Ruben Villaluz vs Calixto Zaldivar

15 SCRA 710 – Political Law – Control Power – Removal Power – Appointees

Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958.
In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and
had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz.
Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and ordered a
committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz
be removed. The president then issued an Administrative Order removing Villaluz from
his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed
considering that he is an appointee of the president.
HELD: Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The President of the
Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential
appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of
Republic Act No. 2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-
competitive or unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be
investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of the Philippines
under the principle that “the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint” .
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend
to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the
executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified
service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent
in the power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to
the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in
line with the provision of our Constitution which says that “the Congress may by law vest
the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads
of department”.
MACAILING v. ANDRADA FACTS:
Petitioners claim possession while petitioners claimed a sales application over a bigger
parcel of land including the 4 parcels of land occupied by the former. The District Land
Officer of
Cotabato decided in plaintiff’s
favor but the Dir. of Lands reversed. The appeal to the Sec. Of
Agri. & natural resources reversed the DoL’s decision. An MR was denied saying that it
has
become final and executory by the SANR and was appealed to the Office of the Pres.
The Office of the Pres. Reversed the decision granting it again to the defendants. The
petitioners instituted an ordinary civil action to have the decision of the SANR declared
final & executory.
ISSUES:
W/n the decision of the Office of the President was valid despite the finality of the
decision of the SANR.
RULING:
In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially
provide for such judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not
necessarily imply that judicial review is unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary
according to the statutes; appeal, petition for review or a writ of
certiorari
. No general rule applies to all the various administrative agencies. Where the law
stands mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court
are still available.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' appropriate remedy is

certiorari
, not an ordinary civil action. Although in injunctive or prohibitory writs, courts must
have jurisdiction over the Corporation, Board, Officer or person whose acts are in
question and not the jurisdiction over the SM of the case, the doctrines invoked in
support of the theory of non-jurisdiction are inapplicable. Here the sole point in issue is
whether the decision of the respondent public officers was legally correct or not, and,
without going into the merits of the case, we see no cogent reason why this power of
judicial review should be confined to the courts of first instance of the locality where the
offices of respondents are maintained, to the exclusion of the courts of first instance in
those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned decisions are
being enforced." The provisions of Lands Administrative Order No. 6 are thus brought to
the fore. Section 12 thereof provides:
12.
Finality of decision promulgated by the Secretary
.
—
The decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now Agriculture and
Natural Resources) or the Under Secretary on an appealed case shall become final,
unless otherwise specifically stated therein, after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the
date of its receipt by the interested parties.
Section 13 following reads:
13.
No reconsideration of final decision or order
.
—
After a decision or order of the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources], the
Under Secretary or the Director of Lands has become final, no motion or petition for
reconsideration of such decision or reinvestigation of the case shall be entertained by
the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources] the Under Secretary or the
Director of Lands, as the case may be, except as provided in Section 14 hereof.
And Section 14 is to this effect:
"Upon such terms as may be considered just, the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural
Resources], the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a decision, order, or other proceeding taken against him
through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, default or excusable neglect:
Provided
, That application therefor be made within a reasonable time

but in no case exceeding one (1) year after such decision, order or proceeding was
taken."

FORTICH vs. CORONA

289 SCRA 624, April 24, 1998

TOPIC: Finality of Judgement; Administrative Law

DOCTRINE: The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgements/resolutions

of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and
regulations; a resolution which substantially modifies a decision after it has attained finality
is utterly void. When an administrative agency's decision becomes final and executory and
no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said agency has lost
its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its decision.
FACTS:

On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large
parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a
group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of
publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections)
intervened on behalf of the farmers.

Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”, “win-win”
resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had
become final and executory.

ISSUE: WON the “win-win” resolution, issued after the original decision had become final
and executory, had any legal effect.

HELD:

No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29,
1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration
thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its
Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to
entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which
second motion became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate
that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of
March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed
in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO
18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion
for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29,
1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the
case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final
and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that
accord finality to administrative determinations.

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or

quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The
noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all.

TAULE vs. SANTOS

August 12, 1991
G. R. No. 90336
x----------------------x
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary dated August
4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void.

Facts:

An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Council (FABC) was held on June
18, 1989 despite the absence of other members of the said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the
president.

Respondent Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its nullification in view of several
flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.

Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing respondent for intervening in the
said election which is a purely non-partisan affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes.

Respondent Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the election and ordering a new one to be
conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of
Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by respondent Santos in
his resolution on September 5, 1989.

Thus this petition before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1)WON the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the
officers of the FABC.

2)WON the respondent Verceles has the legal personality to file an election protest.

Decision:

Petition GRANTED. Assailed August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 resolution is SET ASIDE for having been
issued in excess of jurisdiction. However, the election on June 18, 1989 is annulled. A new election of
officers of the FABC be conducted immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations.
Supplemental petition is likewise partially granted.

Ratio Decidendi:

1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election
of officers of the FABC. He is only vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to exercise
general supervision over the local government as provided in the Local Government Code and in the
Administrative Code.

It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the COMELEC have the
appellate jurisdiction over it.

2) Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government
Code, the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective
members of the said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As
presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president
becomes a member of the assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable circumstances,
the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent governor
is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.
The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for not complying with the
provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.

DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall preside over
the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC
President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the
Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation of the said
mandatory provision.

• Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition alleging that public respondent Local
Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him
being absent on said election. The Secretary of Local Government has no authority to appoint anyone who
does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.