REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

FIRST JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 8
BAGUIO CITY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,
CRIM CASE NO. 1234
- versus- For: UNJUST VEXATION

ANDY VINLUAN,
Accused.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

MOTION TO QUASH

COME NOW THE ACCUSED, by counsel and unto this Honorable

Court, most respectfully moves to quash the information filed against the
accused on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

ARGUMENTS

1. Defendants are indicted for committing the crime of "Unjust

Vexation" that is punished under the Article 287, Paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code; Said provision states that:

"Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be

punished by arrestomenor or a fine ranging from 5
pesos to 200 pesos, or both." (Emphasis ours)

2. DEFENDANTS, HOWEVER, MOST RESPECTFULLY

SUBMIT THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT LACKS
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
OFFENSE FOR THE REASON THAT ARTICLE 287,
PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE THAT
PUNISHES "UNJUST VEXATIONS" CANNOT BE A BASIS
OF ANY CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR BEING NULL
AND VOID AND PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS
FACE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A) SAID PENAL PROVISION CONDEMNS

NO SPECIFIC OR DEFINITE ACT OR
OMISSION THUS FAILING TO DEFINE
ANY CRIME OR FELONY;
 B) SAID PENAL PROVISION IS SO
INDEFINITE, VAGUE AND
OVERBROAD AS NOT TO ENABLE IT
TO BE KNOWN WHAT ACT IS
FORBIDDEN;

C) SUCH VAGUENESS AND

OVERBREADTH RESULT TO
VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE AND THE RIGHT TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED;

D) SUCH VAGUENESS AND

OVERBREADTH LIKEWISE AMOUNT
TO AN INVALID DELEGATION BY
CONGRESS OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
TO THE COURTS TO DETERMINE
WHAT ACTS SHOULD BE HELD TO
BE CRIMINAL AND PUNISHABLE.

A CRIMINAL OR PENAL
LEGISLATION MUST CLEARLY
DEFINE OR SPECIFY THE
PARTICULAR ACT OR ACTS
PUNISHED

3. It is a well-established doctrine that a criminal or penal legislation

must clearly define or specify the particular acts or omissions punished.
As early as 1916, in the case of UNITED STATES VS. LULING, 34
Phil. 725, our Honorable Supreme Court had the occasion to hold that:

"In some of the States, as well as in England, there

exist what are known as common law offenses. In
the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it
is made so by statute. The state having the right
to declare what acts are criminal, within certain
well defined limitations, has a right to specify
what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as
what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as
what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of
guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the
burden of showing that such act or acts are
innocent and are not committed with any criminal
intent or intention." (emphasis and underscoring
 ours, cited in the fairly recent case of Dizon-
Pamintuan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
111426, July 11, 1994) (emphasis and
underscoring ours)

4. Two years later, this was followed by a scholarly exposition by

Justice Johnson in the case of In re: R. MCCULLOCH DICK, 38
Phil. 41, April 16, 1918, where he stated that:

"x xxIn the Philippine Islands no act is a crime

unless it is made so by law. The law must specify
the particular act or acts constituting the
crime. If that were not so, the inhabitants could
not know when they would be liable to be
arrested, tried and punished. Otherwise the
mandatory provisions of the law, that all criminal
laws shall be prescribed, would prove to be a
pitfall and a snare. The inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands, whether citizens, denizens or
friendly aliens, have a right to know, in advance
of arrest, trial and punishment, the particular acts
for which they may be so tried. They cannot be
arrested and tried, and then be informed for the
first time that their acts have been subsequently
made a crime, and be punished therefor. x xx"
(emphasis and underscoring ours)

5. The rationale of said doctrine that a criminal or penal legislation must

clearly define or specify the particular act or acts punished is ably
explained by the United Stated Supreme Court in the case of
LANZETTA v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 306 U.S. 451, where it
held that:

"x xx It is the statute, not the accusation under it,

that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and
warns against transgression. x xxNo one may be
required at peril of life, liberty or property to
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All
are entitled to be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids. x xx" (emphasis and
underscoring ours)
ARTICLE 287, PAR. 2 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE CONDEMNS NO SPECIFIC
ACT OR OMISSION! THEREFORE, IT
DOES NOT DEFINE ANY CRIME OR
FELONY
6. Paragraph 2 of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code does not
define, much less specify, the acts constituting or deemed included in
the term "unjust vexations" resulting to making the said provision a
sort of a "catch-all" provision patently offensive to the due process
clause;

7. The right to define and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty.

Each State has the authority, under its police power, to define and
punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal procedure.
Pursuant to this power to define and punish crimes, the State may not
punish an act as a crime unless it is first defined in a criminal statute
so that the people will be forewarned as to what act is punishable or
not. The people cannot be left guessing at the meaning of criminal
statutes;

8. Moreover, Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code defines FELONIES

(delitos) as "acts or omissions" punishable by law. Article 287, Par.
2 of the Revised Penal Code condemns no specific act or omission!
THEREFORE, IT DOES NOT DEFINE ANY CRIME OR
FELONY!

9. Philippine Jurisprudence is replete with examples that would readily

show that Art. 287, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code has not been
used to prosecute a well-defined or specific criminal act. Instead, it
was used as a "catch-all" provision to prosecute acts which are not
expressly made criminal by any other provision of the Revised Penal
Code. This is anathema to criminal due process that requires
notice of what specific act or omission is punished by law;

10.An examination of the annals of our jurisprudence would likewise

show that Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code has not been
used to punish a specific act:

a) In People v. Reyes, 60 Phil. 369, August 23, 1934,

accused were found guilty of unjust vexation by their act
of disturbing or interrupting a ceremony of a religious
character;

b) In Lino v. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 983, January 30, 1947, it was

used to prosecute the accused of unjust vexation
committed by stopping the jeep driven by the complainant
in a threatening attitude and without any just cause
therefor and telling him to stop driving for the City of
Manila while the strike of city laborers was still going on;

c) In People v. Reyes, 98 Phil. 646, March 23, 1956, it was

held that the act of seizing, taking and holding possession
of passenger jeep belonging to complainant, without the
 knowledge and consent of the latter, for the purpose of
answering for the debt of the said owner, constitutes
unjust vexation;

d) In People v. Yanga, 100 Phil. 385, November 28, 1956,

accused was convicted of unjust vexation for the act of
compelling the complainant to do something against his
will, by holding the latter around the neck and dragging
him from the latter's residence to the police outpost;

e) In People v. Abuy, G.R. No. L-17616, May 30, 1962, the

accused was prosecuted for unjust vexation for the act of
embracing and taking hold of the wrist of the complainant;

f) In People v. Carreon, G.R. No. L-17920, May 30, 1962,

accused was convicted of unjust vexation by the act of
threatening the complainant by holding and pushing his
shoulder and uttering to the latter in a threatening tone the
following words: "What inspection did you make to my
sister in the mountain when you are not connected with
the Bureau of Education?";

g) In People v. Gilo, G.R. No. L-18202, April 30, 1964, the

Court held that the absence of an allegation of "lewd
design" in a complaint for acts of lasciviousness converts
the act into unjust vexation;

h) In Andal v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-29814,

March 28, 1969, accused were found guilty of unjust
vexation under an information charging them with the
offense of offending religious feelings, by the
performance of acts notoriously offensive to the feelings
of the faithful;

i) In People v. Maravilla, G.R. No. L-47646, September 19,

1988, a accused was convicted of unjust vexation for the
act of grabbing the left breast of the complainant against
her will; and

j) Recently in Kwan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113006,

November 23, 2000, the act of abruptly cutting off the
electric, water pipe and telephone lines of a business
establishment causing interruption of its business
operations during peak hours was held as unjust vexation;

11. From the above-cited cases, it clearly appears that Art. 287, par. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code does not punish a specific act. Instead, any and
all kind of acts that are not specifically covered by any other provision of
the Revised Penal Code and which may cause annoyance, irritation,
vexation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to
whom it is directed may be punished as unjust vexation;

ART. 287, PAR. 2 OF THE REVISED

PENAL CODE SUFFERS FROM A
CONGENITAL DEFECT OF
VAGUENESS AND MUST BE
STRICKEN DOWN

12. The term "unjust vexation" is a highly imprecise and relative term
that has no common law meaning or settled definition by prior
judicial or administrative precedents; Thus, for its vagueness and
overbreadth, said provision violates due process in that it does not
give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize;

13. This kind of challenge to the constitutionality of a penal statute on

ground of vagueness and overbreadth is not entirely novel in our
jurisdiction. In an en banc decision in the case of GONZALES v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, re: Constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 4880, our Honorable Supreme Court had the
occasion to rule that the terms "election campaign" and "partisan
political activity" which are punished in said R.A. 4880 would have
been void for their vagueness were it not for the express enumeration
of the acts deemed included in the said terms. The Supreme Court
held:

"The limitation on the period of "election

campaign" or "partisan political activity" calls for
a more intensive scrutiny. According to Republic
Act No. 4880: "It is unlawful for any person
whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any
group or association of persons, whether or not a
political party or political committee, to engage in
an election campaign or partisan political activity
except during the period of one hundred twenty
days immediately preceding an election involving
a public office voted for at large and ninety days
immediately preceding an election for any other
elective public office. The term 'candidate' refers
to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective
public office regardless of whether or not said
person has already filed his certificate of
candidacy or has been nominated by any political
party as its candidate. The term 'election
campaign' of 'partisan political activity' refers to
acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or
 promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a
public office . . ."

"If that is all there is to that provision, it suffers

from the fatal constitutional infirmity of
vagueness and may be stricken down. x xx"

x xx xxx xxx

"There are still constitutional questions of a

serious character then to be faced. The practices
which the act identifies with "election campaign"
or "partisan political activity" must be such that
they are free from the taint of being violative of
free speech, free press, freedom of assembly, and
freedom of association. What removes the sting
from constitutional objection of vagueness is the
enumeration of the acts deemed included in the
terms "election campaign" or "partisan political
activity." (emphasis and underscoring ours)

14. Article 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code punishes "unjust
vexations" and that is all there is to it! As such, applying the
incontestable logic of the Supreme Court in said case of GONZALES
v. COMELEC would lead us to the inescapable conclusion that said
penal provision suffers from the fatal constitutional infirmity of
vagueness and must be stricken down;

15. In the case of CONNALLY V. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO.,

269 U.S. 385, cited by our own Supreme Court en banc in the case of
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn., Inc. v. City Mayor
of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967), the United States
Supreme Court ruled:

"That the terms of a penal statute creating a new

offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their
part will render them liable to its penalties is a
well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with
ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules
of law; and a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application violates the first essential of due
process of law." (emphasis and underscoring
ours)
16. In fact, it is worst in the case of the 2nd Paragraph of Article 287 of
the Revised Penal Code because it punishes "unjust vexations"
without even defining or enumerating the acts constituting the said
crime thus leaving men of common intelligence necessarily guessing
at its meaning and differing as to its application in complete disregard
of constitutional due process;

17. Our Supreme Court in the case of U.S. v. NAG TANG HO, 43 Phil.
1, held that one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law that fails
to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. Said ruling cites the
landmark case of U.S. v. L. COHEN GROCERY CO., 255 U.S. 81,
where the United States Supreme Court in striking down Section 4 of
the Federal Food Control Act of August 10, 1917, as amended, as
unconstitutional, stated that:

"The sole remaining inquiry, therefore, is the

certainty or uncertainty of the text in question, that
is, whether the words 'that it is hereby made
unlawful for any person willfully ... to make any
unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling
or dealing in or with any necessaries,' constituted
a fixing by Congress of an ascertainable standard
of guilt and are adequate to inform persons
accused of violation thereof of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them. That they
are not, we are of opinion, so clearly results from
their mere statement as to render elaboration on
the subject wholly unnecessary. OBSERVE
THAT THE SECTION FORBIDS NO
SPECIFIC OR DEFINITE ACT. It confines the
subject matter of the investigation which it
authorizes to no element essentially inhering in
the transaction as to which it provides. It leaves
open, therefore, the widest conceivable inquiry,
the scope of which no one can foresee and the
result of which no one can foreshadow or
adequately guard against. In fact, we see no
reason to doubt the soundness of the observation
of the court below in its opinion to the effect that,
to attempt to enforce the section would be the
exact equivalent of an effort to carry out a
statute which in terms merely penalized and
punished all acts detrimental to the public
interest when unjust and unreasonable in the
estimation of the court x xx" (emphasis and
underscoring ours)

18. Recently, in COATES v. CITY OF CINCINNATI, 402 U.S. 611, the

 United States Supreme Court passed upon the issue of
constitutionality of a Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance that provides that:
"It shall be unlawful for three or more persons to
assemble, except at a public meeting of citizens,
on any of the sidewalks, street corners, vacant
lots, or mouths of alleys, and there conduct
themselves in a manner annoying to persons
passing by, or occupants of adjacent buildings.
Whoever violates any of the provisions of this
section shall be fined not exceeding fifty dollars
($50.00), or be imprisoned not less than one (1)
nor more than thirty (30) days or both." Section
901-L6, Code of Ordinances of the City of
Cincinnati. (emphasis and underscoring ours)

19. In hammering down the constitutionality of the above-cited

Cincinnati, Ohio ordinance in its landmark decision, the United States
Supreme Court held that:

"Conduct that annoys some people does not

annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague, not in
the sense that it requires a person to conform his
conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible
normative standard, but rather in the sense that no
standard of conduct is specified at all. As a
result, "men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning." Connally v.
General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391

"It is said that the ordinance is broad enough to

encompass many types of conduct clearly within
the city's constitutional power to prohibit. And so,
indeed, it is. The city is free to prevent people
from blocking sidewalks, obstructing traffic,
littering streets, committing assaults, or engaging
in countless other forms of antisocial conduct. It
can do so through the enactment and enforcement
of ordinances directed with reasonable specificity
toward the conduct to be prohibited. It cannot
constitutionally do so through the enactment and
enforcement of an ordinance whose violation may
entirely depend upon whether or not a policeman
is annoyed. " (emphasis and underscoring ours)

20. Same things can be said of Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code that punishes "unjust vexations." As previously shown, the term
"unjust vexations" is broad enough to encompass many types of acts
 or conduct. But while these acts of types of conduct are within the
State's police power to prohibit and punish, it cannot however
constitutionally do so when its violation may entirely depend upon
whether or not another is vexed or annoyed by said act or conduct
and whether or not said act or conduct is unjust is the estimation of
the court;
ARTICLE 287, PAR. 2 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE IS AN INVALID
DELEGATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER TO DEFINE WHAT ACTS SHOULD
BE HELD TO BE CRIMINAL AND
PUNISHABLE

21. The failure of Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code to define or
specify the act or omission that it punishes likewise amounts to an
invalid delegation by Congress of legislative power to the courts to
determine what acts should be held to be criminal and punishable;
Potestasdelegata non delegarepotest. What has been delegated
cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle
that such as delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to
be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own
judgment and not through the intervening mind of another (United
States v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327, 330);

22. Congress alone has power to define crimes. This power as an

attribute of sovereignty may not be delegated to the courts. When a
criminal legislation leaves the halls of Congress, it must be complete
in itself in that it must clearly define and specify the acts or omissions
deemed punishable; and when it reaches the courts, there must be
nothing left for the latter to do, except to determine whether person or
persons indicted are guilty of committing the said acts or omissions
defined and made punishable by Congress. Otherwise, borrowing the
immortal words of Justice Isagani Cruz in Ynot v. Intermediate
Appellate Court (148 SCRA 659), the law becomes a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short a clearly
profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers;

23. Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code fails to set an immutable
and ascertainable standard of guilt, but leaves such standard to the
variant and changing views and notions of different judges or courts
which are called upon to enforce it. Instead of defining the specific
acts or omissions punished, it leaves to the courts the power to
determine what acts or types of conduct constitute "unjust vexation."
Moreover, liability under the said provision is also made dependent
upon the varying degrees of sensibility and emotions of people. It
depends upon whether or not another is vexed or annoyed by said act
or conduct. As previously intimated, one cannot be convicted of a
 violation of a law that fails to set up an immutable and an
ascertainable standard of guilt.

CONCLUSION

In view of all the foregoing, Defendants submit that Art. 287, par.
2 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes "unjust vexations" is
unconstitutional on its face for its fatal failure to forbid a specific or
definite act or conduct resulting to its congenital vagueness and
overbreadth which are anathema to constitutional due process and the
right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged;

Moreover, by leaving it to the judiciary to determine the "justness"

or "unjustness" of an act or conduct that is not clearly defined or
specified by law constitutes a fixing by Congress of an
unascertainable standard of guilt and therefore an invalid delegation,
if not an abdication, of legislative power;

Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that Art. 287, par. 2 of the

Revised Penal Code, being facially unconstitutional, cannot be a basis
of any criminal prosecution. As such, there is no offense to speak of
and consequently, this Honorable Court cannot acquire any
jurisdiction whatsoever to try the defendants of the charge of "unjust
vexation."
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, it is most respectfully
prayed of the Honorable Court to GRANT this MOTION TO QUASH and
to issue an Order dismissing the above-entitled case.
Such other relief as law and justice may warrant are likewise prayed
for.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of August 2014, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines.

EMERSON L. BALGOS
Counsel for the Accused
4F La Azotea Bldg., Session Road, Baguio
City
Tel No.: (074)-442-3396
PTR No. 22222; 1/07/2012; Baguio City
IBP OR No: 7654321; 1/07/2012; Baguio
City
Roll No.: 41289; 4/08/2004
Commission Serial No.: 74-NC-12 (R)
MCLE Compliance No.: IV-34458;
11/28/2014
TIN No: 802-112-107
 NOTICE OF HEARING

THE CLERK OF COURT

RTC, Branch 8
Justice Hall, Baguio City

Greetings!

Kindly submit the foregoing Motion to the Honorable Court for its
consideration and resolution preferably on August 28, 2014 or at any
available calendar of the Honorable Court.

ATTY. EMERSON L. BALGOS

Copy furnished through personal service:

Prosecutor’s Office
Justice Hall, Baguio City