KRUMKA SHAROVA (Sofia, Bulgaria)

The April Uprising As a Factor in the Eastern Crisis

The 1876 April Uprising marked the high point in the Bulgarian peoples'
efforts to cast off Ottoman domination and to acquire their free and indepen-
dent political existence. It was the most brilliant manifestation of the Bulgar-
ian movement for national liberation during the Vuzrazdane-the period of
national revival-a movement which was expressed in numerous uprisings, re-
volts, and plots up to 1876. The April Uprising, as well as its prelude of Sep-
tember, 1875, known as the Stara Zagora Uprising, extended the Eastern
Crisis to the Bulgarian lands leading to serious problems for the Ottoman Em-
pire and its supporters in Europe. The movement for emancipation from Ot-
toman domination and for the creation of a new independent state, Bulgaria,
. spread to the central and eastern regions of the Balkan Peninsula, resulting in
essential changes in the internal and external affairs of the one-time powerful
empire of the Ottomans.
During the spring and summer of 1876, public opinion in Europe and in
the United States indicated, for the first time, anxiety over the fate of the
Bulgarian people; and millions of people all over the world became aware that
the Bulgarians were striving for national liberation. From then on the Bulgar-
ian question, as a component of the Eastern Question, became central to the
relations among the European states. 1

1. The historical literature dealing with the Eastern Crisisis very voluminous. See the
bibliography in M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question (1774-1923): A Study in Interna-
tional Relations (London: St. Martin's Press, 1972), pp. 406-407. Russia's policy toward
the Eastern Question has been clarified more fully by S. S. Tatischev, Imperator Alek-
sandr II, ego zhizn' i tsarstvovanie, 2 vols (St. Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1903), II. P.
Geisman, Vvedeniev istoriu russko-turetskoi voiny 1877-1878 g. (St. Petersburg: M. O.
Vol'-f, 1906); S. Goriainov, Bosfor i Dardanelly (St. Petersburg: I. N. Skorokhodova,
1907) and his La Question d'Orient à la veillede la Traitg de Berlin (1870-1878) (Paris:
Institut u'ciuW.? ?iaYc?,1948); G. P. Geno, Istochniiúî ¡¡{¡prDs,2 V015.(Sûfùa: Tlii?ii-
dozhnik, 1926), II; directly related to the BulgarianQuestion are the works by K. Kozh-
ukharov, Iztochniiat vupros i Bulgariirt 1875-1890 (Sofiia: Durzhavna pechat., 1929);
For additional works, see the bibliography on the April uprising in this issue of South-
eastern Europe. In most of the studies on the Eastern Question, including those dealing
with Russia and with the other Great Powers and the Bulgarians,the place of the April
Uprising in the Eastern Crisisis described mainly with a view to its repercussionson pub-
lic opinion. However, its role as an active factor in the intensification of the crisis and in
the evolution taking place in the policies of Russia, Britain and the other powers is usual-
ly mentioned without any survey of this role in its various manifestations in the Balkans,
in Russia and in the other European countries. Khristo Khristov in his Osvobozhdenieto
na Bulgariia i politikata na zapadnite durzhavi 1876-1878 (Sofiia: Bulgarskaakademiia
 170

After the establishment of the Principality of Serbia, the Kingdom of

Greece, and the Danubian Principalities, which dealt the first blow to Otto-
man domination in Southeastern Europe, the Bulgarian lands acquired a great
significance relative to the fate of Turkey. The largest in territory and popula-
.
tion, situated immediately adjacent to the capital of the empire and along the
routes leading to its northern and western frontiers, these lands became par-
ticularly important in view of economic, military, and strategic considerations.
The alternative-whether the Bulgarians would be allowed to win freedom
for themselves or not, whether they would be able to create a national state
of their own-would determine to a large extent whether Turkey would be
able to preserve her own positions in Europe or whether she would have to
confine herself to her Asian and African possessions.
Due to continuous uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the subsequent
war waged by Serbia and Montenegro against Turkey, the April Uprising was
bound to attract the attention of the Great Powers and the Balkan states in
relation to the Eastern Question as a whole. The uprising in Bulgaria and its
cruel suppression, which provoked great animation in international politics
and had extraordinarily strong repercussions in countries far and near, played
an important part in the development of the Eastern Crisis of 1875-76.
The Bulgarian uprisings in September, 1875, and April, 1876, were of
major significance to the intensification of the revolutionary situation in the
Balkans and to the exacerbation and expansion of the Eastern Crisis. The up-
rising in Bosnia and Herzegovina. in the summer of 1875 was perceived, right-
fully, by the Bulgarian revolutionaries as the beginning of the decisive con-
frontation between the enslaved peoples in the Balkans and Turkey, a battle
which had to be joined by the Bulgarians without delay. Having accumulated
sufficient historical experience in the numerous Bulgarian uprisings and in the
uprisings of the other Balkan peoples, the Bulgarian revolutionaries realized
that all peoples who had been forced into being subjects of the sultan had one
common enemy-the Ottoman Empire-and one and the same historical task
- to cast down their domination. The Bulgarian people followed the uprising
in Bosnia and Herzegovina with enormous interest. It was considered not
merely an uprising by fraternal Southern Slavs but a beginning of fateful
events for the Bulgarian nation as well. It was no accident that the entire Bul-
garian press, be it in free Romania or in Istanbul under the supervision of the
Sublime Porte, devoted a great deal of attention to events in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina.2

na naukite, 1968) has devoted the greatest attention to the emergence of the Bulgarian
Question in international relations from 1876 to 1878.
2. B. Raikov, Aprilskoto vústanie v búlgarskiia vuzrozhdenski'periodichen pechat.
Bibliograftia (Sofila: Narodna biblioteka "Kiril i Metodii," 1973); K. Vuzvuzova-Kara-
teodorova, "Bulgarskiiati chuzhdiiat periodichen pechat ot 1876 g i Aprilskoto vüstanie"
in Aprilskoto vilstanie (1876-1966) (Sofiia: B31garskaakademiia na naukite,_ ' 1966),p.
181.
 171

The Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee in Bucharest, which

promptly began consolidating the political forces of the emigration and of the
people in Bulgaria, as well as preparations for an uprising, addressed a procla-
mation to the Bulgarians on 30 July 1875, calling on them to rise in revolt to-
gether with the people of Herzegovina. "It is inhuman and insane," the Declar-
ation read, "to leave the people of Herzegovina, our brothers in blood and in
suffering, to fight unaided against the common enemy of the southern Slavs.
... We are in duty bound to rise against the common enemy."3 The General
Assembly of the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee of 12 August
endorsed this stand and outlined the plan for an uprising, which broke out
prematurely in September, 1875, in the Stara . Zagora, Shumen, and Ruse dis-
tricts and ended in failure 4
This brief initial outburst of revolutionary sentiment in Bulgaria, which
occurred almost simultaneously with the outburst of the crisis in Herzegovina
and Bosnia, was the first political manifestation of the Eastern Crisis to include
the Bulgarian lands as well. Thus, at the very beginning of the Eastern Crisis,
the Bulgarians, and especially their revolutionary party, took practical steps
toward the realization of cooperation among the revolutionary liberation
movements in the Balkans, a cooperation which these movements considered
essential for all the peoples fighting for freedom.
The revolutionary figures in Bulgaria, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia, and
Montenegro agreed on the need to coordinate the insurgent activities for the
simultaneous outbreak of the uprising in the three unliberated regions, with
aid expected from the two liberated principalities of the Southern Slavs.5
One of the postulates, established as a logical necessity in the political plans
for the uprisings in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, declared that a. simul-
taneous uprising must be coordinated with the war against Turkey which had
been contemplated by Serbia and Montenegro as early as the beginning of the
sixties. Although the Bulgarian uprising of September, 1875, failed, it con-
tributed to an increased sense of insecurity for Turkey's internal situation.
The Bulgarian revolutionary liberation movement of 1875, by its readiness to
declare revolution in Bulgaria, provided moral support for the uprising in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina and, in adition, justified the fears of the Porte and the
Great Powers that the struggle for liberation would not be confined to Bos-
nia and Herzegovina alone.
The Turkish Government regarded the revolutionary ferment in Bulgaria

3. N. T. Obretenov, Spomeni zabalgarskite vustaniia (Sofiia: Bülgarskakniga, 1942),

pp. 203-04.
4. V. Koicheva,Starozagorskoto vilstanie1875 (Sofiia: Otechestven Front, 1975); K.
Kosev, N. Zhechev, D. Doinov, Istoriia na Aprilskoto vústanie 1876 (Sofiia: Partizdat,
1976).
5. D. T. Strashimirov,Arkhivna v`uzrazhdaneto,2 vols. (Sofiia: Ministerstvona narod-
noto prosveshchenic,1908), I, 231-32.
 172

and among the emigres in the summer and autumn of 1875 as a signal for a
new wave of unrest and insubordination, this time near Istanbul. Having ob-
tained advance information about preparations for an uprising in Bulgaria and
for the formation of detachments ready to cross the Danube, the Porte took
prompt measures to thwart the uprising. Naval vessels were sent into the Dan-
ube near the town of Silistra, where the passage of detachments had been ex-
pected, while in the country itself Bulgarians suspected of revolutionary ac-
tivities were arrested. In the Sliven District and other parts of Bulgaria, there
were large-scale discoveries of caches of arms and gunpowder, prepared by the
Bulgarians, and orders were issued to tighten security measures along the rail-
way lines. In addition, army units were sent to the Bulgarian lands to strength-
en the troops already stationed there. Some of the units sent to the town of
Nish (due to Serbia's behavior and the uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
were diverted toward Bulgaria.6 The government adopted large-scale counter-
measures at the inception of the uprising in the' affected regions of Stara Za-
gora, Shumen, and Ruse, as well as in other parts of the country, such as the
district of Tumovo.7 .' . . ' ...
.
"The Turks are extremely worried," wrote the' Russian consul in Adri-
anople, I. A. Ivanov, and "strong and alarming rumors are being spread."8 A.
I. Nelidov, Counsellor at the Russian Embassy in Istanbul, reported the fol-
lowing to Emperor Alexander II: "The numerous arrests made in Bulgaria, far
from pacifying the unrest, only served to intensify the indignation of the in-
habitants of this province, which is usually very peaceful."9 The Ambassador,
on. P. Ignatiev, sent information to the emperor several days later about the
negative results of the arrests made and the flaring up of Muslim fanaticism,
warning at the same time that these were "alarming symptoms" concerning
the further course of events in European Turkey.10
The fear that a new revolutionary center might appear in Bulgaria simul-
taneously with the uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina compelled the Sublime
Porte to heed the advice given by European diplomats and to take further mea-
sures to distract the attention of the subject peoples from the revolutionary
struggle by repeatedly discrediting promises for reform. At the end of Sep-
tember, 1875, immediately after the outbreak of the uprising in Bulgaria and
parallel with the military measures adopted for its suppression and the trials
of the arrested revolutionaries, two official rescripts were issued (an irade of
20 September and a firman of 30 September.) Official government acts for

6. S. A. Nikitin et al., eds., OsvobozhdenieBolgarii ot turetskogo iga. Sbornik doku-

mentov v trekh tomakh, 3 vols. (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1961-67), I, 1 lI
and 118.
7. Ibid., pp. 123-25, 128-29, 133-34,138-39, 147.
8.Ibid, p. 118.
9. Ibid., pp. 133-34.. '
10. Ibid., pp. 138-39.
 173

reforms were also announced at the end of December, which contained reiter-
ations of the assertions that order would be brought to the collection of taxes,
the amount would be reduced, there would be equality between Christians
and Muslims, the system of jurisdiction would be revised, etc. Of course, all
of these palliative measures had been unsuccessfully attempted before in or-
der to pacify the unruly subjects of the sultan.11l
That the revolutionary unrest and attempt at uprising in Bulgaria were
both undesirable and unfavorable for Turkey can be seen from the attitude of
the Porte, after the revolt had been stifled. According to information originat-
ing from one member of the commission charged with the interrogation of
the revolutionaries in Stara Zagora, the local Turkish authorities received in-
structions by telegraph from Istanbul "to look at this happening as a negligi-
ble affair and not to attach much importance to it," and also to cope with it
"in a peaceful and quiet manner," in an attempt to belittle its political im-
pact. Despite the fact that the "peaceful and quiet manner" implied the em-
ployment of the traditional means of arrests, death sentences, killings without
trial, and outrages against the peaceful population,12 the Sublime Porte actu-
ally succeeded, due to the prompt suppression of the uprising, in not allowing
its political import, its program, or its aims to become the subject of open dis-
cussions in diplomatic circles and on an international scale. It became clear to
Turkey, however, as it was to all well-informed diplomats in Istanbul, that the
Bulgarians were embarking on a struggle for political liberation, that the sup-
pression of the uprising of September, 1875, did not end that struggle, and
that in the Bulgarian lands plus the central and eastern provinces of European
Turkey, a revolution was gathering which was in certain respects more danger-
ous to Ottoman domination than the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina.13 "It is
not a matter of some private conspiracy," wrote the Russian consul in Ruse
on 4 October 1875, "it is a matter of the entire awakened nation being aware
of its force, on the one hand, and of the weakness of the Turks and of their
suppression of all human rights on the other. The criminal proceedings under-
taken will hardly bring any good to the Turks, because it is quite impossible
for all Bulgarians to be exiled to Diyarbekir.... It actually appears that the
time is not far away when the whole of Bulgaria will rise as one man."14
Despite its brevity and failure, the uprising of September, 1875, had, as
one of its essential results, the division of the power and attention of the
Turkish Government between Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, and the ac-
celeration of the pledges for reform-quite useless in a revolutionary crisis,
though symptomatic as a reaction on the part of the rulers. In actuallity the

11. Kosev,Istoriia, p. 209.

12. Ibid., p. 198.
13. Kr. Sharova, "Aprilskoto vustanie 1876 g.," Novo vreme, No. 4 (1976).
14. Osvobozhdenie,I, 129.
174

attempted Bulgarian uprising created favorable conditions for a continuation

of the struggle waged by the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Parallel with
that, the resolutions passed by the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Commit-
tee for organizing an uprising, the negotiations for unity of action between
the Bulgarian revolutionaries and those from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well
as with representatives of the Serbian and Montenegrin governments, the up-
rising itself, and the growing patriotic fervor and readiness to fight among the
Bulgarian people, provided the two principalities of Serbia and Montenegro
with additional arguments for making the decision to go to war against Tur-
key. The princiapl element in the strategy behind this war was that it would
be waged under conditions of uprisings, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
but also in Bulgaria-factors which could ensure successful operations by Ser-
bia and Montenegro in their unequal struggle against Turkey.
The further course of events in 1875 and the beginning of 1876 demon-
strated more clearly the Bulgarian uprising's significance to the successful
continuation 'of the uprising innBosnia and Herzegovina and of the Serbian-
Turkish War. The preparations for the Bulgarian uprising scheduled for the
spring of 1876 were followed very closely by the Serbian Government. De-
spite its limited capacity to provide for its own armaments, it promised to
supply rifles and ammunition to the Bulgarians, to render assistance in the
formation of detachments of volunteers on Serbian territory, and try to es-
tablish contact with various circles of the Bulgarian emigration in order to
make use of the forthcoming Bulgarian uprising as a favorable moment for de-
claring war on Turkey. The last months of 1875 and the first months of 1876
were marked by extremely intense activity by the two sides to coordinate the
struggle of the Bulgarians for liberation with the uprising in Bosnia and Herze-
govina and with the war against Turkey, for which Serbia and Montenegro
were already preparing.
We shall not dwell here on the considerations of the Bulgarian revolution-
aries, nor on the significance of the Serbian policy and of the uprisings in the
western regions of the Balkan Peninsula as a favorable and supporting factor
for the cause of Bulgaria's liberation, nor on the Bulgarian initiatives to estab-
lish unity of action with the other Southern Slavs in the course of the prepar-
ations for the April Uprising itself.15 Our interest lies in the other aspect of
the problem, namely, what was the place and role of that uprising in regard to
the intentions by Serbia and Montenegro to support the revolutionary strug-
gles of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in this manner, to accelerate the process
of completing the liberation of the Serbian lands still under Ottoman domina-
tion and realize their long-standing policy of national liberation in which, by

15. For more details, see Kr. Sharova, "Aprilskoto vustanie i borbata za osvobozh-
denie na drugite iuzhnoslavianskinarodi," in Aprilskoto vustanie 1876-1966, p. 131.
 175

the 1870s there was already a strong admixture of considerations for hege-
mony by Serbia over the Southern Slavs
A survey of the behavior of the Serbian governments, which changed fre-
quently between the summer of 1875 and the summer of 1876, will establish
a trend which is common to all of them in their attitude toward the prospects
for uprisings in Bulgaria. Regardless of their political composition and posi-
tions, they persisted in looking for contacts with the leaders of the Bulgarian
liberation movement.
Immediately after the attempted uprising of September, 1875, the new .
Liberal government of Serbia, headed by the well-known functionary of the
Omladina, L. Kalevich, unlike the preceding government led by Y. Ristich,
which preferred contacts with the party of the "old functionaries" among the
Bulgarian emigres, adopted a firm policy of friendship and close cooperation
with the representatives of the Bulgarian revolutionary party. The new govern-
ment conducted secret preparations for war against Turkey,.17 This new Serb-
ian government assessed realistically the incapacity and the lack of desire by
the "old ones" to lead the armed struggle for the liberation of the Bulgarians,
and consequently adopted an orientation toward the revolutionary party.18
The premature outbreak of the uprising, the emergency measures taken by
the Porte for its rapid suppression, and the blood-stained outrages committed
against the Bulgarian patriots foiled the realization of the plan that had been
drawn up for joint action. In the final account, the April Uprising, the opera-
tions of Botev's detachment and of other detachments, and the preoccupa-
tion of Turkey in suppressing the uprising in Bulgaria facilitated the declara-
tion of the Serbian-Turkish War in June.
The participation of numerous Bulgarian volunteer detachments in the
Serbian army was, for the Bulgarians, a continuation of their struggle for free-
dom which had begun with so much inspiration in April, 1876, and had been
so quickly drowned in blood. By this participation, the Bulgarian uprising,

16. There are a number of facts testifying to this. In the beginning of 1876 an appeal '
had been drafted on behalf of P. Khitov, I. Iovanovich,L. Desanchich and Sp. Despoto-
vich and submitted to the Serbian prince with the date 1 January 1876. This appeal, in
addition to stating the conviction of the revolutionary activists of the Southern Slavs
that coopcratiûn bctwccn Scrbians and I'riii?nWaiuin the strüggle againstthe. ccrrz.-,cn
enemy was necessary, expressedthe readiness in behalf of the Bulgarianpeople to accept
the supreme guidance and protection of the Prince Milan Obrenovi6 in the planned up-
rising-something that was alien to the Bulgarianrevolutionaries and obviously not origi-
nating from them. That accounts for the fact that there was no response to this appeal
(See A. Burmov, ed., Aprilskoto vustanie 1876. Sbornik ot dokumenti, 3 vols. [Soflia:
Nauka i izkustvo, 1954-56], I, 61-62 and Osvobozhdenie,I, 188-89).
17. Sharova, "Aprilskoto," p. 141. Dzh. Igniatovich, Liuben Karavelov i srbskoto
obshtestvo (Nish: "Bratstvo," 1969), p. 284.
18. The correspondence between the Serbian diplomatic mission in Bucharest and the
Serbian government contains abundant information about the protection of the new Bul-
garian emmigrants in the autumn of 1875 by Serbia. See Sharova, "Aprilskoto," p. 142.
176

provided once again, a factor favorable to the continuation of the uprisings in

the western regions of the Balkan Peninsula and to the war waged by Serbia
against Turkey.

* * * .

The April Uprising had an impact of great significance on the development,

intensification, and solution of the Eastern Crisis, as well as on the policies of
the Great Powers. This effect was manifested in two directions. In the first
place, it engendered an extremely broad movement of protest and stirred in-
ternational public opinion as a result of Bulgarian aspirations for indepen-
dence, and also as a result of the cruel outrages committed by the Turkish au-
thorities against the Bulgarians. The events created a conviction that no rem-
edy existed for the ills of Ottoman rule in Bulgaria. In the second place, the
April Uprising and its dramatic repercussions in Europe and the United States
became one of the principal factors underlying the reorientation of Russian
policy from a peaceful variant of solving the Eastern Crisis to declaring war
on Turkey, and also inspired essential changes in the positions of the main
supporters, particularly Britain, toward the Ottoman Empire and its inviola-
bility.l9
The April Uprising and its cruel suppression, the complications created by
it in the Ottoman Empire, the connection between the events in Bulgaria and
those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the subsequent war waged by Serbia and
Montenegro on Turkey, created a completely different situation in interna-
tional relations. The Bulgarian uprising became not only an issue in European
politics, but also a dangerous factor for intensifying the Eastern Crisis. The
line pursued by West European diplomacy-to oppose the trends of emanci-
pation and political liberation of the Bulgarians-continued during 1875-76;
but the barbarous suppression of the April Uprising and the broad repercus-
sions which it had on world public opinion, expressed in the indignation of
various social and political circles against the Turkish methods of government,
thwarted any futher active resistance on their part against the desire of the
Bulgarians to attain their independence.
The movement in defense of the Bulgarian people was not confined to
most of the European countries and the United States but also involved coun-
tries such as India and New Zealand, where people had heard nothing about

19. For more detailed information, see Krumka Sharova's forthcoming article on
"The Bulgarian National Problem Before Europe in the XIX Century," presented at the
Scholarly Session in Sofia in May, 1976, which will be published in the collection "One
Hundred Years of the April Uprising." See also Sharova's "La Question nationale bulgare
devant l'Europe au cours de la crise d'orient de debut des annees 40 du XIX siecle,"
Etudes historiques [hereafter EHl. (Sofia), 7 (1975), 203.
 177

Bulgaria until then. Moreover, the intensity of this sympathy surpassed all ex-
pectations. In Great Britain, where public opinion with few exceptions had
demonstrated full solidarity with the general trend of official British policy,
which aimed at preserving Turkey's integrity (and meant, therefore, opposition
to the struggle of the Bulgarians for political emancipation) the movement in
support of the Bulgarian cause assumed proportions which caused a genuine
impact in their political life. It remained as one of the important times in
British history and is still referred to as the "Bulgarian Agitation."20
In France, the Bulgarian uprising also encouraged a large-scale movement
of sympathy for the fate of the Bulgarians. Public opinion which, as a rule,
devoted much less attention to the Bulgarians during the nineteenth century,
compared with the Greeks, Serbians, and Romanians, now concentrated its
attention on the Bulgarian Question and the barbarous rule of the Turkish
authorities, branding the crimes perpetrated against the Bulgarians as a provo-
cation to civilization.21
In Russia, too, which had always been favorably disposed toward the Slav
peoples in the Balkans, resolute change took place in the public mood. Dur-
ing 1875 and in the first months of 1876, the uprising in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, the plight of the population there, and the drive to render aid had caught
the attention of the people in Russia and had relegated the Bulgarians to the
background. The April Uprising changed this situation, affecting both public
opinion and government circles.22
In Germany, the April Uprising furnished a new argument for Chancellor
Bismarck to encourage that trend in Russian political life opposed to the peace
policy of the tsarist government on the Eastern Crisis and, during the initial
phase, to promote active interference by Russia in the Eastern Question. The
involvement of Russia in military operations against Turkey was, at that time,
an important component in the strategy of the German chancellor; and the
realization of this strategy could facilitate the implementation of his plans for

20. R. T. Shannon, Gladstoneand the BulgarianAgitation of 1876 (London: Nelson,

1963). A. Monedzhikova, "Otrazhenieto an Aprilskoto vustanie v Angliia, Frantsiia i
Italiia," Izvestiia na Instituta Khristo Botev, 1 (1956); Iv. Panaiotov, "Otzvuk ot Aprils-
koto vustaniev Angliia."in Izvestiiana Narodnata Biblioteka Kiril i Metodi. 1 (6) (1961 ):
M. Ikonopisova, "Angliskata obshtestvenost i Aprilskoto vustanie," Istoricheski pregled
[hereafter IP], No. 1 (1976), pp. 73-84.
21. R. Polikarova-Verdeil,"Lee evenements bulgares de 1876 et I'opinion francaise,"
these soutenue a la Sorbonne, Paris, 1948; V. Paskaleva, "Demokratichnata obshtesve-
nost v Zapadna Evropa i osvobozhdenieto na B3lgarVa,"in Osvobozhdenietona Bulgariia
ot tursko igo 1878-1958. Sbornik statei (Soflia: BKP, 1958); Ch. Chopov, "Stav Frant-
suske prema dogachaima u Bugarskoi 1876" Godisniak Filozofskog Fakulteta u N.Sadu,
No. 8 (1964-65); S. Damianov, Frantsiia i bulgarskata natsionalna revoliutsiia (Sofiia:
Bulgarskaakademiiana naukite, 1968).
22. Kh. Khristov, "Ruskata obshtestvenost i bulgarskoto natsionalnoosvoboditelno
dvizhenie v navecherieto na rusko-turskata voina ot 1877-1878 g.," in Osvobozhdenieto
... 1878-1958, p. 13.
178

raising Germany to the status of a great power in Europe.23

In Serbia, Romania, and Greece, in Slovenia and Dalmatia, in Italy, among
the Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles, and as far away as the United
States, the Bulgarian uprising and the cruel fate of the Bulgarians were the
most widely discussed world event between the spring and the end of 1876.24
The April Uprising brought about a turning point in the attitude of public
circles in Europe to the Bulgarian Question. The numerous dispatches by
special envoys of the European newspapers, who had seen for themselves how
the Ottoman Empire ruled its Bulgarian subjects and the means it employed
to crush the natural aspirations of that nation, the public rallies, the fund col-
lections, and other campaigns in various countries contibuted to a reorienta-
tion of public opinion in Western Europe toward the Bulgarians. The Russian
people, already favorably disposed, provided abundant and truthful informa-
tion about the plight of the Bulgarians. Even before the government decided
that the war against Turkey was inevitable, the Russian press particularly per-
iodicals with Slavophile leanings, commented on the prospects of a Russo-
Turkish conflict in terms of an event which was necessary, obligatory, and
predetermined by the course of events. The Slav Committees in the country
which, prior to the April Uprising, devoted their attention and channeled their
aid mainly to Bosnia and Herzegovina25 now took up the cause of the Bulgar-
ians.
Indicative of the general mood of Russian public opinion after the April
Uprising were the expectations that the tsarist government would not delay
its decision to declare war on Turkey. "Now only comments about the war
can be heard everywhere, and all people eagerly await the newspapers....
People wonder why Russia has not yet declared war on Turkey, on account
of that country's atrocities." These impressions belong to the Russian police
authorities in the town of Simbirsk; and they can be supplemented by infor-
mation from many other towns and villages in Russia where, despite shared
sympathies and the Slavic and Orthodox community with the Bulgarians, lit-
tle was known about their plight until 1876.26

23. S. D. Skazkin, Konets avstro-russko-germanskogosoiuza, I (Moscow: Rainon,

})P28) K.; Kosev, "Rusko-germanskite otnosheniia i osvobozhdenieto na bulgariia 1877-
1878," in Bulgaro-germanskiotnosheniia i vrUzki,I (Sofiia: Búlgarskaakademiia na nau-
kite, 1972.) V. Paskaleva,"Preussen-Deutschland und die orientafrage in den 50-70 -er
Jahren des XIX Ihd.," EH, 7 (1975), 237 ff.
24. Kr. Sharova, "Mezhdunarodni aspekti na bulgarskoto natsionalnoosvoboditelno
dvizhenie v izsledvaniiatana bulgarskite istoritsi," in D. Kosev, ed., Problemi na Bulgar-
skata istoriografiiasled Vtorata svetovnavoina (Sofiia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1973), pp. 337ff.
25. Osvobozhdenie,I, 207.
26.'Ibid., pp. 370-71. See also A. A. LJlunian,"Otzvutsi na Aprilskoto vustanie v ar-
menskiia pechat i armenskoto natsionalnoosvoboditelno dvizhenie," IP, No. 1 (1976),
pp. 56-66 ;Sh. V. Megrelidze,Sh. A. Badridze, "Balkanskite subitiia prez 1876 g. i gruz-
inskata obshtesvenost," ibid., pp. 66-72.
 179

The growing interest by Russian public circles toward the Bulgarians had
important political consequences. If in Britain which, by her political behavior,
had won the reputation of the most active and fervent supporter and defend-
er of Turkey's integrity, indignant public opinion brought about a profound
crisis in its eastern policy and deprived the government of decisive public sup-
port for an eventual intervention in favor of Turkey, then in Russia the cam-
paign in support of the Bulgarians after April, 1876, would lead logically to
the declaration of a war that would bring the liberation of Bulgaria and the
realization of the aims of Russian policy in the East, in areas lying outside the
Balkan Peninsula.
The new sentiments of Russian public circles toward the Bulgarians were
symbolized most dramatically in the changes of the attitude adopted by the
Slav Committees. These committees were, as a matter of principle, favorably
disposed toward the struggle for liberation waged by all Southern Slavs, but,
prior to the April Uprising, they were somewhat reserved regarding the mater-
ial and moral support which they had to render in aiding the liberation strug-
gle of the Bulgarians.27 The granting of funds to help in the preparations for
the uprising in-Bulgaria, as requested by the Bulgarian revolutionary emigres
in Romania and certain circles of the Bulgarian emigration in Russia, encoun-
tered initial resistance, even from a person like I. S. Aksakov. Because he was
insufficiently informed about the Bulgarian movement and had no sympathies
with the revolutionary forces involved, he did not expect them to be able to
perform anything significant. On this account, he was opposed to the decision
adopted by the Herzegovina Commission of December, 1875, to grant some
twenty to thirty thousand rubles in aid to the Bulgarian uprising, and this de-
cision remained unrealized. Even at the first news of the outbreak of the Bul-
garian uprising, Aksakov was not convinced that their struggle had to be given
financial support.28 He sent only two thousand rubles through General Cher-
niaev to purchase arms for the Bulgarians; however, this gesture could have no
tangible result in the middle of the uprising, particularly since the negotiations
for their utilization had dragged on.29 The restraint shown by the Slav Com-
mittees was certainly influenced by the "Serbian Plan" worked out by Cher-
niaev, who had gone to Serbia at that time and shared with Aksakov his su-
perficial impressions about the Bulgarian emigration in Romania, and the sen-
timents and the revolutionary capacities of the Bulgarians in general.30 Until
the spring of 1876, the Slav Committees continued devoting their greatest

27. F. M. Istomin, Kratkii ocherk deiatel'nosti S. Peterburgskogo slavianskogoblago-

tvoritel'nogo obshtesva za 25 let ego sushtesvovaniia (1866-1893) (St. Petersburg,
1893), p. 26.
28. OsvobozhdenieI, 205-06.
29. Ibid., pp. 201-02.
30.Ibid., pp. 208-09.
 180

attention to events in Herzegovina.31 Brothers N. A. and A. A. Kireev who,

together with the Bulgarian emigres, insisted on immediate aid to the Bulgar-
ian uprising, were still engaged in presenting arguments to Aksakov in May
that it was "absolutely necessary to help the Bulgarians."32 By about the
middle of June, A. A. Kireev had succeeded in obtaining the consent of the
emperor for starting a subscription in Russia to collect funds for the Bulgar-
ians.33
. The conviction that the
Bulgarian population had to be given help by the
Slav Committees took the upper hand in the Slavophile circles in Russia. The
President of the Slav Committee in St. Petersburg, Prince A. I. Vasil'chikov,
believed that "before Serbia and Montenegro start military operations it would
be inadvisable to instigate and to draw the Bulgarians into the conflict, and
on that ground he was opposed to the premature sending of money to this
part of the Balkans." However, by June, he was already of the opinion that
"the time has come to take vigorous action in that country."34 The St. Peters-
burg Committee gave ten thousand rubles to its envoy, V. S. Ionin, with instruc-
tions to "distribute them to the Bulgarians in distress," while Aksakov, speak-
ing on bahalf of the Slav Committee in Moscow, promised "to come to the
aid of the Bulgarians."35 On 27 June 1876, the Moscow Slav Committee is-
sued an appeal drafted by Aksakov which called upon the Russian people to
collect funds in aid of the suffering Bulgarian population. This appeal was
given very broad support-voluntary donations for the Bulgarians began pour-
ing in immediately after the appeal had been launched.36
The steps taken by the Bulgarians themselves, the appalling information
sent by the diplomats-particularly that relayed by Prince A. N. Tseretelev,
who had acquainted himself with the results of the atrocities on the spot, to-
gether with representative W. Baring of Great Britain, E. Schuyler of the Unit-
ed States, and journalist J. MacGahan and the wave of protest which swept
Russia and Europe against the atrocities in Bulgaria all encouraged the deci-
sion of the Slav Committees to begin collecting and sending funds for the Bul-
garian people-not for the uprising but for helping its victims. "All that here-
tofore had been done in Bosnia and Herzegovina pales before the atrocities
committed in Southern Bulgaria," Tseretelev wrote to Nil Popov on 27 May
1876. "The aim of my letter is to draw the attention of our charitable public
to the Bulgarians.... The plight of the defenseless Bulgarians is horrible.
That which is being done there is incredible." Tseretelev adds that even after

3 1. Ibid.,pp. 205-07, 222-24, 250. '

32.Ibid., pp. 230-31.
33.lbid., p. 249.
34. Ibid., p. 245.
35.Ibid., p. 244.
36. Ibid., p. 260.
 181

the suppression of the uprising, the Turks continue to be on the rampage,

"butchering, burning, and destroying to the end. "37
For their part the Bulgarians, including those belonging to the liberal bour-
geoisie which had no liking for evolutionary methods of struggle, called upon
the Slav Committees to provide material assistance to those Bulgarians who
remained without shelter, livelihood, and clothing. "If ever Russia's help
had been needed for the wretched Bulgarians," T. Burmov wrote to Popov on
15 May 1876, "that moment is now, and such help is extremely necessary.
The love of man, the prestige of protector and mother of the Slavs, and the
interests of Slavdom-all that calls for immediate and vigorous help.... Do
whatever you can to help the perishing population-only do it as quickly as
possible. Appeal to the people, beg them, implore them, be it only for fulfill-
ing your duty."38 The Bulgarian Board of Trustees in Odessa sent an appeal
to the St. Petersburg Slav Committee with a similar message, insisting that
"part of the funds donated for the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina be made
available to the Board for the Bulgarian victims" emigrating to Russia and Ro-
'
mania.39
The appeals sent by the Bulgarians to the Russian Government and to the
Slavophiles after the Uprising mark a new phase in the movement for national
liberation. Many presentations and appeals for protection streamed to the
Russian consulates,. to the Russian Embassy in Istanbul, and to the Imperial
Palace, sent by the population from the ruined towns and villages which had
risen in revolt, by individual Bulgarians, by the Bulgarian Central Charity So-
ciety, and by other organizations of the emigres. Similar petitions were ad-
dressed to the governments of the other Great Powers, and particularly to
public figures who were prominent in the movement for helping the Bulgar-
ian people. Such campaigns were operative at that time in Britain, France,
and other countries. After the Uprising had been suppressed the Bulgarians
embarked on a nationwide campaign throughout Europe in search of a solu-
tion to the Bulgarian problem.40 It was a broad campaign which embraced all
social strata of Bulgarian society, regardless of political differences and views
about the roads to be followed toward the attainment of liberty and towards
Bulgaria's future, a campaign which was comparable in scope only to that
waged for an independent national church, A delegation was sent to Europe

37.Ibid., p. 236.
38.Ibid, pp. 222-23.
39. Ibid., pp. 250-52; See also I. V. Koz'menko, "Russkoe obschestvo i April'skoe
bolgarskoe vostanie 1876 g.," Voprosiiistorii, No. 5 (1947); A. Burmov, "Kum istoriiata
na rusko-bulgarskitevruzki prez 1876 g.," Izvestiia na Instituta za bulgarska istoriia, 1-2
(1951), 81-95.
40. Khristov, "Ruskata obshtestvenost," pp. 25-26, 42. G. D. Todorov, "Bulgaraska-
ta obshtestvenost i rusko-turskata voina prez 1877-1878 g." in Osvobozhdenieto ...
1878-1958, pp. 235 ff.
 182

to state the Bulgarian requests and aspirations. Despite the legitimate form of
its manifestation, the movement for attracting the attention of the Russian
and other European governments and of public opinion in Europe was a direct
continuation of the April Uprising and played an important part in influenc-
ing the policies of the European states and favorable public opinion in these
states, Russia in particular.
With the declaration of the Serbian-Turkish War, which was joined by
Montenegro, Bulgarian volunteer detachments joined the military operations
and the problem of help from the Slav Committees to the Bulgarians acquired
new meaning. Funds were now needed both to help the victims and the refu-
gees and for the maintenance of the Bulgarian volunteers. This actually con-
stituted direct aid to the movement for Bulgarian liberation, for the participa-
. tion of Bulgarian volunteers in the war was also a continuation of the Upris-
ing, all the more so because that war was part of its basic idea and political
plan. The lack of funds for training, arming, sending, and maintaining the vol-
unteers was one of the main obstacles preventing this movement from becom-
ing broader; and it was actually one of the main reasons why the Bulgarian
uprising could not be organized on a still larger scale. The Slav Committees in
Russia were instrumental in making it possible for the Bulgarians who had
survived the suppression of the Uprising, as well as those who had not suc-
ceeded in going to Bulgaria before its outbreak, to take part in the war waged
by Serbia against Turkey. In addition to the direct material and fmancial aid
rendered, these Committees were helpful in insisting on the provision of more
efficient aid to the belligerent states, Serbia and Montenegro.41
There was a more radical plan, more closely connected with the Bulgarians
which had been worked out by R. A. Fadeev. He was a well-known Slavophile,
an author of political pamphlets and articles on the Eastern Question, and
was opposed, in principle, to the Russian alliance with Austria-Hungary. How-
ever, he did not enjoy the support of the emperor, nor of the government,
nor even of Aksakov, and was considered an adventurer capable of involving
Russia in reckless operations if he were given the authority. He emphasized
even before the Herzegovina Uprising that the popular defensive war was a
more suitable form of struggle by a Christian people against the Ottoman
domination. During the April Uprising Fadeev, backed by insistent suggestions
on the part of Bulgarian patriots in Russia, proposed a plan which had been
worked out together with Ivan Kishelski, a Bulgarian emigre, for active sup-
port to an independent Bulgarian uprising armed by funds made available by
Russia.
Fadeev's plan was based on the premise that "neither Serbia nor Montene-
gro can be called upon to solve the common Slav problem," and that they

41. Osvobozhdenie, I, 245, 253, 260, 268, 297.

 183

would not fight for the independence of Bulgaria after they had attained the
liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He believed that the solution of the
Serbian and Montenegren problems "will not offer solution to the Eastern
Question nor to the fate of Turkey, because cutting off the Serbian lands
from Turkey amounts to an amputation, to the cutting off of an arm or leg.
Bulgaria, however, is the very interior, the torso of Turkey; consequently,
Bulgaria was in the center of gravity of the Eastern Question. It was the Bul-
garian problem which was a matter linked to the existence of Turkey." From
these arguments Fadeev drew the conclusion that "Russia must tackle the
problem of the Bulgarians," all the more so because the time was getting ripe
for the solution of the Eastern Question by means of a war by Russia against
Turkey-a war in which the military operations of the Russian army in the
Balkans would be of great significance. "It would therefore be very important
for Russia to have the backing of the entire Bulgarian nation."42
Around the middle of July, 1876, Fadeev succeeded in winning over the
tsarevich to his "Bulgarian Plan" and of organizing, through the merchants of
Moscow, a massive campaign for the collection of funds. By the end of August
the campaign had already yielded one hundred and fifty thousand rubles, to
be used for buying weapons for the Bulgarians. Fadeev's plan involved organ-
izing a Bulgarian volunteer detachment in Bessarabia to go to Bulgaria and
there wage a "popular defensive war" by rousing the people to revolt. Fadeev
believed that his plan was much more promising than the "Serbian Plan" work-
ed out by Chemiaev, whom he wanted removed from the handling of Bulgar-
ian affairs. However, as Fadeev did not enjoy the confidence of the emperor,
he looked .for help from Aksakov. The latter was to find a suitable person
who would formally be at the head of the campaign, with the leading part be-
ing played by Fadeev himself. However, the eminent functionary of the Mos-
cow Committee foiled Fadeev's intentions, and his committee took over re-
sponsibility for the Bulgarian Question. A special Bulgarian Commission was
set up in the Moscow Slav Committee, with Aksakov himself playing the lead-
ing part in it.43 _
Notwithstanding this outcome of the plans made by Fadeev, the Bulgarian
Question occupied an important place in the activities of the Slav Committees
and channeled their initiative toward the Bulgarians in the middle of the
summer of 1876. This becomes more apparent with the evolution of the views
held by Aksakov on the Bulgarian Question.
Somewhat reserved and even hostile to the ideas of Fadeev on the Eastern
Question and to the practical possibilities for the realization of his project
about the Bulgarian Uprising in April and May, 1876 (even on the eve of the

42. Ibid., pp. 386-88.

43.Ibid., pp. 300-01.
 184

Uprising, he was doubtful about the possibility of the Bulgarians rising in

armed struggle against Turkey), by September Aksakov reached the conclu-
sion that the general principles in Fadeev's plan were correct and justified.
This was so in view of the importance of fhe Bulgarian lands to the existence
of the Ottoman Empire and to the conduct of the inevitable Russo-Turkish
war. At that moment the eminent Slavophiles found it necessary to address
the imperial government and to request its interference in defense of the Bul-
garians, reproaching it openly for not having officially and publicly reacted
against the atrocities perpetrated in Bulgaria. In response to instructions is-
sued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Slav Committee in Moscow sent
ten thousand rubles, through the Embassy in Istanbul, to the International
Charity Commission in Plovdiv. However, Aksakov expressed the views of
that commission that "there is no other way of actually helping Bulgaria be-
sides the creation of such political conditions of life where a recurrence of
her calamities will become impossible and that finally, even at the present
minute, the Bulgarians can make better use of weapons, rather than bread, in
order to defend themselves against the horrors of Muslim fanaticism."44
The process of reorientation toward the Bulgarians was delayed by the war
waged by Serbia and Montenegro against Turkey, which was bound to absorb
the attention and the funds of the Slav Committees. The principal part in this
respect was played by Cherniaev, who remained in Serbia, at first without the
consent of the emperor and of the government 45 This resulted in a tempor-
ary lull in his plan and of the tactics which relied on the Principality of Serbia.
He was in dispute with Fadeev, Aksakov, and the Slavophiles connected with
them, who were correct in their appraisal that Bulgaria had become the center
of gravity in the events after the April Uprising; and that the policy of Russia
must be attuned to that fact. The rapid rout of the Serbian Army, when Tur-
key proved much too great an adversary, and the general's personal failures as
commanding officer in the war, accelerated and added greater weight to trends
within the Slav Committees for orientating Russian policy toward the Bulgar-
ian Question within the growing Eastern Crisis.
These were the phases which marked the shift in the attitude of the Slavo-
philes toward the Bulgarians: from the original concentration of their atten-
tion solely on Bosnia and Herzegovina up to April, 1876, through a readiness
to render financial assistance to the Bulgarian victims immediately after the
Uprising, and finally, in the months of June and July, to the conviction that
the only real help would be to use the funds collected by the committees to
arm Bulgarian volunteers. Then the stand was adopted that Russia had to de-
clare war on Turkey under the existing conditions of revolutionary crisis in

44. Ibiai , p. 274.

45.Ibid., p. 321.
 185

the Balkans, and that the aim of that war would be the liberation of Bulgaria.
This evolution of the concept was certain to find its place in the propaganda
of the Slavophiles and in their publications, which were very influential in
shaping public opinion on the Bulgarian question and in increasing the popu-
larity of a war against Turkey.
The evolution in the stand of the offficial circles was more complex. Rus-
sia reoriented its position from the plan for a peaceful solution of the Eastern
Crisis to a new official stand-that this basis would prove untenable under the.
conditions created by the April Uprising and the Serbian-Turkish War. This
reorientation took place during the summer of 1876. It had.become increas-
ingly clear, after the outbreak of the Eastern Crisis, when the efforts of the
Porte were directed toward rapid suppression of the revolutionary upheaval in
Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, that the peaceful variant of the three Em-
perors-notwithstanding the apprehensions of Turkey and her supporters, es-
pecially Britain was in actual fact more advantageous to them than it was to
the people of Herzegovina.46 ..
Russia's mistrust toward Austria-Hungary grew increasingly pronounced.
At the beginning of the crisis, overestimating the significance of the agreement
concluded with Austria-Hungary, the Russian government was afraid that there
might be unilateral activity on her part and, on that account, did not desire
any flaring up or spreading of the uprising. Russia's ally and, at the same time,
her rival for supremacy in the Balkans, Austria-Hungary could take advantage
of such developments and could decide to act without any regard for the
stand of nonintervention as adopted by the three emperors. These were the
considerations also expressed by Russian diplomacy in connection with the
uprising of the Bulgarians in September, 1875. Ignatiev was trying to persuade
the grand vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasha that "it was in Turkey's interest to
attach as little significance as possible to this incident"47 and to limit the re-
pressive measures, particularly against the Bulgarian "notables," for otherwise
the unrest in Bulgaria might grow stronger and thereby create additional diffi-
culties for the Porte. The government of the sultan availed itself of the reluc-
tance shown by the three allied powers to intensify the crisis and of the sup-
port which it received from Britain. However, it not only failed to heed the
advice to limit all acts of repression but, on the contrary, applied its severe
measures to cope with the situation, though certainly not to the extent that
they were applied six months later.48
The Bulgarian uprising of April, 1876, intensified and exacerbated the dif-
ferences existing in the Russian government concerning the attitude to be
adopted on the Eastern Question. The peaceful variant and the loyalty to the

46. Ibid., pp. 40, 47.

47.Ibid., p. 127.
48. Ibid., pp. 132-33, 138-39.
186

agreements reached by the three emperors for noninterference failed as proper

tactics in the Eastern Crisis. The caution with which the three powers ad-
dressed the Porte and their efforts to mend matters or, at the Very least, to
introduce temporary calm through new reforms met the firm resistance of
the Turkish Government, particularly of the local authorities and of the Mus-
lim masses. In response to the expectation for appeasement, they were con-
fronted by atrocities during, the April Uprising and long after it had been
crushed. All this in addition to the scope of the movement in defense of the
Bulgarians against Ottoman domination over them and over other Southern
Slav peoples, strengthened the positions of those groups within the govern-
ment circles in Russia who believed that active interference by Russia in Tur-
key's affairs, including open conflict, was the sole correct policy.
. In July, 1876, Emperor Alexander II was worried that a European war
might break out,49 but he was already inclined to accept the inevitability of
conflict with Turkey. His War Minister, D. A. Miliutin, almost simultaneously
stated defmitely and categorically to Chancellor Gorchakov that "never have
the armed forces of Russia been so prepared for war as they are now," there-
by refuting existing opinion and the writings of some newspapers that Russia
was not prepared to wage war.50
The growing interest in the Bulgarian problem by the people who stood
closest to the tsar, particularly the favorable attitude of the tsarevich (on
whom he began to rely after the summer of 1876), Fadeev, and of the tsarina,
was bound to have its effect on the attitude of Alexander II toward the Bul-
garians. Around the middle of July, he expressed "for the first time," accord-
ing to Fadeev, "full approval of our undertaking," and said that he had large
expectations from such a public initiative, provided it remained an initiative
within Russian society and would not discredit the government. "The under-
taking" referred to was the collection of funds to buy arms for the Bulgarians.
In this manner, the organization of Bulgarian volunteer detachments supplied
1
by Russian funds already had the blessing of the tsar at that time.51
All these developments created a more favorable atmosphere within Rus-
sian diplomacy for revising the peaceful variant. Ignatiev presented numerous
petitions to the Sublime Porte in defence of the Bulgarians both during the
course of the Uprising and after it, when the population was being subjected to
cruel reprisals, whether they had risen in revolt or not.52 An experienced dip-
lomat who was well acquainted with the conditions of the Ottoman Empire and
with the position of the Bulgarians in it, Ignatiev could make a realistic ap-
praisal of the great significance of the April Uprising. Notwithstanding its

49. Ibid., pp. 307-08.

50. Ibid., p. 314.
5 1. Ibid.,p. 300.
52. Ibid., pp. 217, 221, 237.
 187

prompt suppression, he did not expect appeasement. "Having routed our co-
religionists completely," he wrote as early as 7 May 1876, "the Bulgarian up-
rising can nevertheless cause the greatest of harm to the strength and organi-
zation of the Ottoman Empire. It is precisely from that point that the Sultan's
ministers view the unrest that has broken out in Tatar-Pazardzhik. The Herze-
govina Uprising is no longer a subject of discussion.... Turkey's sole concern
now is Bulgaria, the main granary of the Empire, and the fact that the Upris-
ing is dealing a blow on Ottoman domination at its very heart."53
This assessment of the Russian ambassador in Istanbul about the place and
role of the Bulgarian Uprising during the Eastern Crisis and of the significance
attached by the sultan's government to Bulgarian aspirations for political free-
dom is confirmed by the content of the diplomatic correspondence of other
European states as well. However, the fact which is of interest to us in this
case is that Ignatiev was emphasizing to his government the new situation
which had arisen among the ruling circles in Turkey after the outbreak of the
April Uprising and the great importance attached by these circles to the
revolution in Bulgaria. Ignatiev was to continue emphasizing this state of af-
fairs in his reports from the summer and autumn of 1876, and also at the con-
ferences of the high-ranking officials of the empire. He never failed to draw
their attention to another essential problem, one which affected Russia's in-
terests directly and which, in the hands of a skillful diplomat and politician,
could become a tool for influencing the adherents to the idea of a peaceful
solution of the crisis along diplomatic channels. Informing the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs about the unbridled atrocities of the Turks against the Bulgar-
ian population in April and May, he reminded his superiors of the fact that
the Bulgarians were looking upon Russia as their protector, much as they had
during the period leading up to 1876; and that Russia therefore had to live up
to their expectations. "The massacre and plunder of our coreligionists is being
perpetrated by the Muslims with real cruelty," he wrote. "The Bulgarians are
still looking desperately toward Russia, but the sympathies constantly shown
to us by this wrteched people could be gravely shaken should the present situ-
ation be allowed to continue."54 This idea is contained in other reports sent
by the Istanbul Embassy as well.
The same apprehensions were expressed also by A. I. Nelidov, secretary of
the Embassy, who agreed wiih ignaiiev un the quesdun ui tiic policy that had
to be adopted by Russia. "The active though fruitless diplomatic negotiations
conducted by the Russian and other European governments after the April
Uprising have unfavorable repercussions among the Bulgarians and the other
subjects of the sultan who expect more efficient help on the part of the big

53. Ibid., p. 218.

54. Ibid., pp. 273-78.
188

Slav power," he pointed out. "If Russia fails to contribute in practice to a

change in the situation in European Turkey," Nelidov wrote in the summer
of 1876, "the Christian population will lose all confidence in us."55
The problem of the moral impact of the policy of nonintervention pursued
by Russia and by her allies of Austria-Hungary and Germany was the subject
of much discussion in Russian public circles, because the Bulgarian atrocities
provoked the indignation of democratic groups throughout Europe. They cre-
ated an active opposition to the pro-Turkish policies of Disraeli's government
in Britain and, throughout Europe and the United States, they brought to life
a movement in defense of the Bulgarian people which often did not confme
itself to protests against the regime in Turkey and with sympathies for Bul-
garia. This movement openly requested from European diplomacy, in the
name and spirit of modem civilization, that the Bulgarians be granted politi-
cal freedom and opportunities for independent development. The movement
in defense of the Bulgarians in Europe was one of the factors accelerating the
evolution of the Russian diplomatic formula for solving the Eastern Question,
particularly the Bulgarian question.
-
It was not accidental that most of the Russian periodicals of divergent
views,56 as well as politicians belonging to various groups pointed out the
danger of Russia's losing the popular appeal and confidence it enjoyed among
the Bulgarians and other Balkan peoples. Informing its Russian readers about
the Bulgarian Uprising and the horrible reality of its suppression, the newspa-
per Golos emphasized that the_outward indifference of the official Russian at-
titude toward the Bulgarians while they were being physically exterminated
was confronting Russia with a serious dilemma-namely, either to preserve
her legendary fame of protector of the Christian peoples in Turkey by active
intervention and radical decision, or to lose the "sympathies and confidence
of the Slavs" should she remain loyal to her agreement with Austria-Hungary
and Getmany to attempt a peaceful outcome to the crisis.57 These warnings
addressed to government circles, became increasingly insistent and embraced
ever wider circles, gradually growing into the conviction that a resolute turn
in Russia's behavior was necessary. This stand was categorically expressed by
the progressive journal Otechestvennye zapiski, which wrote: "The Russian
people have the historical duty to uphold the freedom of the Slavs."58
The pressure exercized by public opinion in Russia and in other countries
on official Russian policy became increasingly tangible. It caused concern in

55. Khristov, "Russkoe obshtestvenost," p. 55.

56. Koz'menko, "Russkoe," p. 99.
57. Golos, 27 June 1876.
58. Otechestvennye zapiski, No. 6 (1876), p. 358.
 189

government circles, including the country's most moderate politicians, such as

A. G. Jomini. He was a close assistant of Gorchakov, the theoretician behind
the policy of nonintervention in the Eastern Crisis, advocating the peaceful
solution of this crisis by joint action of the Great Powers. As early as May,
Jomini pointed out that the difficulties experienced by Russia in her relations
with the states outside the Triple Alliance, and also with her allies, were be-
coming increasingly complicated; that they were placing Russia in a "rather
arduous" position because her official policy was dangerously vulnerable in
regard to her restraint toward the liberation struggles of the Southern Slavs
and their aspirations for a radical solution. This confirms "the accusations
levelled against us by ardent patriots," he wrote, "that we are stopping the
impetus of the Christian Slavs," and that the situation could isolate Russia
from them.59 Even before the war by Serbia and Montenegro on Turkey
began, and still during the course of the April Uprising, Jomini was able to
perceive that conditions were undergoing a radical change. The steps taken
by Russia to attain general agreement among the powers for a peaceful solu-
tion to the crisis were appropriate "to the extent to which the problem af-
fected Herzegovina only," he wrote on 4/16 May 1876 to Giers. "In this case,
however, it is a matter of the entire Eastern Question."60
This train of thought was not characteristic of Jomini alone. His concern
was shared by Gorchakov and by Alexander II. The correspondence exchanged
between Jomini and Giers during May and June abounds in information about
this concern and about the growing anxiety of the emperor. "The political
horizon is dark and grim, and the emperor is keenly concerned," Jomini wrote
on 24 May: "The situation is bad. The emperor is handling it," he repeats on
28 May. "The European diplomats must have stones instead of hearts, so as
not to be moved by the evidence of the horrors and not to wish to come to-
gether in order to put an end to them," he concluded on 3/15 June.61 "We
can do nothing but look at the horrors being perpetrated in Turkey. And this
is only the beginning! The wild beast has scented blood!" Giers told Jomini
on 7/19 June, also informing him that he had insisted that Prince Gorchakov
address a last appeal to Christian Europe for a common protest against the
bloodshed and sacrifices endured by the Bulgarians, and also to take measures
against the Porte.62
As for the moderate trend of the Slavophiles, and the adherents of an

59. Charles and Barbara Jelavich, Russia in the East 1876-1880 (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1959), p. 14.
60. Ibid., p. 11.
6 1. Ibid.,pp. 12-13, 15.
62. Ibid., p. 16.
 190

active Russian policy within government and diplomatic circles, their views
about the content and specific manner in which this activity should be ex-
pressed went through an evolution between the summers of 1875 and 1876,
in light of the expanding and intensifying crisis following the April Uprising.
In 1875 the Russian diplomats were engaged in persistent and continuous
efforts to suggest to the Serbian government and to Prince Milan that a war
against Turkey supporting the uprising in Herzegovina would be "untimely
and fatal" to Serbia. They categorically advised to "stay at peace with Turn
key" and intimated to the prince that if he yielded to the patriotic and war-
loving sentiments in the country "he would lose for good any sympathy for
himself on the part of our government."6 3 The official petitions offered by
representatives of the guarantor-countries (with the exception of Britain)
on 24 September 1875, reflected yet another effort of Russian diplomacy.64
The Bulgarian Uprising in September, 1875, of which Ignatiev had been
notified in advance by the Russian Consul in Ruse, was considered by the
latter as being untimely and undesirable. He immediately telegraphed the
Bucharest Consulate as follows: "Explain to the Bulgarians the recklessness
and the harm from the experiment which.is doomed to failure."65 .
Of course, the Russian diplomat had grounds for such a reaction, consider-
ing the lack of preparedness and obvious doom of that uprising, but his
interpretation of the possible results, namely that the Greeks would avail
themselves of the uprising to "destroy the Exarchate," shows how distant
he was at that moment from the real mood of the Bulgarian people and from
the import of the struggle that was commencing. In this sense, his instructions
to the Russian consul general in Bucharest: "Act immediately to avert.
the calamity" are more indicative of adherence to the official peaceful
policy of the Russian government than of considerations to avoid unneces-
sary sacrifice. The April Uprising, which had also been doomed to failure
by the inequality of the insurgent, forces compared to the Turkish military
and state machine, drove Ignatiev to other conclusions as well-namely, the
realization of the enormous significance of the fact that the Bulgarians had
risen in revolt, and also its unquestionable result, the intensification of the
internal crisis in Turkey and an extreme exacerbation of the Eastern Crisis.
During the height of the uprising, Ignatiev drew the attention of his gov-
ernment to the fact that the Ottoman Empire was threatened by a general
. uprising in the Balkans, and that the uprisings in Herzegovina and Bulgaria
were merely episodes. His conclusion, that the situation made impossible
any hope for reforms in Turkey, was expressed also in proposals submitted

. 63. Osvobozhdenie I, 101, 119-20.

64. Ibid., p. 121.
65. Ibid., pp. 92-93; A. A. Ulunian, "Iz istorii natsional'noosvoboditel'nogo dvizhen-
iia v Bolgarii 60-70-kh gg. XIX v.," Izvestiia na Insfituta za istonio,, 20 (1960), 92-93.
 191

by the Russian representatives to the Berlin Conference, at which they planned

the setting up of an autonomous Bulgarian state. Rejected by the other
participants, these proposals already testified to a change in Russia's posi-
tion.66 At the end of August, Ignatiev sent a well-argued and comprehen-
sive draft to Alexander II covering Russia's demands of the Sublime Porte.
These demands included autonomy for Bulgaria, to be headed by a prince or
by a Christian governor appointed by the Porte and approved by the Great
Powers.67 The April Uprising, the upsurge of the national movement, and the
aspirations of the Bulgarians for independent development had undoubtedly
affected the sceptical attitude of Ignatiev, who had believed in 1867 that the
Bulgarians were not capable of independent struggle and development and
thought that it would be necessary to place them under the guidance of
Serbian Prince Mihail Obrenovic in a common Serbian-Bulgarian state.
The gradual transformation which took place in the position held by
Russia concerning methods of overcoming the Eastern Crisis was expressed
in the demands presented by her diplomacy in connection with the rebellious
Southern Slavs. Whereas in the summer and autumn of 1875, Russia was
sending proposals to the Porte for the granting of more extensive rights to
the subject peoples, in May, 1876, at the conference of the three allied
powers in Berlin, Russia was already insisting on more efficient measures.
However, her plan for granting autonomy to Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bul-
garia was met by stiff opposition from Austria-Hungary and was rejected.
The Berlin Memorandum of 1/13 May, communicated to the governments of
Britain, France, and Italy, called upon the Great Powers to demand from
the Sublime Porte guarantees for pardoning the provinces which has risen
in revolt and for the implementation of promised improvements in the re-
gime, under the control of European representatives.68 The rather general
character of that document, despite the concern expressed in it about the
exacerbation of religious and political passions in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the "extremely threatening unrest in the other points of the Ottoman
Empire," in actual fact had no effect, since the British Government refused
to endorse the initiative of the three emperors. The Bulgarian uprising demon-
strated that the Turkish Government was both incapable and unwilling to
take any real stens toward imnroving the conditions of the peoples striving
for freedom, but was resolved to drown in blood any attempt to win freedom.
Two months later, during the period of the outrages against the April
Uprising and with the Serbian-Turkish war already in progress, a bilateral

66. "Zapiski gr.N. P. Igantieva,1875-1877 gg." Istoricheski vestnik, 136 (1914), 454.
67. S. A. Nikitin, Ocherki po istorii iuzhnykh slavian i russko-balkanskikhsviazei v
SO-70-ye g.XIX v (Moscow:Nauka, 1970), p. 174.
68. Sbomik dogovorov Rossii s drugimi gosudarstvami 1856-1917 (Moscow: Goslit-
izdat, 195 2),pp. 140-43.
192

conference with Austria-Hungary was held on 26 June (o.s.) in Reichstadt.

Here, Russia found it inexpedient to bring up nonintervention which had
been persistently upheld until that time, so as to avoid "tying her hands in
advance, in view of possible contingencies." The Russian representatives
proposed the setting up of independent principalities of Bulgaria and Ru-
melia, whereas the Austrians were prepared to accept autonomy only for the
latter. Although no unanimity was attained in Reichstadt on all problems
discussed, the Austrian claims for annexation (complete or partial) of Bosnia
and Herzegovina were accepted against compensation of Russia in the Asain
regions bordering on Turkey.69 This problem was finally solved by the
secret Budapest Convention of 3/15 January 1877.70
.
The agreement reached between the allied powers not to allow the emer-
gence of a large Southern-Slav state in the Balkans and to provide for-the
annexation of Bosnia and HerzeQovina by Austria-Hungary was of major sig-
nificance to Russia and to the Southern Slav peoples. In fact, it placed limita-
tions on the role to be played by Russia in the Balkans. The emperor and the
chancellor were r afraid of an anti-Russian coalition similar to the one which
had waged the Crimean War, and they were prepared to make rather dis-
advantageous concessions. This decision was significant, because meeting the
Austrian claims for two Slav provinces in the Balkans and a renunciation of
the former idea of creating a unified state of Southern Slavs served to direct
Russian policy in the Balkans toward the Bulgarians, toward their liberation
and prospects for free development in the future. In this manner the April
Uprising, i.e., a national and internal Bulgarian phenomenon, and the com-
promise made by Russian diplomacy over Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e.,
a fact of foreign policy, placed the Bulgarian Question in the limelight of
Russia's Eastern policy during the spring and summer of 1876.
Later, the hesitation of the emperor and the moderates in government
circles regarding a possible war against Turkey, the continuing diplomatic
efforts by the Great Powers to improve the situation of the subject peoples,
and the drafts for compromise solutions to the radical national problems
in the Balkans were the only echoes of the policy that had been pursued by
Russia in Eastern Europe until that time. The inevitability of the Russo-
Turkish War was becoming increasingly evident to both its adherents and
opponents. At the beginning of April, 1876, the War Minister, Miliutin,
advised the Bulgarians not to rise in a "premature revolt" because this would
aggravate the existing crisis and would compel Russia to take resolute steps
against Turkey, including a war which was considered undesirable and un-

69./bid.,.pp. 144-48.
70. Ibid., p. 149. See also Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina, ed P. A. Zaionchkovskii,4 vols. in
3 (Moscow:Gos. publ. bib., 1947-50), II,153.
 193

1
timely at that time.71 Several months later-at the end of July-Miliutin
was trying to persuade Gorchakov that the rumors according to which "Rus-
sia was not ready for war" were harmful, and that Russia had never been
"as prepared for war as she was now,"7 2 and there was not one single state,
not even Prussia, "which was ready to begin military operations immediately."
At the same time, prior to the Conference in Reichstadt, a problem emerged
in circles close to the chancellor-according to Jomini "a problem of enor-
mous gravity"-by her extremely peaceloving behavior was not Russia en-
couraging her adversaries, who could go too far in their belief that they
could act with impunity?73 Without abandoning its vigorous steps for or-
ganizing a joint action by the Great Powers before the Porte in defense of the
Southern Slavs in general, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inareasingly directed
its attention to the Bulgarian problem and reached the conviction that
Russia was faced by the "absolute necessity" to do all within her power to
stop the useless shedding of blood in Bulgaria. This conviction, expressed
by Giers in the beginning of June, 187674 was formulated still more categor-
ically by him in a letter to Jomini two weeks later: "What can we say about
wretched Bulgaria, should this country be abandoned to her sad' fate? I
must assure you that I am interested in this country at this moment much
more than in the other Turkish provinces."75 -
Consequently, as early as during the summer of 1876, without any de-
clared abandonment of the tactics of nonintervention and of peaceful solu-
tion of the Eastern Crisis, the war against Turkey was already being con-
sidered as an alternative by the ruling circles in Russia.76 For the Slavo-
philes, the public movement in defense of the Southern Slavs, the "moder-
ates," and the adherents of an active policy, the Bulgarian Uprising and its
cruel suppression-together with the Reichstadt Conference and the success
scored by Austria-Hungary relative to the planned annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina-played an important role in this change of mood and brought
the Bulgarian Question to the fore in considering war against Turkey. The
facts available indicate that the decisive turn in the intentions of Russia
had taken place as early as the summer of 1876. The symptoms of this
change, some of which have been discussed earlier, were already apparent at
the end of June and during July. On that account, as far as Jomini and Giers
were concerned, the dilemma facing Russia was the following: "Either war
or disarray in our country," War was already considered inevitable; what re-
mained to be decided was the period of time necessary for the preparations.

71. Ibid., p. 32.

72. OsvobozhdenieI, 314.
73. Jelavich,p. 18.
74. Ibid., p. 143.
75. Ibid., p. 144.
76. Khristov, p. 54.
 194

The eventual formal declaration was projected for sometime in the spring
of 1877, as it actually happened
The emperor and his high-ranking dignitaries convened in Livadia in the
first days of September to discuss the situation into which Russia had been
drawn as a result of the continuous activities of appeasement, the failure of
her diplomatic efforts to ensure an action by all Great Powers against Turkey
after the April Uprising, the continuing.uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and the Serbian-Turkish War. The position which prevailed above all other
arguments for and against the war was that Russia was bound to take radical
action in an Eastern Crisis which had become so acute.
The conference in Livadia discussed two main problems. One of them was
to persuade Austria-Hungary to agree to joint operations with Russia. The
suggestion was that Austria-Hungary send troops into Bosnia while the
Russians were penetrating into Bulgaria, and for the allied fleet to enter the
Bosphorus. G.orchakov's draft for an appeal to the Austrian emperor in this
sense was discussed on 7 September. The second problem involved beginning
the direct preparation of Russia for a war against Turkey. The decision
adopted was also in the affirmative, and it was envisaged to begin by partial
mobilization of the Russian army. The General Staff was instructed to pre-
sent an account of the funds necessary for mobilizing the military districts
involved, and the finance minister was asked to take the requisite measures
in this connection. This had to be done within a brief period of time in view
of "the possibility of events taking an unfavorable turn in the not too distant
future."78 On 14 September, Miliutin announced, "in accordance with the
august assent" of the emperor, that, despite all diplomatic efforts, inter-
national relations on the Eastern Question "were taking such a direction as
could confront Russia with the necessity to take up arms." Orders were
issued on 15 September by the minister to the commander-in-chief of the
army in the Caucasus for mobilization, and on 21 September, by orders
of the emperor, the Khar'kov, Odessa, and Caucasus military districts were
placed under martial law.79 The war machine had been started. General
mobilization was carried out in the beginning of November. Though continu-
ing to take part in diplomatic negotiations and combinations, Russia was
preparing for a war against Turkey.
The Austrian reply, eagerly awaited by the ruling circles in Russia, finally
resolved the problem about the war. It became clear that Russia was to wage
the war against Turkey alone, and that Austria-Hungary was planning to
annex Bosnia and Herzegovina without any sacrifice on her part. During the
first days of October, a conference of the emperor and his ministers in

77. Jelavich, pp. 20-21.

78. Dnevnik Miliutina, 11, 61-6 2, 80.
79. Osvobozhdenie,1, 396-98, 419.
 195

Livadia adopted the course of war, without any refusal to participate in new
diplomatic moves until the spring of the following year, when military
operations could be expected to begin. The war aim was also formulated-
the liberation of Bulgaria.80 Parallel with the mobilization of the Russian
army and practical preparations for military operations, detachments of
Bulgarian volunteers were organized who were to serve with Russian troops
under the Russian High Command.
The finding offered concerning the orientation of Russia toward war
occurring during the period of July-September, 1876, is not in contradiction
with the well-known hesitation of Emperor Alexander II right up to the state
Council meeting of 7 February 1877. According to Ignatiev, tendencies
opposed to the declaration of the war were manifest even then, for war had
been considered as the last means of resort in solving the crisis, without
abondoning new attempts at finding a peaceful outcome to the' complex
situation into which Russia had found herself.81 These tendencies were
also expressed in the report presented by Miliutin to the state Council, though
in the light of concern about the difficulties which had to be overcome.
The war minister dwelt on Russia's internal situation, the inconclusive trans-
formations in all fields of life, as a result of which "a war under such cir-
cumstances would be a great calamity for us" which could lead the state to
"utter exhaustion." Despite these well-founded considerations, however,
Miliutin stressed the other side of the problem as well, namely, that the "de
'
facto powerlessness of the collective efforts of Europe could only encourage
Turkey to adopt a most reckless policy" and thereby help her in inflicting
serious damage on Russian interests in the East "until the last vestige of
our influence in the Balkan Peninsula has disappeared."
Weighing carefully all the pros and cons, Miliutin, in the finally account,
accepted the war against Turkey as the only solution which would be favor-
able for Russia. The declaration made by the emperor that he would not
leave the southern Slavs without support, and the costly mobilization of .
the army which had already been carried out, that is to say, the decisions
to prepare for war taken precisely at the moment of the greatest exacerbation
of the Eastern Crisis after the April Uprising-in the summer and autumn of
1876-had already created, in Miliutin's words, a situation in the country
which made it necessary for Russia to wage war at all costs. "The other
states may afford to show hesitation," he warned, "but we cannot. We are
committed in the face of Russia and of the Christians by the words of our
Emperor; we have carried out mobilization of our army, and that army has ,

80. Tatischev,II, 328-29.

81. "Poezdka N. P. Ignatievapo evropeiskim stolitsam pered voinoi 1877-1878 gg.,"
Russkaia starina (1914), p. 497.
 196

taken up the sword, in the eyes of all mankind, to defend our honor."82
The last attempt by the Great Powers to influence the Porte-the London
Protocol-confirmed the realism in the assessment made by Miliutin, and on
30 March the state Council decided on the declaration of the Russo-Turkish
war. Its principal aim, under the existing conditions, was concerned with
Bulgaria.83 The problem of the war had actually been decided much earlier,
in the summer and autumn of 1876, notwithstanding the inconsistency and
apprehensions of the tsar and the government. The State Council of 30
March was only the last and resolute word spoken by Russia.84 There was no
other alternative after Russia had declared her readiness to go to war and
carried out mobilization. The London Protocol of 19/31 March expressed
the unanimity of the Great Powers, Great Britain included, on the basis of
extremely limited demands for reforms in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria,
in the spirit of the familiar note sent by Andrassy on 13 December 1875.
The refusal by the Porte to accept the recommendations of the London
Protocol served to facilitate the declaration of war by Russia.
As early as autumn of 1876, the Russian High Command began working
on its plans for military operations and determined their direction in the
Balkans-toward Bulgaria and Istanbul.85 The State Council of 30 March
decided, on the basis of the report submitted by General Obruchev, that
capturing the Turkish Capital was "absolutely necessary" in order to crush
Ottoman domination and ensure sound peace. This formulation also directed
military operations mainly toward Bulgaria.86 Even if Russia had not agreed
to the demands by Austria-Hungary for Bosnia and Herzegovina, demands
categorically supported by Germany, she could not formulate any other
direct aim but the independence of Bulgaria. Any operations in the direction
of the two western provinces inhabited by Southern Slavs would have re-
sulted in difficulties because of their geographic position, and would prob-
ably have involved military intervention by the two allies of Russia. On the
contrary, the Bulgarian variant of the war planned by Russia ensured for her
the favorable neutrality of Austria-Hungary and Germany, which had been
agreed upon formally in the first days of January, 1877, at the Budapest
Conference
The liberation of the Bulgarians and the setting up of a Bulgarian state
were not the only problems inherent in Russo-Turkish relations and within

82. M. Gazenkampf,Moidnevnik Uj77.1878gg. (St. Petersburg: V. Beiezovski,1908).

83. P. K. Fortunatov, Yoina lo'77-1878 gg. i osvobozhdenie Bolgarii (Moscow:Gos.
ucheb.-pedagog.izd-vo, 1950), pp. 38-39, 41 ; B. Jelavich,A Century of Russian Foreign
Policy, 1814-1914 (Philadelphiaand New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1964), p. 178.
84. Sbomik dogovorov Rossii, p. 156-58.
85. Fortunatov, p. 70. '
86. Khristov, "Ruskata obshtestvenost," p. 103.
87. Sbornik dogovorovRossii, pp. 149-55.
 197

the perspective of Russian policy. Russia had her own aims also on the
Eastern frontiers of Turkey, which became known during the war of 1877-78.
However, the April Uprising, together with the uprisings in Bosnia and.
Herzegovina, the war waged by Serbia and Montenegro against Turkey, and
the compromise acceptance by Russia of Austrian claims on the two Balkan
provinces, determined that the principal aim of the Russo-Turkish War would
be directed toward Bulgaria.

***

In addition to its direct impact on the deepening of the Eastern Crisis

and the shift in Russia foreign policy, the April uprising had an important
indirect impact on the international situation which, in its turn, heightened
the tensions surrounding the Easterri Question and influenced the reorienta-
tion of Russian policy. The unusual activity and the broad scope of the
public campaign in defense of the Bulgarian people in the large states of
Europe and in the Balkan and Slav countries reached their highest degree
of tension in the summer of 1876, which marked the turning point in Russia's
policy toward Turkey, and the connection between them is beyond doubt.
No other Russo-Turkish War had begun with such favorable international
relations for Russia, or with such strong moral justification before world
public opinion, as did the war of 1877-78. The extent of the indignation in
Europe was demonstrated by the numerous. public protests against Ottoman
domination in Europe and their administrative methods in Bulgaria, the
emergence of active opposition against the policy of preserving Turkey's
integrity even in countries in which that policy had a long tradition, and the
criticism levelled against the hostile attitude adopted by supporters of the
Turkish domination relative to the struggle of the Bulgarian people for polit-
ical emancipation and independent state development. These factors created
in Great Britain and France an atmosphere of rejection of the Turkish domina-
tion over the Bulgarians and in Southeastern Europe. The other two great
powers-Austria-Hungary and Germany-had their own reasons for not op-
posing Russia.
From the intricacy of the contradictions involved in the Eastern Question
and hï the intcrt"v'ining of the interests of the rwamnrn the movement in
defense of the Bulgarian people illuminated the incurable vices of the Otto-
man Empire and shook the .moral foundations of a policy which undertook
to preserve its integrity for an extended period.
Particularly significant were the public sentiments in Britain in connec-
tion with the April Uprising. Comments in diplomatic and government
circles, Parliament, the press, at political rallies, and in the correspondence
of eminent politicians and public figures on the horrors in Bulgaria were
bound to shift to another purely internal plane. A question was raised regard-
 198

ing the justification for the stubbornly maintained traditional policy of

Disraeli's Conservative Government protection of Turkey in view of the
immediate economic, financial, and strategic interests of Great Britain.
The Bulgarian Uprising and its barbarous suppression furnished the occasion
to reconsider that policy and to express serious objections against the jus-
tification for its continuation. These objections were based on the real
financial and economic position of the declining Ottoman Empire, which was
steadily becoming a less promising partner of the British bourgeoisie and its
capital investments in Turkey. Moreover, after the control of the Suez Canal
passed into the hands of Great Britain, the strategic significance of the
Straits to her colonial interests lessened. This was yet another fact which
undermined the considerations in favor of an upcompromising support for
Turkey's integrity.
The "Bulgarian Agitation" in Great Britain thus became an issue related
to the general trend of British Eastern policy and brought about sharp clashes
between the opposition and the government, between broad public circles
and the official line of the ruling party. The Bulgarian events caused deep
collisions, misunderstandings, and differences even among the governing
.circles and amid the Conservative Party then in office. Disraeli's unpopular
pro-Turkish policy, and his stubborn denial of the agonizing facts (although
correspondents, diplomats, and other observers had confirmed the cruel out-
rages committed against the Bulgarians and the devastation of their country)
resulted in deep divisions in British society. This dissension paralyzed Great
Britain and hindered the intentions of her prime minister to support Turkey,
even in the event of war.$ 8 .
As early as the first days of September, 1876, when Russia had already
started her military preparations, Britain's foreign Minister Lord Derby warned
Queen Victoria about the growing attitude against Turkey and against Dis-
raeli's position. He was fully justified in his conviction that if, under extreme
circumstances, Russia declared war on Turkey, the Government of Her
Majesty would find it practically impossible to intervene in defense of the
Ottoman Empire.89
The internal division within political life in Britain was serious, and Lord
Derby's words were a reflection of the genuine difficulties which would have
confronted the government had it joined a war on Turkey's side or tried to
return to the policy of the Crimean coalition against Russia, which had long

88. Shannon, p. 266.

89. R. Blake, Disraeli (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1969), p. 595. The stand
taken by Lord Derby was determined by the dominant mood in Britain. W. Denton, one
of the people active in the Bulgarian agitation, expressed it quite categoricallywhen he
wrote: "Thank God that the attitude of the British people did not allow us to join the
war as Turkey's ally." W. Denton, Falacies of the Eastern Question (London: Cassel,Pet-
ter and Galpin, 1877), p. 14.
1
 199

been criticized in Britain. Nevertheless, Disraeli's first attempted to prevent

the outbreak of the war by his proposal for a conference of the Great Powers
in Istanbul, whose resolutions he again undermined by the advice and the
support he rendered to the Porte in the proclamation of new reform acts.
Later on, when the Russian troops crossed the Danube, he still clung to the
idea of drawing Great Britain into the war to help Turkey. The fact is, how-
ever, that the forces favoring war in Britain could not assume control during
1877-78, and Queen Victoria really found it "practically impossible" to
decide on British participation in the armed conflict. Under the circum-
stances, Great Britain was the sole possible organizer of an anti-Russian
coalition at the moment, and the internal divisions within Britain's political
life provided her rival, Russia, with important advantages in the war.
Thus, a Russo-Turkish war was almost inevitable, dictated by the powerful
movement of sympathy on the part of the Russian people for the Slavs who
had risen in revolt, particularly the Bulgarians, the political considerations of
the tsarist government, and the new phenomena in international relations.
The enthusiasm with which the Russian army fought its battles and the
great sacrifices bom by the Russian people and state resulted in a Russian
victory and the liberation of the Bulgarians. The Bulgarian Uprising in April,
1876, was one of the principal factors in determining the course of reorienta-
tion in Russian policy toward the Eastern Crisis and the subsequent decision
to declare war.

Institute of History of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and University of

Sofia