Page 2 Cases

Supreme Court of the Philippines
483 Phil. 50
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 147444, October 01, 2004
VIRGILIO A. SINDICO WITH HIS WIFE VIRGINIA TORCUATOR SINDICO, PETITIONERS,

VS. HON. GERARDO D. DIAZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 68, RTC, DUMANGAS,
ILOILO; SPOUSES FELIPE AND ERLINDA SOMBREA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The issue raised in the case at bar is one of jurisdiction – whether the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
involving agricultural lands irrespective of the presence of tenancy relationship.
In a complaint filed on November 9, 2000,[1] Virgilio A. Sindico, joined by his wife Virginia
Torcuator Sindico, filed a civil case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City against
his first cousin Felipe Sombrea, along with the latter’s wife Erlinda Sombrea, for Accion
Reinvindicatoria with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. The complaint was docketed as 00-
168.
In the complaint, the plaintiff Virgilio Sindico, who is the registered owner[2] of a parcel of land
identified as Lot 1144 situated at Barangay Pandan, Dingle, Iloilo, alleged that after his
acquisition of the lot in 1962, the defendant Felipe Sombrea’s parents, the spouses Eulalio and
Concordia Sombrea, requested him to allow them to cultivate the lot without him (the plaintiff
Virgilio Sindico) sharing in the produce thereof as that would represent his “assistance in the
education of his cousins” including the defendant Felipe Sombrea; that he granted the request but
that he continued to pay taxes; that after the death of the father of the defendant Felipe Sombrea,
the latter continued to cultivate the lot; that on June 20, 1993 he requested the defendant Erlinda
Sombrea to return possession of the lot but the latter requested time to advise her husband-co-
plaintiff Felipe Sombrea; and that despite repeated demands for the return or voluntary turn over
of the possession of the lot, the same remained unheeded, hence, his filing of the complaint.
After the defendants received the summons, they filed a Motion to Dismiss[3] the complaint,
alleging that the RTC has no jurisdiction over their person and that as the subject matter of the
case is an agricultural land which is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) of the government, the case is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DARAB
in accordance with Section 50 of Republic Act 6657 (THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM LAW OF 1988) which reads:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR – The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
and Rule 2, Section 1 of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure which reads:
Section 1. Primary Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes, cases, controversies and matters or incidents involving the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order
Nos. 229, 228 and 227-A, Republic Act 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389,
Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:
a. Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the

cultivating and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws;
x x x (Underscoring supplied)
To the Motion to Dismiss, the plaintiffs filed an Opposition[4] alleging that the case does not
involve an agrarian dispute, there being no tenancy relationship or leasehold agreement with the
defendants.
By Order of January 2, 2004,[5] Branch 68 of the RTC of Iloilo granted the Motion to Dismiss, it
holding that as the issue involved the right to possession of an agricultural lot which is under the
coverage of the CARP of the government, it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DARAB. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint.
As their Motion for Reconsideration[6] was denied by the trial court,[7] the plaintiffs, herein
petitioners, lodged the present Petition for Review on Certiorari[8] proffering as the only issue
whether it is the RTC or the DARAB which has exclusive original jurisdiction of the case.
Petitioners posit that it is the RTC which has.
The Court finds for petitioners.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is not
affected by the pleas set up by the defendant in his answer or in a motion to dismiss, otherwise,
jurisdiction would be dependent on his whims.
The allegations in petitioners’ complaint show that the action is one for recovery of possession,
not one which involves an agrarian dispute.
Section 3(d) of RA 6657 or the CARP Law defines “agrarian dispute” over which the DARAB
has exclusive original jurisdiction as:
(d) . . . refer[ing] to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements
including
any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
Since petitioners’ action is one for recovery of possession and does not involve an agrarian
dispute, the RTC has jurisdiction over it.[9]
That respondents’ only basis in assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court is that the subject
matter of the case is an agricultural land and that they do not deny at all the allegation of the
complaint of petitioners that there is no tenancy or leasehold agreement between them
unmistakably show that there is no agrarian dispute to speak of over which the DARAB has
exclusive original jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order of Branch 68 of the RTC
of Iloilo City granting private respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 00-168 is hereby
SET ASIDE.
Let the record of the case be returned to Branch 68 of the RTC of Iloilo City which is hereby
directed to reinstate Civil Case No. 00-168 to its docket and to take appropriate action thereon
with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
[1]
Record at 2.
[2]
Vide TCT No. T-36543, Id. at 7.
[3]
Id. at 14-19.
[4]
Id. at 25-26.
[5]
Id. at 27-29.
[6]
Id. at 30-33.
[7]
Id. at 43.
[8]
Rollo at 4-40.
[9]
Arzaga v. Copias, 400 SCRA 148 (2003).
Copyright 2016 - Batas.org
485 Phil. 661
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 156118, November 19, 2004
PABLO T. TOLENTINO AND TEMPUS PLACE REALTY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,

PETITIONERS, VS. HON. OSCAR LEVISTE, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, QUEZON CITY, BR.
97 AND SPOUSES GERARDO CINCO, JR. AND PAMELA H. CINCO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioners Pablo T. Tolentino and Tempus Place Realty Management Corporation seek the
review and reversal of the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59506 entitled “Tempus Place Realty Management Corporation and Pablo T. Tolentino
vs. Hon. Oscar Leviste, Presiding Judge, RTC - Quezon City, Branch 97 and Sps. Gerardo
Cinco, Jr., and Pamela H. Cinco.” The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ petition for
annulment of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 97, on the
action for specific performance with damages filed by respondents Spouses Gerardo and Pamela
Cinco against them.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On October 18, 1996, respondents Spouses Gerardo Cinco, Jr. and Pamela Cinco filed a
complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners Tempus Place Realty
Management Corporation and Pablo T. Tolentino. The complaint alleged that respondents
purchased from petitioners a condominium unit in Tempus Place Condominium II at Katarungan
St., Diliman, Quezon City. Despite, however, the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
delivery of the owner’s copy of the condominium certificate of title, petitioners failed to deliver
possession of the unit because they have allegedly leased it to a third party. The complaint
further alleged that petitioners refused to pay the corresponding capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax on the transaction, and execute the necessary board resolution for the
transfer of the property, thus preventing respondents from registering the Deed of Absolute Sale
and transferring the title to the unit in their names. The respondents claimed that because
petitioners refused to deliver possession of the unit and instead leased it to a third party, they are
entitled to a reasonable rental value in the amount of P20,000.00 a month from May 1994 until
the time the possession of the unit is delivered to them. They also claimed moral damages in the
amount of P1,000,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 plus
attorney’s fees in the amount of P1,000,000.00.[1]
As petitioners failed to file their answer to the complaint, Hon. Oscar Leviste, Presiding Judge,
RTC, Branch 97, Quezon City, issued an order on January 17, 1997 granting respondents’
motion to declare petitioners in default. He also appointed the Branch Clerk of Court to act as
commissioner to receive respondents’ evidence ex parte.[2] After reception of evidence, the trial
court, on April 15, 1997, issued a decision for the respondents. It stated:
This Court after considering the oral and documentary evidences presented by the plaintiff finds
that the allegation contained in their pleadings are all true facts and are entitled to the relief as
prayed for, to wit:
1) To deliver to the plaintiffs the possession of the condominium unit covered by CCT No.
5002 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City;
2) To pay the corresponding capital gains tax and documentary stamps tax on the transaction,
and deliver the receipts thereof to the plaintiffs;
3) To execute and deliver to the plaintiffs the necessary Board Resolution;
4) Jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs the following:
a. Actual damages in the amount of P20,000.00 a month from May 1994, up to the time
possession of the condominium units (sic) is delivered to the plaintiffs representing the
reasonable rental value of the unit;
b. Moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
c. Exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
d. Attorney’s fees in the amount of P1,000,000.00.[3]

Petitioners thereafter filed a motion for new trial. They contended that their right to fair and
impartial trial had been impaired by reason of accident, mistake or excusable negligence of their
former counsel, a certain Atty. Villamor.[4] The trial court denied the motion for new trial for
lack of merit.[5]
On November 3, 1997, petitioners, through their new counsel, Atty. Ricardo A. Santos, filed a
notice of appeal of the April 15 decision of the trial court.[6] The Court of Appeals, however,
dismissed the appeal on February 26, 1999 on the ground of abandonment as petitioners failed to
submit the required appeal brief.[7] The decision became final and executory on March 26, 1999
and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.[8]
On July 4, 2000, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an action for annulment of judgment
based on the following grounds:
1. The judgment in default granted reliefs in excess of what is prayed for in

the complaint in gross violation of the clear provisions of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
2. The judgment in default awarded unliquidated damages in palpable

violation of the mandatory provision of Section 3[,] Rule 9, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
3. The judgment in default is in gross violation of Section 14, Article VIII,

1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
4. The judgment in default was rendered in violation of the rights of the

petitioner to substantive and procedural due process.
5. Corrollarily, the gargantuan award for damages by the court a quo in

patent and blatant violation of the law and settled jurisprudence [is]
unconscionable and clearly violative of substantial justice and equities of
the case.
6. Petitioners have good and substantial defenses in respect of private

respondents’ claims.
7. A fortiori, the court has no jurisdiction and/or authority and has
committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding amounts in excess of
what is prayed for in the complaint nor proved by the evidence as well as
in palpable violation of the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code and
the Rules of Court and applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court. Consequently, the challenged judgment in default is an absolute
nullity.[9]
On April 23, 2002, the appellate court issued a decision modifying the trial court decision. It
explained that the annulment of judgment may be based on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction, and it is important that petitioner failed to move for new trial, or appeal, or
file a petition for relief, or take other appropriate remedies assailing the questioned judgment,
final order or resolution through no fault attributable to him. The Court of Appeals found that
the trial court decision may not be annulled on the ground of extrinsic fraud. It stated that the
failure of petitioners’ counsel to file an appellant’s brief in the Court of Appeals did not amount
to extrinsic fraud as to justify annulment of judgment, as it was not shown that their former
counsel’s omission was tainted with fraud and/or deception tantamount to extrinsic or collateral
fraud. Neither may it be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the action for specific
performance and damages was within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Nonetheless, the appellate
court, in the interest of justice and in the exercise of its sound discretion in determining the
amount of damages that may be awarded, held that the moral damages in the amount of one
million pesos (P1,000,000.00) was excessive. It lowered the moral damages to P100,000.00. It
also reduced the exemplary damages to P100,000.00, and the attorney’s fees to P100,000.00.[10]
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. On
November 18, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued an Amended Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is partly GRANTED in that the dispositive
portion of the assailed decision is modified as follows:
a) Actual damages in the amount of P10,000.00 a month from May 1994, up to the time
possession of the condominium units [sic] is delivered to the plaintiffs (private respondents
herein) representing the reasonable rental value of the unit.
b) Moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);
c) Exemplary damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); and,
d) Attorney’s fees in the amount of One [H]undred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioners filed the instant petition for review of the decision and amended decision of the Court
of Appeals. They raise the following arguments:
1. The petitioners can avail of the remedy of annulment of judgment to annul

the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-29707 as Hon. Judge
Leviste had no jurisdiction and/or acted without jurisdiction in issuing the
April 15, 1997 Decision because:
a. The judgment in default granted reliefs in excess of what is prayed

for in the complaint in gross violation of the clear provisions of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
b. The judgment in default awarded unliquidated damages in

palpable violation of the mandatory provision of Section 3[,] Rule
9, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
c. The judgment in default is in gross violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII,

1987 Constitution and Sec. 1, Rule 36, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
d. The judgment in default was rendered in violation of the rights of

the petitioner to substantive and procedural due process.
2. The petitioners were prevented from having their day in court because of
the gross negligence of their former counsel, which gross negligence
amounts to extrinsic fraud.
3. The remedies of appeal, petition for relief or other remedies are no longer
available through no fault of petitioners.
4. The petitioners have valid and substantial defenses to respondents’ cause

of action.[12]
The petition is without merit.
The issue that needs to be resolved in this petition for review is whether the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners.
The governing rule is Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on Annulment of Judgments
or Final Orders and Resolutions. Sections 1 and 2 of the Rule provide for its coverage and the
grounds therefor, thus:
Sec. 1. Coverage. - This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments
or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner.
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. - The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Under the Rule, an action for annulment of judgments may only be availed of on the following
grounds: (1) extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is
regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire
case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to
the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged
is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
court.[13]
Petitioners in this case did not allege nor present evidence of fraud or deception employed on
them by the respondents to deprive them of opportunity to present their case to the court. They,
however, assert that the negligence of their former counsel in failing to file the appeal brief
amounts to extrinsic fraud which would serve as basis for their petition for annulment of
judgment. We disagree. The Court has held that when a party retains the services of a lawyer,
he is bound by his counsel’s actions and decisions regarding the conduct of the case. This is true
especially where he does not complain against the manner his counsel handles the suit.[14] Such is
the case here. When the complaint was filed before the trial court, summons was served upon
the petitioners.[15] They allegedly referred the matter to Atty. Villamor who was holding office at
the building owned and managed by respondent Tempus Place Realty Management
Corporation.[16] However, after they have endorsed the summons to said lawyer, they did not
exert any effort to follow up the developments of the suit. Hence, they were declared in default
and judgment was rendered against them. Even in the course of the appeal, they never bothered
to check with their counsel, Atty. Ricardo Santos, the status of the appeal. The notice of appeal
was filed on November 3, 1997 and petitioners learned of the dismissal of the appeal in October
1999, after petitioner Tolentino received notice of garnishment of his insurance benefits in
connection with the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-96-29207. It was only at that time that they
learned that Atty. Santos had migrated to Australia. This only shows that petitioners, as what
happened during the pendency of the case before the trial court, never bothered to confer with
their counsel regarding the conduct and status of their appeal. The Court stated in Villaruel, Jr.
vs. Fernando:[17]
xxx Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax
and await the outcome of their case. To agree with petitioner’s stance would enable every party
to render inutile any adverse order or decision through the simple expedient of alleging
negligence on the part of his counsel. The Court will not countenance such ill-founded argument
which contradicts long-settled doctrines of trial and procedure.[18]
We reiterate the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel except when the
negligence of his counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his
day in court.[19] Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious injustice
should the exception apply.[20] We find no reason to apply the exception in this case.
In addition, it is provided in Section 2 of Rule 47 that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground
if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief. In other words, it is effectively barred if it could have been raised as a ground in an
available remedial measure.[21] The records show that after petitioners learned of the judgment of
default, they filed a motion for new trial on the ground of extrinsic fraud. It was however denied
by the trial court. They filed a notice of appeal thereafter. Hence, they are now precluded from
alleging extrinsic fraud as a ground for their petition for annulment of the trial court decision.
We are also not persuaded by petitioners’ assertion that the trial court judge lacked jurisdiction
so as to justify the annulment of his decision in Civil Case No. Q-96-29207. Lack of jurisdiction
as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.[22] Jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant or respondent is acquired by voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or
respondent to the court, or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the
service of summons. The trial court clearly had jurisdiction over the person of the defending
party, the petitioners herein, when the latter received the summons from the court. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is conferred by law and is determined from
the allegations in the complaint. Under the law, the action for specific performance and damages
is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioners’ submission, therefore, that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction does not hold water.
We note that petitioners’ arguments to support their stand that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction actually pertain to the substance of the decision. Jurisdiction is not the same as the
exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the
authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction
over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is
but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.[23] The
errors raised by petitioners in their petition for annulment assail the content of the decision of the
trial court and not the court’s authority to decide the suit. In other words, they relate to the
court’s exercise of its jurisdiction, but petitioners failed to show that the trial court did not have
the authority to decide the case.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that petitioners’ petition for annulment of judgment
had no basis and was rightly dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition at bar is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1]
Original Records, pp. 1-4.
[2]
Original Records, p. 15.
[3]
Decision, Civil Case No. Q-96-29207, p. 4; CA Rollo, p. 33.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Petition for Annulment of Judgment, CA G.R. CV No. 59506, p. 6; CA Rollo, p. 7.
[10]
Decision, CA-G.R. SP No. 59506, Rollo, pp. 53-60.
[11]
Amended Decision, CA-G.R. SP No. 59506, Rollo, pp. 48-51.
[12]
Petition for Review, Rollo, pp. 8-43.
[13]
Teodoro vs. Court of Appeals, 388 SCRA 527 (2002).
[14]
Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, 323 SCRA 716 (2000).
[15]
[16]
Motion for New Trial, Civil Case No. Q-96-29207, Original Records, pp. 81-86.
[17]
412 SCRA 54 (2003).
[18]
At p. 66.
[19]
Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[20]
Teodoro vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[21]
Id.
[22]
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium vol. 1 (1997), p. 558.
[23]
Toyota Autoparts, Phils., Inc. vs. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the
Department of Labor and Employment, 304 SCRA 95 (1999).
130 Phil. 786
G.R. No. L-24241, February 26, 1968
HATIB ABBAIN, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. TONGHAM CHUA, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
DECISION
SANCHEZ, J.:
The jurisdictional issue thrust upon this Court was shaped out of background facts to be narrated.
March 12, 1958. Respondent-appellee Tongham Chua commence suit for "forcible entry and
[1]
illegal detainer" against petitioner-appellant Hatib Abbain with the Justice of the Peace Court of
Bongao, Sulu. Pertinent are Tongham Chua's averments therein that he is ''the owner of a piece
of land together with the improvements thereon mostly coconut trees" located in Maraning,
Bongao, Sulu, which contains an area of four hectares more or less; that this land was donated to
by his father, Subing Chua, on January 16, 1952 and from that date up to the present time he has
"assumed ownership's thereof, taken "possession of the land and paid the corresponding taxes
due the government every year"; that "on January 16, 1952 and before this day [March 12, 1958],
my tenant has been the herein defendant, and we have been always dividing the fruits or copra
harvested therefrom on fifty-fifty basis, that is, I shall have 50% of the sale and the herein
defendant gets 50% also"; that during the month of December, 1957, the defendant [herein
petitioner] "by means of force, strategy and stealth unlawfully entered and still occupies the land
in question after I have repeatedly demanded of him to vacate the premises due to his non-
compliance of our agreement of [his] giving share of the several harvests he made."
February 27, 1959. Respondent Justice of the Peace Mariano Managula rendered judgment
directing Hatib Abbain to vacate the premises and place Tongham Chua in possession of the
plantation, with costs. This judgment was predicated upon the findings, after trial, that sometime
before World War II, petitioner Hatib Abbain, because of financial hardship, sold for P225.00 to
Subing Chua the coconut plantation, subject matter of the suit; that after the sale, Hatib Abbain
became the tenant of Subing Chua, the harvests of the land divided on a 50-50 basis; that
subsequently, on January 16, 1952, Subing Chua donated the plantation to his son, Tongham
Chua, and Hatib Abbain, the same tenant of the father, continued to be the tenant on the land;
that the tenancy relationship was at the beginning harmonious and cordial, but that during the
month of December, 1957, the tenant, Hatib Abbain, "got ambitious, and wanted to assume
ownership of the plantation; that the said tenant desisted to give the share of his landlord of the
harvests, hence, the plaintiff [respondent Tongham Chua] filed the present case on March 12,
1958."
June 30, 1959. Hatib Abbain filed the present petition in the Court of First Instance of Sulu
against respondent Tongham Chua and Judge Mariano Managula. The verified petition, with an
affidavit of merits, sought "relief from judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao
and/or annulment of its decision in Civil Case No. 21 with preliminary injunction." Petitioner
[2]
there averred that: (1) the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao did not have jurisdiction over
said Civil Case 21 which is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian
Relations; and (2) because of "fraud, mistake or excusable negligence," he was deprived of a
hearing in said Civil Case 21, and prevented from taking an appeal from the decision therein
rendered. Respondent Tongham Chua traversed the averments of the petition.
October 30, 1964. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Sulu issued the order now the subject
of appeal. The court struck down petitioner's prayer for relief upon the finding that there was no
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which deprived defendant (petitioner) of a
hearing because he was present at the trial and given opportunity to prepare his defense; and that
neither was there evidence that defendant was prevented from taking an appeal therefrom. The
court, moreover, noted that the petition for relief was filed more than four months after the oral
promulgation of the decision on February 25, 1959. On the jurisdictional issue, the court ruled
that "petitioner has not presented any proof or showing of landlord and tenant relationship
between the parties" to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations,
and that upon the allegations of the complaint in Civil Case No. 21, the case is "clearly one of
ejectment."
The petition was thus dismissed without costs. The present is a direct appeal to this Court.
The three errors assigned in appellant's brief raise but one issue: Jurisdiction.
1. Appellant plants his case upon the provisions of Section 21 of Republic Act 1199 (approved
August 30, 1954), known as the "Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines", which reads:
"SEC. 21. Ejectment; violation; jurisdiction. - All cases involving the dispossession of a tenant
by the landholder or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising
from the relationship of landholder and tenant, as well as the violation of any of the provisions of
this Act, shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or
hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes."
The statutory precept just quoted is supplemented by Section 7, Republic Act 1267, creating the
first Court of Agrarian Relations, effective June 14, 1955, as amended by Republic Act 1409
which took effect on September 9, 1955. Said Section 7 provides:
"SEC. 7. Jurisdiction of the Court. - The Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, matters,
controversies or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which determine
the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the
parties works the land: x x x."[3]
As heretofore adverted to, Tongham Chua's complaint was filed on March 12, 1958 - long after
Republic Acts 1199, 1267 and 1409 were incorporated in our statute books. Well to remember
then is that Tongham Chua's complaint positively avers that Hatib Abbain is his tenant on a 50-
50 sharing basis of the harvest; and that he seeks ejectment of Hatib Abbain "due to his non-
compliance of our agreement of [his] giving my share of the several harvests he made." The
Justice of the Peace Court itself found, after hearing, that Hatib Abbain continued to be the
tenant of Tongham Chua after the latter became, on January 16, 1952, owner of the plantation
which he acquired from his father by virtue of a donation; and that Hatib Abbain refused to give
"the share of his landlord of the harvest."
If both the complaint and the inferior court's judgment have any meaning at all, it is that the
Justice of the Peace Court had no jurisdiction over the case. Right at the outset, the complaint
should have been rejected. Failing in this, the case should have been dismissed during the course
of the trial, when it became all the mere evident that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. The
judge had no power to determine the case. Because, Tongham Chua's suit comes within the
coverage of the statutory provision (Section 21, R.A. 1199) heretofore mentioned that [a]ll cases
involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder," shall be under the "original and
exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take
cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes" and the broad sweep of Section 7, Republic Act
1267, which lodged wish the Court of Agrarian Relations "original and exclusive jurisdiction x x
x to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, matters, controversies or disputes
involving all those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of
persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land."
Jurisprudence has since stabilized the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations over cases
of this nature. Such exclusive authority is not divested by a mere averment on the part of the
[4]
tenant that he asserts ownership over the land, "since the law does not exclude from the
jurisdiction" of the Court of Agrarian Relations "cases in which a tenant claims ownership over
the land given to his for cultivation by the landlord."
[5]
The judgment and proceedings of the Justice of the Peace Court are null and void.
2. We take note of the observation of the Court of First instance that the petition for relief from
judgment must have to be ruled out because it was filed beyond the 60-day period after appellant
learned of the judgment. But this is beside the point.
The judgment of the Justice of the Peace Court is not merely a voidable judgment. It is void on
its face. It may be attacked directly or collaterally. Here, the attack is direct. Petitioner-
appellant sought to annul the judgment. Even after the time for appeal or review had elapsed,
appellant could bring, as he brought, such an action. More, he also sought to enjoin enforcement
of that judgment. In varying language, this Court has expressed its reprobation for judgments
[6]
rendered by a court without jurisdiction. Such a judgment is held to be "'a dead limb on the
judicial tree, which should be lopped of or wholly disregarded as the circumstances require." In
[7]
the language of Mr. Justice Street: "Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it
[8]
may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head." And in Gomez vs. Concepcion, this Court quoted
[9]
with approval, the following from Freeman on Judgments: “A void judgment is in legal effect
no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can he obtained. Being worthless in
itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any
one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting
to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. The purchaser as a sale by virtue of its authority
finds himself without title and without redress."
Since the judgment here on its face is void ab initio, the limited periods for relief from judgment
in Rule 38 are inapplicable. That judgment is vulnerable to attack "in any way and at any time,
even when no appeal has been taken." [10]
Upon the view we take of this case, the appealed order of October 30, 1964 is hereby reversed
and set aside; and the decision of the Justice of the Peace Court of Bongao, Sulu, in Civil Case
21, entitled "Tongham Chua, Plaintiff, vs. Hatib Abbain, Defendant," is hereby annulled.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Civil Case No. 21, Justice of the Peace Court, Bongao, Sulu, entitled "Tongham Chua,
[1]
Plaintiff, vs. Hatib Abbain, Defendant."
Case No. 407, Court of First Instance of Sulu, entitled "Hatib Abbain, Petitioner, vs. Tongharn
[2]
Chua and Honorable Mariano Managula, as Justice of the Peace of Bongao, Respondents."
Section 154 of Republic Act 3844, otherwise known as the "Agricultural Land Reform Code,”
[3]
effective August 8, 1963, reads:
"SEC. 154. Jurisdiction of the Court. - The Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over:
(1) All cases or actions involving matters, controversies, disputes, or money claims
arising from agrarian relations: Provided, however, That all cases still pending in
the Court of Agrarian Relations, established under Republic Act Numbered Twelve
hundred and sixty-seven, at the time of the effectivity of this Code, shall be
transferred to and continued in the respective Courts of Agrarian Relations within
who whose district the sites of the cases are located; x x x."
Bakit vs. Asperin, L-15700, April 26, 1961; Valencia vs. Surtida, L-17277, May 31, 1961;
[4]
Gabani vs. Reas, L-14579, June 30, 1961; Ira vs. Zafra, L-17439 October 31, 1962; Tuvera vs.
De Guzman, L-20547, April 30, 1965; Casaria vs. Rosales, L-20288, June 22, 1965. See
also: Mendoza vs. Manguiat, 96 Phil. 309, 311; Santos vs. Vivas, 96 Phil. 538, 541; Basilio vs.
David, 98 Phil. 955, 958.
[5]
Mandih vs. Tablantin, L-12795, March 30, 1960, cited in Tuvera vs. De Guzman, supra.
[6]
Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 949.
[7]
Anuran vs. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29, 36.
[8]
Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca, supra.
[9]
47 Phil. 717, 722-723.
Lipana vs. Court of First Instance of Cavite, 70 Phil, 365, 367, citing Banco Español-Filipino
[10]
vs. Palanca, supra; and Anuran vs. Aquino, supra.
G.R. No. 86773
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 86773, February 14, 1992
SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER-AQUACULTURE

DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD), DR. FLOR LACANILAO (CHIEF), RUFIL CUEVAS
(HEAD, ADMINISTRATIVE DIV.), BEN DELOS REYES (FINANCE OFFICER),
PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND JUVENAL
LAZAGA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the July 26, 1988 decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission sustaining the labor arbiter, in holding herein petitioners Southeast
Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC?AQD), Dr. Flor
Lacanilao, Rufil Cuevas and Ben de los Reyes liable to pay private respondent Juvenal Lazaga
the amount of P126,458.89 plus interest thereon computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment
thereof is made, as separation pay and other post-employment benefits, and the resolution
denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of said decision dated January 9, 1989.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on
December 28, 1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia
and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country (Article 1, Agreement Establishing the
SEAFDEC).
On April 20, 1975, private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate on
a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was appointed Senior External Affairs Officer
on January 5, 1983 with a monthly basic salary of P8,000.00 and a monthly allowance of
P4,000.00. Thereafter, he was appointed to the position of Professional III and designated as
Head of External Affairs Office with the same pay and benefits.
On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice
of termination to private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being
experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated at the close of office hours on
May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his
basic salary for every year of service plus other benefits (Rollo, p. 153).
Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD's failure to pay private respondent his separation pay, the latter
filed on March 18, 1987 a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation benefits
plus moral damages and attorney's fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC (Annex "C" of
Petition for Certiorari).
Petitioners in their Answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the
case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and that private
respondent must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money
accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances had not yet
been obtained by the private respondent.
A formal hearing was conducted whereby private respondent alleged that the non-issuance of the
clearances by the petitioners was politically motivated and in bad faith. On the other hand,
petitioners alleged that private respondent has property accountability and an outstanding
obligation to SEAFDEC-AQD in the amount of P27,532.11. Furthermore, private respondent is
not entitled to accrued sick leave benefits amounting to P44,000.00 due to his failure to avail of
the same during his employment with the SEAFDEC-AQD (Annex "D", Id.).
On January 12, 1988, the labor arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents:

1. To pay complainant P126,458.89, plus legal interest thereon computed from May 16, 1986
until full payment thereof is made, as separation pay and other post-employment benefits;
2. To pay complainant actual damages in the amount of P50,000, plus 10% attorney's fees.
All other claims are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 51, Annex "E")
On July 26, 1988, said decision was affirmed by the Fifth Division of the NLRC except as to the
award of P50,000.00 as actual damages and attorney's fees for being baseless. (Annex "A", p. 28,
id.)
On September 3, 1988, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Annex "G", id.) which
was denied on January 9, 1989. Thereafter, petitioners instituted this petition for certiorari
alleging that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide respondent Lazaga's complaint
since SEAFDEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to its international character and the
complaint is in effect a suit against the State which cannot be maintained without its consent.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-

AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.
It was established by the Governments of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia,

Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore,
Kingdom of Thailand and Republic of Vietnam (Annex "H", Petition).
The Republic of the Philippines became a signatory to the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC on
January 16, 1968. Its purpose is as follows:
"The purpose of the Center is to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development in
Southeast Asia by mutual cooperation among the member governments of the Center, hereinafter
called the 'Members', and through collaboration with international organizations and
governments external to the Center. (Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, Art. 1; Annex "H",
Petition)" (p. 310, Rollo)
SEAFDEC-AQD was organized during the Sixth Council Meeting of SEAFDEC on July 3-7,
1973 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia as one of the principal departments of SEAFDEC (Annex "I",
id.) to be established in Iloilo for the promotion of research in aquaculture. Paragraph 1, Article 6
of the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC mandates:
"1. The Council shall be the supreme organ of the Center and all powers of the Center shall be
vested in the Council."
Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys

functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is
located.
As Senator Jovito R. Salonga and Former Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap stated in their book, Public
International Law (p. 83, 1956 ed.):
"Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by the
agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international purposes, economic
or social and mainly non?political. Among the notable instances are the International Labor
Organization, the International Institute of Agriculture, the International Danube Commission. In
so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct
juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As
such, according to one leading authority ‘they must be deemed to possess a species of
international personality of their own.’ (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 83 [1956
ed.])"
Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic of the Philippines agreed to be
represented by one Director in the governing SEAFDEC Council (Agreement Establishing
SEAFDEC, Art. 5, Par. 1, Annex "H", ibid) and that its national laws and regulations shall apply
only insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC of "an agreed amount of money, movable and
immovable property and services necessary for the establishment and operation of the Center"
are concerned (Art. 11, ibid). It expressly waived the application of the Philippine laws on the
disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD (Section 2, P.D. No. 292).
The then Minister of Justice likewise opined that Philippine Courts have no jurisdiction over
SEAFDEC-AQD in Opinion No. 139, Series of 1984 -
"4. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local
jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of
the country where it is found. (See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44) The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient
medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or
control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local
jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially
on behalf of its member-states. In the case at bar, for instance, the entertainment by the National
Labor Relations Commission of Mr. Madamba's reinstatement cases would amount to
interference by the Philippine Government in the management decisions of the SEARCA
governing board; even worse, it could compromise the desired impartiality of the organization
since it will have to suit its actuations to the requirements of Philippine law, which may not
necessarily coincide with the interests of the other member-states. It is precisely to forestall these
possibilities that in cases where the extent of the immunity is specified in the enabling
instruments of international organizations, jurisdictional immunity is specified in the enabling
instruments of international organizations, jurisdictional immunity from the host country is
invariably among the first accorded. (See Jenks, Id.; See also Bowett, The Law of International
Institutions, pp. 284-1285)."
Respondent Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of jurisdiction is unavailing
because estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of
action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can
provide one. Settled is the rule that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate
jurisdiction is null and void. Thus, in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, this Court held:
"A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to
cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and
may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified
by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of
Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to
situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstances
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-
waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been
repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but
rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue
of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel." (Calimlim vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-34362,
118 SCRA 399 [1982])
Respondent NLRC'S citation of the ruling of this Court in Lacanilao v. De Leon (147 SCRA 286
[1987]) to justify its assumption of jurisdiction over SEAFDEC is misplaced. On the contrary,
the court in said case explained why it took cognizance of the case. Said the Court:
"We would note, finally, that the present petition relates to a controversy between two claimants
to the same position; this is not a controversy between the SEAFDEC on the one hand, and an
officer or employee, or a person claiming to be an officer or employee, of the SEAFDEC, on the
other hand. There is before us no question involving immunity from the jurisdiction of the Court,
there being no plea for such immunity whether by or on behalf of SEAFDEC, or by an official of
SEAFDEC with the consent of SEAFDEC (Id., at 300; underscoring supplied)."
WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an international agency beyond the jurisdiction

of the courts or local agency of the Philippine government, the questioned decision and
resolution of the NLRC dated July 26, 1988 and January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been rendered without jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

483 Phil. 416
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 139031, October 18, 2004
MARIE ANTOINETTE R. SOLIVEN, PETITIONER, VS. FASTFORMS PHILIPPINES, INC.,

RESPONDENT.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated
February 8, 1999 and Resolution dated June 17, 1999, both issued by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51946.
Records show that on May 20, 1994, Marie Antoinette R. Soliven, petitioner, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Makati City a complaint for sum of money with damages
against Fastforms Philippines, Inc., respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1788.
The complaint alleges that on June 2, 1993, respondent, through its president Dr. Eduardo
Escobar, obtained a loan from petitioner in the amount of One Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos
(P170,000.00), payable within a period of twenty-one (21) days, with an interest of 3%, as
evidenced by a promissory note[3] executed by Dr. Escobar as president of respondent. The loan
was to be used to pay the salaries of respondent’s employees. On the same day, respondent
issued a postdated check (dated June 25, 1993)[4] in favor of petitioner in the amount of
P175,000.00 (representing the principal amount of P170,000.00, plus P5,000.00 as interest). It
was signed by Dr. Escobar and Mr. Lorcan Harney, respondent's vice-president. About three
weeks later, respondent, through Dr. Escobar, advised petitioner not to deposit the postdated
check as the account from where it was drawn has insufficient funds. Instead, respondent
proposed to petitioner that the P175,000.00 be “rolled-over,” with a monthly interest of 5% (or
P8,755.00). Petitioner agreed to the proposal. Subsequently, respondent, through Dr. Escobar,
Mr. Harney and Mr. Steve Singson, the new president, issued several checks in the total sum of
P76,250.00 in favor of petitioner as payment for interests corresponding to the months of June,
August, September, October and December, 1993. Later, despite petitioner’s repeated demands,
respondent refused to pay its principal obligation and interests due.
In her complaint, petitioner prays:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that
judgment be rendered:
(a) holding/declaring defendant (now respondent) guilty of breach of contract x x x; and
(b) ordering defendant to pay plaintiff (now petitioner) the following sums:
P195,155.00 as actual damages;

P200,000.00 as moral damages;
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.
Plaintiff prays for such other relief just and equitable in the premises.”
Respondent, in its answer with counterclaim,[5] denied that it obtained a loan from petitioner; and
that it did not authorize its then president, Dr. Eduardo Escobar, to secure any loan from
petitioner or issue various checks as payment for interests.
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a Decision dated July 3, 1995[6] in favor of
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“22. WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders judgment as follows:
22.1. The defendant FASTFORMS PHILS., INC. is ordered to pay the plaintiff, MARIE
ANTOINETTE R. SOLIVEN, the following amounts:
22.1.1. P175,000.00 – the amount of the loan and its interest covered by the check (Exh. 3);
22.1.2. Five (5%) percent of P175,000.00 – a month from June 25, 1993 until the P175,000.00 is
fully paid – less the sum of P76,250.00 – as interest;
22.1.3. P50,000.00 – as attorney’s fees.
22.2. The COMPLAINT for MORAL and EXEMPLARY damages is DISMISSED.
22.3. The COUNTERCLAIM is DISMISSED; and
22.4. Costs is taxed against the defendant.”

Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration[7] questioning for the first time the trial
court’s jurisdiction. It alleged that since the amount of petitioner’s principal demand
(P195,155.00) does not exceed P200,000.00, the complaint should have been filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691.[8]
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration, stressing that respondent is barred from
assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court since it has invoked the latter’s jurisdiction by seeking
affirmative relief in its answer to the complaint and actively participated in all stages of the
trial.[9]
In its Order dated October 11, 1995,[10] the trial court denied respondent’s motion for
reconsideration, holding that it has jurisdiction over the case because the totality of the claim
therein exceeds P200,000.00. The trial court also ruled that respondent, under the principle of
estoppel, has lost its right to question its jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Decision on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The Appellate Court held that the case is within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, petitioner’s claim being only P195,155.00; and that respondent may assail the
jurisdiction of the trial court anytime even for the first time on appeal.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated June 17, 1999.[11]
Hence, this petition.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the trial court has jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. 94-1788.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994[12] or prior to the
institution of Civil Case No. 94-1788, provides inter alia that where the amount of the demand in
civil cases instituted in Metro Manila exceeds P200,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof is lodged with the Regional Trial Court.
Under Section 3 of the same law, where the amount of the demand in the complaint instituted in
Metro Manila does not exceed P200,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive original jurisdiction over the same is
vested in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994, we specified the guidelines in the
implementation of R.A. 7691. Paragraph 2 of the Circular provides:
“2. The exclusion of the term ‘damages of whatever kind’ in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or
one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.” (underscoring ours)
Here, the main cause of action is for the recovery of sum of money amounting to only
P195,155.00. The damages being claimed by petitioner are merely the consequences of this main
cause of action. Hence, they are not included in determining the jurisdictional amount. It is plain
from R.A. 7691 and our Administrative Circular No. 09-94 that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court
which has jurisdiction over the instant case. As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals in its
assailed Decision:
“Conformably, since the action is principally for the collection of a debt, and the prayer for
damages is not one of the main causes of action but merely a consequence thereto, it should not
be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.”
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, “this rule presupposes that estoppel
has not supervened.”[13] In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the
proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief.
Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an
adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals,[14] we held:
“Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x
in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only
in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had received an
adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R.
No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the case before
the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief,
effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court’s jurisdiction. Notably,
from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner
did not question the lower court’s jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed
its motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision that petitioner raised the question of
the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of
jurisdiction by its own inaction.” (underscoring ours)
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas,[15] we
ruled:
“In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case
No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles)
failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. However, private respondents never questioned the trial court’s
jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-
60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the reconstitution
proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial court’s
jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief – the reconstitution of their titles. Private
respondents have thus foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own
actions.
“The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at
any stage, a litigant’s participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including
the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from
challenging the court’s jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals,
300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The
Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and
submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs.
NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA
36 [1995]).” (underscoring ours)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 8,
1999 and Resolution dated June 17, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51946 are
REVERSED. The Decision dated July 3, 1995 and Resolution dated October 11, 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Makati City in Civil Case No. 94-1788 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), and Corona, JJ., concur.

Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.
[1]
Filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amended.
[2]
Penned by Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by then Presiding Justice Cancio
C. Garcia, now Associate Justice of this Court, and Justice Teodoro P. Regino (retired).
[3]
Annex “A”, petitioner’s Complaint, Rollo at 70, 78.
[4]
Exhibit “B”, id. at 70, 79.
[5]
Annex “D”, Petition, Rollo at 82-88.
[6]
Annex “E”, id. at 89-97.
[7]
Annex “F”, id. at 98-101.
Entitled “An Act Expanding The Jurisdiction Of The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
[8]
Trial Courts, And Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending For The Purpose Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, Otherwise Known As ‘The Judiciary Reorganization Act Of 1980’.”
[9]
Rollo at 102.
[10]
Id. at 108-109.
[11]
Annex “A-1”, Petition, Rollo at 52-53.
[12]
Par. 1 of SC Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994.
[13]
Sesbrano vs. CA, G.R. No. 84096, January 26, 1995, 310 Phil. 671, 680.
[14]
G.R. No. 107518, October 8, 1998, 297 SCRA 402.
[15]
G.R. No. 134895, June 19, 2001, 358 SCRA 715.
G.R. No. 145169
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 145169, May 13, 2004
SIENA REALTY CORPORATION, AS REPRESENTED BY LYDIA CO HAO AND LILIBETH

MANLUGON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. LOLITA GAL-LANG, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE RTC OF MANILA, BRANCH 44; ANITA CO NG IN TRUST FOR ROCKEFELLER NG;
AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL 13TH DIVISION, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Challenged via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court is the September 13, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 59096,
Siena Realty Corporation, as represented by Lydia Co Hao and Lilibeth Manlugon v. Hon.
Lolita O. Gal- lang, as Presiding Judge of Br. 44 of the RTC of Manila, and Anita Co Ng in trust
for Rockefeller Ng.
Since the petition attributes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in the
issuance of subject resolution, what should have been filed was one for certiorari under Rule 65.
On this score alone, the petition must be denied due course.
But even if technicality were set aside, just the same the petition fails.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on June 7, 2000 or allegedly
on the 60th day from their receipt of the March 23, 2000 Order of Branch 44 of the Manila
Regional Trial Court denying their motion for Reconsideration of said court’s Order dismissing,
on motion of private respondent, their complaint.
The Court of Appeals, by Resolution[1] of June 20, 2000, dismissed petitioner’s petition for
certiorari, however, for being filed out of time, it holding that:
Per records, it appears that petitioners had only until May 29, 2000 within which
to file the Petition for Certiorari considering the following:
1. Petitioners received a copy of the October 20, 1999 Order denying their
[counsel’s] Notice of Withdrawal [and likewise denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dismissing their complaint] on November 8, 1999;
2. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the October 20, 1999 Order on
November 17, 1999; and that
3. Petitioners received a copy of the March 23, 2000 Order denying their motion for
reconsideration on April 8, 2000.
The instant petition was filed on June 7, 2000 or nine (9) days late.
Thus, for being belatedly filed, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Petitioners thereupon filed (on July 10, 2000) a motion for reconsideration [2] of the above-said
June 20, 2000 Order of the appellate court.
In the meantime, this Court issued in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC ( Reglamentary Period to File
Petitions for Certiorari and Petition for Review on Certiorari) a Resolution dated August 1,
2000 approving the amendment to the following provision of Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 4. Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order, resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court
or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by
the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid
of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by
the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration after notice of said
judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which
shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No
extension of time shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to
exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The amendment to Sec. 4, Rule 65, which took effect on September 1, 2000, reads:
SECTION 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed
in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no
case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court of Appeals, acting on petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of its Order of June 20,
2000, denied, by Resolution of September 13, 2000, [3] said motion in this wise:
xxx
From the argument espoused by petitioners’ counsel, it appears that he overlooked the provision
of second paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended per
Supreme Court Circular dated July 21, 1998, which provides as follows:
“If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration after notice of said judgment,
order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less
than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time shall
be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.”
Verily, the sixty (60) day period within which to file a Petition for Certiorari is not counted from
the date of the receipt of the denial of Motion for Reconsideration, but from the date of the
receipt of the questioned order or decision, except that such 60-day period is interrupted upon the
filing of a Motion for Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, for reason above-stated, the instant motion is DENIED. Consequently, the
present Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED with finality. (Underscoring supplied)
Hence, the petition at bar, petitioners challenging the September 13, 2000 Resolution of the
appellant court as having been
. . . ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS IT WAS MADE WITHOUT
TAKING PRIOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF SUPREME COURT A.M. NO. 00-2 - 03 SC
WHICH RESOLUTION TOOK EFFECT ON SEPTEMBER 1, 2000, AND WHICH
AMENDED THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[4] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s argument is well-taken.
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence reads:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without
the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Even if petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in their motion for reconsideration
before it, the Court of Appeals should have taken mandatory judicial notice of this Court’s
resolution in A.M. Matter No. 00-02-03 SC. The resolution did not have to specify that it had
retroactive effect as it pertains to a procedural matter. Contrary to private respondent’s allegation
that the matter was no longer pending and undetermined, the issue of whether the petition for
certiorari was timely filed was still pending reconsideration when the amendment took effect on
September 1, 2000, hence, covered by the its retroactive application.
The amendatory rule in their favor notwithstanding, petitioners’ petition fails as stated early on.
The order of the trial court granting private respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the complaint was a
final, not interlocutory, order and as such, it was subject to appeal,[5] not a petition for certiorari.
At the time petitioners filed before the appellate court their petition for certiorari on the 60th day
following their receipt of the October 20, 1999 Order of the trial court denying their Motion for
Reconsideration of its dismissal order, the said October 20, 1999 Order had become final and
executory after the 15th day following petitioners’ receipt thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo at 39-40.
[2]
Id. at 105-107.
[3]
Id. at 37-38.
[4]
Id. at 22.
[5]
Sec. 1, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[5]
Sec. 1, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
G.R. No. 56428
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 56428, February 18, 1992
SOUTHERN FOOD SALES CORPORATION AND ROBERT JAMES SIAO, PETITIONERS,

VS. HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH VIII, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU AND RAUL G. LAURENTE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
seeking the nullification of the orders issued by the respondent Judge Bernardo Ll. Salas, in his
capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, 14th Judicial District,
Branch VIII, Cebu City in Civil Case No. R-18431 entitled "Raul G. Laurente v. Southern Food
Sales Corp. and Robert James Siao" dated February 28, 1980 deferring the determination of the
motion to dismiss until after trial and November 6, 1980 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts which gave rise to the controversy at bar are as follows:
Petitioner Southern Food Sales Corporation (corporation) is a domestic corporation organized

and existing under the laws of the Philippines, while co-petitioner Robert James Siao is an office
manager of the petitioner corporation. Public respondent Bernardo Ll. Salas is impleaded in his
official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, 14th Judicial
District, Branch VIII, Cebu City, while private respondent Raul G. Laurente was formerly the
sales supervisor of the petitioner corporation.
Private respondent Raul G. Laurente was employed as sales supervisor of petitioner Southern
Food Sales Corporation from August 15, 1977 to June 29, 1979.
On July 5, 1979, private respondent Laurente was notified and advised of his immediate
termination for gross neglect of duty and/or dishonesty arising from the following acts, namely:
(1) for the dismissal of four (4) salesmen whose anomalies and irregularities were tolerated by
private respondent despite his actual knowledge; (2) for falsifying his meal receipts; (3) for
failing to submit proof of his income tax receipt for 1978; and (4) for misrepresenting his
itinerary of travel. (see Rollo, p. 15)
On August 27, 1979, private respondent instituted a civil action for damages against petitioner
corporation and petitioner Siao with the Court of First Instance of Cebu docketed as Civil Case
No. R-18481.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner corporation with the
Ministry of Labor (now Department of Labor and Employment) for illegal dismissal,
reinstatement with backwages, quarterly commissions, incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.
On November 20, 1979, the labor case was assigned for compulsory arbitration with the
Regional Office No. X and docketed as ROX Arbitration Case No. 469-79.
On January 7, 1980, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on Civil Case No. R-18481, claiming
that jurisdiction should be vested with the National Labor Relations Commission. (see Rollo, p.
25)
In the meantime, the Executive Labor Arbiter Ildefonso G. Agbuya rendered a decision on
February 5, 1980 finding that the termination of complainant was for a just and valid cause, the
dispositive portion of which provides as follows:
"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we hereby rule and order the termination of
the petitioner is for just and valid cause. Further, the respondent, Souther(n) Food Sales
Corporation, is hereby ordered to pay the petitioner, Raul Laurente his commission and 5 days
Service Incentive Leave Pay subject for computation and the following:
1) Unpaid wages from June 16-30, 1979 --------- P750.00
2) 13th Month Pay for 1979 ------------------------- P750.00
SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 16)
Hence, the private respondent interposed an appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission
alleging the sole ground, to wit:
"Serious errors were committed in the findings of fact which would cause grave and irreparable
damage and injury to the complainant." (Rollo, p. 17)
On February 28, 1980, after finding that the grounds in the motion to dismiss did not appear to
be indubitable, the court in Civil Case No. R-18481 deferred the determination of the motion to
dismiss until after trial.
Such order prompted the petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration.
However, the respondent judge issued an order dated November 6, 1980 denying the motion for
reconsideration and setting the case for further proceedings.
Hence, this petition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The petitioners maintain that private respondent's labor complaint docketed as ROX Arbitration
Case No. 496-79 is a prejudicial question which must take precedence before the civil action for
damages may be instituted. In addition, the petitioners stress that it is procedurally absurd for
private respondent to seek remedies in two (2) tribunals of competent jurisdiction for that would
have the effect of splitting a single cause of action.
On the contrary, private respondent argues that there can be no prejudicial question involved
much less is there a splitting of a single cause of action. Although the two (2) cases filed by
private respondent are apparently related to each other, nevertheless, each case has a different
subject matter. The labor case involves the legality of the private respondent's termination or
dismissal, while the civil case involves the manner of dismissal or how the petitioners carried out
the dismissal.
Petitioners claim that the failure of the private respondent to await for the resolution of the
NLRC is equivalent to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Furthermore, they stress that
unless the process of administrative adjudication has been completed, the case is not ready for
judicial intervention.
On this point, the private respondent notes that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not applicable. The private respondent alleges that the filing of Civil Case No. R-
18481 is not in any way dependent upon the outcome of the labor case considering that the two
cases, as previously discussed, are distinct from each other, each having a different subject
matter.
The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion when it deferred the determination or resolution of the motion to
dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the court over claims for damages.
We already held in the case of National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg v. Stolt-
Nielsen Philippines, Inc. (G.R. No. 87958, April 26, 1990, 184 SCRA 682, 686) that "(w)hile a
Court Order deferring action on a motion to dismiss until the trial is interlocutory and cannot be
challenged until final a judgment, still, where it clearly appears that the trial Judge or court is
proceeding in excess or outside of its jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition (or certiorari)
would lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings." In the
case at bar, however, the trial judge did not proceed in excess of his jurisdiction when he issued
the order deferring the resolution of the motion to dismiss until after trial, in order for certiorari
to lie.
Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6715 clearly
provides that the labor arbiter shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from an employer-
employee relationship. However, when the civil case for damages was instituted in 1979, the
applicable law then was Article 217 (a) (3) of the Labor Code as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1367 (May 1, 1978), the pertinent portions of which provide as follows:
"Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (a) The Labor Arbiters shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:
"x x x
"(3) All other cases arising from employer-employee relations duly endorsed by the Regional
Directors in accordance with the provisions of this Code; Provided, that the Regional Directors
shall not endorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of
damages.
"x x x."
Time and again, We stress that "(t)he rule is that where a court has already obtained and is
exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of
the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another
tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the
effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute
changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that
was pending prior to the enactment of the statute." (Bengzon v. Inciong, G.R. Nos. L-48706-07,
91 SCRA 248, 256). We find the aforementioned principle applicable to the case at bar. To
require the private respondent to file a single suit combining his actions for illegal dismissal and
damages in the NLRC would be to sanction the retroactivity of Republic Act No. 6715 which
took effect on March 21, 1989, where the same law does not expressly so provide, or does not
intend to operate as to actions pending before its enactment, hence prejudicial to the orderly
administration of justice. Therefore, the lower court, acting in accordance with the law then
prevailing, has jurisdiction over the claim of damages of the private respondent.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the act of the respondent judge in deferring
the determination of the motion to dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the court until after
trial does not amount to grave abuse of discretion.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.

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Supreme Court of the Philippines

G.R. No. 147444, October 01, 2004

VIRGILIO A. SINDICO WITH HIS WIFE VIRGINIA TORCUATOR SINDICO, PETITIONERS,

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

a. Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the

The Court finds for petitioners.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

Supreme Court of the Philippines

485 Phil. 661

G.R. No. 156118, November 19, 2004

PABLO T. TOLENTINO AND TEMPUS PLACE REALTY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,

The antecedent facts are as follows:

3) To execute and deliver to the plaintiffs the necessary Board Resolution;

4) Jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs the following:

c. Exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;

d. Attorney’s fees in the amount of P1,000,000.00.[3]

1. The judgment in default granted reliefs in excess of what is prayed for in

2. The judgment in default awarded unliquidated damages in palpable

3. The judgment in default is in gross violation of Section 14, Article VIII,

4. The judgment in default was rendered in violation of the rights of the

5. Corrollarily, the gargantuan award for damages by the court a quo in

6. Petitioners have good and substantial defenses in respect of private

b) Moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);

d) Attorney’s fees in the amount of One [H]undred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

1. The petitioners can avail of the remedy of annulment of judgment to annul

a. The judgment in default granted reliefs in excess of what is prayed

b. The judgment in default awarded unliquidated damages in

c. The judgment in default is in gross violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII,

d. The judgment in default was rendered in violation of the rights of

4. The petitioners have valid and substantial defenses to respondents’ cause

The petition is without merit.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition at bar is DENIED.

Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

Supreme Court of the Philippines

130 Phil. 786

G.R. No. L-24241, February 26, 1968

HATIB ABBAIN, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. TONGHAM CHUA, ET AL.,

Plaintiff, vs. Hatib Abbain, Defendant."

effective August 8, 1963, reads:

vs. Palanca, supra; and Anuran vs. Aquino, supra.

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

Supreme Court of the Philippines

G.R. No. 86773

G.R. No. 86773, February 14, 1992

SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER-AQUACULTURE

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents:

The petition is impressed with merit.

Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-

It was established by the Governments of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia,

Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys

WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an international agency beyond the jurisdiction

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Supreme Court of the Philippines

483 Phil. 416

G.R. No. 139031, October 18, 2004

MARIE ANTOINETTE R. SOLIVEN, PETITIONER, VS. FASTFORMS PHILIPPINES, INC.,

In her complaint, petitioner prays:

(a) holding/declaring defendant (now respondent) guilty of breach of contract x x x; and

P195,155.00 as actual damages;

22.1.3. P50,000.00 – as attorney’s fees.

22.2. The COMPLAINT for MORAL and EXEMPLARY damages is DISMISSED.