THE GREAT MASQUERADE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IDEOLOGY PRETENDS TO BE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

Michael Haas
University of Hawaiʽi (retired)

The field of international studies began organizationally when Charles McClelland and several scholars
launched the International Studies Association (ISA) in 1958, when the fate of the world depended on
avoiding nuclear war. McClelland did so during a period of Soviet nuclear bomb testing that deposited so
much radioactivity in the San Francisco Bay Area, where he taught, that a variety of locally grown
agricultural products were almost weekly being declared unsafe, from asparagus to milk to zucchini. In
response, protests to ban all nuclear weapons tests began. The “silent generation” had found a cause,
and ISA promised to address that concern.

Although far from the centers of power of New York and Washington, those founding ISA in California
were seeking a way to prevent nuclear war by building theory with a solid empirical foundation that
might be used to advise the American government and the United Nations. They sought metatheories or
paradigms. The empirical research that they sought was hypothesis testing with data. They were known
as “behavioralists,” who initially could be found at Michigan, Northwestern, Stanford, and Yale.

Prior to the advent of behavioralism, there had been an ongoing debate on normative approaches in
international studies. Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points stressed the development of international law
through two international organizations—the Permanent Court of International Justice and the League
of Nations. After World War I, the United States became a member of the Court but failed to join the
League.

The pioneering of such prewar scholars as Paul Reinsch (1913) came to fruition when the subject matter
of international relations was regarded as sufficiently comprehensive and distinct to merit the status of
an autonomous subfield within political science. Many new courses were offered on diplomatic history,
international law, and international organization. Separate departments of international relations were
occasionally formed on the premise that international affairs can best be understood on a truly
interdisciplinary basis. Whether within or outside political science, the new field aimed to create an
informed citizenry who could provide a check on policymakers.

2
A major goal of international studies scholars was to end warfare as an instrument of statecraft.
International studies scholars eagerly sought American entry into the League and the development of
international treaties to constrain aggression. The failure of the European balance of power to prevent
the World War I, the conscription of a mass army, and the beginning of the practice of total war brought
international events closer to the everyday activities of citizens. World War I might have been avoided if
diplomats could speak to one another in a common forum rather than ad hoc Hague peace conferences,
the third of which was scheduled for 1915. The old diplomacy, which was conducted largely in secret,
was blamed for the outbreak of war in the Fourteen Points. The new norm was for more popular control
of foreign policy and a new diplomacy of open covenants. From the standpoint of ordinary citizens,
whose lives were t risk as never before. The sphere of politics widened to include debates over
international relations beyond the late nineteenth century concern whether to have protective tariffs in
order to protect industry from foreign competition.

What was later called “traditional” international relations was descriptive analysis and normative
argumentation. The work of Quincy Wright (1922), Pitman Potter (1925), and many others provided a
standard for the field. They recommended building international institutions, advancing international
law, and developing public opinion. But Walter Lippmann (1922) considered mobilization of the public as
a naïve idea, and E. H. Carr (1939) criticized the scholarship for being unrealistic in regard to power
realities. Lippmann and Carr were vindicated when World War II began: The League had failed, and
Geneva Conventions were massively violated during the war.

After the war, the field required reassessment. Hans Morgenthau (1948), who began his career as a
student of international law, offered a new direction for the field, known as “realism.” In contrast with
the idealism of the interwar period, Morgenthau offered a set of six norms by which decisionmakers
could avoid war by keeping their states militarily strong. Such idealists as David Mitrany (1943) continued
to advance their idealist agenda, arguing that World War II could have been avoided if more
international institutions had been constructed after 1919.

Accordingly, the realist-idealist debate raged after World War II. The two terms had philosophical
significance, as the idealists felt that ideas and institutions were crucial for bringing about peace. Realists
felt that power realities were as important as the norms invoked to design military strategies. But the
debate was never characterized in metaphysical or scientific terms, and testing of hypotheses based on

3
the two approaches was never viewed as relevant. Realism and idealism were normative theories; they
were never considered scientific theories.

After World War II, some politicians in the United States were suspicious of idealist academics, believing
that some were Marxists or closet Communists. Investigations of academics, the Hollywood film industry,
and trade unions resulted in firing distinguished professors, blacklisting members of the film industry,
and jail sentences for trade union leaders and others. Academics, who considered themselves objective
observers, then feared that they might suffer serious consequences for making policy recommendations
based on their research—or even by wearing red ties.

Into the breach, international relations scholars joined other social scientists in advancing their research
as scientific. David Easton (1951) called for a general theory that would bring together normative and
empirical theory. Pendelton Herring (1953:968-72) wanted political scientists, including international
relations scholars, to deepen their analyses “from the symptoms to the causes” by pursuing theory.
Endless descriptive studies did not impress the new behavioralists, as Easton (1953) decried
“hyperfactualism,” by which he meant that social scientists were piling up facts in study after study
without integrating them theoretically. When I interviewed him two years ago, he clarified that he had
paradigms in mind when he used the word “theory.”

What was then called “behavioralism” professed to look for metatheories that would generate
hypotheses that could be tested with empirical data, either through systematic comparisons or
manipulation of quantitative indicators of concepts derived from paradigms (Dahl 1961). Some
behavioralists appeared to claim that traditional research should be wastebasketed because scientific
norms were not applied.

Yet many of the early behavioralist efforts were amateurish—not scientific enough or perhaps
“scientistic”(Crick 1959)—and ignored policy questions. Behavioralists eschewed deriving policy
implications from research as unscientific. Hence, when I uttered the word “should” during my oral
doctoral exam in 1961, a member of the committee repeated the word in a discouraging tone. What I
had in mind was that there needed to be a backlash to the anti-Communist furor. Later, I coined the
terms “multimethodological” and “neotraditional” to advance the notion that the discipline had room
for both types of research (Haas 1967; Haas and Becker 1970). Neither term became popular, however.

4
Scholars preferred separatist debate, and departments hired according to which approach prevailed
among their faculty.

Among European scholars moving to the United States with a strong philosophical background, Karl
Deutsch (1953) best exemplified the focus on paradigmatic thinking. His communication paradigm
predicted that social networks would bring peace by engaging diverse peoples in a common social
system. The implication of his research was to support normative idealism, but he was very cautious
about drawing that conclusion. Ernst Haas (1958) developed integration theory as a related paradigm to
explain the development of new supranational institutions in Western Europe, which he clearly favored
but nonetheless conducted his research objectively.

By the early 1960s, behavioralists were eager to develop paradigmatic concepts and quantitative
databases. Conceptual development was undertaken by Gabriel Almond (1956, 1960), who developed a
typology of eight functional stages in the political process. Morton Kaplan (1957) characterized five
international systems other than the Morgenthauistic balance-of-power system, including a unit-veto
system in which every country would have nuclear deterrents, such that war between nation-states
would be unthinkable. Fred Riggs (1964) suggested new terms intermediate between dichotomous
characterizations of political systems. The vocabulary of international studies was expanding to
incorporate new concepts and insights.

Meanwhile, an accumulation of UN statistical yearbooks provided a plethora of data about countries,

making quantitative and statistical international relations possible (Haas 1962, 1966). Arthur Banks and
Robert Textor (1963) prepared A Cross-Polity Survey, with 57 variables across 122 countries in a volume
three inches thick. Richard Rosecrance (1963) then delineated several historical international subsystems
along Kaplanistic lines. A group of Yale political scientists incorporated 75 statistical measures for about
as many countries into the pages of the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Russett, Alker,
Deutsch, Lasswell 1964), which went through three editions (Taylor and Hudson 1972; Taylor and Jodice
1983). J. David Singer developed a database of wars (Singer and Small 1966), which expanded over the
years (Singer and Small 1972) and eventually became a part of a database originally developed by Ted
Robert Gurr (1966) that now has evolved into the Polity database, which has gone through four
iterations (Marshall, Jaggers, Gurr 2012). McClelland (1961) tried to develop 22 types of events data,
which later morphed into the current Militarized Interstate Disputes database (Maoz 2005).

5
However, when an early developer admitted that events data had not achieved anything of note (East
1987), I commented that the database consisted neither of operationalizations of concepts developed
from paradigms nor was pursued to solve a policy issue (Haas 1988). Behavioralist research, in many
other cases, remained largely hyperfactual, trying to find something of interest by playing with data for
data’s sake. Prominent behavioralists, in other words, had abandoned or postponed paradigm
development, as I had discovered when Dave Singer asked me to remove a discussion of the systems
paradigm from my test (Haas 1968) of the theory of Hans Speier (1961) and others.

Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State, and War (1959) opened vistas to several paradigms of international
studies at three conceptual levels, including such theorists as Niebuhr, Lenin, and Clausewitz. Although
Thomas Kuhn (1962) popularized the term “paradigm,” some behavioralists considered paradigms to be
too speculative, preferring hypothesis testing of middle-range theory with empirical data (Eulau 1963).
Most behavioralist international studies scholars preferred the word “theory” to describe the basis for
their hypothesis testing. As a result, “theory” was then assumed to refer to consist of middle-range
thinking about clusters of hypotheses relating to a common theme. Paradigm development was
expected to follow in order to organize the findings when sufficient hypothesis testing had been
completed.

Then came the American intervention into Vietnam’s civil war. Daily bodycounts on television provoked
protests, some even larger than civil rights demonstrations that had been ongoing since the late 1950s.
President Lyndon Johnson resigned after hearing the chant “LBJ, how many have you killed today?” ad
nauseam. Although Richard Nixon promised to end the war with honor, his dishonorable bombing of
Cambodia and phony peace negotiations stimulated so much public opposition that the tranquility of the
traditional-behavioralist debate was interrupted at ISA conferences with demands for anti-war
resolutions.

The hypothesis testing of behavioralist international relations was then questioned as irrelevant to the
major questions of the day. Postbehavioralism, with a focus on policy more than research and to the
exclusion of paradigms, became popular. Morgenthau (1965), however, opposed focusing American
military power on Vietnam based on realist principles. Nixon’s triumphalist view of the role of the United

6
States as the world’s peacekeeper (through war and covert action) stimulated op-eds by political
scientists in the New York Times and Washington Post. The realist-idealist debate was revived.

Warren Philipps (1974) then wrote an essay “Where Have All the Theories Gone?” In his essay, he
identified several paradigms, including the field theory of Kurt Lewin (1951), rank theory of Johan
Galtung (1974), arms race theory of Lewis Richardson (1960a,b), and conflict-of-interest theory of Robert
Axelrod (1970). His plea was ignored. Instead, ideologies (action plans based on normative principles)
were now pretending to be theories.

Waltz then offered a revision of realism, known later as “neorealism,” a term that he did not then use.
But the title of his book was Theory of International Politics (1979), suggesting that his ideological view
was a theory in the context of a debate in which behavioralists reserved the term “theory” for scientific
research. Waltz thereby provided something that postbehavioralists enjoyed—debate on the norms to
be applied in the analysis of international policy. But Waltz did not test his approach, which occupied
most of the book after softpedalling his earlier interest in paradigms by critiquing the work of Kaplan,
Rosecrance, and Singer as inadequate according to his criteria of the components of good theory.
Neither did he comment on my operationalization and testing of Rosecrance’s formulation across several
subsystems in different geographic regions (Haas 1970). Waltz was not a fan of operationalization of
concepts derived from paradigms to test theory.

The field of international studies has not recovered from Waltz’s reification of ideology as “theory.” Just
as the debate between realists and neorealists captured the attention of the discipline, a liberalism-
neoliberalism debate was soon launched. Joining the isms in due course were constructivism and
feminism, again without paradigmatic or scientific import.

For the next decade, especially after Cold War ended, international studies consisted of disconnected
research. A new focus seemed warranted, as a “new world order” was proclaimed by President George
H. W. Bush without a clear vision. Some studies were policy oriented, such as Joseph Nye’s Bound to
Lead (1990) and Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History (1992). Others tested hypotheses quantitatively,
including the misguided notion of “democratic peace” (Russett 1993), which largely considered the
multidimensional concept of “democracy” to be a dichotomy, tried to prove hyperfactually what was
already assumed, and was not interested in paradigms. The subtext that a world of democracies would

7
be more peaceful was used by pundit Max Boot (2003) to justify the American effort to create
democracy in the aftermath of the Iraq War of 2003 (Haas 2014a).

In an effort to provide a foundation for paradigmatic research, I wrote Polity and Society (1991) to review
alternative paradigms relating to several problems, including civil strife, development, international
cooperation, and international violence. Each paradigm is described as a set of linked causal propositions
that need testing. Because paradigms are today almost ancient history, a summary of the contents of
those four chapters is in order (Table 1). Today, I would add the human development paradigm of
Amarya Sen (1999) and others, and I have retitled the cost-benefit and cost calculation paradigms as the
rational actor paradigm (cf. Buena de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, Morrow 2001; Haas 2014b:ch4).

Table 1. Paradigms of International Studies

Research Focus
Civil Strife Development International Cooperation International Violence
Social Disorganization Classical economics Transnationalism Cost Calculation
Mass Society Marxism Functionalism Dispositional
Marxism Stages of Growth Leadership Physiological Overload
Relative Deprivation Structural- Cost-Benefit Individual Stress
Mobilization Functionalism Group Pressure Political Process
Diffusionism Communitarian Hostile Interaction
Mass Society Marxism
Dependency Lateral Pressure
Imperialism Mass Society
World-System National Culture
Action-Reaction
Balance of Power
Rank Disequilibrium
Hegemony

After Polity and Society was published, the book was never reviewed, though Tony Affigne recently told
me that he has often consulted the contents. A comment by Robert Keohane was read to a major panel
on how international studies should be organized at a conference of the International Political Science
Association in Berlin during 1994. Without mentioning my name or my book, he succinctly said that he
did not agree that the field should pursue paradigms. Yet when I spoke afterward, I indicated that
sections of the field should focus on problem areas, such as civil strife, development, international
cooperation, and international violence, and those present expressed strong agreement. Some ISA
sections developed along those lines, and others brought together scholarly communities of various
sorts.

8
To pave the way for intellectual developments, a scholar must not only have ideas but also a generation
of graduate students who are willing to promote those ideas. The domination of current international
studies by major universities with large graduate student populations eager to please their
unparadigmatic professors in order to secure employment has ensured that paradigmatic thinking has
been assassinated without a proper burial. As a result, the field has been divided between ideological
pontification, hyperfactual hypothesis testing, and case studies with policy implications—between those
who write op-eds and are interviewed on television, those who engage in multiple regressions with
neither paradigmatic significance nor policy relevance, and those who solely deal with important policy
issues by focusing on individual cases. All three are important, but the discipline is most deeply enriched
when they are linked.

David Lake, echoing an earlier “separate tables” criticism of political science by Gabriel Almond (1990),
blasted isms as “evil,” claiming that theory, epistemology, and academic sects were “impediments to
understanding and progress.” When I heard him at the ISA West convention, I suggested that one way to
bring the profession together was to encourage cross-tests of alternative paradigms. Puzzled, he asked
for clarification. Accordingly, I send him a copy of a cross-test of assimiliationism, integrationism, and
coalition building paradigms of ethnic bloc voting (Haas 1986). However, his ISA presidential address
(Lake 2011), included nothing about cross-tests or paradigms.

As recently as 2013, a conference paper later published with the very same title as the Philipps article
assumed that the main theories of international studies are realism, liberalism, constructivism, feminism,
and Marxism (Callaway and Matthews 2015). Their analysis, based on a study of textbooks in the field in
which paradigms have entirely been forgotten, reinforces my commentary. Philipps was not cited, and
objections raised from the floor after the paper presentation, noting that ideologies were being equated
with theories, were not noted.

Will paradigms of international studies ever be revived? When I started out in the field, I thought so.
Today, I advance “neobehavioralism,” using the term coined by David Easton (1990). In Neobehavioral
Political Science (2014b), I again argue that research should integrate paradigms with empirical research
that has policy implications, giving several examples of studies that expand beyond monofocused to

9
bifocused or even trifocused analysis, following up my Asian and Pacific Cooperation (2013), which cross-
tested paradigms of Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas on data from intergovernmental organizations.

At the present time, there is a disjunction between ideologically-based isms and hypothesis testing, both
described as “theory.” The normative debate will and should continue. But the hyperfactualist
hypothesis testing now resembles humpty dumpty, a mass of unrelated research agendas that could and
should be integrated into paradigms.

Contrary to the original vision of ISA, ideology pretends to be theory today, and hypothesis testing exists
on a parallel track. Paradigms should come out of the closet to ensure that well-rounded international
studies will combine both elements to produce cumulative wisdom that has policy significance.

References
Almond, Gabriel A. (1956). “Comparative Political Systems,” Journal of Politics, 18 (3): 391-409.
Almond, Gabriel A. (1960). “Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics.” In Politics of
the Developing Areas, eds. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Axelrod, Robert (1970). Conflict of Interest. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Banks, Arthur S., and Robert B. Textor (1963). A Cross-Polity Survey. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Boot, Max (2003). “What Next? The Bush Foreign Policy Agenda after Iraq,” Weekly Standard, May 5: 27-
33.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow (2001). The
Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Carr, E. H. (1939). The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International
Relations. London: Macmillan.
Crick, Bernard (1959). The American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Dahl, Robert A. (1961). “The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument for a
Successful Protest,” American Political Science Review, 55 (3): 763-772.
Deutsch, Karl W. (1953). Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of
Nationality. New York: Wiley.

10
East, Maurice A. (1987). “The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: We’re Not There Yet, But . . . ,”
International Studies Notes, 13 (2): 31
Easton, David (1951). “The Decline of Modern Political Theory,” Journal of Politics, 13 (1): 36-58.
Easton, David (1953). The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science. New York: Knopf.
Easton, David (1990). “The Future of the Postbehavioral Phase in Political Science.” In Contemporary
Political Theory, ed. Kirsten Renwick Monroe, Chapter 1. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Eulau, Heinz (1963). The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics. New York: Random House.
Fukuyama, Francis (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.
Galtung, Johan (1964). “A Structural Theory of Aggression,” Journal of Peace Research, 1 (2): 95-119.
Gurr, Ted Robert (1966). New Error-Compensated Measures for Comparing Nations: Some Correlates of
Civil Violence. Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton University.
Haas, Ernst B. (1958). The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Haas, Michael (1962). “Comparative Analysis,” Western Political Quarterly, 15 (2): 294-303.
Haas, Michael (1966). “Aggregate Analysis,” World Politics, 19 (1): 106-121.
Haas, Michael (1967). “Bridge Building in International Relations: A Neotraditional Plea,” International
Studies Quarterly, 11 (4): 320-338.
Haas, Michael (1968). “Social Change and National Aggressiveness, 1900-1960.” In Quantitative
International Politics: Insights and Evidence, ed. J. David Singer, pp. 215-244. New York: Free Press.
Haas, Michael (1970). “International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity,” American Political Science
Review, 44 (1): 98-123.
Haas, Michael (1986). "Comparing Paradigms of Ethnicity and Politics: The Case of Hawaii," Western
Political Quarterly, XL (December 1986), pp. 647-672.
Haas, Michael (1988). “The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: The Need for Theory and Policy
Relevance,” International Studies Notes, 13 (1): 69-74.
Haas, Michael (1991). Polity and Society: Philosophical Underpinnings of Social Science Paradigms. New
York: Praeger.
Haas, Michael (1993). Asian and Pacific Cooperation: Turning Zones of Conflict into Arenas of Peace. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Haas, Michael (2014a). Deconstructing the “Democratic Peace”: How a Research Agenda Boomeranged.
Los Angeles: Publishinghouse for Scholars.

11
Haas, Michael (2014b). Neobehavioral Political Science: A Profession’s Fascinating History, Subfields,
Paradigms, Research Agendas, Policy Applications, and Future. Los Angeles: Publishinghouse for
Scholars.
Haas, Michael, and Theodore L. Becker (1970). “A Multimethodological Plea,” Polity, 2 (2): 267-294.
Herring, E. Pendleton (1953). “On the Study of Government,” American Political Science Review, 47 (4):
961-974.
Kaplan, Morton A. (1957). System and Process in International Relations. New York: Wiley.
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Lake, David (2011). “Why ‘Isms’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to
Understanding and Progress,” International Studies Quarterly, 55 (2): 465-480.
Lewin, Kurt (1951). Field Theory in Social Science. New York: Harper.
Lippmann, Walter (1922). Public Opinion. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Maoz, Zeev (2005). “Dyadic MID Database Version 2.0,” www.pfs.faculty.ucdavis.edu/zmaoz/dyadmid.htl
Marshall, Monty, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr (2012). “Polity Project,”
www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=32&sub=1
Matthews, Elizabeth G., and Rhonda L. Callaway (2015). “ Where Have All the Theories Gone? Teaching
Theory in Introductory Courses in International Relations,” International Studies Perspectives, 16 (2):
190-209.
McClelland, Charles A. (1961). “The Acute International Crisis,” World Politics, 14 (1): 182-204.
Mitrany, David (1943). A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of
International Organizations. New York: Oxford University Press.
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Knopf.
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1965). “We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam,” New York Times, April 18.
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (1990). Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic
Books.
Philipps, Warren R. (1974). “Where Have All the Theories Gone?,” World Politics, 26 (2): 155-188.
Potter, Pitman (1925). An Introduction to the Study of International Organization. New York: The Century
Company.
Reinsch, Paul (1913). Precedent and Codification in International Law. Baltimore, MD: American Society
for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes.
Richardson, Lewis Fry (1960a). Arms and Insecurity. Chicago, IL: Quadrangle.
Richardson, Lewis Fry (1960b). Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. Chicago, IL: Quadrangle.

12
Riggs, Fred W. (1964). Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
Rosecrance, Richard N. (1963). Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in
Perspective. Boston: Little, Brown.
Russett, Bruce M. (1993). Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Russett, Bruce M., Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Harold D. Lasswell, eds. (1964). World
Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Sen, Amarya (1999). Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf.
Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small (1966). “The Composition and Ordering of the International System,”
World Politics, 18 (2): 236-282.
Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small (1972). The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook. New
York: Wiley.
Speier, Hans (1961). Divided Berlin. New York: Praeger.
Taylor, Charles Lewis, and Michael Hudson, eds. (1972). World Handbook of Political and Social
Indicators. 2nd edn. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Taylor, Charles Lewis, and David A. Jodice, eds. (1983). World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.
3rd edn. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959). Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.
Wright, Quincy (1922). Control of American Foreign Relations. New York: Macmillan.

13