1.

Morales v Binay -

PRINCIPLES

Final Decisions of the Ombudsman in Administrative Cases – Rule 43 to the CA

Interlocutory order of the Ombudsman – RULE 65 to the CA

Final Resolution of the Ombudsman recommending filing of criminal case – Rule 65 to the supreme
court

CONDONATION DOCTRINE ABANDONED

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the
conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of
office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense,
and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an
official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense
done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be
condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was
interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses

PRESIDENT’S POWER TO GRANT CLEMENCY IN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSES

From Llamas v. Orbos

The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the
President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may
be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following
petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the
same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why the President cannot
grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious
than criminal offenses.

REQUISITES VALID PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION BY OMBUDSMAN

The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:

Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of
guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman
but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by
the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case
the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an
order of preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely:

(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:

(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty;

(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

FACTS:

Binay preventively suspended. Applied for TRO with the CA. CA issued the TRO to suspend
implementation of the preventive suspension because of condonation doctrine

ISSUE: Can the CA issue a TRO against the interlocutory order of preventive suspension issued by the
Ombudsman?

Disputed Provision:

Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act,118 which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

According to Ombudsman: The SECOND paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in
arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly
this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague
for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase "application for remedy" or the word "findings"
refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that
the same be taken only against a pure question of law.

RULING:

FIRST PARAGRAPH

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme
Court119) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Generally speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is
ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional
remedy for and as an incident in the main action."120 Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which
connotes a suspension of an action while the main case remains pending, the "writ of injunction"
mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the
nature of a provisional injunctive relief.

The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter
of the investigation is outside the office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress,
and the Judiciary.121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious
misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of
filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.122 Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or
administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer
or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

SECOND PARAGRAPH: "[n]o court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision
or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law."

As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies
against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the
Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy" (subject to the exception below) against the same. To
clarify, the phrase "application for remedy," being a generally worded provision, and being separated
from the term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or",133 refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or
provisionally), except an appeal. By the same principle, the word "findings," which is also separated
from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would therefore refer to any finding made by the
Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a decision.

The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific
procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against "the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court
on "pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion
that defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is based on
errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment to which the classifications of (a) questions of fact, (b)
questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and law, relate to. In fact, there is no procedural rule,
whether in the old or new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is
also a statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body cannot be said to have intended the
establishment of conflicting and hostile systems on the same subject. Such a result would render
legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the laws to uncertainty and unintelligibility.135 There
should then be no confusion that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45
appeal to this Court, and no other. In sum, the appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act
provision is that all remedies against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited, except
the above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on pure questions of law.

SECOND PARAGRAPH UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45
appeal so as to apply to interlocutory "findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by
confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded
on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this
light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction,
without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to
the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which was invalidated in the case
of Fabian v. Desiertoni137 (Fabian)

In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since it
had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in
violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision was found to be
inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated,
applies only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law;" and not of quasi-
judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the
Court of Appeals.

Consequence of invalidity.
In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed by Binay, Jr. before the
CA in order to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory
order,148 hence, unappealable.149
In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against
unappelable issuances150 of the Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not directly before this
Court.

2. Villagracia v Shariah Court

PRINCIPLE: Shari' a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where one of the parties is not a
Muslim.
ISSUES:

1. whether a Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the parties is not
a Muslim.
2. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action where one of the
parties is a non-Muslim if the District Court decides the action applying the provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines; and
3. Whether a Shari’a District Court may validly hear, try, and decide a real action filed by a Muslim
against a non-Muslim if the non-Muslim defendant was served with summons.

RULING:

The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original
jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not arising from customary contracts41 wherein
the parties involved are Muslims:

ART 143. Original jurisdiction. – x x x x

(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:

xxxx

(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d)42 wherein the parties involved
are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and

Thus, Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action based on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall
dismiss the claim:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

Application of Civil Code does not cure lack of jurisdiction

The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines by respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court does not validate the proceedings before the court. Under Article 175 of the Muslim Code,
customary contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim law.51 Hence, Shari’a District Courts apply
Muslim law when resolving real actions arising from customary contracts.

In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a District
Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws of
general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court taking
cognizance of the action. This is the reason why the original jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over
real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of regular courts.
However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only if the parties involved are Muslims.
Considering that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction over
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of real property. The proceedings before it are void,
regardless of the fact that it applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in resolving the
action.

WHEN CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS APPLY TO NON-MUSLIMS

True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines expressly prohibits non-
Muslims from participating in Shari’a court proceedings. In fact, there are instances when provisions in
the Muslim Code apply to non-Muslims. Under Article 13 of the Muslim Code,52 provisions of the Code
on marriage and divorce apply to the female party in a marriage solemnized according to Muslim law,
even if the female is non-Muslim.53 Under Article 93, paragraph (c) of the Muslim Code,54 a person of a
different religion is disqualified from inheriting from a Muslim decedent.55 However, by operation of
law and regardless of Muslim law to the contrary, the decedent’s parent or spouse who is a non-
Muslim "shall be entitled to one-third of what he or she would have received without such
disqualification."56 In these instances, non-Muslims may participate in Shari’a court proceedings.57

2. respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, with
Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings before respondent Shari’a District Court,
including the service of summons on Vivencio, are void.

3. Under the judicial system in Republic Act No. 9054,97 the Shari’a Appellate Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of the Shari’a District Courts. He should have filed
his petition for certiorari before the Shari’a Appellate Court.

This court held in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong106 that "until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court
shall have been organized,"107 decisions of the Shari’a District Court shall be appealable to the Court of
Appeals and "shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the [Court of Appeals]
stations preferably composed of Muslim [Court of Appeals] Justices."108 However, considering that To m
a w i s was not yet promulgated when Vivencio filed his petition for certiorari on August 6, 2009, we
take cognizance of Vivencio’s petition for certiorari in the exercise of our original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari.109

Moreover, priority should be given in organizing the Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic law. A
Jurisconsult in Islamic law or "Mufti" is an officer with authority to render legal opinions or
"fatawa"110 on any questions relating to Muslim law.111 These legal opinions should be based on
recognized authorities112 and "must be rendered in precise accordance with precedent."113 In the
Philippines where only Muslim personal laws are codified, a legal officer learned in the Qur’an and
Hadiths is necessary to assist this court as well as Shari’a court judges in resolving disputes not involving
Muslim personal laws.
 3. Tumpag v Tumpag

FACTS:

The CA dismissed, without prejudice, the complaint for recovery of possession and damages that the
petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) because the complaint failed to allege the assessed
value of the disputed property in the case.

Attached, however, to the petitioner’s complaint was a copy of a Declaration of Real Property showing
that the subject property has a market value of P51,965.00 and assessed value of P20,790.00. The CA
was fully aware of this attachment but still proceeded to dismiss the petitioner’s complaint

ISSUE: WON the dismissal is proper

HELD: NO

In the present case, we find reason not to strictly apply the above-mentioned general rule, and to
consider the facts contained in the Declaration of Real Property attached to the complaint in
determining whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the petitioner’s case. A mere reference to the
attached document could facially resolve the question on jurisdiction and would have rendered lengthy
litigation on this point unnecessary.

4. Sebastian v Lagmoy

PRINCIPLE: MTC has jurisdiction regardless of the amount involved in the barangay settlement even if
it exceeds P200,000. The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the "appropriate city or municipal
court" as the forum for the execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon.
Notably, in expressly conferring authority over these courts, Section 417 made no distinction with
respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue involved. Thus, there can be no question that
the law's intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards
to the city or municipal courts regardless of the amount.

FACTS:

Barangay amicable settlement to pay P250,000. Settlement was not repudiated within 10 days.
Settlement was not enforced within 6 months. Complainant Angela filed a motion for execution in the
MCTC one and a half years after the execution of the settlement. MCTC rendered a decision in favor of
complainant for P250,000.

Respondent Michael appealed to RTC. Respondent’s arguments:

(i) an amicable settlement or arbitration award can be enforced by the Lupon within six (6)
months from date of settlement or after the lapse of six (6) months, by ordinary civil action
in the appropriate City or Municipal Trial Court and not by a mere Motion for execution; and
(ii) (ii) the MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case since the amount of P250,000.00 (as
the subject matter of the kasunduan) is in excess of MCTC's jurisdictional amount of
P200,000.00

RTC granted the appeal and dismissed Angela’s case. Angela appealed to the CA. CA granted the petition
and set aside RTC’s decision.
Respondent’s arguments on appeal:

i. that the kasunduan cannot be given the force and effect of a final judgment because it did
not conform to the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay law
ii. the kasunduan is merely in the nature of a private document.
iii. that since the amount of P250,000.00 - the subject matter of the kasunduan - is in excess of
MCTC's jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00, the kasunduan is beyond the MCTC's
jurisdiction to hear and to resolve.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute
the kasunduan regardless of the amount involved;

2. Whether or not the kasunduan could be given the force and effect of a final judgment; and

3. Whether or not the kasunduan can be enforced.

RULING:

Under Section 417, LGC provision, an amicable settlement or arbitration award that is not repudiated
within a period often (10) days from the settlement may be enforced by: first, execution by
the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement; or second, by an action in the
appropriate city or municipal trial court if more than six (6) months from the date of settlement has
already elapsed.

Under the first mode of enforcement, the execution of an amicable settlement could be done on mere
motion of the party entitled thereto before the Punong Barangay.10 The proceedings in this case are
summary in nature and are governed by the Local Government Code and the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations.

The second mode of enforcement, on the other hand, is judicial in nature and could only be resorted to
through the institution of an action in a regular form before the proper City/Municipal Trial Court.11 The
proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of the Rules of Court.

Motion for execution sufficient in form and substance as an initiatory pleading

A perusal of the motion for execution, however, shows that it contains the material requirements of an
initiatory action.

First, the motion is sufficient in form12 and substance.13 It is complete with allegations of the ultimate
facts constituting the cause of action; the names and residences of the plaintiff and the defendant; it
contains the prayer for the MCTC to order the execution of the kasunduan; and there was also a
verification and certification against forum shopping.

Furthermore, attached to the motion are: 1) the authenticated special power of attorney of Annabel,
authorizing Angelita to file the present action on her behalf; and 2) the copy of the kasunduan whose
contents were quoted in the body of the motion for execution.
It is well-settled that what are controlling in determining the nature of the pleading are the allegations
in the body and not the caption.14

The kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment.

Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable settlement and arbitration award shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration often (10) days from the
date of its execution, unless the settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify the
award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court.

Moreover, Section 14, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules states that the
party's failure to repudiate the settlement within the period often (10) days shall be deemed a waiver of
the right to challenge the settlement on the ground that his/her consent was vitiated by fraud, violence
or intimidation.

The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction

to enforce the kasunduan regardless of the amount involved.

The Court also finds that the CA correctly upheld the MCTC's jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or
arbitration .award issued by the Lupon.

We again draw attention to the provision of Section 417 of the Local Government Code that after the
lapse of the six (6) month period from the date of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by
action in the appropriate city or municipal court.

The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the "appropriate city or municipal court" as the forum for
the execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly
conferring authority over these courts, Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount
involved or the nature of the issue involved. Thus, there can be no question that the law's intendment
was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal
courts regardless of the amount.

5. Clidoro v Jalmanzar

FACTS:
Original partition case filed in 1988 in the RTC. CA affirmed and modified the decision on November 13,
1995. In 2003, a complaint for revival of judgment was filed.

Defendants filed a MTD for lack of cause of action. Their arguments:

1.) The petition, not being brought up against the real partiesin-interest, is dismissible for lack of cause
of action;

2.) The substitution of the parties defendant is improper and is not in accordance with the rules;
3.) Even if the decision is ordered revived, the same cannot be executed since the legal requirements of
Rule 69, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has not been complied with; and

4.) The Judgment of the Honorable Court ordering partition is merely interlocutory as it leaves
something more to be done to complete the disposition of the case

RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action because the plaintiffs were not the original
parties, the original defendants were already deceased and so were their beneficiaries.

ISSUE: whether the complaint for revival of judgment may be dismissed for lack of cause of action as it
was not brought by or against the real parties-in-interest.

RULING:

lack of cause of action is not enumerated under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court as one of the grounds for
the dismissal of a complaint.

Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the determination of a lack of cause of action can only
be made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via that mode is failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion may be made on the
ground "that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action."

The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth ofthe material
allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiff's complaint. When a motion to dismiss is
grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as rule, be based only on the
facts alleged in the complaint.

In this case, it was alleged in the complaint for revival of judgment that the parties therein were also the
parties in the action for partition. Applying the foregoing test of hypothetically admitting this allegation
in the complaint, and not looking into the veracity of the same, it would then appear that the complaint
sufficiently stated a cause of action as the plaintiffs in the complaint for revival of judgment (hereinafter
respondents), as the prevailing parties in the action for partition, had a right to seek enforcement of the
decision in the partition case.

n action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a
previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed
upon motion of the prevailing party. It isnot intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the
judgment debtor's case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment. An action for revival of
judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct fromeither the recovery of property
case or the reconstitution case [in this case, the original action for partition], wherein the cause of
action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be
enforced is rendered. x x x10

With the foregoing in mind, it is understandable that there would be instances where the parties in the
original case and in the subsequent action for revival of judgment would not be exactly the same. The
mere fact that the names appearing as parties in the the complaint for revival of judgment are different
from the names of the parties in the original case would not necessarily mean that theyare not the real
parties-in-interest. What is important is that, as provided in Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they
are "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit." Definitely, as the prevailing parties in the previous case for partition, the plaintiffs
in the case for revival of judgment would be benefited by the enforcement of the decision in the
partition case.

ALSO, In Basbas v. Sayson,12 the Court pointed out that even just one of the co-owners, by himself alone,
can bring an action for the recovery of the coowned property, even through an action for revival of
judgment, because the enforcement of the judgment would result in such recovery of property. Thus, as
in Basbas, it is not necessary in this case that all of the parties, in whose favor the case for partition was
adjudged, be made plaintiffs to the action for revival of judgment. Any which one of said prevailing
parties, who had an interest in the enforcement of the decision, may file the complaint for revival of
judgment, even just by himself.

6. Resident Marine Mammals of Tanon Strait v Reyes

PRINCIPLE: legal standing of animals

In light of the promulgation of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, the need to give the
Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino
citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here
that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named
cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may
be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore
declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.

7. Jacinto v Gumara

PRINCIPLE: Who signs verification and certification of NFS

FACTS: Plaintiff executed SPA so that his lawyer will sign the verification and certification of NFS

RULING:

It is true, as petitioner asserts, that if for reasonable or justifiable reasons he is unable to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping in his CA Petition, he may execute a special power
of attorney designating his counsel of record to sign the Petition on his behalf.

In Altres v. Empleo,29 this view was taken:

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential
pronouncements already reflected above respecting noncompliance with the requirements on, or
submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of

defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to
the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged
in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in

verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a
need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances
or compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke
a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. H, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must
execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

TN:

[T]he following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification
without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a
corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an
Employment Specialist in a labor case.

xxx [T]he determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The
rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or
representatives of the corporation to sign xxx, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and
correctness of the allegations in the petition."56 (NISSAN CAR LEASE PHILS., INC. VS. LICA
MANAGEMENT INC. AND PROTON PILIPINAS, INC. (G.R. NO. 176986; JANUARY 13, 2016)

8. Soliman v Fernandez

PRINCIPLE: Limitation on power of court under RULE 17, SECTION 3 to dismiss a case for failure to
prosecute - Case must not be dismissed for failure to move for pre-trial by plaintiff, Clerk of Court
should set the case for pre-trial and issue the Notice of Pre-Trial

RULING
It has long been established and settled that the question of whether a case should be dismissed for
failure to prosecute is mainly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.25 Pursuant to Rule 17,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a court can dismiss a case on the ground of failure to prosecute. The true
test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the prevailing circumstances, the plaintiff is
culpable for want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.26 As to what
constitutes “unreasonable length of time,” this Court has ruled that it depends on the circumstances of
each particular case and that “the sound discretion of the court” in the determination of the said
question will not be disturbed, in the absence of patent abuse.27 The Court, however, in the case
of Belonio v. Rodriguez,28 held that:

The power of the trial court to dismiss an action for non-prosequitur is not without its limits. If a pattern
or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory
requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff is not present, as in this case, courts should not
wield their authority to dismiss. Indeed, while the dismissal rests on the prerogative of the trial court, it
must soundly be exercised and not be abused, as there must be sufficient reason to justify its extinctive
effect on the plaintiff’s cause of action. Deferment of proceedings may be tolerated so that the court,
aimed at a just and inexpensive determination of the action, may adjudge cases only after a full and free
presentation of all the evidence by both parties. In this regard, courts are reminded to exert earnest
efforts to resolve the matters before them on the merits, and adjudicate the case in accord with the
relief sought by the parties so that appeals may be discouraged; otherwise, in hastening the
proceedings, they further delay the final settlement of the case.

In Malayan Insurance Co, Inc. v. Ipil International, Inc.,30 this Court held that the failure of a plaintiff to
prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give rise to the
presumption that he is no longer interested to obtain from the court the relief prayed for in the
complaint. The presumption is not, by any means, conclusive because the plaintiff, on a motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, may allege and establish a justifiable cause for such failure.

We also note that in the trial court, petitioner as defendant was in delay in filing his answer yet the
court showed some leniency in admitting his answer despite of the delay. We find no reason why
respondent as plaintiff should not be granted the same leniency for his failure to move for pre-trial. For
after all, and to underscore the point, the resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC31provides that:
“Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must move ex parte that the case be set
for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch Clerk
of Court shall issue a notice of pre-trial.” Dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute is not the result
stated in the rule. The trial court is required to proceed to pre-trial through the notice of pre-trial and
setting the case for pre-trial by the Branch Clerk of Court.

On a final note, we emphasize that in the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of
the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the
plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority
to dismiss.32 This is in line with the time-honoured principle that cases should be decided only after
giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural
imperfections should thus not serve as basis of decisions.

9. Ching v Ching

PRINCIPLE: Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the
plaintiff. Hence, the "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure will
not apply if the prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant.
As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it is the
second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an
adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the following
requisites must be present:

(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
(3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground
that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.

FACTS:

First case - complaint for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila – Branch 6. Complaint later amended to "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Defendant filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. First case dismissed. RTC Branch 6
gave petitioners 15 days to file complaint.

Second case (2002) - a complaint for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed in RTC Branch 20. Petitioners filed motion
to dismiss and RTC Branch 20 dismissed the second case without prejudice. Defendant moved to dismiss
on the ground of two-dismissal rule

Third case - complaint for "Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit
of Extrajudicial Agreement, Deed of Absolute Sale, and Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for TRO
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" in RTC Branch 6. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of res jiidicata, litis pendencia, forum-shopping, and failure of the complaint to state a cause of action

Petitioners are of the view that when Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias failed to file the appropriate pleading
within fifteen (15) days in the first case, he violated the order of the court. This, they argue, made the
original dismissal an adjudication upon the merits, in accordance with Rule 17, Section 3, i.e., a dismissal
through the default of the plaintiff. Hence, they argue that when respondents filed the second case and
then caused its dismissal, the dismissal should have been with prejudice according to Rule 17, Section 1,
i.e., two dismissals caused by the plaintiff on the same claim.

ISSUE: whether the first case was a dismissal due to fault of plaintiff

RULING:

Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss the case if the plaintiff defaults; it does not
contemplate a situation where the dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction. Since there was already a
dismissal prior to plaintiffs default, the trial court's instruction to file the appropriate pleading will not
reverse the dismissal. If the plaintiff fails to file the appropriate pleading, the trial court does not dismiss
the case anew; the order dismissing the case still stands.
The dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the defendant.

SECOND CASE

Under Section 5 of the same rule,75 a party may re-file the same action or claim subject to certain
exceptions.

Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were merely refiling the same claim that had been
previously dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they moved to dismiss the second case,
the motion to dismiss can be considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiffs instance.

Petitioners do not deny that the second dismissal was requested by respondents before the service of
any responsive pleadings. Accordingly, the dismissal at this instance is a matter of right that is not
subject to the trial court's discretion. In O.B. Jovenir Construction and Development Corporation v.
Macamir Realty and Development Corporation:76

[T]he trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff under
Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs. Even if the motion cites the most
ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as
dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of ground7

THIRD CASE
When respondents filed the third case on substantially the same claim, there was already one prior
dismissal at the instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the instance of the defendants.
While it is true that there were two previous dismissals on the same claim, it does not necessarily follow
that the re-filing of the claim was barred by Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
circumstances surrounding each dismissal must first be examined to determine before the rule may
apply, as in this case.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the failure of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias to file the
appropriate pleading in the first case came under the purview of Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the dismissal in the second case is still considered as one without prejudice. In Gomez v.
Alcantara:79

The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits, and is
necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise provided in
the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to
prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another
action, and the only exception is when the order of dismissal expressly contains a qualification that the
dismissal is without prejudice.80 (Emphasis supplied)

In granting the dismissal of the second case, the trial court specifically orders the dismissal to be without
prejudice. It is only when the trial court's order either is silent on the matter, or states otherwise, that
the dismissal will be considered an adjudication on the merits.
However, while the dismissal of the second case was without prejudice, respondents' act of filing the
third case while petitioners' motion for reconsideration was still pending constituted forum shopping.

FORUM SHOPPING and TWIN-DISMISSAL RULE

When respondents filed the third case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the
second case was still pending. Clearly, the order of dismissal was not yet final since it could still be
overturned upon reconsideration, or even on appeal to a higher court.

Moreover, petitioners were not prohibited from filing the motion for reconsideration. This court has
already stated in Narciso v. Garcia83 that a defendant has the right to file a motion for reconsideration of
a trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss since "[n]o rule prohibits the filing of such a motion
for reconsideration."84 The second case, therefore, was still pending when the third case was filed.

The prudent thing that respondents could have done was to wait until the final disposition of the second
case before filing the third case. As it stands, the dismissal of the second case was without prejudice to
the re-filing of the same claim, in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. In their haste to file the
third case, however, they unfortunately transgressed certain procedural safeguards, among which are
the rules on litis pendentia and res judicata.

Because of the severity of the penalty of the rule, an examination must first.be made on the purpose of
the rule. Parties resort to forum shopping when they file several actions of the same claim in different
forums in the hope of obtaining a favorable result. It is prohibited by the courts as it "trifle[s] with the
orderly administration of justice."90

In this case, however, the dismissal of the first case became final and executory upon the failure of
respondents' counsel to file the appropriate pleading. They filed the correct pleading the second time
around but eventually sought its dismissal as they "[suspected] that their counsel is not amply
protecting their interests as the case is not moving for almost three (3) years."91 The filing of the third
case, therefore, was not precisely for the purpose of obtaining a favorable result but only to get the case
moving, in an attempt to protect their rights.

It appears that the resolution on the merits of the original controversy between the parties has long
been mired in numerous procedural entanglements. While it might be more judicially expedient to apply
the "twin-dismissal rule" and disallow the proceedings in the third case to continue, it would not serve
the ends of substantial justice. Courts of justice must always endeavor to resolve cases on their merits,
rather than summarily dismiss these on technicalities

10. Absolute Management v Metrobank

PRINCIPLE: Does the counsel require SPA at pre-trial to represent client not just as counsel but also as
personal representative

FACTS: Counsel for respondent attended pre-trial to represent client but without SPA. Petitioner was
declared in default. The default order was questioned before the CA. CA ruled that the presumption in
favor of the counsel’s authority to appear in behalf of a client is a strong one. A lawyer is not even
required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of
entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his client’s name. However,
the court,on its own initiative or on motion of the other party[,] [may] require a lawyer to adduce
authorization from the client.

RULING:

in those instances where a party may not himself be present at the pre-trial, and another person
substitutes for him, or his lawyer undertakes to appear not only as an attorney but in substitution of the
client’s person, it is imperative for that representative of the lawyer to have "special authority" to make
such substantive agreements as only the client otherwise has capacity to make. That "special authority"
should ordinarily be in writing or at the very least be "duly established by evidence other than the self
serving assertion of counsel (or the proclaimed representative) himself." Without that special authority,
the lawyer or representative cannot be deemed capacitated to appear in place of the party; hence, it
will be considered that the latter has failed to put in an appearance at all, and he [must] therefore "be
non-suited or considered as in default," notwithstanding his lawyer’s or delegate’s presence.

11. YKR Corp v Phil Agri-business Center

PRINCIPLE: RULE 35 Summary judgment

To determine whether summary judgment was properly rendered by the court a quo, we shall examine
if the following requisites under Rule 35 of the Rules obtain in the case at bar, viz.:

1. there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and

2. the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law

A “genuine issue of fact” is an issue “which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from
a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or
undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is
called for. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the
absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial
so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. x x x When the facts as pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.

In Section 10, Rule 8 thereof, there are three ways of making a specific denial: (1) by specifying each
material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the defendant does not admit, and
whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his
denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and material and denying
only the remainder; and, (3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint, which has the effect of
a denial.

With respect to the aforesaid third form of denial, this Court ruled in Philippine Bank of Communications
v. Court of Appeals34 that the defendant’s contention that it had no knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the deed of exchange was an invalid or ineffectual denial pursuant to
the Rules of Court, as it could have easily asserted whether or not it had executed the deed of exchange
attached to the petition. Citing Capitol Motors Corporations v. Yabut,35 the Court stated
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x The rule authorizing an answer to the effect that the defendant has no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial,
does not apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted, is so plainly and necessarily
within the defendant’s knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably true.

FACTS: Request for Admission served. Petitioners YKR Corporation and then seven out of the ten Yulo
heirs responded to the Request for Admissions by making no categorical admission or denial of the
matters set forth in the Request for Admissions allegedly because all the records of YKR Corporation
have been taken by the PCGG when they were sequestered.

Court held that the matters requested for admission “ought to be within the personal knowledge” of
YKR Corporation and seven out of the ten Yulo Heirs.

ISSUE: is summary judgment proper

HELD: This answer is a permissible way of making a specific denial under the Rules.

In ruling on the issue of whether a genuine issue of fact exists, there was no mention of any
circumstance or situation upon which the court a quo derived its conclusion that the matters requested
for admission “ought to be within the personal knowledge” of YKR Corporation and seven out of the ten
Yulo Heirs. We cannot thus properly ascertain whether the facts which the latter could not make any
truthful admission or denial are so plainly and necessarily within their knowledge.

Considering that petitioners YKR Corporation and the remaining six out of the ten Yulo heirs were
deprived of their day in court, the court a quo should have made its ruling as to the non-existence of
genuine issues of fact by clearly stating its basis both in fact and in law and not on purely conjectural
determinations, i.e., that “the matters requested for admission ought to be within the personal
knowledge of YKR Corporation and [the then] seven out of the ten Yulo Heirs”40 and that “they ought to
have made allegations of any knowledge or information as to the nature of such right or interest, or at
the very least denied PABC’s ownership or right to possession over the subject properties.”41 To be
sure, YKR Corporation and the then seven out of the ten Yulo heirs tendered an answer which is a
permissible form of making a specific denial under Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules. The court a quo itself
stated in the assailed June 30, 2009 Resolution that “this form of response to a Request for Admissions
is allowed by the Rules.”42 Even respondent PABC – the party that moved for summary judgment and
which has the burden to prove that there are no genuine issues of fact in the case at bar – did not
submit any supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions to prove that the matters requested for
admission “ought to be within the personal knowledge of YKR Corporation and [the then] seven out of
the ten Yulo Heirs.”

12. People v Castillo

PRINCIPLE: Remedy from order of quashal of search warrant by the trial court, MTC can issue search
warrant even for offenses outside of their jurisdiction

FACTS: MTC of Cagayan issued a search warrant for suspected violation of RA 9165. RTC quashed the
warrant because the offense involved was outside the jurisdiction of the MTC. Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari under RULE 65 to the SUPREME COURT from the order of the
trial court quashing a search warrant

Arguments: petition was filed in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. He also argues that the
petition should have been filed by the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and not
petitioner Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor

RULING:

REMEDY for order of quashal of search warrant

The special civil action for certiorari is the proper recourse availed of by petitioner in questioning the
quashal of the search warrant as the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge
that ordered the said quashal. In his allegation that the judge misapplied the rules on jurisdiction or on
the proper courts authorized to issue a search warrant, petitioner has shown that the quashal of the
search warrant was patently and grossly done.

In United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 20 this Court ruled that an exception exists to the general rule that
the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court assailing any adverse order of the RTC in
the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, thus:

The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to assail any
adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the
OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a private
corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as
one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case even held that the petitioners therein could argue its
case in lieu of the OSG:

From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings which
led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while the
general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf
of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court
of Appeals, if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the
petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor
General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow petitioners to
argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General.

As such, even if the petitioner in this case, representing the People, is only the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor and not the Office of the Solicitor General, such technicality can be relaxed in the interest of
justice. The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects
and lapses.

MTC jurisdiction to issue search warrant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction
ISSUE: whether a municipal trial court has the authority to issue a search warrant involving an offense in
which it has no jurisdiction, this Court answers in the affirmative

RULING: It must be remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites set
forth by the Constitution and must only be quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable
cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; ( 4) the applicant and
the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Necessarily, a motion to quash a search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search
warrant, such as ( 1) the place searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in
the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 22 Sec. 2. Court where application for search
warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime
was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.

It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a search
warrant must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the resultant case may be filed in another
court that has jurisdiction over the offense committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is
merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a
criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.24 Thus, in certain
cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even though it
has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for the
issuance of such warrant are present.

13. De Leon v Hercules Agro-Industrial

PRINCIPLE: no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed
with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court
of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.

14. Ombudsman v De Los Reyes

PRINCIPLE: Remedy for decisions of the Ombudsman; When Rule 65 petition for certiorari is proper
remedy from decisions of the Ombudsman

Final decision – Appeal Rule 43 to the Court of Appeals

RULE 65:

a) in administrative cases that have become final and unappealable where respondent is exonerated or
where respondent is convicted and the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of
not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to a one-month salary; to the Court of Appeals

b) in criminal cases involving the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause during
preliminary investigation to the Supreme Court

It is settled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule43 of the Rules of Court.53 Indeed, certiorari
lies to assail the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision when there is allegation of grave abuse of
discretion.54 Grave abuse of discretion involves a "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction."55 It must be shown that the Office of the Ombudsman exercised its
power "in an arbitrary or despotic manner — which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law — in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention."56

The prevailing view is that the remedy of certiorari from an unfavorable decision or resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman is available only in the following situations: a) in administrative cases that
have become final and unappealable where respondent is exonerated or where respondent is convicted
and the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine equivalent to a one-month salary; and b) in criminalcases involving the Office of the Ombudsman’s
determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation.57

Furthermore, the writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and is only granted when "there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. . . .

15. Luzon Devt Bank v Krishnan

PRINCIPLE: Whether deposit of real property in lieu of cash or counterbond is allowed to discharge a
writ of attachment

RULING: NOT ALLOWED

In their petition, petitioners contend that it has the option to deposit real property, in lieu of cash or a
counter-bond, to secure any contingent lien on its property in the event respondent wins the case. They
argue that Section 2 of Rule 57 only mentions the term "deposit," thus, it cannot only be confined or
construed to refer to cash.

We rule in the negative.

Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that "[a]n order of attachment may be issued
either ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or by
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much
of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as
may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand, unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as
hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the order, which may be the amount sufficient
to satisfy the applicant’s demand or the value of the property to be attached as stated by the applicant,
exclusive of costs."

Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that "[t]he sheriff enforcing the writ shall without delay and
with all reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, only so much of the
property in the Philippines of the party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from execution, as
may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the court
from which the writ is issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to
the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property to be attached,
exclusive of costs."

From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only
remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond.
Thus, the Court holds that petitioner’s argument that it has the option to deposit real property instead
of depositing cash or filing a counter-bond to discharge the attachment or stay the implementation
thereof is unmeritorious.

Apropos, the trial court aptly ruled that while it is true that the word deposit cannot only be confined or
construed to refer to cash, a broader interpretation thereof is not justified in the present case for the
reason that a party seeking a stay of the attachment under Section 5 is required to make a deposit in an
amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property
to be attached. The proximate relation of the word "deposit" and "amount" is unmistakable in Section 5
of Rule 57. Plainly, in construing said words, it can be safely concluded that Section 5 requires the
deposit of money as the word "amount" commonly refers to or is regularly associated with a sum of
money.

16. Villanueva v JBC

PRINCIPLE:

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief filed against Judicial and Bar
Council to assail constitutionality of requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before
they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts

RULING:
1. Certiorari and prohibition broader in scope and reach - issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions

2. Mandamus not proper - does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a
course of conduct
3. Declaratory relief not proper - [T]he purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of
the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its
enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach." In this case, the
petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy.

4. Supervisory power of the Supreme Court - the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by
virtue of the Court’s power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of
supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed
and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay
down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see
to it that the rules are followed.12

Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC
complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then
the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and
ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules.

17. Carolino v Senga

FACTS: Petition for mandamus to compel payment of retirement benefits

ISSUE: Is mandamus proper

RULING:

A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioner's legal right to the performance of a particular
act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right which is
indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law.29 A doctrine well-embedded in our
jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to the
performance of the act sought to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative duty to perform
the same. The remedy of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial.

The petition for mandamus filed by petitioner's husband with the RTC was for the payment of his
terminated retirement benefits, which has become vested, and being a ministerial duty on the part of
the respondents to pay such claim, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel such payment.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review.34 However, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not be adhered to when the question is purely legal.35 This is because
issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer.36 Appeal to the
administrative officer would only be an exercise in futility.37 Here, the question raised is purely legal, i.e.,
what law should be applied in the payment of retirement benefits of petitioner's husband. Thus, there
was no need to exhaust all administrative remedies before a judicial relief can be sought.

18. Sps Manzanilla v Waterfields Industries

FACTS: Unlawful detainer case. MTC and RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Manzanilla, the lessor. But CA
reversed and ruled there was no cause of action because there was legal compensation of the rental
deposit and the rental arrears.

ISSUE: WON there was a cause of action

RULING: YES
For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit, two requisites must concur: (1) there must be
failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease, and (2) there must be demand both to pay
or to comply and vacate. The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful
detainer, while the second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of
action may be pursued. Implied in the first requisite, which is needed to establish the cause of action of
the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer suit, is the presentation of the contract of lease entered into by the
plaintiff and the defendant, the same being needed to establish the lease conditions alleged to have
been violated. Thus, in Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the evidence
needed to establish the cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is (1) a lease contract and(2) the
violation of that lease by the defendant.

the CA acted on its mistaken notion as to when a cause of action arises. It did not base its determination
of the existence of the cause of action from the fact thatWaterfields failedto pay rents from December
1997 to May 1998. Toit, the cause of action in this case only arose after the contract was terminated and
the rental deposit was found sufficient to cover the unpaid rentals. This is erroneous since as already
discussed, it is the failure to pay rent which gives rise to the cause of action. Prescinding from this, the
CA’s acknowledgement that Waterfields failed to pay rent, as shown by its declaration that the latter is
the debtor of the spouses Manzanilla with respect to the unpaid rentals, is clearly inconsistent with the
conclusion that no cause of action for ejectment exists against Waterfields.

Failure to pay the rent must precede termination of the contract due to nonpayment of rent. It
therefore follows that the cause of action for unlawful detainer in this case must necessarily arise before
the termination of the contract and not the other way around as what the CA supposed. Indeed, in going
beyond the termination of the contract, the CA went a bit too far in its resolution of this case.

19. Silverio v Silverio

RULING: the probate court having jurisdiction over properties under administration has the authority
not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized sale by the
prospective heirs or administrator.

It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of the probate court before it can
be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. Asearly as
1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano(42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an
administrator of property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the probate court is null and void
and title does not pass to the purchaser.

There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the
property under administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected without
authority from said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the
sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for as
long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioner’s contention that the
probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power pertaining to
the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (italics ours) Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1)
any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication
requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the
probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior
approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006. Subsequently,
however, the sale was annulled by the said court on motion by petitioner.

In reversing the intestate court’s order annulling the sale of the subject properties, the CA noted that
said ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time when the TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect. It then concluded that
the eventual decision in the latter case making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only with
respect to the appointment of petitioner as administrator and not to the grant of authority to sell
mooted the issue of whether the sale was executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction were in effect.

20. Tujan-Militante v Cada Deapera

Tujan-Militante v Cada Deapera

TOPIC: HABEAS CORPUS, Jurisdiction, enforceability

PRINCIPLE: Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or
pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs
within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought.

FACTS:
Application for writ of habeas corpus filed by respondent Cada-Deapera against petitioner Tujan-
Militante for custody of her minor daughter Criselda. Petitioner Tujan-Militante resides in Quezon City
with the minor. Summons were not served but the writ was served in Quezon City to Tujan-Militante.

Petitioner’s arguments:

Petitioner Tujan-Militante moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction relying on Section 3 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and maintains that the habeas corpus petition should have been filed before the
family court that has jurisdiction over her place of residence or that of the minor or wherever the minor
may be found.

Respondent asserts that the applicable rule is not Section 3 but Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC
which provides that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with
the Family Court and the writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court
belongs.

She also argues that the court has no jurisdiction over her person because summons was not served.

ISSUE:

1. whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition filed by
respondent who resides in Quezon City
2. whether or not the Court validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of Criselda
when only the writ was served but not the summons.

HELD:

Jurisdiction

Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section
20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region
where enforcement thereof is sought.

The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and
Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig,
Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela.

In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ
is sought to be enforced within the National Capital Judicial Region, as here.

In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan
City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can
still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial
in view of the above rule.

Section 3 and Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC

Anent petitioner’s insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, a plain reading of
said provision reveals that the provision invoked only applies to petitions for custody of minors, and not
to habeas corpus petitions. Thus:

Section 3. Where to file petition.- The petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court
of the province or city where the petitioner resides or where the minormay be found.

Service of Summons:

Lastly, as regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to state that
service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role
somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

21. Salibo v Quezon City

PRINCIPLE:

1. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity.
In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally
detained.
2. Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable,
the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the
designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of
the [petition for habeas corpus.]
3. Habeas corpus is the remedy when a person is arrested without a warrant of arrest and an
information filed against him without preliminary investigation

FACTS: A warrant for Butukan S. Malang was issued in relation to the Maguindano massacre. Petitioner
Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is
not the accused Butukan S. Malang but he was arrested then and there.

Thus, Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City.
The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the merits.
Warden filed his appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Salibo argues that respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 153, Pasig City before the Court of Appeals. Although the Court of Appeals delegated to the trial
court the authority to hear respondent Warden on the Return, the trial court’s Decision should be
deemed a Decision of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, respondent Warden should have directly filed his
appeal before this court.
ISSUE: Is habeas corpus the proper remedy in cases of mistaken identity?

Should a habeas corpus proceeding delegated by the CA to the RTC be appealed to the CA or the SC?

RULING:

Propriety of remedy

Petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None
of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a
Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of
preliminary investigation in this case.

A motion for reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation. The Information
and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang
Salibo are the same person. There is evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of these
processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another person named Datukan Malang Salibo.

Appeal

An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court or any
of its members,50 the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law,51 or the
Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges.52 The court or judge grants the writ and requires the
officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the
writ.53 A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.54

The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ.55 Should the court
issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall
proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court
"acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas
corpus.]"56 Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.

In Saulowhen a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves whether
the respondent should be ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the
petition was filed was being detained or deprived of his or her liberty.65 However, once the superior
court makes the writ returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of Court, the lower court
designated "does not thereby become merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and
conclusion[s] are devoid of effect[.]"66 The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the
lower court, not of the superior court.

Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and authority to determine
the merits"74of petitioner Salibo’s Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore,
was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court
with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts,75 respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal
before the Court of Appeals.

22. Mendoza v People

PRINCIPLE – Probable cause

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to
determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment
of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not
be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue
the arrest warrant.32

The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether
there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable
cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. In People v.
Inting:33

x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the
course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial—is the function of the Prosecutor.34 (Emphasis supplied)

While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on
hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge
does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor’s
determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause
independent of the prosecutor’s finding.

23. Enrile v Manalastas

PRINCIPLE: The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a
plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and
assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order, is not
appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari because of the availability of other
remedies in the ordinary course of law.

FACTS: Complaint for less serious physical injuries filed in MTC. MTC found probable cause. Accused filed
motion to quash but it was denied by MTC. Accused filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC. RTC
dismissed the petition for certiorari. Accused filed a petition for certiorari to the CA for the RTC
dismissal. CA dismissed the petition for being the wrong remedy since the petition for certiorari with the
RTC was an original action and the proper remedy to it was an appeal.

RULING:

CA dismissal proper

Firstly, considering that the certiorari case in the RTC was an original action, the dismissal of the petition
for certiorari on May 25, 2004, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration onJuly 9, 2004, were in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction. As such, the orders were final by reason of their completely
disposing of the case, leaving nothing more to be done by the RTC.17 The proper recourse for the
petitioners should be an appeal by notice of appeal,18 taken within 15 days from notice of the denial of
the motion for reconsideration.19

Yet, the petitioners chose to assail the dismissal by the RTC through petitions for certiorari and
prohibition in the CA, instead of appealing by notice of appeal. Such choice was patently erroneous and
impermissible, because certiorari and prohibition, being extra ordinary reliefs to address jurisdictional
errors of a lower court, were not available to them. Worthy to stress is that the RTC dismissed the
petition for certiorari upon its finding that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the
petitioners’ motion to quash. In its view, the RTC considered the denial of the motion to quash correct,
for it would be premature and unfounded for the MTC to dismiss the criminal cases against the
petitioners upon the supposed failure by the complainants to prove the period of their incapacity or of
the medical attendance for them. Indeed, the time and the occasion to establish the duration of the
incapacity or medical attendance would only be at the trial on the merits.

Petition for certiorari of the MTC denial of motion to quash NOT PROPER in the first place

The proper recourse of the petitioners was to enter their pleas as the accused, go to trial in the MTC,
and should the decision of the MTC be adverse to them in the end, reiterate the issue on their appeal
from the judgment and assign as error the unwarranted denial of their motion to quash.33 Certiorari
was not available to them in the RTC because they had an appeal, or another plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

24. People v Jimenez

25. People v Pareja
26. People v CA
27. Pilipinas Shell v Romars Intl Gases Corp
28. MCMP Construction v Monark Equipment
29. People v Espineli
30. Mabborang v Mabborang
31. Diona v Balanque