Poe vs. COMELEC
The petitioner attached to her COC an “Affidavit Affirming
Facts:
Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn infant
in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing the parental care and custody
over petitioner by Edgardo Militar to Emiliano Militar and his wife, she has been reported and
registered as a foundling and issued a Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, thus was
given the name, Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.
When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses Ronal Allan Kelley (aka
Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces) filed a petition foe her adoption. The
trial court granted their petition and ordered that her name be changed to Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe.
Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of 18 in 1986; in 1988, she applied
and was issued Philippine Passport by the DFA; in 1993 and 1998, she renewed her passport.
She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies after enrolling and pursuing
a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines. She graduated in 1991 from
Boston College where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.
She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S.,
in San Juan City and decided to flew back to the U.S. after their wedding. She gave birth to her
eldest child while in the U.S.; and her two daughters in the Philippines.
She became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came back to the Philippines to support
her father’s candidacy for president in the May 2004 elections and gave birth to her youngest
daughter. They then returned to the U.S. in 2004 but after few months, she rushed back to the
Philippines to attend to her ailing father. After her father’s death, the petitioner and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 2005 and immediately secured a
TIN, then her children followed suit; acquired property where she and her children resided.
In 2006, She took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to RA No.
9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; she filed a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
three children which was granted. She registered as a voter; secured Philippine passport;
appointed and took her oath as Chairperson of the MTRCB after executing an affidavit of
Renunciation of American citizenship before the Vice Consul of the USA and was issued a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the USA in 2011.
In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013
Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period of residence in
the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was
proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In
her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005.
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City
on 14 October 2015.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she
cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc
cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she was in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as
a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-
born citizenship issue.
Issue:
Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Held:
Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-born Filipino.
It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings as they are already impliedly so recognized.
There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting discrimination
against foundlings as the three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the
laws.
Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported by some treaties, adhering to
the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is
found.
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen."[1]
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was
the 1935 Constitution.[2]
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps
and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No.
63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service
to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the
armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship
if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said
foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of
rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance
incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign
country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is
commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned
in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic
of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said
country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically
entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.[3] He ran for and was elected as the Representative of
the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin
of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.[4]
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision[5] dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.[6]
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the
following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of
such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact
that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET
committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when
it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and
constitutionally restore his natural-born status.[7]
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became
an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino
since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and
had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution
expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born
citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the
innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[8]
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These
ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and
the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is
a natural-born citizen thereof.[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship."[10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic
Act No. 530.[11] To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications[12] and none of the disqualifications[13] provided by law to become a Filipino citizen.
The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1)
not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not
been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed
any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.[14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes
by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)
by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.[15]
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As
a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine
citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.[16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen
who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications[17] and none of
the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.[18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the
allied forces in World War II;[20] (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time;[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;[22] and (5) political and economic
necessity.[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of
the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in
the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic, [24]
we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring
to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all
that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to
register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided
in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.][25]
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.[26] This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces
of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local
Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.[27] It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had
to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its
decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a
Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which
were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before
January 17, 1973,[28] of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they
were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born
of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered
natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV
adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section
1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens
under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration
of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire
it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by
the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to
go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-
born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of
the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
House.[29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the
latter.[30] In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power
and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter
for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the
correctness of the assailed decision.[31] There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in
this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
NICOLAS LEWIS vs. COMELEC
DECISION meet the requirements of residency, among others under Section 1, Article 5
of the Constitution. [4]

GARCIA, J.:
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to

the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or
Nicolas-Lewis et al., [5]
filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed
A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed
to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
a Comment,[6] therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may be expected, petitioners were
2003 [1]
(R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to
not able to register let alone vote in said elections.
allow them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of
The facts:
Comment), therein stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to

exercise the right of suffrage, may do so , observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which
elections had rendered the petition moot and academic.[7]
accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national

and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification

The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot
as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States
and academic, but insofar only as petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned.
that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003 [2],
The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of
they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence
allowing duals to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains
requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different
unresolved.
Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence

restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be
eligible to vote in future elections.
Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal vs.
Observing the petitioners and the COMELECs respective formulations of the issues, the same may
be reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile
retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee
voter under R.A. 9189.

COMELEC [3] on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response: The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to the petition.

Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality , it is the

Commission's position that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise
the right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was
not enacted for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their
citizenship on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and
jurisprudence now stand, they are considered regular voters who have to
In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the governing provisions on the right of
suffrage is, therefore, indicated.
We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as follows:
 SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and
who shall have resided in the Philippinesfor at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. xxx.
SEC 2. The Congress shall provide a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility
factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system
wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the
residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote.
In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL[8] - identifying in its
Section 4 who can vote under it and in the following section who cannot, as follows:
Section 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not
otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day
of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives.
Section 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting
under this Act:
(a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine
laws;
(b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who
have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
(c) Those who have [been] convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal
of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year,
including those who have been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under
Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, .;
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the
host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared
for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years
from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also
state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure
to return shall be the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
(e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously
declared insane or incompetent by competent authority . (Words in bracket
added.)
Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism.
However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents
in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would,
however, face a constitutional challenge on the ground that, as narrated in Macalintal, it -
violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the
voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding an election. [The challenger] cites Caasi vs. Court of Appeals [9] to
support his claim [where] the Court held that a green card holder immigrant
to the [US] is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in
the Philippines.
[The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution
does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature
should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on
the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends
or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to
vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone
who, on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided
for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.[10] (Words in bracket added.)
As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 mainly on
the strength of the following premises:
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically
disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in
the host country because immigration or permanent residence in another
country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of
origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident
abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show
that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional
intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that allcitizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise the
right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee
voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is
required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate
Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the affidavit itself
is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d)
is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to
go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it
serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile
of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under
Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes provisional registration
 or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise. [11]
Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress
enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of which reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that
all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of
a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
xxx xxx xxx
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-
acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed
citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet
the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship ;
3) xxx xxx xxx.
(4) xxx xxx xxx;
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office
in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those
who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office
in the country of which they are naturalized citizens;
and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country
which they are naturalized citizens.
After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political rights, specifically the right of
suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.
Opposing the petitioners bid, however, respondent COMELEC invites attention to the same
Section 5 (1) providing that duals can enjoy their right to vote, as an adjunct to political rights,
only if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other
existing laws. Capitalizing on what at first blush is the clashing provisions of
the aforecited provision of the Constitution, which, to repeat, requires residency in the Philippines
for a certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants a Filipino non-resident absentee voting
rights,[12] COMELEC argues:
4. DUALS MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/ RESIDENCE IN
THE PHILIPPINES
4.01. The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements in
RA 9225 is logical. The duals, upon renouncement of
their Filipino citizenship and acquisition of foreign
citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned their
domicile and severed their legal ties to the homeland as
a consequence. Having subsequently acquired a second
citizenship (i.e., Filipino) then, duals must, for purposes
of voting, first of all, decisively and definitely establish
their domicile through positive acts; [13]
The Court disagrees.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise
their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most

likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an
absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence,
to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements
exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Thus, wrote the
Court in Macalintal:
It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it]
intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents
domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters
for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section
2 [Article V] immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the
doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, , the strategic
location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided
for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect
to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared
that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote
even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency
requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of
debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was
deliberated upon on the Senate floor, thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked
into in relation to the constitutional provisions. I think
the sponsor and I would agree that the Constitution is
supreme in any statute that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution .
xxx xxx xxx
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall
have resided in the Philippines. They are permanent
immigrants. They have changed residence so they are
barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked
whether this committee amendment which in fact does
not alter the original text of the bill will have any effect
on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this
has been asked in various fora. This is in compliance with
the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of
residence is synonymous with domicile.
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile is
the intent to return to one's home. And the fact that a
Filipino may have been physically absent from the
Philippines and may be physically a resident of
the United States, for example, but has a clear
intent to return to the Philippines, will make him
qualified as a resident of the Philippines under
this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional
mandate that we that Congress must provide a franchise
to overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage
principle literally as demanding physical
presence, then there is no way we can provide for
offshore voting to our offshore kababayan, Mr.
President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution
says, in Section 2 of Article V, it reads: The Congress
shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is
qualified. In other words, anything that we may
do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must
be anchored on the proposition that they are
qualified. Absent the qualification, they cannot
vote. And residents (sic) is a qualification.
xxx xxx xxx
Look at what the Constitution says In the place wherein
they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election.
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros . We are
separated only by a creek. But one who votes
in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he resides in
Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our
Constitution is. .
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in
Pateros, yes, he may do so. But he must do so, make
the transfer six months before the election, otherwise,
he is not qualified to vote.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr.
President. But it is a point already well-debated even in
 the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason
Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately
after the six-month/one-year residency
requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that
Section 2 which authorizes absentee voting is an
exception to the six-month/one-year residency
requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President,
that one must remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our
jurisprudence residency has been interpreted as
synonymous with domicile.
But the third more practical reason, is, if
we follow the interpretation of the gentleman, th
en it is legally and constitutionally impossible to
give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who
do not physically live in the country, which is
quite ridiculous because that is exactly the whole
point of this exercise to enfranchise them and
empower them to vote. [14] (Emphasis and words in
bracket added; citations omitted)
Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting.According to the poll body:
1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has
been consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens
of other countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in
the pertinent provisions of RA 9225; [15]
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope
of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now
exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee
voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise:
Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of
the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;
Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified
to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is
abroad on the day of elections;
While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust
of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This may be
deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads:
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-
acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed
citizens of the Philippines.
It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen (18) yea
rs of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of "duals" may
nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the
Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present day "duals,"
provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to
R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not
have plausibly intended such absurd situation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that
those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the
system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
SO ORDERED.
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V.
Daza III.The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]
 The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELECs Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios
Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998
elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based
on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered
as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632
and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a
Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14,
1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration
as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and
a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which
he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified
from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano
DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[3] The motion
remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the
COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.[4] Petitioners
motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered
its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed
the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor
of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.[5] The pertinent portions of the resolution of
the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under
the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his
father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought
him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered
him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of
registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not
renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself
as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US
citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May
7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the
candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred
fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred
thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred
fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred
seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the
popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law which
may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA
727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondents certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the
position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice
to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the
winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening
of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC
en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati
City.Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already
37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in
the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of
Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7
May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even
assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the
City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent
Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was
not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioners
motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot
bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to initiate
an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted
by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
....
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the
Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and
whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor
an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati
City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent
be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in
the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out
only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at
that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from
the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,[6] reiterated in several
cases,[7] only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the
question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the
winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on
May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was
precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local position under
40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was
petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered
the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for
certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition
properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners motion for intervention but also with the
substantive issues respecting private respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual
citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses
dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of
Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from running for any
elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the
Charter of the City of Makati.[8]
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides
with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local
elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.[9] For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its
necessity as follows:[10]
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have
circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance and I
reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship
which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident
of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem
of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the
Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all
over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact
that the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China
in Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the Peoples Republic
of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of
Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were represented, which was
dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were
also represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of
Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by
a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed
by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about
the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has
always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or
Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown Taipei
are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean
a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means economic
stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new
section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL
ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with
dual allegiance, thus:[11]
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the
sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke
then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the
Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the
Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of
course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of those
debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the
decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China was made in 1975, a
good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is
asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just
to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship,
with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national
security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a
future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this
country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double
allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will
prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual
citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to
dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process
with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice
if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most
perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a
reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We
recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another
country is something completely beyond our control.[12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to
the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the
following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any
person with dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under
the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There
is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority,
must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
 On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country
of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a
situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he
would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or
the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can
renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect,
be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an
election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines
is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans
example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to
question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the
Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He
will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in
the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that
he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this
disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty[14] of which at the
time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of
the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The
determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter
should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law
may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law
of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our
legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought
or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It
would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth
at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC
en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private
respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now he is solely
a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is
not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was
made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been
made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the United States, whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign
state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign
territory. To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign
relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private
respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements
made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR
NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,
CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND
DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE
FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL
ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE
THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL
RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS
STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC it was held:[17]
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity
of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify him from running for any elective local position? We answer
this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS
at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in
1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his
American citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when
he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino
citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took
his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992,
and in 1995.Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness
or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained
in private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his
American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners contention that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since
no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as
an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit
in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v.
COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere
fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino.
. . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino,
possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation
here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be
express, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is
no renunciation, either express or implied.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago,[19] we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport
and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces
his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
MOY YA LIM VS COMM ON IMMIGRATION
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8
February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand
uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a
period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before
the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13
February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner
of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took
place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write
and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino
neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-
law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization
proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant
for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow
that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to
treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today,
there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of
a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she
may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the
citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as
the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative
case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino
citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.