IV.

Canon 3 Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44 Presiding Judge
Estrellita M. Paas administratively charged Court Aide/Utility Worker Edgar
E. Almarvez with discourtesy, disrespect, insubordination, neglect in
performing his duties, disloyalty, solicitation of monetary consideration and
1. Atty. Renerio Paas, A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC, April 4, 2003.
gross violation of the Civil Service Law. The case was docketed as A.M. OCA
(29) IPI No. 00-956-P.
In her complaint, Judge Paas alleged that Almarvez is discourteous to his
co-employees, lawyers and party litigants; has failed to maintain the
EN BANC
cleanliness in and around the court premises despite order to do so, thus
amounting to insubordination; was, and on several instances, habitually absent
from work or made it appear that he reported for work by signing the logbook
in the morning, only to stay out of the office the whole day; asked from
[A.M. No. P-03-1690. April 4, 2003] detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 before he released to them their
Release Orders; asked for amounts in excess of what was necessary for the
purchase of stamps and pocketed the difference; once failed to mail printed
matter on July 11, 2000 and kept for his own use the amount given to him for
JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, petitioner, vs. EDGAR E. the purpose; and divulged confidential information to litigants in advance of its
ALMARVEZ, respondent. authorized release date for a monetary consideration, thus giving undue
advantage or favor to the paying party, in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). [1]

[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363. April 4, 2003 Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 Clerk of Court Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr., by
his Affidavit,[2] and members of the court staff,[3] by a Joint Affidavit, attested
that Almarvez failed to maintain the cleanliness in and around the court
premises, and had shown discourtesy in dealing with Judge Paas and his co-
EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, petitioner, vs. Judge ESTRELLITA M. employees. Doctoleros affidavit also corroborated Judge Paas allegation that
PAAS, respondent. Almarvez would merely sign the logbook in the morning and thereafter stay
out of the office.
Pasay City Postmaster Emma Z. Espiritu, by Certification dated August
2, 2000,[4] attested that the alleged printed matter intended to be mailed on July
[A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC. April 4, 2003] 11, 2000 was not included in the list of registered mails posted in the Pasay
City Post Office on said date.
Jail Escort Russel S. Hernandez and Jail Officer II Rosendo Macabasag,
[In Re: Use by Atty. Renerio G. Paas as an Office in His Private Practice both assigned to the Pasay City Jail, by their respective affidavits,[5] attested
of His Profession the Office of His Wife, Pasay City MeTC Judge that on several occasions, they saw Almarvez receive from detention
Estrellita M. Paas. prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 in consideration of the release of their Release
Orders.
DECISION Almarvez, by Answer of September 25, 2000, [6] denied Judge Paas
charges, and alleged that the real reason why Judge Paas filed the case against
CARPIO-MORALES, J.: him was because she suspected him of helping her husband, Atty. Renerio G.
Paas, conceal his marital indiscretions; since she failed to elicit any
information from him, she resorted to calling him names and other forms of
harassment; on September 6, 2000, she hurled at him the following invectives
before the other employees of the court: Walang kuwenta, ahas ka, driver lang
kita, pinaasenso kita, walang utang na loob, pinagtatakpan mo pa ang asawa
ko, ulupong; and she insisted that he sign a prepared resignation letter, a copy
of which he was not able to keep.
Almarvez added that he had been subjected by Judge Paas to the
following incidents of oppression and abuse of authority: On July 28, 2000, he
was called by the Judge to her chambers where she berated him as
follows: Sinungaling ka, ang dami mong alam, hindi ka nagsasabi ng totoo sa
akin, gago, tanga, pirmahan mo itong resignation letter, kung hindi kakasuhan
kita ng estafa at falsification; the next day, the Judge, on seeing him, told
him Bakit ka nandiyan, mag-leave ka sa Lunes; and on July 31, 2000, the
Judge called him again to her chambers and told him Ang kapal ng mukha mo,
pumasok ka pa dito, gago, kaya kita ipinasok dito dahil driver kita.
Continuing, Almarvez claimed that on July 31, 2000, he reported the
foregoing incidents to Pasay City MeTC Executive Judge Maria Cancino
Erum who advised him to report the same to the Office of the Clerk of Court;
and on August 1, 2000, he executed a sworn statement-complaint[7] against
Judge Paas and went to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to file it,
but he was advised to try to talk the matter over with her who then told him
that they should forget all about it.
On the merits of the charges, Almarvez denied ever requesting for money
in exchange for the release of court orders and alleged that both Hernandez
and Macabasag executed their respective affidavits because Judge Paas was a
principal sponsor at their respective weddings; Hernandez was in fact indebted
to the Judge for helping him cover-up the escape of a detainee under his
charge; the courts mail matters were always sealed whenever he received them
for mailing and he never tampered with their contents; the alleged unmailed
printed matter was actually posted on June 28, 2000, not on July 11, 2000, via
ordinary instead of registered mail, because the money given to him for the
purpose was insufficient; and on the days when he was out of the office, he
was actually performing personal errands for the judge and her husband, Atty.
Paas, who treated him as their personal driver and messenger.
As further proof of Judge Paas oppressive behavior towards him,
Almarvez claimed that she ordered him to undergo a drug test per
Memorandum dated September 7, 2000,[8] even if he had no history of drug
abuse on a periodic or continuous basis as shown by the test results of his
examination.[9]
The Court treated respondents Answer as a counter-complaint against
Judge Paas and docketed it as A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363.
The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred for
evaluation to the OCA, which assigned them to Executive Judge Vicente L.
Yap of Pasay City RTC, Branch 114 for investigation.
In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was
revealed that Judge Paas husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was using
his wifes office as his office address in his law practice, in support of which
were submitted copies of a Notice of Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, notices
from Pasay City RTC Branch 109 and from the Supreme Court with respect to
the case of People vs. Louie Manabat, et al. (GR Nos. 140536-37) which
indicated Atty. Paas address to be Room 203, Hall of Justice, Pasay
City,[10] the office assigned to Pasay City MeTC, Branch 44.
Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 139-B[11] of the Rules of Court which allows
the Supreme Court to motu proprio initiate proceedings for the discipline of
attorneys, this Court resolved to docket the matter as A.M. No. 01-12-02-
SC and to consolidate it with A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and AM No. MTJ-
01-1363.
In compliance with the December 4, 2001 Resolution[12] of the Court en
banc, Judge and Atty. Paas submitted their January 16, 2002 Joint
Affidavit[13] wherein they vehemently denied the charge that the latter was
using Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his office address, they
claiming that Atty. Paas actually holds office at 410 Natividad Building,
Escolta, Manila with his partner Atty. Herenio Martinez; Atty. Paas would
visit his wife at her office only when he has a hearing before the Pasay City
courts or Prosecutors Office, or when he lunches with or fetches her, or when
he is a guest during special occasions such as Christmas party and her birthday
which are celebrated therein; and Judge Paas would never consent nor tolerate
the use of the court for any personal activities. Attached to the Joint Affidavit
were the separate sworn statements of Atty. Paas law partner Atty. Herenio E.
Martinez[14] and secretary Nilda L. Gatdula[15] attesting that he is holding
office at the above-said address in Escolta, and the Joint Affidavit of the Pasay
City MeTC Branch 44 court personnel[16] attesting that Atty. Paas visits to the
court are neither routine nor daily occurrences, and he never used the court in
the practice of his profession.
On January 24, 2002, Judge Paas executed a Supplemental
Affidavit[17] wherein she admitted that Atty. Paas did use her office as his
return address for notices and orders in Crim. Case Nos. 98-1197 to 98-
1198, People vs. Louie Manabat y Valencia and Raymond dela Cruz y Salita,
(now docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos. 140536-37), lodged at the Pasay City
RTC, Branch 109, but only to ensure and facilitate delivery of those notices,
but after the cases were terminated, all notices were sent to his office address
in Escolta.
 By Resolution of February 12, 2002,[18] the Court referred the matter to
the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
After the completion of his investigation of A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P
and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, Judge Yap submitted his
Report/Recommendation dated February 28, 2002. [19]
On March 11, 2002, the OCA submitted its Report on A.M. No. 01-12-
02-SC dated March 1, 2002.[20]
I. OCA Findings and Recommendations
A. On the charges against Almarvez:
The OCA, for lack of evidence, recommended the dismissal of the
charges against Almarvez of exacting money from detainees, violating
confidentiality of official communication, absence without official leave,
discourtesy and insubordination. Given Almarvez unsatisfactory performance
ratings for three rating periods covering January to June 2000, [21] July to
December 2000,[22] and January to April 2001,[23] however, the OCA
recommended that he be duly penalized for inefficiency in the performance
of his official duties with One (1) Month suspension without pay, instead of
dismissal as warranted under Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994, his
supervisor having failed to observe the procedure thereunder for dropping of
employees from the rolls, which procedure is quoted at the later portion of this
decision.
B. On the charges against Judge Paas:
With respect to the complaint of Almarvez against Judge Paas, the OCA,
for lack of supporting evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges of
maltreatment, harassment and verbal abuse. It found, however, that Judge Paas
had used her administrative power of supervision and control over court
personnel for her personal pride, prejudice and pettiness[24] when she issued
her September 7, 2000 Memorandum ordering Alvarez to undergo a drug test
after she had already filed an administrative case against him. It thus
concluded that, in all probability, the purpose of Judge Paas in ordering
Almarvez to undergo a drug test was to fish for evidence to support the
administrative case she had already filed against him.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Paas be found guilty
of simple misconduct in office, and be penalized with reprimand with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
II. This Courts Findings:
A. On the charges against Almarvez:
Indeed, this Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence to support
the charge of violation of confidentiality of official communication against
Almarvez. The charge against Almarvez in Judge Paas complaint-affidavit
which reads:
That said ALMARVEZ being in charge of the mails had divulged informations
which is confidential in nature to party litigants in advance of its authorized
release date before the release of Court Order and Decision for consideration
of a sum of money thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying party
detrimental to the due administration of justice,[25]
in fact lacks particularity. It is devoid of material details to enable Almarvez to
intelligently meet the same.
As for the charges of neglect of duty, discourtesy and
insubordination which were echoed in the affidavits of court personnel, they
are also too general to support a conviction and are contrary to what is
reflected in his performance rating that he cooperated willingly, even
wholeheartedly, with his fellow employees.
On the charge of violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act): Absent any evidence to support the charge, the affiants-jail
officers who claimed to have witnessed Almarvez receive money from
detention prisoners in exchange for the release of their Release Orders not
having been presented, hence, their claim remains hearsay, Almarvez
categorical denial and counter-allegation that these affiants executed their
affidavits only out of fear of or favor to Judge Paas gain light.
As for the charge that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook and
would thereafter leave the office, again Judge Paas failed to present the affiant-
Clerk of Court Atty. Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr. While she submitted in evidence a
copy of her October 6, 2000 memorandum[26] requiring Almarvez to explain
why he was not in the office on September 8, 11, and 13, and October 5, 2000,
despite his affixing of his signature in the logbook on those dates indicating
that he reported for work, Almarvez satisfactorily explained that on September
8, 11, and 13, 2000, he submitted himself to drug testing as required by her in
her September 7, 2000[27] memorandum, which explanation is supported by the
September 14, 2000 letter of Dr. Rosendo P. Saulog, Medical Specialist II of
the Dangerous Drug Board.[28] As to his whereabouts on October 5, 2000,
Almarvez explanation that he was actually present in the morning but left in
the afternoon for the Supreme Court[29] was not controverted.
On the charge of inefficiency, this Court concurs with the following
findings of the OCA that he should be faulted therefor:
The performance ratings of respondent Almarvez for three (3) rating periods
covering January to June 2000, July to December 2000 and January to April
2001 evidently shows that he failed to perform his official duties. The fact that
respondent Almarvez never disputed the performance ratings given him is
tantamount to an implied acceptance thereof pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule IX Book
V of Executive Order No. 292, quoted as follows:
Sec. 5. An employee who expresses dissatisfaction with the rating given him
may appeal through the established Grievance Procedure of the Department or
Agency within fifteen (15) days after receipt of his copy of his performance
rating. Failure to file an appeal within the prescribed period shall be deemed a
waiver of such right.
The performance ratings of respondent for the said periods are valid grounds
to drop him from the Rolls. However, considering that his
superior/supervisor failed to comply with the requirements set forth in
Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994 of the Civil Service
Commission, which is hereunder quoted, and that he was able to make up
and cure his inefficiency after he was given the opportunity to improve his
performance in his detail to Branch 11, MeTC, Manila, as shown by his
performance rating for the period April to June 2001 with a very satisfactory
rating, dropping him from the roll will no longer be appropriate [30] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)
Par. 2.2 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994 referred to in the
above-quoted findings of the OCA reads:
2.2 Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance.
(a) An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive unsatisfactory
ratings may be dropped from the rolls after due notice. Notice shall mean
that the officer or employee concerned is informed in writing of his
unsatisfactory performance for a semester and is sufficiently warned that a
succeeding unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation from the
service. Such notice shall be given not later than 30 days from the end of the
semester and shall contain sufficient information which shall enable the
employee to prepare an explanation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The suspension of Almarvez for One (1) Month without pay, as
recommended by the OCA, is thus in order.
B. On the charges against Judge Paas:
Regarding the charges of abuse of authority and oppression against Judge
Paas, Almarvez failed to substantiate the same.
Judge Paas order for Almarvez to undergo a drug test is not an unlawful
order. Per Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 34, s. 1997,
public employees are required to undergo a drug test prior to employment to
determine if they are drug-free. To be drug-free is not merely a pre-
employment prerequisite but is a continuing requirement to ensure the highest
degree of productivity of the civil service. However, considering that the order
was issued after Judge Paas filed the administrative case against Almarvez, it
elicits the suspicion that it was only a fishing expedition against him. This is
conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, for which Judge Paas
should be duly reprimanded.
C. On the charges against Judge Paas and Atty. Paas:
By Judge Paas own admission in her January 24, 2002 Supplemental
Affidavit,[31] she was aware that her husband Atty. Paas was using her office to
receive court notices and orders in a case lodged in a Pasay court. As the OCA
puts it, [w]hile the same appears to be innocuous, it could be interpreted as a
subtle way of sending a message that Atty. Paas is the husband of a judge in
the same building and should be given special treatment by other judges or
court personnel.[32]
The following are instructive in the disposition of these charges against
the judge and her spouse, Atty. Paas:
SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, Enhancing the Dignity of Courts
as Temples of Justice and Promoting Respect for their Officials and
Employers reads:
As courts are temples of justice, their dignity and sanctity must, at all times be
preserved and enhanced. In inspiring public respect for the justice system,
court officials and employees must:
1. In general: (a) avoid committing any act which would constitute
grounds for disciplinary action under, as the case may be, the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, Code of Judicial Conduct; and
Section 46, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292); and
(b) faithfully comply with the norms of conduct and perform the
 duties prescribed in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713);
2. Zealously guard the public trust character of their offices;
xxx
6. Never use their offices as a residence or for any other purpose
than for court or judicial functions. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that A judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities. Specifically, Rule 2.03 thereof provides that:
Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to
influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall
not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey
or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge. (Emphasis supplied.)
SC Circular No. 3-92,[33] dated August 31, 1992, of this Court reads:
SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR
RESIDENTIAL OR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES
All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice
may be used only for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation
of the courts of justice, and may not be devoted to any other use, least of all as
residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein
any trade or profession.
Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nellie Kelly Austria vs. Judge
Singuat Guerra), a case involving unauthorized and improper use of the courts
premises for dwelling purposes by respondent and his family, in which the
Court, by Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found respondent Judge guilty
of irresponsible and improper conduct prejudicial to the efficient
administration of justice and best interest of the service, and imposed on him
the penalty of SEVERE CENSURE, the Court declaring that such use of the
courts premises inevitably degrades the honor and dignity of the court in
addition to exposing judicial records to danger of loss or damage.
(Underscoring supplied.)
By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings
before other courts, Judge Paas indeed allowed [him] to ride on her prestige
for purposes of advancing his private interest, in violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct[34] and of the above-stated Supreme Court circulars, which
violation is classified as a less serious charge under the Rules of Court [35]and is
punishable under the same Rule.[36]
A judges official conduct should indeed be free from the appearance of
impropriety; and his behavior not only in the performance of judicial duties,
but also in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. This is premised on
the truism that a Judges official life cannot simply be detached or separated
from his personal existence and that upon a Judges attributes depend the public
perception of the Judiciary.[37]
On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and
deceptive address that had no purpose other than to try to impress either the
court in which his cases are lodged, or his client, that he has close ties to a
member of the judiciary, in violation of the following rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Canon 3A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Canon 10A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Canon 13a LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE
AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPERITY WHICH TENDS TO
INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE
COURT.
Canon 15A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENTS.
Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
public official, tribunal or legislative body. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and appended to respondents personal
record.
The need for relying on the merits of a lawyers case, instead of banking SO ORDERED.
on his relationship with a member of the bench which tends to influence or
gives the appearance of influencing the court, cannot be overemphasized. It is Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the least, to misuse a public office to Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
enhance a lawyers prestige. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
eroded by such reprehensible and improper conduct.
This Court does not subscribe to the proffered excuse that expediency
and a desire to ensure receipt of court orders and notices prompted Atty. Paas
and Judge Paas to allow him to have his court notices sent to office of Judge [1]
A.M. OCA IPI 00-956-P Rollo at 2-4.
Paas, especially given the fact that for his other cases, Atty. Paas used his [2]
office address but there is no showing that he failed to receive the notices sent Exhibit B, Ibid. at 5.
to that address. While a lawyer should make the necessary arrangements to [3]
Exhibit F, Ibid. at 11.
ensure that he is properly informed of any court action, these should not
[4]
violate his lawyers oath or the Code of Professional Responsibility, nor Exhibit C-1, Ibid. at 8.
provide an opportunity for a member of the judiciary to breach his or her [5]
Exhibit D and E, Ibid. at 7 and 10, respectively.
responsibilities under Supreme Court circulars and the Code of Judicial
Conduct. [6]
AM No. MTJ-01-1363 Rollo at 2-4.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds: [7]
Ibid. at 5-6.
(1) In A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P, respondent Edgar E. Almarvez [8]
Annex 2, Ibid. at 5-6.
GUILTY of inefficiency and is hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) Month
[9]
without pay; Annex 3 and 4, Ibid. at 8-9.
[10]
(2) In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, respondent Judge Estrellita M. Paas A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC Rollo at 3-6.
GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary and is [11]
As provided in Sections 13-14 of Rule 139-B, Rules of Court, in
hereby REPRIMANDED, with warning that repetition of the same or similar proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other
acts shall be dealt with more severely; proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme
(3) In A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC, Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General
or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court x x x
(a) Judge Paas GUILTY of violating SC Administrative Circular No. 01- x Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor
99, SC Circular No. 3-92 and Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall
Conduct and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of TWELVE THOUSAND submit to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact
PESOS (P12,000.00), with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts and recommendations together with the record and all the evidence
shall be dealt with more severely; and presented in the investigation for the final action of the Supreme
Court (Emphasis supplied). See Bautista vs. Gonzales, A.M. No.
(b) Atty. Renerio Paas GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is
1625, February 12, 1990, 182 SCRA 151, 158.
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3)
MONTHS, with warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall be [12]
A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC Rollo at 9.
dealt with more severely.
[13]
Ibid. at 10-11.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
[14]
Annex A, Ibid. at 12.
[15]
Annex B, Ibid. at 14.
[16]
Annex C, Ibid. at 15-16.
[17]
Ibid. at 29.
[18]
Ibid. at 34.
[19]
A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P Rollo at 271-280.
[20]
A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC Rollo at 37-39.
[21]
AM OCA IPI No. 00-956-P at 118-119.
[22]
Ibid. at 120-121.
[23]
Ibid. at 122-123.
[24]
OCA Recommendation, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P Rollo at 308.
[25]
Ibid. at 3.
[26]
Exhibit J, Ibid. at 61.
[27]
Annex 2, Ibid. at 20.
[28]
Ibid. at 64.
[29]
Exhibit K, Ibid. at 62.
[30]
OCA Recommendation, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P Rollo at 307-
308.
[31]
A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC Rollo at 29.
[32]
OCA Recommendation, A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC Rollo at 38.
[33]
See Bautista vs. Costelo, Jr., A.M. No. P-94-1043, February 28, 1996, 254
SCRA 148, 157.
[34]
OCA Recommendation, AM No. 01-12-02-SC Rollo at 38.
[35]
Rule 140, Sec. 4 (4). This was amended on September 11, 2001 by A.M.
No. 01-8-10-SC, Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts
and Justices of the Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan.
[36]
Rule 140, Sec. 10B.
[37]
Balderama vs. Judge Alagar, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1449, January 18, 2002, at
11 (citations omitted).
 2. Petition for Authority to Continue Use of
Firm Name “Sycip,, Salazar, Hernandez and
Castillo G.R. No. X92-1, July 30, 1979 (30)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM
NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ &
CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO,
BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO
P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN,
JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E.
FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA,
TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V.
PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO
CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE
LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN
M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S.
J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving
partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the
surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976,
praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the
names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of
September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business
under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact,
Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it
provides in the last paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business
of the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner
as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual
property of the deceased partner liable for any debts
contracted by such person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the
legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as
to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the
legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy
— a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of
clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire
and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy
that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name
which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name
has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use
of the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership
because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical
but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their
respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general
circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were
connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and
international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners'
deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in
a professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or
at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law
firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law
partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted
practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this
Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice
of including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The
matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including
in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R.
No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking
Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene
as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15,
1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still
being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation
dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising
substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners,
prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be
held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys
Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use
of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found
no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953
when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A.
Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm
designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The
Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential
nature of the relations between attorney and client, and the
high standards demanded in the canons of professional
ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote
degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said
attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name
"PERKINS" from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated
by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and
"Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in
their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to
Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm
name, which may or may not include the name of one or
more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include
their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability,
of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a
partnership must either be those of living partners and. in the case of non-
partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact,
Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his
name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The
heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old
members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers.
Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement
for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage,
either gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the
deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not
lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility
on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can
be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-
predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding
liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by
law firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the
use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch.
Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old
firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by
petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of
Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article
primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts
contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the
partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the
law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal
reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good
will to protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good
will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its
individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist
only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership
consisting of lawyers. 9têñ.£îhqwâ£
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial
partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right
to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence
of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a
commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable
from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p.
115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends
or; the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships
of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed
as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically
valuable such skill and reputation may be, especially where
there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to
good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis
supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships
formed by other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on
accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the
practice of accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is
a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. ...
It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on
trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been
stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade
name in law practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct
being applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining
to business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the
Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity
to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of
men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit
of public service, — no less a public service because it may
incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal
profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their
practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the
nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right
does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and
partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the
American Bar Association" in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the
name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership
when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or
allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm
names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more
active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at
the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country
would show how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to
time as the composition of the partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or
more of the partners designated by it is proper only where
sustained by local custom and not where by custom this
purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the
Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new
partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased
partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S.
Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the
name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person
in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a
distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued
use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that
is so because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d
733) which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New
York Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green
even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because
the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory
provision or legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties.
The Court stated therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of
custom and offends no statutory provision or legislative
policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of
both the American Bar Association and the New York State
Bar Association provides in part as follows: "The continued
use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when
permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should
be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through
this use." There is no question as to local custom. Many
firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the
approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the
courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has
considered the matter and reached The conclusion that such
practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the
practice in question. The use of the firm name herein is also
sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the
practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of
acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be
proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a
source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find
such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to
constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a
matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes
of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated
from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in
the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the
legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued
its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of
deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against
which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This
is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is
dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law,
public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of
justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making
trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a
spirit of public service. A trade ... aims primarily at personal
gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to
mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think
of free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer
and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with
their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much
of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by
law. But the member of a profession does not regard himself
as in competition with his professional brethren. He is not
bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the
products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or
corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or
physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is
often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent
and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his
profession even if done with no expectation of reward, This
spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and
ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound
administration of justice according to law. The other two
elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of
a learned art have their justification in that they secure and
maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of
the public must bow to legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised
to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names.
Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have
been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as
such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ.,
concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven
of the Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion
of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the
undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law
office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the
partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late
Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most
junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the
record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not
only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be
included in the listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority
to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder
of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta,
Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976,
prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm name
notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and
his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law
Office which was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that,
as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and
secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of
the name of a deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to
justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law
firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is
not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this
use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it
be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that
Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the
period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of
their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the
legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill
attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That
is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed
before the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of
Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and
Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the
year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge
Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.
# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven
of the Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion
of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the
undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law
office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the
partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late
Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most
junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the
record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not
only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be
included in the listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority
to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder
of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta,
Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976,
prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm name
notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and
his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law
Office which was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that,
as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and
secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of
the name of a deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to
justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law
firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is
not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this
use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it
be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that
Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the
period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of
their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the
legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill
attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That
is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed
before the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of
Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and
Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the
year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge
Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.
#Footnotestêñ.£îhqwâ£
1 See Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 5: see also Petition
of Romulo, et al., p. 3.
2 Citing Sec, 16-A, Public Act No. 3105, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 342; Sec. 39, Commonwealth Act
No. 294; Sec. 23, Republic Act No. 318; Sec. 39, Republic
Act No. 184.
3 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 7-8.
4 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 8-10; Petition of
Romulo, et al., pp. 3- 4.
5 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 13; Petition of Romulo,
et al., p. 4.
6 Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.
7 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 11.
8 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 6-7 and pp. 16-18;
Petition of Romulo. et al., p, 5.
9 Seddal vs. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185 NYS 2d 630,
affd 7 NY 2d 846, 196 NYS 2d 986, 164 NE 2d 860.
10 Section 16-A, Commonwealth Act No. 342.
11 In re Crawford's Estate, 184 NE 2d 779, 783.
12 H.S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953), p. 206; see also Canon
33, par. 2, Canons of Professional Ethics.
13 H.S, Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953) pp. 4-5.
14 7 C.J.S. 708.
15 Am Jur 270.
16 In re Lavine, 41 P2d 161, all cited in Martin, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed., p. 8.
17 Canons 1 to 32 which were adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1908 were also adopted by the Philippine Bar
Association in 1917. The American Bar Association adopted
Canons 33 to 45 in 1928, Canon 46 in 1933 and Canon 47 in
1937. On April 20, 1946, when Canons 33 to 47 where
already in effect, the Revised Constitution of the Philippine
Bar Association was approved and it provided that the
Association "adopts and makes its own the Code of Ethics of
the American Bar Association." (Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, Fifth Ed. p, 341).
18 33 N.Y.S. 2d 733, 734.
19 JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law.
Fourth Ed., Vol. I, p. 7
20 Article 12, Civil Code.
21 Patriarca vs. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).
22 Art. 8, Civil Code
23 Art. 1830, Civil Code.
24 Art. 11, Civil Code.
25 Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity To Modern
Times, (1953), pp. 9-10.
 3. Dacanay v. Baker &Mckengie, A.M. No. 2131, partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and
associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being
May 10, 1985.(31)
members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero &
EN BANC Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.chanrobles law library

[A.C. No. 2131. May 10, 1985.]
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, Complainant, v. BAKER & MCKENZIE and
JUAN G. COLLAS, JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA,
JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO,
NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., Respondents.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents’ use of the firm name
Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the
firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational
business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3,
respondents’ memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practice law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed.,
p. 115.)

Adriano E. Dacanay for and in his own behalf. WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the
firm name Baker & McKenzie.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office
for Respondents. SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Acting C. J.), Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin,

DECISION Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Plana, J., took no part.

AQUINO, J.:
Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion Jr., on leave.

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified
complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from
practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in
Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the
letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers,
asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products
International, Inc. to H. E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of
Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of
Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the
letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the
instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law
in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the
respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional