EN BANC Complainant claims that after respondent received the money, he
never received any updates on the status of his work permit and
A.C. No. 11350 [Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4211], August
09, 2016
ADEGOKE R. PLUMPTRE, Complainant, v. ATTY. SOCRATES R.
RIVERA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This resolves a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Socrates
R. Rivera for absconding with money entrusted to him and
soliciting money to bribe a judge.
On May 13, 2014, complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre filed a
complaint for disbarment1 against respondent before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Complainant alleges that on March 7, 2014, he called respondent
and asked for help in his application for a work permit from the
Bureau of Immigration.2 They met a few days later, and
complainant paid respondent P10,000.00 as professional
fee.3chanrobleslaw
They met again, and complainant gave respondent another
P10,000.00, together with his passport. This was allegedly for the
processing of his work permit.4chanrobleslaw
They met for a third time since respondent asked complainant to
submit ID photos.5 Respondent asked complainant for another
P10,000.00, but complainant refused as they only agreed on the
amount of P20,000.00.6chanrobleslaw
Respondent also asked complainant for P8,000.00, allegedly for
complainant's other case, which respondent was also working
on.7 He explained that P5,000.00 would be given to a Las Piñas
judge to reverse the motion for reconsideration against
complainant, while P3,000.00 would be used to process the motion
for reconsideration. Complainant gave him the
P8,000.00.8chanrobleslaw
pending court case.9 Further, whenever he called respondent to
follow up on his work permit, respondent hurled invectives at him
and threatened him and his wife.10chanrobleslaw
Complainant would retort by saying that he would file complaints
against respondent if he did not give back the money and passport.
That was the last time complainant heard from
respondent.11chanrobleslaw
After inquiring and researching on respondent's
whereabouts,12 complainant was able to track down respondent
and get back his passport, which respondent coursed through
complainant's aunt.13However, despite the return of complainant's
passport, respondent still refused to return the P28,000.00 earlier
endorsed to him.14chanrobleslaw
Complainant then decided to file a complaint against respondent
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.15chanrobleslaw
On May 14, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued the
Order16 directing respondent to file an answer to the complaint.
Respondent failed to show up at the September 17, 2014
mandatory conference,17 as well as at the second mandatory
conference set on October 22, 2014.18 The parties were directed to
submit their verified position papers, after which the case was
submitted for resolution.19chanrobleslaw
On May 27, 2015, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
respondent's suspension for two (2) years from the practice of law
and return of P28,000.00 to complainant.20chanrobleslaw
On June 20, 2015, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors adopted and approved21 the Investigating
Commissioner's recommendation, but modified it to disbar
respondent from the practice of law,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A ", for Respondent's
violation of Canon 1, Canon 7, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17
and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
aggravated by his failure to file Answer and to appear in the
Mandatory Conference. Thus, Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys and Ordered to
Return the Twenty Eight Thousand (P28,000.00) Pesos to
Complainant.22 (Emphasis in the original)
On April 20, 2016, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines transmitted
the case to this Court for final action under Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court.23chanrobleslaw
This Court modifies the findings of the Board of Governors.
I
Respondent's repeated failure to comply with several Resolutions of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines requiring him to comment on
the complaint lends credence to complainant's allegations. It
manifests his tacit admission. Hence, we resolve this case on the
basis of the complaint and other documents submitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
In Macarilay v. Seriña,24 this Court held that "[t]he unjustified
withholding of funds belonging to the client warrants the imposition
of disciplinary action against the lawyer."25cralawred By absconding
with the money entrusted to him by his client and behaving in a
manner not befitting a member of the bar, respondent violated the
following Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
....
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
integrated bar.
....
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties
of his client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01. - A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
....
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
....
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
....
Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Rule 18.04. - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status
of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients
request for information.
As his client's advocate, a lawyer is duty-bound to protect his
client's interests and the degree of service expected of him in this
capacity is his "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability."26 The lawyer also has a fiduciary
duty, with the lawyer-client relationship imbued with utmost trust
and confidence.27chanrobleslaw
Respondent failed to serve his client with fidelity, competence, and
diligence. He not only neglected the attorney-client relationship
established between them; he also acted in a reprehensible
manner towards complainant, i.e., cussing and threatening
complainant and his family with bodily harm, hiding from
complainant, and refusing without reason to return the money
entrusted to him for the processing of the work permit.
Respondent's behavior demonstrates his lack of integrity and moral
soundness.
Del Mundo v. Capistrano28 has reiterated the exacting standards
expected of law practitioners:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who
meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality, including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their
fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Falling short of this standard, the Court will not
hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer by imposing an appropriate
penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in
consideration of the surrounding facts.29 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
A lawyer must, at no time, lack probity and moral fiber, which are
not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the bar but are
likewise essential demands for his continued
membership.30chanrobleslaw
II
When complainant refused to give respondent any more money to
process his work permit, respondent persuaded complainant to
give him an additional P8,000.00 purportedly to ensure that a
motion for reconsideration pending before a Las Piñas judge would
be decided in complainant's favor.31 However, after receiving
P28,000.00 from complainant for the work permit and ensuring the
success of complainant's court case, respondent made himself
scarce and could no longer be contacted.
Although nothing in the records showed whether the court case
was indeed decided in complainant's favor, respondent's act of
soliciting money to bribe a judge served to malign the judge and
the judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won by
the party with the deepest pockets and not on the
merits.32chanrobleslaw
"A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system."33 Further,
"a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative body."34chanrobleslaw
By implying that he can negotiate a favorable ruling for the sum of
P8,000.00, respondent trampled upon the integrity of the judicial
system and eroded confidence on the judiciary. This gross
disrespect of the judicial system shows that he is wanting in moral
fiber and betrays the lack of integrity in his character. The practice
of law is a privilege, and respondent has repeatedly shown that he
is unfit to exercise it.
III
As for the sufficiency of notice to respondent of the disbarment
proceedings against him, this Court notes that on May 14, 2014,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines directed respondent to answer
the complaint against him, but he failed to file his answer.35 The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines set two (2) separate dates for
mandatory conferences36 after respondent failed to attend the first
setting, but he failed to appear in both instances.37 All issuances
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines had the requisite registry
receipts attached to them.
Stemmerik v. Mas38 discussed the sufficiency of notice of
disbarment proceedings. This Court held that lawyers must update
their records with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines by
informing it of any change in office or residential address and
contact details.39 Service of notice on the office or residential
address appearing in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines records
shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for administrative
proceedings against him or her.40chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Socrates R. Rivera
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years. He
is ORDERED to return to complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre the
amount of P28,000.00 with interest at 6% per annum from the
date of promulgation of this Resolution until fully paid. He is
likewise DIRECTED to submit to this Court proof of payment of the
amount within 10 days from payment.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in respondent's personal
record as a member of the bar, and be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING
INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent
law professors1 in response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the
Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not
be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly
dockets this as an administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect
contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting
opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to
the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a
disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded
finding of indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the
October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in
mind, the Court finds that with the exception of one respondent whose
compliance was adequate and another who manifested he was not a
member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere
denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory.
The proffered defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call the
attention of respondent law professors, who are members of the Bar, to the
relationship of their duties as such under the Code of Professional
Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free and
democratic republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this
case are as follows:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes.
RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a
fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a
Judge to the proper authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers
speak their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe
ethical standards of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive
language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a
decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such
decision’s reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of
this Court is not the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been
used to deflect everyone’s attention from the actual concern of this Court to
determine by respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent members
of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional
conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper
intervention or interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it
should be stressed that it was respondents themselves who called upon the
Supreme Court to act on their Statement,2 which they formally submitted,
through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Court’s proper
disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic
freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal
reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is
not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate
speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to
respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because
respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould
the minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-observance
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by
the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is
apropos to revisit the factual antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo
(Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No.
162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al.
(the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision, raising solely the following grounds:
I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this
Honorable Courts’ (sic) assertion that the Executive’s foreign policy
prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant
jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are
proscribed by international human rights and humanitarian
standards, including those provided for in the relevant international
conventions of which the Philippines is a party.4
II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the
broader, if fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human
rights of its citizens – especially where the rights asserted are subject
of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms. 5
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque,
Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they
posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys.
Roque and Bagares asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE
COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST
THREE SOURCES – AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE
PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES
SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE
INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES
EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact
not only of extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of
the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed
Judgment for denying the Petition."8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in
the Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s
article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book
Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’
article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration on July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S.
Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on
comfort women," on the Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on
the GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010.13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted,"
appeared in the Manila Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque
claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly
acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored
with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof.
Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report 15 on
the alleged plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle
responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:
The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for
reconsideration filed yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday.
The motion is available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-
in-the-supreme-court/
The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences
and citations that are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL
article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I
were unaware of the petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion
was filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens
discussion is that it implies that the prohibitions against crimes against
humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article
emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court’s decision is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm 17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on
the Court in reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration.18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the
Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the
last few days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am
compelled, as a question of the integrity of my work as an academic and as
an advocate of human rights and humanitarian law, to take exception to the
possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an
international crime in your esteemed Court’s Judgment in the case of Vinuya
et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April
2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism
by the Philippine chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence
Initiative (SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media Legal Defence
Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in
footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am
also concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I
made in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be
ironic since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal
remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law in 2006 has been made available to your
esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take the time to
carefully study the arguments I made in the article.
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the
issues raised by this letter.
With respect,
(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court
formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics
Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the
Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics
Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and
Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo.21
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring
Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website 22 and
on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A report regarding the statement also appeared on
various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun
Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise posted at the
University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on
August 10, 201026 and at said college’s website.27
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the
University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the
Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The
cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines
Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona
Chief Justice
Subject: Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary
Your Honors:
We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by
thirty[-]eight (38)28members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope
that its points could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law
(Emphases supplied.)
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not
contain the actual signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the
names of 37 UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside
each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law faculty
Statement is reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they
courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse and
suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any
meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the government
of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case
of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only
had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law views the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the
individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct
attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the
Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation
of another person’s work as one’s own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at
best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone else’s ideas
and expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into
committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it
appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker.
It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in
any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part
of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the
production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete
perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows
that the ponente merely copied select portions of other legal writers’ works
and interspersed them into the decision as if they were his own, original
work. Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been
promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court’s and no
longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the
Decision. In the absence of any mention of the original writers’ names and
the publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this
case and the spokesman of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original
articles is a reference to the ‘primary’ sources relied upon. This cursory
explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors’ writings and the
effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are
precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together
with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the
plagiarism since it provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to
appropriate the original authors’ work of organizing and analyzing those
primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be
familiar with all legal and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable,
because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct
and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of
diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of
the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers,
Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually
misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of
Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they
argue that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery
as crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it
obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved
citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at
the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of
copying works without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual
fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it
deals with State liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage
suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured parties’ home States in
the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely
have such opportunities to make an international impact. That the petitioners
were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the
Second World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford
them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the
Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of
many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed
the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the
Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the
Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power
to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of
the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy
and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most
basic values of decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine
Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before
other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its
decisions and cannot accept excuses for failure to attain the highest
standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar
because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a
democratic society. Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy that
surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious
plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only further erode faith and
confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of this
decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women
elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and
exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to
the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without
ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is
beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only the
content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions,
are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be
conscientiously reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of
sanction, then at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an
absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a higher standard of
professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are
critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the Philippines.
It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as
the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and
integrity completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with the
exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust
reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of
the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach
of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and
professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and
credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines the
foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing
implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal
precedents through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of
the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of
the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all
those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse,
such as the petitioners therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature
of the dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of the
Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for
the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his
position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the
Court may consider appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review
the manner by which it conducts research, prepares drafts,
reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a
recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise
guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest
quality of legal research and writing in pleadings, practice,
and adjudication.
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27
July 2010.
(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Dean and Professor of Law
(SGD.) FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN
Dean (1978-1983)
(SGD.) MERLIN M.
MAGALLONA
Dean (1995-1999)
REGULAR FACULTY
(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON
Professor
(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P.
SALVADOR DAWAY
Associate Dean and
Associate Professor
(SGD.) DANTE B.
(SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA
GATMAYTAN
Associate Professor
(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE
Assistant Professor
(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY
Assistant Professor
(SGD.) PACIFICO A.
AGABIN
Dean (1989-1995)
(SGD.) SALVADOR T.
CARLOTA
Dean (2005-2008) and
Professor of Law
(SGD.) JAY L.
BATONGBACAL
Assistant Professor
(SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D.
BATTAD
Assistant Professor
Assistant Professor
(SGD.) SOLOMON F.
LUMBA
Assistant Professor
(SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS
Assistant Professor
LECTURERS
(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A.
(SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA
ALAMPAY
(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S.
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG
QUIMBO
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B.
CORONEL TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L.
(SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
JARDELEZA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(Underscoring supplied.)
Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made
known his sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We
quote Prof. Tams’ letter here:
Glasgow, 18 August 2010
Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)
Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice
Your Excellency,
My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at
the University of Glasgow. I am writing to you in relation to the use of one of
my publications in the above-mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.
The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court’s
Judgment, in the section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes.
As the table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant sentences were taken
almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book Enforcing
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press
2005). I note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of
the Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from another author
(Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive passages
reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an
appropriate form of referencing.
I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support
the Judgment’s cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most
cursory reading shows that my book’s central thesis is precisely the opposite:
namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a
firm place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter
notes that "[t]he present study attempts to demystify aspects of the ‘very
mysterious’ concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the
same vein, the concluding section notes that "the preceding chapters show
that the concept is now a part of the reality of international law, established in
the jurisprudence of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my
work should have been cited to support – as it seemingly has – the opposite
approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your
Honourable Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly
acknowledging it.
On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your
Honourable Court.
I remain
Sincerely yours
(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31
In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits
during the August 26, 2010 hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring
Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of certain
faculty members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics
Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the said
Statement within three days from the August 26 hearing.32
It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was
given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the
signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty
members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was
that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same.
However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did not include former
Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as
represented in the previous copies of the Statement submitted by Dean
Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty.
Armovit) signed the Statement although his name was not included among
the signatories in the previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total
number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the
same Statement, having been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August
11, 2010, was already under consideration by the Court.33
In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the
following observations regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on
the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such
allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they
expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he
cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary
conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise
concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to
the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the
basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of
decency and respect.34 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to
maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus
that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the
judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to
proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s
less than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision
in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and
competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case
on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law
faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that
would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as
law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity
and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath
they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice.35 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan,
Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V.
Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te,
Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De
Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay,
Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo,
Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O.
Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza,
Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M.
Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua,
Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause,
within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they
should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons
1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.37
Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through his letter dated August 10,
2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation
before the Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a
dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty
Statement.38
In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular
administrative matter.
Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the
October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution
On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court,
respondents filed the following pleadings:
(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the
37 respondents, excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T.
Vasquez, in relation to the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and
13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;
(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof.
Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation to the same charge in par.
(1);
(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul
T. Vasquez in relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean
Leonen, in relation to the charge of violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and
(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof.
Owen Lynch.
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and
Prof. Raul Vasquez)
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19,
2010 a common compliance which was signed by their respective counsels
(the Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of said Common Compliance,
respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in
the discharge of the ‘solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers
in the profession of law,’ and as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter
of public concern and one that is of vital interest to them."39 They likewise
alleged that "they acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed out that
"none of them was involved either as party or counsel"40 in the Vinuya case.
Further, respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause Resolution’s
findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment – that respondents indeed are
in contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and officers
of the Court, and have violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and
11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."41
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:
(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions
In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal
processes42 and the courts43 and of tending to influence, or giving
the appearance of influencing the Court44 in the issuance of their
Statement, respondents assert that their intention was not to malign
the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to
ensure continued confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive
was purportedly evidenced by the portion of their Statement
"focusing on constructive action."45 Respondents’ call in the
Statement for the Court "to provide clear and concise guidance to the
Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research
and writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with strictures
enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the development of the legal
system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice’" (under Canon 4 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the
law and legal processes" (under Canon 1, id.).46 Furthermore, as
academics, they allegedly have a "special interest and duty to
vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because
these unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the
academe, especially in our law schools."47
Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the
Restoring Integrity Statement as an ‘institutional attack’ x x x on the
basis of its first and ninth paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at
the time the Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it
appeared to them the Court "was not going to take any action on the
grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation."49 According to respondents, the bases for their
belief were (i) the news article published on July 21, 2010 in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P.
Marquez was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would
not order an inquiry into the matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter
of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but to
downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation
charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the
Court’s indifference to the dangers posed by the plagiarism
allegations against Justice Del Castillo that impelled them to urgently
take a public stand on the issue.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del
Castillo committed plagiarism and should be held accountable in
accordance with the standards of academic writing
A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a
discussion of the merits of respondents’ charge of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the Philippines Board of
Regents v. Court of Appeals52 and foreign materials and
jurisprudence, respondents essentially argue that their position
regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo is the
correct view and that they are therefore justified in issuing their
Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common
Compliance included, among others: (i) the letter dated October 28,
2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice Corona
through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya decision likewise
lifted without proper attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana
Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De
Derecho Internacional and from an International Court of Justice
decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law Review Article entitled
"Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights
Law" by Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, in support of their
charge that Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article
without proper attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54
(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court
when others have likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"
In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the
plagiarism and misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public
issues."55 They identified various published reports and opinions, in
agreement with and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on
the issue of plagiarism, specifically:
(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and
Purple Romero;56
(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57
(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July
25, 2010;58
(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo
published in the Philippine Star on July 30, 2010;59
(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director
General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in the Business
Mirror on August 5, 2010;60
 (vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8,
2010;61
(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s call
for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in the
Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on July 31,
2010;62
(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar
Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
on the calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo
published in The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the
Business Mirror on August 11, 2010;63
(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del
Castillo from a former dean of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod
ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional Association, the
Judges Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines – Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine
Star on August 16, 2010;64 and
(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University
College of Law published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
August 10, 2010.65
In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has
singled them out for sanctions and the charge in the Show Cause
Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they may have violated
specific canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unfair
and without basis.
(d) Freedom of expression
In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents
briefly discussed their position that in issuing their Statement, "they
should be seen as not only to be performing their duties as members
of the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as
citizens of a democracy who are constitutionally protected in the
exercise of free speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited
United States v. Bustos,67In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In
the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of
Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.69
(e) Academic freedom
In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted
that their Statement was also issued in the exercise of their academic
freedom as teachers in an institution of higher learning. They relied on
Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided
that "[t]he national university has the right and responsibility to exercise
academic freedom." They likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology70 which they claimed
recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free
and healthy discussion and communication of a faculty member’s field of
study without fear of reprisal. It is respondents’ view that had they remained
silent on the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have
"compromised [their] integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would
have created a culture and generation of students, professionals, even
lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research and
pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the
public that plagiarism and misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and
that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to one’s conduct."71
In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to
consider the following portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A.
Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and
impartial course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the
judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of
his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought
and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid
of any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook
occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which
affects in no way the outcome of a case.73
On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled,
the Common Compliance stated, thus:
WHEREFORE:
A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law,
members of the Bar and officers of the Court, respectfully pray that:
1. the foregoing be noted; and
2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in
the Show Cause Resolution, including its conclusions that
respondents have: [a] breached their "obligation as law
professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold
 the dignity and authority of this Court, … and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice;" and [b] committed
"violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and
11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing
prayer, respondents respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in
assertion of their due process rights, that before final judgment be
rendered:
1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;
2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute
and/or address the findings and conclusions of fact in the
Show Cause Resolution (including especially the finding and
conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that
connection, that appropriate procedures and schedules for
hearing be adopted and defined that will allow them the full
and fair opportunity to require the production of and to
present testimonial, documentary, and object evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28,
2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc.
Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC); and
3. respondents be given fair and full access to the
transcripts, records, drafts, reports and submissions in or
relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses who were or could have been called in In The
Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74
Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista
Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T.
Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and
Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted the allegations
in the Common Compliance with some additional averments.
Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled
her to challenge the findings and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution.
Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered
indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such
may be punished only after charge and hearing."75
Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good
faith and with the best intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one
member to resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her deep
disappointment and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were what
motivated her to sign the Statement.
On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited
jurisprudence77 which in her view highlighted that academic freedom is
constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such that schools
have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be
taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may be admitted to study and
that courts have no authority to interfere in the schools’ exercise of discretion
in these matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She claims the
Court has encroached on the academic freedom of the University of the
Philippines and other universities on their right to determine how lessons
shall be taught.
Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of
respondents’ constitutional right to freedom of expression that can only be
curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to public safety, public
morale, public health or other legitimate public interest. 78
Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a
separate Compliance by registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said
Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding his
signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of
conversation among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of
academic year 2010-11) because it reportedly contained citations not
properly attributed to the sources; that he was shown a copy of the
Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class; and
that, agreeing in principle with the main theme advanced by the Statement,
he signed the same in utmost good faith.79
In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof.
Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a
democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the
attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente
Sotto;80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion
appearing in American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he "never
had any intention to unduly influence, nor entertained any illusion that he
could or should influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya
case"83 and that "attacking the integrity of [the Court] was the farthest thing
on respondent’s mind when he signed the Statement."84Unlike his
colleagues, who wish to impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity
of the views on what constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his
Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October
2010, some espoused the view that willful and deliberate intent to commit
plagiarism is an essential element of the same. Others, like respondent, were
of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of the
perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This
uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for academic discussion in the
College. Now, this Honorable Court has ruled that plagiarism presupposes
deliberate intent to steal another’s work and to pass it off as one’s
own.85 (Emphases supplied.)
Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that
he "might have been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of such
language [in the Statement] and could have been more careful."86 He ends
his discussion with a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has
faithfully complied with the Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will
rule that he had not in any manner violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of
the Court.
Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of
Canon 10 in relation to his submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty
Statement to this Court
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three
drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty Statement, which he described as
follows:
 "Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of
the UP College of Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures
of the thirty-seven (37) faculty members subject of the Show Cause
Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and
Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
 "Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical
signature, but which reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven
(37) members of the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)". A copy of
Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in the UP
College of Law on 10 August 2010. Another copy of Restoring
Integrity II was also officially received by the Honorable Court from
the Dean of the UP College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three
weeks before the filing of Restoring Integrity I.
 "Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity
II, and which presently serves as the official file copy of the Dean’s
Office in the UP College of Law that may be signed by other faculty
members who still wish to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty-
seven original signatories to Restoring Integrity I above their printed
names and the notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual
signatures of eight (8) other members of the faculty above their
handwritten or typewritten names.87
For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring
Integrity II are relevant since what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain
are the discrepancies in the signature pages of these two documents.
Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.
On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and
came about, Dean Leonen alleged, thus:
2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad
agreement in the faculty on a draft statement, Dean Leonen
instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it among the faculty
members so that those who wished to may sign. For this purpose,
the staff encoded the law faculty roster to serve as the printed draft’s
signing pages. Thus did the first printed draft of the Restoring
Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I, come into being.
2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement,
Dean Leonen was unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Honorable Court’s Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary (G.R.
No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that the
Honorable Court was in the process of convening its Committee on
Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among
the members of the faculty. Some faculty members visited the
Dean’s Office to sign the document or had it brought to their
classrooms in the College of Law, or to their offices or residences.
Still other faculty members who, for one reason or another, were
unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at that time, nevertheless
conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that they would sign as
soon as they could manage.
2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring
Integrity I had been circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed
his staff to reproduce the statement in a style and manner
appropriate for posting in the College of Law. Following his own
 established practice in relation to significant public issuances, he
directed them to reformat the signing pages so that only the names
of those who signed the first printed draft would appear, together with
the corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name. Restoring
Integrity II thus came into being.88
According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or
above the names of non-signatories in the final draft of significant public
issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic considerations as to secure
the integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting
statements with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals and
pranksters."90
With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the
signatories in Restoring Integrity II when in fact he did not sign Restoring
Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a miscommunication
involving his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:
2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with
the reformatted signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of
the name of Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As
Justice Mendoza was not among those who had physically signed
Restoring Integrity I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen
called the attention of his staff to the inclusion of the Justice’s name
among the "(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity II.
2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had
spoken to Justice Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06 August
2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza had authorized the dean to
sign the Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed
fundamentally with its contents. Also according to her, Justice
Mendoza was unable at that time to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement himself as he was leaving for the United States the
following week. It would later turn out that this account was not
entirely accurate.91(Underscoring and italics supplied.)
Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative
officer, however, and so placed full reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here
were indeed other faculty members who had also authorized the Dean to
indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that time
unable to affix their signatures physically to the document."93
However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his
staff reviewed the circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice
Mendoza’s signature. It would turn out that this was what actually transpired:
2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff talked to
Justice Mendoza on the phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially
agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement as he fundamentally
agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly
say that he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the dean to sign
it for him as he was about to leave for the United States. The dean’s
staff informed him that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the
Restoring Integrity Statement to him.
2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was
unable to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the
U.S. the following week.
2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice
Mendoza when he went to the College to teach on 24 September
2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This time, Justice Mendoza
declined to sign.94
According to the Dean:
2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the
call he received from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice
Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the Restoring Integrity
Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he
declined to sign it because it had already become controversial. At that time,
he predicted that the Court would take some form of action against the
faculty. By then, and under those circumstances, he wanted to show due
deference to the Honorable Court, being a former Associate Justice and not
wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by signing the
Statement.95 (Emphases supplied.)
With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature page of
Restoring Integrity II when he was one of the signatories of Restoring
Integrity I and the erroneous description in Dean Leonen’s August 10, 2010
letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by
38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that:
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when
it was circulated to him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by
Dean Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of the signing pages in Restoring
Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still included in the
reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief
Justice Corona that 38 members of the law faculty signed (the original 37
plus Justice Mendoza.)96
Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a
dummy of the Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the
same. He emphasized that the main body of the Statement was unchanged
in all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This
purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statement’s] essential nature as a
‘live’ public manifesto meant to continuously draw adherents to its message,
its signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other
printings of [the Statement] may be made in the future, each one reflecting
the same text but with more and more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal
law by analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an instance where it has
been made to appear in a document that a person has participated in an act
when the latter did not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent
which members of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the
Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or had expressed their desire to be
signatories thereto."99
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation
of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor
misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement or the identities of
the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to
be signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any
violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the Statement] through the
appropriate channels by transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice
Corona for the latter’s information and proper disposition with the hope that
its points would be duly considered by the Honorable Court en
banc."100 Citing Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho,101 Dean
Leonen posits that the required quantum of proof has not been met in this
case and that no dubious character or motivation for the act complained of
existed to warrant an administrative sanction for violation of the standard of
honesty provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility. 102
Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical
reliefs as the Common Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and
for access to the records, evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only
in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation
involving Justice Del Castillo.
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)
For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is
not a member of the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the
State of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at
the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in
2010. He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by
this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
on government and public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he believes
that "the right to speak means the right to speak effectively."104 Citing the
dissenting opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio,
Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be forceful
enough to make the intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality of
education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression, when the very
teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and self-
assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers." 107 Relying
on the doctrine in In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,108Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not pose any danger,
clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to remove it from the protective
mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee on
free speech).109 He also stated that he "has read the Compliance of the other
respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and that "he signed the
Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."110
ISSUES
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of
respondents, the material issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:
1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their
freedom of expression?
2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic
freedom as law professors?
3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they
should not be disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1,
11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily
explain why he should not be disciplined as a Member of the Bar
under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03?
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set
for hearing and in relation to such hearing, are respondents entitled
to require the production or presentation of evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R.
No. 162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts
of, and the witnesses and evidence presented, or could have been
 presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC)?
DISCUSSION
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of
expression.
It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the
Show Cause Resolution, has interfered with respondents’ constitutionally
mandated right to free speech and expression. It appears that the underlying
assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this
Court is denying them the right to criticize the Court’s decisions and actions,
and that this Court seeks to "silence" respondent law professors’ dissenting
view on what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly
show that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of
the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that
motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the
contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the
petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and
consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause
Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court
considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding
the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law
faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief
that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of
that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth"111 when it was "[o]f
public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to
determine the truth of such allegations."112 It was also pointed out in the
Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for reconsideration
of the Vinuya decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to
the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to
be "constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those portions of the
said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as
fair or constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise
concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to
the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the
basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of
decency and respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’
freedom of expression when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to
maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus
that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the
judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to
proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s
less than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision
in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and
competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case
on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law
faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that
would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as
law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity
and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath
they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice.115 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’
submissions, this Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and
judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that
the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of
the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to
discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers,
whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment
and common decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty.
Vicente J. Francisco both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the
following paragraph in his second motion for reconsideration:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution
of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous
and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order
that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as
he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has
been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige
of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of
the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will
necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make
the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.117 (Emphases
supplied.)
The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor
necessary and further held that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential
points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the
many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in
question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is
highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good
practice can never sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to
disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment,
particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for
resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is
insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of
Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the
press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage
of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a
threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader
against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in
order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that
referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration of justice and
increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge,
occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than
contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on
the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the
court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to
intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be
proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.118 (Emphases
supplied.)
Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their
quote from the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo
concerned statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike
the respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in
the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing at all to interfere in
the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents’ theory, Salcedo is
authority for the following principle:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority
and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the
high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being
what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492,
669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust
in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial
power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and
relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious
statements in his pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here,
the respondents’ Statement goes way beyond merely ascribing error to the
Court.
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their
position. In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen,120 cited in the Common
Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the
Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to
the press a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of
what he claimed was a great injustice to his client committed by the Supreme
Court. In the decision, the petition was described, thus:
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this
Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before
the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic
symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice
as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client
"in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices
committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices
that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a
prayer that
"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate
of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation
that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and
confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession."121
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign
jurisprudence on the principle that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right
to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers, including judicial
authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the
courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of
fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an even more extensive
discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this view.1awphi1 To quote from
that decision:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide,
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism
is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct
that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties
which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession
places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows
solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics
enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by
express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the
Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain
at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial
acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential
to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients'
rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to
rein up their tempers.
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer
than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings
which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as
necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed,
because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all
times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten,
40 Atl. 481)
xxxx
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as
to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements
made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in the
course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring
into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance,
observed that:
[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause,
respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to
obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt
proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried
fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public
clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of
the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the
protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. x x x.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good
faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and
contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken
and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing
or modifying its decision. x x x.
xxxx
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part
of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade
the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino
people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that
they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law
into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As
a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to
which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney,
and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the
courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such
guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. 124 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can
be easily gleaned even from more recent jurisprudence.
In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer,
through the imposition of a fine, for making malicious and unfounded
criticisms of a judge in the guise of an administrative complaint and held,
thus:
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of
administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any
other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to its officers.
This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we
stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the
court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is
even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re:
Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only
to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No
law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable to a scrutiny
into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).
xxxx
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in
Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
xxxx
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of
speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be
exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. x x x.
xxxx
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the
confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to
degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595
[1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55
SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs.
Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly
baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to
the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19
January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing,
G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative
complaint which is clearly unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not
excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to his client.
x x x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of
simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings and
imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion to state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members
of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the
interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for
one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to
abstain from all offensive personalityand to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified. 128
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free
speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held
that:
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear
that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a
complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times
and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained.
There are other societal values that press for recognition. x x x. 130 (Emphasis
supplied.)
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the
threat to judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice that
immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions
pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and
Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice of
law for issuing to the media statements grossly disrespectful towards the
Court in relation to a pending case, to wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interest. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression
and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the
context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community. x x x.132 (Emphases
supplied.)
For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some
respondents133 that the Statement presents no grave or imminent danger to a
legitimate public interest.
The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic
freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence,
guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine
what they will teach their students and how they will teach. We must point out
that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon
respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic
freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action
for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in
favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even
if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed
upon in any previous case before this Court, is the question of whether
lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a
defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending
to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the
courts.
Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense
in other bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully
invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence
discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of
members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers
to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal
profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of
expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater
force to the academic freedom of law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad
definition in Cayetano v. Monsod,134lawyers when they teach law are
considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other
disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are
bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same
canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the
Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the
fact that they are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the
Common Compliance that their issuance of the Statement was in keeping
with their duty to "participate in the development of the legal system by
initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the
administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in
keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to
legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence
the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons
to abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law professors
are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their
students exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole
and not just their preferred portions thereof.
The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of
Canons 1, 11 and 13.
Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of freedom of expression
and academic freedom, the Court considers here the other averments in their
submissions.
With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations presented two main
ideas: (a) the validity of their position regarding the plagiarism charge against
Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the
correct action on said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents’
staunch belief that Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the
majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in the Show Cause
Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of
his cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging
in public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into
disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as
Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should be applied in this case with
more reason, as the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced
the Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in a public statement
using contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently
submitted to the Court for "proper disposition."
That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of
the Malaya Lolas was one of the objectives of the Statement could be seen
in the following paragraphs from the same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only
of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered
the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot
coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and
misinterpreted texts.
xxxx
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does
violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in
the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for
contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate matters to be
properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly
inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in
one of the compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the
Common Compliance, respondents even go so far as to attach documentary
evidence to support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del Castillo in the
present controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC), with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the
time of the filing of respondents’ submissions in this administrative case. As
respondents themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed
overriding interest in said ethics case, it is not proper procedure for
respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it
has no bearing on their own administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the
Statement was intended for effective speech; that speech must be "forceful
enough to make the intended recipients listen."136 One wonders what sort of
effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others,
callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and
respect. The Court fails to see how it can ennoble the profession if we allow
respondents to send a signal to their students that the only way to effectively
plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view is to be
offensive.
This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were
deliberately quoted in full in the narration of background facts to illustrate the
sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters and the antagonistic
irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who
would expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works.
Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court,
they still obviously took pains to convey their objections in a deferential and
scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not
do the same. These foreign authors’ letters underscore the universality of the
tenet that legal professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due
respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions
logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive
recriminations.
As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to
take "constructive action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts
as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant for this Court’s
consideration, why was the same published and reported in the media first
before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement
was prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to capture
media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the most
controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in
the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents’ colleague on the UP
Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of
fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew
fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of
the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were still
both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have
been widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time the
Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the
constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement
under the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics
charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time
from the drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its
publication and submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics
Committee had already been convened. If it is true that the respondents’
outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court
then, when it became known that the Court did intend to take action, there
was nothing to prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take
this supervening event into account in the interest of fairness.
Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in
the respondents’ reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the
print media and the internet as proof that they are being unfairly "singled
out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance
show that it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the
institution of disciplinary137 or contempt138 action. This Court takes into
account the nature of the criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of
the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons outside
the profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from
individuals whose personal or other interests in making the criticism are
obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them. However, when law
professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of
fair commentary and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil
liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave
implication on legal education in our country.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance,
considering that this appears to be the first time these respondents have
been involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to
give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-
intentioned in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in
jurisprudence that where the excessive and contumacious language used is
plain and undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. As this Court
expounded in Salcedo:
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his
intention to offend the court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but,
unfortunately, there are his phrases which need no further comment.
Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions
and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no
excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases
employed are justified by the facts a valid defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used
was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the
judicial office should always be observed and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118
La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an
extenuation of liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he prepared said motion.
This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order to avoid
a recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following the bad example,
from taking the same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the
case of said attorney with the justice it deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should,
notwithstanding their claim of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty,
under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to refrain
from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on
pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in
his Compliance compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one
among the respondents who showed true candor and sincere deference to
the Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of how he came to
sign the Statement. He was candid enough to state that his agreement to the
Statement was in principle and that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of
discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of the
October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty
brought about by a division of opinion on whether or not willful or deliberate
intent was an element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing to acknowledge
that he may have been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language
of the Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without
having to retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for
undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and without baseless
insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that
this Court expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their
principles but only that they recognize that they themselves may have
committed some ethical lapse in this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for
showing that at least one of the respondents can grasp the true import of the
Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these reasons, the Court finds
Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar
of the State of Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority
of this Court, he should be excused from these proceedings. However, he
should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine
law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional
conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.
For even if one is not bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility for
members of the Philippine Bar, civility and respect among legal professionals
of any nationality should be aspired for under universal standards of decency
and fairness.
The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause
why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for submitting a "dummy" that was not a true and
faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity
II was not a true and faithful reproduction of the actual signed
copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the body, there
were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the
discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of the Statement
(i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by claiming that it is
but expected in "live" public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as
more and more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise stresses
that he is not administratively liable because he did not misrepresent the
members of the UP Law faculty who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity
Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be signatories
thereto."140
To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s implied view
that the signatures in the Statement are not as significant as its contents.
Live public manifesto or not, the Statement was formally submitted to this
Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories
at that point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies
precisely in the identities of the persons who have signed it, since the
Statement’s persuasive authority mainly depends on the reputation and
stature of the persons who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is apparent
from respondents’ explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of
their positions as UP law professors prompted them to publicly speak out on
the matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen’s predicament is
the fact that he did not from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring
Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead, submitted Restoring
Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn out,
according to Dean Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the retyping of
the signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed
administrative officer in the dean’s office gave the dean inaccurate
information that led him to allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among
the signatories of Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff also failed
to type the name of Atty. Armovit when encoding the signature pages of
Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.
The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or
a website a signed document may have to be reformatted and signatures
may be indicated by the notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are willing
to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to eliminate
blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court,
of a signed document for the Court’s consideration that did not contain the
actual signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is the original signed
document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of
the actual signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation
why he deviated from this practice with his submission to the Court of
Restoring Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the
dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks
and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism with
respect to court submissions for court employees are accountable for the
care of documents and records that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean
Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not
contain the actual signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in itself
a display of lack of candor.
Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations yield the answer. In the
course of his explanation of his willingness to accept his administrative
officer’s claim that Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated as a signatory,
Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had likewise only
authorized him to indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the
Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted
and submitted to this Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not
actually signed the same. Contrary to Dean Leonen’s proposition, that is
precisely tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a person or
persons participated in an act when such person or persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for
perfection and stringent standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the
explanation that there was no misrepresentation when he allowed at least
one person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement when all
he had was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of
Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that the former
intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to
observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the Court, we see no
reason why he could not have waited until all the professors who indicated
their desire to sign the Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the
Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was truly impossible
to secure some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to
leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen should have just resigned himself to the
signatures that he was able to secure.
We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for
actual signatures before submission of the Statement to this Court. As
respondents all asserted, they were neither parties to nor counsels in the
Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement
was neither a pleading with a deadline nor a required submission to the
Court; rather, it was a voluntary submission that Dean Leonen could do at
any time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory.
However, the Court is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of
Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his objectives. In due
consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good intentions, the Court deems
it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and
honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under Canon 10.
Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230
and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC are unmeritorious.
In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for
alternative reliefs should the Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that
is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose,
they be allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and
evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice
Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and
evidence that were presented or may be presented in the ethics case against
Justice Del Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was substantially echoed in Dean Leonen’s separate
Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s Compliance, she similarly expressed
the sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered
indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such
may be punished only after charge and hearing."141 It is this group of
respondents’ premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be
accorded full due process.
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in
this case springs largely from its characterization as a special civil action for
indirect contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October
19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the majority’s
purported failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as
her main ground for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.
However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect
contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no
application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution
this case was docketed as an administrative matter.
The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on
disciplinary proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu
proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of
justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to
the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a
lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same
manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report
of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation,
through a referral to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not
mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an
investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A
will be followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not
require a trial type hearing. We have held that:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard,
hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been
afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is
not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the
requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. 142 (Emphases
supplied.)
In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena
v. Aparicio143 that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.)
In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court – Br. 81,
Romblon – On the Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of
Law,145 we further observed that:
[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or
resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently
provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of
any further investigation after considering his actions based on records
showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on
the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public
interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several
cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus
operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the
astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those
cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of respondents'
administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under
the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no
evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined for
professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.
xxxx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against
and/or formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from
immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer
or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier,
Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present
matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this
Court.146(Emphases supplied.)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a
hearing and their reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on
these proceedings. Neither have they shown in their pleadings any
justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not
specifically stated what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they
intend to present in their defense that will necessitate a formal hearing.
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and
witnesses bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the
findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution
were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the
Court in the Decision in that case. This is the primary reason for their request
for access to the records and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the
only incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the
fact that the submission of the actual signed copy of the Statement (or
Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart
from that fact, it bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC, the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and
independent matter from this case.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause
Resolution that the respondents issued a Statement with language that the
Court deems objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case and the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further
than the four corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news
reports/columns (many of which respondents themselves supplied to this
Court in their Common Compliance) and internet sources that are already of
public knowledge.
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the
language of the Statement and the circumstances surrounding the drafting,
printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the Court does
not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo
could possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within
the knowledge of respondents and if there is any evidence on these matters
the same would be in their possession.
We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how as
early as September 2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics
case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the October 19,
2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from
abroad, predicted that the Court would take some form of action on the
Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable
person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the Statement’s
principles, could foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an
implicit recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court
should simply let pass. This belies respondents’ claim that it is necessary for
them to refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to
divine the bases for the Show Cause Resolution.
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their
respective compliances or chosen not to make a full defense at this time,
because they were counting on being granted a hearing, that is respondents’
own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be
aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a
hearing in disciplinary cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk
they have taken.
Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of,
and evidence presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of
merit.
A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to
have monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue.
Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view
they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court
is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court
demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another
under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges,
court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court
and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for
admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the
courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors,
regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to
which they belong.
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his
submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys.
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin,
Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia
R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin
T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De
Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A.
Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista,
Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O.
Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M.
La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S.
Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas
Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D.
Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law
professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11
and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due
respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive
language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to
denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that
the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found
UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more
mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court,
and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty
in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is
excused from these proceedings. However, he is reminded that while
he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should
strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his
students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the
records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7676 June 10, 2014
AMADO T. DIZON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This concerns an administrative complaint1 for disbarment against Atty.
Norlita De Taza (Atty. De Taza) for the latter's demand for and receipt of
exorbitant sums of money from her client purportedly to expedite the
proceedings of their case which was pending before the Court.
The Facts
Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged that sometime in February 2005, he,
along with his siblings engaged the services of Romero De Taza Cruz and
Associates to represent them in the case of Eliza T. Castaneda, et al. v.
Heirs of Spouses Martin and Lucia Dizon with G.R. No. 174552.2 The
complainant claimed that sometime in February 2007, Atty. De Taza
demanded the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) from him
to expedite the proceedings before the Court. This amount was over and
above the parties’ stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by a contract. 3
According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was that, a month
earlier or in January 2007, Atty. De Taza had already demanded and
received a total of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱800,000.00) from his
sibling Aurora Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to
him, which was to expedite the proceedings of their case before the Court.
Handwritten receipts4 signed by one Atty. Norlita De Taza were submitted by
the complainant, which state:
15 Jan. 2007
Receipt
That the amount received ₱300,000 shall be used to expedite the case
which, in turn shall result in the following:
1. Decision favorable to plaintiff w/in 2 mos. from receipt of
said amount;
2. Back rentals up to present should be returned, if the same
should not be included in the Decision, the 300,000.00 shall
be returned.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza518 Jan. 2007
Receipt
The amount of ₱500,000 has been advanced as part of expense [sic] to
expedite the process before the courts. The said amount has been advanced
by Ms. Aurora Dizon and the same should be reimbursed to her by her
siblings upon winning the case with finality.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza6
On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura,
Manila and learned that the Court had already denied the petition on
November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty. De Taza’s representations that the
case was still pending. He tried to communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she
could no longer be found.7
Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted a complaint for
disbarment8 against Atty. De Taza. He also attached several affidavits and
documents9 from other individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza issued
bouncing checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana
Lynda Pineda executed an affidavit10which was attached to the complaint,
alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11 checks11 in her favor amounting to
₱481,400.00, which were all dishonored by the bank. Demand letters sent to
her went unheeded.
Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose Affidavit12 was
attached to the complaint, averred that Atty. De Taza issued a check13 for
₱50,000.00 as payment for her loan. Said check was dishonored by the bank
for being drawn against a closed account.
Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an affidavit,14 stating
that Atty. De Taza owes her ₱29,560.39 and failed to pay the said amount
despite repeated demands.
On November 14, 2007, the complainant through a letter15 informed the
Court that Atty. De Taza is planning to leave the country as she was joining
her husband in the United States of America (U.S.A.).
In a Resolution16 dated December 10, 2007, Atty. De Taza was required by
the Court to file a Comment. However, the copy of the Resolution was
returned unserved with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS (Return to Sender)-
Moved". The Court then resolved by virtue of the Resolution17 dated July 2,
2008, to send a copy to Atty. De Taza’s office address at Romero De Taza
Cruz and Associates. Said copy was also returned unserved with the
notation "RTS-not connected."
It was then required in the Resolution18 dated October 8, 2008 that the
complainant inform the Court of Atty. De Taza’s new address, which the
complainant faithfully complied with by giving Atty. De Taza’s new address in
the U.S.A. The Court, in its Resolution19 dated January 26, 2009, directed the
Clerk of Court to resend a copy of the Resolution dated December 10, 2007
with a copy of the complaint to Atty. De Taza using the latter’s U.S.A.
address.
Like the previous occasions, the copy of the Resolution dated December 10,
2007 with the complaint was returned; this time, with the postal carrier’s
notation "RTS-Unclaimed". The Court in its Resolution20 dated September 9,
2009, held that the said copy of the Resolution was deemed served and
resolved to consider Atty. De Taza as having waived the filing of her
comment. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
A Notice of Mandatory Conference21 was sent to the parties, in which they
failed to appear. Thus, the parties were directed to file their respective
position papers. The complainant, in a letter22 addressed to the IBP, averred
that he was already residing abroad and maintained that he had already
submitted his documentary evidence at the time of the filing of his complaint.
Atty. De Taza, for her part, did not file any position paper.
In its Report and Recommendation23 dated January 4,2011, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that Atty. De Taza be
suspended for a period of two years from the practice of law.
The IBP Board of Governors modified the Commission on Bar Discipline’s
recommendation in a Resolution24 dated January 3, 2013, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s demand of
[P]800,000.00 to expedite the case pending in the Supreme Court when, in
fact, the case had long been dismissed, Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.25 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Issue
WHETHER ATTY. DE TAZASHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY
LIABLE FOR ISSUING BOUNCING CHECKS, DEMANDING AND/OR
RECEIVING MONEY FROM HER CLIENTS UNDERTHE GUISE OF
HAVING THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT EXPEDITED. Ruling
The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not able to refute
the accusations against her. Numerous attempts were made to afford her an
opportunity to defend herself from the complainant’s allegations, but all these
efforts were only met with silence. Whether her transfer of residence was an
unscrupulous move on her part to evade her creditors, only she would
certainly know. But as far as the Court is concerned, all means were
exhausted to give Atty. De Taza an avenue to oppose the complainant’s
charges. Her failure and/or refusal to file a comment will not be a hindrance
for the Court to mete out an appropriate sanction.
The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings are
investigations by the Court to ascertain whether a lawyer is fit to be one.
There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. As this Court held in
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,26 citing In the
Matter of the Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Almacen, et al.
v. Yaptinchay:27 "Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action
or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of
its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
[their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. x x x.28 (Italics supplied)
"In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, is required."29 Based on the documentary evidence
submitted by the complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza manifested a
propensity for borrowing money, issuing bouncing checks and incurring debts
which she left unpaid without any reason. The complainant even submitted a
document evidencing Atty. De Taza’s involvement in an estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 22 case filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Angeles City (I.S. 07-J-2815-36) for drawing checks against a
closed account, among other complaint-affidavits executed by her other
creditors. Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an
ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when the same is exhibited by a
member of the Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De Taza must remember that she is
not only a symbol but also an instrument of justice, equity and fairness.
"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness
for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal
honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public
confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the
remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of
such act to the public interest and public order.1âwphi1 It also manifests a
lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she
joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the
profession she should hold in high esteem."30
Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were
even worse as she had the gall to make it appear to the complainant that the
proceedings before the Court can be expedited and ruled in their favor in
exchange for an exorbitant amount of money. Said scheme was employed by
Atty. De Taza just to milk more money from her clients. Without a doubt, Atty.
De Taza’s actions are reprehensible and her greed more than apparent when
she even used the name of the Court to defraud her client.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the
lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money
was spent for that particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for
the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client.31 In this case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza demanded money
is baseless and non-existent. Thus, her demand should not have even been
made in the first place.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the
disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for any of the following: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s
oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8)
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.32
The Court in Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo33 suspended the
respondent from the practice of law for two years when the latter issued
checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial
Services, Inc. v. Valerio,34 the same penalty was meted out by this Court to
the erring lawyer who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan.
Additionally, in Anacta v. Resurreccion,35 the Court held that suspension from
the practice of law for four years was the appropriate sanction for a lawyer
who defrauded his client into paying ₱42,000.00 to him for the purported
filing of a petition for annulment of marriage. The respondent therein
presented to his client a copy of the petition with stamped receipt from the
trial court when in reality, no such petition was filed.
In Celaje v. Atty. Soriano,36 the respondent therein demanded ₱14,000.00
from the complainant to be put up as injunction bond and asked for additional
sums of money on other occasions, supposedly to pay the judge who was
handling the case. When the complainant verified this with the judge, the
judge denied the respondent’s allegations. The complainant later learned that
the bond was also unnecessary, as the application for a writ was already
denied by the trial court. Due to the foregoing, the Court suspended the
respondent from the practice of law for two years.
"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only
upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally
important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal
system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in
a manner beyond reproach."37 "The Judiciary has been besieged enough
with accusations of corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal
profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with
such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be
tolerated."38
All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report and
recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline which is to
suspend Atty. De Taza from the practice of law for two years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for TWO YEARS with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their
information and guidance, and let it be entered in Atty. Norlita De Taza's
record in this Court.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5359 March 10, 2014
ERMELINDA LAD VOA. DE DOMINGUEZ, represented by her Attorney-
in-Fact, VICENTE A. PICHON,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez (complainant) was the
widow of the late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in
Caraga, Davao Oriental, on October 18, 1995, involving a dump truck owned
by the Municipality of Caraga. Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges
against the Municipality of Caraga and engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. (Atty. Agleron). On three (3) occasions, Atty.
Agleron requested and received from complainant the following amounts for
the payment of filing fees and sheriffs fees, to wit: (1) June 3, 1996 -
₱3,000.00; (2) June 7, 1996 -Pl,800.00; and September 2, 1996 - ₱5,250.00
or a total of ₱10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no
complaint was filed by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga. 1
Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service
and received the amount of ₱10,050.00. He, however, explained that their
agreement was that complainant would pay the filing fees and other
incidental expenses and as soon as the complaint was prepared and ready
for filing, complainant would pay 30% of the agreed attorney’s fees of
₱100,000.00. On June 7, 1996, after the signing of the complaint, he advised
complainant to pay in full the amount of the filing fee and sheriff’s fees and
the 30% of the attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty. Agleron
averred that since the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of
₱10,050.00 was deposited in a bank while awaiting the payment of the
balance of the filing fee and attorney’s fee.2
In reply,3 complainant denied that she did not give the full payment of the
filing fee and asserted that the filing fee at that time amounted only to
₱7,836.60.
In the Report and Recommendation,4 dated January 12, 2012, the
Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Agleron to have violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to
him, and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of four (4) months.
In its April 16, 2013 Resolution,5 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Agleron be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of only one (1) month.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
except as to the penalty imposed.
Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that:
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his
client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence,
care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free.6 He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed on him.7
In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint
against the Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it
was already prepared and signed. He attributed his non-filing of the
appropriate charges on the failure of complainant to remit the full payment of
the filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorney's fee. Such justification,
however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate him from liability. As
stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full attention
whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant
had not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a
way to speak to his client and inform him about the insufficiency of the filing
fee so he could file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked
professionalism in dealing with complainant and showed incompetence when
he failed to file the appropriate charges.1âwphi1
In a number of cases,8 the Court held that a lawyer should never neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence renders him liable for
disciplinary action such as suspension ranging from three months to two
years. In this case, the Court finds the suspension of Atty. Agleron from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, respondent ATTY. ARNULFO
M. AGLERON, SR. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in
the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014
STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS
BRUNET, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet
(complainants) filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren
(Atty. Guaren) before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CED), Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of
Atty. Guaren for the titling of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva
Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos
(₱10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed
that full payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title; that
Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00)
which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative
to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original copy
of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and
original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for
additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) which they dutifully
gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the
case and each time he would say that the titling was in progress; that they
became bothered by the slow progress of the case so they demanded the
return of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the
same provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) be
deducted to answer for his professional fees.
Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client
relationship between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against
them in a case pending before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob,
Cebu (MCTC).
Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance
fee of ₱10,000.00, but denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for
the titling of the lot. He claimed, however, that he received the payment of
₱1,000.00 and ₱6,000.00; that their agreement was that the case would be
filed in court after the complainants fully paid his acceptance fee; that he did
not take the documents relative to the titling of the lot except for the
photocopy of the tax declaration; and that he did not commit betrayal of trust
and confidence when he participated in a case filed against the complainants
in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf of Atty. Ervin
Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in the said hearing.
In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August 24, 2012, the
Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon
of Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants’
lot and despite the acceptance of ₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his
obligation and allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in the
titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be disciplined for appearing in a
case against complainants without a written consent from the latter. The CBD
recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.
In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD,
suspending Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for three (3) months only.
The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical
conduct of Atty. Guaren, except as to the penalty.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.3
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of
₱7,000.00 as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to
perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants' lot
despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his
client with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of
having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6)
MONTHS effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a
similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in
the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016
NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ROMEO G.
AGUILOS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an
attorney towards his client in which the former is found and
declared to be lacking in knowledge and skill sufficient for the
engagement. Does quantum meruit attach when an attorney fails
to accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected to perform
during his professional engagement?
Antecedents
Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty.
Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent) with misconduct for the latter's
refusal to return the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his
professional services despite his not having performed the
contemplated professional services. She avers that in March 2005,
she sought the legal services of the respondent to represent her in
the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband,
Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the respondent accepted the
engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00, plus the appearance
fee of P5,000.00/hearing; that she then gave to him the initial
amount of P90,000.00;1 that she had gone to his residence in May
2005 to inquire on the developments in her case, but he told her
that he would only start working on the case upon her full payment
of the acceptance fee; that she had only learned then that what he
had contemplated to file for her was a petition for legal separation,
not one for the annulment of her marriage; that he further told her
that she would have to pay a higher acceptance fee for the
annulment of her marriage;2 that she subsequently withdrew the
case from him, and requested the refund of the amounts already
paid, but he refused to do the same as he had already started
working on the case;3 that she had sent him a letter, through Atty.
Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less
whatever amount corresponded to the legal services he had
already performed;4 that the respondent did not heed her demand
letter despite his not having rendered any appreciable legal
services to her;5 and that his constant refusal to return the
amounts prompted her to bring an administrative complaint
against him6 in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March
20, 2007.
In his answer dated May 21, 2007,7 the respondent alleges that the
complainant and her British fiancee sought his legal services to
bring the petition for the annulment of her marriage; that based on
his evaluation of her situation, the more appropriate case would be
one for legal separation anchored on the psychological incapacity of
her husband; that she and her British fiancee agreed on
P150,000.00 for his legal services to bring the action for legal
separation, with the fiancee paying him P70,000.00, as evidenced
by his handwritten receipt;8 that for purposes of the petition for
legal separation he required the complainant to submit copies of
her marriage contract and the birth certificates of her children with
her husband, as well as for her to submit to further interviews by
him to establish the grounds for legal separation; that he later on
communicated with her and her fiancee upon finalizing the petition,
but they did not promptly respond to his communications; that in
May 2005, she admitted to him that she had spent the money that
her fiancee had given to pay the balance of his professional fees;
and that in June 2005, she returned to him with a note at the back
of the prepared petition for legal separation essentially requesting
him not to file the petition because she had meanwhile opted to
bring the action for the annulment of her marriage instead.
The respondent admits that he received the demand letter from
Atty. Martinez, but states that he dismissed the letter as a mere
scrap of paper because the demand lacked basis in law. It is noted
that he wrote in the last part of his answer dated May 21, 2007 in
relation to the demand letter the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for
refund dated 15 August 2005 (Annex "B" of the complaint) as a
mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her
counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ, who unskillfully relied
on an unverified information furnished him, to the urinal project
of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful
purpose.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) summoned the
parties to a mandatory conference on August 3, 2007,10 but only
the complainant and her counsel attended the conference. On his
part, the respondent sent a letter dated July 20, 2007 to the IBP-
CBD to reiterate his answer.11 Due to his non-appearance, the IBP-
CBD terminated the conference on the same day, but required the
complainant to submit a verified position paper within 10 days. She
did not submit the position paper in the end.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. ultimately
recommended as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The undersigned Commissioner is most respectfully recommending
the following:
(1) To order the respondent to return to the complainant the
amount of P30,000.00 which he received for the purpose
of preparing a petition for legal separation. Undersigned
believes that considering the degree of professional
services he has extended, the amount of P40,000.00 he
received on March 10, 2005 would be sufficient payment
for the same.
(2) For failure to distinguish between the grounds for legal
separation and annulment of marriage, respondent
should be sanctioned.

In his commissioner's report dated July 25, 2008,12 IBP

Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. declared that
the respondent's insistence that he could have brought a petition
for legal separation based on the psychological incapacity of the (3) Lastly, for failure to conduct himself with courtesy,
complainant's husband was sanctionable because he himself was fairness towards his colleagues and for using offensive or
apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal separation; improper language in his pleading, which was filed right
that because he rendered some legal services to the complainant, before the Commission on Bar Discipline, he must also be
he was entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 sanctioned and disciplined in order to avoid repetition of
paid to him as acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being the value of the said misconduct.
the services rendered under the principle of quantum meruit; and
that, accordingly, he should be made to return to her the amount
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully
of P30,000.00.
recommended that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be ordered to return to
complainant Nenita D. Sanchez the amount of P30,000.00 which
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. observed that the
the former received as payment for his services because it is
respondent's statement in the last part of his answer, to the effect
excessive.
that the demand letter sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf of the
complainant should be treated as a scrap of paper, or should have
It is also recommended that the Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be
been addressed "to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
serve its rightful purpose," was uncalled for and improper; and he
for failure to show his respect to his fellow lawyer and for using
opined that such offensive and improper language uttered by the
offensive and improper language in his pleadings.
respondent against a fellow lawyer violated Rule 8.0113 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20,
2008,14 the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the findings of
Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr., but modified the
recommendation of the penalty, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A",
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondent's failure to show respect to his fellow lawyer and for
showing offensive and improper words in his pleadings, Atty.
Romeo G. Aguilos, is hereby WARNED and Ordered to
Return the Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos to complainant
within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,16 which the IBP
Board of Governors denied through Resolution No. XXI-2014-177
dated March 23, 2014.17
Issues
The two issues for consideration and resolution are: (a) whether or
not the respondent should be held administratively liable for
misconduct; and (b) whether or not he should be ordered to return
the attorney's fees paid.
Ruling of the Court
We adopt and affirm Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 and Resolution
No. XXI-2014-177, but modify the recommended penalty.
1.
Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be
ordered to return the entire amount received from the client
The respondent offered himself to the complainant as a lawyer who
had the requisite professional competence and skill to handle the
action for the annulment of marriage for her. He required her to
pay P150,000.00 as attorney's fees, exclusive of the filing fees and
his appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing. Of that amount, he
received the sum of P70,000.00.
On the respondent's conduct of himself in his professional
relationship with the complainant as his client, we reiterate and
adopt the thorough analysis and findings by IBP Investigating
Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. to be very apt and cogent, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As appearing in Annex "4", which is the handwritten retainer's
contract between the respondent and the complainant, there is a
sweeping evidence that there is an attorney-client relationship. The
respondent agreed to accept the case in the amount of
P150,000.00. The acceptance fee was agreed upon to be paid on
installment basis. Excluded in the agreement is the payment of
appearance fee, filing fee and other legal documentation.
That next question is - for what case the P150,000.00 was
intended for? Was it intended for the filing of the annulment case
or legal separation?
In the verified Answer filed by the respondent, even the latter is
quite confused as to what action he is going to file in court. The
intention of the British national and the complainant was to get
married. At that time and maybe up to now, the complainant is still
legally married to a certain Jovencio C. Sanchez. That considering
that the two are intending to get married, we can safely assume
that the complainant was contemplating of filing a petition for
annulment of marriage in order to free her from the marriage bond
with her husband. It is only then, granting that the petition will be
granted, that the complainant will be free to marry the British
subject. The legal separation is but a separation of husband and
wife from board and bed and the marriage bond still exists.
Granting that the petition for legal separation will be granted, one
is not free to marry another person.
A reading of the answer filed by the respondent would show that
he himself is not well versed in the grounds for legal separation. He
stated the following;
. . . respondent suggested to them to file instead a legal separation
case for the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband to
comply with his marital obligations developed or of their marriage
on February 6, 1999. (please see par. 2 of the Answer).
If the intention was to file a petition for legal separation, under
A.M. 02-11-11-SC, the grounds are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 2. Petition-
(a) Who may and when to file - (1) A petition for legal separation
may be filed only by the husband or the wife, as the case may be,
within five years from the time of the occurrence of any of the
following causes:
(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
change religious or political affiliation;
(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of
more than six years, even if pardoned;
(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in or outside the Philippines;
(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;
(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or
(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
Psychological incapacity, contrary to what respondent explained to
the complainant, is not one of those mentioned in any of the
grounds for legal separation.
Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
psychological incapacity is never a ground for the purpose of filing
a petition for legal separation.
On the other hand, psychological incapacity has always been used
for the purpose of filing a petition for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage.
That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family Code, it stales
that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and
participate in continuing legal education program (Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent repetition
of such kind of advise that respondent gave to the complainant. In
giving an advise, he should be able to distinguish between the
grounds for legal separation and grounds for annulment of
marriage. But as the respondent stated in his answer, it appears
that he is mixed up with the basic provisions of the
law.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional
competence and skill to the complainant. As the foregoing findings
reveal, he did not know the distinction between the grounds for
legal separation and for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge
would have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting
a professional engagement for either causes of action. His
explanation that the client initially intended to pursue the action for
legal separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably
contemplated by the parties and for which his services was
engaged, was no other than an action for annulment of the
complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of
marrying her British fiancee. They did not contemplate legal
separation at all, for legal separation would still render her
incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in his
answer that he had prepared a petition for legal separation, and
that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to have
the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension
other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim for
services rendered.
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed
on him as an attorney. He thus transgressed Canon 18, and Rules
18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee
which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to
render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent
of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter
without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable. (Emphasis supplied)
The next to be dealt with is the matter of the attorney's fees. We
can easily agree that every attorney is entitled to have and receive
a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the
special instance and request of his client. As long as the attorney is
in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the
interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation
for such services.19
The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer's
agreement between the client and the attorney, which constitutes
the law between the parties for as long as it is not contrary to law,
good morals, good customs, public policy or public order.20 The
underlying theory is that the retainer's agreement between them
gives to the client the reasonable notice of the arrangement on the
fees. Once the attorney has performed the task assigned to him in
a valid agreement, his compensation is determined on the basis of
what he and the client agreed.21 In the absence of the written
agreement, the lawyer's compensation shall be based on quantum
meruit, which means "as much as he deserved."22The
determination of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is
also authorized "when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not
able to finish the case to its conclusion."23 Moreover, quantum
meruit becomes the basis of recovery of compensation by the
attorney where the circumstances of the engagement indicate that
it will be contrary to the parties' expectation to deprive the
attorney of all compensation.
Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what is
reasonable compensation based on the obtaining
circumstances,24 provided that the attorney does not receive more
than what is reasonable, in keeping with Section 24 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees - An
attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view
to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the
extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of
the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys
as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own
professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control
the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
The courts supervision of the lawyer's compensation for legal
services rendered is not only for the purpose of ensuring the
reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees charged, but also
for the purpose of preserving the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession.25cralawred
The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because
as it was later revealed, it was way above his ability and
competence to handle the case for annulment of marriage. As a
consequence, he had no basis to accept any amount as attorney's
fees from the complainant. He did not even begin to perform the
contemplated task he undertook for the complainant because it
was improbable that the agreement with her was to bring the
action for legal separation. His having supposedly prepared the
petition for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of
marriage was either his way of covering up for his incompetence,
or his means of charging her more. Either way did not entitle him
to retain the amount he had already received.
The written receipt dated March 10, 2005 shows that the
respondent received P70,000.00 as acceptance fee. His refusal to
return the amount to the complainant rested on his claim of having
already completed the first phase of the preparation of the petition
for legal separation after having held conferences with the
complainant and her British fiancee. In this respect, IBP
Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. opined that the
respondent could retain P40,000.00 of the P70,000.00 because the
respondent had rendered some legal services to the complainant,
specifically: (a) having the complainant undergo further interviews
towards establishing the ground for legal separation; (b) reducing
into writing the grounds discussed during the interviews based on
her statement in her own dialect (Annexes 1 and 2) after he could
not understand the written statement prepared for the purpose by
her British fiancee; (c) requiring her to submit her marriage
contract with her husband Jovencio C. Sanchez (Annex 3), and the
certificates of live birth of her four children: Mary Joy, Timothy,
Christine, and Janette Anne, all surnamed Sanchez (Annexes 4, 5,
6 and 7); and (d) finalizing her petition for legal separation (Annex
8) in the later part of April, 2007.
The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. in
favor of the respondent was too generous. We cannot see how the
respondent deserved any compensation because he did not really
begin to perform the contemplated tasks if, even based on his
version, he would prepare the petition for legal separation instead
of the petition for annulment of marriage. The attorney who fails to
accomplish the tasks he should naturally and expectedly perform
during his professional engagement does not discharge his
professional responsibility and ethical duty toward his client. The
respondent was thus guilty of misconduct, and may be sanctioned
according to the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence, he
may be ordered to restitute to the client the amount received from
the latter in consideration of the professional engagement, subject
to the rule on quantum meruit, if warranted.
Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the amount of
P10,000.00 for his misrepresentation of his professional
competence, and he is further to be ordered to return the entire
amount of P70,000.00 received from the client, plus legal interest
of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full
payment.
2.
Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor towards his professional colleague
The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to
"abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged."26 This duty of lawyers is further emphasized in the Code
of Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A lawyer
shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically demands that:
"A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."
The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system
which has necessitated lawyers to use strong language in the
advancement of the interest of their clients.27 However, as
members of a noble profession, lawyers are always impressed with
the duty to represent their clients' cause, or, as in this case, to
represent a personal matter in court, with courage and zeal but
that should not be used as license for the use of offensive and
abusive language. In maintaining the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, a lawyer's language - spoken or in his pleadings -
must be dignified.28 As such, every lawyer is mandated to carry out
his duty as an agent in the administration of justice with courtesy,
dignity and respect not only towards his clients, the court and
judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in the Legal
Profession.
The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from
Atty. Martinez should be treated "as a mere scrap of paper or
should have been addressed by her counsel x x x to the urinal
project of the MMDA where it may service its rightful purpose"
constituted simple misconduct that this Court cannot tolerate.
In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify
the offensive and improper language by asserting that the
phraseology was not per se uncalled for and improper. He
explained that he had sufficient cause for maintaining that the
demand letter should be treated as a mere scrap of paper and
should be disregarded. However, his assertion does not excuse the
offensiveness and impropriety of his language. He could have
easily been respectful and proper in responding to the letter.
As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is reprimanded, with
the stern warning that a repetition of the offense will be severely
punished.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
476 dated September 20, 2008 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors, with the MODIFICATION that
Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for
misrepresenting his professional competence to the client,
and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and improper
language towards his fellow attorney, with the stern warning that a
repetition of the offense shall be severely punished.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the
complainant within thirty (30) days from notice the sum of
P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from
the date of this decision until full payment.
Let copies of this decision be attached to the personal records of
Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos as a member of the Philippine Bar, and be
furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
EN BANC
A.C. No. 11246, June 14, 2016
ARNOLD PACAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SINAMAR
LIMOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a verified complaint1 filed on November 4, 2011
by Arnold Pacao (complainant), seeking the disbarment of Atty.
Sinamar Limos (Atty. Limos) for conduct unbecoming of a member
of the Bar.
The Facts
Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel Pacao,
former vault custodian of BHF Pawnshop (BHF) branch in
Mandaluyong City, was charged with qualified theft by BHF. At the
preliminary investigation, Atty. Limos appeared as counsel for BHF.
Thereafter, the case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF,
through Atty. Limos, for a possible settlement. A meeting was then
arranged between the complainant and Atty. Limos, where the
latter represented that she was duly authorized by BHF. After a
series of negotiations, Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is demanding
the sum of P530,000.00 to be paid in full or by installments.
Further negotiation led to an agreement whereby the complainant
would pay an initial amount of P200,000.00 to be entrusted to
Atty. Limos, who will then deliver to the complainant a signed
affidavit of desistance, a compromise agreement, and a joint
motion to approve compromise agreement for filing with the
court.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of
P200,000.00 to Atty. Limos, who in turn, signed an
Acknowledgment Receipt4 recognizing her undertakings as counsel
of BHF. However, Atty. Limos failed to meet the terms of their
agreement. Notwithstanding such failure, Atty. Limos still sought to
get from the complainant the next installment amount of their
purported agreement, but the latter
refused.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's
representative, Camille Bonifacio, who informed him that Atty.
Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorized to
negotiate any settlement nor receive any money in behalf of BHF.
The complainant also learned that BHF did not receive the
P200,000.00 initial payment that he gave to Atty.
Limos.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This prompted the complainant to send a demand letter7 to Atty.
Limos to return the P200,000.00 initial settlement payment, but
the latter failed and refused to do so.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The complainant then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Limos
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD). The IBP-CBD required Atty. Limos to file an
answer but she did not file any responsive pleading.9 A mandatory
conference was then set on March 1 and 29, 2012, and April 19,
2012, but Atty. Limos failed to attend. Thereafter, the IBP-CBD
ordered the parties to submit their position paper, but once again,
Atty. Limos did not bother to submit her position paper.
On May 5, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
the disbarment of Atty. Limos.10 The Investigating Commissioner
found enough evidence on record to prove that Atty. Limos
committed fraud and practiced deceit on the complainant to the
latter's prejudice by concealing or omitting to disclose the material
fact that she no longer had the authority to negotiate and conclude
a settlement for and on behalf of BHF, nor was authorized to
receive the P200,000.00 from the complainant. Atty. Limos was
likewise ordered to return to the complainant the full amount of
P200,000.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date of her receipt of the said amount to the date
of her return of the full amount.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In a Resolution12 dated April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner's report and
recommendation.
On March 8, 2016, the IBP transmitted the notice of the resolution
and the case records to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court.13 As per verification of the Court,
neither party has filed a motion for reconsideration or a petition for
review thereafter.
The Issue
Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a
sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Limos from the practice of
law?14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ruling of the Court
To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that
Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case, for she had already
been twice suspended from the practice of law, by this Court, for
three months each in Villaflores v. Atty. Limos15 and Wilkie v. Atty.
Limos.16 In Villaflores, Atty. Limos received attorney's fees of
P20,000.00 plus miscellaneous expenses of P2,000.00, but she
failed to perform her undertaking with her client; thus she was
found guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty. Likewise,
in Wilkie, Atty. Limos was held administratively liable for her
deceitful and dishonest conduct when she obtained a loan of
P250,000.00 from her client and issued two postdated checks in
the latter's favor to pay the said loan despite knowledge of
insufficiency of funds to cover the same. In both cases, the Court,
gave Atty. Limos a warning that repetition of the same or similar
acts by her will merit a more severe penalty.
Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an
administrative case before this Court for receiving the amount of
P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly for a possible
amicable settlement with her client BHF. However, Atty. Limos was
no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorize to negotiate and
conclude a settlement for and on behalf of BHF nor was she
authorized to receive any money in behalf of BHF. Her blunder is
compounded by the fact that she did not turn over the money to
BHF, nor did she return the same to the complainant, despite due
demand. Furthermore, she even tried to get the next installment
knowing fully well that she was not authorized to enter into
settlement negotiations with the complainant as her engagement
as counsel of BHF had already ceased.
The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates
her offense. The foregoing factual antecedents demonstrate her
propensity to employ deceit and misrepresentation. It is not too
farfetched for this Court to conclude that from the very beginning,
Atty. Limos had planned to employ deceit on the complainant to
get hold of a sum of money. Such a conduct is unbecoming and
does not speak well of a member of the Bar.
Atty. Limos' case is further highlighted by her lack of regard for the
charges brought against her. Similar with Wilkie, despite due
notice, Atty. Limos did not bother to answer the complaint against
her. She also failed to file her mandatory conference brief and her
verified position paper. Worse, Atty. Limos did not even enter
appearance either personally or by counsel, and she failed to
appear at the scheduled date of the mandatory conferences which
she was duly notified.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
By her failure to present convincing evidence, or any evidence for
that matter, to justify her actions, Atty. Limos failed to
demonstrate that she still possessed the integrity and morality
demanded of a member of the Bar. Her seeming indifference to the
complaint brought against her was made obvious by her
unreasonable absence from the proceedings before the IBP. Her
disobedience to the IBP is, in fact, a gross and blatant disrespect
for the authority of the Court.
 Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby
Despite her two prior suspensions, still, Atty. Limos is once again making her unworthy to continue as a member of the bar.
demonstrating to this Court that not only is she unfit to stay in the
legal profession for her deceitful conduct but is also remiss in WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having violated
following the dictates of the Court, which has supervision over her. the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing grave
Atty. Limos' unwarranted obstinacy is a great insolence to the misconduct and willful insubordination, is DISBARRED and her
Court which cannot be tolerated. name ordered STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys effective
immediately.
The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section
27,18 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court, however, Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of Atty.
does not hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the Sinamar Limos. Further, let other copies be served on the
guilty party has become a repeat offender. Considering the serious Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
nature of the instant offense and in light of Atty. Limos' prior Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts
misconduct which grossly degrades the legal profession, the in the country for their information and guidance.
imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment is warranted.
This Decision is immediately executory.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos, the Court
is aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great SO ORDERED.
caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional
and as an officer of the Court.19 However, Atty. Limos' recalcitrant
attitude and unwillingness to heed with the Court's warning, which
is deemed to be an affront to the Court's authority over members
of the Bar, warrant an utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court.
Her repeated desecration of her ethical commitments proved EN BANC
herself to be unfit to remain in the legal profession. Worse, she
remains apathetic to the need to reform herself. A.C. No. 11350 [Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4211], August
09, 2016
"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to
ADEGOKE R. PLUMPTRE, Complainant, v. ATTY. SOCRATES R.
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of
RIVERA, Respondent.
such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions."20 "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and RESOLUTION
for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws,
to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, PER CURIAM:
argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious
example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body This resolves a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Socrates
politic."21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary R. Rivera for absconding with money entrusted to him and
soliciting money to bribe a judge.
Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession. The facts
and evidence obtaining in this case definitely establish her failure On May 13, 2014, complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre filed a
to live up to her duties as a lawyer in accordance with the complaint for disbarment1 against respondent before the
strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Complainant alleges that on March 7, 2014, he called respondent
and asked for help in his application for a work permit from the
Bureau of Immigration.2 They met a few days later, and
complainant paid respondent P10,000.00 as professional
fee.3chanrobleslaw
They met again, and complainant gave respondent another
P10,000.00, together with his passport. This was allegedly for the
processing of his work permit.4chanrobleslaw
They met for a third time since respondent asked complainant to
submit ID photos.5 Respondent asked complainant for another
P10,000.00, but complainant refused as they only agreed on the
amount of P20,000.00.6chanrobleslaw
Respondent also asked complainant for P8,000.00, allegedly for
complainant's other case, which respondent was also working
on.7 He explained that P5,000.00 would be given to a Las Piñas
judge to reverse the motion for reconsideration against
complainant, while P3,000.00 would be used to process the motion
for reconsideration. Complainant gave him the
P8,000.00.8chanrobleslaw
Complainant claims that after respondent received the money, he
never received any updates on the status of his work permit and
pending court case.9 Further, whenever he called respondent to
follow up on his work permit, respondent hurled invectives at him
and threatened him and his wife.10chanrobleslaw
Complainant would retort by saying that he would file complaints
against respondent if he did not give back the money and passport.
That was the last time complainant heard from
respondent.11chanrobleslaw
After inquiring and researching on respondent's
whereabouts,12 complainant was able to track down respondent
and get back his passport, which respondent coursed through
complainant's aunt.13However, despite the return of complainant's
passport, respondent still refused to return the P28,000.00 earlier
endorsed to him.14chanrobleslaw
Complainant then decided to file a complaint against respondent
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.15chanrobleslaw
On May 14, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued the
Order16 directing respondent to file an answer to the complaint.
Respondent failed to show up at the September 17, 2014
mandatory conference,17 as well as at the second mandatory
conference set on October 22, 2014.18 The parties were directed to
submit their verified position papers, after which the case was
submitted for resolution.19chanrobleslaw
On May 27, 2015, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
respondent's suspension for two (2) years from the practice of law
and return of P28,000.00 to complainant.20chanrobleslaw
On June 20, 2015, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors adopted and approved21 the Investigating
Commissioner's recommendation, but modified it to disbar
respondent from the practice of law,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A ", for Respondent's
violation of Canon 1, Canon 7, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17
and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
aggravated by his failure to file Answer and to appear in the
Mandatory Conference. Thus, Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys and Ordered to
Return the Twenty Eight Thousand (P28,000.00) Pesos to
Complainant.22 (Emphasis in the original)
On April 20, 2016, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines transmitted
the case to this Court for final action under Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court.23chanrobleslaw
This Court modifies the findings of the Board of Governors.
I
Respondent's repeated failure to comply with several Resolutions of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines requiring him to comment on
the complaint lends credence to complainant's allegations. It
manifests his tacit admission. Hence, we resolve this case on the
basis of the complaint and other documents submitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
In Macarilay v. Seriña,24 this Court held that "[t]he unjustified
withholding of funds belonging to the client warrants the imposition
of disciplinary action against the lawyer."25cralawred By absconding
with the money entrusted to him by his client and behaving in a
manner not befitting a member of the bar, respondent violated the
following Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
....
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
integrated bar.
....
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties
of his client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01. - A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
....
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
....
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
....
Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Rule 18.04. - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status
of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients
request for information.
As his client's advocate, a lawyer is duty-bound to protect his
client's interests and the degree of service expected of him in this
capacity is his "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability."26 The lawyer also has a fiduciary
duty, with the lawyer-client relationship imbued with utmost trust
and confidence.27chanrobleslaw
Respondent failed to serve his client with fidelity, competence, and
diligence. He not only neglected the attorney-client relationship
established between them; he also acted in a reprehensible
manner towards complainant, i.e., cussing and threatening
complainant and his family with bodily harm, hiding from
complainant, and refusing without reason to return the money
entrusted to him for the processing of the work permit.
Respondent's behavior demonstrates his lack of integrity and moral
soundness.
Del Mundo v. Capistrano28 has reiterated the exacting standards
expected of law practitioners:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who
meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality, including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their
fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Falling short of this standard, the Court will not
hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer by imposing an appropriate
penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in
consideration of the surrounding facts.29 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
A lawyer must, at no time, lack probity and moral fiber, which are
not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the bar but are
likewise essential demands for his continued
membership.30chanrobleslaw
II
When complainant refused to give respondent any more money to
process his work permit, respondent persuaded complainant to
give him an additional P8,000.00 purportedly to ensure that a
motion for reconsideration pending before a Las Piñas judge would
be decided in complainant's favor.31 However, after receiving
P28,000.00 from complainant for the work permit and ensuring the
success of complainant's court case, respondent made himself
scarce and could no longer be contacted.
Although nothing in the records showed whether the court case
was indeed decided in complainant's favor, respondent's act of
soliciting money to bribe a judge served to malign the judge and
the judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won by
the party with the deepest pockets and not on the
merits.32chanrobleslaw
"A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system."33 Further,
"a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative body."34chanrobleslaw
By implying that he can negotiate a favorable ruling for the sum of
P8,000.00, respondent trampled upon the integrity of the judicial
system and eroded confidence on the judiciary. This gross
disrespect of the judicial system shows that he is wanting in moral
fiber and betrays the lack of integrity in his character. The practice
of law is a privilege, and respondent has repeatedly shown that he
is unfit to exercise it.
III
As for the sufficiency of notice to respondent of the disbarment
proceedings against him, this Court notes that on May 14, 2014,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines directed respondent to answer
the complaint against him, but he failed to file his answer.35 The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines set two (2) separate dates for
mandatory conferences36 after respondent failed to attend the first
setting, but he failed to appear in both instances.37 All issuances
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines had the requisite registry
receipts attached to them.
Stemmerik v. Mas38 discussed the sufficiency of notice of
disbarment proceedings. This Court held that lawyers must update
their records with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines by
informing it of any change in office or residential address and
contact details.39 Service of notice on the office or residential
address appearing in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines records
shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for administrative
proceedings against him or her.40chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Socrates R. Rivera
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years. He
is ORDERED to return to complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre the
amount of P28,000.00 with interest at 6% per annum from the
date of promulgation of this Resolution until fully paid. He is
likewise DIRECTED to submit to this Court proof of payment of the
amount within 10 days from payment.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in respondent's personal
record as a member of the bar, and be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING
OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with
thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul
Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in
the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the
prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by
the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen
(14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period
ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application
for probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted
in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro
T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from
the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise
him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for
Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed
the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was
allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He
was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to
take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law,
averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period
by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period
did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge
Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr.
Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for
Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be
granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege
limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts
which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive
effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a
condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive a
license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court,
includes all the elements necessary to make up such a
character. It is something more than an absence of bad
character. It is the good name which the applicant has
acquired, or should have acquired, through association with
his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as
a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or
does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in
following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the
will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not
to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute
is eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a
lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes
home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is
a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such,
is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of
1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater
temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than
in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice
of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an
applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral
standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board
of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause
a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of
each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no
further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion
that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to
the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for
admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be
successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after
a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his
profession, and has established himself therein, a far more
difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings
are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and
annulment of his license.
 In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of
every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or
business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only
to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards
fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those
who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and
only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain
in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions, and a fair private and professional character is
one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is
not to punish him for past offense: an examination into
character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test
of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability,
so that they may not only protect the rights and interests of
their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the
cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts
could such agents give? They are required to be of good
moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court,
which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due
administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible
consequence that both those who have not such
qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them,
have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in
courts to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in
fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10
L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always
been to admit no person to the practice of
the law unless he covered an upright moral
character. The possession of this by the
attorney is more important, if anything, to the
public and to the proper administration of
justice than legal learning. Legal learning
may be acquired in after years, but if the
applicant passes the threshold of the bar
with a bad moral character the chances are
that his character will remain bad, and that
he will become a disgrace instead of an
ornament to his great calling — a curse
instead of a benefit to his community — a
Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a
Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect
of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed,
said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for
disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a
proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in
scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for
admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him
for want of good moral character unless it appears that he
has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his
disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the
inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which
tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty,
integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse
admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of
any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would
seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm
of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real
need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this
open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's Camaligan.
confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. 12
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell
far short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
(rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul
Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to
discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte"
who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and
confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and
kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged
and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior,
which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of [A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]
good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has
expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a
requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time
of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and
consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission
to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth
and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge
Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student
and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit
relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has
become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the
law.
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court
VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate
and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates,
and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to
the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection
therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya
addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by " ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to
appropriate written manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence
by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent
acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said
contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic
language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous
sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the
mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state
on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort
to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my
interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need
to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at
San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which
actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand
corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD
26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin
T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking
for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable
from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things,
he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel,
rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B.
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will.
Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending
circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit,
dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds
between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took
to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated
February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the
same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan
and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also
wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this
Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question,
again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme
Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May
1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of **
(Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995,
Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996
-- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned
envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that
complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine
Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler,
forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his
allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as
irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with
Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea
that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic)
** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint.
Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from
the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this
case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of
Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned
the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power
pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis;
Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal
Family **."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less
aggressive, even obsequious tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him
a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. [6] He stated
that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines
of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by
falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract
entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996,
Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental
anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from
his salary.[7] He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his
rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he
gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with
the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were
typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated
by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to
before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); [8] and
as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money
he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the
official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an
honest mistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is
"lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the
Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is
expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured."[10] He claims he was
manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.[11] He was
induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him;
despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the
property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa
& Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his
wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so
until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract
with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents
as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of
the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya
prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of
"fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having
come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing
loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk
of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2)
earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty.
Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title
but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he
made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds
through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to
(her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters,
Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** **
prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him
by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa &
Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority
and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was
merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any
man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713) interalia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. [16] Section 4
of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times
respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and
behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct
must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."[18]
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking
privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the
accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED
for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e.,
language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney;
and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good SO ORDERED.
customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful,
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against
Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety,
without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner
consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra;
or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of [B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling.
As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a
standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers.
As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L.
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is RANA, respondent.
expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all
times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, DECISION
restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms
might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held CARPIO, J.:
conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already
The Case
had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-
fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before
Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated examinations.
Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor- The Facts
at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term,
or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination,
valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor"
does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
 Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed
the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar
during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent
could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge
against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date
but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and
grave misconduct.Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a
pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this
pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for
George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is
a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act
as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George
Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant
claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation
of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to
take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys
until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court
required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific
assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself
as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent
claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly
accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt
of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon
Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated
considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll
of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment
and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was
only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19
May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation
as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for
Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before
the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1)
respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee
of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is motivated
mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC
proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC
believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents
unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice
of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission
to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law
which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan
while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and
his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan
to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the
records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May
2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for
the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel
for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent
stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN.Bunan himself wrote the MBEC
on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to
represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao
informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the
said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily
Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC
praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held
to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared
in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without
license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice
of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had
no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment,
and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate
does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission
had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran,
Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his
oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys.He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers
oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.[9]
 On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does
not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or
administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of
law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor
and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he
was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted
respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does
not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while
serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence
shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his
counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for
leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law
until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for
his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine
citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There
is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship
in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites
Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar.
– Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue
of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met
all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in
the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in
the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of
his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with
certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately
affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State
(through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession,
compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and
payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of
these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the
courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in
accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular
standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court
mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a
resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing
satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the
bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys
and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license
to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing
― is a continuing requirement. This means continued membership and,
concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of
the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of
the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary
control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still
practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by
law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss
thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the
privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization
as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA
9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is
also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar,
no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its
provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he
must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues
in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing
legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of
legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him
of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the
Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member
of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is
hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above
and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which
he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 6484, June 16, 2015
ADELITA B. LLUNAR, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROMULO
RICAFORT, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The present administrative case stemmed from the complaint-
affidavit1 that Adelita B. Llunar (complainant) filed against Atty.
Romulo Ricafort (respondent) for gross and inexcusable negligence
and serious misconduct.
Antecedents
In September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of
Severina Bafiez, hired the respondent to file a case against father
and son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes (Ard) for the recovery of a
parcel of land allegedly owned by the Banez family but was
fraudulently registered under the name of Ricardo and later was
transferred to Ard.
The property, which Ard had mortgaged with the Rural Bank of
Malilipot, Albay, was the subject of foreclosure proceedings at the
time the respondent was hired. The respondent received from the
complainant the following amounts: (a) P70,000.00 as partial
payment of the redemption price of the property; (b) P19,000.00
to cover the filing fees; and (c) P6,500.00 as attorney's fees.
Three years later, the complainant learned that no case involving
the subject property was ever filed by the respondent with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legaspi City. Thus, the complainant
demanded that the respondent return to her the amount of
P95,000.00.
The respondent refused to return the whole amount of P95,000.00
to the complainant. He argued that a complaint2 for annulment of
title against Ard Cervantes had actually been filed in court, though
not by him, but by another lawyer, Atty. Edgar M. Abitria. Thus, he
was willing to return only what was left of the P95,000.00 after
deducting therefrom the P50,000.00 that he paid to Atty. Abitria as
acceptance fee for handling the case.
The complainant refused to recognize the complaint for annulment
of title filed by Atty. Abitria and claimed that she had no knowledge
of Atty. Abitria's engagement as counsel. Besides, the complaint
was filed three (3) years late and the property could no longer be
redeemed from the bank. Also, the complainant discovered that the
respondent had been suspended indefinitely from the practice of
law since May 29, 2002, pursuant to this Court's decision in
Administrative Case No. 5054,3 which the complainant suspected
was the reason another lawyer, and not the respondent, filed the
complaint for annulment of title in court.
In a resolution4 dated February 2, 2005, the Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
In a report5 dated May 22, 2009, IBP Investigating Commissioner
Cecilio C. Villanueva found the respondent to have been grossly
negligent in handling the complainant's case and to have gravely
abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by the
complainant, thereby, violating Canons 156 and 17,7 and Rules
1.01,8 16.03,9 18.03,10 and 18.0411 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
Also, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have
erred in not informing his client that he was under indefinite
suspension from the practice of law. Due to these infractions,
Commissioner Villanueva recommended that the respondent
remain suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-224 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP
Board of Governors agreed with the Investigating Commissioner's
findings on the respondent's liability but modified the
recommended penalty from indefinite suspension to
disbarment.12 It also ordered the respondent to return to the
complainant the amount of P95,000.00 within thirty (30) days from
notice. The respondent moved for reconsideration.
In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent argued that his
referral of the complainant's case to Atty. Abitria was actually with
the complainant's knowledge and consent; and that he paid Atty.
Abitria P50,000.00 for accepting the case. These facts were
confirmed by Atty. Abitria in an affidavit14 dated November 17,
2004, but were alleged to have been overlooked by Commissioner
Villanueva in his report. The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution
No. XX-2013-710 dated June 21, 2013, denied the respondent's
motion for reconsideration.15chanrobleslaw
Our Ruling
We find the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct in his
dealings with his client and in engaging in the practice of
law while under indefinite suspension, and thus impose
upon him the ultimate penalty of DISBARMENT.
The respondent in this case committed several infractions making
him liable for grave misconduct. First, the respondent did not exert
due diligence in handling the complainant's case. He failed to act
promptly in redeeming the complainant's property within the period
of redemption. What is worse is the delay of three years before a
complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court. The
respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the complainant's case and
wasted precious time and opportunity that were then readily
available to recover the complainant's property. Under these facts,
the respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."
Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the
amounts given to him by the complainant for handling the latter's
case. On three separate occasions, the respondent received from
the complainant the amounts of P19,000.00, P70,000.00, and
P6,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the mortgaged property from
the bank and filing the necessary civil case/s against Ard
Cervantes. The complainant approached the respondent several
times thereafter to follow up on the case/s to be filed supposedly
by the respondent who, in turn, reassured her that actions on her
case had been taken.
After the complainant discovered three years later that the
respondent had not filed any case in court, she demanded that the
respondent return the amount of P95,000.00, but her demand was
left unheeded. The respondent later promised to pay her, but until
now, no payment of any amount has been made. These facts
confirm that the respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which
mandates every lawyer to "hold in trust all moneys and properties
of his client that may come into his possession"16 and to "account
for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client."17 In addition, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the
funds or property he holds for his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated these funds or property for
his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client.18chanrobleslaw
Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright
with the complainant that he was under indefinite suspension from
the practice of law. The respondent should have disclosed this fact
at the time he was approached by the complainant for his services.
Canon 15 of the CPR states that "a lawyer shall observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
clients." The respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a
member of the Bar when he accepted the complainant's case
despite knowing that he could not and should not practice law.
Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite
the indefinite suspension imposed on him. This infraction infinitely
aggravates the offenses he committed. Based on the above facts
alone, the penalty of suspension for five (5) years from the practice
of law would have been justified, but the respondent is not an
ordinary violator of the profession's ethical rules; he is a repeat
violator of these rules. In Nuñez v. Atty. Ricafort,19 we had
adjudged the respondent liable for grave misconduct in failing to
turn over the proceeds of the sale of a property owned by his client
and in issuing bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution
issued by the court in the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Big.
22 filed against him by his client. We then suspended him
indefinitely from the practice of law - a penalty short of
disbarment. Under his current liability - which is no different in
character from his previous offense - we have no other way but to
proceed to decree his disbarment. He has become completely
unworthy of membership in our honorable profession.
With respect to the amount to be returned to the complainant, we
agree with the IBP that the respondent should return the
whole amount of P95,000.00, without deductions, regardless of
whether the engagement of Atty. Abitria as counsel was with the
complainant's knowledge and consent.
In the first place, the hiring of Atty. Abitria would not have been
necessary had the respondent been honest and diligent in handling
the complainant's case from the start. The complainant should not
be burdened with the expense of hiring another lawyer to perform
the services that the respondent was hired to do, especially in this
case where there was an inexcusable non-delivery of such services.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name REMOVED from the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately
upon his receipt of this Decision. Also, he
is ORDERED to RETURN the amount of P95,000.00 to
complainant Adelita B. Llunar, within thirty (30) days from notice of
this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the respondent's
personal record and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. This
Decision should likewise be posted on the Supreme Court website
for the information of the general public.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
EN BANC
A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016
PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant, v. RICHARD A. CARONAN
A.K.A. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by
complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant), before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,"
whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for
purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely
representing that the former has the required educational
qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be admitted to the
practice of law.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R.
Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent is the older of the
two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was
born on August 5, 1976.3 Both of them completed their secondary
education at the Makati High School where complainant graduated
in 19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation,
complainant enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained
a degree in Business Administration in 1997.6 He started working
thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation
(PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he
married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2)
daughters.8Through the years, complainant rose from the ranks
until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11
Store in Muntinlupa.9chanrobleslaw
Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled
at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed
for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) in 1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the
PMA and focused on helping their father in the family's car rental
business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife,
Rosana, and their three (3) children.11 Since then, respondent
never went back to school to earn a college degree. 12chanrobleslaw
In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent
told complainant that the former had enrolled in a law school in
Nueva Vizcaya.13 Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed
complainant that respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that
he used complainant's name and college records from the
University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of
Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar
Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these aside as he did not
anticipate any adverse consequences to him.15chanrobleslaw
In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his
name and identity when he saw the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on
the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's
office in Taguig City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not confront
respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and had
a family to support.17chanrobleslaw
Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store
Manager, complainant was ordered to report to the head office of
PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting his
presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an
investigation involving respondent who, at that point, was using
the najne "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18,
2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer
Crimes Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to
identify documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school
records; (2) his transcript of records from the University of Makati;
(3) Land Transportation Office's records showing his and
respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's
University showing that complainant's transcript of records from
the University of Makati and his Birth Certificate were submitted to
St. Mary's University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St.
Mary's University showing respondent's photograph under the
name "Patrick A. Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the
reason why he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's
involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr.
Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the principal
sponsors at respondent's wedding.20chanrobleslaw
Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate
crimes and commit unlawful activities, complainant took it upon
himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" and that respondent's real name is Richard A.
Caronan.21 However, problems relating to respondent's use of the
name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July
2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Pena & Nolasco
Law Offices requesting that they be furnished with complainant's
contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him
to discuss certain matters concerning respondent.22 On the other
hand, a fellow church-member had also told him that respondent
who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," almost victimized
his (church-member's) relatives.23 Complainant also received a
phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who
narrated how respondent tricked her into believing that he was
authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he
was not.24 Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for
gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP)
22.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name
"Patrick A. Caronan," complainant developed a fear for his own
safety and security.26 He also became the subject of conversations
among his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from
his job at PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-
Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and
identity, and illegal practice of law.28chanrobleslaw
In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him
arid invoked res judicata as a defense. He maintained that his
identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been
resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of
Governors dismissed30 the administrative case31 filed by Agtarap
against him, and which case had already been declared closed and
terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074.32 Moreover, according
to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse,
Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign,
discredit, and harass him because he filed several administrative
and criminal complaints against them before the
Ombudsman.33chanrobleslaw
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled
mandatory conference where both parties failed to
appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April
20, 2015.35 On such date, however, both parties again failed to
appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an
Order36 directing them to file their respective position papers.
However, neither of the parties submitted any.37chanrobleslaw
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva
Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner) issued his Report and
Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely
assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic
records.39 He observed that respondent failed to controvert all the
allegations against him and did not present any proof to prove his
identity.40 On the other hand, complainant presented clear and
overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan."41chanrobleslaw
Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and
complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on
August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan
and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.42 However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by
the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married
to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.43chanrobleslaw
The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that
.the photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as
"Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person
as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."44 These, according to the Investigating Commissioner,
show that respondent indeed assumed complainant's identity to
study law and take the Bar Examinations.45 Since respondent
falsely assumed the name, identity, and academic records of
complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the
bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan"
with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys.46 He also recommended that respondent and the
name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a
member of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the
judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute appropriate
actions against respondent.47chanrobleslaw
On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution
No. XXI-2015-607,48 adopting the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering
that: (a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from
being admitted to the Bar.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of the
IBP.
As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by
clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A.
Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity, and
academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of
Law, obtain a law degree, and take the Bar Examinations.
As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and
complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on
August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and
Norma Atillo.49Respondent himself also stated that he is married to
Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO
records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G.
Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph
taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan"
on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the
photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous
documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among
which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of
Makati bearing his photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school
yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan"
under it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and
2013.55chanrobleslaw
To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that
respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and school
records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real
"Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP
correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real
name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from admission to the
Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant
for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he
had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that
he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began
the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high
school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following
subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic,
english, Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college
degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later
and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without
graduating.56Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite
pre-law degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may
later on complete his college education and earn a law degree
under his real name. However, his false assumption of his brother's
name, identity, and educational records renders him unfit for
admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar
Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for
Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar, Atty.
Froilan R. Melendrez,59 the Court explained the essence of good
moral character:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished
from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of
him, the estimate in which . he is held by the public in the place
where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but
one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct
as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal
law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.[60] (Emphasis supplied)
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the name,
identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the
latter into controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his
safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for
years. Good moral character is essential in those who would be
lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer,
the trust relation which exists between him and his client, as well
as between him and the court.62chanrobleslaw
Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by
pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He
also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous
activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases
against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place
in the legal profession where one of the primary duties of its
members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.63chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the
name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A.
Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar
Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of
appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves
that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069
is ordered DROPPEDand STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;
(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of
law or making any representations as a lawyer;
(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of
the Philippine Bar in the future;
(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Certificates issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and cralawlawlibrary
(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered
to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all
courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real
name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a
member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false
assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of
the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995
In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as
his own lawyer has a fool for a client. There would seem to be more than a
grain of truth in these aphorisms; and they appear to find validation in the
proceeding at bench, at least.
The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has
apparently read some law books, and ostensibly come to possess some
superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural
rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the
respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present,
been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts,
dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts,
including the Supreme Court. In the picturesque language of former Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando, he has "with all the valor of ignorance," 1 been
verbally jousting with various adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the
words of a well-known song, rushing into arenas "where angels fear to tread."
Under the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him
competence to undertake litigation, he has ventured to represent himself in
numerous original and review proceedings. Expectedly, the results have
been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and
quite unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to compose
and circulate many scurrilous statements against courts, judges and their
employees, as well as his adversaries, for which he is now being called to
account.
Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated
by fairly prosaic transactions with three (3) banks which came to have
calamitous consequences for him chiefly because of his failure to comply
with his contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on imposing
his own terms and conditions for their fulfillment. These banks were: Traders
Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank &
Trust Co. (SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation from
them, to secure which he constituted mortgages over immovables belonging
to him or members of his family, or third persons. He failed to pay these
obligations, and when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his
own terms for their satisfaction which were quite inconsistent with those
agreed upon with his obligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably,
the banks refused to let him have his way, he brought suits right and left,
successively if not contemporaneously, against said banks, its officers, and
even the lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by or
against him. He sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial
Courts, and the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who
at one time or another, rendered a judgment, resolution or order adverse to
him, as well as the Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the
notices thereof. In the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned in different fora
the astounding number of no less-than fifty (50) original or review
proceedings, civil, criminal, administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now,
to repeat, he has been continuously cluttering the Courts with his repetitive,
and quite baseless if not outlandish complaints and contentions.
I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS
ROYAL BANK (TRB)
The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the
Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum
of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two
parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned,
respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita
Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan
from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security a
mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo,
covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was
vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective
owners.
Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from
TRB in the sum of P80,000.00, in consideration of which he executed a Trust
Receipt (No. 595/80) falling due on July 22, 1980.2
Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor.
Consequently, TRB caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgages
given to secure them. At the public sale conducted by the sheriff on
September 7, 1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land were sold to TRB as
the highest bidder, for P73,529.09.
Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his
intention to redeem the properties at their auction price. TRB manager Blas
C. Abril however made clear that Borromeo would also have to settle his
outstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80 (P88,762.78), supra.
Borromeo demurred, and this disagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits
commenced by him against the Bank, its officers and counsel, as
aforestated.
A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R.
CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306
On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional
Trial Court for specific performance and damages against TRB and its local
manager, Blas Abril, docketed as Civil Case No. R-22506. The complaint
sought to compel defendants to allow redemption of the foreclosed properties
only at their auction price, with stipulated interests and charges, without need
of paying the obligation secured by the trust receipt above mentioned.
Judgment was rendered in his favor on December 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of
the Cebu City RTC; but on defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeals —
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 — the judgment was reversed, by
decision dated January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals held that the "plaintiff
(Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption and can no longer compel
defendant to allow redemption of the properties in question."
Borromeo elevated the case to this court where his appeal was docketed as
G.R. No. 83306. By Resolution dated August 15, 1988, this Court's First
Division denied his petition for review "for failure . . . to sufficiently show that
the respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in its
questioned judgment, it appearing on the contrary that the said decision is
supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts and
applicable law." Reconsideration was denied, by Resolution dated November
23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution
dated January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution dated
April 19, 1989. The last resolution also directed entry of judgment and the
remand of the case to the court of origin for prompt execution of judgment.
Entry of judgment was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August
7, 1989, the Court denied another motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment;
and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989, the Court merely noted without
action his manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the Court of
Appeals be overturned, and declared that "no further motion or pleading . . .
shall be entertained . . . ."
2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750;
CA-G.R. SP No. 22356
The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo
initiated another civil action in the same Cebu City Regional Court by which
he attempted to litigate the same issues. The action, against the new TRB
Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
8750. As might have been anticipated, the action was, on motion of the
defense, dismissed by Order dated May 18, 1990,3 on the ground of res
judicata, the only issue raised in the second action — i.e., Borromeo's right to
redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB — having been ventilated in Civil Case
No. R-22506 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal
Bank) (supra) and, on appeal, decided with finality by the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court in favor of defendants therein.
The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 22356.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485;
CA-G.R. SP No. 28221
In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB
consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed immovables. Contending that
act of consolidation amounted to a criminal offense, Borromeo filed
complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank
officers and lawyers. These complaints were however, and quite correctly,
given short shrift by that Office. Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City
RTC, this time not only against the TRB, TRB officers Jacinto Jamero and
Arceli Bustamante, but also against City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his
assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers, Mario
Ortiz and the law, firm, HERSINLAW. The action was docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-9485. The complaint charged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and
Igot with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the criminal cases just
mentioned; and faulted TRB and its manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers,
for consolidating the titles to the foreclosed properties in favor of the bank
despite the pendency of Case No. R-22506. This action also failed. On
defendants' motion, it was dismissed on February 19, 1992 by the RTC.
(Branch 22) on the ground of res judicata (being identical with Civil Case
Nos. R-22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with finality in favor of TRB),
and lack of cause of action (as to defendants Pareja, Belarmino and Igot).
Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No.
28221) was dismissed by that Court's 16th Division4 on October 6, 1992, for
the reason that the proper remedy was appeal.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368;
CA-G.R. SP No. 27100
Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30,
1991, still another civil action for the same cause against TRB, its
manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz and the
HERSINLAW law office. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
10368, and was described as one for "Recovery of Sums of Money,
Annulment of Titles with Damages." The case met the same fate as the
others. It was, on defendants' motion, dismissed on September 9, 1991 by
the RTC (Branch 145) on the ground of litis pendentia.
The RTC ruled that —
Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the
defendants therein, namely the Honorable Jufelinito Pareja,
Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal Bank, Arceli
Bustamante, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW
are the same persons or nearly all of them who are
impleaded as defendants in the present Civil Case No. CEB-
10368, namely, the Traders Royal Bank, Jacinto Jamero,
Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW. The only difference is that
more defendants were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-
9485, namely, City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his
assistants Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva Igot. The inclusion
of the City Prosecutor and his two assistants in Civil Case
No. CEB-9485 was however merely incidental as apparently
they had nothing to do with the questioned transaction in
said case. . . .
The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those
sought in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, and the factual bases of the two cases
were essentially the same — the alleged fraudulent foreclosure and
consolidation of the three properties mortgaged years earlier by Borromeo to
TRB.
For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order
rendered by another Judge on November 11, 1991 6 — the Judge who
previously heard the case having inhibited himself; but this Order of
November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of Appeals (9th
Division), by Decision promulgated on March 31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No.
27100 (Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T.
Borromeo), 7 which decision also directed dismissal of Borromeo's complaint.
5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452
When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu
City, Borromeo forthwith made that event the occasion for another new
action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the bank's attorneys — Mario Ortiz,
Honorato Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW firm. This
action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452, and described as one for
"Annulment of Title with Damages." The complaint, dated October 20, 1987,
again involved the foreclosure of the three (3) immovables above mentioned,
and was anchored on the alleged malicious, deceitful, and premature
consolidation of titles in TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case No.
22506. On defendant's motion, the trial court 8 dismissed the case on the
ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point . . ., plaintiff's right to seek
annulment of defendant Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and
when plaintiff will ultimately and finally win Civil Case No. R-22506."
6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236
Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the
"merit" of his cause against TRB and its officers and lawyers, Borromeo now
took a different tack by also suing (and thus also venting his ire on) the
members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him. He filed in
the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-8236, impleading as defendants not
only the same parties he had theretofore been suing — TRB and its officers
and lawyers (HERSINLAW, Mario Ortiz) — but also the Chairman and
Members of the First Division of the Supreme Court who had repeatedly
rebuffed him in G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as the
Members of the 5th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the Court of Appeals who had
likewise made dispositions unfavorable to him. His complaint, dated August
22, 1989, aimed to recover damages from the defendants Justices for —
. . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods
and disregarding evidence and pertinent laws, rendering
manifestly unjust and biased resolutions and decisions bereft
of signatures, facts or laws in support thereof, depriving
plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due process and against
deprivation of property without said process, tolerating,
 approving and legitimizing the patently illegal, fraudulent,
and contemptuous acts of defendants TRB, (which)
constitute a) GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY AND ABUSE
OF POWER emanating from the people, b) FLAGRANT
VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL
PRIMARY RIGHTS DUE PROCESS, ART. 27, 32, CIVIL
CODE, Art. 208, REV. PENAL CODE, and R.A. 3019, for
which defendants must be held liable under said laws.
The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained
fraudulently by TRB/HERSINLAW," and recovery of "100,000.00 moral
damages; 30,000.00 exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 litigation
expenses." This action, too, met a quick and unceremonious demise. On
motion of defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial court, by Order dated
November 7, 1989,9 dismissed the case.
7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069
It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause
subject of two (2) prior actions instituted by him. This was RTC Case No.
CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's lawyers, Wilfredo Navarro and
Mario Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October 4,
1993, 10 on the ground of res judicata — the subject matter being the same
as that in Civil Case No. R-22506, decision in which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by this Court in G.R.
No. 83306 11 — and litis pendentia — the subject matter being also the same
as that in Civil Case No. CEB-8750, decision in which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 22356.12
8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344;
CA-G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928
On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with
the RTC of Cebu (Branch 22) against Borromeo charging him with a violation
of the Trust Receipts Law.13 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the case on the
ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial. His motion was denied by Order
of Judge Pampio A. Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same order, His
Honor set an early date for Borromeo's arraignment and placed the case
"under a continuous trial system on the dates as may be agreed by the
defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his
motion was again found without merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992, he
betook himself to the Court of Appeals on a special civil action of certiorari, to
nullify these adverse orders, his action being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
28275.
Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts
did not show that there had been unreasonable delay in the criminal action
against him, and denied his petition for being without merit. 14
Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928),
but by resolution dated January 31, 1994, the same was dismissed for failure
of Borromeo to comply with the requisites of Circulars Numbered 1-88 and
19-91. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by
Resolution dated March 23, 1994.
a. Clarificatory Communications to
Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"
He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of
March 23, 1994 "Un-Constitutional, Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross
travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed only by a mere clerk and . . .
(failed) to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not resolved on
MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere clerk." 15
The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22,
1994, and with some patience drew his attention to the earlier resolution "in
his own previous case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals and
Samson Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA 1) 16 and on the
same issue he now raises." Said Resolution of June 22, 1994, after
reiterating that the notices sent by the Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc or
any of the Divisions simply advise of and quote the resolution actually
adopted by the Court after deliberation on a particular matter, additionally
stated that Borromeo "knew, as well, that the communications (notices)
signed by the Clerk of Court start with the opening clause —
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the
First Division of this Court dated. _________,
thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or
signed the resolutions."
This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to
Borromeo. The record shows that on July 10, 1987, he received a letter from
Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) dealing with
the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. 17 The same matter was also dealt
with in the letter received by him from Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno,
dated April 4, 1989, and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second
Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989.18 And the same subject was
treated of in another Resolution of this Court, notice of which was in due
course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897.19
B. CRIMINAL CASES
Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt — with "all the valor
of ignorance" — to fasten not only civil, but also criminal liability on TRB, its
officers and lawyers. 20 Several other attempts on his part to cause criminal
prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will now be dealt with
here.
1. I. S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188
On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the
Cebu City Prosecutor against Jacinto Jamero (then still TRB Branch
Manager), "John Doe and officers of Traders Royal Bank." The complaints
(docketed as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the respondents of "Estafa and
Falsification of Public Documents." He claimed, among others that the bank
and its officers, thru its manager, Jacinto Jamero, sold properties not owned
by them: that by fraud, deceit and false pretenses, respondents negotiated
and effected the purchase of the (foreclosed) properties from his
(Borromeo's) mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of legal knowledge,"
agreed to the sale thereof for only P671,000.00, although in light of then
prevailing market prices, she should have received P588,030.00 more.
In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, 21 the Cebu City Fiscal's office
dismissed the complaints observing that actually, the Deed of Sale was not
between the bank and Borromeo's mother, but between the bank and Mrs.
Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the foreclosed properties;
and that Borromeo, being a stranger to the sale, had no basis to claim injury
or prejudice thereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of the
foreclosed properties was beyond question as the matter had been raised
and passed upon in a judicial litigation; and moreover, there was no proof of
the document allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its falsification.
a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234
Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded
complaints, the Fiscal also adverted to two other complaints earlier filed in
his Office by Borromeo — involving the same foreclosed properties and
directed against respondent bank officers' predecessors (including the former
Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers — both of which were dismissed for lack
of merit. These were:
a. I. S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY.
MARIO ORTIZ and RONALD SY) for "Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit and False
Pretenses." — This case was dismissed by Resolution dated
January 19, 1988 of the City Prosecutor's Office because
based on nothing more than a letter dated June 4, 1985,
sent by Bank Manager Ronald Sy to the lessee of a portion
of the foreclosed immovables, advising the latter to remit all
rentals to the bank as new owner thereof, as shown by the
consolidated title; and there was no showing that respondent
Atty. Ortiz was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed of
sale in TRB's favor after the lapse of the period of
redemption, or that Ortiz had benefited pecuniarily from the
transaction to the prejudice of complainant; and
b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD
SY, ET AL.) for "Estafa Through False Pretenses and
Falsification of Public Documents." — This case was
dismissed by Resolution dated January 31, 1990.
2. I.S.Nos. 88-205 to 88-207
While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before
the Supreme Court, 22 an affidavit was executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli
Bustamante, in connection with the former's fire insurance claim over
property registered in its name — one of two immovables formerly owned by
Socorro B. Thakuria (Joaquin Borromeo's sister) and foreclosed by said
bank. 23 In that affidavit, dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that
"On 24 June 1983, TRB thru foreclosure acquired real property together with
the improvements thereon which property is located at F. Ramos St., Cebu
City covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name or TRB." The affidavit was
notarized by Atty. Manuelito B. Inso.
Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of
title by TRB over the foreclosed lots was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant
fasehood in that, among others: . . . the consolidation was premature, illegal
and invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office against the affiant (Bustamante) and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso)
for "falsification of public document, false pretenses, perjury." On September
28, 1988, the Fiscal's Office dismissed the complaint. 24 It found no untruthful
statements in the affidavit or any malice in its execution, considering that
Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer Certificate of Title in
TRB's file, and thus the document that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in
order.
3. OMB-VIS-89-00136
This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August
15, 1988 — sustaining the judgment of the Court of Appeals (10th Division)
of January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, supra, was made the subject
of a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of the Ombudsman,
Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136. His complaint — against
"Supreme Court Justice (First Div.) and Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div)"
— was dismissed for lack of merit in a Resolution issued on February 14,
1990 25 which, among other things, ruled as follows:
It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has
remedies available under the Rules of Court, particularly on
civil procedure and existing laws. It is not the prerogative of
this Office to make a review of Decisions and Resolutions of
judicial courts, rendered within their competence. The
records do not warrant this Office to take further proceedings
against the respondents.
In addition, Sec. 20. of R.A. 6770, "the Ombudsman Act
states that the Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct
the necessary investigation of any administrative act or
omission complained of if it believes that (1) the complainant
had adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial
body;" and Sec. 21 the same law provides that the Office of
the Ombudsman does not have disciplinary authority over
members of the Judiciary.
II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT
PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)
As earlier stated, 26 Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also
borrowed money from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and
executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage
was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No.
75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7,
1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation
for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The
sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.
A. CIVIL CASES
Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit
accommodations he had obtained from the Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo
failed in the fulfillment of his obligations to the UCPB.
Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or
minimize the ill effects of the latter's delinquency, Lao applied with the same
bank (UCPB) for a loan, offering the property he had purchased from
Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing with Lao but
imposed several conditions on him, one of which was for Lao to consolidate
his title over the property. Lao accordingly instituted a suit for consolidation of
title, docketed as Civil Case No. R-21009. However, as will shortly be
narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidation prayed for. As a result, UCPB
cancelled Lao's application for a loan and itself commenced proceedings
foreclose the mortgage constituted by Borromeo over the property.
This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only
against Lao, but also against UCPB and the latter's lawyers, battles which he
(Borromeo) fought contemporaneously with his court war with Traders Royal
Bank.
1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R.
No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273
The first of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action
initiated by Samson Lao in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12),
docketed as Case No. R-21009, for consolidation of title in his favor over the
122-square-meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in accordance with
Article 1007 of the Civil Code. In this suit Lao was represented by Atty.
Alfredo Perez, who was later substituted by Atty. Antonio Regis. Borromeo
contested Lao's application.
Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis
Militante, presiding) denying consolidation because the transaction between
the parties could not be construed as a sale with pacto de retro being in law
an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo was ordered to pay Lao the sum
of P170,000.00, representing the price stipulated in the sale a retro, plus the
amounts paid by Lao for capital gains and other taxes in connection with the
transaction (P10,497.50).
Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was
dismissed for failure of his lawyer to file brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal
— AC-G.R. No. CV-07396 — resulted in a Decision by the Court of Appeals
dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's judgment in toto.
The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by this Court (Third
Division) in a four-page Resolution dated September 13, 1989, promulgated
in G.R. No. 82273 — an appeal also taken by Borromeo. Borromeo filed a
motion for reconsideration on several grounds, one of which was that the
resolution of September 13, 1989 was unconstitutional because contrary to
"Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of
the Division, and there was "no way of knowing which justices had
deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any concurrence of at least three of the
members." Since the motion was not filed until after there had been an entry
of judgment, Borromeo having failed to move for reconsideration within the
reglementary period, the same was simply noted without action, in a
Resolution dated November 27, 1989.
Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established
rule and practice, sent to Borromeo over the signatures of the Clerk of Court
and Assistant Clerk of Court (namely: Attys. Julieta Y. CARREON and
Alfredo MARASIGAN, respectively).
a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679
Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders
Royal Bank, Borromeo attempted to vent his resentment even against the
Supreme Court officers who, as just stated, had given him notices of the
adverse dispositions of this Court's Third Division. He filed Civil Case No.
CEB-8679 in the Cebu City RTC (CFI) for recovery of damages against
"Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and
Asst. Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of
Judicial Records Office." He charged them with usurpation of judicial
functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake,
baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R.
No. 82273."
Summonses were issued to defendants by RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R.
Ybañez, presiding). These processes were brought to the attention of this
Court's Third Division. The latter resolved to treat the matter as an incident in
G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to the Court En Banc on April 25, 1990. By
Resolution (issued in said G.R. No. 82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the
Court En Banc ordered Judge Ybañez to quash the summonses, to dismiss
Civil Case No. CEB-8679, and "not to issue summons or otherwise to
entertain cases of similar nature which may in the future be filed in his court."
Accordingly, Judge Ibañez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashing the
summonses and dismissing the complaint in said Civil Case No. CEB-8679.
The Resolution of June 1, 1990 27 explained to Borromeo in no little detail the
nature and purpose of notices sent by the Clerks of Court of decisions or
resolutions of the Court En Banc or the Divisions, in this wise:
This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed
charges/complaints against officials of the Court. In several
letter complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman,
Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he "suffered
injustices," because of the disposition of the four (4) cases
he separately appealed to this Court which were resolved by
minute resolutions, allegedly in violation of Sections 4 (3), 13
and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His invariable
complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his cases
do not bear the signatures of the Justices who participated in
the deliberations and resolutions and do not show that they
voted therein. He likewise complained that the resolutions
bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not
state the facts and the law on which they were based and
were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore
"unconstitutional, null and void."
xxx xxx xxx
The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that
it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and
decrees them as final and executory, as were a case is
patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in
nature, where the decision appealed from is in accord with
the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is
clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to
forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-
compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due
course always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In
Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], "[T]he
Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions all the
time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or
Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given,
depending on its evaluation of a case" . . . This is the only
way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and,
accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions. . . .
. . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any
subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or
motions decides to deny due course to the petition and
states that the questions raised are factual, or no reversible
error in the respondent court's decision is shown, or for
some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement . . .
(of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution "that no petition
for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis thereof").
For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute
resolutions are promulgated by the Court through the Clerk
of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the
parties concerned by quoting verbatim the resolution issued
 on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform
the parties of the action taken on their cases quoting the
resolution adopted by the Court. The Clerk of Court never
participates in the deliberations of a case. All decisions and
resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court
merely transmits the Court's action. This was explained in
the case — G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix
Gravante, et al.," where, in a resolution dated July 6, 1981,
the Court
said — "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or
dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the
case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among
the members of this Court, which does not and cannot
delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of
Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to
counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this
Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order
together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions.
Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of
the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do
they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to
require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued
would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions
but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions
more properly performed by the Clerk of Court and which
time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases
and the formulation of decisions and orders of important
nature and character. Even with the use of this procedure,
the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs
accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing
number of cases coming to it. . . .
b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501)
6740; G.R. No. 84054
It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while
having no relation to the UCPB, TRB or SBTC, are relevant because they
were the predicates for other suits filed by Joaquin Borromeo against
administrative officers of the Supreme Court and the Judge who decided one
of the cases adversely to him.
The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo filed a civil
action for damages against a certain Thomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6501. On January 12, 1988, the trial court
dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action
and prematurity (for non-compliance with P.D. 1508).
What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same complaint with the same
Court, on March 18, 1988. This time it was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
6740, and assigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of Cebu presided by Hon. Mario
Dizon. Again, however, on defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed the
case, in an order dated May 28, 1988. His first and second motions for
reconsideration having been denied, Borromeo filed a petition for review
before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs.
Tomas Tan and Non. Mario Dizon).
In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply
with the rules by submitting a verified statement of material dates and paying
the docket and legal research fund fees; it also referred him to the Citizens
Legal Assistance Office for help in the case. His petition was eventually
dismissed by Resolution of the Second Division dated November 21, 1988,
for failure on his part to show any reversible error in the trial court's judgment.
His motion for reconsideration was denied with finality, by Resolution dated
January 18, 1989.
Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second
Division) on April 27, 1989 once more remonstrating that the resolutions
received by him had not been signed by any Justice, set forth no findings of
fact or law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty. Garma replied
to him on May 19, 1989, pointing out that "the minute resolutions of this Court
denying dismissing petitions, like the petition in the case at bar, which was
denied for failure of the counsel and/or petitioner to sufficiently show that the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, had committed any reversible error
in the questioned judgment [resolution dated November 21, 1988], are the
result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which
does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial function to its Clerk
of Court or any of its subalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed by
the Court, it sustains the challenged decision or order together with its
findings of facts and legal conclusions."
Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of
June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, supra (or the earlier communications to him
on the same subject) which had so clearly pointed out that minute resolutions
of the Court are as much the product of the Members' deliberations as full-
blown decisions or resolutions, and that the intervention of the Clerk consists
merely in the ministerial and routinary function of communicating the Court's
action to the parties concerned.
c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042
What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff,
yet another in an already long series, was to commence a suit against
Supreme Court (Second Division) Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and
Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers who had sent
him notices of the unfavorable resolutions in G.R. No. 84054, supra. His suit,
filed on June 1, 1990, was docketed as Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon.
Bernardo Salas presiding). Therein he complained essentially of the same
thing he had been harping on all along: that in relation to G.R. No. 91030 —
in which the Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical reasons"
and failure to demonstrate any reversible error in the challenged judgment —
the notice sent to him — of the "unsigned and unspecific" resolution of
February 19, 1990, denying his motion for reconsideration — had been
signed only by the defendant clerks of court and not by the Justices.
According to him, he had thereupon written letters to defendants demanding
an explanation for said "patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions,"
which they ignored; defendants had usurped judicial functions by issuing
resolutions signed only by them and not by any Justice, and without stating
the factual and legal basis thereof; and defendants' "wanton, malicious and
patently abusive acts" had caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral
shock, embarrassment, sleepless nights and worry;" and consequently, he
was entitled to moral damages of no less than P20,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P10,000.00, and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.
On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case
transmitted to the Supreme Court conformably with its Resolution dated June
1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, entitled "Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals and Samson-Lao," supra — directing that all complaints against
officers of that Court be forwarded to it for appropriate action. 28
Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the
Court to "rectify the injustices" committed against him in G.R. Nos. 83306,
84999, 87897, 77248 and 84054. This the Court ordered expunged from the
record (Resolution, July 19, 1990).
2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R.
CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897
Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his
property. In the Cebu City RTC, he filed a complaint for "Damages with
Injunction," which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21880 (Joaquin T.
Borromeo vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Named defendants in
the complaint were UCPB, Enrique Farrarons (UCPB Cebu Branch Manager)
and Samson K. Lao. UCPB was represented in the action by Atty. Danilo
Deen, and for a time, by Atty. Honorato Hermosisima (both being then
resident partners of ACCRA Law Office). Lao was represented by Atty.
Antonio Regis. Once again, Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br. 11,
Judge Valeriano R. Tomol, Jr. presiding) dismissed the complaint, upheld
UCPB's right to foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral damages in
the sum of P20,000.00; attorney's fees amounting to P10,000.00; and
litigation expenses of P1,000.00.
Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 10951. That Court, thru its Ninth Division (per
Martinez, J., ponente, with de la Fuente and Pe, JJ., concurring), dismissed
his appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.
Borromeo filed a petition far review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R.
No. 87897 dismissed it for insufficiency in form and substance and for being
"largely unintelligible." Borromeo's motion for reconsideration was denied by
Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated July 31, 1989 which directed as well entry of
judgment (effected on August 1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (First
Division) said:
The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated
July 4, 1989 filed by petitioner himself and Resolved to
DENY the same for lack of merit, the motion having been
filed without "express leave of court" (Section 2, Rule 52,
Rules of Court) apart from being a reiteration merely of the
averments of the Petition for Review dated April 14, 1989
and the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989. It
should be noted that petitioner's claims have already been
twice rejected as without merit, first by the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu and then by the Court of Appeals. What
petitioner desires obviously is to have a third ruling on the
merits of his claims, this time by this Court. Petitioner is
advised that a review of a decision of the Court of Appeals is
not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will
be granted only when there is a special and important
reason therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a petition for
review may be dismissed summarily on the ground that "the
appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay
or the question raised is too unsubstantial to require
consideration" (Section 3, Rule 45), or that only questions of
fact are raised in the petition, or the petition otherwise fails to
comply with the formal requisites prescribed therefor
(Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45; Circular No. 1-88). Petitioner is
further advised that the first sentence of Section 14, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution refers to a decision, and has no
application to a resolution as to which said section
pertinently provides that a resolution denying a motion for
reconsideration need state only the legal basis therefor; and
 that the resolution of June 26, 1989 denying petitioner's first
Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25, 1989 does indeed
state the legal reasons therefor. The plain and patent
signification of the grounds for denial set out in the
Resolution of June 26, 1989 is that the petitioner's
arguments — aimed at the setting aside of the resolution
denying the petition for review and consequently bringing
about a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals — had
failed to persuade the Court that the errors imputed to the
Court of Appeals had indeed been committed and therefore,
there was no cause to modify the conclusions set forth in
that judgment; and in such a case, there is obviously no
point in reproducing and restating the conclusions and
reasons therefor of the Court of Appeals.
Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.
On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the
Clerk of Court of the Court's First Division, denouncing the resolution above
mentioned as "a LITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS, and ABSURD SELF-
SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and drunk with power
which it has forgotten emanates from the people," aside from being "patently
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of signatures and facts and law: . . . and
characterizing the conclusions therein as "the height of ARROGANCE and
ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE
POWER totally at variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL
provisions . . ." To the letter Borromeo attached copies of (1) his "Open Letter
to the Ombudsman" dated August 10, 1989 protesting the Court's "issuing
UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS;'" (2)
his "Open Letter of Warning" dated August 12, 1989; and (3) a
communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily
Inquirer, dated August 10, 1989. His letter was ordered expunged from the
record because containing "false, impertinent and scandalous matter
(Section 5, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court)." Another letter of the same ilk,
dated November 7, 1989, was simply "NOTED without action" by Resolution
promulgated on December 13, 1989.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R.
SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999
In arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo filed another
action to invalidate the foreclosure effected at the instance of UCPB, which
he had unsuccessfully tried to prevent in Case No. CEB-21880. This was
Civil Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs.
UCPB, et al.) for "Annulment of Title with Damages." Here, UCPB was
represented by Atty. Laurence Fernandez, in consultation with Atty. Deen.
On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A.
Juaban, presiding) dismissed the complaint on the ground of litis
pendentia and ordered Borromeo to pay attorney's fees (P5,000.00) and
litigation expenses (P1,000.00).
Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this
judgment (CA G.R. SP No. 14519); but his action was dismissed by the
Appellate Court on June 7, 1988 on account of his failure to comply with that
Court's Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of certified true copies of
the Trial Court's decision of December 26, 1987 and its Order of February
26, 1988, and for statement of "the dates he received . . . (said) decision and
. . . order."
Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as
G.R. No. 84999. In a Resolution dated October 10, 1988, the Second
Division required comment on Borromeo's petition for review by the
respondents therein named, and required Borromeo to secure the services of
counsel. On November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles entered his
appearance for Borromeo. After due proceedings, Borromeo's petition was
dismissed, by Resolution dated March 6, 1989 of the Second Division for
failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any
reversible error in the questioned judgment. His motion for reconsideration
dated April 4, 1989, again complaining that the resolution contained no
findings of fact and law, was denied.
a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178
Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by
Borromeo in the RTC of Cebu City, this time against the Trial Judge who had
lately rendered judgment adverse to him, Judge Generoso Juaban. Also
impleaded as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres Narvasa (then
Chairman, First Division), Estrella G.Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then,
respectively, Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the First Division),
and others. Judge German G. Lee of Branch 15 of said Court — to which the
case was raffled — caused issuance of summonses which were in due
course served on September 22, 1989, among others, on said defendants in
and of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution dated October 2, 1989
— in G.R. No. 84999 — this Court, required Judge Lee and the Clerk of
Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for issuing said summonses.
Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles — who, as already stated, had for a Dear Mr. Borromeo:
time represented Borromeo in G.R. No. 84999 — filed with this Court his
withdrawal of appearance, alleging that there was "no compatibility" between This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a
him and his client, Borromeo — because "Borromeo had been filing copy of the actual resolution with the signatures of all the
pleadings, papers; etc. without . . . (his) knowledge and advice" — and Justices of the Second Division in Case G.R. No. 77243
declaring that he had "not advised and . . . (had) no hand in the filing of (said) whereby the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of
Civil Case CEB 8178 before the Regional Trial Court in Cebu. On the other the petition was denied for lack of merit.
hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October 23, 1989, apologized to
the Court and informed it that he had already promulgated an order In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance,
dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-8178 on motion of the principal defendants
Resolution dated July 6, 1981 in G.R. No. 56280, Rhine
therein, namely, Judge Generoso Juaban and United Coconut Planters Bank
Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., et al., wherein the
(UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal of appearance, and Judge Lee's
Supreme Court declared that "(m)inute resolutions of this
compliance, were noted by the Court in its Resolution dated November 29,
Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the
1989. petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough
deliberation among the members of this Court, which does
4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R. not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions
CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248 to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be
known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by
It is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or
Samson K. Lao which gave rise to another action that ultimately landed in order together with its findings of facts and legal
this Court. 29 The transaction involved a parcel of land of Borromeo's known conclusions." It is the Clerk of Court's duty to notify the
as the "San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo sued Lao and parties of the action taken on their case by quoting the
another person (Mariano Logarta) in the Cebu Regional Trial Court on the resolution adopted by the Court.
theory that his contract with the latter was not an absolute sale but an
equitable mortgage. The action was docketed as Case No. CEB-374. V
Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court (Branch 12) declaring e
valid and binding the purchase of the property by Lao from him, and the r
subsequent sale thereof by Lao to Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the Court y
of Appeals, but that Court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097, affirmed the Trial t
Court's judgment, by Decision promulgated on October 10, 1986. r
u
Borromeo came up to this Court. on appeal, his review petition being l
docketed as G.R. No. 77248. By Resolution of the Second Division of March y
16, 1987, however, his petition was denied for the reason that "a) the petition y
as well as the docket and legal research fund fees were filed and paid late; o
and (b) the issues raised are factual and the findings thereon of the Court of u
Appeals are final." He moved for reconsideration; this was denied by r
Resolution dated June 3, 1987. s
,
He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said
adverse resolutions through various motions and letters, all of which were J
denied. One of his letters — inter alia complaining that the notice sent to him U
by the Clerk of Court did not bear the signature of any Justice — elicited the L
following reply from Atty. Julieta Y. Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third I
Division, dated July 10, 1987, reading as follows: E
T
 A with G.R. No. 82273 which did not bear the justices' signatures. 32 In a
Y Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed
. his complaint for "lack of merit" declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned
C actuations of the respondents alleged to constitute usurpation . . . it cannot
A be reasonably and fairly inferred that respondents really were the ones
R rendering them," and "it is not the prerogative of this office to review the
R correctness of judicial resolutions." 33
E
O III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY
N BANK & TRUST CO. (SBTC)

B. CRIMINAL CASES A. CIVIL CASES

Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal
Bank, and similarly without foundation, Borromeo attempted to hold his
adversaries in the cases concerning the UCPB criminally liable.
1. Case No; OMB-VIS-89-00181
In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other
attempts to overturn the judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No.
21880, 30 Borromeo filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on
August 18, 1989, a complaint against the Chairman and Members of the
Supreme Court's First Division; the Members of the Ninth Division of the
Court of Appeals, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, Undersecretary of
Justice Silvestre Bello III, and Cebu City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja,
charging them with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
the Revised Penal Code.
By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 31 the Office of the Ombudsman
dismissed Borromeo's complaint, opining that the matters therein dealt with
had already been tried and their merits determined by different courts
including the Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No. 87987).
The resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we find it unreasonable for
complainant to dispute and defiantly refuse to acknowledge the authority of
the decree rendered by the highest tribunal of the land in this case. . . ."
2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418
A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas), dated January 12, 1990, against Atty. Julieta
Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, Supreme Court, and others,
charging them with a violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules
of Court, etc.) for supposedly usurping judicial functions in that they issued
Supreme Court resolutions (actually, notices of resolutions) in connection
1. RTC Case No. 21615; CA-
G.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769
The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running
court battles, was the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it
Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19,
consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure
payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance
bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in
the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo
failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an
action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.
The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to
Branch 10, Judge Leonardo Cañares, presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was
represented by Atty. Edgar Gica, who later withdrew and was substituted by
the law firm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit through Atty.
Wilfredo Navarro.
Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both
defendents were sentenced to pay to SBTC, solidarily, the amount of
P436,771.32; 25% thereof as attorney's fees (but in no case less than
P20,000.00); and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ of
execution issued in due course pursuant to which an immovable of Borromeo
was levied on, and eventually sold at public auction on October 19, 1989 in
favor of the highest bidder, SBTC.
On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside the judgment by
default, but the same was denied on March 6, 1990. His Motion for
Reconsideration having likewise been denied, Borromeo went to the Court of
Appeals for relief (CA-G.R. No. 20617), but the latter dismissed his petition.
Failing in his bid for reconsideration, Borromeo appealed to this Court
on certiorari — his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 94769. On September
17, 1990, this Court dismissed his petition, and subsequently denied with
finality his motion for reconsideration. Entry of Judgment was made on
December 26, 1990.
However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated
in light of his history of recalcitrance and bellicosity, these proceedings did
not signify the end of litigation concerning Borromeo's aforesaid contractual
commitments to SBTC, but only marked the start of another congeries of
actions and proceedings, civil and criminal concerning the same matter,
instituted by Borromeo.
2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267
While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo
commenced a suit of his own in the Cebu RTC against SBTC; the lawyers
who represented it in Civil Case No. R-21625 — HERSINLAW, Atty. Wilfredo
Navarro, Atty. Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried and disposed of the
suit, Hon. Leonardo Cañares. He denominated his action, docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-9267, as one for "Damages from Denial of Due Process,
Breach of Contract, Fraud, Unjust Judgment, with Restraining Order and
Injunction." His complaint accused defendants of "wanton, malicious and
deceitful acts" in "conniving to deny plaintiff due process and defraud him
through excessive attorney's fees," which acts caused him grave mental and
moral shock, sleepless nights, worry, social embarrassment and severe
anxiety for which he sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as
well as litigation expenses.
By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon.
Godardo Jacinto, presiding) granted the demurrer to evidence filed by
defendants and dismissed the complaint, holding that "since plaintiff failed to
introduce evidence to support . . . (his) causes of action asserted . . ., it
would be superfluous to still require defendants to present their own
evidence as there is nothing for them to controvert."
2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458;
CA-G.R. CV No. 39047
Nothing daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed on July 2, 1991
still another suit against the same parties — SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge
Cañares — but now including Judge Godardo Jacinto, 34 who had rendered
the latest judgment against him. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
10458, was, according to Borromeo, one "for Damages (For Unjust
Judgment and Orders, Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws Violation of the
Constitution, Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo faulted Judges
Cañares and Jacinto "for the way they decided the two cases (CVR-21615 &
CEB NO. 9267)," and contended that defendants committed "wanton,
malicious, and unjust acts" by "conniving to defraud plaintiff and deny him
equal protection of the laws and due process," on account of which he had
been "caused untold mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless nights,
and embarrassment for which the former are liable under Arts. 20, 21, 27,
and 32 of the Civil Code."
The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991,
the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15 (Judge German G. Lee, Jr., presiding)
dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata, immunity of judges from
liability in the performance of their official functions, and lack of jurisdiction.
Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA-
G.R. CV No. 39047.
In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro,
lawyer of SBTC, for contempt of court. The motions were denied by
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special 7th Division) dated April 13,
1993. 35 Said the Court:
Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes,
the subject motions, in fact, proffer nothing but a stark
difference in opinion as to what can, or cannot, be
considered res judicata under the circumstances.
xxx xxx xxx
By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and
his apparent penchant for argumentum ad hominen, it is, on
the contrary the appellant who precariously treads the
acceptable limits of argumentation and personal advocacy.
The Court, moreover, takes particular note of the
irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored and finds
them highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the
dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts. That he is not a
licensed law practitioner is, in fact, the only reason that his
otherwise contumacious behavior is presently accorded the
patience and leniency it probably does not deserve.
Considering the temperament he has, by far, exhibited, the
appellant is, however, sufficiently warned that similar
displays in the future shall accordingly be dealt with with
commensurate severity.
IV. OTHER CASES
A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R,
CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929
One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K.
Lao is pertinent. This is Case No. CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu. It appears that sometime in 1979, Borromeo was granted a loan of
P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) on the
security of a lot belonging to him in San Jose Street, Cebu City, covered by
TCT No. 34785.36 Later, Borromeo obtained a letter of credit in the amount of
P37,000.00 from Republic Planters Bank, with Samson Lao as co-maker.
Borromeo failed to pay his obligations; Lao agreed to, and did pay
Borromeo's obligations to both banks (PBCom and Republic), in
consideration of which a deed of sale was executed in his favor by Borromeo
over two (2) parcels of land, one of which was that mortgaged to PBCom, as
above stated. Lao then mortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own
loan in the amount of P240,000.00.
Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson
Lao in the Cebu Regional Trial Court alleging that the defendants had
conspired to deprive him of his property. Judgment was rendered against him
by the Trial Court. Borromeo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
where his appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 14770. On March 21,
1990, said Court rendered judgment affirming the Trial Court's decision, and
on February 7, 1991, issued a Resolution denying Borromeo's motion for
reconsideration. His appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 98929, was
given short shrift. On May 29, 1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated a
Resolution denying his petition for review "for being factual and for failure . . .
to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error
in its questioned judgment."
Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the
resolutions sent to him were unconstitutional and void because bearing no
signatures of the Justices who had taken part in approving the resolution
therein mentioned.
B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528
What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against
Borromeo, at least as of date of this Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil
Case No. CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City (Branch 18),
which was yet another case filed by Borromeo outlandishly founded on the
theory that a judgment promulgated against him by the Supreme Court (Third
Division) was wrong and "unjust." Impleaded as defendant in the action was
former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, as Chairman of the Third Division at
the time in question. On August 31, 1994 the presiding judge, Hon. Galicano
O. Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter alia dismissing Borromeo's
complaint "on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor
made the following pertinent observations:
. . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds
that this Court has indeed no jurisdiction to review, interpret
or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme
Court. The acts or omissions complained of by the plaintiff
against the herein defendant and the other personnel of the
highest Court of the land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12 of
plaintiff's complaint are certainly beyond the sphere of this
humble court to consider and pass upon to determine their
propriety and legality. To try to review, interpret or reverse
the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court
would appear not only presumptuous but also contemptuous.
As argued by the lawyer for the defendant, a careful perusal
of the allegations in the complaint clearly shows that all
material allegations thereof are directed against a resolution
of the Supreme Court which was allegedly issued by the
Third Division composed of five (5) justices. No allegation is
made directly against defendant Marcelo B. Fernan in his
personal capacity. That being the case, how could this Court
question the wisdom of the final order or judgment of the
Supreme Court (Third Division) which according to the
plaintiff himself had issued a resolution denying plaintiffs
petition and affirming the Lower Court's decision as reflected
in the "Entry of Judgment." Perhaps, if there was such
violation of the Rules of Court, due process and Sec. 14, Art.
8 of the Constitution by the defendant herein, the appropriate
remedy should not have been obtained before this Court. For
an inferior court to reverse, interpret or review the acts of a
superior court might be construed to a certain degree as a
show of an uncommon common sense. Lower courts are
without supervising jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the
judgment of the higher courts.
Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was
denied "for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis" by an Order dated
November 15, 1994.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433
A. Complaint Against Lawyers
of his Court Adversaries
Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
lawyers who had appeared for his adversaries — UCPB and Samson K. Lao
— in the actions above mentioned, and others. As already mentioned, these
lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo Deen, Honorato
Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and Alfredo Perez. His complaint against them,
docketed as Administrative Case No. 3433, prayed for their disbarment.
Borromeo averred that the respondent lawyers connived with their clients in
(1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed of sale with pacto de retro as a
genuine sale, although it was actually an equitable mortgage; (2) fraudulently
depriving complainant of his proprietary rights subject of the Deed of Sale;
and (3) defying two lawful Court orders, all in violation of their lawyer's oath
to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo
alleged that respondents Perez and Regis falsely attempted to consolidate
title to his property in favor of Lao.
B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers
The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely
baseless and nothing but pure harassment." In a pleading dated July 10,
1990, entitled "Comments and Counter Motion to Cite Joaquin Borromeo in
Contempt of Court;" July 10, 1990, filed by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Cebu City Chapter, signed by Domero C. Estenzo (President),
Juliano Neri (Vice-President), Ulysses Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B.
Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U. Lainid
(Director), Manuel A. Espina (Director), Ildefonsa A. Ybañez (Director), Sylvia
G. Almase (Director), and Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin (Auditor). The
lawyers made the following observations:
It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard
members of the Judiciary with deferential awe and respect
sometimes to the extent of cowering before the might of the
courts, here is a non-lawyer who, with gleeful abandon and
unmitigated insolence, has cast aspersions and shown utter
disregard to the authority and name of the courts.
And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that
here is a non-lawyer who uses the instruments of justice to
harass lawyers and courts who crosses his path more
especially if their actuations do not conform with his whims
and caprices.
Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then
Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan with supposed infidelity and violation of the
constitution, etc., the lawyers went on to say the following:
The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this
Honorable Court, and other members of the Judiciary are
clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent and contemptuous.
They tend to bring dishonor to the Judiciary and subvert the
public confidence on the courts. If unchecked, the scurrilous
attacks will undermine the dignity of the courts and will result
in the loss of confidence in the country's judicial system and
administration of justice.
. . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the
courts and the legal profession. So many baseless
badmouthing have been made by Borromeo against this
Honorable Court and other courts that for him to go scot-free
would certainly be demoralizing to members of the
profession who afforded the court with all the respect and
esteem due them.
Subsequently, in the same proceeding; Borromeo filed another pleading
protesting the alleged "refusal" of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines to act on his disbarment cases "filed against its
members."
C. Decision of the IBP
On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila
Grapilon) transmitted to this Court the notice and copy of the decision in the
case, reached after due investigation, as well as the corresponding records
in seven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted the Report and
Recommendation dated December 15, 1993 of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi,
President, IBP, Cebu City Chapter, representing the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, recommending dismissal of the complaint as against all the
respondents and the issuance of a "warning to Borromeo to be more
cautious and not be precipitately indiscriminate in the filing of administrative
complaints against lawyers." 37
VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS
Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters
("open" or otherwise), "circulars," flyers or leaflets harshly and quite
unwarrantedly derogatory of the many court judgments or directives against
him and defamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers and employees, as
well as the judges and court employees involved in the said adverse
dispositions — some of which scurrilous writings were adverted to by the
respondent lawyers in Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing and
circulation of these defamatory writing were apparently undertaken by
Borromeo as a parallel activity to his "judicial adventures." The Court of
Appeals had occasion to refer to his "apparent penchant for argumentum ad
hominen" and of the "irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored . . .
(which were found to be) highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to
the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts."
In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant,
corrupt, oppressors, violators of the Constitution and the laws, etc.
Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star"
as regards the reported conferment on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan
of an "Award from the University of Texas for his contributions in upholding
the Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that Fernan "and the Supreme Court
persist in rendering rulings patently violative of the Constitution, Due Process
and Rule of Law, particularly in their issuance of so-called Minute
Resolutions devoid of FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES . . ." He sent a copy of
his letter in the Supreme Court.
He circulated an "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he
had "suffered INJUSTICE after INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to
render TRUE JUSTICE but done the opposite, AND INSTEAD OF
RECTIFYING THEM, labeled my cases as 'frivolous, nuisance, and
harassment suits' while failing to refute the irrefutable evidences therein . . .;"
in the same letter, he specified what he considered to be some of "the terrible
injustices inflicted on me by this Court."
In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after
EDSA, your pledges have not been fulfilled. Injustice continues and as you
said, the courts are agents of oppression, instead of being saviours and
defenders of the people. The saddest part is that (referring again to minute
resolutions) even the Supreme Court, the court of last resort, many times,
sanctions injustice and the trampling of the rule of law and due process, and
does not comply with the Constitution when it should be the first to uphold
and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of his, dated June 21, 1989 and
captioned, "Open Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and
Andres Narvasa," repeated his plaint of having "been the victim of many . . .
'Minute Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction the theft and landgrabbing
and arson of my properties by TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED
COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, AND one TOMAS B. TAN — all without
stating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of . . . (my) cases,
despite your firm assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such
facts or laws (during our talk in your house last March 12 1989);" and that
"you in fact have no such facts or laws but simply want to ram down a most
unjust Ruling in favor of a wrongful party. . . ."
In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt
to fool people!" he mentions what he regards as "The blatant lies and
contradictions of the Supreme Court, CA to support the landgrabbing by
Traders Royal Bank of Borromeos' Lands." Another flyer has at the center
the caricature of a person, seated on a throne marked Traders Royal Bank,
surrounded by such statements as, "Sa TRB para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at
nakaw! Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!" etc Still another "circular"
proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme Court minute resolutions w/o
facts, law, or signatures violate the Constitution" and ends with the
admonition: "Supreme Court, Justice Fernan: STOP VIOLATING THE
CHARTER." 38
One other "circular" reads:
SC, NARVASA — TYRANTS!!!
— CODDLERS OF CROOKS!
— VIOLATOR OF LAWS
by: JOAQUIN BORROMEO
NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it
shielded CROOKS in the judiciary. Adding "The SCRA (SC
Reports) will attest to this continuing vigilance Of the
supreme Court." These are lame, cowardly and self-serving
denials and another "self-exoneration" belied by evidence
which speak for themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) — the
SCRA itself.
It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and
associates issued UNSIGNED, UNCLEAR, SWEEPING
"Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR FACTS and LAWS in
patent violation of Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution. It
is precisely through said TYRANNICAL, and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham rulings that Narvasa & Co.
have CODDLED CROOKS like crony bank TRB, UCPB, and
SBTC, and through said fake resolutions that Narvasa has
LIED or shown IGNORANCE of the LAW in ruling that
CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION (GR 83306). Through said despotic
resolutions, NARVASA & CO. have sanctioned
UCPB/ACCRA's defiance of court orders and naked land
grabbing — What are these if not TYRANNY? (GR 84999).
Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment
without first resolving the motion for reconsideration (G.R
No. 82273). Was it not tyranny and abuse of power for the • DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES, and
SC to order a case dismissed against SC clerks (CEBV- even MERE CLERKS TO BE IMMUNE
8679) and declare justices and said clerks "immune from FROM SUIT AND UN-ACCOUNTABLE TO
suit" — despite their failure to file any pleading? Were THE PEOPLE and REFUSING TO
Narvasa & Co. not in fact trampling on the rule of law and ANSWER AND REFUTE CHARGES
rules of court and DUE PROCESS in so doing? (GR No. AGAINST HIMSELF
82273).
J
TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their O
acts speak for themselves! NARVASA & ASSOC: ANSWER A
AND REFUTE THESE SERIOUS CHARGES OR RESIGN!! Q
U
IMPEACH NARVASA I
N
T
• ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING,
.
UNCLEAR, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
B
"MINUTE RESOLUTIONS" VIOLATIVE OF
O
SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8, Constitution
R
R
• VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND O
DUE PROCESS IN ORDERING CASE M
AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679) E
DISMISSED DESPITE THE LATTER'S O
FAILURE TO FILE PLEADINGS; HENCE IN
DEFAULT

• CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN RULING,
THAT CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION,
CONTRADICTING LAW AND SC'S OWN
RULINGS — TO ALLOW CRONY BANK
TRB TO STEALS LOTS WORTH P3
MILLION

• CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S

DEFIANCE OF TWO LAWFUL COURT
ORDERS AND STEALING OF TITLE OF
PROPERTY WORTH P4 MILLION

• BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE

SAME TIME AND PREDICTABLY
EXONERATING HIMSELF AND FELLOW
CORRUPT JUSTICES

VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS
OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR
A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter
IBP, dated June 21, 1992
Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among
others, of some members of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. Its President thereupon addressed a letter to this Court,
dated June 21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one of them — that last
quoted, above — " . . . .sent to the IBP Cebu City Chapter and probably other
officers . . . in Cebu," described as containing "highly libelous and defamatory
remarks against the Supreme Court and the whole justice system"— and (2)
in behalf of the Chapter's "officers and members," strongly urged the Court
"to impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act."
B. Resolution of July 22, 1993
Acting thereon, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution on July 22, 1993,
requiring comment by Borromeo on the letter, notice of which was sent to
him by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The resolution pertinently reads as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The records of the Court disclose inter alia that as early as
April 4, 1989, the Acting Clerk of Court, Atty. Luzviminda D.
Puno, wrote a four page letter to Mr. Borromeo concerning
G.R. No. 83306 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Traders Royal
Bank [referred to by Borromeo in the "circular" adverted to by
the relator herein, the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and two (2)
other cases also filed with the Court by Borromeo: G.R. No.
77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Samson Lao and Mariano
Logarta) and G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Hon.
Mario Dizon and Tomas Tan), all resolved adversely to him
by different Divisions of the Court. In that letter Atty. Puno
explained to Borromeo very briefly the legal principles
applicable to his cases
5 and dealt with the matters mentioned
in his circular. 6
-
4
The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by
9 instituted by Borromeo in this
the Court in other cases
Court, i.e., G.R. No. .87897 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of
Appeals, et al.) and No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v.
Court of Appeals and Samson Lao), as well as the existence
of other communications made public by Borromeo
reiterating the arguments already passed upon by the court
in his cases and condemning the court's rejection of those
arguments.
Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines thru its
above named, President, and taking account of the related
facts on record, the Court Resolved:
1) to REQUIRE:
(a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a
proceeding for contempt against Joaquin T. Borromeo
instituted at the relation of said Cebu City Chapter,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and (2) to SEND to the City
Sheriff, Cebu City, notice of this resolution and copies of the
Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993 together with its
annexes; and
(b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL
SERVICE of said notice of resolution and a copy of the
Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993, together with its
annexes, on Joaquin T. Borromeo at his address at Mabolo,
Cebu City; and
2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days
from receipt of such notice and the IBP Chapter's letter of
June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to file a comment on the
letter and its annexes as well as on the other matters set
forth in this resolution, serving copy thereof on the relator,
the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Palace of Justice Building, Capitol, Cebu City.
SO ORDERED.
1. Atty. Puno's Letter of April 4, 1989
Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989, referred to in the
first paragraph of the resolution just mentioned, explained to Borromeo for
perhaps the second time, precisely the principles and established practice
relative to "minute resolutions" and notices thereof, treated of in several other
communications and resolutions sent to him by the Supreme Court, to wit:
the letter received by him on July 10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y.
Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) (in relation to G.R No. 77243 39) the
letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May
19,
1989, 40 and three resolutions of this Court, notices of which were in due
course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No.
87897; 41 that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82274 (186 SCRA 1), 42 and
that dated June 11, 1994 in G. R. No. 112928. 43
C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993
In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo filed a Comment
dated August 27, 1993 in which he alleged the following:
1) the resolution of July 22, 1993 (requiring comment)
violates the Constitution which requires "signatures and
concurrence of majority of members of the High Court;"
hence, "a certified copy duly signed by Justices is
respectfully requested;"
2) the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should
inhibit themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and
Judge at the same time, . . . (and) this case should be heard
by an impartial and independent body;"
3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by
members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague,
unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out "what
particular statements in the circular are allegedly libelous
and condemnable;" and does not appear that Atty. Legaspi
has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those
accused in the "libelous circular;"
4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "was exercising his
rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition
the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by
the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the
accountability of public officials;" the circular merely states
the truth and asks for justice based on the facts and the
law; . . . it is not libelous nor disrespectful but rather to be
commended and encouraged; . . . Atty. Legaspi . . . should
specify under oath which statements are false and lies;
5) he "stands by the charges in his circular and is prepared
to support them with pertinent facts, evidence and law;" and
it is "incumbent on the Hon. Chief Justice and members of
the High Court to either refute said charges or dispense the
justice that they are duty bound to dispense.
D. Resolution of September 30, 1993
After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord Borromeo the fullest
opportunity to explain his side, and be reprsented by an attorney, the Court
promulgated the following Resolution on September 30, 1993, notice of
which was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk of Court.
. . . The return of service filed by Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino,
Office of the Clerk of Court Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, dated August 26, 1993, and the Comment of Joaquin
Borromeo, dated August 27, 1993, on the letter of President
Manuel P. Legaspi of the relator dated June 21, 1993, are
both NOTED. After deliberating on the allegations of said
Comment, the Court Resolved to GRANT Joaquin T.
Borromeo an additional period of fifteen (15) days from
notice hereof within which to engage the services or
otherwise seek the assistance of a lawyer and submit such
further arguments in addition to or in amplification of those
set out in his Comment dated August 27, 1993, if he be so
minded.
SO ORDERED.
E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment
of October 15, 1992
Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated October 15, 1992,
reiterating the arguments and allegations in his Comment of August 27,
1993, and setting forth "additional arguments and amplification to . . . (said)
Comment," viz.:
1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specify and state
under oath the alleged 'libelous' remarks contained in the
circular . . .; (they should) be ordered to file a VERIFIED
COMPLAINT . . .(failing in which, they should) be cited in
contempt of court for making false charges and wasting the
 precious time of this Highest Court by filing a baseless
complaint;
2) the allegations in their circular are not libelous nor
disrespectful but "are based on the TRUTH and the LAW",
namely:
a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures
and clear facts and laws are patent
violations of Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art. VIII of
the Constitution;
b) there is no basis nor thruth to this Hon.
Court's affirmation to the Appelate Court's
ruling that the undersigned "lost" his right of
redemption price, since no less than this
Hon. Court has ruled in many rulings that
CONSIGNATION IS UNNECESSARY in
right of redemption;
c) this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony banks
TRB and UCPB's frauds and defiance of court orders in G.R.
Nos. 83306 and 878997 and 84999.
F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of
November 26, 1993
Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date of November 26,
1993, adverting to "the failure of the IBP and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his
charges under oath and the failure of the concerned Justices to refute the
charges in the alledged "libelous circular" and, construing these as "and
admission of the thruth in said circular," theorized that it is "incumbent on the
said Justices to rectify their grave as well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's
baseless and false charges."
VII. THE COURT CONCLUSIONS
A. Respondent's Liability
for Contempt of Court
Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of
Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules
and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct
directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of
justice.44 He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without
merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to
him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final and
executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application of his
own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his
personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he
has insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing
for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried
the patience of the judges and court employees who have had to act on his
repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. He has
wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court
employees who have had the bad luck of having to act in one way or another
on his unmeritorious cases. More particularly, despite his attention having
been called many times to the egregious error of his theory that the so-called
"minute resolutions" of this Court should contain findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices
promulgating the same, 45 he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-
same theory in various proceedings, causing much loss of time, annoyance
and vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved.
1. Untenability of Proffered Defenses
The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members
of the Court should inhibit themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and
Judge at the same time . . . (and) this case should be heard by an impartial
and independent body, is still another illustration of an entirely unwarranted,
arrogant and reprehensible assumption of a competence in the field of the
law: he again uses up the time of the Court needlessly by invoking an
argument long since declared and adjudged to be untenable. It is axiomatic
that the "power or duty of the court to institute a charge for contempt against
itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer, is essential
to the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants,
lawyers and the public. Were the intervention of the prosecuting officer
required and judges obliged to file complaints for contempts against them
before the prosecuting officer, in order to bring the guilty to justice, courts
would be inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent to perform their
functions with dispatch and absolute independence. The institution of
charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold persons guilty of
civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All
that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and
an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. The
charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person.
. . ." 46
His claim — that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by
members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and
sweeping" because failing to point out what particular statements in the
circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it does not appear that
Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those
accused in the 'libelous' circular" — is in the premises, plainly nothing but
superficial philosophizing, deserving no serious treatment.
Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making
the allegations claimed to be contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of
freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress
of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in
accordance with the accountablity of public officials." The constitutional rights
invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious litigation of the same
causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees; and other
persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their
time, and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.
B. Basic Principles Governing
the Judicial Function
The facts and issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a
restatement of the principles governing finality of judgments and of the
paramount need to put an end to litigation at some point, and to lay down
definite postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing predilection
on the part of lawyers and litigants — like Borromeo — to resort to
administrative prosecution (or institution of civil or criminal actions) as a
substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review
provided by law from court judgments or orders.
1. Reason for courts; Judicial
Hierarchy
Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In
every country there is a more or less established hierarchical organization of
courts, and a more or less comprehensive system of review of judgments
and final orders of lower courts.
The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of
litigation, i.e., the presentation of evidence by the parties — a trial or hearing
in the first instance — as well as a review of the judgments of lower courts by
higher tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the
factual and legal issues through briefs or memoranda. The procedure for
review is fixed by law, and is in the very nature of things, exclusive to the
courts.
2. Paramount Need to end
Litigation at Some Point
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation
must end. Hence, after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been
undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or
terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be
sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement
with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment,
indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must
prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the
issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded
absolute finality. 47 As observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines
v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, 48 a party "may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he
feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a
court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism
that courts are the temples of right."
3. Judgments of Supreme Court
Not Reviewable
The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most
jurisdictions, is that judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not be
reviewed by any other agency, branch, department, or official of
Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter must
rest. Its decision should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any
other entity, much less reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted by
error in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, flawed in its logic or
language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect. 49 This, on the
indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy, and constitutional
and traditional principle.
In an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In
Re: Wenceslao Laureta — involving an attempt by a lawyer to prosecute
before the Tanod bayan "members of the First Division of this Court
collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an 'unjust
extended minute Resolution' with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article
204 of the Revised penal Code ". . . and for deliberatly causing "undue injury"
to respondent . . . and her co-heirs because of the "unjust Resolution"
promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act . . . —
the following pronouncements were made in reaffirmation of established
doctrine: 50
. . . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of
December 24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts in toto,
"(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme — the
third great department of government entrusted exclusively
with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable
disputes, public and private. No other department or agency
may pass upon its judgments or declare them "unjust." It is
elementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the early
case of Arnedo vs.Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911])
"controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of
sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of
occasional error, judgments of courts determining
controversies submitted to them should become final at
some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice
recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control
even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of
correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of
the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the
courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to
decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to
determine the respective rights of the parties. (Luzon
Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA
305, 316-317)
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate
court, whether an en banc or division, speak for themselves
and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond
investigation or inquiry under the same principle of
conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs.
Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61
Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme
Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well settled
that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in
the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by
petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of
margin fees] — on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democractic
system — the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally
applicable to Supreme Court orders, resolutions and
decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc.
vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs.
Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil.
1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).
The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine
of separation of powers calls for the executive, legislative
and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their
duties as they see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It
has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary has a
right to expect that neither the President nor Congress would
cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it
should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces at
work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into
acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers
presupposes mutual respect by and between the three
departments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34
SCRA 275, 286-287).
4. Final and Executory Judgments of
Lower Courts Not Reviewable
Even by Supreme Court
In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies
available under law to a party who is adversely affected by their decisions or
orders are a motion for new trial (or reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an
appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on
whether questions of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in
accordance with fixed and familiar rules and conformably with the hierarchy
of courts. 51Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the ground
that it was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, may be had through the special civil action
of certiorari or prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
However, should judgments of lower courts — which may normally be
subject to review by higher tribunals — become final and executory before,
or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too, become inviolable,
impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in
anyway modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the
Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of
Government. 52
C. Administrative Civil or Criminal Action
against Judge. Not Substitute for Appeal;
Proscribed by Law and Logic
Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a
regrettable increase in the resort to administrative prosecution — or the
institution of a civil or criminal action — as a substitute for or supplement to
appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these remedies operates
as a form of threat or intimidation to coerce judges into timorous surrender of
their prerogatives, or a reluctance to exercise them. With rising frequency,
administrative complaints are being presented to the Office of the Court
Administrator; criminal complaints are being filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman or the public prosecutor's office; civil actions for recovery of
damages commenced in the Regional Trial Courts against trial judges, and
justices of the Court of Appeals and even of the Supreme Court.
1. Common Basis of Complaints
Against Judges
Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent
Judges or Justices rendered manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory
orders 53 — i.e., judgments or orders which are allegedly not in accord with
the evidence, or with law or jurisprudence, or are tainted by grave abuse of
discretion — thereby causing injustice, and actionable and compensable
injury to the complainants (invariably losing litigants). Resolution of
complaints of this sort quite obviously entails a common requirement for the
fiscal, the Ombudsman or the Trial Court: a review of the decision or order of
the respondent Judge or Justice to determine its correctness or
erroneousness, as basic premise for a pronouncement of liability.
2. Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for
Correction of Judgments and Orders
The question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or
not in lieu of the prescribed recourses for appeal or review of judgments and
orders of courts, a party may file an administrative or criminal complaint
against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or, having opted for
appeal, may nonetheless simultaneously seek also such administrative or
criminal remedies.
Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution
in the Supreme Court and the lower courts established by law, the question
submits to only one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies are
neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is
available, and must wait on the result thereof.
Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that
any contrary postulation can have only intolerable legal implications. Allowing
a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet final and
executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal prosecution for unjust
judgment against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an
indispensable first step, confer the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an
incongruous function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the
determination of whether the questioned disposition is erroneous in its
findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that
impediment, whatever determination he makes could well set off a
proliferation of administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility here after
more fully explored.
Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already
pointed out, within the power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his
deputies, directly or vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review — by appeal or
special civil action — is not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves
but must be exercised in accordance with a well-defined and long
established hierarchy, and long-standing processes and procedures. No
other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and
vexatiously repetitive.
These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra. 54
Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204
of the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust
judgment," refer to an individual judge who does so "in any
case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not
the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness"
of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate
court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of
Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should
likewise know that said penal article has no application to the
members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its
Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and
accordingly render their collective judgment after due
deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the
ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot
prosper.
xxx xxx xxx
To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and
prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the Supreme
Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the
regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to
subvert and undermine that very independence of the
judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For
it is a general principle of the highest importance to the
proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in
 exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act
upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone
who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge
would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom,
and would destroy that independence without which no
judiciary can be either respectable or useful." (Bradley vs.
Fisher, 80 U. S. 335).
xxx xxx xxx
To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and
claim that the members acted "with deliberate bad faith" and
rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of
the duty of their high office to act upon their own
independent consideration and judgment of the matter at
hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and
conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to
disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of
official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the
separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.
Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without
violating the separation of powers mandated by the
Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of
this Court on legal issues submitted by them and their
adversaries for final determination to and by the Supreme
Court and which fall within the judicial power to determine
and adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in the
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law.
This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have
become final and executory. Such judgments, being no longer reviewable by
higher tribunals, are certainly not reviewable by any other body or authority.
3. Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed
Rules to Declare Judgments or Orders
Erroneous or Unjust
To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgement or
order is unjust — or was (or was not) rendered within the scope of the
issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had exceeded his jurisdiction and
powers or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case — is an essentially
judicial function, lodged by existing law and immemorial practice in a
hierarchy of courts and ultimately in the highest court of the land. To repeat,
no other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or
investigation service or any other branch; nor any functionary thereof, has
competence to review a judicial order or decision — whether final and
executory or not — and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a
criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or
order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.
4. Contrary Rule Results in Circuitousness
and Leads to Absurd Consequences
Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of
unjust judgments or interlocutory orders of the type above described, which,
at bottom, consist simply of the accusation that the decisions or interlocutory
orders are seriously wrong in their conclusions of fact or of law, or are tainted
by grave abuse of discretion — as distinguished from accusations of
corruption, or immorality, or other wrongdoing. To allow institution of such
proceedings would not only be legally improper, it would also result in a futile
and circuitous exercise, and lead to absurd consequences.
Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the judicial
hierarchy; i.e., a judgment is rendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed
and affirmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the latter's judgment is
appealed to and in due course affirmed by the Court of Appeals; and finally,
the appellate court's decision is brought up to and affirmed by the Supreme
Court. The prosecution of the municipal trial court judge who rendered the
original decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment)
would appear to be out of the question; it would mean that the Office of the
Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have to find, at the preliminary
investigation, not only that the judge's decision was wrong and unjust, but by
necessary implication that the decisions or orders of the Regional Trial Court
Judge, as well as the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court who affirmed the original judgment were also all wrong and unjust —
most certainly an act of supreme arrogance and very evident supererogation.
Pursuing the proposition further, assuming that the public prosecutor or
Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the decision in
question — despite its having been affirmed at all three (3) appellate levels
— and thereafter, disagreeing with the verdict of all four (4) courts, file an
information in the Regional Trial Court against the Municipal Trial Court
Judge, the fate of such an indictment at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or
the Regional Trial Court would be fairly predictable.
Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the
Sandiganbayan or a Regional Trial Court, the appeal before the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals would have an inevitable result: given the
antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside and the correctness
of the judgment in question, already passed upon and finally resolved by the
same appellate courts, would necessarily be sustained.
Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial
Judge, in his turn, from filing a criminal action against the Sandiganbayan
Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge who should convict him of the
offense, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against the Justices
of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court who should affirm his
conviction.
The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be
modified, and regardless of whether it is a civil, criminal or administrative
proceeding that is availed of as the vehicle to prosecute the judge for
supposedly rendering an unjust decision or order.
5. Primordial Requisites for Administrative
Criminal Prosecution
This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this
impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but,
taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable
requisites are that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some
appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged
judgment or order, and there be also evidence of malice or bad faith,
ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering
said judgement or order. That final declaration is ordinarily contained in the
judgment rendered in the appellate proceedings in which the decision of the
trial court in the civil or criminal action in question is challenged.
What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal
or dismissal in a criminal action, as to which — the same being unappealable
— it would be unreasonable to deny the State or the victim of the crime (or
even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put to the test of proof such
charges as they might see fit to press that it was unjustly rendered, with
malice or by deliberate design, through inexcusable ignorance or negligence,
etc. Even in this case, the essential requisite is that there be an authoritative
judicial pronouncement of the manifestly unjust character of the judgment or
order in question. Such a pronouncement may result from either (a) an action
of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the;
judgment, as having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process
to the prosecution; or (b) if this be not proper, an administrative proceeding in
the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for promulgating an unjust
judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final,
authoritative judicialdeclaration that the decision or order in question is
"unjust," no civil or criminal action against the judge concerned is legally
possible or should be entertained, for want of an indispensable requisite.
D. Judges Must be Free from
Influence or Pressure
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external
forces or factors. They should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil,
criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions
they may make in the performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is
sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges
are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and
in good faith.
This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he
renders. 55 To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and
would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment. 56 The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and
malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith; 57 it is only in these cases that
administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of the Supreme
Court.
As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that
"judges of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil
action for damages for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial
functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction."58 Based on
Section 9, Act No. 190, 59 the doctrine is still good law, not inconsistent with
any subsequent legislative issuance or court rule: "No judge, justice of the
peace or assessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of damages
by reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good faith,
and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction."
Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code,
providing that any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the enumerated rights and liberties of another person — which
rights are the same as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III of the
Constitution); — shall be liable to the latter for damages. However, such
liability is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes
a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. But again, to the extent
that the offenses therein described have "unjust judgment or "unjust
interlocutory order" for an essential element, it need only be reiterated that
prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to the caveat already
mentioned: that such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained,
unless there be a final judicial pronouncement of the unjust character of the
decision or order in issue.
E. Afterword
Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may
well be asked why it took no less than sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50)
grossly unfounded cases lodged by respondent Borromeo in the different
rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take the present
administrative measure. The imposition on the time of the courts and the
unnecessary work occasioned by respondent's crass adventurism are self-
evident and require no further elaboration. If the Court, however, bore with
him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that the repeated rebuffs he
suffered, with the attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would
somehow seep into his understanding and deter him from further forays
along his misguided path. After all, as has repeatedly been declared, the
power of contempt is exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive
principle. Unfortunately the Court's forbearance had no effect on him.
Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as
signs of weakness and impotence. Worse, respondent's irresponsible
audacity appears to have influenced and emboldened others to just as
flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and insulting proceedings
against the courts, born of affected bravado or sheer egocentrism, to the
extent of even involving the legislative and executive departments, the
Ombudsman included, in their assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit of
personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must come to an end, and it is
time for the Court to now draw the line, with more promptitude, between
reasoned dissent and self-seeking pretense. The Court accordingly serves
notice to those with the same conceit or delusions that it will henceforth deal
with them, decisively and fairly, with a firm and even hand, and resolutely
impose such punitive sanctions as may be appropriate to maintain the
integrity and independence of the judicial institutions of the country.
WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of
constructive contempt repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and
instructions given to him, and to the end that he may ponder his serious
errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their
authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN
(10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND
PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of
which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts,
judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-51813-14. November 29, 1983.]
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT
V. LUCILA, Petitioners, v. HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR.,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C.
QUILATAN, Respondents.
Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar, for Petitioners.
The Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; LITIGATION BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL COURT;
BY WHOM CONDUCTED. — Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, clearly provides that in the municipal court a party may
conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed
by him for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput v. Bernabe, 55
Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a
case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of
Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless
imprudence.
2. ID.; ID.; APPEARANCE OF PRIVATE PROSECUTOR; PERMISSION
OF FISCAL NOT REQUIRED. — The permission of the fiscal is not
necessary for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In
the first place, the law does not impose this condition. What the
fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to
disallow the private prosecutor’s participation, whether he be a
lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if the
fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he
can just manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its
approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case: under his
supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer
can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a case
before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be
allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and
control of the trial fiscal.
3. ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION FOR LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL
INJURIES; COMPLAINANT ENTITLED TO ASSISTANCE OF A NON-
LAWYER FRIEND IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE CIVIL ACTION IF
NOT EXPRESSLY WAIVED NOR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT
SEPARATELY IS MADE. — In the two criminal cases, filed before the
Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the
offended party, did expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his
right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil action is
deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said
complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the
success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he
cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not
a lawyer.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SECTION 34, RULE 138, RULES OF COURT; "A
PARTY" WHO MAY CONDUCT HIS LITIGATION IN THE COURT OF
THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, CONSTRUED. — Section 34, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court of a Justice of
the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining witness in
Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court
of Parañaque, Metro Manila. is not a "party" within the meaning of
the said Rule. The parties in a criminal case are the accused and
the People. A complaining witness or an offended party only
intervenes in a criminal action in respect of the civil liability. The
case of Laput end Salas v. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only
In respect of the accused, an a "party," in a criminal case.
2. ID.; SECTIONS 4 AND 15, RULE 110 OF THE RULES OF COURT;
CONTROLLING AND TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER SECTION 34, RULE
138. — Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being
the more specific provisions in respect of criminal cases, should
take precedence over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be
controlling (Bagatsing v. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]).
Section 4 provides that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted
under the control of the Fiscal, while Section 15 specially provides
that the offended party may intervene, personally or by attorney,
in the prosecution of the offense.
DECISION
RELOVA, J.:
Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent
Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then Municipal Court of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of
petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private
prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for less
serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and
Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated
September 4, 1979, denying the motion for reconsideration
holding, among others, that "the fiscal’s claim that appearances of
friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in places where
there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if
we are to allow non-members of the bar to appear in court and
prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends of
the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the additional requirement of paying
professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to
naught." (p. 25, Rollo)
Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo
Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints against Patrolmen
Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical
injuries, respectively, and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro
Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were
senior law students of the U.P. College of Law where, as part of the
curriculum of the university they were required to render legal
assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus,
in August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate
appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan.
Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the
appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order
dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and
disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as "SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal
private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on September actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners’ prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.
motion for reconsideration.
x x x
Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with
prayers, among others, that the Orders of respondent judge, dated
"SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. —
August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are
Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly
in plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
reserved the right to institute it separately from the criminal action,
and/or were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may
lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979,
intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the
issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent judge
offense."cralaw virtua1aw library
and all persons acting for and in his behalf from conducting any
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the
And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to
Philippines v. Danilo San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the
intervene is subject to the direction and control of the fiscal and
Philippines v. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of Parañaque,
that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case
Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such
later on, requires the prior approval of the fiscal.chanrobles
dates as may be fixed by said respondent judge."cralaw virtua1aw
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
library
We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
Court, clearly provides that in the municipal court a party may
which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed
by him for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput v. Bernabe, 55
"SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice
Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a
of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with
Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless
the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his
bar."cralaw virtua1aw library
defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to
enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the
Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is
law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he
authorized to appear in court and conduct his own case; and, in the
wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private
inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by
prosecutor’s participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the
an attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional
trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active
Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney.
participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the
court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the
On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that
prosecution of the case under his supervision and control. Further,
pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is
We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or
the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private
as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court,
prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to
with more reason should he be allowed to appear as private
the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and
prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.
15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of
Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not
expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it
separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly
instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo
Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action
and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his
right to be assisted by a friend who is not a
lawyer.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August
16, 1979 and September 4, 1979 which disallowed the
appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila
as friends of party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan, are
hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby ordered to
ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners Malana and
Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the
temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is
LIFTED.
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-
0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case
No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion
for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this
Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the
MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case
No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the
complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his
appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v.
Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as
an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the
prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission
for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No.
19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over
the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for
continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of
superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is
the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public respondent
MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public
respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705
pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3,
2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that
the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one
that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and
that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide
that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites
Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the
appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend
of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the
RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7,
2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order
of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold
In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705
pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s
Second Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the
Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance
of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant
Petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to
deny the prayer for the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite
petitioner having established the necessity of granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO
DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO
CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE
TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW
WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR
MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS
WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE
OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted
by the nature of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed
directly before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and
implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No.
730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes
cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear
before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in
Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student,
from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant
in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by
the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial
court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the
legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this
rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and
all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must
be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the
Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior
court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts,
a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of
a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the
peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent
or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend
of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis
supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is
subsequently changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in
Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member
of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of
Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists
for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial
Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and
Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or
friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for
conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138.
The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred
to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not
have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private
prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the
basis for the petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a
non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As
succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a
law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the
supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very
nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this
reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended
by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in
its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the private
complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for
a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private
prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage
results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an
enemy country, and crime against popular representation.9 The basic rule
applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor
prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that
the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to
prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45,
Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control
and supervision of the public prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),
ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING respondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is
the issue presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May
1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of
Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent
Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the
said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo
entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the
Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961,
ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila
and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963,
Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants,
filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On
22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a
reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963,
filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's
fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed
a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the
backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the
ground that he is not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by
Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings
were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the
complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent
Quintin Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the
backwages as compensation for professional services rendered in the case,
apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates
............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning
......................................................................... 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis
................................................................. 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the
order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on
the ground of late filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January
1965.1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion
contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted
and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as
respondent's answer to the petitioner for review. 2 The case was considered
submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated
Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467,
27 March 1968,4 that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's
fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees
with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and
cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral
in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner
thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented
by legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in
the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to
attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing
Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of
the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of
evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to
duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or
defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle
the representative to compensation for such representation. For Section 24,
Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees.
— An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the
recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the
client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not
one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila
and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover
attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in
representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those
possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and
the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary
control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There,
it is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been
enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the
bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the
great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation
for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not
been admitted to practice before the court or in the
jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as
an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to
practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time.6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be
violated;7 that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of
court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,8 and the law will
not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in
violation of law;9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave
the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity
and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-
lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery
of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented
when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover
as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be
awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that
appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should
be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction;
such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot
justify an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award
of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of some of its
members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that
moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union
members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were
included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it
being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the
petition as co-petitioners was belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of
attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of its members
because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in
the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was organized
"for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-
being"; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union
may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic
Act 875, which provides:
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any
person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to
the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear
the financial burden of litigations.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice
of law before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him
who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as
"representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a
serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should
actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this
matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken
up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against
the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they
awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin
Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against
respondent Muning.
A.C. No. 7325 January 21, 2015
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Domiciano F.
Villahermosa, Sr., against Atty. Isidro L. Caracol for deceit, gross misconduct
and violation of oath under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases3 involving cancellation of
emancipation patents and transfer certificates of title, cancellation of special
power of attorney and deeds of absolute sale and recovery of ownership and
possession of parcels of land derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 433 which covered 23.3018 hectares of land in Valencia, Bukidnon.
Counsel on record for plaintiff was Atty. Fidel Aquino.
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had
two sons, Fernando and Efren. As legal heirs of Micael, Fernando received
53,298 square meters while Efren received 33,296 square meters.
Subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in their
respective names.
When the agrarian reform law4 was enacted on October 21, 1972,
emancipation patents and titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo
Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program,who in turn sold the parcels of land
to complainant’s spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. A deed of absolute sale
was executed in favor of Raymunda.
On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) issued a decision ordering the cancellation of the emancipation
patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered
by the agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to and affirmed by
the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals.
On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as "Add’l Counsel for the Plaintiffs-
Movant," filed a motion for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon
praying for the full implementation of the March 2, 1994 decision. 5
On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second
Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition6which he signed as "Counsel for the
Plaintiff Efren Babela"7. Villahermosa filed this complaint8 alleging that Atty.
Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he obtained no authority
from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren
could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because
Efren had already been dead9 for more than a year. He claimed that Atty.
Caracol’s real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly
bought the same parcel of land. Villahermosa presented affidavits of Efren’s
widow10and daughter11 both stating that Efren never executed a waiver of
rights and that the parcel of land was sold to Villahermosa through a deed of
sale. Both also stated that they werefamiliar with Efren’s signature. They
state that the signature inthe waiver was different from his usual signature.
Villahermosa averred that Atty. Caracol committed deceit and gross
misconduct.
In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol introduced falsified and
manufactured evidence intothe proceedings. Atty. Caracol, in introducing a
document denominated asWaiver of Rights where Efren waived all his rights
in favor of Ernesto Aguirre, was able to secure the execution of the judgment
in one of the cases12 in favor of Ernesto Aguirre. Villahermosa also filed a
case13 for falsification of public document and use of falsified document
against Ernesto Aguirre and Atty. Caracol.14
Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as
"additional counsel". He said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised
him to go ahead with the filing. Moreover, he stated that he was not aware
that there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto Aguirre’s favor.
In its Report and Recommendation,15 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed
deceitful acts and misconduct. It found that respondent did not present
credible evidence to controvert the allegation that he was not authorized by
plaintiff or counsel of record. Respondent admitted that at the time of the
filing of the second motion, Efren was dead. It noted that Atty. Caracol did
not explain how he obtained the authority nor did he present any proof of the
authority. However, there was insufficient evidence to hold him liable for
falsification.
The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to
the DARAB, Region X that he was counsel of Efren to protect the interest of
Ernesto Aguirre, his real client, violating his oath as a lawyer. It thus
recommended that Atty. Caracol be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of five years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation but
modified the penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law. 16 Atty.
Caracol moved for reconsideration17 but was denied.18
Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal19 which this Court returned to him since
no legal fees are required in administrative cases.20
We adopt the findings of the IBP.
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of
a lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his client, hence:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be
properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no
written power of attorney isrequired to authorize him to appear in court for his
client, butthe presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who
assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority
under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue,
the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such
order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person
without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for
contemptas an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions. (Emphases supplied)
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Dev’t. Co.,21 this Court said that
while a lawyer is not required to present proof of his representation, when a
court requires that he show suchauthorization, it is imperative that he show
his authority to act. Thus:
A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the
client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not
invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his client’s name. However,
[a] court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party may require a
lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.22
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for
a person without being retained nor may he appear in court without being
employed unless by leave of court.23 If an attorney appears on a client’s
behalf without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he
purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his
appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his
assumed authority.24 If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney
for a party toa case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for
contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transaction.25
We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a
client, an attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of either client or
the lawyer.26
Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he appeared in the
proceedings before the DARAB. The records are unclear at what point his
authority to appear for Efren was questioned. Neither is there any indication
that Villahermosa in fact questioned his authority during the course of the
proceedings.
However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time
he filed the Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and
Demolition. As an honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have
informed the Court of his client’s passing and presented authority that he was
retained by the client’s successors-in-interest and thus the parties may have
been substituted.27
We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in People v.
Mendoza28 where he stated:
I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan
Magalop, presumably upon the adviceof his counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol
of the CLAO (now the PAO). It would seem that this lawyer was less than
conscientious when he advised his indigent client to admit a crime the man
did no[t] commit. As the ponenciaobserves, "outside of his improvident plea
of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him – presented or
forthcoming. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which
Magalop could have been implicated."
It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who,
through an incredible lack of zeal in the discharge of his duties, was
apparently willing, without any moral compunctions at all, and without proof,
to consign an innocent man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without
cause.1âwphi1 The defense counsel in this case did not seem to appreciate
this responsibility when he prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the
right to submit evidence in his behalf.29
While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracol’s liability
under the present circumstances, we would like to highlight the important role
of an attorney in our judicial system. Because of the particular nature of an
attorney’s function it is essential that they should act with fairness, honesty
and candor towards the courts and his clients.30 Under Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
This flows out from the lawyer's oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to
uphold the law and court processes in the pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer
must be more circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards the public in
general as agents of the judicial system.
Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid
about his representation. We also observe that he has used underhanded
means to attain his purpose. Atty. Caracol's blatant disregard of his duties as
a lawyer cannot be countenanced. In view of his actions of contravening his
lawyer's oath and in violation of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility we deem it proper to suspend him from
the practice of law for a period of one year.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol GUILTY.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol from the
practice of law for ONE YEAR effective upon finality of this Resolution, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2610 June 16, 1951
CEFERINA RAMOS, ET ALS., petitioners,
vs.
ANATOLIO C. MAÑALAC, or his successor, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Second Branch, and FELIPE
LOPEZ, respondents.
D. Ignacio Castillo for petitioners.
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an order of the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan dated September 22, 1947, placing one
Felipe Lopez in possession of two (2) parcels of land claimed to belong to
petitioners, and of the decision rendered by the same court on August 24,
1939, ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage executed on said property to
satisfy the payment of an obligation.
The facts involved in this case are: On August 31, 1933, Victoriano,
Leonardo, Vicenta, Isabina, Gregoria, Ceferina, Jose and Geronimo, all
surnamed Ramos, executed a power of attorney in favor of their brother
Eladio Ramos giving the latter authority to encumber, mortgage and transfer
in favor of any person a parcel of land situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan.
On August 9, 1934, by virtue of the power of attorney abovementioned,
Eladio Ramos executed in favor of one Romualdo Rivera a mortgage on
therefore said property. Together with another parcel of land, to guarantee
the payment of loan of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum. When Eladio Ramos failed to pay the obligation on its date of
maturity, Romualdo Rivera, the mortgage, filed an action to foreclosure the
mortgage, making as parties-defendants the herein petitioners, brothers and
sisters of Eladio Ramos (civil case No. 7668). The summons was served only
upon Eladio Ramos, who acknowledge the service in his own behalf and in
that services of Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his appearance for all
the defendants, and submitted an answer in their behalf. After trial, at which
both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision ordering
Eladio Ramos to pay to the plaintiff his obligation of 300, with interest thereon
at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, from August 9, 1934, until its full
payment, plus the sum of 100 as attorney's fees, and ordering the
foreclosure of the mortgage upon failure of Eladio Ramos to pay the
judgment within ninety (90) days from the date the decision becomes final.
The decision was rendered on August 24, 1939. As Eladio Ramos failed to
pay the judgment within the period therein specified, on motion of the
plaintiff, the court ordered the sale at public auction of the mortgaged
properties, which were sold to the plaintiff as the highest bidder and the
provincial sheriff issued the corresponding deed of the sale in his favor. The
sale was confirmed by the court on April 1, 1941. On August 21, 1947,
Romualdo Rivera sold the properties to Felipa Lopez, who later filed a motion
praying that she be placed in possession thereof. This motion was granted
on September 22, 1947. As the petitioners did not heed the order, they were
summoned by the court to explain why they should no be punished for
contempt for their refusal to comply with the writ of possession, to which they
answered contending that said writ partakes of the nature of an action and as
it was issued after more than five years, the court acted in excess of its
jurisdiction, and that the sale conducted by the sheriff was illegal because
petitioners were not properly served with summons as defendants in the
foreclosure suit. The explanation given by petitioners having been found to
be unsatisfactory, the court insisted in its order and threatened to punish the
petitioners as for contempt of court if they failed to obey the order. Hence this
petition for certiorari.
The issues posed by the petitioners relate (1) to the validity of the decision
rendered by the lower court on August 24, 1939, in civil case No. 7668,
ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage excluded by Eladio Ramos on the
properties in question; and (2) to the validity of the order of the court dated
September 22, 1947, directing the issuance of a writ of possession to place
respondent Felipa Lopez in possession to place respondent Felipa Lopez in
possession of the properties purchased by her from the mortgagee.
As regards the first issue, we are of the opinion that the claim of the
petitioners can not be sustained for the reason that it is in the nature of a
collateral attack to a judgment which on its face is valid and regular and has
become final long ago. It is a well-known rule that a judgment, which on its
face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in separate action brought
principally for the purpose (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil., 717).
Granting for the sake of argument that petitioners were not properly served
with summons in civil case No. 7668, as they claim, the defect in the service
was cured when the petitioners voluntarily appeared and answered the
complaint thru their attorney of record, Lauro C. Maiquez who appeared in
their behalf in all stages of the case. Since an Attorney Maiquez who
appeared for the petitioners must be presumed to have been authorized by
them when he appeared in their behalf in all the stages of the case. The
security and finality of judicial proceedings require that the evasions and
tergiversations of unsuccessful litigants should be received with undue favor
to overcome such presumption (Tan Lua vs. O'Brien, 55 Phil., 53). This is
specially so when, as in the instant case, it is only after the lapse of more
than nine (9) years after the judgment has been rendered that petitioners
thought of challenging the jurisdiction of the court.
The second issue raised by the petitioners is not also taken, for the simple
reason that the issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceedings
is not an execution of judgment within the purview of section 6, Rule 39, of
the Rules of Court, but is merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the
court can undertake even after the lapse of five (5) years, provided the
statute of limitations and the rights of third persons have not intervened in the
meantime (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil., 201). This is the correct interpretation
of section 6, Rule 39, in relation to section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
This is a case where the judgment involved is already final executed, and the
properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and the properties
mortgaged sold by order of the court, and purchaser thereof has transferred
them to a third person, who desires to be placed in their possession. In the
exercise of its interlocutory duty to put and end to the litigation and save
multiplicity of an action, no plausible reason is seen why the court cannot
issue a peremptory order to place the ultimate purchaser in the possession of
the property.
The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in a
foreclosure suit, the court has the power to give possession to the purchaser,
and the latter will not be driven to an action at law to obtain possession. The
power of the court to issue a process and place the purchaser in possession,
is said to rest upon the ground that it has power to enforce its own decrees
and thus avoid circuitous action and vexatious litigation (Rovero de
Ortega vs.Natividad, 71 Phil., 340).
It has also been held:
In a foreclosure suit, where no third person not a party thereto
intervenes and the debtor continues in possession of the real
property mortgaged, a writ of possession is a necessary remedy to
put an end to the litigation, inasmuch as section 257 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (now section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court)
provides that the confirmation of the sale by judicial decree operates
to divest all the parties to the action of their respective rights and
vests them in the purchaser. According to this legal provision, it is the
duty of the competent court to issue a writ so that the purchaser may
be placed in the possession of the property which he purchased at
the public auction sale and become his by virtue of the final decree
confirming the sale. (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil., 201). Emphasis
supplied.
The following American authorities may also be involved in support of the
order of the lower court:
A court of equity, having obtained jurisdiction in action for the
foreclosure of the mortgage, and having decreed a sale of the
premises, RETAINS its jurisdiction and has authority to put the
purchaser in possession of the property, without compelling him to
resort to an action of law. (27 Cyc., 1937; 42 C. J., 271 and cases
there cited.) (Bold types and emphasis supplied).
. . . It does not appear to consist with sound principle that the court
which has exclusive authority to foreclosure the equity of redemption
of a mortgagor, and can call all the parties in interest before it, and
decree a sale of the mortgaged premises, should not be able even to
put the purchaser into possession against one of the very parties to
the suit, and who is bound by the decree. When the court has
obtained jurisdiction of a case, and has investigated and decided
upon the merits, it is not sufficient for the ends of justice merely to
declare the right without affording the remedy. If it was to be
understood that after a decree and sale mortgaged premises, the
mortgagor, or other party to the suit, or perhaps, those who have
been let into possession by the mortgagor, pendente lite, could
withhold the possession in defiance of the authority of this court, and
compel the purchaser to resort to a court of law, I apprehend that the
delay and expense and inconvenience of such a course of
proceeding would greatly impair the value and diminish the results of
sales under a decree. (See Notes to Wilson v. Polk, 51 Am. D., 151).
(Kershew v. Thompson, 4 Johns, Ch., 609).
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioners.
A.M. No. 35 September 30, 1949
In re Attorney FELIX P. DAVID, petitioner.
Felix P. David in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista and Solicitor Estrella
Abad Santos for the Government.
REYES, J.:
The respondent, Felix P. David, a member of a Philippine Bar, is charged
with the malpractice for misappropriating funds entrusted to him by his client,
the complainant Briccio S. Henson. Respondent having answered denying
the charge, the complaint was referred to the Solicitor General for
investigation. After the investigation the Solicitor General rendered his report
finding the respondent guilty of professional misconduct and recommending
disciplinary action. The Solicitor General reports the following facts to have
been conclusively established:
. . . that on February 15, 1947, respondent obtained P840 from his
client Briccio Henson to be applied to the payment of inheritance and
real estate taxes due from the estate of Esteban Henson for 1945,
1946 and 1947 (p. 3, t. s. n.), for which he signed a receipt (Annex
'A'; p. 3, t. s. n.). On several occasions, complainant asked the
respondent to show him the official tax receipt evidencing the
payment of said taxes, to which the latter answered that he had
already paid them, but the receipts were left with his friend in San
Fernando. Respondent promised to give the receipt later.
 Complainant waited patiently for it but it was never delivered. After
the respondent had failed to deliver the receipt, complainant became
suspicious and inquired from the provincial treasurer of Pampanga
about the matter. Said official gave the information that the taxes
were never paid. Consequently, complainant requested the
respondent to refund the money given him for the payment of said
taxes (p. 7, t. s. n., OSG), but he failed to do so. Respondent made
several promises to return the money which he never complied.
Neither had he done anything to transfer the titles of the land in the
name of the heirs of Esteban Henson up to the present (p. 9, t. s. n.).
In view of this failure of the respondent, the complainant was
ultimately forced to pay the taxes out of his own pocket (p. 8, t.s.n.).
Required to answer the complaint formulated by the Solicitor General on the
basis of his report, respondent failed to do so. And despite due notice he
likewise failed to appear at the hearing before this Court. Indeed, we note
from the Solicitor General's report that respondent, instead of welcoming
every opportunity for hearing, seems to have wanted to avoid it. On this point
the report says:
It is worthwhile mentioning that every time the case was set for
hearing the complainant made his appearance.
On the morning of July 8, 1948, both parties appeared; respondent
made a formal request in person to the investigator asking that the
hearing be postponed to 2 o'clock p.m. of the same day. Out of
consideration to him, even to the discomfiture of complainant,
respondent's request was again granted. But contrary to his
assurance, the respondent again failed to appear.
There is no question that respondent received from complainant the
sum of P840 for the specific purpose of applying the same to the
payment of taxes due from the estate which he was engaged to
settle. The receipt which he issued for said amount as well as for the
sum of P110 and a sack of rice paid to him for his expenses and fee
reads as follows: . . .
February 15, 1947.

At the hearing held on May 26, 1948, both parties appeared and the
complainant had testified, the hearing was set for continuance the
Received from Mr. Briccio S. Henson the sum of eight
following day. Both parties agreed in the presence of the investigator
hundred and forty (P840) pesos to be paid as follows:
to postpone said hearing for June 5, 1948. On June 5, 1948,
complainant appeared, but respondent did not show up, so to give
the respondent a chance, the investigator postponed the P210 -Inheritance tax of the heirs of the late Don Esteban
continuation of the hearing to June 17. Both parties were duly
subpoenaed (attached to the records). On June 15th, respondent
P630 -Land taxes for 1945-1947.
sent a letter (attached to the records) to Assistant Solicitor General
Ruperto Kapunan, asking that the hearing be postponed to June 25,
1948. According to the request, both parties were again duly Failure on my part to deliver to him the official receipts
subpoenaed for June 25, 1948 (attached to the record). In the corresponding to the above mentioned amount, I promise to
subpoena sent to respondent, his attention was invited to Rule 127, return to him the whole amount of P840 not later than April
section 28, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if he fails to 16, 1947 without any obligation on his part.
appear and answer the charge, the Solicitor in charge will proceed to
hear the case ex parte. In spite of this, on the morning of June 25, he
again sent another letter (attached to the records) to Assistant A separate amount of one hundred and ten (P110) pesos
Solicitor General Kapunan, asking that the hearing be transferred to and a sack of rice was paid to me for my expenses and fee.
July 7, or 8, 1948. In order that the respondent be given all the
chances to defend himself, his request was granted. In the subpoena (Sgd.) Atty. FELIX DAVID.
sent him setting the hearing for July 8, 1948, as requested, the
following remark was stated:

Failure on your part to appear will cause the investigator to proceed Respondent did not care to testify. But through his unverified answer, he
with the investigation and to file the corresponding recommendation would make it appear that he was entitled to and had been promised a legal
to the Supreme Court. No further postponement will be entertained. fee for his services and that, as this promise was not complied with, he "saw
it fit to withhold said amount (the P840 for taxes) until he is paid." This not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as
explanation is obviously an afterthought and clearly unfounded. For the private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case
established fact is that respondent at first made complainant believe that the of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., 79 Phil 647, wherein it was ruled that “when an
sum in question had already been applied by him to the payment of taxes, attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City
and, as testified to by complainant, for the little that respondent was able to Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law
do in connection with the case entrusted to him, he has already received his practice.” Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of
fee as shown by the above-copied receipt. The conclusion is therefore City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17,
irresistible that respondent misappropriated the money of his client. This
1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney
makes him guilty of unprofessional conduct.
Fule.
In view of the gravity of the misconduct committed, the respondent Felix P. Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a “Motion to Inhibit
David is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case,” this time invoking Section
five years from the date this decision become final, without prejudice to a 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain
more severe action if the sum misappropriated is not refunded within one attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this
month from the same date. limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear
and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U.
Torres, JJ., concur. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of
which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the
offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in
the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil
liability of the accused.
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
vs.
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant. appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes
committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of
DECISION criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal and not by the City Attorney of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict
PAREDES, J.:
in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed
Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent
of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted
replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by together with the criminal action.
City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may
private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The
appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private
condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial
prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.
of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the appearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor
is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore
reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense
counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule
138, Revised Rules), which provides that “no judge or other official or employee of
the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private
practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.” He claims that
City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in
private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did
not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules.
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law
to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as customarily and demanding
payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor
General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given
permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should
be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
A.M. No. 2266 October 27, 1983
HERMINIO R. NORIEGA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL R. SISON, respondent.
Herminio R. Noriega for complainant.
Emmanuel R. Sison in his own behalf.
DECISION
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed on June 3, 1981 by Herminio R. Noriega
against Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison (admitted to the Bar on March 31, 1976) on the
ground of malpractice through gross misrepresentation and falsification.
Complainant Noriega alleges that respondent Sison is a regular and permanent
employee of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a Hearing Officer
and as such, “is mandated to observe strictly the civil service rules and regulations,
more particularly … the prohibition of government employees to practice their
professions”; that to circumvent the prohibition and to evade the law, respondent
assumed a different name, falsified his identity and represented himself to be one
“Atty. Manuel Sison”, with offices at No. 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, “at the
times that he will handle private cases”; that “Manuel Sison” is not listed as a
member of the Bar in the records of the Supreme Court; that under his said assumed
name, respondent is representing one Juan Sacquing, the defendant in Case No.
E01978 before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, submitting
pleadings therein signed by him respondent) under his assumed name, despite his
full knowledge That “Manuel Sison” is not a member of the Bar and that his acts in
doing so are illegal and unlawful. 1 Xerox copies of pertinent documents, pleadings,
orders and notices are annexed to the complaint to support the material allegations
therein.
As required, respondent filed his Answer on August 20, 1981. He attached thereto a
copy of the written authorization given by Julio A. Sulit, Jr., Associate Commissioner
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, for him to appear as counsel of Juan
Sacquing, a close family friend, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court JDRC
of Manila, Respondent alleges that he never held himself out to the public as a
practicing lawyer; that he provided legal services to Sacquing in view of close family
friendship and for free; that he never represented himself deliberately and
intentionally as “Atty. Manuel Sison” in the Manila JDRC where, in the early stages
of his appearance, he always signed the minutes as “Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison”, and
in one instance, he even made the necessary correction when the court staff wrote
his name as Atty. Manuel Sison”; that due to the “inept and careless work of the
clerical staff of the JDRC”, notices were sent to “Atty. Manuel Sison”, at 605 EDSA,
Cubao, Quezon City, where respondent’s parents conduct a printing office and
establishment, which notices were honored by the personnel of said office as
respondent’s family has called respondent by the nickname “Manuel”; that
respondent did not feel any necessity to correct this error of the JDRC since he “could
use his nickname ‘Manuel’ interchangeably with his original true name as a formal
name, and its use was not done for a fraudulent purpose nor to misrepresent”; and,
that this administrative case is only one of the numerous baseless complaints
brought by complainant against respondent, the former being a disgruntled loser in
an injunction case in the SEC heard before respondent as Hearing Officer.
In resolving this disbarment case, We must initially emphasize the degree of
integrity and respectability attached to the law profession. There is no denying that
the profession of an attorney is required after a long and laborious study. By years of
patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself
and his family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary
value of this profession but rather on the social prestige and intellectual standing
necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the fact that every
attorney is deemed an officer of the court.
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by
Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Court when he said:
On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and
the prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought
not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely
desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its
harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling
power, some discretion ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment,
but it must be exercised. 2
The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him
of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice
by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable
and reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in
them. 3
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for
the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must
be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious
consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court
has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty. 4
This Court has also held in Re: Atty. Felizarda M. de Guzman 5 that to be made the
basis of suspension or disbarment, the record must disclose as free from doubt a
case which compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious
character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof must be clearly
demonstrated. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved; and as an officer of the
court, that he performed his duty in accordance with his oath.
Examining the facts of this case, We hold that the allegations in the complaint do
not warrant disbarment of the respondent. There is no evidence that the respondent
has committed an act constituting deceit, immoral conduct, violation of his oath as
a lawyer, willful disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or corruptly and
willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case without attorney to do so. 6
There is no violation of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations for his appearance as
counsel for the defendant in the JDRC Case No. E-01978 was with authority given by
the Associate Commissioner Of SEC, Julio A. Sulit, Jr.
This Court also holds that under the facts complained of supported by the annexes
and the answer of respondent likewise sustained by annexes attached thereto and
the reply of the complainant, the accusation that respondent with malice and
deliberate intent to evade the laws, assumed a different name, falsified his identity
and represented himself to be one “ATTY. MANUEL SISON” with offices at No. 605
EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City at the times that he will handle private cases, is not
meritorious. Neither is the charge substantiated. The only case DRC Case No. E-
01978 wherein respondent appeared as counsel for the defendant. It being an
isolated case, the same does not constitute the practice of law, more so since
respondent did not derive any pecuniary gain for his appearance because
respondent and defendant therein were close family friends. Such act of the
respondent in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close family friend should
not be allowed to be used as an instrument of harassment against respondent.
The ruling in Zeta vs. Malinao (87 SCRA 303) wherein the respondent was dismissed
from the service because being a government employee, he appeared as counsel in
a private case, cannot be applied in the case at bar because the respondent in
said Zeta case had appeared as counsel without permission from his superiors.
Although the complaint alleges violation of civil service rules, the complainant
however states that the basis of his complaint for disbarment is not the respondent’s
act of appearing as counsel but the unauthorized use of another name. 7
A perusal of the records however, reveals that whereas there is indeed a pleading
entitled “Objection/Opposition to the 2 Formal Offer of Evidence” (Annex “C” to the
Complaint for Disbarment, which is signed as “Manuel Sison”, counsel for
defendant, 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, p. 7 of the Records), there is, however,
no showing that respondent was thus motivated with bad faith or malice, for
otherwise he would not have corrected the spelling of his name when the court staff
misspelled it in one of the minutes of the proceeding. Moreover, We find no reason
or motive for respondent to conceal his true name when he have already given
express authority by his superior to act as counsel for Juan Sacquing in the latter’s
case pending before the JDRC And while it may be True that subsequent errors were
made in sending notices to him under the name “Atty. Manuel Sison, ‘ the errors
were attributable to the JDRC clerical staff and not to the respondent.
At most, this Court would only counsel the respondent to be more careful and
cautious in signing his name so as to avoid unnecessary confusion as regards his
Identity.
At this point, We are constrained to examine the motives that prompted the
complainant in filing the present case. An examination of the records reveals that
the complainant was a defendant in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Case No. 1982 filed by the Integrated Livestock Dealers Inc. and Teofisto Jiao against
seven (7) respondents including the complainant, seeking to oust the complainant
and his codefendants from acting as officers of the Integrated Livestock Dealers lnc.
then pending before respondent as Hearing Officer of the SEC, who after trial
decided the case against the herein complainant. From this antecedent fact, there is
cast a grave and serious doubt as to the true motivation of the complainant in filing
the present case, considering further that other administrative charges were filed by
the complainant against respondent herein before the SEC, JDRC and the Fiscal’s
office in Manila.
We hold that complainant’s repeated charges or accusations only indicate his
resentment and bitterness in losing the SEC case and not with the honest and sincere
desire and objectives “(1) to compel the attorney to deal fairly and honestly with his
client;” (Strong vs. Munday 52 N.J. Eq. 833, 21 A. 611) and “(2) to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.” (Ex parte Brounsal
Cowp 829; 83 Reprint; 6 C.J., p. 581; see In re de los Angeles Adm. Case No. 225,
Sept. 31, 1959, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 6, p. 242).
In the light of the foregoing, We find no reason or necessity to refer this complaint
to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014
VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When
this court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer
must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from
holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law.
For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift one-
year suspension from the practice of law.1
In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I.
Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the Lawyer's
Oath.4 Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their
stead, in violation of Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial Law. This court
suspended respondents from the practice of law for one year, revoked their
notarial commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as notaries
public for two years.
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration,7 praying
that respondents be disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of
law. In the resolution8 dated September 6, 2006, this court denied
complainant Lingan's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the
Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II, filed the
undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.9
In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14,
2006, complainant Lingan wrote the Commission on Human Rights. Lingan
requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga following the latter's
suspension from the practice of law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the
Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution10 dated
January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI
of the. Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II.
According to the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's
suspension from the practice of law "prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his
post [as Regional Director] for want of eligibility in the meantime that his
authority to practice law is suspended."11
Atty. Baliga · argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected
with his functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director.
According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not
include his suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification of this
court's resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to prevent further injury and prejudice
to [his] rights."12
This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as
this court does not render advisory opinions.13
On May 8, 2009, this court received ·a letter from complainant Lingan. In his
letter14 dated May 4, 2009, Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga continued
practicing law and discharging his functions as Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director, in violation of this court's order of suspension.
Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on Human
Rights En Banc 's resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director.
On Atty. Baliga's motion, the ommission reconsidered Atty. Baliga's
suspension and instead admonished him for "[violating] the conditions of his
commission as a notary public."15According to complainant Lingan, he was
not served a copy of Atty. Baliga's motion for reconsideration.16
Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director necessarily required the
practice of law. A Commission on Human Rights Regional Director must be a
member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court
suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a
non-lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to hold the position of [Regional
Director] [during the effectivity of the order of suspension]."17 The
Commission on Human Rights, according to complainant Lingan, should
have ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his functions as Regional
Director. Complainant Lingan prayed that this court give "favorable attention
and action on the matter."18
This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for report and recommendation.19
In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, 2009, the Office of the
Bar Confidant found that the period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and
Baliga had already lapsed. It recommended that respondents be required to
file their respective motions to lift order of suspension with certifications from
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Executive Judge of the court
where they might appear as counsel and state that they desisted from
practicing law during the period of suspension.
On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to
perform his functions as Regional Director during the period of suspension,
the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the Commission "deliberate[ly]
disregard[ed]"21 this court's order of suspension. According to the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had no power to "[alter,
modify, or set aside any of this court's resolutions] which [have] become final
and executory. "22
Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant
recommended that this court require him to submit a certification from the
Commission on Human Rights stating that he desisted from performing his
functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of
law.23
The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty. Baliga and
the Commission .on Human Rights be required to comment on complainant
Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued to perform his functions as
Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of law.
On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation,24 arguing that his
suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension from
public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the coverage of [his suspension
from the practice of law] to [his] public office would be tantamount to
[violating] his constitutional rights [sic] to due process and to the statutory
principle in law that what is not included is deemed excluded."25
In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court required
respondents to file their respective motions to lift order of suspension
considering the lapse of the period of suspension. This court further ordered
Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights to comment on
complainant Lingari's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued performing his
functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of
law. The resolution dated September 23, 2009 provides:
Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public imposed on
respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court resolves:
(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, to
FILE their respective motions to lift relative to their suspension and
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public and
 SUBMIT certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
Executive Judge of the Court where they may appear as counsel,
stating that respondents have actually ceased and desisted from the
practice of law during the entire period of their suspension and
disqualification, unless already complied with in the meantime;
(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification from
the Commission on Human Rights [CHR] stating that he has been
suspended from office and has stopped from the performance of his
functions for the period stated in the order of suspension and
disqualification, within ten (10) days from notice hereof;
(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to COMMENT on
the allegations of complainant against them, both within ten (10)
days from receipt of notice hereof; ...27 (Emphasis in the original)
In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their
respective motions to lift order of suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed his
comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that he continued performing
his functions as Regional Director during his suspension from the practice of
law.
In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that as
Regional Director, he "perform[ed], generally, managerial functions,"30 which
did not require the practice of law. These managerial functions allegedly
included ."[supervising] ... the day to day operations of the regional office and
its personnel";31 "monitoring progress of investigations conducted by the
[Commission on Human Rights] Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the
implementation of all other services and assistance programs of the
[Commission on Human Rights] by the different units at the regional
level";33 and "[supervising] . . . the budgetary requirement preparation and
disbursement of funds and expenditure of the [Regional Office]."34 The
Commission allegedly has its own "legal services unit which takes care of the
legal services matters of the [Commission]."35
Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of
law, Atty. Baliga claimed thaf he "faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's
resolution suspending him from the practice of law]."36
The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment37 dated November 27,
2009. It argued that "the penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of
the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty that may be imposed upon
him as a public official for the same acts."38 According to the Commission,
Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law is a "bar matter"39 while the
imposition of penalty upon a Commission on Human Rights official "is an
entirely different thing, falling as it does within the exclusive authority of the
[Commission as] disciplining body."40
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's
resolution of the issue and would "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this
court] arrives at on [the] matter. "41 In reply42 to Atty. Baliga's comment,
complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again disobeyed this. court. Atty.
Baliga failed to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights
stating that he was suspended from office and desisted from performing his
functions as Regional Director.
As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his
position as Regional Director and only performed generally managerial
functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying
the order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions of
a "lawyer-manager,"43 which under the landmark case of Cayetano v.
Monsod44 constituted practice of law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the
position of Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the officer "to be a lawyer
[in] good standing."45 Moreover, as admitted by Atty. Baliga, he had
supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-
manager," Atty. Baliga practiced law while he held his position as Regional
Director.
With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in reassuming
his position as Regional Director, complainant Lingan countered that if Atty.
Baliga were really in good faith, he should have followed the initial resolution
of the Commission on Human Rights suspending him from office. Atty. Baliga
did not even furnish this court a copy of his motion for reconsideration of the
Commission on Human Right's resolution suspending him from office. By
"playing ignorant on what is 'practice of law', twisting facts and
philosophizing,"46 complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer
has that] moral vitality imperative to the title of an attorney."47 Compfainant
Lingan prayed that Atty. Baliga be disbarred.
On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty.
Calubaquib.48 He was allowed to resume his practice of law and perform
notarial acts subject to compliance with the requirements for issuance of a
notarial commission.
On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report, and recommendation Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year
suspension and the respective comments of Atty. Baliga and the
Commission on Human Rights.49
In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18, 2010, the Office of the
Bar Confidant stated that Atty. Baliga "should not [have been] allowed to
perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities [as Regional Director]
which [required acts constituting] practice .of law."51 Considering that Atty.
Baliga claimed that he did not perform his functions as Regional Director
which required the practice of law, the Office of the Bar Confidant
recommended that the Commission on Human Rights be required to
comment on this claim. The Office of the Bar Confidant also recommended
holding in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift suspension
"pending [the Commission on Human Right's filing of comment]."52
In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance the
resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension. The
Commission on Human Rights was ordered to comment on Atty. Baliga's
claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional
Director.
In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human Rights
reiterated that the penalty imposed on Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is
separate from the penalty that might be imposed on him as Regional
Director. The Commission added that it is "of honest belief that the position of
[Regional Director] is managerial and does not [require the practice of
law]."55 It again manifested that it will "abide by whatever ruling or decision
[this court] arrives on [the] matter."56
The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of
suspension should be granted.
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We,
therefore, suspend him further from the practice of law for six months.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." 57 It
includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal]
profession"58 or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill."59
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered
practice. of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,60 this court cited the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered by
lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or
legal talent"61 is practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under
the Constitution with power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights[.]"62 It is divided into regional offices with
each office having primary responsibility to investigate human rights
violations in its territorial jurisdiction.63 Each regional office is headed by the
Regional Director who is given the position of Attorney VI.
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of
Human Rights Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR
Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the following powers and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission
on Human Rights] matters;"65
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;66
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human
rights complaints in the absence of the legal officer or investigator; 67
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties
and discuss "immediate courses of action and protection remedies
and/or possible submission of the matter to an alternative dispute
resolution";68
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including
notices, letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas within the territorial
jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases
prepared by the legal officer.70
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths
and affirmations are usually performed by members of the judiciary and
notaries public71 - officers who are necessarily members of the
bar.72Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the
Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing immediate courses of action and
protection remedies and reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human
rights cases prepared by the legal officer require the use of extensive legal
knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director
must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good standing and authorized
to practice law.74 When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as
when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the
Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is
holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from holding the
position of Regional Director.
This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on
June 15, 2006, "effective immediately."75From the time Atty. Baliga received
the court's order of suspension on July 5, 2006,76 he has been without
authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary qualification to his position
as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As the
Commission on Human Rights correctly resolved in its resolution dated
January 16, 2007:
WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect, prevents Atty.
Baliga from assuming his post, for want of eligibility in the meantime that his
authority to practice law is suspended. This is without prejudice to the
investigation to be conducted to the practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in
the case of all Regional Human Rights Directors is not generally allowed by
the Commission;
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on Human
Rights of the Philippines resolved to put into effect and implement the legal
implications of the SC decision by decreeing the suspension of Atty. Jimmy
P. Baliga in the discharge of his functions and responsibilities as
Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao City for the period for
which the Supreme Court Resolution is in effect.77 (Emphasis in the original)
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the
Commission on Human Rights did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due
process. First, he was only suspended after: investigation by the Commission
on Human Rights Legal and Investigation Office.78 Second, the Commission
gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he filed his motion for
reconsideration.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not
supported by the record. It was also immaterial.1âwphi1 He held the position
of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director because of his authority
to practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to hold
that position.
All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director constituted practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have
desisted from holding his position as Regional Director.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any
lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R.
Magat from the practice of law for six months for practicing his profession
despite this court's previous order of suspension.
We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as
Regional Director despite lack.of authority to practice law.1âwphi1
We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the
resolution dated April 13, 2007, reconsidering its first resolution suspending
Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead, the Commission
admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly warned him that repeating the same
offense will cause his dismissal from the service. The resolution with CHR
(III) No. A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007 reads:
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty.
Jimmy P. Baliga prays before the Honorable Commission to recall and annul
his suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney VI of the Commission on
Human Rights - Regional Office No. II, per 16 January 2007 Commission en
Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.
The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the
Commission that Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga is totally blameless and should not
suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his Lawyer's oath.
The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is concerned
with the transgression by Atty. Baliga of his oath of office as government
employee. As records have it, the Commission granted Atty. Baliga authority
to secure a commission as a notary public. With this, he is mandated to act
as a notary public in accordance with the rules and regulations, to include the
conditions expressly set forth by the Commission.
With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution in SC
Administrative Case No. 5277 dated 15 June 2006, the Commission cannot
close its eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is clearly repugnant to the
conduct of an officer reposed with public trust.
This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being enraged,
and censure Atty. Baliga for having contravened the conditions of his
commission as a notary public. What was granted to Atty. Baliga is merely a
privilege, the exercise of which requires such high esteem to be in equal
footing with the constitutional mandate of the Commission. Clearly, Atty.
Baliga should keep in mind that the Commission exacts commensurate
solicitude from whatever privilege the Commission grants of every official and
employee.
The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one year
suspension imposed on him pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution. The
Commission believes that the further suspension of Atty. Baliga from the
office may be too harsh in the meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is
being served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the admonition of Atty.
Baliga as above expressed is sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an
erring public officer.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in Resolution CHR
(III) No. A2007-013 and imposes the penalty of admonition with a stem
warning that a repetition of the same will merit a penalty of dismissal from the
service.80 (Emphasis in the original)
The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April
13, 2007. This resolution caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as
Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority to practice law.
We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. 81 The Commission cannot, by
mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy this court's orders of
suspension from the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human
Rights has the power to appoint its officers and employees,82 it can only
retain those with the necessary qualifications in the positions they are
holding.
As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege
burdened with conditions."83 To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers
must "[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest
degree of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal
profession."84
WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice
of law for six ( 6) months. Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one (1) year and
six (6) months of suspension from the practice of law, effective upon service
on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Commission on Human Rights.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10465, June 08, 2016
SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO AND GLORIA J.
EUSTAQUIO, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDGAR R.
NAVALES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated January 16, 2010
filed by complainants spouses Lamberto V. Eustaquio and Gloria J.
Eustaquio (complainants) against respondent Atty. Edgar R.
Navales (respondent), praying that respondent be meted the
appropriate disciplinary sanction/s for failing to pay rent and to
vacate the apartment he is leasing despite demands.
The Facts
Complainants alleged that they are the owners of an apartment
located at 4-D Cavite St., Barangay Paltok, SFDM, Quezon City,
which they leased to respondent under a Contract of Lease2 dated
April 16, 2005. However, respondent violated the terms and
conditions of the aforesaid contract when he failed to pay monthly
rentals in the aggregate amount of P139,000.00 and to vacate the
leased premises despite repeated oral and written demands.3 This
prompted complainants to refer the matter to barangay
conciliation, where the parties agreed on an amicable settlement,
whereby respondent promised to pay complainants the amount of
P131,000.00 on July 16, 2009 and to vacate the leased premises
on July 31, 2009. Respondent eventually reneged on his obligations
under the settlement agreement, constraining complainants to file
an ejectment case4 against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 40 (MeTC-Br. 40), docketed as Civil
Case No. 09-39689. Further, complainants filed the instant case
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), contending that respondent miserably failed
to exemplify honesty, integrity, and respect for the laws when he
failed and refused to fulfil his obligations to
complainants.5chanrobleslaw
Despite notices,6 respondent failed to file his Answer, to appear in
the mandatory conference, and to file his position paper.
Meanwhile, the MeTC-Br. 40 promulgated a Decision7 dated
December 8, 2009 in the ejectment case in favor of the
complainants and, accordingly, ordered respondent to vacate the
leased premises and to pay complainants the following amounts:
(a) P139,000.00 representing unpaid rentals as of July 2009; (b)
further rental payments of P8,000.00 per month starting August
17, 2009 until the actual surrender of said premises to
complainants; (c) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00; and
(d) cost of suit.8chanrobleslaw
During the pendency of the case, respondent was appointed as an
Assistant City Public Prosecutor of Quezon City.9chanrobleslaw
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation10 dated February 8, 2011, the
IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively
liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be meted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall
be dealt with more severely.11 It was found that respondent
displayed unwarranted obstinacy in evading payment of his debts,
as highlighted by his numerous promises to pay which he
eventually reneged on. In this light, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner concluded that respondent violated Rules 1.01 and
1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and,
thus, should be held administratively liable.12chanrobleslaw
In a Resolution13 dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid report and
recommendation. Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution 14 dated
September 15, 2014 adopting and approving the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendations of the IBP and,
accordingly, meted respondent the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.
As per Registry Return Card No. 957,15 respondent received the
Court's order of suspension on October 16, 2014.16 Records are
bereft of any showing that respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and, thus, the Court's order of suspension against
him became final and executory.
Events Following the Finality of Respondent's Suspension
On September 7, 2015 and upon request from the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), a Certification17 was issued by the
MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 38 (MeTC-Br. 38) stating that
respondent has been appearing before it as an Assistant City
Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the present. In connection
with this, the MeTC-Br. 38 wrote a letter18 dated September 8,
2015 to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), inquiring about the
details of respondent's suspension from the practice of law. In view
of the foregoing, the OCA indorsed the matter to the OBC for
appropriate action.19chanrobleslaw
Despite due notice from the Court,20 respondent failed to file his
comment to the aforementioned Certification issued by MeTC-Br.
38.
The OBC's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation21 dated February 10, 2016, the
OBC recommended that respondent be further suspended from the
practice of law and from holding the position of Assistant City
Prosecutor for a period of six (6) months, thus, increasing his total
suspension period to one (1) year, effective immediately.22 It found
that since respondent received the order of suspension against him
on October 16, 2014 and did not move for its reconsideration, such
order attained finality after the lapse of 15 days therefrom. As
such, he should have already served his suspension. In this
relation, the OBC ratiocinated that since respondent was holding a
position .which requires him to use and apply his knowledge in
legal matters and practice of law, i.e., Assistant City Prosecutor, he
should have ceased and desisted from acting as such. However, as
per the Certification dated September 7, 2015 of the MeTC-Br. 38,
respondent never complied with his order of suspension. In view
thereof, the OBC recommended to increase respondent's
suspension from the practice of law and from holding the position
of Assistant City Prosecutor for an additional period of six (6)
months.23chanrobleslaw
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue presented for the Court's resolution is whether or
not respondent should be held administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
After due consideration, the Court sustains the findings and
recommendation of the OBC and adopts the same in its entirety.
It is settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the practice of law. As such, when the Court orders a lawyer
suspended from the practice of law, he must desist from
performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting
from holding a position in government requiring the authority to
practice law.24 The practice of law embraces any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing acts
which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any
kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
In the instant case, the OBC correctly pointed out that the Court's
Resolution26 dated September 15, 2014 suspending respondent
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months became final
and executory fifteen (15) days after respondent received a copy of
the same on October 16, 2014. Thus, respondent should have
already commenced serving his six (6)-month suspension.
However, respondent never heeded the suspension order against
him as he continued discharging his functions as an Assistant City
Prosecutor for Quezon City, as evidenced by the
Certification27 issued by MeTC-Br. 38 stating that respondent has
been appearing before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since
September 2014 up to the present.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071,28 otherwise known as
the "Prosecution Service Act of 2010," provides the powers and
functions of prosecutors, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City
Prosecutor. - The provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor shall:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Be the law officer of the province of
the city officer, as the case may be;
(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances
within their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary
information or complaint prepared or made and filed against the
persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he/she or
any of his/her assistants shall receive the statements under oath or
take oral evidence of witnesses, and for this purpose may
by subpoena summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath
before him/her, and the attendance or evidence of an absent or
recalcitrant witness may be enforced by application to any trial
court; and cralawlawlibrary
(c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors
and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts at the
province or city and therein discharge all the duties incident to the
institution of criminal actions, subject to the provisions of the
second paragraph of Section 5 hereof.
Verily, a plain reading of the foregoing provision evidently shows
that the government office of Assistant City Prosecutor requires its
holder to be authorized to practice law. Hence, respondent's
continuous discharge of his functions as such constitutes practice of
law and, thus, a clear defiance of the Court's order of suspension
against him.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and wilfully
appearing as an attorney without authority to do so - acts which
respondent is guilty of in this case - are grounds for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court,
in Lingan v. Calubaquib,29Feliciano v. Bautista-Lozada30 and Ibana-
Andrade v. Paita-Moya31 consistently imposed an additional six (6)-
month suspension from the practice of law to erring lawyers who
practiced law despite being earlier suspended. Under the foregoing
circumstances, the Court deems it proper to mete the same
penalty to respondent in addition to the earlier six (6)-month
suspension already imposed on him, as recommended by the OBC.
Thus, respondent's total period of suspension from the practice of
law - and necessarily, from the holding the position of Assistant
City Prosecutor as well - should be fixed at one (1) year.
As a final note, it must be stressed that "[d]isbarment of lawyers is
a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy
members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and
honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the
plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of
proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to
frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its
sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe
punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant
lawyer is possible."32chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales is
found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
an additional period of six (6) months from his original six (6)-
month suspension, totalling one (1) year from service of this
Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as a
member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice,
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016
TERESITA P. FAJARDO, Complainant, v. ATTY. NICANOR C.
ALVAREZ, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This administrative case involves the determination of whether a
lawyer working in the Legal Section of the National Center for
Mental Health under the Department of Health is authorized to
privately practice law, and consequently, whether the amount
charged by respondent for attorney's fees is reasonable under the
principle of quantum meruit.
Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal
Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent
Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to defend her in criminal
and administrative cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The parties have differing versions of the facts as summarized by
the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Teresita's
version of the facts is as follows:
Around 2009, Teresita hired Atty. Alvarez to handle several cases
filed against her before the Office of the Ombudsman.1 Atty.
Alvarez was then working in the Legal Section of the National
Center for Mental Health.2 He asked for P1,400,000.00 as
acceptance fee.3 However, Atty. Alvarez did not enter his
appearance before the Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any
pleadings.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with
the Office of the Ombudsman who could help with dismissing her
case for a certain fee.5 Atty. Alvarez said that he needed to pay the
amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and acquaintances working at
the Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases against Teresita
dismissed.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez
talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution and
decision recommending the filing of a criminal complaint against
Teresita, and her dismissal from service,
respectively.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion
of the amount she gave.8 Atty. Alvarez promised to return the
amount to Teresita; however, he failed to fulfill this
promise.9 Teresita sent a demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he
failed to heed.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the other hand, Atty. Alvarez claims the following:
Atty. Alvarez is Legal Officer III of the National Center for Mental
Health under the Department of Health.11 He has authority to
engage in private practice of the profession.12 He represented
Teresita in several cases before the Office of the
Ombudsman.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Alvarez and Teresita had an arrangement that Teresita would
consult Atty. Alvarez whenever a case was filed against her.14 Atty.
Alvarez would then advise Teresita to send him a copy of the
complaint and its attachments through courier. 15 Afterwards, Atty.
Alvarez would evaluate the case and call Teresita to discuss his
fees in accepting and handling the case.16 A 50% downpayment
would be deposited to Atty. Alvarez's or his secretary's bank
account.17 The balance would then be paid in installments.18 The
success fee was voluntary on Teresita's
part.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On July 10, 2009, Atty. Alvarez received a call from Teresita
regarding a meeting at Shangri-La Mall to discuss the decision and
resolution she received from the Office of the Ombudsman
dismissing her from service for dishonesty and indicting her for
violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, respectively.20 Atty.
Alvarez accepted the case and asked for P500,000.00 as
acceptance fee.21According to Atty. Alvarez, he arrived at the
amount after considering the difficulty of the case and the workload
that would be involved, which would include appeals before the
Court of Appeals and this Court.22 However, the fee is exclusive of
filing fees, appearance fees, and other miscellaneous fees such as
costs for photocopying and mailing.23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Alvarez claimed that he prepared several pleadings in
connection with Teresita's case:
(1) motion for reconsideration filed on July 23, 2009 in
connection with the administrative case;
(2) motion for reconsideration filed on July 23, 2009 in
connection with the criminal case;
(3) petition for injunction filed on October 15, 2009 before
the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City; and
(4) petition for preliminary injunction with prayer for a
temporary restraining order filed before the Court of
Appeals on November 18, 2009, and the amended
petition on November 26, 2009.24
Atty. Alvarez also said that he prepared several letters to different
government officials and agencies.25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Alvarez alleged that Teresita made staggered payments for
the amounts they agreed on.26 Teresita only paid the balance of
the agreed acceptance fee equivalent to P450,000.00 on February
11, 2010.27While Teresita paid P60,000.00 for the miscellaneous
expenses, she did not pay the expenses for other legal work
performed and advanced by Atty.
Alvarez.28ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the last day for filing of the petition for review of the Office of
the Ombudsman's Decision, Teresita informed Atty. Alvarez that
she was no longer interested in retaining Atty. Alvarez's services as
she had hired Atty. Tyrone Contado from Nueva Ecija, who was
Atty. Alvarez's co-counsel in the cases against
Teresita.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On June 1, 2011, Teresita filed before the Office of the Bar
Confidant a Verified Complaint praying for the disbarment of Atty.
Alvarez.30 This Court required Atty. Alvarez to file his comment on
the complaint within 10 days from
notice.31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On December 7, 2011, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for investigation, report, and
recommendation.32ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In his Report and Recommendation33 dated November 12, 2012,
Investigating Commissioner Honesto A. Villamayor found Atty.
Alvarez guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
and recommended Atty. Alvarez's suspension from the practice of
law for one (1) year.34 Atty. Alvarez was also ordered to return the
amount of P700,000.00 to Teresita with legal interest from the
time of demand until its full payment.35 The dispositive portion of
the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding Respondent guilty of committing unlawful,
immoral and deceitful acts of the Canon of Professional
Responsibility, [it] is recommended that he be suspended for one
(1) year in the practice of law and he be ordered to return the
amount of P700,000.00 to the Complainant within two (2) months
from receipt of this order with legal interest from the time of
demand, until fully paid, with a warning that repetition of [a]
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.36cralawred
On the unauthorized practice of law, the Investigating
Commissioner found that while Atty. Alvarez claimed that he was
authorized by his superior to privately practice law, the pleadings
he allegedly prepared and filed did not bear his name and
signature.37 Hence, the Investigating Commissioner stated
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The time that Respondent spent in following up the case of
Complainant in the Office of the Ombudsman is a time lost to the
government which could have been used in the service of many
taxpayers[.]38cralawred
In any case, granting that Atty. Alvarez was authorized by his
superior to practice his profession, the Investigating Commissioner
stated that Atty. Alvarez was prohibited to handle cases involving
malversation of funds by government officials such as a municipal
treasurer.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found that the
attorney's fees Atty. Alvarez asked for were
unreasonable:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
From all indication, Complainant was forced to give to the
Respondent the amount of P1,400,000.00 because of the words of
Respondent that he has friends in the Office of the Ombudsman
who can help with a fee. That because of that guarantee,
Complainant was obligated to shell out every now and then money
for the satisfaction of the allege[d] friend of the Respondent[.]
Complainant is an ordinary Municipal Treasurer of a 4th or 5th class
municipality and the amount of attorney's fees demanded by the
Respondent is very much excessive. . . . The exorbitant amount
that he demanded from complainant is too much for a lowly local
government employee. What the Respondent did is not only illegal,
immoral and dishonest but also taking advantage of a defenseless
victim.
....
While a lawyer should charge only fair and reasonable fees, no
hard and fast rule may be set in the determination of what a
reasonable fee is, or what is not. That must be established from
the facts of each case[.]
....
The fees claimed and received by the Respondent for the alleged
cases he handled despite the fact that the records and evidence
does not show that he ever signed pleadings filed, the amount of
P700,000.00 is reasonable, thus, fairness and equity dictate, he
has to return the excess amount of P700,000.00 to the
complainant[.]40cralawred
In Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-77841 dated June 21, 2013,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted
the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that complaint [sic] is
guilty of unlawful, immoral and deceitful acts, Atty. Nicanor C.
Alvarez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year with [a] Warning that repetition of the same acts shall
be dealt with more sever[ejly. Further, he is Ordered to Return the
amount of P700,000.00 to complainant with legal interest from the
time of demand.42 (Emphasis in the original)cralawred
Atty. Alvarez moved for reconsideration of the Resolution, 43 but the
Motion was denied by the Board of Governors in Notice of
Resolution No. XXI-2014-28644 dated May 3, 2014. The Resolution
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there
being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission
and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration
of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-778 dated June 21,
2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.45 (Emphasis in the original)cralawred
We resolve the following issues:
First, whether respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez, as a lawyer
working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental
Health under the Department of Health, is authorized to engage in
the private practice of law; and
Second, whether the amount charged by respondent for attorney's
fees is reasonable under the principle of quantum meruit.
The Investigating Commissioner did not make a categorical
declaration that respondent is guilty of unauthorized practice of his
profession. The Investigating Commissioner merely alluded to
respondent's unauthorized practice of law.
We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice of his
profession.
Respondent claims that he is authorized to practice his
profession46 as shown in the letter dated August 1, 2001 of
National Center for Mental Health Chief Bernardino A.
Vicente.47 The letter reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
TO : ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ
Legal Officer III
This Center
Subject : Authority to engage in private practice of
profession
This refers to your request for permission to engage in private
practice of your profession.
In accordance with Administrative Order No. 21, s. 1999 of the
Department of Health, which vested in the undersigned the
authority to grant permission for the exercise of profession or
engage in the practice of profession, you are hereby authorized to
teach or engage in the practice of your profession provided it will
not run in conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine
government as a whole. In the exigency of the service however, or
when public interest so requires, this authority may be revoked
anytime.
Please be guided accordingly.
[sgd.]
BERNARDINO A. VICENTE, MD, FFPPA, MHA, CESO IV
Medical Center Chief II48 (Emphasis supplied)cralawred
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In
the context of this case, his surreptitious actuations reveal illicit
intent. Not only did he do unauthorized practice, his acts also show
badges of offering to peddle influence in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,49 the modern concept of the term "practice
of law" includes the more traditional concept of litigation or
appearance before courts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there,
in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under
the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law."cralawred
....
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting
orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of
the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines
of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within
the meaning of the statute."cralawred
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill."
....
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term
"practice of law," particularly the modern concept of law practice,
and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by
the framers of the Constitution, Arty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor—verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.50 (Emphasis
supplied)cralawred
Cayetano was reiterated in Lingan v. Calubaquib:51
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are
characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of]
service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill."
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is
considered practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, this court cited
the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and
agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit
requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or legal talent" is practice
of law.52 (Citations omitted)cralawred
By preparing the pleadings of and giving legal advice to
complainant, respondent practiced law.
Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known
as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees, and Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of
1986,53government officials or employees are prohibited from
engaging in private practice of their profession unless authorized
by their department heads. More importantly, if authorized, the
practice of profession must not conflict nor tend to conflict with the
official functions of the government official or
employee:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Republic Act No. 6713:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts
and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in
the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
....
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. -
Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
....
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions[.]
....
Memorandum Circular No. 17:
The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall
be granted by the head of the ministry or agency in accordance
with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules,
which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any
private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a
written permission from the head of Department; Provided, That
this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their
entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in
outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours
should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not
impair in any way the efficiency of the other officer or
employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in
the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do
not involve any real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the
discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the
management of the enterprise or become an officer or member of
the board of directors",cralawred
subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office
deems necessary in each particular case in the interest of the
service, as expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service
Commission.cralawred
In Abella v. Cruzabra,54 the respondent was a Deputy Register of
Deeds of General Santos City. While serving as an incumbent
government employee, the respondent "filed a petition for
commission as a notary public and was commissioned . . . without
obtaining prior authority from the Secretary of the Department of
Justice."55 According to the complainant, the respondent had
notarized around 3,000 documents.56 This Court found the
respondent guilty of engaging in notarial practice without written
authority from the Secretary of Justice. Thus:
It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as
a notary public, she did not obtain a written permission from the
Secretary of the D[epartment] [of] J[ustice]. Respondent's
superior, the Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization
because he is not the head of the Department. And even assuming
that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent failed to
present any proof of that written permission. Respondent cannot
feign ignorance or good faith because respondent filed her petition
for commission as a notary public after Memorandum Circular No.
17 was issued in 1986.57ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head
of the National Center for Mental Health, whose authority was
designated under Department of Health Administrative Order No.
21, series of 1999.58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit
against the Ombudsman and against government in general,
respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of interest.
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly
conditioned on the requirement that his practice will not be "in
conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine
government as a whole."59ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Javellana v. Department of Interior and Local Government,60 the
petitioner was an incumbent City Councilor or member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bago City. He was a lawyer by
profession and had continuously engaged in the practice of law
without securing authority from the Regional Director of the
Department of Local Government.61 In 1989, the petitioner acted
as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang and filed a
case for Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages against
Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia, City Engineer of Bago
City.62ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed an administrative case before
the Department of Local Government for violation of Section
7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 and relevant Department of Local
Government memorandum circulars on unauthorized practice of
profession, as well as for oppression, misconduct, and abuse of
authority.63 While the case was pending before Department of Local
Government, the petitioner was able to secure a written authority
to practice his profession from the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government, "provided that such practice will not conflict or tend
to conflict with his official functions."64ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This Court in Javellana observed that the petitioner practiced his
profession in conflict with his functions as City Councilor and
against the interests of government:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees
relating or incidental to the performance of their duties are
necessarily impressed with public interest for by express
constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The
complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against
City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City
Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner
Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer
Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City
Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees
and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer
Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-
58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of R[epublic] A[ct] [No.] 6713)
prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private
practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests
adverse to the government.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent.
Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme
Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of
law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to
avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public
duties and the private practice of their profession, in those
instances where the law allows it.65cralawred
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public
officer, an employee of government. The Office of the Ombudsman
is part of government. By appearing against the Office of the
Ombudsman, respondent is going against the same employer he
swore to serve.
In addition, the government has a serious interest in the
prosecution of erring employees and their corrupt acts. Under the
Constitution, "[p]ublic office is a public trust."66 The Office of the
Ombudsman, as "protectors of the [P]eople,"67 is mandated to
"investigate and prosecute . . . any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient."68ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, a conflict of interest exists when an incumbent government
employee represents another government employee or public
officer in a case pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. The
incumbent officer ultimately goes against government's mandate
under the Constitution to prosecute public officers or employees
who have committed acts or omissions that appear to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.69 Furthermore, this is consistent
with the constitutional directive that "[p]ublic officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the [P]eople, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency;
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives."70ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The objective in disciplinary cases is not to punish the erring officer
or employee but to continue to uplift the People's trust in
government and to ensure excellent public
service:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[W]hen an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is
not the punishment of that officer or employee, but the
improvement of the public service and the preservation of the
public's faith and confidence in the government. . . . These
constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law,
are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They
should be taken as working standards by all in the public
service.71cralawred
Having determined that respondent illicitly practiced law, we find
that there is now no need to determine whether the fees he
charged were reasonable.
In disbarment or disciplinary cases pending before this Court, the
complainant must prove his or her allegations through substantial
evidence.72 In Advincula v. Macabata,73 this Court dismissed a
complaint for disbarment due to the lack of evidence in proving the
complainant's allegations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party
who makes the allegations—ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non
qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla
sit. In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with
the burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of
wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with
guilt.74 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)cralawred
Moreover, lawyers should not be hastily disciplined or penalized
unless it is shown that they committed a transgression of their oath
or their duties, which reflects on their fitness to enjoy continued
status as a member of the bar:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on
the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great
caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear
cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of
the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should
merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither
affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only
justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such
extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfltness to continue in the
practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as
the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be
clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted
out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the
commission of the offense should also be considered. 75cralawred
Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility when he communicated to
or, at the very least, made it appear to complainant that he knew
people from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help them get
a favorable decision in complainant's case.
Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity
in the practice of their profession.76Respondent violated the oath
he took when he proposed to gain a favorable outcome for
complainant's case by resorting to his influence among staff in the
Office where the case was pending.77ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.0278prohibit lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.79 Respondent's
act of ensuring that the case will be dismissed because of his
personal relationships with officers or employees in the Office of
the Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 780 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to always "uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession."
In relation, Canon 1381 mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the
merits of his [or her] cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the
court."
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and
receive a favorable outcome for his or her client violates Canon 13
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.82 This act of influence
peddling is highly immoral and has no place in the legal
profession:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judge—or
a judge evincing a willingness—to discuss, in private, a matter
related to a case pending in that judge's sala cannot be over-
emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson did talk on different
occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through a mutual friend, Atty.
Sevilla, leads us to conclude that Atty. Singson was indeed trying
to influence the judge to rule in his client's favor. This conduct is
not acceptable in the legal profession.83cralawred
In Jimenez v. Verano, Jr.,84 we disciplined the respondent for
preparing a release order for his clients using the letterhead of the
Department of Justice and the stationery of the
Secretary:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to
gain special treatment and consideration from a government
agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to
be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-
bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be
seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the
people's faith in the judicial process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the
administration of justice. To that end, their clients' success is
wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.
Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by
the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client's cause,
is condemnable and unethical.
....
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client's cause must always be
within the bounds of the law. A self-respecting independence in the
exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a
member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent
fell short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case,
a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as
commensurate penalty for the offense.85cralawred
Similar to the present case, in Bueno v. Rañeses,86 we disbarred a
lawyer who solicited bribe money from his client in violation of
Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in
Bildner, the Court believes that Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate
administrative penalty of disbarment because of the multi-layered
impact and implications of what he did; by his acts he proved
himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer's relations to
the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both
false and fraudulent. It is false because no bribery apparently took Cnbi ko dun sa kontak dati na magbibigay tayo na pera sa
place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because allowance lang muna later na ang bayad pag labas ng reso at
the professed purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. kaliwaan pero sbi nya mas maganda kung isasabay na ang pera
Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving pagbgay ng letter mo sa omb.. Parang dun tayo nagkamali pero
the impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but ang solusyon ay sana ibalik nila ang pera . . in d meantime hindi
through deceitful means—a decidedly black mark against the dapat apektado ang kaso at kailangan an Appeal sa CA at may
Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected deadline yun
the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.
DATE: 31-05-2010
From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the
judge allegedly on the "take," the Judiciary as an institution, and TIME: 5:24 pm
the IBP of which he is a member. The Court cannot and should not
allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a TYPE: Text Message
signal to one and all—to all lawyers, their clients and the general
public—that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no ....
quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our judicial
system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of
the Bar.87 (Emphasis supplied)cralawred SUBJECT:
In the interest of ridding itself of corrupt personnel who encourage
influence peddling, and in the interest of maintaining the high Gud pm pnro, naLBC n b ang Reso? Kung Jan un pnrmahn ...
ethical standards of employees in the judiciary, this Court did not
hesitate in dismissing its own employee from government service DATE: 21-05-2010
when she peddled influence in the Court of Appeals:88
What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the TIME: 5:13 pm
actuations of a few erring court personnel peddling influence to
party-litigants, creating the impression that decisions can be TYPE: Text Message
bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the disillusionment of the
public. This Court has never wavered in its vigilance in eradicating ....
the so-called "bad eggs" in the judiciary. And whenever warranted
by the gravity of the offense, the supreme penalty of dismissal in FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
an administrative case is meted to erring personnel.89cralawred
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant was SUBJECT:
"forced to give . . . Respondent the amount of P1,400,000.00
because of the words of Respondent that he ha[d] friends in the Pnro sbi ng Dep Omb la png cnabi sa knya ng Omb. Ang CA Reso
Office of the Ombudsman who c[ould] help with a fee."90 It is pnaiwan n Orly @ studyohn nya (txt kontal)
because of respondent's assurances to complainant that she sent
him money over the course of several months.91 These assurances DATE: 15-04-2010
are seen from the text messages that respondent sent
complainant:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary TIME: 6:07 pm
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
TYPE: Text Message
SUBJECT:
....
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> TIME: 5:03 pm

SUBJECT: TYPE: Text Message

Yung blessing pala ni gutierez ang hnhntay ng overall dep omb si ....
orly at dun din siya subok kuha letter pero nasbhan na si gutierez
ng dep omb for Luzon sbi ko pwwde b nila gawin total alam na ni FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
gutierez. . . Maya tawag ko sayo update
SUBJECT:
DATE: 15-04-2010
Sa dep omb for Luzon na nya follow up ang MR at saka overall dep
TIME: 12:44 pm omb si orly dun nya kukunin letter

TYPE: Text Message DATE: 30-03-2010

.... TIME: 5:00 pm

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> TYPE: Text Message

SUBJECT: ....

Gud mrng Tess hindi na svmagot kahapon tnxt ko pero minsan FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
hndi tlga sumasagot yun nag ttxt lang pagkatapos kaya lang d mo
pala naiintindihan ang txt nya bisaya "istudyahun" ibig sabihn SUBJECT:
kausapin pa so nasbi na nya sa omb yung letter at istudzahan pa
Gud pm pnro. Ang Dep. Omb. My closd dor mtng pro pnkta s knya
DATE: 31-03-2010 ang note q at sabi rw bumalik aq aftr Holy wk. C Orly nman ay
ngsabi n es2dyuhn p rw nya.
TIME: 8:25 am
DATE: 30-03-2010
TYPE: Text Message
TIME: 4:52 pm
....
TYPE: Text Message
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
....
SUBJECT:
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
Ok panero update ko na lang client pero nag txt tlga kailangan daw
nya letter habang wala pa omb reso., Txt mo lang ko panero, have SUBJECT:
a nice holidays., (sagot ko yan tess)
Binigay ko na pera kahapon at kinausap ko para sa letter magkikita
DATE: 03-03-2010 pa kami marnaya las 2 at kukunin nya copy letter natin kay sales
at CA reso Pnro ung rep alo n bngay mo 1st Mar 24 ay ok Ing pra s 2 falo-ups
q Mar 25 @ Mar 30. As usual, magkita tau Apr 14 @ kunin q
DATE: 15-04-2010 20th para sa falo-up Apr 15 thnx

TIME: 12:32 pm DATE: 08-04-2010

TYPE: Text Message TIME: 10:58 am

.... TYPE: Text Message

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> ....

SUBJECT: FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

Tess ndpst mo na? Kakausapin ko kasi na qc na lang kami kita at SUBJECT:

malapit ako dun maya at hindi na sa crsng. Tnx
Ok panero kailangan malinaw din ang presentation lp sa client
DATE: 14-04-2010 panero at ang impression nya yun na ang hningi natin... so april 15
panero an balik mo sa MR at yung letter form omb to dof bhala ka
TIME: 1:29 pm na sa diskarte panero pag nakakuha tayo nakahanda na 150k dun

TYPE: Text Message DATE: 08-04-2010

.... TIME: 10:56 am

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> TYPE: Text Message

SUBJECT: ....

Gud pm pnro. Ok ba ang 15k rep maya 6pm? Thnx (txt ng kontak FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
tess kausapin ko mbuti sa letter)
SUBJECT:
DATE: 14-04-2010
Pnero dapat maalala mo n ung purpose ng 400th hindi directly
TIME: 10:25 am delivery ng Reso granting d MR pro ung delivery by the Dep Omb
ng letr of appeal 2 d Omb at pgpaliwang nya sa Omb. Re sa hnhngi
TYPE: Text Message ng rspondnt n modfcation ng Dcsion. Nung 1st mtng ntn Mar 24,
ngin4m q sau n ngawa n i2 ng Dep Omb pro kausapn p ng Omb c
.... Orly. Itong huli ang nabtn p, pro yon ay dscrtion n ng Omb@ wing
control d2 and Dep. Omb.
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
DATE: 08-04-2010
SUBJECT:
TIME: 10:55 am

TYPE: Text Message
....
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
Tess gud mrng, wag mo kalimutan mgdpst 25k today 6pm mtng
naming omb tnx.
DATE: 24-03-2010
TIME: 10:23 am
TYPE: Text Message
....
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
Gud pm uli pnro. Kung subukan q n lkrn ky Orly ung cnabi mong
letr adrsd 2 DOF Sec @ synd n Orly ang letr, pktanong s rspndnt
kung ok b s knya nab yarn nya aq ng Atty's fee n 75thou upfront @
another 75thou upon receipt of a DOF ordr holdng n abyans
implmntation of hr dsmsal due 2 Orly's letr? thnx
DATE: 11-03-2010
TIME: 7:03 pm
TYPE: Text Message92cralawred
In response to his alleged text messages, respondent claims that
complainant must have confused him with her other
contacts.93 Respondent found it "mesmerizing" that complainant
was able to save all those alleged text messages from two (2)
years ago.94 Moreover, assuming these messages were "true, still
they [were] not legally admissible as they [were] covered by the
lawyer-client privileged communication as those supposed texts
'[had been] made for the purpose and in the course of
employment, [were] regarded as privileged and the rule of
exclusion [was] strictly enforced.'"95ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In cases involving influence peddling or bribery, "[t]he transaction
is always done in secret and often only between the two parties
concerned."96 Nevertheless, as found by the Investigating
Commissioner and as shown by the records, we rule that there is
enough proof to hold respondent guilty of influence peddling.
We agree with the penalty recommended by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board of Governors. We find respondent's acts of
influence peddling, coupled with unauthorized practice of law, merit
the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law.
To be so bold as to peddle influence before the very institution that
is tasked to prosecute corruption speaks much about respondent's
character and his attitude towards the courts and the bar.
Lawyers who offer no skill other than their acquaintances or
relationships with regulators, investigators, judges, or Justices
pervert the system, weaken the rule of law, and debase
themselves even as they claim to be members of a noble
profession. Practicing law should not degenerate to one's ability to
have illicit access. Rather, it should be about making an honest
appraisal of the client's situation as seen through the evidence
fairly and fully gathered. It should be about making a discerning
and diligent reading of the applicable law. It is foremost about
attaining justice in a fair manner. Law exists to temper, with its
own power, illicit power and unfair advantage. It should not be
conceded as a tool only for those who cheat by unduly influencing
people or public officials.
It is time that we unequivocally underscore that to even imply to a
client that a lawyer knows who will make a decision is an act
worthy of the utmost condemnation. If we are to preserve the
nobility of this profession, its members must live within its ethical
parameters. There is never an excuse for influence peddling.
While this Court is not a collection agency for faltering
debtors,97 this Court has ordered restitution of amounts to
complainants due to the erroneous actions of
lawyers.98 Respondent is, therefore, required to return to
complainant the amount of P500,000.00—the amount that
respondent allegedly gave his friends connected with the Office of
the Ombudsman.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of
violating the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, the Lawyer's Oath, and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) year with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent
is ORDERED to return the amount of P500,000.00 with legal
interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar

Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record as
attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.