
be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with
the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore
vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the
Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the
Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC
Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the
office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and
even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for
respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent
Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more
convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten
(10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration
because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper
construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership
of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987
Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions
are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that
such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to
the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere
possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or
pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing
the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A
certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his
profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a
business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a
Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to
be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent
or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment
for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ...
(emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a
Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a
particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of
a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of
his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words,
it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State
v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
 services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal
knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño,
Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People
v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders
an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay
for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing
Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls
for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice
of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law
presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a
lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but
involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of
his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining
whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of
practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the
practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the
records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which
constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the
drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such
were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as
"practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General
in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the activeand continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public
for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent
Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment
to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must
dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him
while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications
of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we
are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made
on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it
were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of
the appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who
both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we
said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this
Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot
disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on
Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in
an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by
no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be
examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified
to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that
the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice
of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous
activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that
one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as
long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally.
The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the
definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become
involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main
occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an
incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the
Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the
ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not
affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know
about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even
have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so
deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as
these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such
transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he
must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy
Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say
that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial
and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or
at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even
if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The
possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom
dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade
me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by
the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance,
in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist
and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various
positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a
businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused
on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in
Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests)
and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his
activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual
practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions
worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice
Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law
as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly
definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod
engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while
on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically
stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with
no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in
the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the
work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to
look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the
Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into
grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief
that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability,
proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international
banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance
with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty.
He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of
the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational
limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his
life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar
is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the
practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC
chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts.
What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee,
working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law,
whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in
the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is
active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental,
seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years
requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's
decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one
is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year
period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent
Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has
never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar
examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice
must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph.
D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period.
How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of
Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department;
Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia
and Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e.,
Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation,
Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development
Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989
Coup Attempt — Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
 a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that
respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of
commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the
claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working
as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that
legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an
executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to
equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in
various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an
ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined
meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment
has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal
knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor,
barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and
student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as
such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for
at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection
with litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the
giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of
legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other
instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions
involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901,
and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or
definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has
been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according
to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or
rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when
the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of
any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that
definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex
rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not
only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed,
habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather
evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the
parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent.
He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many
times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one
years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would
be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he
did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had
prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't
recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember
saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and
contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he
was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so,
that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in
preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker,
he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books
as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he
has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate
transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged
in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or
employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one
of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or
defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled
"attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an
attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another,
without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law,
legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on
the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be
true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client
with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the
state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ...
His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law
Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by
Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually;
to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on
in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to
exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or
medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a
succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA
109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted
as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself
recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of law
in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of
a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of
his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent
or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09
citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from
his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of
isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law.
Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the
Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup
Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr.
Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations
as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing
business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing
business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of
appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the

Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity,
and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President,
Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the
specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less
than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave

abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Footnotes

1 Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary.

2 14 SCRA 109

3 Commission on Appointments' Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE: Republic of the Philippines
WHAT CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 6-7. SUPREME COURT
Manila
4 14 SCRA 109.
EN BANC

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL
A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short)
Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which
reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following
June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or
causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it
shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's
name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken
shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the
Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the
resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February
23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of
Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a
joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the
parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral
arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show
that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are
in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of
Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in
accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove
cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme
Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is
found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the
authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the
Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment
for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in
these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an
official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear
or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the
Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar
shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a
pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence
of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are
void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name
from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the
justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature
pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to
constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface
whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions
of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal
profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case
before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the
Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al.,
Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in
its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated
on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it
was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study
of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in
the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration,
that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly
constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong,
as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment
of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar,
and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility
breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and,
upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of
the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding
considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more
than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes
upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the
integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is
not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public
interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to
his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice
— as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public
interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme
Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a
public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power"
(Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the
Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in
enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its
Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines
in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through
Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands
of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and
regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and
welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim
goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To
this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into
anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the
State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from
some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of
Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise
power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro.
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law
and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act,
the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it
shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act
(Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of
the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice
of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large,
were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform
to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the
common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he
did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he
should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal
with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power
to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is:
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the
lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court
Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)
— which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent
that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions
would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence
infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to
practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that
under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to
the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before
the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize,
then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that
the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such
are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the
Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and
disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky,
said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does
not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is
inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the
court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they
are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of
the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and
traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching
and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not
be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it
explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration
of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly
vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of
the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that
the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his
name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Adopted in the Supreme Court's Resolution, promulgated on
January 9, 1973, ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines.
2 114 A.L.R. 101.
3 Memorandum of Authorities on the Constitutionality of Bar
Integration, cited in the Report of the Commission Bar
Integration on the Integration of the Philippine Bar, Nov. 30,
1972; see also Supreme Court Resolution of January 9, 1973,
ordaining the integration of the Philippine Bar.
4 In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark 35, 259 S. W. 2d 114;
Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902;
Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So.
280: In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 P. 665; Commonwealth
ex rel. Ward vs. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41 98 S. W. 2d 53; Ayres
vs. Hadaway 303 Mich. 589, 6 N. W. 2d 905; Petition for
Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195; Petition for
Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d
515; Clark vs. Austin, 101 S. W. 2d 977; In Re Integration of
Nebraska State Bar Assn., 133 Neb. 283, 275 N. W. 265, 114
A.L.R. 151; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 291; Baker vs. Varser,
240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E. 2d 90; In re Integration of State Bar of
Oklahoma, 185 Okla, 505, 95 P. 2d 113; State ex rel. Rice vs.
Cozad, 70 S. Dak. 193, 16 N. W. 2d 484; Campbell vs. Third
District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S. E.
2d 883; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230,102 N. W. 2d
404.
5 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE
PHILIPPINE BAR AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR, approved on September 17,1971.
6 In re Unification of New Hampsire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re
Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4P. 2d 643; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10
Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367 U.S.
820, 6 L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826; Railways Employes'
Dept. vs. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 100 L. ed. 1112, 76 S. Ct.
714.
7 Diokno, Jose W., "Bar Integration — A Sword and a Shield
for Justice" (Manor Press, Q.C., 1962) p. 17.
8 Fellers James, "Integration of the Bar — Aloha!", Journal of
the Am. Judicature Society, Vol. 47, No. 11 (1964) p. 256. 9
Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404;
Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L, ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct.
1826.
9. Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis., 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404;
Lathrop vs. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct.
1826.
10 Hill vs. State Bar of California, 97 P. 2d 236; Herron vs.
State Bar of California, 24 Cal. 53, 147 P. 2d 543; Carpenter
vs. State Bar of California, 211 Cal. 358, 295 P. 23; In re
Mundy, 202 La. 41, 11 SO. 2d 398; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292
P. 291; In re Platz, 60 Nev. 24, 108 P. 2d 858, In re Gibson, 35
N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; Kelley vs. State Bar of Oklahoma,
148 Okla, 282, 298 P. 623.
11 Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902; In
re Integration of Bar of Hawaii, 432 P. 2d 887; Petition for
Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d
515; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291; In re Unification of
New Hampshire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex.
550, 4 P. 2d 643; State Bar of Oklahoma vs. McGhnee 148
Okla, 219, 298 P. 580; Kelley vs. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148
Okla, 282, 298 P. 623; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d
230,102 N. W. 2d 404.
12 In re Gibson, 4 P. 2d 643.
The following words of Justice Harlan are opposite: "The
objection would make every Governmental exaction the
material of a 'free speech' issue. Even the income tax would be
suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have
never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes
in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his
conscience as irreligious or immoral The right of private
judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government." (Concurring
opinion of Harlan, J, joined by Frankfurter, J., in Lathrop vs.
Donahue, 367
U.S. 820, 6 L.ed. 21191, 81 S. Ct. 1826, citing Cardozo, J. with
Branders and Stone, JJ., concurring, in Hamilton vs. Regents of
Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245, 79 L.ed. 343, 55 S. Ct. 197.)
13 Inre Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291.
14 Bar Flunkers Case, 50 O.G. 1602; In re Aguas, 1 Phil. 1, and
others.
 PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM
NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO."
LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G.
HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN,
JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H.
CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ,
ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO

CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE
LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M.
DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J.
SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners
of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving
partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that
they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of
partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976,
both Petitions were ordered consolidated.

Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:

1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business
under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article
1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the
last paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of

Republic of the Philippines the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as
SUPREME COURT part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of
Manila the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such
person or partnership. 1
EN BANC
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the
July 30, 1979 legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to
the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative
authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy — a
profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients
as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a
trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended
by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the
name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the
characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of
the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because
Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their
respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general
circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were
connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and
international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners'
deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a
professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at
least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm
necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law
partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted
practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this
Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of
including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter
was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including in their
firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No.
L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation.
The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus
curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated
that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used
although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21,
1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same
arguments as those now being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use
of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys
Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of
the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no
reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when
it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of
Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the
name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in
view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations
between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded
in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be
allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the
possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised
to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by
the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta,
Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their
partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article
1815 of the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name,
which may or may not include the name of one or more of the
partners.
 Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their
names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a
partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a
partnership must either be those of living partners and. in the case of non-
partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact,
Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name
in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a
deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the
creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to the
widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the
fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such
payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. "
Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions
entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits
accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by
law firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use
of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the
practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make
a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an
old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased
partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by
petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title
IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily
deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the
individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or
partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name
of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a
hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will
to protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but
whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual
members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a
commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting
of lawyers. 9têñ.£îhqwâ£
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial
partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right to
carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a
stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial
partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will
of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends
or; the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of
attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a
firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable
such skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no
provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as
an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed
by other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy
specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of
accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a
mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. ... It is
not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that
"the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law
practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being
applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to
business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the
Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to
Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men
pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of
public service, — no less a public service because it may
incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
 Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession
from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the
nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right
does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment,
but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the
nature of a public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the
American Bar Association" in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the
name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when
such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care
should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the
continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law
partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or
more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the
firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their
firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of
the partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or
more of the partners designated by it is proper only where
sustained by local custom and not where by custom this
purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the
Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new partner
and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who
was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op.
cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the
name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in
search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished
name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use
of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so
because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d
733) which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York
Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if
none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because the
practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or
legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated
therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of
custom and offends no statutory provision or legislative policy.
Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the
American Bar Association and the New York State Bar
Association provides in part as follows: "The continued use of
the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible by
local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use." There is
no question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the
names of deceased members with the approval of other
attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate
Division of the First Department has considered the matter and
reached The conclusion that such practice should not be
prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
 Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the
practice in question. The use of the firm name herein is also
sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the
practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of
acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved
as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right
cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of
the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the
same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice
does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a
juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The
former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute.
Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the
legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its
Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased
partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no
custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to
speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the
death of any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public
policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of
justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making
trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a
spirit of public service. A trade ... aims primarily at personal
gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to
mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of
free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and
grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their
fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much of the
world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the
member of a profession does not regard himself as in
competition with his professional brethren. He is not bartering
his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his
skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There
should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The
best service of the professional man is often rendered for no
equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do
what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done
with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in
which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a
prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law.
The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization
and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they
secure and maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the
public must bow to legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to
drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names.
Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have
been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ.,
concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of
the Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of
Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned
did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip,
Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon
Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior
partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record,
the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of
petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the
listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to
continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of
the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo,
De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they
be allowed to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of two
partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972
and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office
which was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the
said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary
connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the
name of a deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the
petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the
name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical"
as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of
the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be
indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander
Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when
they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of
their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the
legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill
attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a
legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed
before the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of
Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso,
his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he
died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm
name was illegal or unethical.
# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of
the Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of
Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned
did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip,
Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon
Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior
partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record,
the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of
petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the
listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to
continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of
the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo,
De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they
be allowed to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of two
partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972
and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office
which was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the
said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary
connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the
name of a deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the
petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the
name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical"
as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of
the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be
indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander
Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when
they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of
their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the
legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill
attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a
legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed
before the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of
Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso,
his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he
died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm
name was illegal or unethical.
#Footnotestêñ.£îhqwâ£
1 See Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 5: see also Petition of
Romulo, et al., p. 3.
2 Citing Sec, 16-A, Public Act No. 3105, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 342; Sec. 39, Commonwealth Act No.
294; Sec. 23, Republic Act No. 318; Sec. 39, Republic Act No.
184.
3 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 7-8.
4 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 8-10; Petition of Romulo,
et al., pp. 3- 4.
5 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 13; Petition of Romulo, et
al., p. 4.
6 Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.
7 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 11.
8 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 6-7 and pp. 16-18;
Petition of Romulo. et al., p, 5.
9 Seddal vs. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185 NYS 2d 630, affd
7 NY 2d 846, 196 NYS 2d 986, 164 NE 2d 860.
10 Section 16-A, Commonwealth Act No. 342.
11 In re Crawford's Estate, 184 NE 2d 779, 783.
12 H.S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953), p. 206; see also Canon
33, par. 2, Canons of Professional Ethics.
13 H.S, Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953) pp. 4-5.
14 7 C.J.S. 708.
15 Am Jur 270.
16 In re Lavine, 41 P2d 161, all cited in Martin, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed., p. 8.
17 Canons 1 to 32 which were adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1908 were also adopted by the Philippine Bar
Association in 1917. The American Bar Association adopted
Canons 33 to 45 in 1928, Canon 46 in 1933 and Canon 47 in
1937. On April 20, 1946, when Canons 33 to 47 where already
in effect, the Revised Constitution of the Philippine Bar
Association was approved and it provided that the Association
"adopts and makes its own the Code of Ethics of the American
Bar Association." (Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed.
p, 341).
18 33 N.Y.S. 2d 733, 734.
19 JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law.
Fourth Ed., Vol. I, p. 7

20 Article 12, Civil Code.

21 Patriarca vs. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).

22 Art. 8, Civil Code

23 Art. 1830, Civil Code.

24 Art. 11, Civil Code.

25 Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity To Modern

Times, (1953), pp. 9-10
 EN BANC

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the

ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792
Complainant, Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he
Present:
was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11,
Panganiban, CJ,
Puno,
2004.[4]
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, basis of the Complaint and its attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBDdirected him
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona, to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004. [6] Afterwards, the case
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr., was deemed submitted for resolution.
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report

Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated: and Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Respondent. January 25, 2006
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.

DECISION In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon
PER CURIAM: 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction

of the latter for frustrated homicide,[7] which involved moral turpitude, should
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel
result in his disbarment.
Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the
60 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:
conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the
x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota
circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in
preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife.
Code of Professional Responsibility;[2] and constitutes sufficient ground for his
Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. [3] the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had
 overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent
member of the Baguio community who was under the influence
of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the
latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On
Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi
driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was
driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the
ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of the civil
drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the
liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto
accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to
help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up Soriano.[10]
immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow
when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused
fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the
taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who
around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be
pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his has yet to comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil
car and got his revolver making sure that the handle was
wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way liability to the Court of Appeals.[11]
back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the
accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return
them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the
accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that
accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell
on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a
sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes
crime involving moral turpitude.
whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the
complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.[8]

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of

such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of
character, based on the following facts:
Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the
1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
carotid artery on the left side of his neck,[9] complainant would have surely died
2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant
of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance, according to the only because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken
him;
attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord 3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted
assault, Respondent went back to his car, got a gun,
injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot
Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
his job as a taxi driver.
 4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed
him out and fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence,
Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he
claimed that he was the one mauled by Complainant
and two unidentified persons; and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent
has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to
Complainant.[12]
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP
Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner
Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a
crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By
such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral
character.[13] In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands
convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has
already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that
remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated
homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude
has been discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, [15] a
labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his
conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances surrounding
the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employers contention and
held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the
crime would have been violative of the IRRIs Employment Policy Regulations and
indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant
circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not
for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion
belonged to the courts, as explained thus:
x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral
turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral
turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown
by every known and intentional violation of statute,
but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
 In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the

turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a

absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was

Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows: already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of

x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse,
employee] was then urinating and had his back turned when the
victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave
forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa
pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for
it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan
knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it his crime.
at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the
latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that
Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral
his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling
total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that
Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to
immoral or unjust.[17]
be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple

traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an

circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with

unworthiness to practice law. which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of

complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by superiority and to exact revenge.

respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm

twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1

clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault. of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an

unlicensed firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.[19]
He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts.
We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack
[20]
We remind him that, both in his attorneys oath and in the Code of Professional
of good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to
Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the land.
enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting honesty.[24]

in even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court

when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and
four years[21] since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To
duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of
date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his

extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants

traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and
family.[25] But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by
youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly
making it appear that it was complainants family that had sought a conference
amount that could never even fully restore what the latter has lost.
with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the

exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an
[22]
character. Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so
entirely implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other
gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the
persons.[27] The trial court had this to say:
privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be

justified in suspending or removing them from that office. [23] The physical evidence as testified to by no less than
three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support
his allegation that three people including the complainant
helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he
sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not
downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were
bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On the
contrary, his injuries sustain the complainants version of the
 incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on
the chest. x x x.[28]

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the

administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and

membership is more important than truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of the clients may repose confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and

vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid
profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous
our profession of odious members.
behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled

by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith. We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great

caution, and that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot
of the legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly
disbarred. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that
only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for
academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and
law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, justice.
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty

and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[31] We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege

demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of
they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected
committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
commensurate.
 Associate Justice Associate Justice
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances

not the mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO M
legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen Associate Justice Associate Justic
dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the

bar.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZ
Associate Justice Associate Jus

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is

hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the

Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
CANCIO C. GARCIA
and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the Associate Justice
country.

[1]
SO ORDERED. Rollo, pp. 1-5.
[2]
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN CANON 1. - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
Chief Justice and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
[3]
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
Associate Justice Associate Justice other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice x x x.
[4]
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Rollo,
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ p. 32.
[5]
Associate Justice Associate Id., p.
Justice 36.
[6]
Id., pp. 40-46.
[7]
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ accused, ATTY. MANUEL DIZON, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED
 [21]
HOMICIDE, as charged. There being one mitigating The RTC Decision is dated November 29, 2001, while the Probation Order is
circumstance of voluntary surrender and one dated May 3, 2002.
[22]
aggravating circumstance of treachery, the Court People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692, January 30, 1990.
[23]
hereby imposes upon him an indeterminate penalty of See Co v. Bernardino, 349 Phil. 16, January 28, 1998.
[24]
6 months of arresto mayor as minimum period to 6 Tan v. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473, February 24, 1992.
[25]
years of prision correccional as maximum period. RTC Decision, p. 21; rollo, p. 26.
[26]
The accused is also adjudged civilly liable and is Id., pp. 12 & 17.
[27]
hereby ordered to pay unto the private offended party, Id, pp. 11-12 & 16-17.
[28]
Roberto Soriano[,] the following: Id., pp. 20 & 25.
[29]
a. P76,293.00 as actual damages; Tan v. Sabandal, supra.
[30]
b. P100,000.00 as moral damages; Olbes v. Deciembre, AC No. 5365, April 27, 2005.
[31]
and Resurreccion v. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129, December 14, 1998, per curiam.
[32]
c. P100,000.00 as exemplary Ting-Dumali v. Torres, 427 SCRA 108, April 14, 2004; De Jesus-Paras v.
damages. Vailoces, 111 Phil. 569, April 12, 1961.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 27)
[8]
RTC Decision, pp. 18-19; rollo, pp. 23-24. Penned by Judge Edilberto T.
Claravall of Branch 60, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City.
[9]
Id., pp. 6-7 & 11-12.
[10]
Probation Order, p. 2; rollo, p. 29.
[11]
Rollo, p. 3.
[12]
IBP Report, pp. 4-5.
[13]
Nuez v. Astorga, 452 SCRA 353, February 28, 2005.
[14]
International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, 221 SCRA 760, 767, May 12,
1993, per Nocon, J. citing Can v. Galing, 155 SCRA 663, 667-668,
November 27, 1987, per Padilla, J.; Tak Ng v. Republic, 106 Phil. 727,
730, December 23, 1959, per Barrera, J.; In Re Basa, 41 Phil. 275, 276,
December 7, 1920, per Malcolm, J.
[15]
Id.
[16]
Id., p. 768. Citations omitted.
[17]
Id., pp. 767-768.
[18]
RTC Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 10.
[19]
IBP Report, p. 5.
[20]
I, (name), of (address), do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines; I will support and defend its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to its
commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I
will not delay any mans cause for money or malice and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and I impose
upon myself this obligation voluntarily, without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
 (b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his
A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had
submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his
allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal
education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically

admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his
third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General
Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high
school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities
considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's
Manila failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper
school officials. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second
EN BANC charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing
College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A.
graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A.
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously
certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF records.
TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
BENGZON, C.J.: facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953,
Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite
academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor
General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report
recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because
contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he
(Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal
education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the
following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion"
was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having
obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got
it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of
1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then
he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules
provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That
previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private
Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it,
luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having
been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that
he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not
the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses
of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential..

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of
Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within
thirty days. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,

Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy
Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar
Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY.
MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY.
GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment;
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo
Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G.
Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary
action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court
for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations
question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar
Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively —
invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one
examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason
or another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p.
2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner
himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D.
Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that
the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent
alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that
this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the
bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their
grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now
when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due
process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust
treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why
the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to
go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of
admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the
1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political
Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law
and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954
underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated
by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that
the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial
bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar
examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and
57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which
was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested
Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to
submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having
brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E.
Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking,
stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for
doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having
re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject
upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the
authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal
investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar
Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why
his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he
did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise
resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days
from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned
were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice
why no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo
filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41,
36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo
filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer
filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent
Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp.
100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince
came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent
Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with
Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee
Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in
Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a
number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law
to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this
development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in
Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent
for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public
International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This
notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another
successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation
resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a
notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade
from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by
another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and
Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request
of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation
Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a
student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on
September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the
Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student
of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August
13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does
not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in
that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not
make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was
terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to
submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted
their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent
residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he
was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered
as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his
oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers
earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their
cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their
direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-
examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-
checked the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I
was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar
 Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy
in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of
the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that
candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject
and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to
the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he
brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-
evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is
on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75%
the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was
really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in
the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade
to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to
me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found
that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the
answers were based on the same standard used in the correction
and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original
grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to
5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10%
(emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his
April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not
reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of
these answers because of the same evaluation and standard;
hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at
10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination
booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I
received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor
the identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and
under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the
misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the
following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or
about October 16, 1971, relationship between
Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to
the point that with respect to the correction of
the examination booklets of bar candidates I
have always followed him and considered his
instructions as reflecting the rules and policy
of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect
to the same; that I have no alternative but to
take his words;
b) That considering this relationship
and considering his misrepresentation to me
as reflecting the real and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother
any more to get the consent and permission
of the Chairman of the Bar Committee.
Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself
from all members of the Supreme Court and
specially the chairman of the Bar Committee
for fear that I might be identified as a bar
examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me
in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to
consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid
because I was not the one who made the original correction of
the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in
Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8,
1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence
to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks
(bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which
according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to
my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel
of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar
confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it
was possible for me to review and re-examine the said
notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a
grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the
highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-
examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still within my control and authority as
long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified
or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was
revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the
examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not
been identified or revealed; and that it might have been
possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said
examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's
representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I
might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-
examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in
accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the
grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the
examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again
clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the
grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the
examinee in question had not been decoded and his name
known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook
and the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the
same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to
item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal
copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other
copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other
copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.;
emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation",
respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts
stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political
and international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name
of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon
receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his
name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and
that I have never met him even up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was
authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly asked the
Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision
and was so assured of my authority as the name of the
examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed.
The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so
appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in
the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the
Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as,
unless called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent
personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an
examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30
o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to
verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me
that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious.
Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of
the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two
companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular
visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour
that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
 7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the
same condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to
review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to
see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the
examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly
possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular
notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which
was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did
not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades
of the examinee in the position to know and that there was
nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained
by the examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%.
After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final
grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and,
as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee
pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the
other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar
Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an examinee
failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in
said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it
as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we
still did not know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had
absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or
his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee
concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or
rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit
dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and
collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna
Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed
correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping in the
correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar
Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law
saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing
grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in
Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%then he
would make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that
is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points,
initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and
revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee
concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted
the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to
the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger
and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April
14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of
February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion
Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and
submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used
the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested
me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the
grade that I had previously given. He explained that the
 examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but that been apprised otherwise, that it was not
because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in within the authority of the Bar Confidant of
Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. the Supreme Court to request or suggest that
Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were the grade of a particular examination
reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had
admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo every right to presume, owing to the highly
particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough Confidant, that the request was legitimate.
English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I
would reconsider the grades I had previously given and xxx xxx xxx
submitted was entirely within my discretion.
c) In revising the grade of the particular
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as examinee concerned, herein respondent
Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and that the said carefully evaluated each and every answer
request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, written in the notebook. Testing the answers
proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the by the criteria laid down by the Court,
paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the and giving the said examinee the benefit of
answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items. representation that it was only in that
However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the particular subject that the said examine
new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade failed, herein respondent became convinced
increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of that the said examinee deserved a higher
75% in my subject. grade than that previously given to him, but
that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis honest appraisal, to be given the passing
supplied). grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned
that, in reappraising the answers, herein
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the respondent downgraded a previous rating of
contents of his sworn statement, adding the following: an answer written by the examinee, from
9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-
39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in
increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned in dated April 17, 1972:
Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted
in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not xxx xxx xxx
having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar
Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners'
Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was
omission, that — informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects
except Mercantile Law;
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for
the first time, he was not aware, not having
 That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be
willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar
candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar
candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the
answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase
his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the
changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents
of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby
state that I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar
Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith
and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one
of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that
where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner
concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the
candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made
the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in
Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this
time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-
41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in
the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I
was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first
notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks.
Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of
the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier
to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial
weight should then be given to clarify of
language and soundness of reasoning' (par.
4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after
the release of the results of the examinations, we are usually
swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown
their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and
have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of
them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-
evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or
requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable
Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the
same they have to be denied because the result of the
examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that
motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners
concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re-
evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake
or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither
did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the
 examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not
remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that
he remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee
during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who
obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50%
in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject,
respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner
concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said
examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee
concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act
would stir such serious charges as would tend to undermine his
integrity because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo
filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer,
stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners
concerned into believing that the examinee involved failed only
in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the
notebooks in question were submitted to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they
so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum
(identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that
portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to
all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the
notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January
and the early part of February, 1972, on my
way back to the office (Bar Division) after
lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake
ticket. I have always made it a point that the
moment I think of so buying, I pick a number
from any object and the first number that
comes into my sight becomes the basis of the
ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first
number that I saw was "954" boldly printed
on an electrical contribance (evidently
belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a
post standing along the right sidewalk of P.
Faura street towards the Supreme Court
building from San Marcelino street and
almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of
the fence of the Araullo High
School(photograph of the number '954', the
contrivance on which it is printed and a
portion of the post to which it is attached is
identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo
and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded
to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that
would contain such number. Eventually, I
found a ticket, which I then bought, whose
last three digits corresponded to "954". This
number became doubly impressive to me
because the sum of all the six digits of the
ticket number was "27", a number that is so
significant to me that everything I do I try
somewhat instinctively to link or connect it
with said number whenever possible. Thus
even in assigning code numbers on the
Master List of examinees from 1968 when I
first took charge of the examinations as Bar
Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the
number "27" (or "227") or end with said
number. (1968 Master List is identified and
marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure
"27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a
Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-
Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the
beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo;
1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the beginning of the list as
Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List
as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the
end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27)
was born out of these incidents in my life, to
wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with
the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was
stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial
Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the
last Pacific War broke out on December 8,
1941. While I was still confined at the
hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed
by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
resulting in many casualties. From then on, I
regarded November 27, 1941 as the
beginning of a new life for me having been
saved from the possibility of being among the
casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was
able to get out of the army byway of
honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27,
1947, I got married and since then we begot
children the youngest of whom was born on
February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon
after buying the ticket, I resumed my work
which at the time was on the checking of the
notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon
the notebooks bearing the office code number
"954". As the number was still fresh in my
mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me
to pry into the contents of the notebooks.
Impressed by the clarity of the writing and
language and the apparent soundness of the
answers and, thereby, believing in all good
faith on the basis of the aforementioned
Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo
and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-
evaluation, I set them aside and later on took
them back to the respective examiners for
possible review recalling to them the said
Confidential Memorandum but leaving
absolutely the matter to their discretion and
judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have
reference to either of the two cases which I brought to the
attention of the committee during the meeting and which the
Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines,
namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a
passing general average but with a grade
below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the
notebooks of this examinee bear the Office
Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh.
9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile
Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951
with the original grade of 4% increased to
50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-
Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a
borderline general average of 73.15% with a
grade below 60% (57%) in one subject
which, at the time, I could not pinpoint
having inadvertently left in the office the data
thereon. It turned out that the subject was
Political and International Law under Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The
notebooks of this examinee bear the Office
Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh.
10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and
International Law bearing the Examiner's
Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57%
increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh.
10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political
and International Law is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in the sworn statement
of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo
Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was
 reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the
former; and only Political and International Law in the latter,
under the facts and circumstances I made known to the
Committee and pursuant to which the Committee authorized
the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners
concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even
volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in
his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very
little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation,
unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since
the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that
Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he
was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he
"was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was
going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the
posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated
that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of
the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former
BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before
except once when, as required by the latter respondent
submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar
examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court
not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release
thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case,
especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar
confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in
the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation
clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is
richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable
Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge
whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's
actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In
fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had
the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar
Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant
Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are evidently
purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein
respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation
of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination
Committee done only or especially for him and not done
generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who
are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of
Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it
must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to
increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination
and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers
were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant
Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is
the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in
herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's
having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done
in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect
because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar
Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar
themselves and the result of their work that year, as also
unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible
from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only
goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence,
or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973
would make this Respondent Account or answer for the
actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the
 actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some
conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident
imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners
were in the performance of their duties and that they should be
regarded as such in the consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded.
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo
systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-
evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving
separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired
revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected
notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar
Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971,
just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner
Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets,
and then and there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a
review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that
a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low
one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-
evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-
56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back
to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-
evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is
on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could be
reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-
examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was
really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that
he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The
particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95
and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the
examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-
Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V,
pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven
subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in
six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the
Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February,
1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel
Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in
Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said
notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing
that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had
done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade
given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general
average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise
made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were
reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being
admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of
respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed
himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the
attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum
that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic,
knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and
solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the
correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to
clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the
matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion.
Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had
the authority to make such request and further believing that such request was in
order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular
subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo
authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in
the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of
310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not
make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent
Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a
new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to
be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law
bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and
Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated
and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar
examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible — the
respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to
help out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo
acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said
notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with
leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or
an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections
in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook
with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average
was still below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent
Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in
Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the
correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had
already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject —
Criminal Law — that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had
missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in
Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would
make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing
the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of
the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and
thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general
list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is
746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65,
66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by
respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-
evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate
had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of
policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in
the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the
Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested
by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination
period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general
average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects,
including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in
Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite
ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar Examination
Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject
and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody
objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A &
B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16,
rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent
Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other
subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting
within hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated together.
Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular
paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar
candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%.
Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the
answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however
thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision
(Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-
34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the
particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would
not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33,
rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he
remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change
the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the
notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with
Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp.
34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the
residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks,
respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a
Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions.
According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February,
1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent
Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing
Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual
amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the
said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns
that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of
which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his
authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of
the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said
notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee
Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V,
pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE
RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR
SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative
the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of
Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of
eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971
Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average
for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any
subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute
that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps
towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent
Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of
passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of
the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-
Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII,
p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He
maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or
betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice
to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to
the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37,
rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said
confidential memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in
the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to
even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the
examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only
presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and
Pamatian — whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and
deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as
corroborate each other.
(Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted
during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo
adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that
respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in
him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as
well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who
were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent
Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein,
ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent
Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing
separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee
failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To
repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in
the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general
average was only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it
be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the
borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred
back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing
mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with
grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the
unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:
BAI
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's
original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9
weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar
examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor
only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto
Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for
each of the latter who — Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg
and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

1. Political Law Public The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts. in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to
or 30 weighted points make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the
Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners,
BAI his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects
taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare
Labor Laws and Social a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a
certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or
evaluation made.
73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the
examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume
or 33 weighted points. to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done
by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can
Taxation 74% 74% = no re- validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to
evaluation made. suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the
Court.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points. Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without
any intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that
22 weighted points. he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more
than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9%
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) = of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more
11 pts. or 44 weighted points. properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent
Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to
the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted
Legal Ethics and Practical
average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of
evaluation made.
reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by
————————————
respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the
1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the
unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee
or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-
evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any
pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and
International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of
impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better situated
than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of
Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the
members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the
examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in
four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to
Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his
suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47.
rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the
papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man
desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was
revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a
period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19,
1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was
just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN
MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO
EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO
QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER
BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE
INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the
aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo
Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of
Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the
Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.)
and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-
evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification
in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo
further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper
which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-
43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the
Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged
sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the
meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as,
according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room
when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45,
rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court
in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of
record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-
31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was
only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and
this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.).
According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35,
rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears,
however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was
changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and
the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was
present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela
Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as
Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed
out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as
Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol.
VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their
admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case
of an examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all
subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner
concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp.
15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political
Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case
of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below
50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Taxation 69% 69% = "
Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re- Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to ————————————————
Galang.
Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was
Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that
there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to
involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject,
Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him. had two (2) other failing grades. These are:

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of

Political Law 70%
the members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject
Taxation 72%
and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed
should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo,
allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are
No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. as follows:
1164, p. 72, rec.).
BA
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of
57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
grades in three (3) subjects, as follows: Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Labor Laws 3% Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Taxation 69%
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Mercantile Law 68% Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his
grade in Political Law are as follows: Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

BA (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27 The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of
weighted points Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation
Civil Law 75% 75% = " of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to
Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the
Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was
after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang
had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of
74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential
Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as
subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having
betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby
impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in
the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or
their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be
required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
respondent.
A Bar were in accordance with the rules.
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should
likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of
the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil
Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and
Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal
profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1)
previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or
present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these
facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers'
Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of
whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly
involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination
Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight
(8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with
one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court
and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the
Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy
clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with
the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the
Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must
always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar
Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates,
his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined
and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of
respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was
initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious
breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant.
Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971
Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar
Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission
of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or
not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the
Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee
benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is
whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection,
among others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the
Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be
... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or
under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule
127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all
his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable
the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore,
as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine.
Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal
record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case
dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for
application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court
beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases
involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all
other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the
application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first
time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal
records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory
evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court
all his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in
the ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with
the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to
consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an
applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by
its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent
Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application
form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to
declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by
any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is
no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar
examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for
use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether
involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is
required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense
before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is
there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet,
respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court
his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is
pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make
mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967,
1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of
fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal
case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in
1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath
that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the
Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was
allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972
was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar
examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged
crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well — settled
(see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the
respondent, in withholding from the board of law examiners
and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for
admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an
indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court
(cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or
the judge to whom he applied for admission, been apprised of
the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the
judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law
Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required
to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was
stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the
discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the
discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly
of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and
his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The
finding of indictments against him, one of which was still
outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should
have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as
were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as
tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis
supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal
case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the
circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that
case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who
was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to
clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the
requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore
unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the
Court requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his
omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer
any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular
manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the
surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the
Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted
every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or
withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of
the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It
would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose
integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him
with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to
hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing
American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in
this present case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on
several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates
to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of
(a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on
applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme
Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the
basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and
recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b)
lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c)
fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis
Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro
and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the
Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were
convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo
(now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty.
Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation
and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of
respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that
they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the
identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the
same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly
demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the
respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and
without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission
of members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances,
should have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more
inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo.
They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who
would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-
examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them
the complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by
respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject
and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the
examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily
done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so
declared under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or
merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with
the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to
respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades
of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of
Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You
brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost
passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the
exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his
failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-
Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent
Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot
her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination
notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass
the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said
'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are
failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave
it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was
to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark
correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if
the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a
total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet
accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made
by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their
declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee
concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and
deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of that information you
made the re-evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of
your own accord in the absence of such
information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted
my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.;
see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5,
Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-
Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated
march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he
brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-
evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is
on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was
really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so
and in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation
in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade
to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55,
rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and
under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them is
representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned,
herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer
written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid
down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of
the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was
only in that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein
respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved
a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not
deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the
passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on December
31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar
Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in
other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law,
if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent
Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no
one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was
impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty
and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased
grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records,
Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the
respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in
connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do
not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their
explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein
respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the
Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest — absolute
purity of the proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost
case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November
14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this
unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated
with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his
(examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom
said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not
pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity
of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and
therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo
did not bring this out during the investigation which in his words is "essential to
his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the
investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of
such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho
before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated
lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable
outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not
invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members
of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived
them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their
respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and
did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in
connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised
Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee.
Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination
booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar
results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by
respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an
indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit
restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of
delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar
examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of
committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after
the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may
be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of
the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired
from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374
square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The
deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only
on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the
said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total
amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry
No. 90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of
inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage — P8,411.40,
Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of
inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.].
Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only
P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more
or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent
Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his
savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his
sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him
through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000)
[Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00
savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully
reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets
a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972
statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the
amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the
P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under
Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn.
The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his
1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein
involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and
Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol.
VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of
respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely
doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00)
is not reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets and
Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note
which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he
received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during
the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo
himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not
seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of
payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during
the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the
Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise
was not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that
there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own,
is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of
money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that
the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten
or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing
circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the
amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 —
date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of inscription).
On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF
Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was
subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor
of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by
respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled on March 20,
1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage
in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's
house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly
amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that
since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in
connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October
13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were
valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his
liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in
the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he
acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and
November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such
car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities
of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however,
that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971
Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November,
1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and
lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth
P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of
the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the above-
mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said
acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's
 examination papers or to show that the money used by
respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties
came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing
the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed
respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations
alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent
Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as
ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or
resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court.
His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after
he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of
guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the
1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave
from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in
lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation
that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot
(Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under
Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft
Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations
duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing
himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such
violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a
public officer once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2,
Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned
Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the
investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of this
Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between
respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D.
Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights
educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days
— 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution
(now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio
D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the
implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent
Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims
Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator
(Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time,
therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and
beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was
approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31,
1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the
time attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he
was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution
from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and
from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of
Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the
investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in
1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-
letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ
Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from
Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester
of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent
Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of
the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he
does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also know
whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required
to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings
(Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS
and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a
look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and
imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is
obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans
Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like
educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however,
whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the
application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not
know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp.
28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st
Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly
before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement
in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while
working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father
belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in
Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in
other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar
only and does not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even
while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member
of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine
Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken
with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a
result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo
dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal
Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned
and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of
first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army;
XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa,
Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the
mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition
to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated
December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected
notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose
whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court
expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in
Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT
VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME
ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG,
alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS
NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and
Aquino, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Antonio, J., is on official leave.
Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a
SUPREME COURT lawyer.
Manila
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by
EN BANC Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were
held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at
first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.

G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971 On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the
backwages as compensation for professional services rendered in the case,
apportioned as follows:
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),
ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs. Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates .............................................
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF 10%
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING respondents.
Quintin Muning .........................................................................
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners. 10%

Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning. Atty. Atanacio Pacis .................................................................
5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order,
is sought to be voided in the present petition.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the
issue presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and ground of late filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965. 1 He asked
for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion contained averments that go
the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial
into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered the motion for
Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a
reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for
non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.
review.2 The case was considered submitted for decision without respondent's
brief.3
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo
entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated
Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the
Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27
reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino
Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & March 1968,4 that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees,
Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with
lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot
attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963,
be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the
Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount.
absence of a contract, as in the present case.
Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation
indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their
backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —
Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings
 In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner
thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented by
legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the
Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's
fees: for the same section adds that —
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing
Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of
the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to
duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in
the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the
representative to compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138,
of the Rules of Court, providing —
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. —
An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client
no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the
recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's
representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he
cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino
Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties
litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who
are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being
subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the
public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is
stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been
enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the bar
from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great
weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for legal
services cannot be recovered by one who has not been admitted
to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction the services
were rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an
attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to practice ...
and is an attorney in good standing at the time.6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; 7 that
acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,8 and the law will not assist a person
to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law; 9 and that if
were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless
confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a
chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to
disciplinary measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of
attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when
the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an
"agent" and not as an attorney. 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be
awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that
appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should be
excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such
special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an
exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of
attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members.
This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an
extension of time to file the present petition for review; union members Entila
and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the
present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them
(Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of
attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of its members because
such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the
industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was organized "for the
promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if
an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal
as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person
aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme
Court of the Philippines ...,
5 4 A.L.R. 1088, Editorial note.
6 7 C.J.S 1022.
7 See also, Foundation Finance Co. vs. Robins, 153 So. 833
179 La. 259, reversing (App) 149 So. 166.

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the 8 Rule 71, Rules of Court.
financial burden of litigations.
9 Harris v. Clark, 142 N.E. 881, 81 Ind. App. 494.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of
law before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are 10 Harriman v. Straham, 33 P. 2d 1067, 47 Wyo. 208.
not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as "representatives" and
appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding
corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by 11 4 A.L.R. 1089.
positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue
before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, 12 NLU v. Dinglasan, L-7945, 23 March 1956, 52 O.G. No. 4,
however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally 1933.
engaged in the practice of law.
13 Section 1(a), Republic Act 875.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they
awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning.
Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,

Villamor and Makasiar, JJ. concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, page 37.

2 Rollo, page 62.

3 Rollo, page 75.

4 22 SCRA, 1266.