Serapio vs Sandiganbayan

Facts: Atty. Edward Serapio (petitioner) filed two petitions in the SC; these are: 1. A petition for certiorari assailing the resolutions of

the Third division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for reinvestigation and motion to quash; 2. Petition for

Habeas Corpus.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of plunder together with Former President Joseph Estrada and son Jinggoy Estrada among

others. Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. He allegedly

received, on behalf of the said foundation, millions of pesos coming from illegal activities.

The Ombudsman recommended the filing of a case against him before the Sandiganbayan. A warrant for his arrest was issued.

Upon learning of the said warrant he voluntarily surrendered to the PNP. Petitioner, thereafter, file an Urgent Motion for Bail but

such motion is opposed by the prosecution for the reason that petitioner should be arraign first before he can avail of Bail. Later on

Petitioner simultaneously filed a motion to quash.

The bail hearing was reset several times due to various pleadings filed by petitioner and the prosecution.

Due to this, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus for the reason that the prosecution have waived their right to present

evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; the prosecution launched an endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to

prevent the conduct of the bail hearings; and, on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of his guilt. For the said

reasons, he is still being deprived of his liberty.

Petitioner cited also Moncupa vs. Enrile, which in such case the Court held that habeas corpus extends to instances where

detention, while valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner should be first arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted.

2. WON petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended information during the pendency of his petition for bail.

3. Whether joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused is mandatory.

4. WON petitioner was deprived of his right to due process and should be released from detention via writ of habeas corpus.

Ruling:

1. NO. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender:
  even before a complaint or information is filed against him and

 even if the crime charged is a capital offense.

 Note: he may apply but the court has to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong or not. If the evidence of guilt is not

strong bail will be a matter of right, the court must grant the bail.

2. YES. Application of an accused for bail does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the information.

Bail and motion to quash has different purpose, the two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other.

Bail’s purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the same time

securing his appearance at trial. Motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of the criminal

complaint or information.

3. NO, it is not mandatory. It is under the discretion of the court WON there will be a joint hearing of the petition for bail.

In a petition for bail, the hearing will be summary in nature. In this case the joinder of the hearing of petitioner’s bail with the trial of

former President Estrada will prejudice the petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to

obtain bail. Bail application must be resolved without unnecessary delay.

4. NO. The petitioner voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.

General Rule: The writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an

officer under the process issued by the court which had jurisdiction to issue the same. (no habeas corpus if detained validly)

Exception (Moncupa vs. Enrile): where the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under the law, had later become invalid. (even

though the person praying its issuance were not completely deprived of their liberty)

In this case, the general rule applies because petitioner voluntarily surrendered. The exception to the rule does not apply because

the hearing on petitioner’s application for bail has yet to commence. “later become invalid”(the deprivation became arbitrary) not

applicable because the delay of the hearing cannot be pinned solely to the prosecution, petitioner himself is partly to be blamed.

Moreover, “Petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting ones right to bail. It cannot be availed of

where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such
discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with

the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.”

other issue: The prosecution did not waive its right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner.

Even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail by an accused charged with a capital

offense, the trial court is still under duty to conduct hearing on said application.

Petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his application for bail and resolve the

same in his favor because petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter of right at this stage of the proceeding (wa pa na determine if

the evidence of guilt is strong or not). There must be first be a finding that the evidence against petitioner is NOT STRONG before

he may be granted bail.

Barbero vs Judge Dumlao

Facts: Barbero filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Medina. The case was raffled to Judge Anghad of RTC Branch 36,

Santiago City. Judge Anghad issued a warrant of arrest against Medina. Medina was arrested by virtue of the warrant. However,

Judge Dumlao approved Medina’s bail. Judge Dumlao is the MTC judge of San Mateo, Isabela. Barbero alleged that Judge

Dumlao’s approval of Medina’s bail and his order to release Medina were unlawful.

Issue: WON the grant of bail by Judge Dumlao is unlawful?

Ruling:

YES. Under Sec. 17 (a) of Rule 114, the application for bail must be filed in the court where the case is pending. In the absence

or unavailability of the judge thereof, the application for bail must be filed with another branch of the same court within the

province or city. Second, if the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail

may be filed with any regional trial court of the place.

In this case, there was no showing that Judge Anghad was absent or unavailable or that Medina was arrested outside Santiago City.

Thus, Medina's bail should have been filed with Judge Anghad. Even if Judge Anghad were absent or unavailable or even if Medina

were arrested in San Mateo, Judge Dumlao would still be liable because the bail should have been filed with another branch of the

RTC in Santiago City or with the RTC of San Mateo, respectively.

Leviste v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of

Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision

mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction to the Court of

Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health

condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application

for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of

appeal should be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.” Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion

the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is

more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent,

bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE: In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more

than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted

absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

HELD: NO, discretionary nature of bail mentioned in Section 5 of Rule 114 does not mean automatic grant of bail in case of appeal.

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail

ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. The provision categorically refers to “the following or other

similar circumstances”. Hence, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the 3rd par. of Sec. 5, Rule 114 may be

considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal. That is why it is not automatic because it has to consider

other circumstances not enumerated in sec. 5.

Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following rules:

 After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20

years is imposed, and not one ofthe circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and

proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);

 After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20

years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail

shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5)

Chua vs Court of Appeals

Facts: Chiok (private respondent) was on trial before the RTC for estafa. However, he failed to appear at the end of the

promulgation twice. The RTC promulgated a decision convicting him for estafa, and issued an Omnibus Order (a) denying

respondent's motion for reconsideration of the judgment of conviction; (b) canceling his bail; and (c) giving him five (5) days from
notice within which to appear before the trial court, otherwise he would be arrested. He failed to appear within 5 days so a warrant

of arrest was issued. Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with application for TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction

enjoining the RTC from implementing Omnibus Order cancelling his bail, which it granted.

Issue: WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of the

respondent.

Ruling:

YES. Firstly, the petition for certiorari with prayer for a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 53340) is not the
proper recourse in assailing the trial court's May 28, 1999 Omnibus Order canceling his bail. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure 3 provides:

SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail
may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the natureof the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during
the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: SDHITE

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
or TcIAHS

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or ON MOTION OF ANY PARTY, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. 4 (Underscoring supplied)

It is clear from the last paragraph of the above provision that private respondent's appropriate remedy against the trial court's May
28, 1999 Omnibus Order canceling his bail is by filing with the Court of Appeals a motion to review the said order in the same
regular appeal proceedings in CA-G.R. CR No. 23309he himself initiated. Such motion is an incident in his appeal. 5 The
filing of a separate petition via a special civil action or special proceeding questioning such adverse order before the
appellate court is proscribed. 6 Such independent special civil action obviously contravenes the rule against multiplicity of suits and
constitutes forum shopping. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing outright respondent's petition for certiorari in CA-
G.R. SP No. 53340. The basic rule is that such petition may only be availed of when "there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 7HSacEI

Secondly, the assailed September 20, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals granting respondent's application for a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the trial court's Omnibus Order canceling his bail, is bereft of any
factual or legal basis. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that (1) he has a clear existing right to be
protected; and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are in violation of such right. 8

The first requisite is absent. Respondent has no right to be freed on bail pending his appeal from the trial court's judgment. His
conviction carries a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years (to be exact, 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum) which justifies the cancellation of his bail pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 5 (b),
(d) and (e) of Rule 114, quoted above. Moreover, he failed to appear despite notice during the promulgation of judgment on January
26, 1999. His inexcusable non-appearance not only violated the condition of his bail that he "shall appear" before
the court "whenever required" by the latter or the Rules, 9 but also showed the probability that he might flee or commit another
crime while released on bail.
Summary sa ruling:

 remedy when bailed is cancelled,

o motion to review the said order in the same regular appeal proceedings. Such motion is an incident in his
appeal.

o petition for certiorari is not proper.

 Respondent is not allowed to bail because one of the circumstances enumerated in sec. 5 is/are present

 The court should have immediately promulgated its decision when respondent was not present.

o promulgation of judgment in absentia is mandatory pursuant to Sec.6, Rule 120