Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

11th Judicial Region
Branch 17, Davao City

FE TUADLES,
Plaintiff,

-versus-
CIVIL CASE NO. R-DVO-18-
02452-CV
For: DAMAGES

BONIFACIO CRUZ,
Defendant.
x ---------------------------x

MEMORANDUM OF THE PLAINTIFF

COMES NOW, PLAINTIFF, unto this Honorable Court, most

respectfully submits her Memorandum and avers:

PREFATORY STATEMENT
Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage
to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. (Art. 20, Civil Code)

THE PARTIES

Plaintiff FE TUADLES is of legal age, widow, Filipino, and a resident

of 008 Pecan Drive, Phase 7, Ecoland Subdivision, Ecoland, Davao City.
Plaintiff is the spouse of the late Romeo Tuadles who died in a vehicular
accident last 1 January 2014 while riding a Cimarron Jeepney registered
and owned by the Defendant.

Defendant BONIFACIO CRUZ is of legal age, Filipino, married, and

a resident of #39 Acacia St., Roldan Village, Ma-a, Davao City. Defendant
is the registered owner of a Cimarron Jeepney bearing Plate No. LXX 349
and driven by Aurelio Laxa.

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 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Sometime in 1 January 2014, the late Romeo Tuadles was onboard

a Cimarron Jeepney bearing license plate no. LXX 349 registered and
owned by Defendant. The aforementioned jeepney at that time was driven
by Aurelio Laxa who is a regular driver of the Defendant.

Due to the reckless driving of Aurelio Laxa in running the

abovementioned jeepney way above the speed limit, the jeepney turned
turtle as it was negotiating a curve on the road. As a result of the incident,
the late Romeo Tuadles was thrown towards the windshield of the jeepney
thereby bumping his head in the process. The late Romeo Tuadles
eventually succumbed to the head trauma resulting to his untimely death.

When Plaintiff learned that the abovementioned jeepney was

registered and owned by the Defendant, she sent a demand letter to the
Defendant demanding that she be paid for the actual damages spent on
the death of her late husband and for moral damages that she suffered.
To substantiate her claim for actual damages, plaintiff offers in evidence
the death certificate of Romeo Tuadles1 with the funeral and burial
expenses2, as well as the Medical Certificate from the Institute of
Psychiatry and Behavioral Medicine3.

On its part, defendant merely raised the defense of denial of its

receipt of the demand letter and prescription to be exonerated from
liability.

ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED

1. Whether or not Defendant should pay the Plaintiff actual

damages for the death of Plaintiff’s husband?;

2. Whether or not Plaintiff is entitled to the damages prayed for in

the complaint?; and

1
“Annex A”
2
“Annexes B to B-1”
3
“Annex E”

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 3. Whether or not the action has prescribed?

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS

Cruz, as registered owner, is deemed the employer

of the driver, Laxa, and is thus vicariously liable
under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of
the Civil Code

It is undisputed that the underlying cause of the untimely death of

the late Romeo Tuadles was due to a massive head trauma as stated in
the Death Certificate4. The massive head trauma was, in turn, brought
about when the late Romeo Tuadles bumped his head on the windshield
of Defendant’s jeepney as it turned turtle on the road. In this instant case,
the proximate cause of the death of Romeo Tuadles was because of the
reckless driving of Defendant’s driver Aurelio Laxa in negotiating a curve.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and

continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.5

Since, the death of Romeo Tuadles was due to the reckless driving
of Aurelio Laxa, it follows that Defendant is equally liable to Plaintiff as
Aurelio Laxa is an employee of the Defendant.

4
A copy of the Death Certificate is hereby attached as Exhibit A.
5
Dumayag v. People, G.R. No. 172778, 26 November 2012

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 Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code,
an action predicated on an employees act or omission may be instituted
against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission
committed by his employee.

Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes
him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law principle of pater
familias for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of ones
subordinates to prevent damage to another.6

As its core defense, Cruz contends that he cannot be held liable for
the driver of its vehicle at the time of accident, Laxa, is not its employee
since the vehicle was taken without his knowledge and consent.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has doctrinally pronounced that in
cases of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle
is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made
primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in
relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code. 7

The same doctrine holds true in so far as third persons are

concerned where the Court has considered the registered owner of the
motor vehicle as the employer of the negligent driver and the actual
employer merely as an agent of such owner. 8

Thus, it is established that in so far as holding the registered owner of

the motor vehicle primarily and directly liable for damages under Article
2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, as it is understood in labor relations law, is
not required. It is sufficient that Cruz is shown to be the registered owner of

6
FILCAR Transport Services vs Espinas GR No. 174156, June 20, 2012
7
ibid
8
Equitable Leasing Corporation vs Suyom 437 Phil. 244, 252 (2002).

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the motor vehicle that caused damage in order that it may be held vicariously
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Defendant, therefore, is liable to pay Plaintiff actual damages for the

death of Romeo Tuadles in the amount of Php 85,000.00 as evinced by
receipts, copies of which are attached in the Complaint.

All conditions precedent are complied with for the

filing of damages

Defendant denies liability by simply raising the defense of failure to

receive any demand letter, which is not worthy of credence or belief as the
office address of the defendant has never changed since the time of
incident. Moreover, even this bare argument would still fail to exonerate
them from liability as there exists no provision under the law that prior
demand is a condition sine quanon to the filing of a claim for actual
damages based on a tortious act, but only those obligations arising from
contracts.

Furthermore, conciliation proceedings before the Barangay is also

not a condition precedent for the filing of a claim for actual damages based
on tort. Nowhere under Presidential Decree 1508 does it provide that the
instant case is among those covered under Barangay conciliation
proceedings, the pertinent portion of the law reads:

Section 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon

of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes except:

1. Where on party is the government, or any subdivision or

instrumentality thereof;

2. Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute

relates to the performance of his official functions;

3. Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a

fine exceeding P200.00;

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 4. Offenses where there is no private offended party;

5. Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in

the interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.

Time for filing the action has not yet lapsed

Defendant likewise aver that plaintiff’s cause of action had already

prescribed. However, it must be noted that the series of extrajudicial
demand made by the plaintiff could work to interrupt the prescriptive
period to file an action.

Article 1155 of the Civil Code is explicit that the prescriptive period is
interrupted when an action has been filed in court; when there is a written
extrajudicial demand made by the creditors; and when there is any written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
In the present case it cannot be gainsaid that plaintiff made a series
of written extrajudicial demands for the petitioners to pay for actual
damages. The records reveal that starting (January 2014 until insert date,
wala po nakalagay sa complaint ate mel), plaintiff continuously demanded
from the defendant but the latter ignored the same. Therefore, the four
year prescriptive period could not have lapsed until (insert date).

From all the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that plaintiff filed

this action with sufficient evidence to support the claim and this action is
not merely baseless and malicious. Thus, defendant is not entitled for any
damages prayed for. Instead, the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs prayed
for in the Complaint as the untimely death of her husband caused her
sleepless nights as she could not imagine or think that her husband’s
death was due to the reckless driving of Defendant’s employee. As such,
Plaintiff is entitled to moral damages in the amount of Php 60,000.00.

Also, by reason of the unjust refusal of the Defendant to pay the

actual damage suffered by the Plaintiff relative to the death of her
husband, Plaintiff was forced to engage the services of counsel such that
she is entitled to Attorney’s fees in the amount of Php 5,000.00.

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 PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays of this Honorable Court

that a Decision be rendered ordering Defendant to pay the following, to
wit:

a. Actual Damages in the amount of Php 85,000.00

b. Moral Damages in the amount of Php 60,000.00
c. Attorney’s Fees in the amount of Php 5,000.00

Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Davao City, Philippines. March 17, 2018.

MIRANDA and ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICE

Suite 143, Plaza de Miranda
Buhangin, Davao City
Tel. No. (082) 227-1000

By:

ATTY. MEL CATHERINE MIRANDA

Counsel for the Plaintiff
Roll No. 88124; 5/11/2016
PTR No. 1234567-A, 1/3/2018; Davao City
IBP Member Roll No. 00890, 1/3/2018;
Davao City
MCLE Compliance No. II-000456
For the 2nd Compliance
September 20, 2017, M.M.

Copy furnish personally via registered mail to:

ATTY. NESTLE M. AMPARO

Counsel for the Defendant

PTR No. 128611363; -1/03/2018; Davao City

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 IBP Life Members Roll No. 36388
Roll of Attorneys No. 755555
34567-A, 1/3/2018; Davao City
MCLE Certificate of Exemption No. IV-0012222
Issued on 04-16-17 at Pasig City

EXPLANATION AS TO SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL

Service was effected via registered mail due to distance, time,

and manpower constraints.