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    A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY Edited by ROBERT FE GOODEN and Pattie Perr He) 15 Community WILL KYMLICKA Introduction ‘The rallying ery of the French Revolution ~ iberté, égalité ot fraternite”— lists the three basic ideals ofthe modern democratic age. The great ideologies ofthe eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ~ socialism, conservatism, lberalism, nalonalism and republicanism - each offered its own conception ofthe Ideals of bert, equally and community. The ideal of community took many diferent forms, from class solidarity ‘or shared citizenship to a common ethnic descent of cultural identity, But forall of these theories, and for the philosophers who helped defend them, community wes ‘one of the basic conceptual building blocks to be shaped and defined After the Second World War, however, community seemed to drop out ofthe pi ture, For example, John Rawls, whose book A Theary af Justice (1971) 1s largely credited with reviving the tradition of normative political philosophy in the Anglo. American world, says that his work is intended to provide an interpretation ofthe con- cepis of liberty and equality Tis not that Rawls reectsthe value of community It's rather that he pad lite atention to it. Pezhaps he thought that community was no longer a subject of ideological dispute, or that recent history had revealed that the ideal of community was 100 lable to manipalation by fascist, racist or totalitarian regimes. Rawls is not unique in this regard. Most contemporary Iiberal philosophers have litle to say about the ideal of community. If community i discussed at al, itis often seen as derivative of liberty and equality ~ Le. a society lives up tothe ideal of com- ‘munity iftts members are treated as free and equal persons, Liberal visions of politics do not include any independent principle of community, such as shared national, language, culture. religion, history or way of life ‘Today, in the 1980s and 1990s, community has resurfaced. An entire school of thought, known as ‘communitarianism’, has arisen in political philosophy whose central claim is precisely the necessity of attending to community alongside. i not prior to, liberty and equality. Communitarians believe that the value of community 4s not suliciently recognized In liberal theories of justice, or inthe public cullace of iberal societies This emphasis on community can be found in Marxism as well, and is of course a defining feature of the communist ideal. However, the kind of communitarianism which has recently come to prominence with the writings of Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, Alasdair Macintyre and Charles Taylor is quite diferent from traditional 366 35+ communtry Marxism, Marxists see community as something that ean only be achieved by a revo- Iutionary change In society, by the overthrow of capitalism and the building of a socia- list society. The new communitarians, on the other hand, believe that community already exists, in the form of common social practices, cultural traditions and shared social understandings. Community does not need to be built de novo, but rather needs to be respected and protected. To some extent, communitarians see community in the very social practices that Marxists see as exploltative and alienating. As Amy Gut- mann put it, whereas the ‘old! communitarians looked to Marx, and his desire to remake the world, the ‘new’ communitarians look to Hegel, and his desire to recon- cile people to their world (Gutmann, 1985). ‘The idea that community can be constructed from the ground up has few defenders today, even on the Left. When contemporary socialists appeal to community, thele Ideal is often a variation of the liberals’ — Le. membership In a community involves being treated as a free and equal cltlzen. The major difference is that Rawls says that our sense of equal citizenship (and hence community membership) Is based on the possession of civil and politcal rights, whereas socialists argue that social rights are equally important. For the new communitarians, however, the socialist concep- tion of community in terms of ‘social citizenship’ (King and Waldron, T988) still {eats community as derivative of freedom and equality, rather than as an indepen- dent value ot principle, For communitarians, community Is something more than, or other than, a society of free and equal citizens. So the new communitarians are united by the belief that political philosophy must pay more attention to the shared practices and understandings within each society, They also agree that this requires modification of traditional liberal principles of jus- tice and rights, They differ, however. on how these principles should be modified. ‘We can distinguish three distinct, sometimes conflicting, strands of communitarian thought, Some communitarians belleve that community replaces the need for princi- ples of justice. Others see justice and community as perfectly consistent, but think that | proper appreciation ofthe value of community requires us to modify our conception of what justice is. These latter communitarians fall into two camps. One camp argues that community should be seen as the source of principles of justice (Le. justice should bbe based on the shared understandings of society, not on universal and ahistorical principles) the other camp argues that community should play a greater role In the ‘content of principles of justice (Le. justice should give more weight to the common ‘z00d, and less weight to individual rights) I wll look at these three positions in tura, Community and the limits of justice Ravvls clalms that justice is ‘the first virtue of soclal institutions’ (x71, p. 3) Michael Sandel (1982) responds that justice is not the first virtue of social Kf to be valued for its own sake, but rather is a ‘remedial’ virtue, remedying a flaw in social life, Drawing partly on Rawls’ own account of the ‘circumstances of justice’, Sandel argues that justice Is only needed where there is an absence of the "more noble’ virtues of benevo- lence or solidarity. I people responded spontaneously to the needs of others out of love or shated goals, then there would be no need to claim one's rights. Hence an increased 367, PART Itt» SPECIAL TOPICS concern with justice can, in some circumstances, reflect @ worsening of the mora} situation, rather than a moral improvement. Sandel suggests that the family Is a social institution where justice is not needed, and where a preoccupation with justice ‘may diminish the sense of love, and thereby lead to more conflict (1982, pp. 28-35), Similar views about the ‘limits of justice’ can be found among some Marxists and feminists, who see the preoccupation with justice as arising from the need to ‘stand up for one’s due’ in a world full of conflicting interests. On this view, justice helps med. ite conflicts, butit also tends to create conflicts and to decrease the natural expression of sociability. Hence justice is a regrettable necessity at present, but a barrier to a higher form of community. This view about the dichotomy between community and justice is, I believe, ‘mistaken, Justice does not displace love or solidarity, and nothing in the idea of justice precludes people from choosing to forgo thelr rightful claims In order to help others. Justice simply ensures that these decisions are genuinely voluntary, and that no ‘one can foree others to accept a subordinate position, Justice enables loving relation. ships, but ensures that they are not corrupted by domination or subordination, Justice and shared meanings ‘Many communitarians agree with Rawls about the importance of justice. However, they claim that liberals misinterpret justice as an ahistorical and external criterion : for criticizing the ways of lie of every society. Utiltarians, liberal egalitarians and lib ertarians may disagree about the content of justice, but they all seem to think that i] their preferred theory provides a standard that every suclely should live up to. ‘They i do not see it as a decisive objection that their theory may be in conflict with local beliefs. Indeed, this is sometimes seen by liberals as the point of discussing justice — it pro- vides a standpoint for questioning our beliefs, and for ensuring that they are not ‘merely local prejudices. As Ronald Dworkin (1985, p. 219) puts it, In the end, poli- tical theory can make no contribution to how we govern ourselves except by strug ling, against all the impulses that drag us back into our own culture, towards 4enerality and some reflective basis for deciding which of our traditional distinctions and discriminations are genuine and which spurious.’ For Dworkin, justice should be our eritic, not our micro. Michael Walzer argues that this quest for a universal theory of justice is misgulded. i ‘There Is no such thing as a perspective external to the community, no way to step i outside our history and culture. The only way to identify the requirements of jus tice, he claims, is to see how each particular community understands the value of | social goods. society is just iit acts in accordance withthe shared understandings i ‘ofits members, as embodied in its characteristic practices and institutions, Hence iden- tying principles of justice is more a matter of cultural interpretation then of philoso phicel argument : According to Walzer, the shared understandings in our society require ‘complex i equality’ ~ Le, a system of distribution that does not try to equalize all goods, bat I rather seeks to ensure that inequalities in one ‘sphere’ (e.g. wealth) do not permeate 1 1 368 15» COMMUNITY other spheres (¢.g. health care, political power), However, he acknowledges that other societies do not share this understanding of justice, and for some societies (e.g, caste societies) justice may involve virtually unlimited inequality in rights and goods (Wal- er, 1983) Walzer’s theory is, of course, a form of cultural relativism, and itis beyond the scope ofthis paper to discuss that age-old philosophical debate. However, there are two co sion objections to communitarian attempts to define justice in terms of a community's shared understandings. First, and paradoxically. Walzer’s theory violates one of our deepest shared understandings. According to Walzer, slavery is wrong if our society disapproves of it, But that is not how most people understand claims of justice ‘They put the causal arrow the other way around ~ i.e. we disapprove of slavery because it is wrong. Its wrongness is a reason for, not the product of, our shared understanding. Second, there may not be many shared understandings about jus- lice, especially if we attend not only to the voices of the vocal and powerful, but also to the weak and marginalized. People disagree about issues such as the proper role of markets (on which Walzer wishes to impose severe limits). In order to resolve these disagreements, we need to assess competing understandings in the light of a more general conception of justice. So even if we start with local understandings. as Walzer suggests, we are driven by the existence of disagreement, and our own critical reflection, towards a more general and less parochial standpoint, Individual rights and the common good For many communitarians, the problem with liberelism is not its emphasis on justice, nor its universalism, but rather its ‘individualism’. According to this criticism, llberals base their theories on notions of individual rights and personal freedom, but neglect the extent to which individual freedom and well-being is only possible within commu- nity. Once we recognize the dependence of human beings on society, then our abliga- tions to sustain the common good of society are as weighty as our rights to individual liberty. Hence, communitarians argue, the liberal ‘politics of rights’ should be aban- doned for a ‘politics of the common good This, [believe is the most important issue raised by the new communitarians, How- lever, we need to put it in perspective. A liberal society does restrict individual liberty. since it demands compliance with the principles of freedom and equality. A liberal state will prevent me from acting in ways that deprive you of your liberty or your fair share of resources. Moreover, a Uberal state appeals to @ notion of the common sg00d as the bass for its decisions about allocating public resources (e.g. taxing people to fund health care or education). Hence a liberal soclety often restricts individual Ib- erty to promote the ‘common good’ However, liberals believe that there is an important constraint on the way the state restricts individual liberty ~ namely, it cannot take a stand on the intrinsic merits of Afferent lifestyles (or ‘conceptions ofthe good’). liberal state does not deprive people of their rights or resources on the grounds that their lifestyle Is worthless. Nor does it reward people with greater liberty or resources on the grounds that their lifestyle has ‘more intrinsic value. Each person’s conception of the good is shown equal respect, if 369 PART III - spECIAL TOPICS consistent with the principles of justice, ‘not in the sense that there is an agreed public measure of intrinsic value or satisfaction with respect to which all these conceptions ‘come out equal, but in the sense that they are not evaluated at all from a [public] standpoint’ (Rawls, 1982, p. 172). This idea that the state does not rank the intrinsic ‘merit of different conceptions of the good is often called the idea of ‘state neutrality Communitarians, on the other hand, conceive ofthe common good as a substantive conception of the good which defines the community's ‘way of lie’. This way of life forms the basis for a public ranking of conceptions of the good, and the weight given to an individual's preferences depends on how much she conforms or contributes to this common good. A communitarian state is not, therefore, constrained by the requirement of ‘neutrality’. It encourages people to adopt conceptions of the good that conform to the community's way of life, while discouraging conceptions of the ‘good that conflict with It Should we prefer this ‘politics of the common good’ over liberal neutrality? Liberals say that neutrality is required to respect people's autonomy. According to liberal the- ory, individuals should be free to decide for themselves what sort of life they will lea In particular, they should be free to question thelr participation in existing social prac tices, and opt out of them, should those practices seem no longer worth pursuing Rawls (1974, p. 560) summarizes this view by saying that ‘the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by It, by which he means that we can always step back from any patticular project and question whether we want to continue pursuing it If people no longer find the community's traditional ‘way of life’ satisfying, they should be free to seek out more worthwhile alternatives, For liberals, a politics of the common goovt wonld preclude or distort this procase of evaluating and revising our commitments. As noted earlier, communitarians believe that the liberal emphasis on autonomy is ‘unbalanced. It ignores the way that individuals are dependent on soclety. There are ‘many diflerent communitarian objections here, both to the idea of autonomy and to the idea of state neutrality. I will consider four such objections. ‘The embedded self ‘According to Michael Sandel and Alasdalr Macintyre, the liberal picture of individuals picking and choosing thelr conceptions of the good is facile. They argue that Rawls exaggerates our capacity to stand back from and question our social roles, and ignores the fact that the selfs “embedded! in existing soctal practices. Our social roles and relationships, or at least some of them, must be taken as fixed for the purposes of deciding how to lead our lives. As Sandel puts it, the self is not prior to, but rather constituted by, its ends. Our identity Is defined by certain ends that we did not ‘choose’, but rather ‘discovered’ by virtue of our being embedded in some shared social context (Sandel, 1982, pp. 52-5. 150; cl, Maclntyre, r98r, pp. 204-5). Decid- ing how to lead one's life, therefore, is not a matter of choosing one's social roles, but rather of understanding the roles we already find ourselves in. A politics of the com- ‘mon good, by expressing these constitutive ends, enables us to ‘know a good in com- ‘mon that we cannot know alone’ (Sandel, 1982, p. 183). 370 15 + COMMUNITY [ think that communitarians exaggerate our ‘embeddedness’ In particular roles. It may not be easy to question deeply held beliefs about the good, but the history of the women’s movement, for example, shows that people can question and reject even the most deeply entrenched sexual, economle and family roles. We are not {capped by our present attachments, incapable of judging the worth of the goals we Inherited or ourselves chose earller. Is true that we find ourselves in various relation- ships, often without having consciously chosen them. But we do not always like what wwe find. No matter how deeply implicated we are in a social practice, we feel capable of, questioning whether the practice is worthwhile. The process is often difficult. But itis a defining feature of the modern world that people claim the right, and the responsibil- ity, to decide for themselves whether thelz inherited roles are worthy of their alle- glance. ‘The social thesis Many communitarians criticize liberalism, not for its belief in individual autonomy, but for neglecting the social conditions required for the exercise of aulonomy, For ‘example, Charles Taylor claims that many liberal theories are based on ‘atomistn’, the vlew that individuals are not in need of any communal context in order to develop and exercise thelr capacity for self determination. Taylor argues instead for the ‘social thesis’, which says that autonomy can only be developed and exercised in a certain kind of social environment (Taylor, 1985) Of course, liberals do not literally deny the social thesis. The view that we might scquire autonomy outside of soclety Is absurd. However, Taylor believes that libetals {ignore the full implications of the social thes, ‘The social thesis tells us that the capa- city to assess one’s conception of the good can only be exercised in a particular sort of ‘community. But, Taylor argues, this sort of autonomy-supporting community can only be sustained by a politics of the common good. I will consider three versions of this claim, focusing respectively on the need to sustain a diverse culture that provides people with meaningful options; the need for shared forums in which to evaluate these options; and the need to sustain political legitimacy. The need for cultural diversity ‘The freedom to choose one’s way of lifes only meaningful if we have options to choose from, and the socal thesis tells us that these options come from our culture. Commt= nitarians argue that liberal neutrality Is incapable of ensuring the existence ofa rich and diverse culture which provides such options. According to liberal theory, a state ‘which intervenes in the cultural marketplace to encourage or discourage any part= cular way oflife restricts people's autonomy. But what ifthe cultural market-place, lft on ts own, eventually undermines cultural pluralism, leading to a drab and uniform ‘ass culture? Neutrality would then be self-defeating. This is an important objection. Many liberals are surprisingly sllent about the pos- sibility that cultural diversity could falter. As Taylor (1985, p. 206) says, ‘tis as though the coniltions of a creative, diversifying freedom were given by nature.” One liberal response is to claim that a wide range of good ways of hfe will in fact 371 wy PART Ill - SPECIAL TOPICS sustain themselves tn the cultural market-place without state assistance, because people are able to recognize the worth of good ways of fife, and will support thea, {this Is Rawls’ response). Another response isto accept thatthe state must actively Protect cultural diversity, but to deny that this requires abandoning state neutray, ity. For example, the state could ensure an adequate range of options by providing tax credits to people who make culture-supporting contributions in. accordance with their personal ideals. The state thereby acts to ensure that there are sufficient options, but the evaluation of these options occurs outside the state, through the Choices of private individuals (this is Dworkin’s response. Taylor, on the other hand, suggests that the evaluation of conceptions of the good should be a political question, and that the state should intervene not simply to enone ‘an adequate range of options, but to promote particular options. The debate, therefor, is not whether an adequate range of options is required, but rather how these options ‘should be evaluated. Communitarians argue that the preferability of dillrent ways of Ife should be a matter of political advocacy and state action; liberals argue that it should be left to the cultural market-place. Communitarians might argue that they can improve the quality of people's options, by encouraging the replacement of less valuable options by more valuatle ones. Bey Iiberals also hope to improve the range of people's options. Freedom of speech and association allows each group to advertise its way of life, and unsatisfying ways of Me will have difficulty attracting adherents. Since people are free to choose between competing visions of the good life, valuable options will tend to drive out those that are worthless, without the state having to engage in a public ranking of different ways of lie ‘The need for shared deliberations ‘Some communitarians argue that the lberal preference for the cultural marketplace over the state as the appropriate arena for evaluating ways of life stems from on ‘atomistic bellef that judgements about the good are only ‘autonomous’ when they fare made by isolated individuals who are protected from social pressure. Liberals think that autonomy is promoted when judgements about the good are taken out of the political realm, But in reality individuals require the sharing of experiences and the give and take of collective deliberation. Individual Judgements about the ‘good become a matter of subjective and arbitrary whim if they are cut off from collec. live deliberations. According to some people, this is precisely what has happened to ‘most Americans as a result of the influence of liberal individualism (Bellah et al. 1985). Communitarianism’s polities of the common good, on the other hand, adopts the view that ‘men living in a community of shared experiences and language is the only context in which the individual and society can discover and test their values through the essentially political activities of discussion, criticism, example, and emu. lation’ (Crowley, 1987, p. 282). The state is the proper arena in which to formulate ‘our visions of the good, because these visions require shared inguity. They cannot be pursued, or even known, by solitary individuals. ‘This misconstrues the sense in which Rawls claims that the evaluation of ways of 372 life should not be a public concern. For Rawls, shared experiences concerning the good are at the heart of the various groups or ‘communities of interests’ that exist in a Liberal society. Freedom of association Is important precisely because it enables people to enter into this —ree social union with others" (Rawls, 1971, p. 543). Rawls simply denles that the state is an appropriate forum for those deliberations. Unfortunately. communitarians rarely distinguish between collective activites and politcal activities. It is, of course, true that participation in ‘a community of shared experiences and language’ is what enables individuals to make intelligent decisions about the good life. But why should such participation be organized through the state rather than through the free association of individuals? Its true that we should ‘create opportunities for men to give voice to what they have discovered about themselves and the world and to persuade others of its worth’ (Crowley, 1987, p. 295). But a liberat society does create such opportunities ~ freedom of assembly, speech and association are fundamental liberal rights. The opportunities for shared inquiry simply occur within and between groups and associations below the level of the state = fiends and family, churches, cultural associations, professional groups, trade unions, universities, the media etc ‘Acsimllar problem weakens Habermas’ radical critique of liberal neutrality. Haber- ‘mas wants the evaluation of dierent ways of life to be a political question, but unlike communitarians, he does not want thereby to promote people's acceptance of the community's ‘way of fe’. Indeed, he thinks that political deliberation is required pre- cisely because In lis absence people will tend to accept existing practices as givens, and thereby perpetuate the false needs which accompany those practices. Only when exist- Ing ways of hfe are ‘the objects of éiscursive will-formation’ can people's understand Ing of the good be free of deception. Liberalism does not demand the scrutiny of these practices, and so fails to recognize people's interest in escaping lalse needs (Habermas, £979, pp. 188-9), But again, why should the evaluation of people's conceptions of the good be dane through the state? Groups of various sizes below the level of the state might be more appropriate forums for the sort of ‘discursive will-ormation’ which involves Interpreting one’s genuine needs. So liberalism does not neglect the importance of a shared culture for meaningful options, or of the sharing of experiences for meaningful evaluation of those options. Liberalism recognizes these social requirements of individual autonomy, but inter- prets them in a way that relies on soclal rather than political processes. Of course, this aspect of lberal theory requires a certain faith in the operation of non-state for- tums for individual judgement and cultural development, and a distrust of the opera- tion of state forums for evaluating the good. This optimism and distrust may not be ‘warranted. Indeed, Just as critics of liberalism have falled to defend thelr falth in pol- ities, so liberals have failed to defend their faith in non-state forums. In Jact, it seems that each side in this debate has failed to learn the lesson taught by the other side. Despite centuries of liberal insistence on the importance of the distinc ton between state and society. communitarians still seem to assume that whatever is properly social must become the province of the political. They have nat contronted the liberal worry that the all-embracing authority and coercive means which charac- 373, PART III SPECIAL TOPICS ferze the state make it @ particularly inappropriate forum for the sort of genuinely shared deliberation and commitment that they desire. Despite centuries of commni. tarian insistence on the fragile nature of a tolerant and diverse culture, liberals still tend to take the existence of such a cultare for granted, as something which naturally arises and sustains itself. Liberals have not confronted the worry that state neutrality threatens the cultural preconditions of autonomy, either by failing to involve people in ‘deep enough way in their communal practices (as communitarians fear), or conver. sely, by failing to detach people in strong enough way from the expectations of exist {ng practices and ideologies (as Fiabermas fears). So both sides need to give us a more comprehensive comparison of the opportunities and dangers present in state and nom, state forums for evaluating the good ‘While this question remains open, it should be clear that we are not likely to answer itifwe continue to see it as a debate between liberal ‘atomism’ and the communitarian ‘social thesis’, Liberals and communitarians do not disagree about the need for com. ‘munal practices and forums. Rather, they disagroe about the need for state iuvolve- ‘ment in evaluating and protecting those practices, If this is the real issue, then the disagreement is more empirical than philosophical. What is needed is empirical ev. ence about the extent to which valued social practices require state support, or state restrictions on individual liberty, in order to survive. ‘The need for political legitimacy ‘There is another issue raised by the social thesis. Whatever the proper role ofthe state, ‘it can only fulfil its functions sf public institutions are stable, and that in turn requires that they have leyllmacy in the eyes of the citizens, Taylor believes that political insti, tutions governed by the principle of neutrality are incapable of sustaining legitimacy, and hence incapable of sustaining the social context required for seli-determination, According to Taylor. the neutral state undermines the sense of community which Is required for citizens to accept the sacrifices demanded by the welfare state. Citizens will only identify with the state, and accept its demands as legitimate, when there is a “common form of life’ which ‘is seen as a supremely impottant good, so that its con tinuance and flourishing matters to the citizen for its own sake and not just instru. ‘mentally to their several individual goods or as the sum total of these individael goods’ (Taylor, 1986, p. 215). This sense of the common good has been undermined partly because state neutrality means that people are free to choose thelr goals inde- Pendently ofthis ‘common form of lie’, and to tramp the pursuit of this common good should It violate ther rights. Whereas a communitarian state would foster an ldenti- fication with the common form of life, the liberal model foes very well with @ more atomist consciousness, where I understand my digaity as that of an individual bearer of rights. Indeed ~ and here the tension surfaces between the two - I cannot be too willing to trump the collective decsion in the name of individual rights if { haven't ‘already moved some distance from the community which makes these decisions. (Teslon, 3986, p. 222) This ‘distancing’ from the community's shared form of life means we become ‘unwilling to shoulder the burdens of liberal justice, As a result, liberal democracies 374 15 > communrty are facing a ‘legitimation crisis’. Citizens are asked to sacrifice more and more in the name of justice, but they share less and less with those for whom they are making sacrifices. Taylor (1986, p. 225) worries that ‘the increasing stress oa rights as domi nant over collective decisions’ will eventually ‘undermine the very legitimacy of the democratic order’ Liberals, on the other hand, believe that citizens will accept the burdens of justice even in their relations with people who have very different conceptions of the good. Conilicting conceptions can be tolerated because the public recognition of principles of justice is sufficient to ensure stability even in the face of such conflicts. People with different lifestyles will respect each other's rights, not because It promotes a shared way of Ife, but because they accept that each person has an equal claim to consideration, Hence the basis for state legitimacy Is a shared sense of justice, not « shared conception of the good. Why do communitarians think that a shared way of life is required to sustain legit- macy? Communitarians often look to history for examples of societies, such as the democracies of Ancient Greece. or eighteenth-century New England town govern. ‘ments, that were based on a polities of the common good, and that had a high degree of civic participation and loyalty. But these historical examples are misleading. New England town governments may have had great legitimacy among their members, bat that is at least partly because women, atheists, Indians and the propertyless were all dented membership. Had these groups been allowed membership, they would not have been impressed by the pursuit of what was often a racist and sexist ‘common good’. The way in which legitimacy was ensured among all members was to exclude ‘fom membership dhose yroups most likely to reject the community's ideals, Contemporary communitarians are not advocating that legitimacy be secured by enying membership to those groups in the community who have not historically par Ucipated in shaping the ‘common form of life’. Sandel and ‘Taylor say that there are shared ends that ean serve as the basis for a polities of the common good which will be legitimate to all groups in society. But they give no examples of such ends, per- hhaps because there are none. They say that these shared ends are to be found in our historical practices, but they do not mention that those practices were defined by a small section of society ~ propertied white men ~ to serve the interests of peopertied, white men. Attempts to promote these kinds of ends reduce legitimacy and further exclude marginalized groups. This is clearest in the case of various forms of right- wing communitarianism (e.g. the Moral Majority in the United States, based on the Christian, patriarchal family). Many communitarians dislike this view of the common, 00d, but the problem of the exclusion of historically marginalized groups is endemic ‘o the communitarian project (Gutmann, 1985, pp. 318-22). As Hirsch (1986, ». 424) notes, ‘any “renewal"” or strengthening of community sentiment will accom. plish nothing for these groups’. On the contrary, our historical sentiments are ‘part of the problem, not part of the solution’. Political legitimacy may require participation by all groups in society. This is one of the central insights of ‘civic republicanism’ (Pettit, 1989). But it only makes sense to 'nvite people to participate in politics (or for people to accept that invitation) if they will bbe treated as equals, And that is Incompatible with defining people in terms of roles 375 they did not shape or endorse. if legitimacy Isto be earned, it will require empowering the oppressed to define their own aims. Its not surprising, therefore, to find represen tatives of the ‘new social movements’ (eg. women, people with disabilities, immi. ‘grants and visible minorities, gays and lesbians) expressing concer about the appeal to ‘community’ (eg. Okin, T989, pp. 41-73; Young, 1990. pp. 227-36). While these groups have objections to liberalism, which they feel has ignoted the roots of their oppression, they see communitarianism as even mote threatening to their claim for recognition, What then is the basis for social unity in modern democracies? According to Mill (962, pp. 122-3), ‘the only shape in which the feeling is likely to exist hereafter’ 's an attachment to ‘principles of individual freedom and political and social equal- ley’, Likewise, Rawls says that social unity is grounded in a public acceptance of society as @ system of fair co-operation among free and equal persons. In other ‘words, as I noted at the beginning, liberals treat community as derivative of feeedom ‘and equality, rather than an independent principle. We can now see that this rede. tion in the status of community as a political ideal does not reflect indifference to its value, but rather a realistic assessment of modern realities, Any ‘thicker’ conception cof community, liberals argue. is inconsistent with two baste aspects of modern life the demand for individual autonomy. and the existence of social pluralism. As Rawle (1987, p. 10) puts It, the ‘fact of pluralism’ means that ‘the hope of political commu nity must be abandoned, if by such a community we mean a political society united in affirming a general and comprehensive’ conception of the good. Community and nationalism Yet there is something wrong with this liberal picture, For one thing, it does not explain why the world is divided into almost 200 separate countries. If principles of Ireedom and equality are the basis of political legitimacy, why don’t all democratic nations become amalgamated into one unified country? In the real world, the oppo- site is occurring, Everywhere we look, multinational states are disintegrating. Many colonies of multinational empires (e.g. in Aftica), and provinces in multinational fed crations (e.g. Croatia or Quebec), are seeking independence. They do not want to be free and equal citivens within a larger state, they want to be free and equal citizens of their own state. They want the right to be self-governing or the right of national self-determination, ‘This right of each people to self

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