There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because
conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant
Criminal Law. Conspiracy.
Jose Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148965. February 26, 2002
Puno, J.
FACTS:
As an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then
President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former
President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were
filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
The respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause
warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against
the former President and the other respondents therein. One of the Informations was
for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was
herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
ISSUE:
Should the charge against petitioner be dismissed on the ground that the allegation of
consipiracy in the Information is too general?
HELD:
No. In the crime of plunder different parties may be united by a common purpose. In
the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a
commonality to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different
participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy
charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from
illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that
each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and
receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual
acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general
rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when
the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason,
rebellion and sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or
conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the offense. When conspiracy is charged as a
crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in the
complaint or information. The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different
when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing
the crime as in the case at bar.
only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and
makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation
in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be
equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or
allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have
performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the
accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a
substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts
relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as
much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a
person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision
that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts.
Following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a
mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of
the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive,
collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner
that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such
precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts.
Thus, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EUGENIO LAGARTO Y
GETALADO, JR., ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GR No. 65833, May 06, 1991
Facts: On May 25 1983, at about 6:00 o’clock in the evening more or less, inside the
public market Bgy. Little Venice, Municipality of Laoang, Province of Northern Samar,
Philippines, Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado, Jr. with deliberate intent to kill with the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Reynaldo Aducal, who was
buying fish in the public market with the use of a Batangas fan knife or Balisong which
the above-named accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting
upon said victim fatal wounds on his chest, which wounds caused the instantaneous
death of the victim.
Accused is a recidivist, having been previously convicted by final judgment of another
crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code, that of murder in criminal
case no. 1473.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of guilty.
The Regional Trial Court accepted his plea and declared accused, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Murder defined and penalized in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, appreciating in his favor
the mitigating circumstance of spontaneous plea of guilty which is offset by the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, the Court hereby sentences said
accused to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH with all the accessories provided for
in Art. 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
The imposition of the supreme penalty of Death warrants an automatic review by the
Supreme Court thus, this case. The counsel de oficio recommends that the sentence
be modified, contending that the lower court erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation and treachery against the accused and erred in
sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of death.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the existence of recidivism
and the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.
Ruling: No. The trial court’s judgment was MODIFIED by the Supreme Court.
Appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of spontaneous plea of guilty
which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the Court sentenced said
accused to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay the heirs of Reynaldo Aducal an indemnity of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised
Penal Code. the accused was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 on
September 15, 1983. There being no appeal, the judgment therein became final on
October 11, 1983. The second conviction was rendered on October 26, 1983 for
Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear that the accused is a recidivist: the accused had been
convicted by final judgment at the time of the rendition of the judgment for the second
offense.
The court also found no merit in the finding of the trial court that evident premeditation
and treachery existed in the commission of the crime. It is a rule that a plea of guilty
cannot be held to include evident premeditation and treachery where the evidence
adduced does not adequately disclose the existence of these qualifying
circumstances.
Evident premeditation requires proof of the following requisites; (a) the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he had
clung to his determination; and (c) a
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will.
To adequately prove the existence of evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish
that the accused meditated on his intention between the time it was conceived and the
time the crime was actually perpetrated. Defendant’s proposition in killing Reynaldo
Aducal in retaliation for the act of Reynaldo Aducal in stabbing his brother, was nothing
but an expression of his own determination to commit the crime which is entirely
different from premeditation.
In addition, in order that treachery may be appreciated, it is necessary to prove the
manner in which the victim was attacked. Treachery can in no way be presumed but
must be fully proved. Where there are merely indications that the attack was sudden
and unexpected, but there are no precise data on this point, the circumstance of
treachery cannot be taken into account.
In the case at bar, there is no evidence to show that the mode of attack was
consciously adopted as to insure the perpetration of the crime and safety from the
defense that the victim might put up. There is an absence of evidence to show the
means employed by assailant and the mode of attack.
G.R. No. L-48740 August 5, 1942
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTINO TOLENTINO Y DE DIOS and LUISA CORPUZ Y QUITONG, defendants.
FAUSTINO TOLENTINO Y DE DIOS, appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor-General Enriquez and Solicitor Kapunan, Jr. for appellee.
OZAETA, J.:
In the municipal court of Manila, where this action was commenced, as well as in the
Court of First Instance, to which it was appealed, both of the above-named defendants
pleaded guilty to the charge of theft of seven shirts valued at P14 belonging to one
Cosme Famorca. Both being, recidivists, were sentenced in the Court of First Instance
to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and to pay the corresponding civil
indemnity to the offended party. Faustino Tolentino y de Dios was further sentenced to
suffer an additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for habitual
delinquency. He alone appealed to this Court.
The only question raised by the appellant is the correctness of the additional penalty.
The pertinent allegation of the information is that the accused Faustino Tolentino y de
Dios is a habitual delinquent, he having been convicted of the crimes of theft and
estafa by final judgments rendered by competent court, as follows:
Date of commission
Date of sentence appellant's fourth previous conviction alleged in the information should bee
disregarded because the date of his release in connection therewith was not shown.
Crime On the other hand counsel for the appellant, on the basis of the trial court's implied
finding that this is appellant's fourth conviction, contends that appellant should be
Sentence sentenced under paragraph 5 (a) of article 62, as if the present were only his third
conviction, on the ground that the first conviction should be taken circumstance and
Date of release should be disregarded as an element of habitual, delinquency.

10-13-25 We cannot uphold appellant's contention. Under his theory an accused cannot be
sentenced for habitual delinquency unless he has had at least three previous
Qualified theft, MCDE-16887 convictions, because the first conviction has to be taken only as an aggravating
circumstance and has to be disregarded for the purpose of determining habitual
6 months and P3 indemnity delinquency. That, we think, would be unwarranted interpretation of the Habitual
Delinquency Law (paragraph 5 of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code), which reads
3-18-26 as follows:

10-29-26 5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:

10-30-26 (a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law
for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision
Theft, NCDE - 42165 correccional in its medium and maximum periods:

3 months and 1 day (b) Upon a fourth conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for
the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor
1-20-27 in its minimum and medium period; and

8-1-27 (c) Upon fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty a guilty to the additional penalty
8-1-27 of prision mayor in its maximum period to the reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

Qualified theft, NCDE-57895 Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the penalties to be imposed
upon the offender in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.
6 months 1 day and P15 indemnity
For the purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent if
8-10-30 within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes
of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsificacion, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third
9-14-35 time or oftener.

9-30-35
Estafa, CFID- 50973
2 months 1 day arresto mayor, to return the bicycle stolen or its value P40, and
additional penalty of 2 years 4 months 21 days of prision correccional, and costs.
The trial court sentenced the appellant under paragraph 5 (b) of article 62 of the
Revised Penal Code, as if this were only his fourth and not his fifth conviction. The
Solicitor General recommends the affirmance of that sentence, on the theory that
A habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist, and in imposing the principal penalty
upon him the aggravating circumstance of recidivism has to be taken into account. In
fixing the penalty provided by law for the last crime " as required in paragraph 5 (a) (b),
and (c) of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, the court cannot disregard articles 14
(9) and Revised Penal Code, which respectively define recidivism as an aggravating
circumstance and lay down the rule for the application of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. We reaffirm the holding of this Court in People vs. Melendez, 59 Phil.,
154; People vs. Espina, 62 Phil., 607; and the People vs. De Jesus, 63 Phil., 760, as a
correct interpretation of the Habitual Delinquency Law. However, for the purpose of
fixing the additional penalty, recidivism cannot be taken as an aggravating
circumstance for the reason it is inherent in habitual delinquency (People vs. de Jesus,
supra).
Neither can we accept the recommendation for affirmance made by the Solicitor
General on the theory that the present is appellant's fourth conviction. We cannot
disregard his previous fourth conviction alleged in the information solely because the
date of his release in connection therewith has not been shown. It appearing that he
was sentenced for the fourth time on September 30, 1935, to suffer two months and
done day of arresto mayor plus an additional penalty of two years, four months, and
twenty-one days of prision correctional, we can readily see that he must have been
released in connection therewith less than ten years previous to August 13, 1941, the
date of the commission of the offense complained of in the present case. The stand
taken by the trial court and the Solicitor General is untenable because if appellant's
fourth previous conviction be disregarded, he could not be sentenced to any additional
penalty as a habitual delinquent, his previous third conviction and release having taken
place more than ten years prior to August 13, 1941.
It results that this is appellant's fifth conviction, and accordingly, he must be sentenced
under paragraph 5 (c) of article 62 to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. This penalty must be
imposed in its minimum degree because of the mitigating circumstance of plea of
guilty.
Wherefore, with the modification that the appellant Faustino Tolentino y de Dios shall
suffer an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor, the sentence
appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Yulo, C.J., Paras and Moran, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BOCOBO, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion which, upon the fifth conviction of
the accused, considers recidivism as an aggravating circumstance in fixing the
principal penalty, despite the fact that, in imposing the additional penalty for habitual
delinquency, previous conviction is also counted. In this case, none of the conviction
prior to the fifth should be deemed an aggravating circumstance of recidivism in fixing
the principal penalty, which should therefore be arresto mayor in its minimum degree,
or one month and one day, in view of the plea of guilty.
Article 14 paragraph 9 and 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
ART. 1. Aggravating circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
9. The accused is a recivist.
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.
10. That the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law
attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a
lighter penalty.
and Article 62, paragraph 5 of the same Code reads:
ART. 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of
habitual delinquency. — Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual
delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing
the penalty in conformity with the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law
for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision
correctional in its medium and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for
the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor
in its minimum and medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of
prision mayor in its maximum period of reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article the total of the two penalties to be
imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.
For the purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, if
within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes
of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsificacion, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third
time or oftener.
From the above provisions it can be seen that the Revised Penal Code recognizes
three situations in which offenders who are convicted more than once find themselves,
namely, reiteration, recidivism and habitual deliquency. Reiteration refers to any crime
which is not in the same title of the Revised Penal Code, recidivism to crimes in the
same title of the Code, and habitual delinquency to robbery, theft and estafa, and
falsification. In reiteration, the number of previous punishments is unimportant
provided there has been at least one if the law attaches an equal or greater penalty, or
at least two if the penalty is lighter. In recidivism, if the previous convictions are of
crimes other than robbery, theft, estafa and falsification, but are embraced in the same
title as the last offense, the number of previous convictions is also immaterial. But if the
previous convictions are of robbery, etc. the number of the same is important because
if there is only one previous conviction, there is recidivism but if there have been two or
more previous convictions of robbery, etc., habitual delinquency exists.
Therefore it can be inferred that the law has followed a logical and general plan in
dealing with criminals who commit robbery, etc., more than once. That plan is that if
there is only who is convicted for the second time is a recidivist, and if thereafter he
does not reform, but commits robbery or kindred crimes for the third time or oftener, he
is a habitual delinquent. Thus there is first recidivism and then habitual delinquency.
These two conditions are successive and not simultaneous stages in the life of the
criminal in cases of robbery, etc. Therefore, upon the third, fourth or subsequent
conviction, he is no longer a recidivist but a habitual delinquent. His first conviction
having already been counted as an aggravating circumstance of recidivism in fixing the
principal penalty when he was convicted for the second time, it would seem that to
consider his first conviction again as an aggravating circumstance of recidivism in
meeting out the principal penalty when he is found guilty for the third, fourth fifth or
additional times, runs counter to the general scheme of the law as I construe it and
already explained.
I believe therefore that upon the fifth conviction of robbery or similar crimes, as in the
present case, none of the prior convictions should be considered an aggravating
circumstance of recidivism in laying down the principal penalty. It is enough that all the
four previous convictions are considered as part of the habitual delinquency and the
proper additional penalty is applied accordingly.
Moreover, it would seem to be unjust, on fifth conviction to count any one of the
previous convictions as an aggravating circumstance in fixing the principal penalty,
because all the prior convictions are already considered in meeting out the additional
penalty. This interpretation of the law takes into account the same offense twice at the
same time, namely, first as an aggravating circumstance in imposing the principal
penalty, and then as one of the required previous convictions in fixing the additional
penalty for habitual delinquency. Non bis in idem. To punish a person twice for the
same offense is frowned upon in this legal maxim.
But it is said in the majority opinion that the court cannot disregard articles 14 (9) and
64 of the Revised Penal Code, which respectively define recidivism as an aggravating
circumstance and lay down the rule for the application of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. But these articles are not disregarded in my view of the question
because, as already set forth there is no recidivism, but habitual delinquency, on the
third or subsequent conviction, of robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification.
Furthermore, penal laws are liberally construed in favor of the accused. This has not
been done in the majority opinion because it considers the same offense twice.
Lastly, the object of article 14, paragraph 9 and article 62, paragraph 5 of the Revised
Penal Code is the same: to be severe on those who manifest criminal tendencies in
order to curb criminality. The object is already attained when the additional penalty
(which is very heavy compared with the principal) for habitual delinquency is applied. It
is therefore unnecessary to consider the first or any other previous conviction as an
aggravating circumstance in order to increase the principal penalty. To do so is
tantamount to saying: "The accused is a dangerous character because he has been
previously convicted of robbery, etc., twice or oftener; therefore he should get the
additional penalty for habitual delinquency. But he is also a dangerous character
because the first or any other of these same previous convictions for similar crime
means recidivism; therefore, he should also get a higher penalty because of the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism." It would, however, seem more reasonable to
hold that inasmuch as the more includes the less, the previous conviction which is the
essence of recidivism is absorbed in the total number of convictions that make up
habitual delinquency. The majority opinion itself admits that "a habitual delinquent is
necessarily a recidivist." If so, why should he be punished as a recidivist when he is
already punished as a habitual delinquent?
G.R. No. 93436 March 24, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MELCHOR REAL y BARTOLAY, accused-appellant.
QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Masbate,
Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 1606 finding appellant guilty of murder.
We affirm with modification, the appealed decision.
I
The information against appellant reads as follows:
That on or about March 11, 1978, in the morning thereof, at the Poblacion of the
Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the said accused with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and criminally attack, assault and hack with a
sharp bolo one Edgardo Corpus y Rapsing, hitting the latter on the nape, causing an
injury which caused the death of the said Edgardo Corpus y Rapsing several days
thereafter.
That the accused is a recidivist having been convicted by the Municipal Court of
Aroroy, in the following cases:
Crime Date of Conviction
1. Ill treatment by Deed — July 6, 1965
Q. Was he hit?
2. Grave Threats — November 25, 1968
A. Yes, Sir.
(Rollo, p. 14).
Q. In what part of his body was he hit?
Upon being arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.
A. At the right neck.
After trial, the court convicted appellant and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 and costs. Q. Did you admit to the authorities that it was you who hacked Edgardo Corpus?

Hence, this appeal. A. Yes, sir.

II On cross-examination, he again admitted his guilt.

At about 9:00 A.M. on March 17, 1978, in the public market of Aroroy, Masbate, Q. And when this Edgardo Corpus turn (sic) his back, you immediately hacked
appellant and Edgardo Corpus, both vendors, engaged in a heated argument over the him on his neck?
right to use the market table to display their fish.
A. Yes, sir ( TSN, July 9, 1986, pp. 6-8; Emphasis supplied).
Moreno de la Rosa, the Municipal Mayor, who happened to be at the public market,
tried to pacify them, saying that they were arguing over trivial matters. III

The two protagonists momentarily kept their peace but after awhile Corpus raised his Before us, appellant argues that the crime committed was only homicide and not
voice again and said something to appellant. The latter, in a soft voice, uttered murder and that he is entitled to two mitigating circumstances: namely, passion and
"SOBRA NA INA NA IMO PAGDAOGDAOG" (You are being too oppressive). obfuscation and vindication of a grave offense.

When Corpus kept on walking to and fro near the disputed fish table, appellant started We agree with appellant that the offense committed was homicide. He is entitled to the
to sharpen his bolo while murmuring to himself. Once Corpus turned around with his benefit of the doubt as to whether he acted with alevosia when he attacked the victim.
back towards appellant, the latter hacked him on the nape. The blow caused Corpus to As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is
collapse. He was rushed to a medical clinic. When asked by his wife as to who hacked treachery if such mode of attack was cooly and deliberately adopted by him with the
him, he answered "Melchor Real." purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule does not
apply, however, where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but
A police investigator went to the clinic to take the dying declaration of Corpus, who was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the
said that it was appellant who stabbed him. Corpus died two days later. provocative act of the victim (People v. Aguiluz, 207 SCRA 187 [1992]). This is more
so, where the assault upon the victim was preceded by a heated exchange of words
Appellant admitted hacking Corpus but claimed that he did so out of humiliation and between him and the accused (People v. Rillorta, 180 SCRA 102 [1989]). In the case
anger when the victim threw his fish in the presence of so many people. at bench, the assault came in the course of an altercation and after appellant had
sharpened his bolo in full view of the victim. Appellant's act of sharpening his bolo can
He testified as follows: be interpreted as an attempt to frighten the victim so the latter would leave him alone.
It was simply foolhardy for the victim to continue walking to and fro near appellant in a
Q. When Edgardo Corpus was lambasting you in the presence of the public, taunting manner while the latter was sharpening his bolo.
what did you do, how did you feel?
The suddenness of the attack does not, by itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia
A. I got angry. where the decision to attack was made peremptorily and the victim's helpless position
was accidental (People v. Ardisa, 55 SCRA 245 [1974]).
Q. And what did you do?
Appellant also claims that he is entitled to two mitigating circumstances: namely,
A. So I hacked him. vindication of a grave offense and passion and obfuscation. The peculiarity of these
two mitigating circumstances is that they cannot be applied at the same time if they
arise from the same facts or motive.
If appellant attacked his victim in the proximate vindication of a grave offense, he
cannot successfully claim in the same breath that he was also blinded by passion and
obfuscation. At most, only one of two circumstances could be considered in favor of
appellant (People v. Yaon, Court of Appeals, 43 O.G. 4142 cited in I Reyes, Revised
Penal Code [1981]).
The act of the victim in berating and humiliating appellant was enough to produce
passion and obfuscation, considering that the incident happened in a market place
within full view and within hearing distance of many people.
The trial court held, and the Solicitor General agreed, that the attendant aggravating
circumstance was reiteracion and not reincidencia as alleged in the information. The
trial court and the Solicitor General are in error.
According to the information charging appellant of murder and the evidence, the
accused was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed on July 6, 1965 and grave
threats on November 25, 1968.
In recidivism or reincidencia, the offender shall have been previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[g]). In reiteracion, the offender shall have been punished
previously for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for
two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty (Revised Penal Code, Art.
14[10]). Unlike in reincidencia, the offender in reiteracion commits a crime different in
kind from that for which he was previously tried and convicted (Guevarra, Penal
Sciences and Philippine Criminal Law 129 [1974]).
Appellant was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed (Revised Penal Code, Art.
266, Title Eight) and grave threats (Revised Penal Code, Art. 282, Title Nine). He was
convicted of homicide in the instant criminal case (Revised Penal Code, Art. 249, Title
Eight). Inasmuch as homicide and ill-treatment by deed fall under Title Eight, the
aggravating circumstance to be appreciated against him is recidivism under Article
14[g] rather than reiteracion under Article 14(10) of the Revised Penal Code.
There is no reiteracion because that circumstance requires that the previous offenses
should not be embraced in the same title of the Code. While grave threats fall in title
(Title Nine) different from homicide (Title Eight), still reiteracion cannot be appreciated
because such aggravating circumstance requires that if there is only one prior offense,
that offense must be punishable by an equal or greater penalty than the one for which
the accused has been convicted. Likewise, the prosecution has to prove that the
offender has been punished for the previous offense. There is no evidence presented
by the prosecution to that effect.
Appellant is convicted of homicide, appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation, which is offset by the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that appellant is convicted of the crime of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as maximum. The indemnity to
be paid to the heirs of the victim is increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25177 October 31, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICOLAS LAYSON, CEZAR RAGUB, CEZAR FUGOSO and JOVENTINO GARCES,
defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio
A. Torres and Solicitor Lolita O. Gal-lang for plaintiff-appellee.
Potenciano Villegas, Jr. as counsel de officio for defendants-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the decision dated September 25, 1965 of the Court of
First Instance of Davao in criminal case 8495 imposing the death penalty on Nicolas
Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces.
On January 17, 1964 when these four accused stabbed Regino Gasang to death, they
were inmates of the Davao Penal Colony serving sentences of conviction for the
following crimes:
Nicolas Layson
—
kidnapping with robbery, homicide, homicide and theft;
Cezar Ragub
—
frustrated murder and homicide;
Cezar Fugoso
—
robbery in an inhabited house and theft;
Joventino Garces
—
robbery hold-up and robbery in an uninhabited house.
In the early morning of that hapless day, at about 4:45 o'clock, the four accused,
armed with bladed weapons, entered the cell where the unsuspecting victim, prisoner
Regino Gasang, was. Layson locked the door of the room. Without warning and acting
in concert they then swiftly took turns in stabbing Gasang. They thereafter barricaded
themselves, refusing to surrender to the trustees who had come to the scene of the
crime, agreeing to surrender only to Vicente Afurong, the supervising prison guard.
Afurong arrived, identified himself, and assured them of their safety, whereupon they
handed their weapons through the hole of the barricaded door and surrendered
themselves.
Gasang died shortly after being brought to the prison hospital. Death was caused by
severe internal and external hemorrhage and shock, all secondary to multiple stab
wounds.
Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that they killed Gasang because the latter
urinated on their coffee cups a number of times. Garces stated that he killed Gasang
because the latter spat on him a week before. The four plotted to kill Gasang a few
days prior to the actual slaying.
On March 25, 1964 all the accused were indicted for the crime of murder. The
information recites:
The undersigned accuses Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino
Garces of the crime of Murder, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 160, of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about January 17, 1964, in the Davao Penal Colony, Municipality of
Panabo, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-mentioned accused, while then being convicts serving in the said Davao Penal
Colony their corresponding sentences of conviction by reason of final judgment
imposed upon them, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,
armed with sharp-pointed instruments, with treachery, evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab with said weapons Regino Gasang, their co-
inmate in the said Colony, thereby inflicting upon him serious injuries which caused his
death; with the aggravating circumstances of (1) recidivism with respect to the accused
Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub, and (2) all of them with two or more prior
convictions.
Upon arraignment, all the four accused, assisted by counsel de officio, freely and
spontaneously pleaded guilty. Notwithstanding the plea of guilty, the court a quo
proceeded to receive testimony because of the gravity of the offense. On September
30, 1965 the court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty in favor of all of
them and the aggravating circumstances of recidivism and having been previously
punished for two or more crimes to which the law attaches a lighter penalty with
respect to the accused Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub, the aggravating
circumstance of having been punished with two or more offenses to which the law
attaches a lighter penalty with respect to the accused Cezar Fugoso and Joventino
Garces and the aggravating circumstances consisting of any two of the qualifying
circumstances alleged in the information which are treachery, evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength for one is sufficient to qualify the crime to murder and
the special aggravating circumstance of having committed the crime charged while
serving the penalty imposed upon them for previous offenses as regards all the
accused and conformably with Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
sentences all of them to DEATH, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased Regino Gasang in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of the penalty imposed and to
pay the costs proportionately.
For the purposes of this review, suffice it to consider, on the one hand, the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and the special aggravating
circumstance of quasi-recidivism, and, on the other, the mitigating circumstance of
plea of guilty.
We reject the recommendation of the Solicitor General that the mitigating circumstance
of passion and obfuscation be considered in favor of all the accused. For this
circumstance to exist, it is necessary that the act which gave rise to the obfuscation be
not removed from the commission of the offense by a considerable length of time,
during which period the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.1
Three of the accused admitted that they harbored ill-feeling against Gasang because
the latter urinated on their coffee cups several times, all these taking place at least ten
days before the actual slaying. Gasang spat on Garces a week before the day of the
killing. All of the accused plotted to kill Gasang a few days before January 17, 1964. In
the light of these circumstances, it is evident that sufficient time had elapsed during
which the accused regained their equanimity. They moved their evil scheme forward to
consummation after obtaining weapons from their fellow inmates whose aid they had
solicited. The aforenarrated circumstances negate the presence of passion and
obfuscation; upon the contrary, they prove the attendance of the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation.
Treachery attended the commission of the crime. The necropsy report (exh. I) and the
diagram (exh. J), plus the testimony of Dr. Guillermo de Guzman, conclusively prove
that the victim was killed in a manner insuring utter suddenness and complete surprise
in the execution of the offense, with resultant incapability of the victim to offer
resistance. That there was abuse of superior strength would suffice to qualify the crime
to murder, but this circumstance must be considered as absorbed in treachery.2
Treachery qualifies the killing to murder;3 evident premeditation becomes a mere
generic aggravating circumstance4 which is offset by the mitigating circumstance of
plea of guilty. A qualifying circumstance not only gives the crime its proper and
exclusive name but also places the author thereof in such a situation as to deserve no
other penalty than that specially prescribed for said crime.5
The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (art. 160, Rev. Penal Code)
was correctly considered against all the accused, who, at the time of the commission
of the offense, were undoubtedly serving their respective sentences for previous
convictions. Quasi-recidivism has for its effect the punishment of the accused with the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony, and cannot be
offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.6
When they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, all the accused admitted all the
material facts and circumstances alleged in the information. The crime of murder is
punished with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Because of the
attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, this Court is
left with no alternative to affirming the death penalty imposed by the court a quo.
It was error for the trial judge to consider against the accused the aggravating
circumstance of having been previously punished for two or more crimes to which the
law attaches lighter penalties because the said aggravating circumstance of
"reiteracion" requires that the offender against whom it is considered shall have served
out his sentences for the prior offenses. Here all the accused were yet serving their
respective sentences at the time of the commission of the murder.
Concurrence in the grim view that we take of this case is given by Attorney Potenciano
Villegas, Jr., counsel de officio for the four accused, who unqualifiedly recommends
affirmance of the judgment a quo.
It is indeed a lethal hand that pens affirmance of a death sentence, but ours is the
inescapable duty to enforce the inexorable mandate of the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson,
Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces, is affirmed. The indemnification to
the heirs of the victim, Regino Gasang, is hereby increased to P12,000,7 to be paid
jointly and severally by the four accused. Costs de officio.
G.R. No. L-44988 October 31, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CANUTO BERNAL, defendant-appellant.
Juan M. Ladaw for appellant.
Acting Solicitor-General Melencio for appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.:
The accused was charged with the crime of theft, the information alleging that, aside
from the presence of the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, the accused is an
habitual delinquent because he had been convicted, prior to the commission of the
offense at bar, thrice of the same crime of theft. The accused pleaded not guilty, but
the court, after trial, found him guilty as charged, and sentenced him to four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, to pay the accessories of the law, to return the three
stolen roosters to Mariano de Leon or to indemnify the latter the value thereof in the
sum of P3, and to pay the costs. As an habitual delinquent, because previously
convicted three times of the same crime of theft, he was sentenced to an additional
penalty of seven (7) years of prision mayor.
The facts are not disputed by the defense. It has been established that late in the
evening of October 11, 1935, the accused, without the owner's consent, took three
gamecocks belonging to Elias Piamonte valued at P50, and three other roosters
belonging to Mariano de Leon valued at P3. Only two of the gamecocks of Elias
Piamonte, valued at P30, were recovered. It has equally been established that the
accused had been thrice convicted of the crime of theft; The first time on April 25, 1935
by the justice of the peace court of San Pablo, Laguna; the second time on June 24,
1935 by the justice of the peace court of San Pablo, Laguna; and third time on October
19, 1935, by the justice of the peace court of Tanauan, Batangas.
The defense assigns only one error of law in the judgment, to wit, the accused an
habitual delinquent under subsection (b) of paragraph 5 of article 62 of the Revised
Penal Code, and in imposing upon him the penalty therein provided. It contends that
the applicable provision is that found in subsection (a) of the aforesaid codal
paragraph and article, because in truth and according to the decisions, the accused
has no more than two prior convictions, the third being the one at bar. Elaborating on
this contention, the defense alleges that the conviction on October 19, 1935, for the
crime of theft should not be counted against the accused because it took place after
the commission of the offense at bar on the 11th of the said month and year. The
Solicitor-General in his brief agrees with the defense, and recommends that the
penalty fixed in subsection (a) of paragraph 5 of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code
be imposed upon the accused. We hold that the third conviction, having taken place
after the commission of the last offense with which the accused is now charged, should
not be reckoned with in determining habitual delinquency and the additional penalty to
be imposed, upon the authority of the decisions of this court in People vs. Santiago (55
Phil., 266), People vs. Ventura (56 Phil., 1, 5), and People vs. Reyes (G.R. Nos.
43904, 43905, October 18, 1935 [62 Phil., 966).
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account in the
commission of the crime of theft in view of the established fact that the accused was
thrice convicted of the said crime prior to the trial of this case on November 4, 1935
(art. 14, par. 9, Revised Penal Code). For this reason, the penalty imposable should be
six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. As an habitual delinquent,
because he was twice convicted of the crime of theft prior to the commission of the
offense at bar (art. 62, last paragraph of the Revised Penal Code), he should be
sentenced to the additional penalty of three (3) years of prision correccional pursuant
to subsection (a) of paragraph 5 of the said article.
The question arose, in the course of our deliberation on this case, of whether or not in
instances where the accused turns out to be an habitual delinquent the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism, when alleged and proved, should be taken into account in
fixing the penalty applicable for the commission of the principal offense, independently
of the additional penalty provided by law for habitual delinquency. It has been urged
that said aggravating should not be considered, otherwise it would be twice held
against the accused inasmuch as it is necessarily taken into account in ascertaining
whether he is a habitual delinquent or not. The majority of the court hold to the contrary
view, namely, that recidivism should be reckoned with; hence, the accused is
sentenced to the minimum of the maximum penalty fixed by law.
In resolving this question as above set out, the majority of the court gave heed to the
following considerations:
the Code. Defining reiteration or habituality paragraph 10 of the same article provides
that it is committed when the offender has been previously punished for an offense to
which the law attaches at an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to
which it attaches a lighter penalty. Reflecting on these definitions it will be seen that
recidivism, viewed as an aggravating circumstance, is not a factor or element which
necessarily forms an integral part of habitual delinquency. It will be noted that the
elements as well as the basis of each of these circumstances are different. For
recidivism to exist, it is sufficient that the accused, on the date of his trial, shall have
been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same
title. For the existence of habitual delinquency, it is not enough that the accused shall
have been convicted of any of the crimes specified, and that the last conviction shall
have taken place ten (10) years before the commission of the last offense. It is
necessary that the crimes previously committed be prior to the commission of the
offense with which the accused is charged a third time or oftener.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is modified, and the accused-appellant
is found guilty of the crime of theft charged in the complaint and sentenced to six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, to return to the offended parties the
stolen and unrecovered roosters, or in default thereof to indemnify Elias Piamonte in
the sum of P20 and Mariano de Leon in the sum of P3, with the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to an additional penalty of three (3)
years of prision correccional, with the costs in both instances. So ordered.
READ CONCCURING AND DISSENTING.

First: This is not the first time that the question has been submitted to the consideration
of the court. In People vs. Melendrez (59 Phil., 154), and People vs, Espina (62 Phil.,
607), we have already held that in cases similar to the one at bar, the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism should be taken into consideration, notwithstanding the
allegation and proof that the accused were habitual delinquents and should
accordingly be sentenced to the additional penalty provided by law; and

Second: It is not correct to assume that recidivism is twice taken into account when the
accused is declared an habitual delinquent and when it is deemed to aggravate the
crime in fixing the principal penalty to be imposed, because recidivism as an
aggravating circumstance modifying criminal liability is not an inherent or integral
element of habitual delinquency which the Revised Penal Code considers as an
extraordinary and special aggravating circumstance.

Under the last subsection of paragraph 5 of article 62 of he Revised Penal Code, a

person shall be deemed to be habitually delinquent, if within a period of ten years from
the date of his release or last conviction of the crime of robbery, theft, estafa, or
falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. Paragraph 9
of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code defines recidivism by stating that it is
committed by a person who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of