TORRES VS LOPEZ

FACTS:

Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila Philippine Islands. On February 25, 1924, leaving a
considerable estate. Shortly thereafter Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will asked
that the will of Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of
the deceased on the grounds: (1) That the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of
senile dementia and was under guardianship; (2) that undue influence had been exercised by the
persons benefited in the document in conjunction with others who acted in their behalf; and (3) that
the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the document was obtained through fraud and deceit. After a
prolonged trial judgment was rendered denying the legalization of the will. In the decision of the trial
judge appeared, among others, these findings:

All this evidence taken together with the circumstances that before and at the time Tomas Rodriguez
was caused to sign the supposed will Exhibit A, and the copies thereof there already existed a final
judgment as to his mental condition wherein he was declared physically and mentally incapacitated to
take care of himself and manage his estate shows in a clear and conclusive manner that at the time of
signing the supposed will of Tomas Rodriguez did not possess such mental capacity as was necessary
to be able him to dispose of his property by the supposed will.

But even supposing as contended by petitioner's counsel that Tomas Rodriguez was at the time of
execution of the will, competent to make a will, the court is of the opinion that the will cannot be
probated for it appears from the declaration of the attesting witness Elias Bonoan that when the
legatee Luz Lopez presented the supposed will, Exhibit A, to Tomas Rodriguez, she told him to sign
said Exhibit A because it was a document relative to the complaint against one Castito, which Exhibit 4,
then pending in the justice of the peace court, and for the further reason that said Tomas Rodriguez
was then under guardianship, due to his being mentally and physically incapacitated and therefore
unable to manage his property and take care of himself. It must also be taken into account that
Tomas Rodriguez was an old man 76 years of age, and was sick in the hospital when his signature to
the supposed will was obtained. All of this shows that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez appearing in
the will was obtained through fraudulent and deceitful representations of those who were interested
in it. (Record on Appeal, p. 23)

From the decision and judgment above-mentioned the proponents have appealed. Two errors are
specified, viz: (1) The court below erred in holding that at the time of signing his will, Tomas Rodriguez
did not possess the mental capacity necessary to make the same, and (2) the court below erred in
holding that the signatures of Tomas Rodriguez to the will were obtained through fraudulent and
deceitful representations, made by persons interested in the executions of said will.

ISSUE:

HELD:
B. Law. — The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes as a requisite to the allowance of a will that the
testator be of "sound mind" (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 614). A "sound mind" is a "disposing mind."
One of the grounds for disallowing a will is "If the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapable
of the execution." (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 634 [2].) Predicated on these statutory provisions,
this court has adopted the following definition of testamentary capacity: "'Testamentary capacity is
the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time,
to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have
claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his
property among the objects of his bounty.'" (Bugnao vs. Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163, followed in Bagtas
vs. Paguio [1912], 46 Phil., 701.) The mental capacity of the testator is determined as of the date of
the execution of his will (Civil Code, art. 666).

Various tests of testamentary capacity have been announced by the courts only later to be rejected as
incomplete. Of the specific tests of capacity, neither old age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind,
weakness of the memory, the appointment of a guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or
jointly to show testamentary incapacity. Each case rests on its own facts and must be decided by its
own facts.

There is one particular test relative to the capacity to make a will which is of some practical utility.
This rule concerns the nature and rationality of the will. Is the will simple or complicated? Is it natural
or unnatural? The mere exclusion of heirs will not, however, in itself indicate that the will was the
offspring of an unsound mind.

On the issue of testamentary capacity, the evidence should be permitted to take a wide range in
order that all facts may be brought out which will assist in determining the question. The testimony of
subscribing witnesses to a will concerning the testator's mental condition is entitled to great weight
where they are truthful and intelligent. The evidence of those present at the execution of the will and
of the attending physician is also to be relied upon. (Alexander on Willis, vol. I, pp. 433, 484; Wharton
& Stille's Medical Jurisprudence, vol. I pp. 100 et seq.)

The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have
clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a
testamentary document. (Hernaez vs. Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689; Bagtas vs. Paguio, supra.)

Counsel for the appellee make capital of the testator being under guardianship at the time he made
his will. Citing section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure and certain authorities, they insist that the
effect of the judgment is conclusive with respect to the condition of the person. To this statement we
cannot write down our conformity. The provisions of the cited section were taken from California,
and there the Supreme court has never held what is now urged upon us by the appellee. The rule
announced that in some states, by force of statute, the finding of insanity is conclusive as to the
existence of insanity during the continuance of adjudication, is found to rest on local statutes, of
which no counterpart is found in the Philippines. (32 C.J., 647; Gridley vs. Boggs [1882], 62 Cal., 190;
In the matter of the Estate of Johnson [1881], 57 Cal., 529.) Even where the question of insanity is out
in issue in the guardianship proceedings, the most that can be said for the finding is that it raises a
presumption of incapacity to make a will but does not invaluable the testament if competency can be
shown. The burden of providing sanity in such case is cast upon the proponents.

It is here claimed that the unsoundness of mind of the testator was the result of senile dementia. This
is the form of mental decay of the aged upon which will are most often contested. A Newton, Paschal,
a Cooley suffering under the variable weather of the mind, the flying vapors of incipient lunacy,"
would have proved historic subjects for expert dispute. Had Shakespeare's King Lear made a will,
without any question it would have invited litigation and doubt.

Senile dementia usually called childishness has various forms and stages. To constitute complete
senile dementia there must be such failure of the mind as to deprive the testator of intelligent action,.
In the first stages of the diseases, a person may possess reason and have will power. (27 L. R. A., N. S.
[1910], p. 89; Wharton & Stille's Medical Jurisprudence, vol. I. pp. 791 et seq.; Schouler on Wills, vol. I,
pp. 145 et seq.)

It is a rather remarkable coincidence that of all the leading cases which have gone forth from this
court, relating to the testator having a sound and disposing mind, and which have been brought to
our notice by counsel, every one of them has allowed the will, even when it was necessary to reverse
the judgment of the trial court. A study of these cases discloses a consistent tendency to protect the
wishes of the deceased whenever it be legally possible. These decisions also show great tenderness
on the part of the court towards the last will and testament of the aged.

In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag, supra the court gave credence to the testimony of the subscribing
witnesses who swore positively that at the time of the execution of the will the testator was of sound
mind and memory. Based on these and other facts, Mr. Justice Carson, speaking for court, laid down
the following legal principles:

Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it
full testamentary known as insanity or idiocy there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or
incapacity and while on one hand it had been held that mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility
from disease of body, or from age, will to render a person incapable of making a will a weak or feeble
minded person may make a valid will provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable
him to know what he is about and how or to whom he is disposing of his property' (Lodge vs. Lodge, 2
Houst. [Del.] 418); that, "To constitute a sound be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or
otherwise (Sloan vs. Maxwell, # N. J. Eq., 563); that it has not been understood that a testator must
possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree. . . .Few
indeed would be the wills confirmed it this is correct. Pain, sickness, debility of body from age or
infirmity, would according to its violence or duration in a greater or less degree, break in upon,
weaken, or derange the mind, but the derangement must be such as deprives him of the rational
faculties common to man' (Den. vs. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L., 680); and that Sound mind does not mean a
perfectly balanced mind. The question of soundness is one of degree' (Boughton vs. Knight. L. R., 3 P.
& D., 64; 42 L. P. P., 25); on the other hand, it has been held that testamentary incapacity does not
necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of an unsound mind. Weakness of
intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age, from disease, or great bodily infirmities of suffering,
or from all these combined, may render the testator in capable of making a valid will, providing such
weakness really disqualifies for from knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of
the act she is engaged in.

SAMSON VS CORRALES

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting to probate a
document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased Mariano Corrales Tan. There is no
direct evidence as to the interest of the oppositor-appellant in the estate in question, though it may,
perhaps, be inferred from the testimony of his wife Maximina Ong that he is the son of the deceased.

In his answer to the petition for probate he alleges, in substance, that the will is incomplete and
fraudulent and does not express the true intent of the testator; that the testator acted under duress
and under undue influence, and that at the time of the execution of the will he was not of sound and
disposing mind.

We do not think the opponent has succeeded in proving any of his allegations. There is no evidence
whatever showing that the testator acted under duress or undue influence and the only question of
fact which we need consider is whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind when the
document in question was executed.

Upon this point the testimony of Dr. Tee Han Kee, the attending physician, as a witness for the
opposition, is to the effect that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose
condition for several days prior to his death. He died about eight or nine o'clock in the evening of
December 26, 1921, and the will is alleged to have been executed in the forenoon of the same day.
Counsel for the appellant, in his well-prepared brief, argues ably and vigorously that coma implies
complete unconsciousness, and that the testator, therefore, could not at that time have been in
possession of his mental faculties and have executed a will. There are, however, varying degrees of
coma and in its lighter forms the patient may be aroused and have lucid intervals. Such seems to have
been the case here. Doctor Tee Han Kee, the opponent's principal witness, who visited the deceased
in the evening of December 25th, says he then seemed to be in a state of coma and that in the
forenoon of December 26th, when the doctor again visited him, he was in "the same state of coma."
Maximina Ong, the wife of the opponent, the only other witness for the opposition, states that on
December 26th the deceased could not talk and did not recognize anyone. But all the witnesses
presented by the petitioner, five in number, testify that the deceased was conscious, could hear and
understand what was said to him and was able to indicate his desires. Four of these witnesses state
that he could speak distinctly; the fifth, Velhagen, says that the deceased only moved his head in
answer to questions.

That the deceased was in an exceedingly feeble condition at the time the will was executed is evident,
but if the witnesses presented in support of the petition told the truth there can be no doubt that he
was of sound mind and capable of making his will. And we see no reason to discredit any of these
witnesses; the discrepancies found between their respective versions of what took place at the
execution of the document are comparatively unimportant and so far from weakening their testimony
rather lend strength to it by indicating the absence of any conspiracy among them.
As against their testimony we have only the testimony of Maximina Ong and Dr. Tee Han Kee. The
former is not a disinterested witness. As to the testimony of the latter it is sufficient to say that mere
professional speculation cannot prevail over the positive statements of five apparently credible
witnesses whose testimony does not in itself seem unreasonable.

There is no direct evidence in the record showing that the publication of the time and place of the
hearing of the petition for probate has been made as provided for in section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and the appellant argues that the court below erred in admitting the will to probate
without proof of such publication. This question not having been raised in the court below will not be
considered here.

Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, speaking of hearings for the probate of wills, also provides
that "At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath, reduced to writing and signed by the
witnesses" and the appellant maintains that the transcript of the testimony of the witness Dr. N. M.
Saleeby, not having been signed by the witness, the testimony should have been excluded.

There is no merit in this contention. When, as in this case, the testimony is taken by the stenographer
of the court and certified to by him, the provision quoted can only be regarded as directory and a
failure to observe the provision will not render the testimony inadmissible. (Reese vs. Nolan, 99 Ala.,
203.)

The order appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

LIM VS CHINCO

This is a contest over the probate of a paper writing purporting to be the will of Victorina Villaranda y
Diaz, a former resident of the municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, who died in the
Hospital of San Juan de Dios, in the City of Manila, on June 9, 1929. The deceased left no descendants
or ascendants, and the document produced as her will purports to leave her estate, consisting of
properties valued at P50,000, more or less, chiefly to three collateral relatives, Eusebia, Crispina, and
Maria, of the surname of Lim. This instrument was offered for probate by Eusebia Lim, named in the
instrument as executrix Opposition was made by Juliana Chinco, a full sister of the deceased. Upon
hearing the cause the trial court sustained the opposition and disallowed the will on the ground that
the testatrix did not have testamentary capacity at the time the instrument purports to have been
executed by her From this judgment the proponent of the will appealed.

The deceased was a resident of Mercauayan, Province of Bulacan, and was about 80 years of age at
the time of her death. On the morning of June 2, 1929, she was stricken with apoplexy, incident to
cerebral hemorrhage, and was taken in an unconscious condition, seated in a chair, to her room.
Doctor Geronimo Z. Gaanan, a local physician of Meycauayan, visited the old lady, with whom he was
well acquianted, three or four times, the first visit having occurred between 6 and 7 p. m. of June 3d.
Upon examining the patient, he found her insensible and incapable of talking or controlling her
movements. On the same day the parish priest called for the purpose of administering the last rites of
the church, and being unable to take her confession, he limited himself to performing the office of
extreme unction. Doctor Isidoro Lim, of Manila, was also called upon to visit the patient and he came
to see her two or three times. With his approval, it was decided to take the woman to the hospital of
San Juan de Dios in Manila, and on the morning of June 5, 1929, the ambulance from this hospital
arrived, in charge of Doctor Guillermo Lopez del Castillo, a resident physician of the hospital. At about
11 c'clock a.m. on that day she was embarked on the ambulance and taken to the hospital, where she
died four days later.

The purported will, which is the subject of this proceeding, was prepared by Perfecto Gabriel, a
practicing attorney of Manila, whose wife appears to be related to the chief beneficiaries named in
the will. This gentlemen arrived upon the scene at 9 o'clock on the forenoon of June 5, 1929. After
informing himself of the condition of the testatrix, he went into a room adjacent to that occupied by
the patient and, taking a sheet from an exercise book, wrote the instrument in question. He then took
it into the sick room for execution. With this end in view Gabriel suggested to Doctor Lopez del
Castillo that he would be pleased to have Doctor Castillo sign as a witness, but the latter excused
himself for the reason that he considered the old lady to be lacking in testamentary capacity. Another
person present was Marcos Ira, a first cousin of the deceased, and attorney Gabriel asked him also
whether or not he was willing to sign as one of the witnesses. Ira replied in a discouraging tone, and
the attorney turned away without pressing the matter. In the end three persons served as witnesses,
all of whom were in friendly relations with the lawyer, and two relatives of his wife. The intended
testatrix was not able to affix her signature to the document, and it was signed for her by the
attorney.

The vital question in the case is whether the supposed testatrix had testamentary capacity at the time
the paper referred to was signed. Upon this point we are of the opinion, as was the trial judge, that
the deceased, on the morning of June 5, 1929, was in a comatose condition and incapable of
performing any conscious and valid act. The testimony of Doctor Gaanan and Doctor Lopez del
Castillo is sufficient upon this point, and this testimony is well corroborated by Paciana Diaz and Irene
Ahorro. The first of these witnesses was the one who chiefly cared for the deceased during her last
illness in Meycauayan until she was carried away to the hospital in Manila; and the second was a
neighbor, who was called in when the stroke of apoplexy first occurred and who visited the patient
daily until she was removed from Meycauayan.

The testimony of these witnesses is convincing to the effect that the patient was in a continuous state
of coma during the entire period of her stay in Meycauayan, subsequent to the attack, and that on
the forenoon of June 5, 1929, she did not have sufficient command of her faculties to enable her to
do any valid act. Doctor Lim, the physician from Manila, testified for the proponent of the will. His
testimony tends to show that the patient was not suffering from cerebral hemorrhage but from
uræmic trouble, and that, after the first attack, the patient was much relieved and her mind so far
cleared up that she might have made a will on the morning of June 5th. The attorney testified that he
was able to communicate with the deceased when the will was made, and that he read the
instrument over to her clause by clause and asked her whether it expressed her wishes. He says that
she made signs that enabled him to understand that she concurred in what was written. But it is clear,
even upon the statement of this witness, that the patient was unable to utter intelligent speech.
Upon the authority of Perry vs. Elio (29 Phil., 134), the paper offered for probate was properly
disallowed.

The judgment appealed from will therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the
appellant.
VDA. DE PEREZ VS TOLETE

FACTS:

Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and
residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of
survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall
be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their
home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of
the wills.

Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing
that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were
executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and
his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings,
which Salud failed to give.

For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in
accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York,
the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed

HELD:

Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this
country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine
laws is imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of
the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2)
the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been
admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5)
the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the
Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil.
610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed
evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign
country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs

This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has
always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not
consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of
the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting
that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor
General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).

The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to
be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27,
Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were
an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is
not the petitioner, are required.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices
of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be
addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable
time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan
spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and
copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
SUNTAY VS SUNTAY

FACTS:

On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of
Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and
a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China, and children by the first marriage had with the late
Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and
Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who
survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (special
proceedings No. 4892) and after hearing letters of administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay.
After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate. On 15 October
1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a
last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November
1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing
of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the
loss of the said will. An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the will and this
Court held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will and
remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further proceedings (63 Phil., 793).
In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the
taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, on 7 February 1938 the probate
court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the surviving
widow and dismissed the petition. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation,
claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will and
testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the
same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino
Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in the
Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4
January 1931

ISSUE:

HELD:

As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the point
in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:

Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed,
filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.

Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for
allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having
jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given
as in case of an original will presented for allowance.

Section 3 provides:

If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it,
and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts, to which
shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the
same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law
of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal
requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. The unverified answers to the questions
propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of China set forth in
Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from
the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert
on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse party
would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to
attend to trade matters. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district
court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and
that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the
absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law
of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating
or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and
even if it were so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a
proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both
to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the
Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in
the Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948). The proceedings had in
the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened toe or come up to the standard of such
proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were
held at the back of such interested parties.

does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view
thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance
with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and
allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal
district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate
or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and
recorded by a competent court of this country.

PALAGANAS VS PALAGANAS
FACTS:

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United
States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California,
she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left
properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.

On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for
his appointment as special administrator of her estate.[1] On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners
Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of
Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in the
Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming
Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed
under duress and without the testators full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto,
they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.

Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate
occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave
to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit
their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be probated in and allowed
by a court in the Philippines.

On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:[2] (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based
executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.

Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA),[3] arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot
be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,[4] affirming the assailed order of the RTC,[5] holding
that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernestos submission of
the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond.
The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and
allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The
present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and
allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision,
Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.

ISSUE:
whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it
has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

HELD:

But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same
have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be
given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the
law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.[6]

In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the
decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may
take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the
executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at
any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to
the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the
estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been
delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the
fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the
probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province.[7] The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and
probated in the country of its execution.

In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California,
petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will
before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in
a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a
competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to
petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply
to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign
probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means
to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance,
since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been
proved and allowed by the proper court.[8]
Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling that the court
can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas will and that, in the meantime, it was
designating Ernesto as special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of
the due execution of the will, i.e. the testators state of mind at the time of the execution and
compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial courts
directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Rupertas will and the certified copies of
the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.

POBRE VS GONONG

FACTS:

It is indicated that the parties-litigants in this case are related to each other, tracing their common
ancestry from the original owners of the properties involved, who appear to be Bonifacio Pobre and
Irene Blanco, to whom was born an only son, Isidoro Pobre. Petitioner avers that Irene Blanco
predeceased Bonifacio Pobre and later Bonifacio Pobre married Teresa Blanco, to which marriage
Maxima Pobre and Jovita Pobre were born (Memorandum of Petitioner, Rollo, p. 135). Maxima Pobre
later was married to Basilio Quianzon. Isidoro Pobre married Maria Evangelists and out of this
marriage were born the following: Petitioner Francisco E. Pobre; Respondent Iluminada Pobre Llanes;
Violeta Pobre; Josefina Pobre; and Cresencio Pobre.

After the death of Bonifacio Pobre and later, Teresa Blanco, all properties left by them intestate,
consisting of 35 parcels of untitled agricultural lands, located mostly in the towns of Paoay and Pinili,
Ilocos Norte, were inherited by Maxima Pobre de Quianzon and Jovita Pobre. Maxima Pobre de
Quianzon died on January 19, 1959 without any issue and without any will. Thus, Jovita Pobre
inherited the entire estate of her sister, Maxima.

Upon the death of Jovita Pobre on August 5, 1976, Petitioner Francisco E. Pobre, Respondent
Iluminada Pobre Llanes, Violeta Pobre, Cresencio Pobre, who are all children of the late Isidoro Pobre,
(half-brother of Jovita Pobre and Maxima Pobre de Quianzon) became the surviving heirs of the
intestate estate of Jovita Pobre as they were the latter's nephews and nieces.

On May 28, 1977, Petitioner Francisco E. Pobre filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, praying that after due hearing and publication, letters of
administration be issued to him for the administration of the intestate estate of Maxima Pobre de
Quianzon and Jovita E. Pobre, and that the said estates of Maxima Pobre de Quianzon and Jovita E.
Pobre be settled and distributed among their legal heirs. This Intestate Proceedings was docketed as
Special Proceedings, No. 754-IV.

On October 7, 1977, Respondent Iluminada P. Llanes, assisted by her husband, Felix G. Llanes, filed
her opposition to the Petition. She alleged that Maxima Pobre de Quianzon was only an illegitimate
child of the deceased Bonifacio Pobre; that Jovita Pobre was the only legitimate child of the spouses
Teresa Blanco and Bonifacio Pobre and, therefore, it should be Jovita Pobre alone who should
succeed to the entire estate left by her mother Teresa Blanco, except for such portion that may be
alloted to an illegitimate child as prescribed by Art. 895 in relation to Article 983 of the New Civil Code;
that at the time of the death of Maxima Pobre, her only legal heir was her husband Basilio Quianzon;
that Petitioner Francisco Pobre and the other heirs mentioned in the Petition are precluded from
inheriting the estate of Maxima Pobre who was an illegitimate child; that furthermore, Jovita Pobre
had disposed of all her properties before her death and Respondent spouses Llanes, acquired by
purchase from Jovita Pobre parcels 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19, 22, 23 (to the extent of 1/3 of the
whole only) and parcels 25, 26, 27, and 32, in the Inventory of Properties co-owned by Maxima Pobre
de Quianzon and Jovita B. Pobre; and that Francisco Pobre was disqualified to be appointed as
administrator.

The lower court on February 20, 1978, appointed the Clerk of the lower court, Atty. Julian Duco as
special administrator of the intestate estate in question but on January 13, 1979, said appointment
was revoked and petitioner Francisco Pobre was appointed administrator of the estate. The latter
then submitted to the Court an Inventory and Appraisal of the Real and Personal Estate of the
decedents Maxima Pobre and Jovita Pobre

ISSUE:

HELD:

The final determination of the ownership of the properties in question in the case at bar, is not to be
made in the Intestate Proceedings, Sp. Proc. 754-IV, but in Civil Case No. 1128-IV which is the
separate Civil Action to Quiet Title, filed by respondent Iluminada Llanes in the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Norte. The assailed orders of exclusion in the intestate proceedings are merely interlocutory
orders, because the question of title of the properties excluded from the Inventory of the
Administrator cannot be determined by the intestate court. In an earlier case, this Court held:

We hold that the order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was not a final order. It was interlocutory in
the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots. The probate
court in the inclusion incident could not determine the question of title. (Valero Vda. de Rodriquez vs.
Court of Appeals, L-39532, July 20, 1979, 91 SCRA 540).

Reliance of Petitioners on the pronouncements made in the case of Coca vs. Pangilinan, L-29547,
January 31, 1978 (81 SCRA 278-285) that after the issues have been joined and in case no amicable
settlement had been reached, the probate court should receive evidence or conduct a full dress
hearing on the motion in the form of complaint, is not applicable to the case at bar. In Coca vs.
Pangilinan, the appellees therein did not institute a separate action to determine the ownership of
the twelve (12) hectares or portion of the estate involved. Because of this circumstance, it was ruled
that it would be just, expeditious and inexpensive solution to require the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan
to file in the intestate proceedings, a motion in the form of complaint setting forth therein their claim
for the twelve (12) hectares portion which the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan, should then file their
Answer thereto. After the issues have been joined and no amicable settlement reached, the probate
court should receive evidence.

However, in the case at bar, there was already a separate action that had been filed by respondents
Llanes in Civil Case No. 1128-IV, of the CFI of Ilocos Norte for the quieting of title over the properties
excluded from the Inventory before the assailed orders in this case were issued. Respondent Llanes
opted to file a separate civil action and this was a right she could exercise.
The general rule is that question of title t• property cannot be passed upon in a testate or intestate
proceeding. However, when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to
submit to the probate court the question of title to property and, when so submitted, the probate
court may definitely pass judgment thereon. (Sebial vs. Sebial, L-23419, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 385).

The second issue raised by Petitioner Administrator as to whether or not the exclusion of the
properties in question by the lower court was arbitrary for being based mainly on the Special
Administrator's Inventory-Report on the Status and Possession of Properties, which report has no
valid basis. Petitioner is raising a factual issue which is not a proper subject of certiorari proceeding

PIO BARRETO VS CA

FACTS:

The proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Drepin were initiated shortly after his death on
July 29, 1972 with the filing of a petition for probate of his holographic will on August 23, 1972.

In this holographic will the late Drepin listed twenty-two (22) persons as his alleged creditors, and
within the six (6) months after publication within which to file claims against the estate, twelve (12)
persons filed their respective claims. The total amount of obligations that may be chargeable against
the Drepin Estate is P1,299,652.66.

The only asset of the testate estate of Drepin consists of three (3) parcels of titled land with an area of
approximately eighty (80) hectares, and another parcel with an area of eighty-one (81) hectares still
pending registration. The estate is saddled with claims of creditors named in the Drepin will and
creditors who have filed their claims within the reglementary period. The only way to pay their claims
is to sell the Drepin lots, so that from the proceeds of the sale, the debts of the estate could be paid,
and any remaining balance distributed to the Drepin heirs.

Since the filing of the petition for probate of the Drepin will, on August 23, 1972, nine (9) offers had
been made for the purchase of the Drepin lands, among them, that of GM Management Phils., dated
August 15, 1978, through its President Honor P. Moslares. Basis for Moslares' letter proposal is a deed
of sale with mortgage executed by the decedent in his favor on October 9, 1970. It appears that on
said date, the deceased sold 80.3980 hectares of land absolutely and perpetually to Honor P.
Moslares for the sum of P2,600,000.00 with a downpayment of P300,000.00. To secure the payment
of the remaining P2,300,000.00, the latter mortgaged the land to the former. The parties further
agreed not to register the sale yet until P1,300,000.00 shall have been paid to Drepin and
P1,000.000.00 paid to Drepin's creditors.

Subsequently, on June 25, 1971, Drepin and Moslares entered into a "Joint Venture Agreement". Said
agreement listed Drepin as the registered "owner" of the lots and denominated Moslares as
"developer" tasked with converting the lands into a residential subdivision.
Before the agreement could be implemented, Nicolai Drepin died.

Upon learning of the existence of Special Proceedings No. 7257, 7261 and 7269 herein respondent
Moslares, on August 15, 1978, informed the Judicial Administrator

Atty. Tomas Trinidad that he is already the owner of the properties made subject matter of the
Special Proceedings and proposed that he be permitted to pay the balance on the sale with mortgage
in accordance with the terms of his written proposal. The probate court, on August 17, 1978 issued an
order approving respondent Moslares' proposal and authorizing administrator Trinidad to enter into
the appropriate agreement. This was reiterated by the court in its order dated January 9, 1979, with
the condition that GM Management Phils. had only up to February 28, 1979 to comply with its
letter-offer dated August 15, 1978 and "failure on their part to comply with the same within the
period specified, the contract with the decedent shall be deemed resolved and ineffective." Counsel
for heir claimant Cornelia Tejano was Revise given up to said date to make and submit a more
beneficial offer. Neither GM Management nor counsel for Tejano was able to perform as required.

Requests for revision of payment and extension of period within which to pay the balance of
P1,600,000.00 were made by Moslares. Further, he filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion
proposing transfer of the certificate of titles over the land subject of the proceedings so as to enable
him to generate funds to liquidate the payable balance. The same were left unacted upon by the
probate court.

Meanwhile, on September 25,1979, A Deed of Undertaking was entered into by respondent Moslares
and the Administrator to implement the Contract of Sale with Mortgage. Such deed provided for the
mode of payment which Moslares was to follow as well as the clearing and transfer of the certificates
of title in the name of Moslares. The latter proviso was to enable Moslares to secure the loan needed
to pay for the balance of the purchase price. Postdated checks were issued by Moslares to cover the
amount embraced in said undertaking. Approval of the agreement with Moslares was strongly urged
by the Administrator. No action was taken by the court thereon. At the hearing of October 19, 1979,
Moslares tendered P1,600,000.00 to the Judicial Administrator. This was opposed by counsel for heir
Tejano, Atty. Ramon Encarnacion, on the ground that respondent Moslares had only until February 28,
1979 within which to pay the same. Attorney Encarnacion thereupon brought to the attention of the
court an offer to buy the properties for P3,000,000.00 by herein petitioner Pio Barretto Realty
Development, Inc. Because of the differing contentions and the new offer, the probate court ordered
the parties to submit memoranda and set a conference on November 28, 1979 to discuss the new
offer.

ISSUE:

HELD:

We are in full accord with the respondent court's resolution of the first issue, and we quote:
For continually presuming that the three titled lots were part of the Drepin estate and for refusing to
provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion, did the respondent court act without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion?

We hold that even with such presumption and refusal, the respondent court still acted within its
jurisdiction and not with grave abuse of discretion. After all, the jurisprudence and rule are both to
the effect that the probate court "may" provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion, not
"should". The obvious reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that
questions of title or ownership, which result to inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, can only be settled in a separate action. Hence, even if respondent court presumed an the
way that the properties sold by Drepin to petitioner were part of Drepin's estate, that would not
prevent nor defeat petitioner's remedy in a separate suit.

And We hold that Civil Case No. 41287 is just such a suit instituted to settle the question of ownership
over the lots covered originally by TCTs Nos. 259060, 259061 and 259062, despite the claim for
damages, because of the composite effect of the prayer in the complaint thereof ...

xxx xxx xxx

In effect, We are saying that the question of whether the properties sold by Drepin to Petitioner
should be excluded from the probate proceedings below, can not be determined with finality by Us in
this case, because in this petition We are merely reviewing the acts of the respondent CFI as a
probate court. Any ruling by the probate court to include those properties "is only provisional in
character and is without prejudice to a judgment in a separate action on the issue of title or
ownership" (Sebial v. Sebial, L-23419, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 385). Consequently, in reviewing the
exercise of such limited probate jurisdiction, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion of
the properties involved, as prayed for; to do so would expand the probate court's jurisdiction beyond
the perimeters set by law and jurisprudence. It is fitting and proper that this issue be ventilated and
finally resolved in the already instituted Civil Case No. 41287, even as We hold that respondent
court's act of not excluding the lots involved did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. In view of
this limitation, We need not resolve the issue of whether there was novation of the Deed of Sale with
Mortgage, or not.

This same elemental principle, we found occasion to reiterate in the cases of Junquera v. Borromeo
(19 SCRA 656); Borromeo v. Canonoy (19 SCRA 667); Recto v. dela Rosa (75 SCRA 226); Lachenal v.
Salas (71 SCRA 202); Bolisay v. Alcid (85 SCRA 213); Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals (91 SCRA
540).

However, from here, the road forks as we disagree with the respondent court's findings on the
second issue.

In his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, respondent Moslares assails the issuance of
the four impugned orders by the probate court on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to
rescind the Deed of Sale with the Mortgage entered into by the deceased during his lifetime, due to
the limited jurisdiction of the probate court merely to settle and liquidate the estates of a decedent
and not to pass upon questions of title to property.

On the other hand, the petitioner argues that in voiding and nullifying the four orders of the probate
court, the Court of Appeals, in effect, would have the former court recognize the alleged ownership of
Mr. Moslares over the three titled Drepin lots involved in this case contrary to its pronouncement in
settling the first issue.

It is to be noted that the last agreement entered into by the deceased prior to his death, that is, the
Joint Venture Agreement listing Drepin as owner of the properties in question, and the surrender to
administrator Trinidad of the certificates of title, had led the probate court to enter or include said
properties in its inventory of the deceased's estate. Thus, provisionally, ownership thereof was
recognized as vested in the estate. Subsequently, in the course of the probate proceedings, the sale of
the properties was found to be necessary to settle the deceased's obligations. It was then that herein
private respondent Moslares submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court in an "Offer to Buy"
said properties, based on his previous agreement with the deceased during the latter's lifetime.

GUTIERREZ JR VS MACANDOG

FACTS:

Agustin Gutierrez, Sr. died intestate on January 3, 1977 in the municipality of New Escalante, Negros
Occidental. He was survived by the following legal heirs: Lolita A, Gutierrez, his surviving spouse by
the third marriage, Agustin, Jr., Herne, Mauricio, Cynthia, Augusto and Bambi (minor) all surnamed
Gutierrez, Rosario G. Tabares, Concepcion G. Balane, Eva G. Gamo, Susan G. Medalla, Corazon G.
Espelita, and Thelma G. Bering,

Upon proper motion dated April 18, 1977, the respondent court issued an order appointing Cynthia B.
Gutierrez as special administratrix of the estate of the late Agustin Gutierrez, Sr., pending the
issuance of the letters of administration.

On July 15, 1977, the corresponding letters of administration was issued by the court.

On February 20, 1981, Cynthia Gutierrez, acting in her capacity as administratrix of the estate, filed
with the court a "Motion for Authority to Secure Additional Loan" of at least P300,000.00, which she
needed "to manage and operate the estate for this crop year 1981-1982. "

On March 23, 1982, administratrix Cynthia Gutierrez as well as Mauricio,Gutierrez, among others,
filed a verified Motion to Reconsider Order dated March 20, 1981 and for an Order Directing the PNB
Not to Release Any Withdrawals by Elpedia Gutierrez" on the following grounds: a) that the grant of P
50,000.00 in favor of Elpedia Gutierrez was never prayed for by the administratrix in her motion; b)
that Elpedia Gutierrez is not an heir of the late Agustin Gutierrez, Sr. and neither is the estate under
obligation to give support to her; c) that to add more burden to the estate to the tune of P50,000.00
is highly unjustifiable and detrimental to the affairs of said estate; and d) the heirs of Agustin
Gutierrez, Sr. are not agreeable to releasing the amount from the estate in favor of Elpedia Gutierrez.

It is noteworthy to mention that on August 31, 1979, Mauricio Gutierrez filed a petition for legal
separation against the private respondent stating as ground, the latter's attempt on his life. However,
before a decision could be handed down by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Bacolod City,
Mauricio Gutierrez and his eldest son were killed in an ambush.

On June 18, 1981, the respondent judge issued the second questioned order denying the motion for
reconsideration with the additional directive that the sum of P50,000.00 "be released by the PNB to
her (Elpedia Gutierrez) due to the urgency and exigency as the said amount is needed for her support
and her children" and that the above amount "be deducted from whatever share Mauricio Gutierrez
is entitled to the estate of the late Agustin Gutierrez, Sr. his father.

ISSUE:

HELD:

We find merit in the petition.

The respondent Elpedia's claim for support should not have been addressed to the estate of Agustin
Gutierrez, Sr.

When the first questioned order was issued by the respondent judge, Mauricio Gutierrez was still
alive. In fact, he was one of those who opposed such order. The respondent judge had no authority to
issue the said order because she knew fully well that the claim had no leg to stand on as Elpedia was
not an heir to the estate and the decedent had no obligation whatsoever to give her support.
Respondent Elpedia, at this point, should have asked for support pendente lite before the juvenile
court where the action for legal separation which was filed by her husband was pending. Then, when
Mauricio Gutierrez died, she should have filed an action for the settlement of estate of her husband
where she and her children could receive such allowance as may be directed by the court under
Section 3, Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Therefore, the second order, even though it was issued after the death of Mauricio Gutierrez, is also
null and void for being without any legal basis.

While it may be true that by right of representation, the respondent Elpedia and her children are
entitled to the rightful share of Mauricio Gutierrez to the estate of Agustin Gutierrez, Sr., the same
cannot be given in advance. It has to wait until all the claims against the estate have been settled.
Under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, all claims against the estate of a deceased must be
filed within a limited time so that thereafter, the heirs can claim their share in the estate.
As was held in Py Eng Chong v. Herrera, (70 SCRA 130, 135):

... The above quoted provision (Sec. 5, Rule 86) is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against
it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should
be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. "The law strictly
requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order
to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue."

It was, therefore, premature for the respondent judge to order the release of the amount in question.

Moreover, the claim for support even assuming that it is meritorious was not reduced into writing and
filed with the court, This, alone, should have militated against the granting of such claim. The fact that
the private respondent asserts that some of her and her husband's conjugal properties were in the
possession of the estate is not sufficient to dispense with the mandatory requirement of filing a claim
against the estate. If it were true that said conjugal properties were being included as part of the
estate of the decedent, then the private respondent, aside from opposing the inclusion, should have
filed a separate action for the recovery of the properties. The alleged inclusion can never be an excuse
for the private respondent to acquire P50,000.00 from the estate and much less if the amount is to be
taken only from a loan incurred by the said estate.

In the case of Valero vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals (91 SCRA 540, 545-546), we ruled:

The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should
not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970
Edition, pp. 448-449 and 473; Lachenal v. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).

In the case at bar, the private respondent did not file a separate action for the recovery of the alleged
included conjugal properties, and in asking for support, she also failed to file a formal claim with the
court. Thus, no hearing was conducted to determine the merit of such claim and the administratrix
was not also given ample opportunity to contest the claim which is her rightful duty to examine or
oppose, being the administratrix of the estate.

As we have ruled in Estate of Olave v. Reyes (123 SCRA 767, 771-772):

The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to
protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be able to
examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the
primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the
probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for
its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the administration, inasmuch as upon
the death of a person, his entire estate is burdened with the payment of all his debts and no creditor
shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shall share pro-rata in the liquidation of the estate
of the deceased.

JARDELEZA VS JARDELEZA

FACTS:

On March 7, 1997, the Spouses Gilda Jardeleza and Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. (Ernesto) commenced
Civil Case No. 23499 against respondents Spouses Melecio and Elizabeth Jardeleza, JMB Traders, Inc.,
and Teodoro Jardeleza (Teodoro) respecting several parcels of their conjugal lands. Civil Case No.
23499 was raffled to Branch 33 of the RTC. On January 13, 2004, during the pendency of Civil Case No.
23499, Ernesto died. Hence, administration proceedings (Special Proceedings No. 04-7705) were
commenced in the RTC (assigned to Branch 38), and Teodoro was appointed as the administrator of
the estate. The other heirs questioned the appointment in the Court of Appeals (CA).

Meanwhile, Teodoro, in his capacity as the administrator, filed a motion to dismiss in Civil Case No.
23499 on the ground that because Melecio, one of the defendants, was also an heir of Ernesto, the
properties subject of the action for reconveyance should be considered as "advances in the
inheritance," and, accordingly, the claim for reconveyance should be heard in Special Proceedings No.
04-7705 by Branch 38.

Branch 33 issued the first assailed order dated January 31, 2005 granting the motion to dismiss.

Gilda sought reconsideration, arguing that she had a personal cause of action of her own distinct from
that of Ernesto; that she neither signed nor consented to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 23499; and
that Teodoro should have first sought the approval of Branch 38 as the intestate court considering
that the estate could potentially recover properties belonging to it.

ISSUE:

HELD:

Thirdly, the jurisdiction of the RTC as a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and probate of a will of a deceased person, and does not extend to the
determination of a question of ownership that arises during the proceedings.9 This is true whether or
not the property is alleged to belong to the estate,10 unless the claimants to the property are all heirs
of the deceased and they agree to submit the question for determination by the probate or
administration court and the interests of third parties are not prejudiced;11 or unless the purpose is
to determine whether or not certain properties should be included in the inventory, in which case the
probate or administration court may decide prima facie the ownership of the property, but such
determination is not final and is without prejudice to the right of interested parties to ventilate the
question of ownership in a proper action.12 Otherwise put, the determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title by a court of
competent jurisdiction.13chanrobleslaw

In this regard, it bears mentioning that Civil Case No. 23499 had been instituted in 1997 and was
pending trial before Branch 33 prior to the bringing of the probate proceedings in 2004. In dismissing
Civil Case No. 23499, Branch 33 shirked from its responsibility to decide the issue of ownership and to
let the probate court decide the same. Branch 33 thereby did not consider that any decision that
Branch 38 as a probate court would render on the title and on whether or not property should be
included or excluded from the inventory of the assets of the estate would at best be merely
provisional in character, and would yield to a final determination in a separate action.

Lastly, the comments of the heirs of Gilda, who had meanwhile also passed away, and Ernesto reveal
that they had no longer any objection to the overturning of the dismissal. In his comment,14 Teodoro
prayed that the dismissal be undone. Rolando Jardeleza's own comment15 expressed his support for
the petition of Gilda to have the dismissal reversed so that the properties allegedly donated to the
respondents would be brought back to the estate of his late parents and be included in its final
settlement. In her comment16 and consolidated reply to comments,17 Glenda Jardeleza manifested
her intention to substitute the late Gilda, her mother, and prayed that Civil Case No. 23499 be
remanded to Branch 33 for further proceedings. With all the heirs of Gilda and Ernesto having thus
united to seek the undoing of the dismissal in order to have a trial on the merits on the question of
ownership of the affected properties, the dismissal should now be undone.

GREGORIO VS MADARANG

FACTS:

Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr. (Casimiro, Sr. or the decedent) died intestate on June 3, 1995, leaving real
and personal properties with an estimated value of P200,000.00.[1] He was survived by his wife
Dolores and their five children, namely Casimiro, Jr., Jose, Ramiro, Vicente and Corazon.

In the intestate proceedings filed by the couples son Jose which was lodged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57, Dolores was appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of
Casimiro, Sr.[2]

Dolores submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of the decedents estate. Jose filed his
Comment on the Report, alleging that it omitted six lots including Lot 829-B-4-B located in Cebu City
which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125429.

A hearing was thus conducted to determine whether the six lots formed part of the estate of the
decedent. By Order of April 5, 2002,
instructed Dolores to revise her Inventory Report to include the six lots.

Dolores and her children, except Jose who suggested that the former be referred to as oppositors,[5]
questioned the RTC order of inclusion of the six lots via motion for reconsideration during the
pendency of which motion the court appointed herein petitioner Corazon as co-administratrix of her
mother Dolores.

As Dolores and her co-oppositors alleged that the six lots had been transferred during the lifetime of
the decedent, they were ordered to submit their affidavits, in lieu of oral testimony, to support the
allegation. Only herein respondent Vicente complied. In his Affidavit, Vicente declared that one of the
six lots, Lot 829-B-4-B, was conveyed to him by a Deed of Donation executed in August 1992 by his
parents Dolores and Casimiro, Sr.[6]

It appears that petitioners later manifested that they no longer oppose the provisional inclusion of
the six lots, except Lot 829-B-4-B.

Jose moved to reconsider the RTC January 20, 2003 Order, arguing that since the title to Lot 829-B-4-B
remained registered in the name of his parents, it should not be excluded from the Inventory; and
that the Deed of Donation in Vicentes favor was not notarized nor registered with the Register of
Deeds. Joses motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order of February 5, 2003, he filed a
Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE:

HELD:

More specifically, petitioners question the appellate courts finding that as the parties interposed no
objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the inventory of the estate of Casimiro V.
Madarang, in effect, they have consented thereto.[12]

A review of the voluminous records of the case shows that, indeed, there was no accord among the
parties respecting the exclusion of Lot 829-B-4-B.

While a probate court, being of special and limited jurisdiction, cannot act on questions of title and
ownership, it can, for purposes of inclusion or exclusion in the inventory of properties of a decedent,
make a provisional determination of ownership, without prejudice to a final determination through a
separate action in a court of general jurisdiction.

The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the probate court to make a
provisional determination of ownership of Lot 829-B-4-B. It bears stress that the question is one of
collation or advancement by the decedent to an heir over which the question of title and ownership
can be passed upon by a probate court.[13]

As earlier reflected, Vicentes claim of ownership over Lot 829-B-4-B rests upon a deed of donation by
his father (decedent) and his mother.

Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition.
(underscoring supplied)

in relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as to advancement made, or

alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the questions and on the heir. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

REPUBLIC VS MARCOS

FACTS:

On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City Branch 156, acting as a probate court,
in Special Proceeding No. 10279, issued an Order[4] granting letters testamentary in solidum to
respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last
will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos. On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of
the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[6] in so far as the January 11, 1996 RTC
Order granted letters testamentary to respondents. On the other hand, respondent Imelda Marcos
filed her own motion for reconsideration on the ground that the will is lost and that petitioner has not
proven its existence and validity.

On February 5, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he already filed
a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 as directed by the January 11, 1996 RTC Order and that he took
his oath as named executor of the will on January 30, 1996.
On March 13, 1996, the RTC issued Letters of Administration[7] to BIR Commissioner Liwayway
Vinzons-Chato in accordance with an earlier Order dated September 9, 1994, appointing her as
Special Administratrix of the Marcos Estate.

On April 1, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters of
Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato.

On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order[8] denying the motion for partial reconsideration filed by
petitioner as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Imelda Marcos, the
penultimate portion of which reads

ISSUE:

HELD:

Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to serve as executors, to wit:

Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. No person is competent to

serve as executor or administrator who:

xxxx

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of trust by reason of drunkenness,
improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense
involving moral turpitude. (Emphasis Supplied)

In the case at bar, petitioner anchored its opposition to the grant of letters testamentary to
respondents, specifically on the following grounds: (1) want of integrity, and (2) conviction of an
offense involving moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that respondents have been convicted of a
number of cases[30] and, hence, should be characterized as one without integrity, or at the least,
with questionable integrity.[31]

The RTC, however, in its January 11, 1996 Order, made the following findings:

However, except for petitioner Republics allegation of want of integrity on the part of Imelda Trinidad
Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Romualdez Marco II, named executors in the last will and
testament, so as to render them incompetent to serve as executors, the Court sees at this time, no
evidence on record, oral or documentary, to substantiate and support the said allegation. (Emphasis
Supplied)
Based on the foregoing, this Court stresses that an appellate court is disinclined to interfere with the
action taken by the probate court in the matter of removal of an executor or administrator unless
positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown.[32] The Rules of Court gives the lower court the
duty and discretion to determine whether in its opinion an individual is unfit to serve as an executor.
The sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by the said court, whose
sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not
conformable to or in disregard of the rules of orders of the court.[33]

Hence, in order to reverse the findings of the RTC, this Court must evaluate the evidence presented or
alleged by petitioner in support of its petition for disqualification. However, after a painstaking review
of the records and evidence on hand, this Court finds that the RTC committed no error or gross abuse
of discretion when it ruled that petitioner failed to substantiate its allegation.

Petitioner conveniently omits to state that the two cases against respondent Imelda Marcos have
already been reversed by this Court. Her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17453 was reversed by this
Court in Dans, Jr. v. People.[34] Likewise, her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17450 was reversed by
this Court in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan.[35] Hence, the so-called convictions against respondent
Imelda Marcos cannot serve as a ground for her disqualification to serve as an executor.

On the other hand, the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II involve four charges
for violation of Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four charges for violation of Section
50 (non-payment of deficiency taxes) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (NIRC).

It is a matter of record, that in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569,[36] the CA acquitted respondent Ferdinand
Marcos II of all the four charges for violation of Section 50 and sustained his conviction for all the four
charges for violation of Section 45. It, however, bears to stress, that the CA only ordered respondent
Marcos II to pay a fine for his failure to file his income tax return. Moreover, and as admitted by
petitioner,[37] said decision is still pending appeal.

Therefore, since respondent Ferdinand Marcos II has appealed his conviction relating to four
violations of Section 45 of the NIRC, the same should not serve as a basis to disqualify him to be
appointed as an executor of the will of his father. More importantly, even assuming arguendo that his
conviction is later on affirmed, the same is still insufficient to disqualify him as the failure to file an
income tax return is not a crime involving moral turpitude.

MALOLES 2 VS PHILIPS

In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He declared that he has no
compulsory heirs and that he is naming as sole devisee and legatee the Arturo de Santos Foundation,
Inc. (ASF). The named executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips. The petition was filed in RTC Makati
Branch 61. Judge Fernando Gorospe of said court determined that Arturo is of sound mind and was
not acting in duress when he signed his last will and testament and so Branch 61 allowed the last will
and testament on February 16, 1996.
Ten days from the allowance, Arturo died. Thereafter, Pacita, as executrix, filed a motion for the
issuance of letters of testamentary with Branch 61. She however withdrew the motion but later on
refilled it with RTC Makati Branch 65.

Meanwhile, a certain Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for intervention with Branch 61 claiming that
as a next of kin (him being the full blooded nephew of Arturo) he should be appointed as the
administrator of the estate and that he is an heir.

Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order transferring the motion filed by Pacita to Branch 61.
Judge Santos ratiocinated that since the probate proceeding started in Branch 61, then it should be
the same court which should hear Pacita’s motion. Branch 61 however refused to consolidate and
referred the case back to Branch 65. Branch 65 subsequently consolidated the case per refusal of
Branch 61. Eventually, Branch 65 allowed the motion for intervention filed by Octavio.

ISSUE: Whether or not Octavio Maloles II has the right to intervene in the probate proceeding.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court first clarified that the probate of will filed in Branch 61 has already
terminated upon the allowance of the will. Hence when Pacita filed a motion with Branch 65, the
same is already a separate proceeding and not a continuance of the now concluded probate in Branch
61. There is therefore no reason for Branch 65 to refer back the case to Branch 61 as it initially did.
Further even if the probate was terminated, under Rule 73 of the Rules of Court concerning the venue
of settlement of estates, it is provided that when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the
case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches.

Anent the issue of Octavio being an heir, such contention has no merit. He is not an heir. Arturo died
testate. Next of kins may only inherit if a person dies intestate. In this case, Arturo left a valid will
which expressly provided that ASF is the sole legatee and devisee of his estate.

IN RE BASA

The Attorney-General asks that an order be issued for the disbarment of Attorney Carlos S. Basa.

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the
Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila with the
crime of abduction with consent, was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. del
Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven
months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment
handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court. 1

The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that “A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude . . .” The sole question presented, therefore, is whether the crime of
abduction with consent, as punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude.

“Moral turpitude,” it has been said, “includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.” (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no
decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of
this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good
morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. (In re Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon
[1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of
November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)

When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court,
we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the
respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the
limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly
ruined.

It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be discharged from
prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. So ordered.