According to Angchangco, Jr. v.

Ombudsman,44 inordinate delay in resolving a criminal

complaint, being violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to
the speedy disposition of cases, warrants the dismissal of the criminal case.

xxx

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily
compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the
speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the
possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last,
because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness
of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to
recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned
prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a
cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained,
his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its
case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible
for the government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require
impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the
prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two
things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued
from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is
reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such
delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked
by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or
prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper
for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the
defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the
prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the State. x x
x

Xxx

Lastly, the contention is that the State cannot be bound by the mistakes committed by
the public officers involved in the review of the case and that the right of the State to
prosecute erring officers involved in this P89 Million-Peso Fiasco cannot be prejudiced.
We should take note that equally true is the constitutional right of the respondents to the
speedy disposition of cases and the constitutional mandate for the Ombudsman to act
promptly on complaints.65 The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in
the disposition of cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the
people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.66 The
adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with
the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the
ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the
people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile.

G.R. No. 199151-56, July 25, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH

DIVISION, LT. GEN. LEOPOLDO S. ACOT, B/GEN. ILDEFONSO N. DULINAYAN,
LT. COL. SANTIAGO B. RAMIREZ, LT. COL. CESAR M. CARINO, MAJ. PROCESO
T. SABADO, MAJ. PACQUITO L. CUENCA, 1LT. MARCELINO M. MORALES,
M/SGT. ATULFO D. TAMPOLINO, REMEDIOS "REMY" DIAZ, JOSE GADIN, JR.,
GLENN ORQUIOLA, HERMINIGILDA LLAVE, GLORIA BAYONA AND RAMON
BAYONA JR., Respondents.

The trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to countenance delays in the prosecution of
the case. The Court's ruling in Tan v. People[23] is quite instructive, to wit:

An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is

guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14 (2) of Article III of the
Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being
to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined
within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may
interpose.Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the right to
speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice
denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of
disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is
constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.

Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic

Act No. 8493, otherwise known as "The Speedy Trial Act of 1998," was
enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial period to 180 days from
the first day of trial. Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court
dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court
Circular No. 38-98, which has been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119.

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court had occasion to state -

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy

disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent
the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent
delays in the administration of justice by mandating the
courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of
criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy
disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been
denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification.
 The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential

ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It
cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system
where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It
secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the
rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the
rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules
of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give
meaning to that intent.

The Court emphasized in the same case that:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights

of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of

his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy
trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b)
the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his
right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or

justification of the State for such delay. Different weights

should be assigned to different reasons or justifications

invoked by the State. x x x.

Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused's right to

speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining whether
petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and
balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason
therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d)
prejudice caused by such delay.

xxxx

We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy

trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given
to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[24]

Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had already been deprived of his
liberty on two occasions. First, during the preliminary investigation before the MCTC,
when he was incarcerated from November 18, 2004 to March 16, 2005, or a period of
almost four months; then again, when an Information had already been issued and
since rape is a non-bailable offense, he was imprisoned beginning June 27, 2008 until
the case was dismissed on January 16, 2009, or a period of over 6 months. Verily, there
can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any duration of time is quite
oppressive. Because of private respondent's continued incarceration, any delay in trying
the case would cause him great prejudice. Thus, it was absolutely vexatious and
oppressive to delay the trial in the subject criminal case to await the outcome of
petitioners' petition for transfer of venue, especially in this case where there is no
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by a higher court
against herein public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
CHURCHILLE V. MARI and the PEOPLE G.R. No. 187728
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Present:
Petitioners, VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
- versus - ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,* JJ.
HON. ROLANDO L. GONZALES,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Promulgated:
Branch 39, Sogod, Southern Leyte, and
PO1 RUDYARD PALOMA y TORRES, September 12, 2011
Respondents.

A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16,
Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which provides:

SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends
to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all
proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may
demand expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the administration of
justice.21

It must be noted, however, that the right to speedy disposition of cases should be
understood to be a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved would not be sufficient.22Jurisprudence dictates that the right is
deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.23

Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered and balanced: (1)
the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged
towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to
prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to
assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation
or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he
may interpose.30 This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by
the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual.
In the context of the right to a speedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan31 (Corpuz) illumined:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily
compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the
speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the
possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last,
because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness
of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to
recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned
prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a
cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained,
his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its
case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible
for the government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require
impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the
prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two
things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued
from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is
reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such
delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked
by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or
prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper
for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the
defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the
prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the State. x x
x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

As the right to a speedy disposition of cases encompasses the broader purview of the
entire proceedings of which trial proper is but a stage, the above-discussed effects in
Corpuz should equally apply to the case at bar. As held in Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.: 32

Sec. 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, reads:

"Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."

Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid
constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of
justice. It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case";
includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial, and affords
broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial.
It is more embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only
the period after the submission of the case. The present constitutional provision applies
to civil, criminal and administrative cases. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)

G.R. No. 191411 July 15, 2013

RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA, Petitioner,

vs.
SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 191871

EDWIN N. NACIONALES, ERNESTO P. MALVAS, and JOSE MA. G.

AMUGOD, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.