Sample Exam with Suggested Answers

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – I (PRELIM EXAM)

WITH SUGGESTED ANSWERS

1. a) When may the State invoke its immunity from suit? What is the Restrictive Theory of
State Immunity?

Answer: a) The State may invoke its sovereign immunity from suit in the following
instances:

i. When the Republic is sued by name;

ii. When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency as the
same is so called because it has no separate juridical personality but is
merged in the general machinery of the government; or
iii. When the suit is on its face against a government officer but ultimate
liability will be on the government as it will require the latter to perform an
affirmative act like appropriating public funds for the satisfaction of the
judgment.
The Restrictive Theory of State Immunity means that a State may be said to have descended to
the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued
only when it enters into business contracts. However, the restrictive application of State
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. It does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. (United States vs. Ruiz)

b) What is the effect of the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under section 1
of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution on the political question doctrine?

Ans. The so-called expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court particularly under the
second clause of the second paragraph of section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution actually limits the political question doctrine which, heretofore, was forbidden
territory for the courts. Under this expanded jurisdiction, a political question is no longer
an insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power.

However, this expanded jurisdiction does not do away with the political
question doctrine. It was inserted in the Constitution to prevent courts from making use
of the doctrine to evade what otherwise are justiciable controversies. The intendment is
to stop weak courts and judges from seeking refuge behind the political question doctrine
when afraid to displease the powerful.

2. The President proposes amendments to the Constitution advocating a shift from the
Presidential system of government to a Parliamentary one and calls for a plebiscite,
appropriating public funds therefor, in which to submit said proposal to the people for
ratification. Mr. Walang Packy, a citizen and a taxpayer, challenges the Presidential
acts aforesaid. In turn the Solicitor General contends: i) that Mr. Packy has no locus
standi to bring the action; ii) that the issue is not justiciable; and iii) that there is no
law or constitutional provision that prohibits the President from proposing
amendments to the Constitution. Decide.

Ans. Mr. Packy has locus standi to bring the action. This involves a valid taxpayer’s
suit. The settled rule is that a taxpayer like Mr. Packy has substantial interest in inquiring
into the legality of official acts that involve expenditure of public funds.
 The issue raised is legal and justiciable. Where the vortex of the controversy
refers to the legality or validity of the contested acts, the matter is definitely justiciable or
non-political. It does not concern itself with the wisdom of the act of the President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform
such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the Constitution
confers on the President that power to propose amendments to the Constitution is
therefore a downright justiciable question. Since the Constitution provides how it may be
amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of the Constitution, can declare whether the
procedure followed or the authority assumed in proposing amendments thereto is valid or
not. (Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections)

While it may be true that there is no law or Constitution provision that prohibits
the President from proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is equally true that there
is no law or constitutional provision that empowers the President to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Article XVII of the Constitution expressly provides that amendments to the Constitution
may be proposed by Congress, acting as a constituents assembly, by a constitutional
convention, or directly by the people through initiative. Amendment of the Constitution,
being an exercise of sovereignty, must be construed against the existence of the power
to propose amendments in a person or entity not authorized by the people. A departure
from the procedure laid down by the people is pro tanto the establishment of a new
constitution. It is doing for the people what they have not chosen to do for themselves –
a mockery of our constitutional system.

3. As an aftermath of the Escalante Massacre, the President issued E.O. # 19 which

created the Escalante Commission for the “purpose of conducting an investigation
into the incident.” The commission recommended that the victims or their heirs be
compensated by the government. Based on this recommendation, the victims filed an
action for damages against the Republic and the military officers involved in the
incident. The Solicitor General moved to dismiss the suit invoking state immunity,
consent not having been first obtained. The victims argued that there was waiver of
state immunity when the commission recommended the indemnification of the victims
or their heirs. a) Was there a waiver of state immunity? b) Is the State liable for
damages?

Ans. a) No, there was no valid waiver of state immunity. The recommendations of
the commission can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but
must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the recommendation is not a legislative
act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver
of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. (Republic vs.
Feliciano)

b) The State is not liable for damages. Where a public officer acted beyond
the scope of his authority or in bad faith, no liability attaches to the State as the latter only
authorizes the legal acts of its officers. The State as a person can do no wrong. (Shauf
vs. Court of Appeals)

In addition, the recommendation made by the commission to compensate the

victims or their heirs does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the
State. The Commission was created merely for the “purpose of conducting an
investigation into the incident,” Thus, its recommendation does not in any way bind the
State. (Republic vs. Sandoval)
 Furthermore, the State can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. (Municipality of San Fernando, La Union vs. Judge Firme)

4. a) Distinguish constituent power from legislative power? b) What is the source and
basis of the authority of Congress when it acts as a constituent assembly? c) Are the
acts of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, justiciable?

Ans. a) Constituent power is the power to make or amend the Fundamental Law.
Legislative power, on the other hand, is essentially lawmaking power. It is the power to
make laws and to alter or repeal them. A general grant of legislative power to the
legislature under the Constitution does not include the grant of constituent power.
Constituent power is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository of
sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours — to make, and, hence, to amend their
own Fundamental Law. (Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections)

b) The source and basis of the authority of Congress when it acts as a constituent
assembly is the Constitution itself. Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power, unlike the people,
when performing the same function, (of amending the Constitution) for their authority
does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of
government including the Constitution itself. (Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections)

c) The acts of Congress when acting as a constituent assembly are obviously justiciable.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows,
necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or
beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise. they could brush aside and set the same at
naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to
the rigid nature of our Constitution.

In short, the issue whether or not the acts of Congress - acting as a constituent assembly
- are legal or constitutional is essentially justiciable and not political, and, hence, subject
to judicial review.

5. Mr. Lukas Lakatlangit was born in the United States of a Filipino father and a Russian
mother on January 16, 1973. He returned to the Philippines when he was eighteen
years of age, carrying an American passport and he was registered as an alien with the
Bureau of Immigration. Lukas ran and won in the congressional elections of 1998. Mr.
Perde Gana, the losing candidate for Congressman, filed a quo warranto case against
Lukas on the ground that the latter is disqualified for not being a Filipino citizen.
Decide.

Ans. Whether or not Lukas is a Filipino citizen would depend on whether he is a

legitimate child or not.

Assuming that Lukas is a legitimate child, he is a Filipino citizen. All the

constitutions (Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987) that governed the Philippines
provide that those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines are Filipino citizens. The
registration of a Filipino citizen as an alien with the Commission on Immigration does not
necessarily amount to a renunciation of his Filipino citizenship. Likewise, the mere use
of a foreign passport is not a ground for loss of Philippine citizenship. He is therefore
qualified to run for Congressman.

However, assuming that Lukas is an illegitimate child, he is not qualified to run

for Congress. An illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his known parent – his
 mother. Since his mother is a Russian, he will also be a Russian citizen, even is his
father is a Filipino citizen. (In re Mallare)

6. In 1986, the Republic of the Philippines filed a case against XYZ Corporation to recover
alleged ill-gotten assets. Before the case could be set for hearing, Mr. Mando Rugas,
together with other stockholders of XYZ Corporation, filed a motion with the
Sandiganbayan for leave to intervene by attaching their answer in intervention. The
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and admitted their answer in intervention. The
Solicitor General contends that the Sandiganbayan acted erroneously because the
Republic being a sovereign state cannot be sued without its consent and the
intervention is in legal effect a suit against the state. The Supreme Court invited you
as amicus curiae to give your comments on the contentions of the Solicitor General.
What will your comments be?

Ans. The Solicitor General’s contention that Mr. Rugas’ intervention is a suit or
counter suit against the State is bereft of merit. Mr. Rugas and the other stockholders
merely assumed a defensive position vis-à-vis the Republic’s suit against XYZ
Corporation, of which they are stockholders. The fact that they interjected themselves
into the case at their own initiative does not alter the essential nature of their
intervention. They intervened merely to unite with the defendant XYZ Corporation in
resisting the claims of the Republic, as plaintiff. It would have been different if they were
the ones who took the initiative in an action against the Republic by filing a complaint in
intervention or a complaint. Therefore, the suit in intervention is not a suit or counter suit
against the State that can bring into operation the fundamental postulate of our system of
government that the state may not be sued without its consent. (Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan, Feb. 28, 1990)

7. Ms. Wayna Dudla, because of her extraordinary achievement of flunking the Philippine
Bar Exams for a record 29 times, was granted honorary citizenship by the State of
Utopia, a country where lawyering is considered a crime. Wayna readily accepted
such citizenship. Did Wayna lose her Filipino citizenship?

Ans. No, Wayna did not lose her Filipino citizenship.

Section 3 of Article IV of the Constitution provides that Philippine citizenship

may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. The law governing loss of
Philippine citizenship is Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended. The grounds,
however, for the loss of Filipino citizenship, as provided in said law, do not include the
acceptance of the grant of honorary citizenship in another country. The elementary
principle of statutory construction that when the law contains an express enumeration of
items, what is not included should be excluded, finds application in this case. Expressio
unios est exclusio alterius. As long as Wayna would not expressly renounce her Filipino
citizenship or subscribe to an oath of allegiance support the constitution or laws of a
foreign country, she would not lose her Filipino citizenship.

8. Mr. Nan Gigil raped Ms. Gin Lugus (not her real name), a pretty girl of tender age.
However, before Gin could file criminal charges, she died of cancer of the toenails.
Since Gin was a minor who had no known parents, grandparents or guardian, in what
capacity may the State help in vindicating the violation of her womanhood?

Ans. The State may, in its capacity as parens patriae or guardian of the rights of its
people, help in vindicating the outrage done to Ms. Gin Lugus by bringing her abuser to
justice. To the State is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individuals
who, because of age or incapacity, are in an unfavorable position vis-à-vis other parties.
 This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every
State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no
affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarch
to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary,
it is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of
humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.
(Government of P.I. vs. Monte de Piedad)

9. In 19 February 1994, Jane Roe, a victim of rape who was then in the first trimester of her
pregnancy, filed a petition to declare Art. 258 of the Revised Penal Code
unconstitutional. The said article punishes abortion practiced by the woman herself.
She contends that said article violates the equal protection clause for it fails to
distinguish between those who became pregnant by being raped and those who are
pregnant by their own consented act. However, while Jane’s petition was pending in
the Supreme Court, she had given birth to the son of her abuser. The termination of
her pregnancy rendered the case moot and academic as she is no longer exposed to
the punitive effects of Art. 258. Will the mooting of the case foreclose the exercise by
the Supreme Court of its power of judicial review?

Ans. The general rule in our jurisdiction is that the power of judicial review may not
be exercised in vacuo, which means that an actual case or controversy must exist, not
only at the time of the filing of the action but more importantly at the time of the rendition
of the decision. Thus, it is axiomatic that the mooting of the case ipso facto results in the
loss of the jurisdiction over the case, thus foreclosing the exercise by the judiciary of its
power of judicial review.

However, the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that the mooting of the
case does not preclude the exercise of judicial review. Even if a case were moot and
academic, a statement of the governing principles is appropriate for the guidance not
only of the parties but others similarly situated. This is referred to as the symbolic
function of judicial review. It is the act of conveying to the members of the bench as well
as the bar the controlling doctrinal laws or jurisprudential pronouncements of the
Supreme Court to serve as guide in deciding cases with parallel circumstances. (Eastern
Broadcasting Corp. vs. Dans, Jr.)

It must be noted, however, that the exercise of the Supreme Court of this
symbolic function depends entirely upon its discretion. An examination of the cases
where it used this function shows that the Supreme Court exercises this prerogative only
when the case it involves protection and preservation of basic constitutional rights and
guarantees or when the case involves what is styled in American jurisprudence as
“capable of repetition, yet evading review.”

Jane’s petition, aside from being moot and academic and patently
unmeritorious, it does not involve the protection or preservation of basic constitutional
rights that would justify the court to exercise the symbolic function of judicial review. The
Constitution, far from providing the right to abort, it expressly commands the State to
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.

10. Ms. Obra Maestra, in her capacity as a public school teacher, filed a petition assailing
the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 007, prohibiting the teaching of the
theory of evolution in public schools. Her school adopted a biology textbook
containing a chapter on Darwin. The State, represented in this instance by the
Solicitor General, surprisingly posed no objections to the petition. In the course of the
proceedings, it was proven that the said law had been enacted during the Japanese
occupation of the Philippines and that there was no indication it had ever been
enforced, and that the pallid, unenthusiastic, even apologetic defense of the law
presented by the State indicates that the State would make no attempt to enforce the
said law. a) Is Ms. Maestra’s petition a proper subject for judicial review? b) May the
State question the constitutionality of C.A. No. 007?

Ans. a) The petition is not a proper subject of judicial review for want of an actual
case or controversy. The exercise of the courts of the power of judicial review is
predicated upon the existence of a genuinely justiciable case or controversy as judicial
review may not be exercised in vacuo. (Epperson vs. Arkansas)

An “actual case or controversy” is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an

assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. There must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing
law and jurisprudence. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.

Furthermore, Ms. Maestra does not have the requisite standing to assail the
validity of the questioned law. There is no showing that she has suffered some
threatened or actual injury resulting from the enforcement of the putatively invalid law.
This is buttressed by the fact that it was proven that the law had never been enforced
and that there are indications that the State would make no attempt to enforce said law.
(Warth vs. Seldin)

b) The State may properly question the constitutionality of C.A. No. 007.
Unchallenged is the rule that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if C.A. No. 007
really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines has a substantial interest in
having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure
of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can
challenge the validity of its own laws. (People vs. Vera)