PEOPLE vs VALDEZ We find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its

G.R. No. 129296 admissibility. For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the
September 25, 2000 following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made
with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must
FACTS: be express; and (4) it must be in writing.[51] The records show that the
- The police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya received a tip admission by appellant was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal
from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana admission allegedly made by an accused during the investigation,
plantation allegedly owned by Abe Valdez. without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even
- Thereafter the Chief of Police of Villaverde formed a reaction before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being
team to verify the report and instructed them to uproot said violative of the right to counsel during criminal investigations, it is also
marijuana plants and arrest Valdez. hearsay.[52] Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it
- The following day, the police team together with the informer was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of
left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence, regardless of
being grown. the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.[53]
- After a 3-hour trek the police arrived at the place and found
Valdez in his nipa hut. They looked around the area where
Valdez had his kaingin and saw 7 5-foot high, flowering
marijuana plants in 2 rows, approximately 25 meters from
appellant's hut.
- One of the police asked Valdez who owned the prohibited
plants and, according to the former, the latter admitted that
they were his.
- The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants. The police
took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants.
- Valdez was then arrested and charged with a violation of the
Dangers Drugs Act of 1972.
- The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt

ISSUE:
WON the seized marijuana plants are admissible in evidence against the
accused.

RULING: No
The Court held that the search and seizure without a warrant that was
made by the police officers was violative of Sec. 2 Art. 3 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides for the rights of persons against
unreasonable searches and seizure.

The Constitution[31] lays down the general rule that a search and seizure
must be carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the
search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." In the instant case, there
was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of
the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police
officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain
a warrant to search Valdez's farm. Furthermore, contrary to OSG’s
contention, the plain view doctrine cannot apply in the case. Said
doctrine applies where the police inadvertently came across the object.
Clearly, their discovery of the plants was not inadvertent. The seized
marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further
search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not
in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand."

Therefore, the marijuana plants cannot, as products of an unlawful

search and seizure, be used as evidence against Valdez. They are fruits of
the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the
part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized
marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.

In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished
the police appellant's name as well as the location of appellant's farm,
where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the
police operation was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said
information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest
appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the
police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under
investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a
general inquiry.
PEOPLE vs ADOR
G.R. Nos. 140538-39
June 14, 2004
FACTS:
- The appellants, Godofredo and Diosdado III Ador, are suspects
in the killing of Abe Cuya and Rodolfo Chavez.
- On the way to the crime laboratory, Godofredo told his police
escort that he had been entrusted with a handgun which he
kept in his residence, which he fired on the night of the
killing. The information was relayed to Major Idian, then
Deputy Chief of Police of Naga City, who ordered PO3
Nepomuceno to accompany him in recovering the gun. Thus,
Major Idian, PO3 Nepomuceno and some others accompanied
Godofredo to the latters residence.
- Upon reaching the Ador residence, Godofredo, together with
PO3 Nepomuceno, went to their backyard, retrieved the gun
from under a fallen coconut trunk and turned it in to the
latter.
- Both appellants were found guilty by the trial, thus the
appeal.
beyond reasonable doubt.[52] All the circumstances must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the theory that all the accused are
guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that they are innocent and with every other possible, rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.[53] The evidence must exclude each and
every hypothesis which may be consistent with their innocence. [54] Also,
it should be acted on and weighed with great caution.[55] Circumstantial
evidence which has not been adequately established, much less
corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of conviction.[56]
Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there should be more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[57] Like an
ornate tapestry created out of interwoven fibers which cannot be
plucked out and assayed a strand at a time apart from the others, the
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads
to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. [58] The test to determine
whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record are sufficient to
convict the accused is that the series of the circumstances proved must
be consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his
innocence.

ISSUE:
WON the admissions of Godofredo Ador without counsel may be
admitted as evidence in the case.

RULING: No

The admissions made by Godofredo to Major Idian and PO3

Nepomuceno including the gun in question cannot be considered in
evidence against him without violating his constitutional right to
counsel. Godofredo was already under custodial investigation when he
made his admissions and surrendered the gun to the police
authorities. The police had already begun to focus on the Adors and
were carrying out a process of interrogations that was lending itself to
eliciting incriminating statements and evidence: the police went to the
Ador residence that same evening upon being informed that the Adors
had a long-standing grudge against the Cuyas; the following day, all the
male members of the Ador family were told to go to the police station;
the police was also informed of the dying declaration of deceased
Chavez pointing to the Adors as the assailants; the Adors were all
subjected to paraffin examination; and, there were no other suspects as
the police was not considering any other person or group of
persons. The investigation thus was no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime as the Adors were already being held as suspects for the
killings of Cuya and Chavez.

Consequently, the rights of a person under custodial investigation,

including the right to counsel, have already attached to the Adors, and
pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 12(1) and (3), 1987 Constitution, any waiver of
these rights should be in writing and undertaken with the assistance of
counsel. Admissions under custodial investigation made without the
assistance of counsel are barred as evidence.[78] The records are bare of
any indication that the accused have waived their right to counsel,
hence, any of their admissions are inadmissible in evidence against
them. As we have held, a suspects confession, whether verbal or non-
verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel without a valid
waiver of such assistance regardless of the absence of such coercion, or
the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence,
even if such confession were gospel truth.

The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on circumstantial evidence

to support its conclusion of guilt.[51] It may be the basis of a conviction so
long as the combination of all the circumstances proven produces a
logical conclusion which suffices to establish the guilt of the accused
PEOPLE vs BACONGUIS test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the
GR No. 149889 witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
Dec. 2, 2003 (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
FACTS: demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of
- Appellant, Ruel Baconguis, was charged of murder for the identification procedure.[20] (Underscoring supplied)
allegedly killing Roberto Mercado.
- The only witness in the crime was Lydia Mercado-Lledo, the The totality of circumstances test has been fashioned to assure fairness
sister of the victim. as well as compliance with constitutional requirements of due process in
- Crediting Lydia’s positive identification of appellant as the regard to out-of-court identification.[
man she saw leaving her house and jumping over the fence
and the results of the paraffin test, the trial court convicted A showup, such as what was undertaken by the police in the
appellant by the decision on review. identification of appellant by Lydia, has been held to be an underhanded
mode of identification for "being pointedly suggestive, generating
confidence where there was none, activating visual imagination, and, all
ISSUE: told, subverting their reliability as an eyewitness.[29] Lydia knew that she
WON the result of the paraffin test is conclusive. was going to identify a suspect, whose name had priorly been furnished
by her brother-policeman, when she went to the police station. And the
police pointed appellant to her, and told her that he was the suspect,
RULING: No while he was behind bars, alone.[30]

It is well settled that nitrates are also found in substances other than The unusual, coarse and highly singular method of identification, which
gunpowder.[34]Thus, in a number of cases,32 the Court acquitted the revolts against accepted principles of scientific crime detection,
accused despite the finding of gunpowder nitrates on his hand, noting alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands neither respect
that: nor acceptance.
Scientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is
not conclusive. While it can establish the presence of nitrates or nitrites
on the hand, it does not always indubitably show that said nitrates or
nitrites were caused by the discharge of firearm. The person tested may
have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the
same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives,
fireworks, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans,
and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite
deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products
of combustion of tobacco. The presence of nitrates, therefore, should be
taken only as an indication of a possibility but not of infallibility that the
person tested has fired a gun.33

In fact, prosecution witness Police Superintendent Liza Madeja Sabong,

who conducted the paraffin test on appellant, testified that a person
who fires a gun can transfer gunpowder from his hands to someone
standing very near him even if the second person did not fire a gun
himself.34

But even assuming arguendo that appellants being positive for

gunpowder may be credited as circumstantial evidence indicating his
culpability, that is only one circumstance, and since no other
circumstance was established by the prosecution, the first requirement
for circumstantial evidence to warrant conviction of appellant has not
been met.

The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt
of appellant beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted.

Prosecution witness Lydia identified appellant, then alone in the

detention cell, and in open court as the person she saw leaving the
house.

The value of the in-court identification made by Lydia, however, is

largely dependent upon the out-of-court identification she made while
appellant was in the custody of the police. In People v. Teehankee,
Jr.,[19] this Court held that corruption of out-of-court identification
contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of
the case.

In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification

of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
PEOPLE vs TUMIMPAD
GR No. 109144
August 19, 1994
FACTS:
- Accused-appellant, Moreno Tumimpad, was charged and
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
- He allegedly rape Sandra Salcedo, a 15-year old mongoloid
child.
- The trial court convicted Tumimpad of the crime basing its
decision on the results of the "Major Blood Grouping Test"
and "Pheno Blood Typing" conducted on the 2 accused and
the victim.
- The result showed that Tumimpad had the same blood type
with the child conceived by the victim.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in convicting Tumimpad based on the result
of the blood test.
What is the value of the blood test as evidence.
RULING: No
Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial
evidence given by the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test
was adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one
of many others of the same blood type may have been the father of the
child. As held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals 19:
Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood
samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be
established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular
child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is.
Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have recognized the value
and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have recognized
the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the results of the
test, made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the
alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of
the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable
results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed to
turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test. The
findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of
paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any
one of many others with the same blood type may have been the father
of the child.
PEOPLE vs CARPO
GR No. 132676
April 4, 2001
FACTS:
- Accused-appellants were convicted by the trial court of
multiple murder complexed with attempted murder for the
death of Florentino, Norwela, Nissan and Noemi Dulay.
- They allegedly caused the explosion in the house of the
victims by means of a hand grenade.
- After conviction, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court
for automatic review.
- After the filing of briefs, the accused filed an Addendum to
Appellant's Brief urging that the favorable results of their lie
detector tests with the NBI be admitted into the records.
- The lie detector reports state that when accused-
appellants answered NO to a series of questions related to
the incident the polygrams revealed (they had) no specific
reactions indicative (of) deception.
ISSUE:
WON the accused-appellants should be acquitted based on the
poygrams.
RULING: No
A lie detector test is based on the theory that an individual will undergo
physiological changes, capable of being monitored by sensors attached
to his body, when he is not telling the truth. The Court does not put
credit and faith on the result of a lie detector test inasmuch as it has not
been accepted by the scientific community as an accurate means of
ascertaining truth or deception.
PEOPLE vs MENESES
GR No. 111742
March 26, 1998
FACTS:
- Accused-appellant, Roman Meneses, was found guilty of
murder for the killing of his brother-in-law, Cesar Victoria.
- His conviction was based mainly on the testimony of the
victim’s son, Christopher, who testified that he was awakened
from sleep at around 3:00 in the morning and saw his father
being stabbed in the heart with a veinte nueve by Meneses.
ISSUE:
WON the testimony of Christopher is credible enough to convict
Meneses.
RULING: No
Meneses’ conviction is anchored entirely on the testimony of the single
eyewitness, Christopher Victoria, who identified appellant as the one
who he allegedly saw stab his father.
We find that the trustworthiness of the identification of appellant by
Christopher is dubious, raising reasonable doubt in the mind of the
Court as to appellants culpability.
It was established that the crime took place in the wee hours of the
morning, before the crack of dawn, at around three oclock.[11] The court
can take judicial notice of the laws of nature,[12] such as in the instant
case, that at around three in the morning during the Christmas season, it
is still quite dark and that daylight comes rather late in this time of
year.[13] Nowhere in the description of the crime scene by witness SPO3
Mendoza in his testimony was it established that there was light or
illumination of any sort by which Christopher could see the attacker.
The crime took place in a makeshift room measuring about three by five
square meters. While the room had a door, there was no mention of a
window which could have allowed entry of some kind of light from the
outside. It is highly improbable that a young boy, just roused from sleep
and his eyes adjusting to the unlit room, could identify the attacker,
much less identify the knife used, as Christopher did, as a veinte nueve.
The prosecution failed to paint a crystal-clear picture of the environment
by which Christopher could have made an accurate and reliable
identification of the attacker. Christophers testimony being improbable,
is not credible. Evidence is credible when it is such as the common
experience of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except
its conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience.
DEL ROSARIO vs PEOPLE
GR No. 142295
May 31, 2001
FACTS:
- Petitioner, Vicente Del Rosario, was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms.
- Among the evidences presented against him was a
certification issued by the Chief, Firearms and Explosives
Division, PNP, stating that a certain Vicente “Vic” Del Rosario
of Brgy. Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, had not been issued a
license to carry a firearm.
- Petitioner argued that he is Vicente Del Rosario of Brgy. Tigbe,
Norsagaray, Bulacan, and that he has a valid firearm license.
ISSUE:
WON the court is correct in convicting Del Rosario in consideration of
the certification issued by the CFED,PNP.
RULING: No
petitioner submitted that he was not the person referred to in the said
certification because he is Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas from
Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The Court takes judicial notice of
the existence of both barangay Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray,
Bulacan.[16] In fact, the trial court erred grievously in not taking judicial
notice of the barangays within its territorial jurisdiction, believing the
prosecutions submission that there was only barangay Tigbe, and that
barangay Bigte in the certification was a typographical
error.[17] Petitioner presented to the head of the raiding team, Police
Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique, Chief, Operations Branch, PNP
Criminal Investigation Command, a valid firearm license. The court is
duty bound to examine the evidence assiduously to determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. It is true that the court may rely on the
certification of the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP on the
absence of a firearm license.[18] However, such certification referred to
another individual and thus, cannot prevail over a valid firearm license
duly issued to petitioner.
PEOPLE vs ESTOMACO
GR No. 117485-86
April 22, 1996

FACTS:

- Accused-appellant, Melchor Estomaco, was charged with five

counts of incestuous rape of her daughter.
- The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
two of the cases filed against him, imposing upon him the
penalties of reclusion perpetua and death, respectively.

RULING:

In the automatic review of the cases, the Supreme Court emphasized the
consistency of non-compliance by the court a quo of the procedural
rules to be observed for the validity of the arraignment of an accused.

Among said non-compliance is the proper reading of the complaints to

the accused during his arraignment.

Court: Likewise of very serious importance and consequence is the fact

that the complaints were supposedly read to appellant in Ilonggo/local
dialect. Parenthetically, there was no statement of record that appellant
fully understood that medium of expression. This assumes added
significance since Ilonggo, or properly called Hiligaynon, is a regional
language,[18] spoken in a major part of Iloilo province, Negros Occidental
and, with variations, in Capiz. Within a province or major geographical
area using a basic regional language, there may be other local dialects
spoken in certain parts thereof. If said indication in the aforequoted
portion of the transcript intended to convey that Ilonggo is merely a
local dialect and was also the idiom referred to, the same is egregious
error; it would be different if local dialect was used to denote an
alternative and different medium but, inexplicably, without identifying
what it was.

The significance of this distinction is found right in the provisions of

Section 1(a) of Rule 116 which, cognizant of the aforestated linguistic
variations, deliberately required that the complaint or information be
read to the accused in the language or the dialect known to him, to
ensure his comprehension of the charges. The Court takes judicial
notice, because it is either of public knowledge or readily capable of
unquestionable demonstration,[19] that in the central and northwestern
part of Iloilo province and all the way up to and throughout Antique,
including necessarily San Joaquin where the offenses were committed
and of which appellant and his family are natives, the local dialect is
known as kinaray-a.

Barring previous exposure to or as a consequence of extended social or

commercial intercourse, kinaray-a is not readily understandable to nor
spoken by those born to the Hiligaynon regional language or who have
lived in the areas under its sway for an appreciable period of time. The
converse is true for those whose native tongue is the dialect of kinaray-
a, since they are generally not well-versed in Ilonggo, or
Hiligaynon. Since all the complaints are not only in English but in
technical legal language, we are again at sea as to whether and how the
indictments were translated to Ilonggo and/or to kinaray-a, or that the
appellant was truly and honestly made of the charges and, especially,
the consequences of his guilty plea thereto. The records are silent and
do not reveal anything on this point, nor how the dialogue between the
presiding judge and appellant was translated. Yet a mans life is at stake
while this Court wrestles with that dilemma created by an omission of
official duty.

(Judgment Set aside – Remanded)