SORIANO MATA vs. HON.

JOSEPHINE BAYONA

G.R. No. 50720 March 26, 1984

Facts:
Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets
known as Masiao Tickets” without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai and amusement
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from
the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers
connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its
whereabouts and to which inquiry respondent judge replied “it is with the curt”. The judge then
handed the records to the Fiscal who attached then to the records

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that under the constitution “no search warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge personally or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized b law after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce”.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and witnesses that he
may produce and to attach then to the records. Such written deposition is necessary in order
that the judge may be able to properly determined the existence and nonexistence of the
probable cause, to hole liable for perjury the person giving It if it will be found later that his
declaration are false.
Deposition – any written statement certified under oath. – written testimony of a
witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trail or haring upon oral
examination

The search warrant is illegal, the return of the thing seized cannot be ordered. Illegality
of search warrant does not call for the return of the thing seize, the possession of which is
prohibited.

(#81) UY KHEYTIN vs VILLAREALG.R. No. 16009; September 21, 1920TOPIC:

SEARCH AND SEIZURE; REMEDIES; RETURN OF PROPERTY ILLEGALLY SEIZED
FACTS:
Ramon Gayanilo, corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, presented to the judge of the Court of
First Instance of Iloiloan application for search warrant, stating in his application; "That in the
house of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Niño St., No. 20,Iloilo, under the writing desk in his store, there is
kept a certain amount of opium." Upon that application the said judge, onthe same day, issued a
search warrant. Armed with that search warrant, the respondent M. S. Torralba, accompanied
bysome of his subordinates, on the same day (April 30th) searched the house of the petitioner Uy
Kheytin and found therein 60small cans of opium. They wanted to search also the bodega on the
ground-floor of the house, but Uy Kheytin positivelydenied that it was his or that he rented it.
Lieutenant Torralba wanted to be sure, and for this reason he placed a guard in thepremises to see
that nothing was removed therefrom, and then went away to find out who the owner of the bodega
was.The next morning he learned from the owner of the house, one Segovia, of the town of Molo,
that the Chinaman Uy Kheytinwas the one who was renting the bodega. Thereupon Lieutenant
Torralba and his subordinates resumed the search and thenand there found and seized other
articles such as opium liquid, empty opium containers, opium pipe and the like.Furthermore, officers
seized books, papers, etc.A criminal complaint was filed charging the petitioners with a violation of
the Opium Law. They were duly arrested, and apreliminary investigation was conducted by the
justice of the peace, after which he found that there was probable cause forbelieving that the
crime complained of had been committed and that the defendants were the persons responsible
therefor.Petitioners herein filed a petition in the Court of First Instance, asking for the return of
"private papers, books and otherproperty" which the Constabulary officers had seized from said
defendants, upon the ground that they had been so seizedillegally and in violation of the
constitutional rights of the defendants. Petitioners contend that the search was illegal
andtherefore asking for the return of the items seized.
ISSUE:
May the opium, books, papers, etc. be returned?
RULING: (Opium and its paraphernalia
–
NO; Books, papers, etc.
–
YES)
In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant in question in
that the judge did not firstexamine the complainant or any witnesses under oath. But the property
sought to be searched for and seized having beenactually found in the place described by the
complainant, reasoning by analogy from the case of an improper arrest, we areof the opinion that
irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the return of the opium found and seized
under saidwarrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating the latter.

That the officers of the law believed that the books, papers, etc.,which they seized might be
used as evidence
against the petitioners herein a criminal action against them for a violation ofthe Opium Law,
is no reason or justification under the law for the seizure
: First, because they were not "particularlydescribed" or even mentioned in the search warrant;
second, because, even if they had been mentioned in the searchwarrant, they could not be legally
seized, for a search warrant cannot be used for the purpose of obtaining evidence; andthird,
because to compel a person to produce his private papers to be used in evidence against him would
be equivalent tocompelling him to be a witness against himself.From all of the foregoing
our conclusions are:1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did
not comply with the requirements of section98 of General Orders No. 58, the
petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium and its paraphernalia which werefound
and seized under said warrant
, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the judge.2. That
the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the search begun on the previous day, and,
therefore, did notrequire another search warrant.3. That the
seizure of the petitioner's books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no
inherent relation withopium and the possession of which is not forbidden by law, was illegal
and in violation of the petitioners' constitutionalrights.
Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that each and all of the respondents herein, their
assistants or successors, be,and they hereby are, forbidden from examining or making any use of
said books, letters, telegrams, etc., and they are herebyordered to immediately return the said
articles to the petitioners.

ESPANO VS CA
RODOLFO ESPANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998

Facts:

Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They
saw petitioner selling something to another person. After the alleged buyer left,
they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him.
The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if
he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The
policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags
of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was
charged of possession of prohibited drugs.

Issue:

Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense . . . “

Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught
in flagrante as a result of a buy bust operation conducted by police officers on the
basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area.
The police officer saw petitioner handling over something to an alleged buyer.
After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophane of
marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bag of
marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being fruits of the crime.

FIRST DIVISION

MABINI EPIE, JR. and RODRIGO G.R. No. 148117

PALASI,

Petitioners,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus -
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CORONA,

AZCUNA, and
THE HON. NELSONIDA T. ULAT-
GARCIA, JJ.
MARREDO, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10,
La Trinidad, Benguet and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Promulgated:
Respondents.

March 22, 2007

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals dated September 15, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 55684.

The facts of the case as gleaned from the records are:

In an Information dated September 22, 1998, the Office of the Provincial

Prosecutor of Benguet Province charged Mabini Epie, Jr. and Rodrigo Palasi,
petitioners, with violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705,[2] as
amended. The Informtion reads:

That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, along the Halsema National Highway
at Acop, Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually aiding each other and without any authority of law or
without any license or permit granted by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), and with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and
transport 870 bd. ft. of Benguet Pine lumber having a total market value of TWENTY
FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P24,360.00), Philippine Currency,
belonging to the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, to the damage and prejudice of the
GOVERNMENT in the actual sum aforesaid.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.

The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet
(presided by respondent Judge Nelsonida T. Ulat-Marredo), docketed as Criminal
Case No. 98-CR-3138.

When arraigned, both petitioners, with the assistance of counsel de parte,

pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6,
1998, SPO2 Alberto Ngina of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tublay Station
received an information from a confidential agent that a jeepney with Plate No.
AYB 117 at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine lumber.

SPO2 Ngina immediately relayed the information to SPO4 Rentao Quitoriano and
SPO1 Domingo Pulig. They then swiftly established a checkpoint in Acop,
Tublay, Benguet.

At around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, the PNP operatives spotted the jeepney
heading toward La Trinidad. They flagged it down but it did not stop. Hence, they
chased the vehicle up to Shilan, La Trinidad where it finally halted.

The police saw five persons inside the jeepney then loaded with assorted
vegetables, like womboc[3] and chili.
When SPO4 Quitoriano lifted a womboc, he found some pieces of lumber under
it. The driver and his companions admitted they have no permit to transport the
lumber. The police immediately arrested and investigated petitioners, Marso
Insiong Dumpit, Armando Palasi, and Ben Arinos. Only petitioners were charged
with violation of Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.

After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioners, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Suppress Evidence of the Prosecution on the ground that the pieces of
Benguet pine lumber were illegally seized.

In a Resolution[4] dated July 26, 1999, respondent judge denied the motion.

Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration. Likewise, it was denied in a

Resolution dated September 27, 1999.

Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55684 assailing the said Resolutions
of the trial court.

On September 15, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the
petition, holding that respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the search conducted without
warrant by the police officers is valid; and that the confiscated pieces of lumber
are admissible in evidence against the accused.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. However, it was

denied in a Resolution[5] dated April 11, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition raising the sole issue of whether the police officers
have a probable cause to believe that the subject vehicle was loaded with illegal
cargo and that, therefore, it can be stopped and searched without a warrant.

In this jurisdiction, the fundamental law of the land recognizes and protects the
right of a person to privacy against unreasonable intrusions by the agents of the
State. This right to undisturbed privacy is guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution which provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3(2), also of Article III, provides that any evidence obtained in violation of
the above provision shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through with
judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure constitutes derogation of a
constitutional right.[6]

The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People v. Sarap,[7] we

listed the exceptions where search and seizure may be conducted without
warrant, thus: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain
view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances. The only requirement in these exceptions is the presence of
probable cause. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place to be searched.[8] In People v. Aruta,[9] we ruled that in
warrantless searches, probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground
of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed. There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula in determining
probable cause for its determination varies according to the facts of each case.

Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless

search and seizure may be conducted by peace officers. The only issue we should
determine is whether there was probable cause to justify such warrantless search
and seizure.

We recall that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, a confidential informer

disclosed to SPO2 Ngina that a passenger jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 loaded
with Benguet pine lumber was at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet. The lumber was covered
with assorted vegetables. A PNP roadblock was then placed in Acop,
Tublay, Benguet to intercept the jeepney. At around 4:00 p.m. of that same day,
the police spotted the vehicle. They flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing
the police to chase it until it reached Shilan, La Trinidad. A search of the vehicle
disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners could not produce
the required DENR permit to cut and transport the same.

In People v. Vinecarao,[10] we ruled that where a vehicle sped away after noticing
a checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, in an
apparent attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding with their inspection,
there exists probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law
enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were officers of the law or that
the vehicle contained objects which were instruments of some offense. This ruling
squarely applies to the present case. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in
holding that respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she ruled that the warrantless
search is valid and that the lumber seized is admissible in evidence against
petitioners.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55684. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Umil vs. Ramos

FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests and
searches made by the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the “confidential information” that
the authorities received. Except for one case where inciting to sedition was charged, the rest are charged
with subversion for being a member of the New People’s Army.

RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since
subversion is a form of a continuing crime – together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the
inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the
arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses
pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise,
it would be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of
irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free
from error.

DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The “confidential information” was nothing but hearsay. The searches and
arrests made were bereft of probable cause and that the petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto or
in any overt act. Utmost, the authorities was lucky in their fishing expeditions.

2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the state. People vs. Marti --Marti and his wife
went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped
packages. Marti informed the owner that the packages simply contained books, cigars and gloves as gifts
to his friends in Zurich and refused to allow the owner to examine and inspect the packages. However,
before the delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, the owner's husband inspected the package and
found marijuana which was later turned over to the NBI. A case was filed against Marti. Marti invoked his
right against illegal searches and seizure. Held: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant
that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the
State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution

Microsoft vs maxicorp

In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that Microsoft Softwares
(Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged within the premises of
Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a
computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of Windows.
For their purchase, they were issued a receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a
certain “Joel Diaz”. Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC.
He brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as
evidence as well as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a
computer technician, who showed the judge that the software in the computer unit bought
by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated. The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable
cause for a case of copyright infringement and unfair competition committed by Maxicorp,
issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the warrant before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision it
highlighted the fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s or Sacriz’ name hence the
proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary
evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From
what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright
infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano
and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed
and sold within Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some
cases, installed there.
The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s name nor was it in Sacriz’ name does
not render the issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause
requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination
exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given
situation.Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings simply
because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is
not in his name.

Stonehill vs Diokno DIGEST

DECEMBER 21, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

Stonehill vs Diokno
20 SCRA 383

Facts:

Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners

herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and
loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense;
stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be
used as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the applications
adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance
violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants
in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized
in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in
the residences of petitioners herein.
Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the
corporation.
Held: No.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
ispurely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners
herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents,
papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may
not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity.

Enrile vs Salazar
In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime
Salazar. Said crime arose from the failed coup attempts against then president Corazon
Aquino. There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime charged against
him. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed a petition for habeas
corpus questioning his detention and alleging that the crime being charged against him is
nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the landmark case of People vs
Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes
such as murder; as such, the proper crime that should have been charged against him
is simple rebellion – which is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. He
claimed that it only took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling of the
case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that such period is so short that it was
impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the voluminous record of the case
from the prosecution’s office – that being, the constitutional provision that a judge may only
issue a warrant of arrest after personally determining the existence of probable cause has
not been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez ruling should be
abandoned and that it should be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes like
murder.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the case at bar.
HELD:
1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there was actually
a previous law (P.D. 942) which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law
provided that graver crimes may not be complexed with rebellion. However, President
Corazon Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power granted to her by the 1986
Freedom Constitution). That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law
under the Revised Penal Code, still stands. The courts cannot change this because courts
can only interpret laws. Only Congress can change the rebellion law (which the SC
suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as it stands, Enrile is correct, there
is no such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder are absorbed.
He can only be charged with rebellion – which is bailable.
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only took an hour and
twenty minutes to issue the warrant from the time the case was raffled to him despite the
fact that the prosecution transmitted quite a voluminous record from the preliminary
investigation it conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows established procedure by
personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some might consider only a relatively
brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome
the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS [188 SCRA 288; G.R. NO.

89139; 2 AUG 1990]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao

Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and
Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City.
While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a
"buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the
petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They then
checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38
Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds of live
ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live
ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police
station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was
asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and
ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken
to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him
were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City.
Issue: Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.

Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the
petitioner, argues that under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is
further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful
under the circumstances.

in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering

that it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that
when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag
there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag
and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the
possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant
for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too
late.

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions
heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.

The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988

September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)
DECISION

PADILLA, J.:
I. THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the
purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing
an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be
directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people.
Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches
and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

II. THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.
 Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do
not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas)
may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the
interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings
in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all
of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions –
which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonablyconducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly
society and a peaceful community.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5151. October 19, 2004]

PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M.

LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D. EVANGELISTA, SR., and NELSON
B. MELGAR, complainants, vs. ATTY. NORBERTO M.
MENDOZA, respondent.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo,

Solomon M. Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista, Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar
against Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross
Misconduct.
Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that respondent, a former
Municipal Trial Court Judge, abandoned his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in
favor of his paramour, Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one
Ramon G. Marcos; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente have been cohabiting
openly and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy. Estrella, Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro; respondent had fathered two children by his paramour Marilyn dela
Fuente; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates
of their two daughters that they were married on May 12, 1986, making it
appear that their two children are legitimate, while in respondents Certificate
of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC during the 1995 elections, respondent
declared that his wife is Felicitas V. Valderia; in respondents certificate of
candidacy for the 1998 elections, he declared his civil status as separated;
such declarations in the birth certificates of his children and in his certificate of
candidacy are acts constituting falsification of public documents; and
respondents acts betray his lack of good moral character and constitute
grounds for his removal as a member of the bar.
Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states that complainants, who
are his political opponents in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, are merely filing this
case to exact revenge on him for his filing of criminal charges against them;
complainants illegally procured copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna
Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993,
thus, such documents are inadmissible in evidence; respondent did not
participate in the preparation and submission with the local civil registry of
subject birth certificates; respondent never declared that he had two wives, as
he has always declared that he is separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V.
Valderia; and complainants have used this issue against him during elections
and yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still elected him as Mayor,
hence, respondent has not offended the publics sense of morality.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (hereinafter IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
Thereafter, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP conducted hearings.
Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and Romeo M. Laygo,
submitted their affidavits as their direct testimony and were subjected to
cross-examination by respondents counsel.
Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as follows: He knows
respondent for they both reside in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Respondent is
known as a practicing lawyer and a former Municipal Trial Court Judge.
Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn dela
Fuente, representing themselves to be husband and wife, and from their
cohabitation, they produced two children, namely, Mara Khrisna Charmina
dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza.
Sometime in 1995, he (witness Melgar) received a letter from a concerned
citizen, informing him that respondent was married to Felicitas Valderia of San
Rafael, Bulacan, on January 16, 1980, but respondent abandoned his wife to
cohabit with Marilyn dela Fuente. Attached to the letter was a photocopy of a
Certification issued by the Civil Register attesting to the marriage between
respondent and Felicitas Valderia. He also received information from
concerned citizens that Marilyn dela Fuente is also legally married to one
Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced by a Certification from the Office of the Civil
Register. Respondent stated in his Certificate of Candidacy filed with the
COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married to Felicitas Valderia. In
respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1998, he
declared his civil status as separated. Respondent has represented to all that
he is married to Marilyn dela Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper
where respondent holds the position of Chairman of the Board of the Editorial
Staff, respondent was reported by said newspaper as husband to Marilyn dela
Fuente and the father of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.
On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as follows: He was the
former mayor of Naujan and he and respondent belong to warring political
parties. It was not respondent who told him about the alleged immoral conduct
subject of the present case. Although he received the letter of a concerned
citizen regarding the immoral conduct of respondent as far back as 1995, he
did not immediately file a case for disbarment against respondent. It was only
after respondent filed a criminal case for falsification against him that he
decided to file an administrative case against respondent.[1]
On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified that there were people
who were against the open relationship between respondent and Marilyn dela
Fuente as respondent had been publicly introducing the latter as his wife
despite the fact that they are both still legally married to other persons, and so
someone unknown to him just handed to their maid copies of the birth
certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.[2]
The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted as his direct
testimony, is practically identical to that of witness Melgar. On cross-
examination, witness Laygo testified that he was not the one who procured
the certified true copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela
Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, as
somebody just gave said documents to Nelson Melgar. He was a municipal
councilor in 1995 when the letter of a concerned citizen regarding
respondents immorality was sent to Melgar, but he did not take any action
against respondent at that time.[3]
Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence consisting of
photocopies which were admitted by respondents counsel to be faithful
reproductions of the originals or certified true copies thereof, to wit: a letter of
one Luis Bermudez informing Nelson Melgar of respondents immoral
acts,[4] the Certification of the Local Civil Registrar of San Rafael, Bulacan,
attesting to the celebration of the marriage between respondent and one
Felicitas Valderia,[5] the Birth Certificate of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela
Fuente Mendoza,[6] the Birth Certificate of Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza,[7] the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 9,
1995,[8] the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 25,
1998,[9]Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro
dated October 27, 1998, attesting to the marriage celebrated between Marilyn
dela Fuente and Ramon Marcos,[10]and the editorial page of
the Naujanews (February-March 1999 issue),[11] wherein it was stated that
respondent has two daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.
Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any evidence and
merely submitted a memorandum expounding on his arguments that the
testimonies of complainants witnesses are mere hearsay, thus, said
testimonies and their documentary evidence have no probative weight.
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed
Resolution No. XVI-2004-123, reading as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering respondents violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he
is no longer cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and has abandoned such
immoral course of conduct.

Portions of the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar

Discipline, upon which the above-quoted Resolution was based, read as
follows:
FINDINGS:

The evidence of complainants to support their charge of immorality consists in a) the

testimonies of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo given by way of affidavits executed
under oath and affirmed before the Commission and b) their documentary evidence
consisting of their Exhibits A to H.

Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not formally present or offer
any evidence. Respondent opted not to present his evidence anymore because
according to him there is none to rebut vis--vis the evidence presented by the private
complainants. Respondent instead submitted a memorandum through counsel to argue
his position. As can be seen from the comment and memorandum submitted,
respondents counsel argues that the complaint is politically motivated since
complainants are political rivals of respondent and that the birth certificates Exhibits
D and D-1 which were offered to show that respondent sired the children namely
Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela
Fuente Mendoza out of his cohabitation with Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible
because they were allegedly secured in violation of Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 1993. The rest of the exhibits are either hearsay or self-serving according to
respondent.

The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein, on the other hand,
categorically state in their affidavits [Exhibits A and B] particularly in paragraph 2
that Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn de la Fuente,
representing themselves to be husband and wife. In paragraph 10 of said affidavits the
witnesses also categorically state that respondent has even represented to all and
sundry that Marilyn de la Fuente is his wife. These categorical statements made under
oath by complainants are not hearsay and remain un-rebutted. Respondent chose not
to rebut them.

Exhibit E, the Certificate of Candidacy executed by respondent shows that respondent

is married to one, Felicitas V. Valderia. As shown by Exhibit H, a marriage
certificate, Marilyn de la Fuente is married to one, Ramon G. Marcos. Duly certified
true copies of said exhibits have been presented by complainants.

With respect to Exhibits D and D-1, we believe that they are competent and relevant
evidence and admissible in this proceedings. The exclusionary rule which bars
admission of illegally obtained evidence applies more appropriately to evidence
obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. The instant case cannot be
analogous to an illegal search or seizure. A person who violates Rule 24 of
Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by respondent risks the penalty of
imprisonment or payment of a fine but it does not make the document so issued
inadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the present case. Exhibits D
and D-1 which are duly certified birth certificates are therefore competent evidence to
show paternity of said children by respondent in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary.

By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the testimonies of witnesses

Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo, and corroborated by the documentary exhibits will
show that indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a certain Marilyn de la
Fuente who is not his wife and that out of said cohabitation respondent sired two
children. These facts we repeat have not been denied by respondent under oath since
he chose to just argue on the basis of the improper motivations and the
inadmissibility, hearsay and self-serving nature of the documents presented.
Complainants have presented evidence sufficient enough to convince us that indeed
respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a person who is not his wife. The
evidence taken together will support the fact that respondent is not of good moral
character. That respondent chose not to deny under oath the grave and serious
allegations made against him is to our mind his undoing and his silence has not helped
his position before the Commission. As between the documents and positive
statements of complainants, made under oath and the arguments and comments of
respondent submitted through his lawyers, which were not verified under oath by
respondent himself, we are inclined and so give weight to the evidence of
complainants. The direct and forthright testimonies and statements of Nelson Melgar
and Romeo Laygo that respondent was openly cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente is
not hearsay. The witnesses may have admitted that respondent Mendoza did not tell
them that a certain Marilyn de la Fuente was his paramour (for why would respondent
admit that to complainants) but the witnesses did state clearly in their affidavits under
oath that respondent was cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente who is not respondents
wife. Again their categorical statements taken together with the other documents, are
enough to convince us and conclude that respondent is not of good moral character.

Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of good moral
character is a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing. The
continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in
the practice of law [Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586 (1956); Cordova vs.
Cordova 179 SCRA 680 (1989); People vs. Tuanda 181 SCRA 682 (1990)]. The
moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1 (1997)].

In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a mockery of the
fundamental institution of marriage. Respondent in fact even so stated in Exhibit F
that he is separated from his wife. This fact and statement without any further
explanation from respondent only contributes to the blot in his moral character which
good moral character we repeat is a continuing condition for a member to remain in
good standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent has
violated this rule against engaging in immoral conduct.

We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement made in Santos vs.
Dischoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978) that courts should not be used by private persons
particularly disgruntled opponents to vent their rancor on members of the Bar through
unjust and unfounded accusations. However, in the instant case the charges can hardly
be considered as unfounded or unjust based on the evidence presented. The evidence
presented shows that respondent no longer possess (sic) that good moral character
necessary as a condition for him to remain a member of the Bar in good standing. He
is therefore not entitled to continue to engage in the practice of law.

We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be fully supported

by the pleadings and evidence on record, and, hence, approve and adopt the
same.
The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence
required in administrative proceedings which is only substantial evidence, or
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conviction.[12]
Witness Melgars testimony that respondent had been publicly introducing
Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife is corroborated by the contents of an article in
the Naujanews, introducing respondent as one of Naujans public servants,
and stating therein that respondent has been blessed with two beautiful
children with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.[13] It should be noted that said
publication is under the control of respondent, he being the Chairman of the
Board thereof. Thus, it could be reasonably concluded that if he contested the
truth of the contents of subject article in the Naujanews, or if he did not wish to
publicly present Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife, he could have easily ordered
that the damning portions of said article to be edited out.
With regard to respondents argument that the credibility of witnesses for
the complainants is tainted by the fact that they are motivated by revenge for
respondents filing of criminal cases against them, we opine that even if
witnesses Melgar and Laygo are so motivated, the credibility of their
testimonies cannot be discounted as they are fully supported and
corroborated by documentary evidence which speak for themselves. The birth
certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22,
1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente; and the
Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to
the existence in its records of an entry of a marriage between respondent and
one Felicitas Valderia celebrated on January 16, 1980, are public documents
and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, as provided for
under Article 410[14] of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna
Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto
M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente, are inadmissible in evidence for having
been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1993, which provides as follows:

Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records.

(1) The records of a persons birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no information
relating thereto shall be issued except on the request of any of the following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in administrative,
judicial or other official proceedings to determine the identity of the childs parents or
other circumstances surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the persons death, the nearest of kin.
(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at
least two months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred pesos, or both
in the discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that

evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by
the law or these rules. There could be no dispute that the subject birth
certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether
the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates
allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only
provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of
birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in
violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On
the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion
of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It
should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable
searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by
the government or the state.[15] In People vs. Hipol,[16] we explained that:

The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself
with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights
only tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression
and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.
Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. The alleged
warrantless search made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurers office,
can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted
searches and seizures.

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals,

obtained the subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the
Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of
the birth certificates in question, said public documents are, therefore,
admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of
this administrative case against respondent.
Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina
dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and
respondents Certificate of Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein
respondent himself declared he was married to Felicitas Valderia, were never
denied nor rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public documents sufficiently
prove that he fathered two children by Marilyn dela Fuente despite the fact
that he was still legally married to Felicitas Valderia at that time.
In Bar Matter No. 1154,[17] good moral character was defined thus:

. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he
is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.

In Zaguirre vs. Castillo,[18] we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct,

to wit:
. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such
conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.

In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of the Bar and
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships
or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards and, thus, ruled that siring a child with a woman other than his wife
is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer.[19]
We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The fact that
respondent continues to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not
his legal wife, thus, siring children by her, shows his lack of good moral
character. Respondent should keep in mind that the requirement of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain ones good
standing in the legal profession.[20] In Aldovino vs. Pujalte, Jr.,[21] we
emphasized that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of
members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the
trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the
legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is
made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the
public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him
one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to
withdraw the privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found

GUILTY of immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law
until he submits satisfactory proof that he has abandoned his immoral course
of conduct.
Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on respondent at his last
known address and entered in his record as attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar
Confidant, and the Court Administrator be furnished also a copy of this
resolution for their information and guidance as well as for circularization to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.