Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
1. Generality - If the accused attacks the jurisdiction of the court because of the
unique characteristic of his person (e.g. he is a foreigner, military, ambassador,
President), the applicable principle is generality. If the accused attacks the jurisdiction
of the court due to the unique characteristic of the place where the crime was committed
(e.g. foreign vessel, embassy or high sea), the applicable principle is territoriality.
It is submitted that a Vice-President even during his tenure could not invoke
immunity from criminal prosecution for plunder on the following reasons: (1) plunder
are not his official conducts as Vice-President; (2) the job of the Vice-President unlike
the head of the executive department does not demands undivided attention; (3) and
the implementation principal penalty of imprisonment for plunder is not inconsistent
with the constitutional provision on non-removal of impeachable officer except through
impeachment since he can function as Vice-President while serving sentence in
prison.However, accessory penalty of disqualification, which involved removal from
office, is not implementable since the enforcement thereof will offend the constitutional
provision on non-removal of impeachable officer.
b. Convention of the law of the sea - Under the Convention on the Law of the
Sea, the flag state of foreign merchant vessel passing through the territorial sea of
another state has jurisdiction over crimes committed therein. However, a coastal state
such as the Philippines can exercise jurisdiction over any crime committed on board
such ship in the following cases: (1) if its consequences extend to the coastal State; (2)
if it disturbs the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; (3) if the
ship master or a diplomatic or consular officer of the flag State requested assistance
from the local authorities; or (4) if it is for the suppression of traffic in narcotic drugs or
psychotropic substances.
1|Page Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
b. Regime of islands - Under the principle of territoriality, the court has also
jurisdiction over crime committed in Kalayaan Islands or Scarboruogh Shoal because
the Baseline Law (RA No. 9522) declares that the Philippines exercise sovereignty and
jurisdiction over it.
c. Bigamy - Under the principle of territoriality, the court has jurisdiction over
concubinage involving illicit relationship maintained in the Philippines; but it has no
jurisdiction over bigamy involving subsequent marriage contracted in Taiwan.
3. Extraterritoriality – Under the flag state rule, the Philippines has jurisdiction
over hijacking of PAL airplane in an American territory since it its registered in the
Philippines but not over murder committed in vessel registered in Panama while on high
seas although it is owned by a Filipino. Under the protective principle, the court has
jurisdiction over forgery of Philippine money committed in Taiwan whether by a Filipino
or an alien but not over forgery of US dollars committed therein. Under the
extraterritoriality rule, the court has jurisdiction over plunder, direct bribery and
falsification of document by a public officer in a Philippines consular premises stationed
in America but not corruption of public officer and falsification of document committed
by private individual as principal by inducement. Under the universality principle, the
court has jurisdiction over piracy committed on high seas for being a universal crime
but not over murder qualified by the circumstance of taking advantage of the calamity
brought about by piracy on high seas. The 12-mile territorial water of Taiwan or Sabah
may be considered as high seas; hence, piracy committed therein can be prosecuted in
the Philippines (People vs. Lol-Lo and Saraw, G.R. No. L-17958, February 27, 1922).
4. Prospectivity -If the court in trying an accused, who committed a crime prior
to the passage of the law, should give retroactive effect to the law provided that: (1) it is
favorable to the accused and (2) the accused is not a habitual delinquent (Article 22 of
RPC). If the law repeals a previous law or provision defining a crime, the applicable
principle is not Article 22 of RPC but nullum crimen poena sine lege. Since the intention
of the new law is to decriminalize an act punishable by the repealed law, the accused
should be acquitted or released if the already convicted, even though he is a habitual
delinquent.
Reclusion perpetua, which has duration of 40 years under Article 27 of RPC and
30 years under Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592 if the convict has
undergone preventive imprisonment, is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, which
has no duration. Amendatory law, which prescribes reclusion perpetua instead of life
imprisonment, shall be given a retroactive effect for being favorable to the accused
(People vs. Morilla, GR No. 189833, February 5, 2014).
If a child in conflict, who is a habitual delinquent, committed the crime prior to RA No.
9344, he is entitled to retroactive application thereof. Section 68 of RA No. 9344 expressly
provides retroactive application of the privileges to a child in conflict with the law (Atizado vs.
People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010, Bersamin) without condition. On the other
hand, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides retroactive application of the favorable law
subject to the condition of non-habitual delinquency. Since Section 68 of RA No. 9344 is a specific
provision while Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is a general provision, the latter yields to the
former. Generalia specialibus non derogant. Hence, the retroactive effect of RA No. 9344 is
unconditional.
2|Page Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
6. Repeal –RA No. 10655 has repealed Article 351 of RPC on premature marriage
without reenactment. This is a total repeal in which the intention of the new law is to
decriminalize an act punishable of old law. Atotal repeal deprives the courts of
jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its
repeal (Sindiong and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000). RA 8353 expressly repealed Article 336 of
RPC on rape but re-enacted it redefining this crimeunder Article 266-A. This is a partial
repealin which the intention of the new law is not to decriminalize an act punishable of
old law but to introduce changes. The effect of the new law is amendatory. This partial
repeal of Article 336 does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try and punish offender
for rape committed prior to RA No. 8353 (U.S. vs. Cana, 12 Phil. 241). RA No. 8353 shall
be given prospective effect since it is not favorable to the accused.
The accused shot with a firearm and killed by mistake a thief in the toilet, who
turned out to be his girlfriend. Invasion of property is considered as unlawful aggression
under Article 12 of the RPC because of the self-help doctrine under the Civil Code (People
vs. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, April 20, 1983). Even though there is no actual
invasion of property, unlawful aggression as an element of defense of property will be
considered as present because of the mistake of fact principle. However, the means
employed by him firing shots through the toilet door is not reasonable; and hence, he is
only entitled to privilege migrating circumstance of incomplete defense of property (US
vs. Apego, G.R. No. L-7929, November 18, 1912).
a. Tetanus - There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the
stabbing and the date when victim was rushed to hospital, exhibiting symptoms of
tetanus infection. Since infection is severe, he died the next day. The incubation period of
severe tetanus infection is less than 14 days. Hence, he could not have been infected at
the time of the stabbing since that incident occurred 22 days before the symptoms
manifested. The infection was an efficient intervening cause breaking the connection
between the physical injuries and death. Hence, the crime committed is physical injuries
(Villacorta vs. People, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011). If the victim was infected
by tetanus at the time of stabbing, and the infection is the proximate cause of death, the
crime committed is homicide (People vs. Cornel, G.R. No. L-204, May 16, 1947).
If the victim accidentally killed is the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle, the crime committed is qualified carnapping or carnapping in the
aggravated form under Section 3 of RA No. 10883. If the victim accidentally killed is not
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle, the crimes committed are
simple carnapping and homicide. The concept of carnapping is the same as that of theft
and robbery (People vs. Sia, G.R. No. 137457, Nov. 21, 2001). Although not punishable
under RPC, it can be treated as a felony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC (See:
Dimat vs. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012). Hence, the accused is liable for
homicide, which is the direct and natural consequence of simple carnapping.
Kidnapping for ransom consummates at the precise moment when the victim was
abducted. Receiving ransom payment is not an element of this crime. What is important
is that the victim was kidnapped for purpose of ransom. Since the crime is already
consummated, there is no basis to say that it is impossible to commit this crime (People
vs. Tan, G.R. No. 95322, March 1, 1993). Moreover, kidnapping is a crime against liberty
and not against person or property.
Firing a gun at the unoccupied bedroom with intention to kill a victim constitutes
impossible crime because it is factually impossible to kill a victim, who was not in the
bedroom (Intod vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992). But throwing
grenade at the unoccupied bedroom, where the victim is supposed to be sleeping,
constitutes arson if the bedroom was burned as a consequence.
“A” discharged shotgun at “B” from a distance of 300 yards; but because of the
limited range of the firepower of the shotgun, it would be impossible for “A” to harm “B”.
“A” is liable of discharge of firearm and not impossible crime. Where the offender
unlawful entered the house and took a watch that turned out to be his own, he is liable
for trespass to dwelling and not impossible crime (Criminal Law Conspectus by Justice
Florenz Regalado). If the accused administered abortive drugs upon his girlfriend whom
he believed to be pregnant, which turned out not to be true, but the woman became ill
4 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
for more than 30 days, the accused will be liable for serious physical injuries and not
impossible crime of abortion (Criminal Law Reviewer by Gregorio).
a. Gender crime - Gender is an element of all crimes against chastity except acts
of lasciviousness. In seduction and consented acts of lasciviousness, and abduction, the
offender must be a man, while the victim must be a woman. The offender in adultery
must be a married woman, while in concubinage a married man. If the element of gender
is not present in a crime against chastity, it is impossible to commit this crime (e.g. it is
impossible to commit abduction against a person, who is gay). Despite the impossibility
of its commission, the accused is not liable for impossible crime. To be held liable for
impossible crime, the act which is impossible to commit must constitutes crime against
person or property.However, abduction is a crime against chastity. But the accused may
be held liable for illegal detention.
A person, who has sexual intercourse with a woman not knowing that she was
already dead,is liable for impossible crime since rape is now a crime against person.
However, if he is aware that the woman is already dead, he is not liable for impossible
crime since criminal intent or propensity to rape, which is the basis of penalizing
impossible crime, is wanting.
If the gender element in rape through sexual intercourse is not present, the
offender is not liable for impossible crime. Although it is impossible to commit rape
through sexual intercourse where the victim is a gay, such acts constitute acts of
lasciviousness.
10. Indeterminate offense - Climbing on top of the naked victim, touching her
genitalia and mashing her breastsaresusceptible of double interpretation (People v.
Lamahang). His intention is either to rape or seduce her. Hence, the accused cannot be
held liable for attempted rape because intent to have sex is not clear. He is only liable
for acts of lasciviousness (Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014,
Bersamin).
Inflicting non-mortal wound upon the victim by shooting him constitutes physical
injuries if the accused did not further shoot him to inflict mortal wounds. The crime is
not attempted homicide because failure to shoot him further shows lack of intent to kill.
Moreover, spontaneous desistance from further shooting to victim to inflict mortal
wounds is a defense in attempted homicide (Pentecostes, Jr. vs. People, GR No. 167766,
April 7, 2010). But inflicting mortal wound upon the victim constitutes frustrated
homicide (De Guzman vs. People, G.R. No. 178512, November 26, 2014, Bersamin) even
if the accused desisted from further shooting him. The fact that the wounds are mortal
indicates intent to kill. Moreover, spontaneous desistance from further shooting is not
a defense in frustrated homicide (People vs. Abella, G.R. No. 198400, October 07, 2013).
offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or
opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression
must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand
to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or
like aiming to throw a pot (Rustia vs. People, G.R. No. 208351, October 05, 2016,
Bersamin).
12. Battered woman syndrome -The essence of this defense of “Battered Woman
Syndrome” as a defense is that battered woman, who suffers from physical and
psychological or emotional distress, is acting under an irresistible impulse to defend
herself although at the time of commission of the crime the battererhad not yet
committed unlawful aggression. That is why “Battered Woman Syndrome” is a defense
notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-
defense such as unlawful aggression (Section 26 of RA No. 9262). This Syndrome refers
to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in
women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse (Section 3).
The three phases of the Battered Woman Syndrome are: (1) the tension-building
phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving or non-violent phase
(People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004). The basis of the irresistible
impulse to make a defense against the batterer is the woman’s experiencing two
battering episodes.
The elements of Battered Woman Syndrome as a defense are as follows: (1) the
woman is subjected to cumulative abuse by the victim, with whom she has marital,
sexual or dating relationship; and (2) the cumulative abuse or battery is the act of
inflicting physical harm resulting to physical and psychological or emotional distress.
Since the abuse must be cumulative, there must be at least two episodes involving the
infliction of physical harm. If the first episode is infliction of physical harm and the
second episode is verbal abuse, the accused cannot avail Battered Woman Syndrome as
a defense.
13. Imbecility and minority – Mental retardation includes (a) idiot, whose
mental age is two-year old; (b) imbecile, whose mental age is seven-year old; (c) moron
or feebleminded, whose mental age is twelve-year old and (d) borderline intelligence
(People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011 Bersamin; People vs. Bayrante,
G.R. No. 188978, June 13, 2012).
In rape, there is a difference between actual age and mental age. In statutory
rape, the actual age of the victim must be under 12 years old. In rape against a person
deprived of reason, the mental age of the victim is 2 years old (idiot), 7 years old
(imbecile), 12 years old (feebleminded) or above 12 years old but suffering from
borderline intelligence (People vs. Butiong, supra; People vs. Bayrante, supra).
Under Section 5 (b) of RA No 7610, when the child subjected to sexual abuse is
under 12 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape and acts of
lasciviousness under RPC. For purpose of Section 5 (b), there is no difference between
6|Page Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
actual age and mental age. Hence, the victim whose actual age is 12 years old but her
mental age is 9 years old, is considered as a victim under 12 year of age within the
contemplation of Section 5 (b) (People vs. Pusing, G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016),
14. Insanity - The presumption, under Article 800 of the Civil Code, is that every
human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the
burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence (People vs. Tibon, G.R. No.
188320, June 29, 2010). There are two tests (People vs. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246,
November 29, 1950) to determine whether the mental condition of the accused is
exempting or mitigating:
a. Test of cognition – Under the test of cognition, the mental condition of the
accused is an exempting circumstance of insanity if there was a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the criminal act (People vs. Bulagao, G.R. No. 184757,
October 05, 2011); or mitigating circumstance of mental illness if there was only a partial
deprivation of intelligence (People vs. Puno, G.R. No. L- 33211, June 29, 1981). After
satisfying his lust, accused threatened the victim. This implies that accused knew what
he was doing, that it was wrong, and wanted to keep it a secret. It also indicated that
the crime was committed during one of his lucid intervals. Accused is not exempt from
liability for failure to pass the cognition test (People vs. Alipio, G.R. No. 185285, October
5. 2009).
b. Test of volition – Under the test of volition, the mental condition of the
accused is a mitigating circumstance of mental illness if there is complete or partial
deprivation of freedom. In sum, if a sex maniac or homicidal maniac had merely passed
the volition test but not the cognition test, he will only be given the benefit of mitigating
circumstance of illness. Diminution of freedom is enough to mitigate the liability of the
offender suffering from illness (See: People vs. Rafanan, Jr. November 21, 1991, G.R.
No. 54135, November 21, 1991). Thus, kleptomania is a mitigating circumstance of
mental illness.
Irresistible homicidal impulse in People vs. Bonoan G.R. No. 45130, February 17,
1937, which is an exempting circumstance is not anymore controlling. Irresistible
homicidal impulse, which is based on the volition test, is only a mitigating circumstance.
To exempt a person from criminal liability due to insanity, the controlling rule is
cognition testand not the volition test(People vs. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March
17, 2004). In several Supreme Court cases, the pleas of insanity of accused who are
suffering from schizophrenia or psychosis were rejected because of failure to pass the
cognition test. (People vs. Medina, G.R. No. 113691, February 6, 1998; People vs.
Pascual, G.R. No. 95029, March 24, 1993).
15. Child in conflict with the law -The rights and privileges of a child in conflict
with the law are as follows:
2. Ifthe accused is 15 years of age or below but above 12 years, shallbe considered
as a neglected child. Neglected child shall be mandatorily placed in a youth care facility
or Bahay Pag-asa in the following instances: (a) If the child commits serious crimes
such as parricide, murder, infanticide, rape, kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with homicide or rape, robbery with homicide or rape, destructive arson, or carnapping
where the driver or occupant is killed or raped or offenses involving dangerous drugs
punishable by more than 12 years of imprisonment; and (b) In case of repetition of
7 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
offenses and the child was previously subjected to a intervention program and his best
interest requires involuntarily commitment.
3. If the child is found guilty, the court shall place him under suspended
sentence, without need of application instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction
(Section 38 of RA 9344). The law makes no distinction as to the nature of offense by the
child. The Senate debate discloses that the suspension is applicable to heinous crime
(People vs. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011; People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No.
199270, October 21, 2015).
An accused, who is under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime, is a child in conflict with the law. He will not be deprived of privileges under the
law even though he reaches age of majority at time of rendition of judgment. Exception:
While Section 38 of RA 9344 provides suspension of sentence can still be applied even
if the child is already 18 years of age at the time of conviction. However, Section 40
limits the suspension of sentence until the child reaches the age of 21 (People vs.
Gambao, GR No. 172707, October 01, 2013; People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270,
October 21, 2015; Hubilla vs. People, G.R. No. 176102, November 26, 2014, Bersamin).
3. If the accused is an adult, application for probation must be filed within the
period of perfecting an appeal (Section 4 of PD No. 968 or Probation Law). However, the
accused is a child in conflict with the law, application for probation may be filed at any
time (Section 42 of RA No. 9344). In sum, it can be filed even beyond the period of
perfecting an appeal or even during the pendency of an appeal.
4. The child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the
court, be made to serve his sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities in accordance with
Section 51 of RA No. 9344 (People vs. Arpon, G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011;
People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015; Hubilla vs. People, G.R. No.
176102, November 26, 2014, Bersamin).
where minority of the offender is an element. A child shall not be punished for
committing a status offense (Section 57). Under Section 57-A, local ordinances on status
offenses shall be for the protection of children. For committing status offense, children
recorded as a child at risk shall be brought to their residence or to any barangay official
at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents instead of being
penalized.
18. Voluntary confession - A plea of guilty made after the prosecution had
begun presenting its evidence cannot be considered voluntary since it was made only
after the accused realized that the evidence already presented by the prosecution is
enough to cause his conviction (People vs. Montinola, G.R. No. 131856-57, July 9, 2001).
the commission of robbery with homicide by his co-conspirator, is not liable because
the former dissociated himself from the conspiracy.
Conspirators are all liable for robbery although not all profited and gained from
the robbery. When a conspirator committed homicide by reason of or on the occasion of
the robbery, his co-conspirators are liable for special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, unless they endeavored to prevent the killing (People vs. Ebet, GR No. 181635,
November 15, 2010; People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Diu,
GR No. 201449, April 03, 2013) or they cannot prevent the killing since they are not
aware thereof (People vs. Corbes, G.R. No. 113470, March 26, 1997). This rule is
applicable to special complex crime of kidnapping with rape (People vs. Anticamaray,
GR No. 178771, June 08, 2011) or robbery with rape (People v. Suyu, G.R. No. 170191,
August 16, 2006; People v. Canturia, G.R. No. 108490 June 22, 1995).
c. Offense under special law - B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the
supplementary application of the provisions RPC including the rule on
conspiracy. Hence, such rule may be applied supplementarily. Thus, a non-issuer of
bum check can be held liable for violation of BP Blg. 22 on the basis of conspiracy.
(Ladonga vs. People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005). The principle of conspiracy
may be applied to RA No. 9262. Thus, a person (such as mother-in-law), who has no
marital, sexual or dating relationship with the victim, can be held liable for violence
against woman on the basis of conspiracy (Go-Tan vs. Go, G.R. No. 168852, September
30, 2008)
If there is conspiracy, the act of the public officer in violating RA No. 3019 is
imputable to the private individual although there are not similarly situated in relation
to the object of the crime. Moreover, Section 9 provides penalty for public officer or
private person for crime under Section 3. Hence, a private individual can be prosecuted
for violation of RA No. 3019 (Go vs. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602,
April 13, 2007). Even if the public officer, with whom the private individual allegedly
conspired, died, the latter can still be prosecuted for violation of RA No. 3019. Death
extinguishes the criminal liability but not the crime. Hence, if there is proof of the crime
and conspiracy between the dead public officer and private individual, the latter can
still be convicted of violation of RA No. 3019 (People vs. Go, GR NO. 168539, March 25,
2014). However, if the public officer with whom the private individual allegedly conspired
is acquitted, the latter should also be acquitted (Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
126995, October 6, 1998).
24. Accomplice - Lending weapon such a gun to a killer for purpose of killing a
specific person such as Pedro is an act of accomplice. But if the killer used the weapon
in killing a different person such as Juan, the lender is not liable as an accomplice. To
be held liable as an accomplice, it is important that that he knows and concurs in the
criminal design of the principal (community of design) and participates before or during
the commission of the crime by supplying moral or material aid in an efficacious way.
In this case, the lender concurred in the killing of Pedro but not Juan. Hence, he is not
liable as an accomplice. If the killer used another weapon such as knife instead of the
gun borrowed in killing Pedro, the lender is not liable as an accomplice. Although the
10 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
lender concurred in the killing of Pedro, he did not supply the killer material or moral
aid in an efficacious way since the weapon used is not the one borrowed from him.
25. Fencing – In fencing, the property, which the accused possesses with intent
to gain, must be derived from the proceeds of theft or robbery (Ong vs. People, GR No.
190475, April 10, 2013). The concept of carnapping is the same as that of theft or
robbery (People vs. Sia, G.R. No. 137457, November 21, 2001). Thus, carnapping can
be considered as within the contemplation of the word “theft” or “robbery” in PD No.
1612 (Dimat vs. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012). If the property is derived
from the proceeds of malversation or estafa, fencing is not committed. But the accused
can be held liable as an accessory if he profited or assisted other to profit from this
misappropriated property.
Actual knowledge that the property is stolen is not required. Fencing is committed
is the accused should have known that the property is stolen taken into consideration
the attending circumstances such as (1) the price of the property is so cheap; (2)
expensive jewelry is being offered for sale at midnight in a street; (3) accused knew that
the car he bought was not properly documented (Dimat vs. People, supra); or (4) new
tires are being peddled in the streets by an unknown seller (Ong vs. People, supra).
Furthermore, mere possession of stolen property shall be prima facie evidence of fencing
(Section 6 of PD No. 1612).
The criminal actor, who threwthe body of murdered victim into the river to destroy
the corpus delicti, is liable for murder qualified by the circumstance of employment of
means to afford impunity.The one who assisted in in throwing the body is liable as an
accessory to murder for destroying the body of the crime to prevent its discovery (People
vs. Devaras, G.R. Nos. 100938-39, December 15, 1993)or a principal in the crime of
obstruction of justice for destroying it to impair its availability as evidence in a criminal
proceeding.
After the discovery of illegal possession of lumber, the accused unlawfully took
the truckused to commit the crime from the authorities. He is not liable as an accessory
since he did not conceal the instrument of the crime for the purpose of preventing the
discovery thereof. Crime was already discovered when the concealment was made.
However, he is liable for obstruction of justice for concealing the truck to impair its
availability as evidence in the criminal proceeding for illegal possession of lumber
(Padiernos vs. People, G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015).
There is no credit if the accused is recidivist; has been convicted previously twice
or more times of any crime; or has failed to surrender voluntarily before a court of law
upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence (Article 29 of RPC as amended
by RA No. 10592).
If the offender is a child, the applicable rule for crediting the period of
commitment and detention is not Article 29 of RPC but Section 41, RA 9344, which
provides that the full time spent in actual commitment and detention of juvenile
delinquent shall be credited in the services of his sentence.
29. Special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) –If detention prisoner or convicted
prisoner escapes during the calamity, and subsequently surrenders within 48 hours
from the time the President announces the passing away of such calamity, he is entitled
to 1/5 special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) under Article 98 of RPC as amended by
RA No. 10592; if the convicted prisoner did not surrender within the period, he is liable
for evasion of sentence under Article 158 of RPC punishable by penalty equivalent to
one-fifth of the time still remaining to be served under the original sentence, which in
no case shall exceed six months; if the detention prisoner did not surrender within the
period, he is not liable for evasion of sentence. Only convicted prisoner can commit
evasion of service of sentence because a detention prisoner is not serving sentence,
which he can evade.
12 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
30. Special complex crime –Raping the victim or inserting instrument in her
anal orifice after treacherously inflicting mortal wounds is not a special complex crime
of rape with homicide because the original design of the victim is kill and not to rape
the victim. The crime committed is murder qualified by treachery and rape shall be
regarded either as ignominy or cruelty (People vs. Laspardas, G.R. No. L-46146, Oct. 23,
1979) or sexual assault shall be treated as cruelty (People vs. Bernabe, G.R. No.
185726, October 16, 2009).
a. Special rule for kidnapping with homicide - Where the person kidnapped is
killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely
sought or was merely an afterthought, the accused is liable for a special complex crime
of kidnapping with homicide (People vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 116239, November 29, 2000;
People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 118570, October 12, 1998; People vs. Larranaga, 138874-
75, February 3, 2004; People vs. Montanir, GR No. 187534, April 04, 2011; People vs.
Dionaldo, G.R. No. 207949, July 23, 2014). However, if the derivation of liberty is just
incidental to the transportation of the victim to the place where he will be executed, the
crime is murder. Kidnapping with homicide is not committed because of lack of intent
to deprive liberty (People vs. Estacio Jr., G.R. No. 171655, July 22, 2009).
The phrase “by reason of the rape” obviously conveys the notion that the killing
is due to the rape, which is the crime the offender originally designed to commit. The
victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing. In contrast, the phrase “on the occasion
of the rape” as shown by Senate deliberations refers to a killing that occurs
immediately before or after,or during the commission itself of the rape, where the victim
of the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim (People vs. Villaflores, G.R.
No. 184926, April 11, 2012, Bersamin; People vs. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5,
2011).
13 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
g. Robbery by using force upon thing - Breaking the window of a house and
taking property inside without entering constitutes theft. Breaking the window is not a
circumstance that will qualify the taking into robbery by using force upon thins since
this crime requires that the breaking of window is a means to enter the building (People
vs. Adorno, CA 40 O.G. 567; People vs. Jaranilla. G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974).
Breaking the window to commit theft is an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
Using picklock to open a locked cabinet and taking property therein is not
robbery by using force upon thing. To constitute robbery by using force upon thing, the
picklock must be used to open the building and not merely a lockedfurniture (US vs.
Macamay, G.R. No. 11952, September 25, 1917). Entrusted key is not a false key in
robbery by using force upon thing.
L-41336, February 18, 1983; Fransdilla vs. People, GR No. 197562, April 20, 2015,
Bersamin). If the entry into the dwelling is without force upon thing, and the property
was taken by means of violence or intimidation, the crime committed is robbery by
means of violence or intimidation with aggravating circumstance of disregard of dwelling
(People vs. Tejero, G.R. No. 128892 June 21, 1999; People vs. Evangelio, G.R. No.
181902, August 31, 2011). When the elements of both robbery with homicide and
robbery by using force upon thing (unlawful entry) are present, the former shall absorb
the latter. In sum, robbery by using force upon thing committed on occasion of robbery
by means of violence or intimidation shall be integrated into the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide (People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People
vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 05, 2016). But aggravating circumstances of
disregard of dwelling and unlawful entry shall be both appreciated (People vs. Lamosa,
G.R. No. 74291-93, May 23, 1989).
31. Compound crime - The single act of rolling the hand grenade on the floor of
the gymnasium which resulted in the death of victims constituted a compound crime of
multiple murders (People vs. Mores, GR No. 189846, June 26, 2013). Wherethe use of
grenade render the victim defenseless, “use of explosives” shall be considered as a
qualifying circumstance because this is the principal mode of attack. Thus, treachery
will be relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance (People vs. Comadre, et
al., G.R. No. 153559, June 8, 2004). The single act of running over the victims with a
van constitutes compound crime of multiple murders (People vs. Punzalan, Jr., G.R. No.
199892, December 10, 2012).
a. Single act treated as several acts - Single act of pressing the trigger of
Thompson or armalite is treated as several acts as many as there are bullets fired from
gun. Because of special mechanism of Thompson, the single act of pressing its trigger
will cause the continuous firing of bullets. Thus, accused is liable as many homicides
as there are victims (People vs. Desierto, (C.A.) 45 O.G. 4542; People vs. Sanchez, G.R.
No. 131116, August, 27, 1999; People vs. Tabaco, G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19,
1997; People v. Vargas, Jr., G.R. No. 86728, April 6, 1990; People vs. Bermas, G.R. Nos.
76416 and 94312 July 5, 1999).
b. Variance rule - The body of the information charged the accused of compound
crime with murder and attempted murder since two victims were hit by a single shot.
The evidence shows that murder and attempted murder are separate crimes since the
two victims were hit by several shot. Under the variance rule, if the crime alleged in the
information varies with the crime proven with evidence, the accused shall be convicted
of the crime alleged or proven whichever the lesser. Thus, accused shall be convicted of
complex crime, which is lesser compared to two crimes (People vs. Bernardo, GR No.
198789, June 03, 2013).
The “single criminal impulse rule” under the Lawas doctrine is more of an
exception than the general rule (People vs. Remollino, G.R. No. L-14008, September 30,
1960). Article 48 on compound crime speaks of single act, but not single criminal
impulse (People vs. Pineda, G.R. No. L-26222, July 21, 1967). In Lawas case, the SC
was merely forced to apply Article 48 because of the impossibility of ascertaining the
number of persons killed by each accused (People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No.
184500. September 11, 2012). Thus, the Lawas doctrine should not be applied if there
is conspiracy since the number of victims actually killed by each conspirator is not
anymore material if there is conspiracy (People vs. Elarcosa, G.R. No. 186539, June 29,
2010).
15 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
The “single criminal purpose rule” under the Abella case was adopted in
consideration of the plight of the prisoners; hence, it is only applicable if killings were
commit by prisoners against their fellow prisoners (People vs. Pincalin, G.R. No. L-
38755, January 22, 1981; People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012
32. Complex crime proper - Stabbing after the rape is a separate crime of
frustrated homicide. This is not a complex crime proper since the latter is not necessary
to commit the former (People vs. Isla, G.R. No. 199875, November 21, 2012).
a. Abduction and rape - If the main objective of the accused is to rape the victim,
the crime committed is rape. Forcible abduction (People vs. Mejoraday, G.R. No. 102705,
July 30, 1993; People vs. Almanzor, G.R. No. 124916, July 11, 2002) or illegal detention
(People vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. 148991, January 21, 2004), which is incidental to the
commission of rape, is absorbed. The doctrine of absorption rather than Article 48 of
RPC is applicable since forcible abduction or illegal detention is an indispensable means
to commit rape.
If the accused abducted the victim without clear showing of lewd design, the
crime committed is kidnapping since it will appear that the intention of the accused is
to deprive victim of his liberty. If as a consequence of illegal detention, the victim was
rape, the crime committed is a special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. This is
the crime committed regardless of the number of rapes. Multiple rapes will be considered
as a component of this special complex crime (People vs. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No.
186417, July 27, 2011; People vs. Anticamaray, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011). If as
a consequence of illegal detention, the victim was rape and then killed, the crime
committed is a special complex crime of kidnapping with homicide. Rape will be
considered as a component of this special complex crime (People vs. Larranaga, 138874-
75, February 3, 2004, En Banc).
The difference between rape through forcible abduction and kidnapping with rape
lies on the criminal intention of the accused at the precise moment of abduction. If the
abduction is committed with lewd design, the crime committed is rape through forcible
abduction. On the other hand, if the abduction is committed without lewd design, the
crime committed is kidnapping with rape (People vs. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417,
July 27, 2011). Even if the victim was detained for one week and in the course thereof,
she was rape, the crime committed is rape through forcible abduction if the abduction
is committed with lewd design (People vs. Amaro, G.R. No. 199100, July 18, 2014).
If the accused was molesting the victim immediately upon abduction, that is proof
that abduction is committed with lewd design (People vs. Jose, supra). After eating the
food given by accused, the victim became dizzy and thereafter, she passed out. When
she regained consciousness, she notices that she and accused are naked inside a room.
She was raped and detained for 6 days. The crime committed is rape through forcible
abduction (People vs. Amaro, G.R. No. 199100, July 18, 2014).
16 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
Membership in CPP-NPA alone will not establish political motivation behind the
killing for purpose of convicting the killers for rebellion (People vs. Lovedioro, G.R. No.
112235, November 29, 1995; People vs. Solongan, G.R. No. 137182, April 24, 2003).
But membership in a liquidation squad and killing a government officer is sufficient to
establish political motivation (People v. Dasig,G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993).
RA No. 6968 eliminated the phrases "engaging in war against the forces of the
government", "committing serious violence" and “destroying property” in Article 135 of
RPC. These modes of committing rebellion deleted by RA No. 6968 were used by the SC
in justifying the doctrine of absorption. The amendment of Article 135 does not affect
the accepted concept of rebellion and these “overt acts of violence” are deemed
“subsumed” in the provision on public and armed uprising, which is an element of
rebellion in Article 134 (Regalado). Hence, the doctrine of absorption is still good. The
incidents in Lovedioro case, and Solongan case happened after RA No. 6968, and yet,
the SC is still applying the doctrine of absorption.
34. Delito continuado - In order that continuous crime may exist, there should
be: (1) plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; (2) unity of criminal
intent and purpose and (3) unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated (Santiago
vs. Garchitorena , GR NO. 109266, December 2, 1993). The following are delito
continuado: (1) several acts of taking roasters owned by different owner under a single
criminal impulse to take them all in violation of a single penal provision, and that is
Article 308 of RPC (Note: This is also called single larceny rule; People vs. Jaranilla, G.R.
No. L-28547, February 22, 1974); and (2)several acts of taking away by force the
valuables of the employees working in Energex gasoline station committed under a
single criminal intent to commit robbery in that place in violation of a single penal
provision, and that is Article 294 of RPC (People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26,
2009).
Accused inserted his penis thrice into the private part of victim for purpose of
changing position. The three penetrations motivated by a single criminal intent to
satisfy his lust in violation of single penal provision (Article 266-A of RPC) constitute a
continued crime of rape (People vs. Aaron, G.R. Nos. 136300-02, September 24,
2002). Accused inserted his penis thrice into the private part of victim for purpose of
resting for five minutes. He satisfied his lust every time he would withdraw his penis to
rest. Since the three penetrations were motivated by separate three criminal impulse to
satisfy his lust, three separate crimes of rape are committed (People vs. Lucena, GR No.
190632, February 26, 2014).
35. Incorrect penalty – The court should prescribe the correct penalties in
complex crimes in strict observance of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the court should impose the
penalty for the graver offense in the maximum period. Otherwise, the penalty prescribed
is invalid, and will not attain finality (De Castro vs. People, G.R. No. 171672, February
02, 2015, Bersamin).
In Fransdilla vs. People, GR No. 197562, April 20, 2015, Bersamin, the trial judge
fixed the indeterminate sentence at "imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 14 years
and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum". This is a patent elementary error. Considering
that the clear objective of the ISLAW is to have the convict serve the minimum penalty
before becoming eligible for release on parole, both the minimum and the maximum
penalties must be definite, not ranging. This objective cannot be achieved otherwise, for
determining when the convict would be eligible for release on parole would be nearly
impossible if the minimum and the maximum were as indefinite as the RTC fixed the
indeterminate sentence. Indeed, that the sentence is an indeterminate one relates only
to the fact that such imposition would leave the period between the minimum and the
maximum penalties indeterminate "in the sense that he may, under the conditions set
out in said Act, be released from serving said period in whole or in part."
In People vs. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012, Bersamin - The
trial court sentenced the accused to suffer reclusion perpetua to death for murder. This
is erroneous. Reclusion perpetua and death should not be imposed as a compound,
alternative or successive penalty for a single felony. In short, the imposition of one
precluded the imposition of the other.
18 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
Article 64 of RPC provides the rules on application of divisible penalty. Under this
provision, the penalty prescribed for a felony shall be applied in its proper imposable
period based on the presence of modifying circumstances.
Under Article 349 of RPC, the penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. In the absence
of modifying circumstances, prision mayor pursuant to Article 64 shall be applied in its
medium period, which ranges from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying the Islaw,
the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of prision
correccional, the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the offense, which is from
6 months and 1 day to 6 years. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence of 2 years and
4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
maximum is proper (Lasanas vs. People, G.R. No. 159031, June 23, 2014, Bersamin).
Under Article 249 of RPC, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. In the
absence of any modifying circumstances, reclusion temporal shall be applied in its
medium period, which ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months. Applying Article 64, within the limits of the medium period of reclusion
temporal, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number
and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser
extent of the evil produced by the crime. Thus, the court could not impose the highest
penalty of the medium period of reclusion temporal, and that, is 17 years and 4 months
without specifying the justification for so imposing. Without proper justification, the
court should impose the lowest penalty of the medium period of reclusion temporal,
and that is, 14 years, 8 months. Since ISLAW is applicable, 14 years, 8 months shall
be considered as the maximum penalty while the minimum penalty shall be fixed within
the limits of prision mayor, which ranges from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. Hence,
the accused is sentenced to suffer 10 years of prision mayor as minimum indeterminate
penalty to 14 years, 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum penalty (Ladines vs.
People, G.R. No. 167333, January 11, 2016, Bersamin).
36. Four indivisible penalty - There are four kinds of divisible penalty, which
are governed by Article 64, to wit: (1) penalty composed of three periods fixed in
accordance with Article 76; (2) penalty not composed of three periods computed in
accordance with Article 65; (3) complex penalty under Article 77, par. 1; and (4) penalty
without specific legal form under Article 77, par. 2.
a. Penalty containing three periods – Article 76 of RPC expressly fixed the range
of the period for reclusion temporal, prision mayor, temporary disqualification, prision
correccional, destierro, suspension, arresto mayor, and arresto menor. To find the range
of the periods of any of the afore-said penalties, one will simply read Article 76. If the
crime committed is homicide and there is one mitigating circumstance of confession,
the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal shall be applied in its minimum period
because of Article 64. Article 76 expressly states that the range of the minimum period
of reclusion temporal is from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Within the
range of this period, the maximum indeterminate penalty shall be fixed.
The range of the minimum, medium and maximum periods fixed in accordance
with Article 76 is one-third equal portion of the respective penalties except arresto
mayor. Under Article 76, the minimum period of arresto mayor ranges from 1 month
and 1 day to 2 months; medium period ranges from 2 month and 1 day to 4 months;
and maximum period ranges from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months. Hence, the time
included in the duration of the minimum period of arresto mayor is only one month
while that of the medium and maximum is two months.
The penalty for malversation under paragraph 2 of Article 217 of RPC is prision
mayor in its minimum and medium period. The range of this penalty is not found in
Article 76. Considering that this penalty is not composed of three periods, the time
included in the penalty prescribed should be divided into three equal portions, which
each portion forming one period, pursuant to Article 65 (Zafra vs. People, G.R. No.
176317, July 23, 2014, Bersamin).
The duration of “prision mayor in its minimum and medium period” is 6 years
and 1 day to 10 years. To determine “the time included in the duration,” deduct “one day”
and the lower limit of the prescribed penalty from its upper limit.
Four years, which is “the time included in the duration,” shall be divided into three
equal portions.
4 years
÷3
-------------------------
1 year and 4 months --------- one third portion of the penalty
The minimum, medium and maximum periods shall be formed out the 3 equal
portions of the penalty. The time included in the duration of each period is 1 year and
4 months.
6 years
+1 year and 4 months
----------------------------
7 years and 4 months
+ 1 year and 4 months
----------------------------
8 years and 8 months
+1 year and 4 months
-----------------------------
10 years
Thus, the minimum period of the prescribed penalty of “prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods” ranges from 6 years and 1 day to 7 years and 4 months;
its medium period ranges from 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months;
its maximum period rages from 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to 10 years (Zafra vs.
People, G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014, Bersamin).
shall be the medium period; death penalty, which is the most severe, shall be the
maximum period. Thus, in the absence of modifying circumstances, reclusion temporal
to death prescribed for treason shall be applied in its medium period, and that is,
reclusion perpetua.
Prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period
prescribed for simple robbery under Article 294 of RPC is a complex penalty under since
it composed of three distinct penalties. Thus, prision correccional in its maximum period,
which is the lightest of the three, shall be minimum period of this prescribed penalty.
Prision mayor in its minimum period, which is the next penalty, shall be the medium
period. Prision mayor in its medium period, which is the most severe, shall be the
maximum period. In sum, prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its medium period prescribed for robbery shall be broken down as follows:
See: People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 168173, December 24, 2008, En Banc, People vs.
Barrientos, G.R. No. 119835, January 28, 1998, En Banc, People vs. Castillo, G.R. No.
L-11793, May 19, 1961, En Banc, People vs. Diamante, G.R. No. 180992, September
04, 2009, and People vs. Lumiwan, G.R. Nos. 122753-56, September 07, 1998.
See: People vs. Morante, G.R. No. 187732, November 28, 2012
See: People vs. Macabando, G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013; People vs. Romero,
G. R. No. 112985, April 21, 1999; Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No. 159950,
February 12, 2007; and People vs. Oliva, G.R. No. 122110, September 26, 2000
See: Estepa vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 59670, February 15, 1990, Torres vs. People,
GR No. 175074, August 31, 2011, Cabarlo vs. People, G.R. NO. 172274, November 16,
2006; Mesina vs. People, G.R. No. 162489, June 17, 2015, Bersamin.
38. Off set rule - Only ordinary aggravating and mitigating circumstances are
subject to the offset rule. Privileged mitigating circumstance of minority cannot be offset
by ordinary aggravating circumstance (Aballe vs. People, G.R. No. L-64086, March 15,
1990). If privileged mitigating circumstance and ordinary aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of felony, the former shall be taken into account in graduating
penalty; the latter in applying the graduated penalty in its maximum period (People vs.
Lumandong, GR NO. 132745, March 9, 2000, En Banc). Quasi-recidivism is a special
aggravating circumstance and cannot be offset by a generic mitigating circumstance
22 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
(People vs. Macariola, G.R. No. L-40757 January 24, 1983). The circumstance of
treachery, which qualifies the killing into murder, cannot be offset by a generic
mitigating circumstance voluntary surrender (People vs. Abletes and Pamero, GR NO.
L-33304, July 31, 1974).
39. Penalty of offense under special law - The penalty for possession of
dangerous drugs is 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. The court cannot
impose a straight penalty of 12 years and 1 day since the application of indeterminate
sentence law is mandatory (unless the accused deserves a lenient penalty by confessing
pursuant to the Nang Kay principle). Applying the Islaw, the minimum indeterminate
penalty shall not be less than 12 years and 1 day while the maximum shall not exceed
20 years. Thus, the court can sentence the accused to suffer 15 years of imprisonment
as minimum to 18 years as maximum (Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No. 195005, September
12, 2011; Escalante vs. People, G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013).
Under Section 9 of RA 3019, the penalty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019
is imprisonment for not less than 6 years and 1 month and not more than 15 years.
Applying the Islaw, the minimum indeterminate penalty shall not be less than 6 years
and 1 month while the maximum shall not exceed 15 years. Thus, the court can
sentence the accused to suffer 6 years and 1 month of imprisonment as minimum to 10
years as maximum (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 177105-06, August 12, 2010, Bersamin).
RA No. 7080 and RA No. 10591 adopt the nomenclature of the penalties in RPC.
Hence, minority, confession (Jacaban vs. People, GR No. 184355, March 23, 2015; Malto
vs. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007) or quasi-recidivisim shall be
considered in plunder and illegal possession of loose firearm.
23 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
Under Section 98 of RA No. 9165, the provisions of RPC shall not apply except in
the case of minor offenders. Hence, if the accused is a minor, privilege mitigating
circumstance of minority (People vs. Montalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011; People
vs. Musa, G.R. No. 199735, October 24, 2012Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No. 195005,
September 12, 2011), confession or quasi-recidivisim (People vs. Salazar, G.R. No.
98060, January 27, 1997) shall be considered in crime involving dangerous drugs. In
this case, life imprisonment shall be considered as reclusion perpetua. If the accused is
an adult, these circumstances shall not be appreciated.
If the special law (such as RA No. 6235 on hijacking and RA No. 3019 on
corruption) did not adopt the technical nomenclature of penalties in RPC, the latter shall
not apply. Mitigating circumstance of confession shall not be appreciated since the
penalty not borrowed from RPC cannot be applied in its minimum period. The crime has
not attempted or frustrated stage since penalty not borrowed from RPC cannot be
graduated one or two degrees lower.
Mitigating circumstance of old age can only be appreciated if the accused is over
70 years old at the time of the commission of the crime under RA No. 3019 and not at
the time of promulgation of judgement (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 177105-06, August
12, 2010, Bersamin). Moreover, this the mitigating circumstance of old age cannot be
appreciated in crime punishable by RA No. 3019 since this law did not adopt the
technical nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
42. Subsidiary penalty - If the convict has no property with which to meet the
fine, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each
amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at
the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court (Article 39 of RPC
as amended by RA No. 10159).
43. Multiple sentences - When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties,
he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. Thus,
convict could serve simultaneously arresto mayor and fine, prision correccional and
perpetual absolute disqualification, or reclusion perpetua and civil interdiction. In sum,
while lingering in prison, convict could pay fine, return the property confiscated, be
disallowed to cast his vote or to act function as a public officer.
When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them
successively if the nature of the penalties will not permit simultaneous service. Convict
must serve multiple penalties successively: (1) where the penalties to be served are
destierro and imprisonment; and (2) where the penalties to be served are imprisonment.
However, the successive service of sentences is subject to the three-fold rule and 40-
year limitation rule.
44. Three-fold rule - The three fold rule is to be taken into account not in the
imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed
(People vs. Escares, G.R. No. L-11128-33, December 23, 1957; Mejorada vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987). Thus, the court cannot dismiss
criminal cases in excess of three on the basis of three-fold rule.
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, G.R. No.
94115 August 21, 1992). However, the doctrine of condonation of administrative offense
by reason of reelection has been abandoned for being inconsistent to Section 1, Article
X1 of the 1987 Constitution on public office is a public trust and public accountability
(Morales vs. CA and Binay, GR No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015).
d. Pardon - Person, who was pardoned for the crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua, cannot run in the Senatorial race if the terms of the pardon has not expressly
restored his right to hold public office (Article 36 of RPC) or expressly remitted the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification (Article 41). GMA pardoned
President Estrada with express restoration of his civil and political rights. Hence, he is
eligible to run as Mayor (Risos-vidal vs. Lim, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015).
violation of RA No. 3019 commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the
Committee made an exhaustive investigation (Presidential Ad hoc fact-finding
committee vs. Hon. Desierto, G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011).
The PCGG has no power to investigate cronies of Marcos for violation of RA No.
3019 not involving ill-gotten wealth. Such investigation for being voidab initiowould not
interrupt the running of prescription (People vs. Romualdez and Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 166510, April 29, 2009).
Under PD No. 968 as amended, crimes against public disorder are non-
probationable. However, under RA No. 10707, crimes against public disorder such as
alarm and scandal and direct assault are now probationable.
48. Direct assault – Simple assault (such as punching) upon an agent of a person
in authority (e.g. police officer) while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes
simple resistance and not direct assault because there is no intent to defy the law and
its representative at all hazard, which is an element thereof (U.S. vs. Tabiana, G.R. No.
11847, February 1, 1918; U.S. vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 13083, December 11, 1917; People
vs. Lapitan, G.R. No. 38226, November 17, 1933). But serious assault upon agent of a
person in authority while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes direct assault
(U.S. vs. Cox, G.R. No. 1406, January 6, 1904; U.S. vs. Samonte, G.R. No. 5649,
September 6, 1910).
Simple assault (such as punching) upon a person in authority (e.g. mayor or chief
of police) while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes qualified direct assault.
The law does not distinguish between serious and simple “laying of hands” upon a
person in authority as a qualifying circumstance. Hence, a simple laying of hands upon
a person in authority constitutes qualified direct assault. The Tabiana principle is only
applicable if the victim is an agent of a person in authority (U.S. vs. Gumban, G.R. No.
13658, November 9, 1918).
The phrase "on occasion of such performance" used in Article 148 of RPC means
"by reasonof the past performance of official duty because the purpose of the law is to
allow them to discharge their duties without fear of being assaulted by reason thereof
(People vs. Renegado, G.R. No. L-27031, May 31, 1974). Attacking a judge on the street
by reason of past performance of duty (such as citing the accused in contempt)
constitutes qualified direct assault (U.S. vs. vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 6820, October 16,
27 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
1911). But attacking a retired judge by reason of past performance of duty is not direct
assault since he is not anymore a person in authority at the time of the assault. Note:
The mandatory retirement age of a judge is 70 year.
Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of a person in authority, who is a
victim of direct assault, is liable for direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of an agent of person in authority, who
is a victim of direct assault, is liable for indirect direct assault. Attacking a third person
who comes to the aid of an agent of person in authority, who is a victim of simple
resistance, is liable for physical injuries.
Brother of a detention prisoner and convicted prisoner bribed the clerk of court
to falsify release order and their custodians to release his brothers. Convicted prisoner
but not the detention prisoner is liable for evasion of service of sentence. Brother and
clerk of court are liable for delivery of prisoner from jail with respect to the escape of
detention prisoner and convicted prisoner. Custodians are liable for infidelity in the
custody of prisoners with respect to the escape of detention prisoner and convicted
prisoner. Brother is liable for two counts of corruption of public officer. Clerk of court
and custodians are liable for direct bribery. Clerk of court and brother are liable for
falsification of document as principal by direct participation and as principal by
inducement, respectively.
50. Bribery - Plaintiff gave money to the judge, who in consideration thereof
subsequently rendered an unjust decision in favor of the former. The judge is liable of
direct bribery and rendering unjust decision, while the plaintiff is liable of corruption of
public officer. But if the plaintiff gave money to the judge, who subsequently rendered
a decision against the former, the crime committed by the judge is indirect bribery while
the plaintiff is liable of corruption of public officer. The judge is not liable of direct bribery
since rendering a decision against the corruptor indicates that the former did not receive
the money in consideration of rendering a decision in favor of the latter. It seems that
the plaintiff merely gave the money to the judge by reason of his position as such.
51. Abortion and infanticide – If the fetus is killed inside the womb of his
mother, the crime is abortion regardless of whether he is viable or not (People vs.
Paycana, Jr. G.R. No. 179035, April 16, 2008; People vs. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884,
March 30, 1988). If the victim is killed outside the womb of the mother, the crime is: (1)
abortion if the victim is not viable e.g. intrauterine life is only 6 months (People vs.
Detablan, 40 O.G. No. 9, p. 30; People vs. Paycana, Jr. G.R. No. 179035, April 16, 2008);
or (2) infanticide, if the victim is viable e.g. his intrauterine life is more than 6 months
and his life is less than 3 day old; or (3) murder if the victim is viable and his life is 3
day old or more.
If the accused maltreated his wife and as a consequence, his wife and unborn
child died, the crime committed is compound crime of parricide and unintentional
28 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
abortion (People vs. Robinos, G.R. No. 138453, May 29, 2002; People vs. Villanueva,
G.R. No. 95851, March 01, 1995). If the accused maltreated his pregnant wife and as a
consequence, his wife died, and his child was expelled, and died thereafter within 3
days, the crime committed is compound crime of parricide and infanticide. If the
accused maltreated his pregnant wife and as a consequence, his wife died, and his child
was expelled, and died thereafter on the third day, the crime committed is compound
crime of double parricides.
52. Parricide - In parricide, if the victim is his parent or child, the relationship
can either be legitimate or illegitimate; if the victim is the spouse, grandparent or
grandchild, the relationship must be legitimate (People vs. Gamez, GR No. 202847,
October 23, 2013). Relationship in parricide is by blood except where the victim is
spouse (Regalado). The qualifying circumstance of relationship in parricide is personal.
Hence, it can be appreciated against the wife but not against a co-conspirator, who is
not related to her husband, the victim (People vs. Bucsit G.R. No. 17865, March 15,
1922).
Killing his wife after surprising her in the act of committing homosexual
intercourse with another woman is not death under exceptional circumstance. “Sexual
intercourse” mentioned in Article 247 is different from homosexual intercourse. Killing
his mistress after surprising in the act of committing sexual intercourse with a man is
not death under exceptional circumstance(U.S. vs. Versola, G.R. No. 10759, January
25, 1916). The offender in Article 247 must be a “legally married person.” Killing his wife
under the circumstance indicating that she had just finished having sexual intercourse
with another man is not death under exceptional circumstance. He did not catch his
wife in the very act of sexual intercourse, but after such act (People vs. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 46310, October 31, 1939).
55. Rape – Among the amendments of the law on rape introduced under RA No.
8353 is Section 266-D, which provides “Any physical overt act manifesting resistance
against the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party
29 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
Knowledge of the mental disability of the victim is not an element of rape (People
vs. Caoile, GR No. 203041, June 5, 2013) but it is an ingredient of the qualifying
circumstance of mental disability, which must be alleged in the information (People vs.
Obogne, GR No. 199740, March 24, 2014; People vs. Lascano, G.R. No. 192180, March
21, 2012).
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost
or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
30 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted
by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall
not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim (People vs. Lupac, G .R. No. 182230, September 19, 2012, Bersamin).
b. Absorption rule - If the accused commits rape and acts of lasciviousness, the
latter is absorbed by the former (People vs. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 29, 2002).
But the doctrine of absorption is not applicable to rape through sexual assault. Inserting
lighted cigarette into the genital orifice and anal orifice of the victim and raping her
constitutes two counts of rape by sexual assault and rape through sexual intercourse
(People vs. Crisostomo, GR No. 196435, January 29, 2014). Inserting the penis into the
mouth of the victim and into her genital orifice constitutes rape through sexual assault
and organ rape (In People vs. Espera, G.R. No. 202868, October 02, 2013).
c. Variance rule - If the crime charged is rape, but the crime proven is acts of
lasciviousness, the accused will be convicted of the latter because of the variance rule.
Acts of lasciviousness is a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the charge of
rape. If the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, but the crime proven is
rape through sexual assault, the accused cannot be convicted of the latter. The variance
rule is not applicable since rape through sexual assault is not necessarily included in
the charge of rape through sexual intercourse. The elements of these two crimes are
materially and substantially different. In such case, the accused will be convicted of acts
of lasciviousness, which is necessarily included in the charge of rape through sexual
intercourse (People vs. Pareja, GR No. 202122, January 15, 2014; People vs. Cuaycong,
G.R. No. 196051, October 02, 2013; People vs. CA, G.R. No. 183652, February 25,
2015).
d. Marital rape - Husband can be held liable for marital rape. Article 266-A of
RPC uses the term “man” in defining rape without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship
with his victim. Under Article 266-C of RPC, in case it is the legal husband who is the
offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish
the criminal action. RA No. 8353 has eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape
cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife’s body and
thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least,
presumed (People vs. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014),
f. Statutory rape - The term statutory rape should only be confined to situations
where the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of age. If the victim of rape is a
person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, the crime committed is
simple rape committed against a person "deprived of reason" (People vs. Dalan, G.R. No.
203086, June 11, 2014, Bersamin).
31 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
In People vs. Nuyok, G.R. No. 195424, June 15, 2015, Bersamin, the commission
of rape can be established by circumstantial evidence even if the victim, being the sole
witness, was rendered unconscious during its commission. Accused slapped victim and
punched her in the stomach. She was rendered unconscious. When she regained
consciousness, she found blood in her panties, and felt pain in her vagina. Accused was
convicted of rape.
In People vs. Belgar, G.R. No. 182794, September 08, 2014, Bersamin, the
accused had injected an unknown substance into her belly that had then rendered her
unconscious. Upon waking up, she had found herself lying naked on the ground; she
had felt pain in her vagina, which held a red and white substance in it; and he had been
the only person last seen by her before she had passed out. The lack of direct evidence
against him notwithstanding, these circumstances sufficed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt because they formed an unbroken chain that unerringly showed
Belgar, and no other, had committed the rape against her.
If the offender touches the body of the victim through force, without touching the
labia of her pudendum but with clear intention to have sexual intercourse, the crime
committed is attempted rape. Intent to have sexual intercourse is present if is shown
that the erectile penis of the accused is in the position to penetrate (Cruz vs. People,
G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014, Bersamin) or the accused actually commenced to
force his penis into the victim's sexual organ (People vs. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060,
December 11, 2013).
For there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of
penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not
completed (People vs. Bandril, G.R. No. 212205, July 06, 2015).
If the offender touches the body of the victim through force, with lewd design but
without clear intention to have sexual intercourse, the crime committed is acts of
lasciviousness. Kissing and undressing the victim (People vs. Sanico, G.R. No. 208469,
August 13, 2014) or touching her vagina by the hand of the accused (People vs.
Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013), touching the breast and thighs of
victim and kissing her (People vs. Victor, G.R. No. 127904, December 05, 2002); or
rubbing his penis on the mons pubis of the pudendum (People vs. Abanilla, G.R. Nos.
148673-75, October 17, 2003) is merely acts of lasciviousness because intent to have
sexual intercourse is not clearly shown, but lewd design is established.
In Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014, Bersamin, touching her
genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts are "susceptible of double
interpretation." These circumstances may show that the intention of the accused is
either to commit rape or simple seduction (or acts of lasciviousness). Since intent to
have sexual intercourse is not clear, accused could not be held liable for attempted rape.
Hence, he is only liable for acts of lasciviousness.
If the offender touches the body of the victim without lewd design or without clear
intention to satisfy lust, the crime committed is unjust vexation.
In People vs. Balbar, G.R. Nos. L-20216 & L-20217, November 29, 1967, accused
kissed and embraced his co-teacher while the latter was conducting her class. The
factual setting, i.e., a schoolroom in the presence of complainant's students and within
hearing distance of her co-teachers, rules out a conclusion that the accused was
actuated by a lustful design. The crime committed is merely unjust vexation.
32 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
In People vs. Sumingwa, G.R. No. 183619, October 13, 2009, embracing,
dragging and kissing in front of her friend constitute unjust vexation.
56. Perjury - Person cannot be held liable for perjury involving a complaint
affidavit for theft based on the execution of affidavit of desistance. There is no perjury
solely on the basis of two contradictory statements. There must be further evidence that
will show which of the two sworn statements is false (U.S. vs. Capistrano 40 Phil. 902).
In a verified answer, accused denied the allegation in the complaint for collection
on his loan obligation. He is not liable for perjury since verification is not required in
answer in a civil case. He cannot be prosecuted for perjury on the basis of an alleged
falsehood made in a verified pleading, which is not mandated by law to be verified
(Saavedra, Jr. vs. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 93178, September 15, 1993; Flordelis
vs. Himalaloan, G.R. No. L-48088, July 31, 1978).
The fact that subornation of perjury is not expressly penalized in RPC does not
mean that the direct induction of a person by another to commit perjury has ceased to
be a crime, because said crime is fully within the scope of provision on principal by
inducement (People vs. Pudol, G.R. No. 45618, October 18, 1938).
In De Castro vs. People, G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015, Bersamin, as a
bank teller, she took advantage of the bank depositors who had trusted in her enough
to leave their passbooks with her upon her instruction. Without their knowledge,
however, she filled out withdrawal slips that she signed, and misrepresented to her
fellow bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due course. Her
misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the
withdrawal slips. She thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding the
bank, her employer, in the various sums withdrawn from the bank accounts of
depositors; and falsification of a commercial document, by forging the signatures of
33 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
depositor in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor concerned had
signed the respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such
offenses were complex crimes, because the estafa would not have been consummated
without the falsification of the withdrawal slips.
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and Falsification will
constitute as one complex crime and when they are considered as two separate offenses.
The complex crime of estafa through falsification of documents is committed when one
has to falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money or goods from another
person. In other words, the falsification is a necessary means of committing estafa. If
the falsification is committed to conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses of
estafa and falsification are committed. In the instant case, when accused collected
payments from the customers, said collection which was in her possession was at her
disposal. The falsified or erroneous entries which she made on the duplicate copies of
the receipts were contrived to conceal some amount of her collection which she did not
remit to the company. Hence, the accused is liable for separate crimes of estafa and
falsification of document (Patula vs. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012,
Bersamin).
In Zafra vs. People, G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014, Bersamin, there is a big
disparity between the amount covered by receipts issued to the taxpayer, and the
amount for the same receipts in the tax collection reports indicating the falsification
resorted to by the accused in the official reports he filed, thereby remitting less than
what was collected from taxpayers concerned, resulting to the loss of revenue for the
government as unearthed by the auditors. Thus, the accused is liable for complex crime
of malversation through falsification of documents.
government funds because of the nature of their functions such a treasure or has
participated in the use or application of thereof (Zoleta vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
185224, July 29, 2015) such as a mayor, whose signature is needed to disburse
municipal funds (Manuel vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158413, February 08,
2012).
59. Estafa –In offenses against property (theft or estafa), if the subject matter of
the offense is generic and not identifiable (e.g. money), an error in the designation of the
offended party is fatal. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and
identifiable (e.g. check or jewelry), an error in the designation of the offended party is
immaterial (Senador vs. People, G.R. No. 201620, March 06, 2013). In oral defamation,
a crime against honor, the identity of the person against whom the defamatory words
were directed is a material element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the person
injured is material (People vs. Uba, 106 Phil. 332).
Where the borrower is importers acquiring goods for resale, goods sold in retail
are often within his custody until they are purchased. This is covered by trust receipt
agreement. Failure to return the unsold good or deliver the proceeds of sale to the bank
is estafa in relation to PD No. 115 (Trust Receipt Law). Where the borrower is engaged
in construction, the materials are often placed under custody of his clients, who can
only be compelled to return the materials if they fail to pay. Since the bank and the
contractor know that the return of the materials is not possible, this is not covered by
trust receipt agreement. This transaction becomes a mere loan, where the borrower is
obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the goods. The accused
is not liable for estafa because of the constitutional provision of non-imprisonment for
nonpayment of debts (Yang vs. People, G.R. No. 195117, August 14, 2013).
In other forms of swindling under Article 316, (1) and (2) of RPC, offender made
false representation involving real property and act of ownership such as selling it,
which causes damage to third person. In paragraph 1, the accused represents that he
owned the property, while in paragraph 2, he expressly represents in the deed of
conveyance that the property is “free from encumbrance” (Estrellado-Mainar vs. People,
G.R. No. 184320, July 29, 2015) or "como libre". These words "como libre" in the Spanish
Penal Code are deemed incorporated in the RPC (Naya vs. Abing, G.R. No. 146770,
February 27, 2003).
60. Theft - To "take" under theft the Revised Penal Code does not require
asportation or carrying away (Medina vs. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015). It is
not an indispensable requisite of theft that a pickpocket should carry, more or less far
away, a wallet taken from its owner (People vs. Mercado, G.R. Nos. L-45471 and L-
45472, June 15, 1938).
The term "personal property" in RPC should be interpreted in the context of the
Civil Code. Consequently, any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of theft. Business may be
appropriated under Bulk Sales Law. Thus, the business of providing telecommunication
35 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
and the telephone service is a personal property (Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076,
January 13, 2009). Since asportation is not an element of theft, a personal property can
to be the object of theft as along as it is capable of appropriation although it is not
capable of "asportation" (Medina vs. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015).
Intangible property is not capable of asportation, and yet, it can be an object of theft
since is capable of asportation.
If the property is tangible, taking is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession over the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the
same (People vs. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004). If the property is
intangible, taking includes controlling the destination of this property stolen to deprive
the owner of the property (e.g. the use of a meter tampering, use of a device to
fraudulently obtain gas, and the use of a jumper to divert electricity). Using device to
control the destination of international telephone call under the telecommunication
system of PLDT without its consent to earn by charging user of the phone at the expense
of PLDT is taking the property of PLDT of providing telecommunication service (Laurel
vs. Abrogar, supra).
a. No frustrated theft - If the bulky goods are taken by the accused inside a
compound (such as SM), theft is consummated even if the accused failed to bring out
the stolen goods from the compound, which makes him unable to freely dispose it.
Inability to dispose the stolen property is not an element of theft. Unlawful taking is the
element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. Without unlawful taking,
the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. Thus, theft cannot have a frustrated
stage (Valenzuela vs. People, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007). If the accused is charged
with frustrated theft, he could not be convicted of the crime charged because theft has
no frustrated stage. Neither could he be convicted of consummated theft since it was
not alleged in the information. But he could be convicted of attempted theft because this
is a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the charge of frustrated theft
(Canceran vs. People, G.R. No. 206442, July 01, 2015).
If the accused received the car from the owner for repair the possession is
physical, and thus, misappropriation thereof is carnapping (Santos vs. People, G.R. No.
77429 January 29, 1990).If the accused received the property to bring it to a goldsmith
for examination and to immediately return it back to the owner, his possession is
physical, and thus, misappropriation thereof is theft (U.S. v. De Vera, G.R. No. L-
16961, September 19, 1921). If the accused received the property with authority to sell
it (Guzman vs. CA, 99 Phil. 703), or money with authority to use it to buy palays
(Carganillo vs. People, G.R. No. 182424, September 22, 2014), or with full freedom and
discretion on how to use it to facilitate its remittance to BIR as payment of tax and
reduce the amount due (Velayo vs. People, G.R. No. 204025, November 26, 2014), his
possession is juridical. Thus, failure of the agent to return it is estafa (Guzman v. Court
of Appeals, 99 Phil. 703; Tria vs. People, G.R. No. 204755, September 17, 2014).
A franchise holder must personally operate the motor vehicle. That is the reason
why government regulation prohibits operator of motor vehicle from leasing it. In the
eye of the law the driver of taxi or passenger jeepneyunder boundary arrangement was
only an employee of the owner rather than a lessee. For being an employee, his
possession of the jeepney is physical (People v. Isaac G.R. No. L-7561, April 30, 1955),
and thus, misappropriation thereof is carnapping (People vs. Bustinera, G. R. No.
148233, June 8, 2004)
As a rule, the possession of the employee such as bank teller, collector or cash
custodian is only physical possession. Hence, misappropriation of property is qualified
theft. Abuse of confidence is present since the property is accessible to the employee
36 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
(People v. Locson, G.R. No. L-35681, October 18, 1932; Matrido vs. People, G.R. No.
179061, July 13, 2009; Benabaye vs. People, G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015;
Chua-Burce vs. CA, G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000; Balerta vs. People, G.R. No.
205144, November 26, 2014). However, if the employee is an officer of the companywith
discretion on how to use property or fund of the company,his possession is juridical;
hence, misappropriation thereof is estafa. Thus, the following officers are liable for estafa
through misappropriation (1) a corporate officer with discretion option on how to use
bending machine without the participation of the corporation(Aigle vs. People, G.R. No.
174181, June 27, 2012); (2) bank President with discretion on how to administer fund (People
vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014), and (3) Liaison Officer of a pawnshop with
discretion on how to secure or renew licenses and permits (Gamboa vs. People, G.R. No.
188052, April 21, 2014).
c. Lost property - Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver
the same to the local authorities or to its owner, is liable for theft. If the finder surrenders
the property found to a policeman, who fails to deliver it the owner, the policeman is
liable for theft. He acquired the position occupied by the actual finder. Appropriating
the property is of the same character of that made by one who originally found the same
(People vs. Avila, G.R. No. L-19786, March 31, 1923).
If the main objective is to kill the victim in a building, and fire is resorted to as
the means to accomplish such goal, the crime committed is murder only. Murder
qualified by means of fire absorbs arson since the latter is an inherent means to commit
the former (People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994). Single act of burning
the building to kill two persons constitutes compound crime of double murders (People
vs. Gaffud, G.R. No. 168050, September 19, 2008).
One has deliberately set fire to a building is presumed to have intended to burn
the building (People vs. De Leon, G. R. No. 180762, March 4, 2009). Since intent to burn
is presumed, intent to kill must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Failure to
show intent to kill, the accused shall be convicted of arson with homicide and not
murder (People vs. Baluntong, G.R. No. 182061, March 15, 2010).
If the main objective is to burn the building, but death results by reason or on
the occasion of arson, the crime is arson with homicide, and the resulting homicide is
absorbed (People vs. Villacorta, 172468, October 15, 2008).
If the objective is to kill, and in fact the offender has already done so, and arson
is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, the offender may be convicted of two
separate crimes of either homicide or murder, and arson (People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No.
93485, June 27, 1994).
37 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
Third ground - To avoid criminal liability, the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage must be made previous to the consummation of bigamy, which is required by
Article 40 of the Family Code that provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. A declaration of the absolute nullity of the first
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense in
bigamy (People vs. Teves, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011). Even though the first
marriage was contracted prior to the Family Code, the rule is the same since Article 40,
which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively. The reason is that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Jarillo vs.
People, G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010).
Exceptions:
38 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
15, 2015) but marriage contracted against the provisions of the law under Article 350
(People vs. Peralta, CA-GR No. 13130-R, June 30, 1955).
The De Lara principle is only applicable if the two requisites are applicable: (1)
the accused did not did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to
contract a second marriage. As a rule, the accused cannot use the voidness of the second
marriage as a defense in bigamy because she fraudulently secured a certificate of
marriage, and that is presenting a falsified affidavit of cohabitation instead of marriage
license (Santiago vs. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015); and (2) the second
marriage is null and void for lack of marriage license; if the first marriage is declared
null and void due to lack of marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation, this is not a
defense because Article 40 of the Family Code required declaration of nullity before the
celebration of second marriage (Lasanas vs. People, G.R. No. 159031, June 23, 2014,
Bersamin).
2. The principle that “one who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy” is not applicable where the
parties merely signed the marriage contract without marriage ceremony performed by a
duly authorized solemnizing officer. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract
bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
Hence, bigamy is not committed (Morigo vs. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 06,
2004).
3. X contracted three marriages. His first wife is already dead when X contracted
his third marriage.
X is liable for bigamy involving the second marriage on the basis of his first
marriage because the first was existing when the contracted the second.
X is not liable for bigamy involving the third marriage on the basis of the first
marriage since the first has already been extinguished by reason of death of the first
wife when he contracted the third.
X is not liable for bigamy involving the third marriage on the basis of the second
marriage since the second is null and void for being a bigamous marriage.
Other view: X is liable for bigamy involving the third marriage on the basis of the
second marriage. Although the second is null and void for being a bigamous marriage,
X should have first caused the declaration of nullity of the second marriage for being
bigamous before contracting a third marriage.
64. Libel - Under Article 360 of the RPC, the publisher, and editor of newspaper,
shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he
were the author thereof. The publisher and editors cannot disclaim liability for libelous
articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they had no participation in the
preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone in the publication
of Remate, on which the defamatory articles appeared. It is not a matter of whether or
not they conspired in preparing and publishing the subject articles, because the law
simply so states that they are liable as if they were the author (Tulfo vs. People, G.R. No.
161032, September 16, 2008).
39 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
Stealing property and planting the stolen property to impute to the victim the
crime of theft constitutes complex crime of incriminating an innocent person through
theft.
There are two views on whether culpa is a crime or just a mode of committing a
crime.
First view: Culpa under Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code is not a crime but
just a mode of committing a crime. Applying this rule, there are three crimes committed,
to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, (2) reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property and (3) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.
However, single reckless act resulting in homicide and damage to property is a complex
crime (Angeles vs. Jose, G.R. No. L-6494, November. 24, 1954). But the slight physical
injuries that resulted from the same recklessness shall be treated as a separate crime.
Since this is a light felony, it cannot be made a component of a complex crime (Lontoc,
Jr. vs. Gorgonio, L37396, April 30, 1979; People vs. Turla, G.R. No. L-26388, February
14, 1927; Gonzaga vs. People, G.R. No. 195671, Jan. 21, 2015; 1983, 2011, and 2012
Bar Exams).
Under this view, the motion to quash shall be denied because reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and the complex crime of reckless
40 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property are separate crimes, and
hence, the conviction of the first is not a bar to the continued prosecution of the second.
Under this view, the motion to quash shall be granted because reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, damage to property and slight physical injuries
constitute a single crime, and hence, the conviction of culpable felony involving slight
physical injuries is a bar to the continued prosecution of the same culpable felony
involving homicide and damage to property.
67. BP 22 – Settled is the rule that estafa will not lie when the parties waive the
negotiable character of a check, and instead treat the same as proof of an obligation.
For instance, when there is an agreement between the parties at the time of the issuance
and postdating of the checks that the obligee shall not encash or present the same to
the bank, the obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa because the element of deceit is
lacking (People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 163662, February 25, 2015, Bersamin). In BP
Blg. 22, the fact that the check is not intended to be encashed or deposited in a bank is
not a defense. This check produces the same effect as ordinary check. What the law
punishes is the issuance of a rubber check itself and not the purpose for which the
check was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance (Cueme vs.
People, G.R. No. 133325, June 30, 2000).
a. Knowledge of the payee - When the payee was informed that the checks are
not covered by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall not arise People vs. Villanueva,
G.R. No. 163662, February 25, 2015, Bersamin). In BP Blg. 22, the facts that the payee
had knowledge that he had insufficient funds at the time he issued the check is
immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of the offense under this law. The
gravamen of the offense under BP Blg. 22 is the issuance of a bad check; hence, malice
and intent in the issuance thereof are inconsequential (Rigor vs. People, G.R. No.
144887, November 17, 2004).
b. No account with the bank - According to the accused, she did not own the
check that she issued to complainant as collateral. He merely borrowed it from a friend.
What BP Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a worthless check. The law did
not look either at the actual ownership of the check. The law penalizes a person who
indulges in the making and issuing of unfunded check on an account belonging to
another with the latter’s consent. Also, that the check was not intended to be deposited
was really of no consequence to her incurring criminal liability under BP 22 (Resterio
vs. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012, Bersamin).
2005). But in BP Blg. 22, it is not a valid defense (Ngo vs. People, G.R. No. 155815, July
14, 2004). In BP Blg. 22, the check involved must be issued to apply on account or for
value. Deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa indicate that “account” refers to pre-
existing obligations; while “for value” means an obligation incurred simultaneously with
the issuance of the check.
The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply the proof for the
second element of violation of BP Blg. 22 arising from the presumption of knowledge the
law puts up but also affords the offender due process. The law thereby allows the
offender to avoid prosecution if she pays the holder of the check the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for the payment in full of the check by the drawee
within five banking days from receipt of the written notice that the check had not been
paid. The Court cannot permit a deprivation of the offender of this statutory right by
not giving the proper notice of dishonor (Resterio vs. People, G.R. No. 177438,
September 24, 2012, Bersamin).
Demand letter was given with the security guard without proof that it reached
accused and through registered mail which was returned with the notation "N/S Party
Out 12/12/05". Since there is proof that accused received the notice of dishonor, he
was acquitted. However he is still civilly liable (San Mateo vs. People, G.R. No. 200090,
March 6, 2013).
The mere presentment of the two registry return receipts was not sufficient to
establish the fact that written notices of dishonor had been sent to or served on the
petitioner as the issuer of the check. Considering that the sending of the written notices
of dishonor had been done by registered mail, the registry return receipts by themselves
were not proof of the service on the accused without being accompanied by the
authenticating affidavit of the person who had actually mailed the written notices of
dishonor, or without the testimony in court of the mailer on the fact of mailing (Resterio
vs. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012, Bersamin).
For notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the addressee or
a duly authorized agent of the addressee. In fact, the registry return receipt itself
provides that “[a] registered article must not be delivered to anyone but the addressee,
or upon the addressee’s written order, in which case the authorized agent must write
the addressee’s name on the proper space and then affix legibly his own signature below
it.” In the case at bar, no effort was made to show that the demand letter was received
by petitioners or their agent. All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the
registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this
signature is that of one of the petitioners or of their authorized agent remains a mystery
(Resterio vs. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012, Bersamin).
The wife of complainant verbally informed the accused that the check had
bounced did not satisfy the requirement of showing that written notices of dishonor had
been made to and received by the petitioner. The verbal notices of dishonor were not
effective because it is already settled that a notice of dishonor must be in writing
(Resterio vs. People, G.R. No. 177438. September 24, 2012, Bersamin).
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, notice of dishonor is not required where
the drawer has no right to expect that the bank will honor the check. Since bank account
of accused was already closed even before the issuance of the subject check, he had no
right to expect the drawee bank to honor his check. Hence, he is not entitled to be given
42 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
a notice of dishonor (Lopez vs. People, G.R. No. 166810, June 26, 2008, ).The crime
involved in Lopez vs. People is estafa through issuance of bouncing check. However, it
is submitted the Lopez principle can be applied to violation of BP 22.
The essence of estafa through issuance of bouncing check is to punish fraud and
not to protect the integrity of the check. Damage and deceit are elements of estafa, and
the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the
value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will
merely satisfy the civil liability (Lim vs. People, supra).
68. RA No. 7610 - The Family Code prohibits the infliction of corporal
punishment by teacher. A schoolteacher in employing unnecessary violence on her
minor student, who even fainted, is liable for child abuse under RA No. 7610 (Rosaldes
vs. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014, Bersamin). Accused saw the victim and
his companions hurting his minor daughters. Angered, accused struck minor-victim at
the back with his hand and slapped his face. Since the accused committed the act at
the spur of the moment, they are perpetrated without intent to debase his "intrinsic
worth and dignity" as a human being, or to humiliate or embarrass him. Without such
intent, the crime committed is not child abuse under RA 7610 but merely slight physical
injuries (Bongalon vs. People, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013, Bersamin).
If the child is 12 years old and above, and the acts of the accused constitute
sexual abuse under RA No. 7610 and rape through sexual assault or acts of
lasciviousness, he shall be prosecuted under RA No. 7610 since this law prescribed a
grave penalty (Dimakuta vs. People, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015). However, if
43 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
the acts constitute sexual abuse and rape through sexual intercourse, he shall be
prosecuted under RPC since this law prescribed a graver penalty. He cannot be
prosecuted for compound crime of rape and sexual abuse because the latter is
punishable under special law. He cannot be prosecuted for both rape and sexual abuse
because of the rule on double jeopardy (People v. Matias, G.R. No. 186469, June 13,
2012 and Alberto vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182130, June 19, 2013).
If the child is under 12 years old, and the acts of the accused constitute sexual
abuse and rape or acts of lasciviousness, the latter shall be prosecuted penalized as
follows: (1) rape through sexual intercourse; (2) acts of lasciviousness with the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period (Section 5 of RA No. 7610).Prior to RA No.
8353 (Rape Law), inserting finger into genital orifice is acts of lasciviousness. Hence,
reclusion temporal in its medium period under RA No. 7610 should be imposed. Under
RA No. 8353, inserting finger into genital orifice is rape through sexual assault where
the penalty is prision mayor. To impose the lighter penalty under RPC as amended by
RA 8353 is unfair to the victim. It is not the intention of RA No. 8353 to disallow the
imposition of penalty under RA No. 7610 if the victim is child subjected to sexual abuse,
who isunder 12 years of age (People vs. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011). If
the crime is qualified rape through sexual assault, the Chingcase is not applicable since
RA No. 8353 prescribed a grave penalty of reclusion temporal for it (People vs. Bonaagua,
G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011).
71. Illegal recruitment - An employee may be held liable with his employer, if
the former actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. The employee
cannot escape liability by claiming that she was not aware that before working for her
employer in the recruitment agency, she should first be registered with the POEA. Illegal
recruitment in large scale is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Good faith is not a
defense (People vs. Valenciano, G.R. No. 180926, December 10, 2008).
44 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
necessarily included in the charge of importation (People vs. Chan Liu, G.R. No. 189272,
January 21, 2015).
For illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish that
the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug without authority.
However, mere possession of dangerous drug constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any
satisfactory explanation (Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No. 195005, September 12, 2011).
b. Attempted sale - Poseur-buyer showed shabu for sale to poseur buyer. The
sale was aborted when the police officers immediately placed accused under arrest. The
crime committed is attempted sale (People vs. Figueroa, G.R. No. 186141, April 11,
2012).
c. Coordination with PDEA - Lack of coordination with the PDEA will not
invalidate a buy-bust operation. Such coordination is not an indispensable
requirement in buy-bust operations (People vs. Mendosa, G.R. No. 189327, February
29, 2012)
h. Plea bargaining - Section 23 of RA No. 9165, any person charged under any
crime involving dangerous drugs regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be
allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.
73. RA No. 3019 – In Giangan vs. People, G.R. No. 169385, August 26, 2015,
Bersamin -Giangan as the barangay chairman acted upon the honest and sincere belief
that he was then summarily abating the nuisance that a regular user of the obstructed
road had just reported to him. A further indication of the good faith of Giangan was the
45 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
turning over of the wooden posts to the police station, manifesting that the accused were
acting within the scope of their authority. Good faith means honest, lawful intent; the
condition of acting without knowledge of fraud, and without intent to assist in a
fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme. Also, the act complained of was rendered
inconsistent with the manifest partiality and bad faith that the law punished. He was
acquitted of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 because the element of evident bad
faith is not present.
In People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 177105-06, August 12, 2010, Bersamin, the Court
of Appeals (CA) rendered a decision reinstating the title of the complainant. Provincial
Adjudicator despite knowledge of the CA decision still rendered his decision in a DARAB
Case that completely contradicted the CA decision by invalidating title of the
complainant. He displayed evident bad faith and manifest partiality by his arrogant
refusal to recognize and obey the CA decision causing undue injury to the complainant
and giving unawaarnted benefits to private individuals in violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
No. 3019.
City treasurer, city accountant and city administrator allowed the release of cash
advance in favor of a paymaster despite the fact that she has previous unliquidated cash
advances. They are liable because of conspiracy of silence or inaction. Public officers’
omissions to question irregularities indicate a common understanding and concurrence
of sentiments respecting the commission of the offense of causing undue injury to the
government through gross inexcusable negligence. This is called conspiracy by silence
(Jaca vs. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013).
Sandiganbayan. and Justice Secretary Perez, G.R. No. 188165, December 11, 2013,
Bersamin).
First - That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance
with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons; (Note: Senator Pogi can be held liable for plunder even if
the principal offender, who masterminded the plunder of pork barrel, is a private
individual, the Pork-barrel Queen. What is important is that Senator Pogi in connivance
with Pork-barrel Queen acquired ill-gotten wealth). On the other hand, Pork-barrel
Queen can be held liable for plunder on the basis of conspiracy.
Can the Senator use the defense in malversation that he is not responsible for
the misuse of his PDAP since it is the duty of the appropriate implementing agency of
the government to check that the recipient of the fund is not bogus? No. Assuming that
the duty to check that the recipient of the Senator’s PDAP is not bogus belongs to the
appropriate agency of the government, the Senator is still liable since malversation can
be committed through culpa.
47 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
Note: The word “combination” means at least two different predicate crimes; while
the term “series” means at least two predicate crimes of the same kind (Ejercito vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006). Thus, a single predicate
crime amounting to 50 million pesos is not plunder. The intention of the lawmakers is
that if there is only one predicate crime, the offender has to be prosecuted under the
particular crime, which is already covered by existing laws. What is punishable under
the law is "acts of plunder", which means that there should be at least, two or more,
predicate crimes (See deliberation of the Bicameral Committee on Justice, May 7, 1991).
Third - That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00 (Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).
The damages suffered by the government in diverting the road from the poblacion
to the farm of the accused shall not be considered in determining if plunder is
committed. What is important is the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by the public
officer and not the amount of damage suffered by the government.
In People vs. Joseph Estrada, Criminal Case No. 26558, September 12, 2007 -
One of the predicate crimes alleged in the information is misappropriation of the excise
tax share of Ilocos Sur. This was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. However, the
following predicate crimes were alleged and proven by evidence (1) series of acts of
receiving collections from "jueteng" in the aggregate amount of P545,291,000.00; and
(2) series consisting of two acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS to purchase shares of
stock of Belle Corporation and collecting or receiving commission from the sales of Belle
Shares in the amount of P189,700,000.00. This pattern of criminal acts indicates an
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth in the amount of more
than P50 million. Estrada was convicted of plunder.
In case of several individuals are charged with plunder, the law requires that
there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons (GMA vs. People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016, Bersamin). In the Enrile vs.
People, G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015, if the allegation is true, the main plunder is
Senator Enrile. In People vs. Estrada, the main plunderer is the hub or President
Estrada.
If the main plunderer is identified, the total amount acquired by him and his co-
conspirators shall be considered in determining if the P50 million threshold had been
reached. For example, if GMA was identified as a main plunder, her acts and that of
the other conspirators in amassing, accumulating and acquiring ill-gotten wealth
aggregating to P365,997,915.00 shall be considered for purposes of determining if the
P50 million threshold had been reached. In this situation, plunder is committed.
In Enrile vs. People, G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015, it was stated that in the
crime of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by Senator, his assistant,
and a private individuals in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as the total amount
amassed, acquired or accumulated by them is at least P50 million.
66. Hazing - Prior to RA No. 8049, the consent of the victim to hazing and lack
of intent to kill will negate dolo. Hence, the crime committed only reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide (Villareal vs. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012).
Congress instead of amending RPC created a special law (RA No. 8049) to make
hazing malum prohibitum, where consent of the victim and lack of intent to kill is not a
defense and the mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem shall not be appreciated
(Dungo vs. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 01, 2015).
49 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
The elements of the crime of hazing are: (1) That there is an initiation rite or
practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or
organization; (2) That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity,
sorority or organization; and (3) That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in
some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury (Dungo vs. People, supra; People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No.
171222, February 18, 2015). Organization includes companies, PNP, AFP (People vs.
Bayabos). Even the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a
corporation engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment are covered by the law
(Dungo vs. People, supra).
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct
participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown
that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are
school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take
preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof (People vs. Bayabos).
The accused claim that the information avers a criminal charge of hazing by
actual participation, but the only offense proved during the trial was hazing by
inducement. The information alleged that the accused during a planned initiation rite
and being then officers of APO fraternity used personal violence upon a neophyte
resulting to his death. The "planned initiation rite" as stated in the information included
the act of inducing victim to attend it. Accused not only induced victim to be present at
the resort, but they actually brought him there. The hazing would not have been
accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners that induced the victim to be
present (Dungo vs. People, supra).
50 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
a. Illegal Access – Illegal access refer is committed by any person, who shall
access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right. Ethical hackers are
professionals who employ tools and techniques used by criminal hackers but would
neither damage the target systems nor steal information. Since the ethical hacker does
his job with prior permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from
the coverage cybercrime law on illegal access (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 11, 2014).
51 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
2017 BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
UP, LAW CENTER, UST, Villasis Law Center, CPRS, Magnificus Review, Power house
Using the name of another person and his pictures in opening a facebook account
without authority constitutes cybercrime offense.
a. Cyber libel – Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed,
cyber libel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code, already punishes it. Online defamation constitutes “similar means”
for committing libel (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 20335, February 18. 2014).
The place where libelous article was accessed by the offended party in the internet
is not equivalent to the place where the libelous article is “printed and first
published”. To rule otherwise is to allow the evil sought to be prevented by the
amendment to Article 360, and that was the indiscriminate laying of the venue in libel
cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, to harass an accused. At any rate, Article
360 still allow offended party to file the civil or criminal complaint for internet libel in
their respective places of residence (Bonifacio vs. RTC, Makati, Branch 149, G.R. No.
184800, May 5, 2010).
show a lack of intent to penalize a "private obscene showing between two private persons
although. (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014).
Under Section 6 of RA No. 10175, the penalty for crimes punishable under special
laws committed through and with the use of information and communication
technologies shall be one degree higher than that provided the law. However, this
provision requires the application of the rules on graduation of penalties under the
Revised Penal Code. Hence, Section 6 finds application only if special law involved has
adopted the technical nomenclature of the penalties of Revised Penal Code.
For more updated discussions, insights and latest jurisprudence, please buy
the 2017 Edition Criminal Law Reviewer by Judge Marlo Bermejo Campanilla.
Available at Rex Bookstore
54 | P a g e Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for
publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.