CASE DOCTRINES

CHAPTER 2

1. Central Mindanao University vs. Republic

2. Republic vs. Zuburban Realty and Development Corporation

3. Republic vs. Tan

4. Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. As the votes
were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However,
after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition assailing the constitutionality of the provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules claiming
they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine is DISMISSED.

5. Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority

The AJVA is void for violating SEC. 2-3 of the art. 12 of the constitution which prohibits Private Corporation from owning
and kind of lands of the public domain.

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands compromising of the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell
or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject
to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

6. Republic vs. Naguiat

The respondent failed to present the required certification form the proper government agency reclassifying the land
applied for as alienable and disposable. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the state.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to be classified or reclassified as alienable and disposable land by the State remain a
part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, unclassified land, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession
and occupation of the land however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

7. Republic vs. CA and De la Rosa

SC held that indeed the areas where the lands were located are forest lands. This should not however affect the vested
rights of Benguet and Atok. SC agreed with the finding of the appellate court that having acquired the lots from their
predecessors-in- interest who on their part acquired valid location of the lots prior to the 1953 Constitution and before
the constitutional ban on private alienation of mineral lands, the June Bug claim by Benguet, and the Emma and Fredia
claims of Atok, were therefore removed from the public domain and had become private properties.

The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in
accordance with law, the power of the Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment
of the located claim was gone.

8. Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds

9. Collado vs. CA

Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public,
notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-
in- interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding
real estate taxes.
Petitioners failed to complete the required period of possession under PLA or under RA 1942 and PD 1073 (the law
prevailing at the time the petitioners applied for registration.

Also even if the Lot were alienable and disposable prior to the issuance of EO 33, the law reserved it as a watershed. Thus,
ever since the land has become non-disposable and inalienable public land. The period of occupancy after the issuance of
EO33 could no longer be counted because the land was no longer susceptible to occupancy, disposition, conveyance or
alienation.

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of public domain belong to the State.

10. Pajomayo vs. Manipon

Necessarily, when one of the two titles is held to be superior over the other, one should be declared null and void and
should be ordered cancelled. And if a party is declared to be the owner of a parcel of land pursuant to a valid certificate
of title said party is entitled to the possession of the land covered by said valid title. The decree of registration issued in
the cadastral proceedings does not have the effect of annulling the title that had previously been issued in accordance
with the provisions of the land Registration Law (Act 496).

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same
land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties, and in of successive registration
where more than one certificate is issued over the land the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the
land as against the person who relies on the second certificate.

11. Republic vs. CA and Lapina

SC ruled that, it is undisputed that private respondents were undoubtedly natural born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession
in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors in interest under the Public Land
Act.

Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon,
they had been the owners of the same since 1978.

12. Malabanan vs. Republic

In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and
disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant
for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

- Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

- However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition
of property of the public dominion begin to run.

The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with
just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in- interest have been in possession of the
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of
the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.

13. Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest; is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. The land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and
part of the public domain.

“The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State. (Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195).”

14. Republic vs. Southside Homeowners Association

Consistent with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part
thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not registrable, unless it is in the meantime
reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable public land. And until a given parcel of land is released from its
classification as part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable
and alienable, its status as part of a military reservation remains,even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than
as a military camp or for defense.

15. Republic vs. CA and Republic Real Estate Corporation

Are submerged areas considered as within the term foreshore lands?

- No. CA erred in stating that under RA 1899. The term foreshore lands includes submerged areas.

- Foreshore land: A strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide. Hence, the subject matter of the agreement between Pasay City and RREC is not
part of foreshore lands, and is outside the commerce of man. Hence, it cannot be reclaimed.

16. Republic vs. CA and Del Rio

Director of Lands contends that because the land is covered with water four to five months a year, it is considered part of
the lake bed of Laguna de Bay or is at least a foreshore land. However, the rise and fall of the water level of Laguna de Bay
happens during rainy season, and is not caused by gravitational forces but rather by rains. Moreover, the land is
submerged in water only for four to five months. The highest ordinary depth must be that during dry season that occurs
most of the time during the year.
Foreshore land is defined as “The strip of land that lies between the high and low water mark and that is alternately wet
and dry according to the flow of the tide.” Since the rise of water levels is due to rains and not the “flux and reflux of
tides”, it cannot be a foreshore land. As such, the land in question is neither a part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay
nor is it a foreshore land. As such, it is not a public land and therefore registerable.

Since del Rio has possessed the subject parcel in the concept of owner with just title and in good faith, his possession need
only last for ten years in order for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in. The Court finds applicant has satisfied this
requirement. Moreover, even if the land is a public land, he would still be entitled to a judicial confirmation of his imperfect
title for satisfying the requirements of the Public Land Act:

17. Republic vs. Regulto

Generally, Public Lands granted by Free patent are not liable for just compensation. Section 112 of C.A. No. 141, as
amended, provides that lands granted by patent shall be subjected to a right-of- way in favor of the Government. However,
there is “taking”; in the context of the State’s inherent power of eminent domain, when the owner is actually deprived or
dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property or
when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. It is apparent that there is taking of the remaining area of the property
of the Spouses Regulto. It is true that no burden was imposed thereon, and that the spouses still retained title and
possession of the property. The fact that more than half of the property shall be devoted to the bypass road will
undoubtedly result in material impairment of the value of the property. It reduced the subject property to an area of 138
square meters. Thus, the spouses are entitled to just compensation.

18. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Republic

FOREST lands are outside the commerce of man and unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form. It is well settled
that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest, timber or mineral lands. Any
title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled.
The rule must stand no matter how harsh it may seem. Dura lex sed lex.

The Bureau of Lands found out that at the time the sales patent was issued to Bugayong, the land was still classified as a
forest zone; it was declared as alienable and disposable land only on March 25, 1981. Forest lands cannot be owned by
private persons and is not registrable under the land registration law.