1NC v.

Armenia Aff—for Devansh

 T

Interpretation: If the affirmative prohibits the production of nuclear power,

they must defend the prohibition of the production of nuclear power in all
countries, they cannot specify a country or group of countries to take the
resolutional action

The term “countries” is a generic bare plural, not an empirical group

Nebel 14
[Jake Nebel, co-director of Victory Briefs, Philosophy and Marshall Scholar at Oxford University. “Jake Nebel on
Specifying ‘Just Governments’.” http://vbriefly.com/2014/12/19/jake-nebel-on-specifying-just-governments/. (2014)]
AS

My aim is
pr imary to motivate a general approach to questions about specification and topicality that
not really to argue against agent specification on th is topic. It is , rather,

takes the precise wording of the resolution as central. The approach is to figure out what the resolution means, not what you want it to mean.
Another aim is to expose the reader to certain distinctions and techniques that may be helpful beyond this particular case.¶ Bare Plurals¶ I believe that debaters shouldn’t specify

a government on the living wage topic. The standard argument for this is simple: “just governments [Countries]” is a plural noun phrase, so
it refers to more than one just government. Most debaters will stop there. But there is much more to say. (Some seem
not to care about the plural construction. I plan to address this view in a later article about the parametric conception of topicality.)¶ Some noun phrases include

articles like “the,” demonstratives like “these,” possessives like “my,” or quantifiers like “some” or “all.” These words are called
determiners. Bare plurals, including “just governments,” lack determiners. There’s no article,
demonstrative, possessive, or quantifier in front of the noun to tell you how many or which
governments are being discussed.

Violation—they don’t defend the prohibition of nuclear power in every country

Standards:
1. Grammatical Precision—
A. The wording of the resolution is intentional. Absent adding words to the
res, specifying has no basis.
B. Key to fairness and education, common usage supported by linguists
accounts for the most predictable interpretation of the topic, which controls
pre-round prep and substantive engagement.
C. Pragmatic benefits are irrelevant since the topic of the res is intentional –
adding words to the res is definitionally untextual, killing predictability since
that justifies an infinite number of interpretations of the topic.
D. Key to real world, it’s how the term would be interpreted by scholars and
other relevant persons in the field meaning it’s the most correct
interpretation.
Grammar is an independent voter because it’s the basis of predictability or ground

2. Limits—there are some 45 countries with nuclear power which gives them 45 single
country affs, as well as an almost infinite number of multiple country affs—45 factorial is in
the millions—that’s way too many affs to prepare for and the negative gets stretched thin

A. Turns their education offense—research overload leads to superficial

education, meaning we don’t learn about the aff or anything else
B. Prep burden—the aff has infinite prep time to prepare for their specific aff,
whereas the neg has to prepare for millions of different affs—this creates an
unreciprocal burden because they only have to prepare for one debate
whereas we have to prepare for millions of different scenarios

PICs are bad—moots the aff because you can pic out of any part and moot 6 minutes of
speech time—locks aff out of the debate strategically and avoids clash

2. Topical version solves—you can read specific country offense as an advantage to a whole
res aff—also solves their depth offense because we can weigh between different parts of the
aff or different advantages

4. Topic lit—the majority of topic lit talks about broad issues of global warming and
assumes global policy in which everyone prohibits the production of nuclear power—two
impacts:
 A. Predictability—literature serves as the basis for all pre-round prep
B. Ground—we don’t get core neg arguments like the warming DA because
nuclear power still predominately exists in the world of the aff

The voter is fairness—Debate is a game that needs rules to provide equitable access to the
ballot.

This outweighs: A. Controls the internal link to education—equal opportunity for dialogue
is a prerequisite to having intelligible discourse on important issues. B. It’s a gateway issue
in choosing a winner—the ballot should reflect who did the better debating but such an
evaluation is impossible if one debater had to do more work to achieve the same thing as the
other.

Drop the debater 1. The round is irreparably skewed, I had to invest time and alter strat to
check abuse, which shouldn’t have occurred in the first place. 2. Reject arg is severance,
allows him to sever and shift advocacies to collapse on another issue in the next speech, 3.
Deterrence – prevents them from exploiting time tradeoff on theory and continuing to be
unfair in the future. Competing interps since reasonability brightlines are infinitely
regressive since we don’t know what is reasonable to begin with, forcing judge intervention,
or we accept their brightline and debate it in which case it collapses to offense defense.

T > THEORY
1. Jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the ability to vote for untopical affs since their role
is to determine who did the better debating in terms of the text of the resolution – theory is
contestable since the judge doesn’t necessarily have to enforce theory rules and those
practices are always justifiable.
2. If the aff’s not topical, that means neg prep didn’t apply which forced me to read
strategies I wouldn’t have had to under normal circumstances – they initiated the abuse so
they’re reponsible for any subsequent abuse claims.
3. Other theory issues are framed by T – interpretations about what other ground is
lost/gained by practical choices are not as important as the overall delineation of ground.

NO RVI
1. Burdens: T is an already aff burden – winning that the aff is topical doesn’t mean you
should automatically win. That model of debate would logically grant auto-wins to the aff
each time.
2. Forces Theory: RVI’s force every theory debate to ignore substance since both debaters
generate offense on the highest layer. This only not explodes time skew but also destroys
substantive education by ignoring substance.
3. Chills Theory: RVI’s discourage debaters from checking abuse since the abusive debaters
can just be prepped well on their abusive practices and bait theory – the prep skew is
already in the cheater’s favor, so it’s almost impossible to win.
 Relations DA
Armenia’s nuclear power is key to relations with Russia
http://arka.am/en/news/economy/levitin_armenia_s_nuclear_power_plant_en
ables_armenia_and_russia_to_step_up_their_cooperation_in_ene/
Arka ‘15
YEREVAN, October 15. /ARKA/. Armenia’s nuclear power plant in Metsamor enables Armenia and Russia to
step up their cooperation in energy sector, Igor Levitin, the Russian president’s advisor who long years led the Armenian-Russian
intergovernmental commission, said Saturday in Yerevan. “Our relations in this area very firm, and there is a good potential

for developing them by using atomic energy,” he said answering ARKA News Agency’s
question. Leviting said that Armenia can generate more electric power by using new technologies
in the atomic energy. He said the two countries’ presidents gave appropriate instructions to the ministers when they met earlier this year. Armenia plans to build a
new unit for the NPP which is expected to be commissioned in 2019-2020. In order to attract foreign investors, the Armenian parliament in 2006 abolished the state monopoly on
ownership of new nuclear power units. The Armenian Metsamor nuclear power plant is located some 30 kilometers west of Yerevan. It was built in the 1970s but was closed

Armenian authorities said they

following a devastating earthquake in 1988. One of its two VVER 440-V230 light-water reactors was reactivated in 1995.

will build a new nuclear power plant to replace the aging facility. The new plant is supposed to
operate at twice the capacity of the Soviet-constructed facility. Metsamor currently generates
some 40 percent of Armenia's electricity. But the government has yet to attract funding for the
project that was estimated by a U.S.-funded feasibility study to cost at as much as $5 billion.

Relations are on the brink now – they’re key to manage Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict – energy’s the key internal link
Anna Nemtsova 16 [(Anna Nemtsova, ) In Nagorno-Karabakh, a Bloody New War With Putin
on Both Sides, Daily Beast 4-4-2016] AT
Armenia's relationship with Russia was tested this year, despite that Armenia joined
Russia's Eurasian Union and received financial assistance and weapons deliveries from
Moscow. In January, a Russian soldier killed an entire Armenian family in Giumri. Moscow
eventually allowed the Armenian government to conduct its own trial of the soldier, but not
before igniting protests across Armenia and raising anti-Russia sentiments. Protests later sprang
up in Yerevan against a price hike for electricity demanded by a Russia company. Although
the protesters claimed their discontent was only with social issues, Russian politicians were
visibly worried that the protest would turn to overall discontent with Armenia's pro-Russia
stance. Armenia's economy, hurt by Russia's economic decline in the face of Western
sanctions, also declined, which has further enflamed domestic anger. Moreover, Armenia and
the European Union started to work on a new cooperation agreement, which could also cause
some problems with Moscow by complicating its standoff with the West. Empowering Russia-
based Armenian politicians amenable to Moscow's interests would certainly benefit Russia's
negotiations with Sarkisian's government, especially on another, more important issue:
Nagorno-Karabakh. Stratfor recently noted numerous efforts on Azerbaijan's part to
change an existing status quo regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Usually, small-
scale clashes along the contact line that define the conflict result in mostly Armenian
casualties and loss of military equipment. However, Yerevan suspects that a recent Russian-
Azerbaijani diplomatic rapprochement might lead Russia to allegedly agree to a possible
change of this status quo. Several theories have been propounded, from withdrawing Armenian
forces from the seven regions adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, to the placement of Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — the Russia-led military bloc — peacekeepers. But
Armenia's political elite, predominantly made up of politicians originating from Nagorno-
Karabakh (like Sarkisian), has staunchly objected to any of these scenarios. Thus it may not be
entirely coincidental that Yerevan, following the alleged Russian-Azerbaijani talks, decided to
ramp up its forces along the contact line as well as to overtly criticize the CSTO. Moreover,
Armenian leaders even threatened that in case of an Azerbaijani military attack, Yerevan
would consider recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state, which would make
placing any peacekeepers there virtually impossible. The Kremlin's decision to overtly support
Russia-based Armenians is a direct response to Moscow's challenges with the Armenian
government. More important, Russia's overall strategy of isolating the former Soviet state to keep
it dependent is part of its grand design to maintain a grip on the entire former Soviet periphery.
Since the collapse of the pro-Russia government in Ukraine in 2014 and the conflicts and regional
political maneuvers that followed, Russia has feared the loss of this sphere of influence to the
West. Hence, losing clout in Armenia, even to a non-Western country such as Iran, let alone
Europe, risks putting another dent in Russia's weakened buffer zone. So in the long term,
pro-Russia figures such as Karapetian and Abrahamian are likely to play important role in
Armenian politics. The influence of Russian companies in Armenia's energy sector will have
equally strategic repercussions, limiting the country's ability to become a transit country for
Iranian exports and increasing its dependence on Russia.

Failure to manage the conflict causes a proxy war in the Caucasus

Anna Nemtsova 16 [(Anna Nemtsova, ) In Nagorno-Karabakh, a Bloody New War With Putin
on Both Sides, Daily Beast 4-4-2016] AT
MOSCOW — Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave in Azerbaijan that became breakaway
republic backed by Armenia in all spheres of life, has been living in a not-quite-frozen state
of war since 1994. Every schoolboy in the mountainous little republic has grown up knowing that
after graduation he will put on a uniform and join the military to police the unstable cease-fire.
The republic’s 150,000 people, mostly ethnic Armenians, remember rockets destroying
apartment buildings in the fighting more than 20 years ago, and have long feared that their
worst nightmare of full-scale war would return. Now it looks like it has. The war woke up on
Saturday night with both sides of the front using armored vehicles, battle tanks, and aviation,
launching multiple rockets, and shooting artillery at each other. Over 30 people were killed and
dozens wounded in the worst combat in the last two decades. The regional implications are
hard to miss. Armenia is one of Russia’s closest allies and Turkey immediately backed up
Azerbaijan at a time when relations between Moscow and Ankara are bitter and vindictive.
Given the war in Syria, where Russia and Turkey back opposing sides, and Turkey shot down a
Russian warplane in November, the current eruption between Armenia and Azerbaijan is
even more geopolitically dangerous than two decades ago. On the eve of violent clashes
Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan were attending
the Nuclear Summit in Washington, but obviously had no chance to shake hands and make
peace to prevent the tragedy. Among the first victims of the latest violent clashes in Nagorno-
Karabakh were children: a 12 year old boy, Vaginak Grigorian, was killed in the cross fire by one
of Azerbaijan’s Grad multiple-rocket launchers, the Armenian papers reported; two more children
were wounded among dozens of civilian victims. On Monday, the Karabakh ministry of defense
claimed its forces had destroyed 19 of Azerbaijan’s tanks, and posted dreadful images on Twitter
of buildings shelled the night before, of burned vehicles, of dead bodies, and of victims covered
in blood. The Armenian government claimed that a bus with Armenian volunteers going to
Karabakh was hit by an Azerbaijani drone. Five volunteers were killed. Azerbaijan meanwhile
reported on dozens of casualties. It would be hard to overstate the dependence of the Armenian
contingent on Moscow. Nagorno-Karabakh’s officials told The Daily Beast in interviews last
summer that neither Armenia nor Nagorno-Karabakh could survive without Russia’s support in
the conflict with Azerbaijan. In 2014 Armenia joined Vladimir Putin’s dream project, the
Eurasian Economic Union, together with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Armenian military doctrine
holds that Russia is the guarantor of the country’s military security, and in the last few years
Russia equipped its military bases in Armenian Gyumri and Erebuni with MiG-29 fighters, Mi-24
helicopters, as well as with more than 70 tanks, armored vehicles and artillery systems. Last
December, Russia delivered new helicopters to its aviation base in Erebuni. In February Moscow
announced it was selling $200 million worth of arms to Armenia. But, here’s the rub: at the same
time, Russia sold hundreds of tanks to Armenia’s long time enemy, Azerbaijan. Last year the
contracts for Russian military exports to Azerbaijan included armored vehicles, artillery and
mortar systems. While in Yerevan, Armenia’s capital, many wondered what else they had to do to
prove their loyalty and devotion to the Kremlin, in Moscow it was clear that President Putin
needed Azerbaijan as Russia’s ally, too, especially as relations between Russia and Turkey
worsened. There are many reasons it’s not in the Kremlin’s interest to lose Azerbaijan’s
friendship. In 2014 Russia’s Rosneft and Azerbaijan’s Socar oil companies created a joint
venture to explore oil and gas fields together in both countries, and Azerbaijan’s exports to Russia
have been growing. Experts both in Moscow and in Baku believe that president Putin would
do almost anything to avoid a full-scale conflict between Russia and Azerbaijan. “Putin
cannot afford to lose Azerbaijan, he would do everything to negotiate the peace for Nagorno-
Karabakh now,” an independent political analyst, Dmitriy Oreshkin, told The Daily Beast on
Monday. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was planning to visit Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan,
this week, while Russian Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev planned to visit Yerevan, the capital
of Armenia. Many in Yerevan wish that U.S. President Barack Obama had managed somehow to
play a peacemaker’s role in Washington last week to prevent the escalation of Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. That was not to be. But, as Armenian parliament member Tevan Poghosyna told The
Daily Beast, “If the international community does not manage to stop the war now, several
countries might be involved in the conflict, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
supporting Azerbaijan and Russia, we hope, supporting Armenia.” Another descent into
chaos and proxy war is, to be sure, the last thing the world needs right now.

Causes a full-scale US-Russia war

Friedman 9 George, Fall. Founder and Chief Executive Officer of STRATFOR, Ph.D. in
Government from Cornell University. “The Coming Conflict With Russia,” Journal of
International Security Affairs No 17, http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/17/friedman.php
The Caucasus serves as the boundary between Russian and Turkish power, and has
historically been a flash point between the two empires. It was also a flash point during the
Cold War. The Turkish–Soviet border ran through the Caucasus, with the Soviet side consisting
of three separate republics: Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, all now independent. The
Caucasus also ran north into the Russian Federation itself, including into the Muslim areas of
Dagestan and, most important, Chechnya, where a guerrilla war against Russian domination
raged after the fall of Communism. From a purely defensive point of view, the precise
boundaries of Russian and Turkish influence don’t matter, so long as both are based somewhere
in the Caucasus. The rugged terrain makes defense relatively easy. Should the Russians lose
their position in the Caucasus altogether and be pushed north into the lowlands, however,
Russia’s position would become difficult. With the gap between Ukraine and Kazakhstan
only a few hundred miles wide, Russia would be in strategic trouble. This is the reason the
Russians are so unwilling to compromise on Chechnya. The southern part of Chechnya is deep
in the northern Caucasus. If that were lost, the entire Russian position would unravel. Given a
choice, the Russians would prefer to be anchored farther south, in Georgia. Armenia is
already an ally of Russia. If Georgia were Russian, Moscow’s entire position would be much
more stable. Controlling Chechnya is indispensable. Reabsorbing Georgia is desirable. Holding
Azerbaijan does not provide a strategic advantage—but the Russians would not mind having it as
a buffer with the Iranians. Russia’s position here is not intolerable, but Georgia, not incidentally
closely allied with the United States, is a tempting target, as was seen in the August 2008
conflict. The situation in the Caucasus is not only difficult to understand but also difficult to deal
with. The Soviet Union actually managed to solve the complexity by incorporating all these
countries after World War I and ruthlessly suppressing their autonomy. It is impossible for Russia
to be indifferent to the region now or in the future—unless it is prepared to lose its position in the
Caucasus. Therefore, the Russians can be expected to reassert their position, most likely
starting with Georgia. And since the United States sees Georgia as a strategic asset, Russia’s
reassertion there will lead to confrontation with the United States. Unless the Chechen
rebellion completely disappears, the Russians will have to move south, then isolate the rebellion
and nail down their position in the mountains. There are two powers that will not want this to
happen. The United States is one, and the other is Turkey. Americans will see Russian
domination of Georgia as undermining their position in the region. The Turks will see this
as energizing the Armenians and returning the Russian army in force to their borders. The
Russians will become more convinced of the need to act because of this resistance. A duel in
the Caucasus will be the likely result.

Russia war=extinction
Barrett et al 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University,
Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at
Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania
State University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive
Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science
from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June
2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States
and Russia,” Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament,
and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor & Francis)

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by
far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely
reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization
worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States
and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch;
deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized
launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear
weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without
direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based
on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation
mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a
counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they
involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 )
Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack
through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to
reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of
deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to
have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent
counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would
cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’
development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before
suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold
War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-
West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that
inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a
substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other
with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of
attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of
events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather
phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded
at the wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either
the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by
actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an
event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear
terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear
weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to
circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has
long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher
during U.S.–Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime
historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the
future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise
tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to
misinterpret events as attacks. 16
 Econ DA

Nuclear shut down will have a huge fiscal impact – nuclear energy constitutes
a massive portion of Armenian exports and domestic power production
ENPI 13 (European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, “ARMENIA: COUNTRY
STRATEGY PAPER,” 2007-2013,
https://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/country/enpi_csp_armenia_en.pdf)
Decommissioning of the Medzamor nuclear power plant will have significant fiscal
implications. Despite longstanding international requests to close down Medzamor, the power plant continues to cover 40 % of
Armenia's electricity consumption. The international community remains worried because this type of nuclear power plants cannot be upgraded to
current safety levels and because Medzamor is located in a highly seismic zone. The GoA has now decided to build an even bigger

new nuclear power plant in the same area when Medzamor is decommissioned. In the EU’s view it remains doubtful whether such action is needed in
order to generate sufficient replacement capacity. The country has developed enough alternative energy sources to replace the 400 Megawatt currently stemming from Medzamor.

Current Armenian ideas go however towards export of energy. Armenia's external trade
remains very low and little diversified (main exports are base metals and precious stones) in spite of Armenia being a WTO member since 2003
and benefiting from the EU’s GSP. Improvements in this regard should be pursued as a matter of priority. The current account deficit decreased slightly to about 4% of GDP in

The EU is Armenia’s main trade partner, accounting for

2005. The current account and debt position is sustainable.

46.5% of Armenia's exports and 28.2% of its imports. EU-Armenia trade has been growing over the last five years, but similarly to Armenia's trade with
the world in general, it is still very low and nondiversified. Exports to and imports from the EU increased to about € 416 million and €528 million, respectively, in 2005.

Armenia econ weak

Gadimova 16 [Nazrin Gadimova, Armenia on edge of economic collapse," Azer News,
3/1/2016] AZ
Extremely unstable socio-economic situation in Armenia would be better described as a decay of the country. Various
international organizations make unfavorable forecasts regarding the economic situation that Armenia
faced. The Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) analysts expect deterioration of Armenia's balance of payments in
2016. This was noted in the “CIS Macromonitor” report published by analysts of the EDB. “ The possible deterioration of the payments
balance is linked with the expansion of foreign trade deficit due to reduced exports and increased imports in
monthly terms. During this period, there was recorded return to the trend of depreciating dram, which was intensified by strengthening of the dollar on
world markets,” EBD analysts believe. Probably, under the influence of the foreign trade and the current account deficit expansion, as well as further
cheapening of dram and increased short-term external debt, the payments balance could deteriorate, the report says. Earlier during the discussions over
the state budget at the country’s parliament, many opposition parliamentarians have predicted the collapse of the country. MP Mger Shakhgeldian
claimed that the economic growth index shown in the draft budget is not sufficient to ensure the development and competitiveness of Armenia in the
region. He said the GDP growth of 2.2 percent in general should not be considered as a growth for a country like Armenia, because this growth cannot
lead to any positive effects.

It's key to their economy – past growth proves and Russia is funding
repairs/fortifications to the site now
NTI 15 [Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Fact Sheet: Armenia," July 2015] AZ
There are two known nuclear research facilities in Armenia: the Yerevan Institute of Physics and the Analitsark Research Facility in Gyumri. [2] Neither
houses fissile material. Armenia has one nuclear power plant, Metsamor, (also known as the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant), which contains
two VVER-440 reactor units and produces approximately 40% of the country's electricity. [3] Unit 1 went
critical in 1976 and Unit 2 in 1980. [4] Both units were shut down after the 1988 earthquake. Unit 1 is permanently out of operation, while Unit 2 was re-
commissioned in 1995. [5] The re-opening of Unit 2 played a crucial role during the period of economic recovery
following Armenia's independence by providing Armenia with surplus power capacity. [6] While the government had planned to
close the unit by 2017, it decided in October 2012 to extend the life of the old reactor for another ten years. [7] In March 2014, the Armenian
government approved a plan to extend the plant's operational lifespan further until 2026 with
repairs to be made beginning in 2017. [8] These repairs will be funded by the Russian Federation, which has
offered Armenia a grant of $30 million and a loan of $270 million to complete the necessary work. [9] The Russian Federation supplies the nuclear fuel
necessary for Metsamor's operation under a 2003 agreement between Moscow and Yerevan that ceded management of the plant to Russia's electricity
monopoly Unified Energy Systems (UES). [10]

Economic collapse causes competition for resources and instability that

triggers hotspots around the globe – co-opts all other causes of war
Harris and Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the
National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis
Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”
http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf Increased Potential for Global
Conflict
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and
interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences,
there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the
Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on
fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and
on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to
think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason,
the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly
volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood
that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal
will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is
reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of
the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long
established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated
attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that
become self-radicalized, particularly in the
absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most
dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost
certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran
could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers,
acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type
of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear
Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an
unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The
close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and
mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and
warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight
times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially
leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could
reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices.
Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this
could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources,
for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however,
will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as
China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed
turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval
capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create
opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the
Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult
both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
 Case
Closing the Metsamor plant destroys the quality of life of Armenians and
decimates industry,
Sahakyan 16 [Armine Sahakyan, Human rights activist based in Armenia, Columnist with the
Kyiv Post. 04/27/2016 12:36 pm ET. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/armine-sahakyan/armenia-
continues-to-gamb_b_9788186.html]

Even Armenians who worry about the plant’s safety don’t want to return to the days between
1989 and 1995 when it was shut down after a 1988 earthquake in Gyumri, 48 miles from
Metsamor. The quake devastated Armenia’s second-largest city, killing 25,000 and
leaving half a million homeless. Although the plant came through the 1988 quake without
a hitch, it is located in an active seismic zone — and many Armenian nuclear officials
feared a catastrophe if the next temblor involved a direct hit on Metsamor. At the time
they recommended closing it, Armenia was able to obtain oil and gas from Russia and
Turkmenistan for its thermal power plants. The government decided to increase its purchase of
those supplies to produce additional power from thermal plants to cover the loss of
electricity from the nuclear plant. The war between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijan over the
Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, which had long been Azerbaijani territory, dashed the thermal-
plant plans, however. That’s because the oil and gas that Russia and Turkmenistan were
sending to Armenia came through Azerbaijan, which refused to transport the fuel once the
conflict started. With the nuclear plant shut down and thermal plants unable to be ramped
up, Armenians went through the Dark Ages for several years. Power was available only one
hour a day, bringing industry to a standstill and making life at home miserable. “You can
imagine—it was as cold in the apartment as it was in the street” in winter, journalist Ara
Tadevosyan recalled. Although a truce in the war was negotiated in 1994, Armenia was
still unable to get oil and gas from Russia and Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan demanded
nothing less than the return of Nagorno-Karabakh. Desperate for electricity, Armenia
reopened the Metsamor plant — the first time in history that a shuttered nuclear facility
had been restarted.

A multinational watchdog concluded that the plant is safe

Asbarez 15 [ Asbarez, Armenian American Daily Newspaper. October 2015.
http://asbarez.com/141116/armenian-nuclear-plant-absolutely-safe-says-german-scientist/ ]
the German chairman of a multinational watchdog
Armenia’s Metsamor nuclear power station remains “absolutely safe” just as it nears the end of its 30-year design life span,

monitoring its operations insisted “The Armenian plant is absolutely safe compared on Tuesday. . It is safe when

with the safety of other plants of its kind,” Adolf Birkhofer told reporters after a meeting in Yerevan of the Nuclear Energy Safety Council advising President Serzh Sarkisian. Birkhofer argued that the Soviet-built

plant has undergone numerous safety upgrades and repairs over Western ever since being reactivated in 1995 strong

objections. The United States and the European Union still consider it inherently unsafe. The council, headed by Birkhofer, is comprised of 12 mostly foreign nuclear experts. One of them is an American and six others are from Europea n Union
member states.
Armenia’s Nuclear power is entirely safe
Asbarez ‘16 [Asbarez, Armenian American Daily Newspaper. October 2015.
http://asbarez.com/141116/armenian-nuclear-plant-absolutely-safe-says-german-scientist/ ]
YEREVAN (RFE/RL)— Armenia’s Metsamor nuclear power station remains “absolutely safe” just as it
nears the end of its 30-year design life span, the German chairman of a multinational watchdog monitoring its operations insisted on Tuesday.
“The Armenian plant is absolutely safe. It is safe when compared with the safety of other plants of

its kind,” Adolf Birkhofer told reporters after a meeting in Yerevan of the Nuclear Energy Safety Council advising President Serzh Sarkisian. Birkhofer argued
that the Soviet-built plant has undergone numerous safety upgrades and repairs ever since being
reactivated in 1995 over strong Western objections. The United States and the European Union still consider it inherently unsafe. The
council, headed by Birkhofer, is comprised of 12 mostly foreign nuclear experts. One of them is an American and six others are from European Union member states. The

main focus of the advisory body’s meeting was the Armenian authorities’ ongoing efforts to
extend the life of Metsamor’s sole functioning reactor by 10 years, until 2026. The reactor generating more than
one-third of Armenia’s electricity was originally due to be shut down in 2016. Yerevan decided to delay its decommissioning after failing to attract billions of dollars in funding

Last year it secured a $270 million Russian

needed for its ambitious plans to replace the plant with a new and more modern facility.

government loan for that purpose. The loan is due to be mainly spent on the purchase of Russian
nuclear equipment and additional safety measures that will be implemented at Metsamor. Vahram
Petrosian, the secretary of Birkhofer’s council, said that the modernization will make Metsamor safe enough to remain operational even after 2026. He argued that some nuclear
plants in Russia, Ukraine and Finland have had their operations extended by up to 30 years. “I don’t think that [Metsamor’s life will be extended] by another 20 years,” Petrosian
told the press. “But I can certainly speak of [an extra] 5 years.” The remarks might be an indication that the Armenian government does not expect to raise an estimated $4 billion
needed for building a new nuclear plant in the coming years. Sarkisian announced the impending launch of its construction shortly after becoming president in 2008. He did not

An energy security strategy unveiled by

mention the new plant in a speech delivered at the latest meeting of the Nuclear Energy Safety Council.

the government in July envisages Armenia’s continued heavy reliance on atomic energy, which is much
cheaper than energy generated by its gas-powered plants. The 20-year plan was drawn up with financial and technical assistance provided by the United States.

1988 disproves- a major earthquake that year didn't cause a meltdown –

they'll say the next time will be different but they have no ev on that and the
reactors have been improved
Plants are safe and are necessary for energy security – your ev is a product of
Turkish propaganda
Armenpress 15 (Armenian Press, domestic news organization in Armenia, “Armenian
Nuclear Power Plant is Absolutely Safe,” October 2015,
https://armenpress.am/eng/news/823498/adolf-birkhofer-armenian-nuclear-power-plant-is-
absolutely-safe.html)
YEREVAN, OCTOBER 27, ARMENPRESS. The Chairman of the Republic of Armenia Presidential Nuclear Energy Safety Council Adolf Birkhofer
thinks that the nuclear power plant of Armenia is absolutely safe. The official said the aforementioned at the end of
the 14th Council session during the briefing with the journalists on October 27. "Armenpress" reports that a journalist asked: "For political
reasons, Turkey takes advantage of the issue of Armenia having a nuclear power plant and
voices safety concerns noting that it poses danger for them. I'd like to learn about the safety of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant." 'The
Armenian Nuclear Power Plant is absolutely safe. I mean, that all nuclear power plants of the same level have the same
safety. The Armenian Nuclear Power Plant has reached such level within many years," Birkhofer replied. In regard to
the question whether Armenia will retain the power station after the exploitation of the second power unit which currently operates, Adolf Birkhofer
agreed with his Armenian colleague, Secretary of the Nuclear Safety Council under Armenia President Vahram Petrosyan that Armenia would by all
means have a nuclear power plant as it was necessary for ensuring energy security.