4.
That the accused was in the balcony of the house when it was
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 147607. January 22, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENHUR MAMARIL, appellant.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963, finding
appellant Benhur Mamaril guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8 [1] of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as amended by RA No. 7659.
The Information filed against appellant reads:
That on or about the 1st day of February, 1999 and sometime prior thereto, in the
municipality of Lingayen, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, willfully, unlawfully
and criminally [did] keep and possess crushed marijuana leaves contained in seventy
eight (78) sachets with a total weight of two hundred thirty six and eighty three
hundredth (236.83) grams and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops weighing one
thousand six hundred grams, each brick weighing eight hundred (800) grams, with a
total weight of one thousand eight hundred thirty six and eighty three hundredth
(1,836.83) grams, a prohibited drug, without authority to possess the same.
CONTRARY to Sec. 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[2]
When arraigned on October 8, 1999, appellant pleaded not guilty. [3] At the pre-
trial conference held on October 18, 1999, the parties admitted the following facts:
1. That the search was made in the house and premises of the parents of
the accused where he (accused) also lives, at Ramos St.,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, on February 1, 1999 at about 2:30 o clock in
the afternoon;
2. That the search was conducted by the elements of the PNP particularly
SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, SPO1 Alfredo Rico and others;
3. That the policemen brought along with them a camera;
searched;
5. The existence of the report of physical science report No. (DT-077-99)
issued by the PNP Crime Laboratory through Chemist Theresa Ann
Bugayong Cid;
6. That accused was subjected to urine sample laboratory on February 2,
1999.[4]
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Prosecutions Evidence
On January 25, 1999, the Intelligence Section PNCO of the Lingayen Police
Station, represented by SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda, applied [5] before the Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, for a search warrant authorizing the search
for marijuana, a prohibited drug, at the family residence of appellant Benhur Mamaril,
situated at Ramos Street, Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan. On said date, then
presiding Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos (now retired) issued Search Warrant No.
99-51.[6]
On February 1, 1999, at about 2:30 p.m., the Chief of Police of the Lingayen Police
Station, SPO3 Alfredo Rico, SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. and other police officers went
to the residence of appellant and implemented Search Warrant No. 99-51. When they
arrived at appellants house, they saw appellants mother under the house. They asked
her where appellant was, and she told them that appellant was in the house,
upstairs. When they went upstairs, they saw appellant coming out of the room. Upon
seeing the policemen, appellant turned back and tried to run towards the back
door. SPO3 Rico told appellant to stop, which appellant did. SPO3 Rico informed
appellant that they had a search warrant to search the house premises. They showed
appellant and his mother the search warrant. Appellant looked at the search warrant
and did not say anything. Thereafter, the policemen searched the house. The search
was witnessed by two members of the barangay council in said area, namely, Barangay
Kagawad Leonardo Ramos and Barangay Tanod Valentino Quintos, whom the police
brought with them.[7]
The searching team confiscated the following: (1) fifty-five (55) heat-sealed plastic
sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves, which were found in a buri bag
(bayong) under appellants house; (2) three heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
suspected marijuana leaves and seeds contained in an eye-glass case; (3) twenty-two
(22) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds
taken under a pillow placed on a monobloc chair; and (4) two (2) bricks of suspected
marijuana contained inside a white and gray bag found inside the closet of appellants
room. SPO3 Alfredo Rico took pictures[8] of the confiscated items and prepared a
receipt[9] of the property seized. SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. prepared a
certification[10] that the house was properly searched, which was signed by appellant
and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. After the search, the police
officers brought appellant and the confiscated articles to the Lingayen Police Station
and turned them over to the desk officer.[11]
The next day, on February 2, 1999, police officers Alfredo Rico, Alberto Santiago
and Rodolfo Madrid brought the confiscated articles to the Crime Laboratory at Camp
Florendo, San Fernando, La Union for examination. Appellant was also brought there
for a drug test.[12]
Police Superintendent Ma. Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid, forensic chemist and
head of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Regional Office I, Camp Florendo, Parian, San
Fernando City, La Union, testified that on February 2, 1999, she received from the Chief
of Police of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a request[13] for a drug test on the person of
appellant Benhur Mamaril and a laboratory examination of the confiscated
specimens.[14] After weighing the specimens and testing the same, Police
Superintendent Cid issued a report[15] finding the specimens[16] to be POSITIVE to the
test for the presence of marijuana x x x.[17]
Moreover, Police Superintendent Cid affirmed the findings in her report [18] that the
examination conducted on the urine sample of appellant was positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu.[19]
After the prosecution formally offered its testimonial and documentary exhibits on
March 5, 2000, appellant, through his counsel, filed a motion with
memorandum[20] contending that: (1) the exhibits of the prosecution are inadmissible in
evidence under Section 2 and Section 3 (2) of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution as the search warrant, by virtue of which said exhibitswere seized, was
illegally issued, considering that the judges examination of the complainant and his two
witnesses was not in writing; and (2) said search warrant was illegally or improperly
implemented. Appellant prayed that all the exhibits of the prosecution be excluded as
evidence or in the alternative, that the resolution of the admissibility of the same be
deferred until such time that he has completed the presentation of his evidence in chief.
On August 25, 2000, the prosecution opposed the motion, and the trial court denied
appellants motion.[21]
The Defenses Evidence
Appellant Benhur Mamaril, 31, single, laborer, denied that he was residing at his
parents house at Ramos Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan since he has been residing at
a rented house at Barangay Matic-matic, Sta. Barabara, Pangasinan since December
18, 1998. Appellant declared that on February 1, 1999, it was his brother and the latters
family who were residing with his mother at Ramos Street, but on said day, his brother
and family were not in the house since they were at the fishpond. [22]
Appellant testified that on February 1, 1999, he was at his parents house at
Ramos Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan, because he and his live-in partner visited his
mother on said day and arrived there at 10:00 a.m. At about 2:00 p.m. of February 1,
1999, while appellant was at the back of his parents house, about seven to nine
policemen, in civilian clothes, arrived. The policemen asked appellant to go upstairs
and they immediately handcuffed him and brought him to the balcony of the house. He
stayed at the balcony until the search was finished after more than 30 minutes.
Thereafter, he was brought to the clinic of one Dr. Felix and a medical examination was
conducted on him. Then he was brought to the municipal hall.[23]
Appellant testified that he saw the buri bag, the eye-glass case, and the gray and
white bag containing suspected marijuana for the first time on the day of the search
when he was at the balcony of their house. He also testified that he saw the Receipt of
Property Seized for the first time while he was testifying in court. He admitted that the
signature on the certification that the house was properly searched was his.[24]
Moreover, appellant testified that in the early morning of February 2, 1999, he was
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, La Union where he gave his
urine sample. Appellant insinuated that the confiscated items were only planted
because he had a misunderstanding with some policemen in Lingayen. However, he
admitted that the policemen who searched his parents house did not threaten or harm
him in any way and he had no misunderstanding with SPO3 Alfredo Rico. [25]
Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, was requested to testify on the available records regarding Search
Warrant No. 99-51 on file in the trial court and to identify said documents. Atty. Castillo
testified that he only had with him the application for search warrant, the supporting
affidavits of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez and the return of the
search warrant.[26]
Atty. Enrico declared that before he assumed office as Branch Clerk of Court, the
person supposed to be in custody of any transcript of the searching questions and
answers made by Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos in connection with the
application for Search Warrant No. 99-51 was Mrs. Liberata Ariston, who was then a
legal researcher and at the same time OIC-Branch Clerk of Court. However, during the
trial of this case, Mrs. Liberata Ariston was in the United States of America. Atty. Enrico
averred that he asked Mrs. Liberata Aristons daughter, Catherine Ramirez, who is a
court stenographer, about said transcript, but it has not been found. Atty. Enrico
testified that based on the records, there is no stenographic notes. He added that they
tried their best to locate the subject transcript, but they could not find it. [27]
The Trial Courts Decision
On January 23, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of the accused of the crime of possession of marijuana defined and penalized under
Section 8 of RA 6425, as amended, this Court in the absence of any modifying
circumstances, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000), plus
costs of this suit.
The period of preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be credited in
full in service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.
SO ORDERED.[28]
The Appeal
Appellant contends that the trial court made the following errors:
I Said Constitutional provision is implemented under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE THE ARTICLES ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED-APPELLANT
CONSIDERING THAT SEARCH WARRANT NO. 99-51 WAS ILLEGALLY ISSUED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS TOTALLY
INADMISSIBLE THE INVENTORIED ARTICLES IN THE RECEIPT OF SEIZED
PROPERTY AND THE CORRESPONDING CERTIFICATION ISSUED THERETO
(EXHS. J AND I) SINCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT ASSISTED BY
COUNSEL WHEN HE SIGNED THE SAME.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[29]
Appellant prays for his acquittal on the ground that Search Warrant No. 99-51 was
illegally issued considering that there was no evidence showing that the required
searching questions and answers were made anent the application for said search
warrant. Appellant pointed out that Branch Clerk of Court Enrico O. Castillo testified
that based on the records, there was no transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings in connection with the application for said search warrant.Appellant thus
asserts that it cannot be said that the judge made searching questions upon the alleged
applicant and his witnesses, which is in violation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution and Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
Appellants contention is meritorious.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article
III, Section 2, of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
thus:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together
with the affidavits submitted.
Under the above provisions, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon
a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.[30] In determining the existence
of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge must examine the complainant and
his witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the
examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and
answers.[31]
Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39 of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, who was requested to testify on the available records kept in their office
regarding Search Warrant No. 99-51, presented before the court only the application
for search warrant[32] and the supporting affidavits[33] of PO3 Alberto Santiago and
Diosdado Fernandez. Atty. Castillo could not produce the sworn statements of the
complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge examined them in the form of
searching questions and answers in writing as required by law. Atty. Castillo testified,
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Would you admit that from the records available there is no transcript of
the proceedings of a searching questions and answers made by the
Executive Judge upon the complainant as well as the two (2) witnesses
not only in connection with application for Search Warrant 99-51 but in
all of those application covered by that record namely, 99-49, 99-50,
99-51, 99-52, 99-53 and 99-54?
 A Sir, based on the records there is no transcript of [s]tenographic
notes.
Q Did you not ask Catherine Ramirez, the daughter of then OIC-Mrs.
Liberata Ariston about said transcript?
A I asked her for several times, sir, and in fact I asked her again yesterday
and she told me that she will try to find on (sic) the said transcript.
Q But until now there is no transcript yet?
A Yes, sir.
Q Because according to the rules the transcript must be attached to the
records of this case together with the application for search warrant as
well as the supporting affidavit of the said application, but there is no
records available to have it with you and there is no proof with you?
A Because during the time I assumed the office, sir, the records in the store
room which they placed is topsy turvy and all the records are
scattered. So, we are having a hard time in scanning the records, sir.
Q But did you not try your very best assisted by the Court personnel to locate
said transcript, Mr. Witness?
A Sir, we tried our best but based on the transcript I can not just read the
said transcript.
Q You mean to say you were able to [find] the stenographic notes?
A No, sir. There are stenographic notes but they are not yet transcribed, sir.
Q That is by a machine steno?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you not ask the assistance of the co-stenographers in your sala who
are using the machine steno to identify what cases does that
stenographic notes (sic)?
A Sir, I was assisted by some stenographers but we can (sic) not find
the transcript of stenographic notes concerning Search Warrant
No. 99-49 to 99-54.[34] (Underscoring ours)
Based on the above testimony and the other evidence on record, the prosecution
failed to prove that Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put into writing his examination
of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers
before issuance of the search warrant. The records only show the existence of an
application[35] for a search warrant and the affidavits[36] of the complainants witnesses.
In Mata v. Bayona,[37] we held:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record.Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or
non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it
will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the
Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and
attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
We cannot give credit to the argument of the Solicitor General that the issuing
judge examined under oath, in the form of searching questions and answers, the
applicant SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda and his witnesses on January 25, 1999 as it is so
stated in Search Warrant No. 99-51. Although it is possible that Judge Ramos
examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers, the fact remains that there is no evidence that the examination was put into
writing as required by law. Otherwise, the depositions in writing of the complainant and
his witnesses would have been attached to the record, together with the affidavits that
the witnesses submitted, as required by Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, we find untenable the assertion of the Solicitor General that the subject
stenographic notes could not be found at the time Branch Clerk of Court Enrico Castillo
testified before the trial court because of the confused state of the records in the latters
branch when he assumed office.
The Solicitor General also argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his
right to question the legality of the search because he did not protest against it, and
even admitted during his testimony that he was neither threatened nor maltreated by
the policemen who searched their residence.
We disagree. The cases[38] cited by the Solicitor General involved a warrantless
search. In this case, the police authorities presented a search warrant to appellant
before his residence was searched. At that time, appellant could not determine if the
search warrant was issued in accordance with the law. It was only during the trial of
this case that appellant, through his counsel, had reason to believe that the search
warrant was illegally issued causing appellant to file a motion with memorandum
objecting to the admissibility of the evidence formally offered by the prosecution.In
People v. Burgos,[39] we ruled:
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the
accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it
must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v.
Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his
house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v.
Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de
Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
xxxxxxxxx
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent, or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56
C.J., pp.1180, 1181).
We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the
loss of fundamental rights. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458).
In this case, we construe the silence of appellant at the time the policemen
showed him the search warrant as a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the
law. Moreover, appellant seasonably objected[40] on constitutional grounds to the
admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to said warrant during the trial of the
case,[41] after the prosecution formally offered its evidence.[42] Under the circumstances,
no intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from his conduct before or
during the trial.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is
hereby rendered declaring Search Warrant No. 99-51 NULL and VOID and the search
and seizure made at appellants residence illegal. For lack of evidence to establish
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant BENHUR MAMARIL is
hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being
held for some other legal grounds.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to IMPLEMENT without
delay this Decision and to INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof,
of the date appellant was actually released from confinement.
The confiscated marijuana is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the
trial court is hereby directed to deliver or cause its delivery to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for proper disposition.

No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their Costs de oficio.
seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant.[43] In Mata v. Bayona,[44] we ruled: SO ORDERED.

.[N]othing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal
requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera:

It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or
more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and
that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from inspection
and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.

Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the
requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction
should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or
gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify
it.

We, therefore, find that the requirement mandated by the law that the examination
of the complainant and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing in the
form of searching questions and answers was not complied with, rendering the search
warrant invalid. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search
warrant cannot be used in evidence against appellant in accordance with Section 3
(2),[45] Article III of the Constitution.
It is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by appellant in seeking to
exclude the evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant.
Without the aforesaid illegally obtained evidence, there is no sufficient basis to
sustain the conviction of appellant.
 have been passed upon by this Court in the subject decision. Petitioner alleges that he
Republic of the Philippines also filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a Complaint for Qualified Theft
Supreme Court against the respondents based on the same incidents and that should the Information
Manila for Qualified Theft be filed with the proper court, the items seized by virtue of the subject
search warrants will be used as evidence therein.
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
On August 6, 2010, respondents filed their Reply.

ROMER SY TAN, G.R. No. 174570 On September 8, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution[4] wherein respondents
Petitioner, were required to submit a certified true copy of the Order of the RTC dated November
14, 2008, which granted their motion to withdraw the information.
Present:
On October 22, 2010, respondents complied with the Courts directive and
-versus- submitted a certified true copy of the Order.[5]
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, In granting the motion to withdraw the Information, the RTC took into
PERALTA, and consideration the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG MENDOZA, JJ. 90368 dated August 29, 2006, which affirmed the findings of the City Prosecutor of
SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG, SY YU SAN, and BRYAN Manila and the Secretary of Justice that the elements of Robbery, i.e., unlawful taking
SY LIM, Promulgated: with intent to gain, with force and intimidation, were absent. Thus, there was lack of
Respondents. probable cause, warranting the withdrawal of the Information. [6] The RTC also
December 15, 2010 considered that the said pronouncements of the CA were affirmed by no less than this
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Court in G.R. No. 177829 in the Resolution[7] dated November 12, 2007.
Accordingly, the RTC granted respondents motion to withdraw the information
without prejudice, the dispositive portion of which reads:
RESOLUTION
WHEREFORE, the motion to withdraw information is hereby
GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
PERALTA, J.:
SO ORDERED.

On February 17, 2010, this Court rendered a Decision [1] in G.R. No. 174570
entitled Romer Sy Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue, et al., the decretal portion of which reads, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated December 29,
2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 81389 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Orders of the RTC dated September 1, 2003 and October 28,
2003 are REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrant Nos. 03-
3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED.
On March 22, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration [2] wherein
respondents informed this Court, albeit belatedly, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
granted their motion for the withdrawal of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06-
241375. As such, respondents prayed that the decision be reconsidered and set aside
and that the quashal of the subject search warrants be rendered moot and academic
on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case.
In his Comment[3] dated July 7, 2010, petitioner maintains that the motion is a mere
reiteration of what respondents have previously alleged in their Comment and which
Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the Information for Robbery, the
quashal of the subject search warrants and the determination of the issue of whether
or not there was probable cause warranting the issuance by the RTC of the said search
warrants for respondents alleged acts of robbery has been rendered moot and
academic. Verily, there is no more reason to further delve into the propriety of the
quashal of the search warrants as it has no more practical legal effect. [8]
Furthermore, even if an Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the
basis of the same incident subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery, petitioner
cannot include the seized items as part of the evidence therein. Contrary to petitioners
contention, he cannot use the items seized as evidence in any other offense except in
that in which the subject search warrants were issued. Section 4, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.
 Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in
connection with only one specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the
applicants personal knowledge and his or her witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore,
utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with
the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated
from the same incident.

Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of the Information was based on

the findings of the CA, as affirmed by this Court, that there was no probable cause to
indict respondents for the crime of Robbery absent the essential element of unlawful
taking, which is likewise an essential element for the crime of Qualified Theft, all
offenses which are necessarily included in the crime of Robbery can no longer be filed,
much more, prosper.

Based on the foregoing, the Court resolves to Grant the motion.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by

the respondents is GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated February 17, 2010
is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The petition filed by Romer Sy Tan
is DENIED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
September 2, 2015
G.R. No. 188794
HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated March
31, 2009, and the Resolution3dated July 10, 2009, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 31154. The appealed decision affirmed the joint judgment 4 dated
September 5, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao City, Albay,
which convicted petitioner Honesto Ogayon of violating Sections 11 and 12, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165.5
The Antecedent Facts
On December 1, 2003, two Informations were filed against Ogayon for the crimes
allegedly committed as follows:
I. Criminal Case No. 4738:
That at about 5:20 o’clock (sic) in the morning of October 2, 2003 at Barangay Iraya,
Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control four (4) pcs. of
small aluminum foil, four (4) pcs. Of disposable lighter in different colors, one (1)
blade trademark "Dorco," and one (1) roll aluminum foil, instruments used or intended
to be used for smoking or consuming shabu, without authority of law, to the damage
and prejudice of the public interest and welfare.6
II. Criminal Case No. 4739:
That at about 5:20 o’clock (sic) in the morning of October 2, 2003 at Barangay Iraya,
Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to violate
the law, and without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing 0.040 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), with full knowledge that in his possession and control is a dangerous drug, to
the damage and prejudice of the public interest and welfare.7
During his arraignment in Criminal Case Nos. 4738 and 4739 on January 21, 2004,
and March 17, 2004, respectively, Ogayon denied both charges and pleaded "not
guilty." The joint pre-trial held on May 5, 2004 yielded only one factual admission on
the identity of the accused.8 A joint trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecution Version
On October 2, 2003, at around 5:20 a.m., Police Chief Inspector Elmer Ferrera,
together with the other members of the Albay Provincial Police Office, proceeded to
Ogayon’s house in Barangay Iraya, Guinobatan, Albay, to enforce Search Warrant
No. AEK 29-2003.9The warrant was for the seizure of shabu and drug paraphernalia
allegedly kept and concealed in the premises of Ogayon’s house. Barangay Tanod
Jose Lagana (Tanod Lagana) and Kagawad Lauro Tampocao assisted the police
team in conducting the search.10
Upon reaching Ogayon’s house, the police team noticed several persons inside a
nipa hut located nearby. Suspecting that a pot session was about to be held, the
police team restrained two of the five persons and immediately proceeded to
Ogayon’s house. After introducing themselves as police officers, Senior Police Officer
Herminigildo Caritos (SPO4 Caritos) informed Ogayon that they had a warrant to
search his place. SPO4 Caritos handed a copy of the warrant to Ogayon, who
allowed the police team to conduct the search.11
Led by SPO4 Caritos, some members of the police team went to the comfort room
located about five meters away from Ogayon’s house. When they searched the area,
they found an object (wrapped in a piece of paper with blue prints) that fell from the
wooden braces of the roof. Upon SPO4 Caritos’ inspection, the paper contained two
(2) small, heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that the police team suspected to
contain shabu.
The search of the comfort room also uncovered four (4) disposable lighters, one (1)
knife measuring six inches long, used aluminum foil, one (1) roll of aluminum foil, and
a "Dorco" blade.12 SPO4 Caritos then placed his initials on the two (2) plastic sachets
before joining the rest of the police officers who were conducting a search in
Ogayon’s house. The police officers who searched Ogayon’s house found live
ammunition for an M-16 rifle.
After conducting the search, the police team prepared a Receipt of Property
Seized.13 The receipt was signed by the seizing officers, representatives from the
Department of Justice and the media, and two (2) barangay officials who were
present during the entire operation.14
The police team thereafter arrested Ogayon and the two (2) other persons who had
earlier been restrained, and brought them to Camp Simeon Ola for booking. The
seized items were likewise brought to the camp for laboratory examination. In his
Chemistry Report,15 Police Superintendent Lorlie Arroyo (forensic chemist of the
Philippine National Police Regional Crime Laboratory) reported that the two (2) plastic
sachets seized from Ogayon’s place tested positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.16
The Defense Version
The defense presented a different version of the events.
Testifying for himself, Ogayon disavowed any knowledge of the prohibited drugs and
claimed that he saw the seized items for the first time only when they were being
inventoried. His statements were corroborated by the testimony of his wife, Zenaida
Ogayon.
Ogayon asserted that prior to the search, he was asleep in his house. His wife
Zenaida woke him up because several policemen and barangay officials came to his
house. He claimed that the police team did not present any search warrant before
conducting the search, and it was only during trial that he saw a copy of the warrant.
He recounted that the police officers, splitting into two groups, conducted a
simultaneous search of his house and the comfort room located nearby. He noticed
that SPO4 Caritos, who was part of the group that searched the comfort room, came
out and went to the Barangay Hall. Shortly after, SPO4 Caritos returned,
accompanied by Tanod Lagana. SPO4 Caritos again went inside the comfort room,
leaving Tanod Lagana waiting outside. SPO4 Caritos thereafter came out from the
comfort room and ran towards Ogayon’s house while shouting "positive, positive." 17
The RTC Ruling
On September 5, 2007, the RTC rendered a joint judgment convicting Ogayon of the
two criminal charges against him. Relying on the presumption of regularity, the RTC
rejected Ogayon’s frame-up defense. The dispositive portion of the joint judgment
reads:
WHEREFORE, under the above considerations, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
a. In Criminal Case No. 4738, accused, Honesto Ogayon y Diaz is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 12, Art. II, Republic
Act No. 9165, known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,"
for his unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, namely: four (4) pcs. small
aluminum foil, one (1) roll aluminum foil, four (4) pcs. disposable lighters,
and one (1) pc. blade; thereby sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years
and to pay a FINE of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00);
b. In Criminal Case No. 4739, accused, Honesto Ogayon y Diaz is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 11, Art. II, Republic
Act No. 9165, known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,"
for his unlawful possession of two (2) pcs. Small heat-sealed plastic sachets
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," with total net weight
of 0.0400 gram; thereby, sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years
and to pay a FINE of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00). 18
Ogayon appealed to the CA. This time, he questioned the validity of the search
warrant, claiming it was improperly issued. He argued that the search warrant was
defective for lack of transcript showing that the issuing judge conducted an
examination of the applicant for search warrant and his witnesses.
The CA Ruling
In accordance with Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a judge must examine
under oath and in writing an applicant for search warrant and his witnesses. Although
the CA found no evidence in the records showing compliance with this requirement, it
nevertheless upheld the search warrant’s validity due to Ogayon’s failure to make a
timely objection against the warrant during the trial.
That Ogayon objected to the prosecution’s formal offer of exhibits, which included the
search warrant, was not sufficient for the CA. Ogayon merely claimed that the
chemistry report was not executed under oath, the items were not illegal per se, and
that he did not sign the Receipt of Property Seized since he was not present when the
seized items were confiscated. The CA noted that the objections were not based on
constitutional grounds, and for this reason, concluded that Ogayon is deemed to have
waived the right to question the legality of the search warrant.19
Based on the search warrant’s validity, the CA affirmed Ogayon’s conviction for
possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Although the comfort room was located
outside Ogayon’s house, the CA declared that he exercised exclusive control over it
and should rightly be held responsible for the prohibited drugs and paraphernalia
found there.
As with the RTC, the CA relied on the presumption of regularity of the police team’s
operation and found Ogayon’s claim of frame-up to be unsupported. The CA thus
ruled that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Ogayon was liable for
the crimes charged.
The Issues
In the present petition, Ogayon raises the following assignment of errors:
I.
The CA erred in finding that Ogayon had waived his right to question the legality of
the search warrant.
II.
Even granting without admitting that Ogayon had already waived his right to question
the legality of the search warrant, the search conducted was still highly irregular,
thereby rendering the seized articles as inadmissible in evidence.
Ogayon primarily argues that there was a violation of his constitutional right to be
secure in his person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. He denies waiving the right through his supposed failure to assail the search
warrant’s validity during the trial. On the contrary, he claims to have objected to the
prosecution’s formal offer of the search warrant.
Even assuming that he questioned the search warrant’s validity only during appeal,
Ogayon contends that this should not be interpreted as a waiver of his right. Since an
appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, any objection made
on appeal, though not raised before the trial court, should still be considered.
Ogayon next argues that the search conducted by the police team on his premises,
pursuant to an already defective search warrant, was highly irregular. He and his
spouse were in their house when SPO4 Caritos allegedly discovered the shabu in the
comfort room located outside their house, so they were not able to witness the
search. Moreover, he claimed that there were other persons near the premises of his
house (and the comfort room) when the search was conducted. Hence, it could not
indubitably be concluded that the seized items were under his actual and effective
control and possession.
The Court’s Ruling
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the fundamental
constitutional rights. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, reads:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. [emphasis ours]
This right has been included in our Constitution since 1899 through the Malolos
Constitution20 and has been incorporated in the various organic laws governing the
Philippines during the American colonization,21 the 1935 Constitution,22 and the 1973
Constitution.23
The protection afforded by the right is reinforced by its recognition as a fundamental
human right under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,24 to both of which the Philippines is a
signatory.25 Both the Covenant and the Declaration recognize a person’s right against
arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy and property. 26
Given the significance of this right, the courts must be vigilant in preventing its
stealthy encroachment or gradual depreciation and ensure that the safeguards put in
place for its protection are observed.
Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant is central to the right, and its existence largely depends on the
finding of the judge conducting the examination.27 To substantiate a finding of
probable cause, the Rules of Court specifically require that –
Rule 126, Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statem gether with the affidavits submitted. [emphasis ours]
Ogayon’s appeal of his conviction essentially rests on his claim that the search
warrant was defective because "there was no transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings in which the issuing judge had allegedly propounded the required
searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable
cause."28We find that the failure to attach to the records the depositions of the
complainant and his witnesses and/or the transcript of the judge’s examination,
though contrary to the Rules, does not by itself nullify the warrant. The requirement to
attach is merely a procedural rule and not a component of the right. Rules of
procedure or statutory requirements, however salutary they may be, cannot provide
new constitutional requirements.29
Instead, what the Constitution requires is for the judge to conduct an "examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce," after
which he determines the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.
The examination requirement was originally a procedural rule found in Section 98 of
General Order No. 58,30 but was elevated as part of the guarantee of the right under
the 1935 Constitution.31 The intent was to ensure that a warrant is issued not merely
on the basis of the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, but only after
examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses. As the same
examination requirement was adopted in the present Constitution, we declared that
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are insufficient to establish the factual
basis for probable cause.32 Personal examination by the judge of the applicant and
his witnesses is indispensable, and the examination should be probing and
exhaustive, notmerely routinary or a rehash of the affidavits. 33
The Solicitor General argues that the lack of depositions and transcript does not
necessarily indicate that no examination was made by the judge who issued the
warrant in compliance with the constitutional requirement.
True, since in People v. Tee,34 we declared that –
[T]he purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the
examining magistrate as to the existence of probable cause.1âwphi1 The Bill of
Rights does not make it an imperative necessity that depositions be attached to the
records of an application for a search warrant. Hence, said omission is not
necessarily fatal, for as long as there is evidence on the record showing what
testimony was presented.35
Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement is shown by the depositions and
the transcript. In their absence, however, a warrant may still be upheld if there is
evidence in the records that the requisite examination was made and probable cause
was based thereon. There must be, in the records, particular facts and circumstances
that were considered by the judge as sufficient to make an independent evaluation of
the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. 36
The Solicitor General claims that, notwithstanding the absence of depositions and
transcripts, the records indicate an examination was conducted. In fact, a statement in
the search warrant itself attests to this:
Search Warrant
xxxx
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examination under oath of the
applicant and his witnesses that there is probable cause to believe that respondent,
without authority of law, has under his possession and control the following articles to
wit:
---Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "Shabu" and paraphernalia which are kept and
concealed in the premises of his house particularly in the kitchen and in the CR
outside his house both encircled with a red ballpen, as described in the sketch
attached to the Application for Search Warrant, located at Bgy. Iraya, Guinobatan,
Albay.37 (emphasis and underscore ours)
Generally, a judge’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is accorded great deference by a reviewing court, so long as there was
substantial basis for that determination.38 "Substantial basis means that the questions
of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place
sought to be searched."39
Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, we find nothing in the
records of this case indicating that the issuing judge personally and thoroughly
examined the applicant and his witnesses. The absence of depositions and
transcripts of the examination was already admitted; the application for the search
warrant and the affidavits, although acknowledged by Ogayon himself, 40 could not be
found in the records. Unlike in Tee, where the testimony given during trial revealed
that an extensive examination of the applicant’s witness was made by the judge
issuing the warrant, the testimonies given during Ogayon’s trial made no reference to
the application for the search warrant. SPO4 Caritos testified that he was among
those who conducted the surveillance before the application for a search warrant was
made. However, he was not the one who applied for the warrant; in fact, he testified
that he did not know who applied for it.41
The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can infer that the
requisite examination was made, and from which the factual basis for probable
cause to issue the search warrant was derived. A search warrant must conform
strictly to the constitutional requirements for its issuance; otherwise, it is void. Based
on the lack of substantial evidence that the search warrant was issued after the
requisite examination of the complainant and his witnesses was made, the Court
declares Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003 a nullity.
The nullity of the search warrant prevents the Court from considering Ogayon’s
belated objections thereto.
The CA declared that Ogayon had waived the protection of his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures due to his failure to make a timely objection
against the search warrant’s validity before the trial court. It based its ruling on the
procedural rule that any objections to the legality of the search warrant should be
made during the trial of the case. Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides
the manner to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence obtained thereby:
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file.
— A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby
may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted.
If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by
the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the
motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be
resolved by the latter court. [emphasis ours]
We find the CA’s casual treatment of a fundamental right distressing. It prioritized
compliance with a procedural rule over compliance with the safeguards for a
constitutional right. Procedural rules can neither diminish nor modify substantial
rights;42 their non-compliance should therefore not serve to validate a warrant that
was issued in disregard of the constitutional requirements. As mentioned, the
existence of probable cause determined after examination by the judge of the
complainant and his witnesses is central to the guarantee of Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution. The ends of justice are better served if the supremacy of the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is preserved over
technical rules of procedure.
Moreover, the courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights; we should not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights.43 In People v. Decierdo,44 the Court declared that "[w]henever a
protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection,
the presumption is always against the waiver." The relinquishment of a constitutional
right has to be laid out convincingly.
In this case, the only evidence that Ogayon waived his constitutional right was his
failure to make a timely motion during the trial to quash the warrant and to suppress
the presentation of the seized items as evidence. This failure alone, to our mind, is
not a sufficient indication that Ogayon clearly, categorically, knowingly, and
intelligently made a waiver.45 He cannot reasonably be expected to know the
warrant’s defect for lack of data in the records suggesting that defect existed. It would
thus be unfair to construe Ogayon’s failure to object as a waiver of his constitutional
right. In People v. Bodoso,46 the Court noted that "[i]n criminal cases where life, liberty
and property are all at stake… The standard of waiver requires that it ‘not only must
be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’"
At this point, we note the purpose for the enactment of Section 14, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court – a relatively new provision incorporated in A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC or the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000). The provision
was derived from the policy guidelines laid down by the Court in Malaloan v. Court of
Appeals47to resolve the main issue of where motions to quash search warrants
should be filed. In other words, the provision was "intended to resolve what is
perceived as conflicting decisions on where to file a motion to quash a search warrant
or to suppress evidence seized by virtue thereof…." 48 It was certainly not intended to
preclude belated objections against the search warrant’s validity, especially if the
grounds therefor are not immediately apparent. Thus, Malaloan instructs that "all
grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the
original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they
shall be deemed waived," and that "a motion to quash shall consequently be
governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant
may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress."
A closer reading of the cases where the Court supposedly brushed aside belated
objections would reveal that the objections were disregarded because they had been
cured or addressed based on the records.
In Demaisip v. Court of Appeals,49 the accused asserted that the search warrant was
never produced in court, thus suggesting its absence. The Court, however, noted that
"there were supposed testimonies of its existence."
The rulings in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,53 People v. Court of Appeals,54 and
People v. Correa55 are without significance to the present case. As mentioned,
Malaloan v. Court of Appeals involved the question of where motions to quash search
warrants should be filed, and the guidelines set therein was applied in People v. Court
of Appeals. People v. Correa, on the other hand, involved a warrantless search of a
moving vehicle.
We reiterate that the requirement to raise objections against search warrants during
trial is a procedural rule established by jurisprudence. Compliance or noncompliance
with this requirement cannot in any way diminish the constitutional guarantee that a
search warrant should be issued upon a finding of probable cause.1âwphi1 Ogayon’s
failure to make a timely objection cannot serve to cure the inherent defect of the
warrant. To uphold the validity of the void warrant would be to disregard one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution.
In the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003, the search conducted
on its authority is likewise null and void. Under the Constitution, any evidence
obtained in violation of a person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.56 With the inadmissibility of
the drugs seized from Ogayon' s home, there is no more evidence to support his
conviction. Thus, we see no reason to further discuss the other issues raised in this
petition.
WHEREFORE, under these premises, the Decision dated March 31, 2009, and the
Resolution dated July 10, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31154 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction, as stated in
the joint judgment dated September 5, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12,
Lig ity, Albay, in Criminal Case Nos. 4738 and 4739, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and petitioner HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ is ACQUITTED of the criminal charges
against him for violation of Republic Act No. 9165.
SO ORDERED.

In People v. Tee,50 the accused claimed that the issuing judge failed to exhaustively
examine the complainant and his witnesses, and that the complainant’s witness (a
National Bureau of Intelligence operative) had no personal knowledge of the facts
comprising probable cause, but the Court brushed these claims aside. It found that
the witness’ knowledge of the facts supporting probable case was not based on
hearsay as he himself assisted the accused in handling the contraband, and that the
issuing judge extensively questioned this witness. In People v. Torres, 51 the accused
assailed the validity of the search conducted pursuant to a search warrant as it was
supposedly made without the presence of at least two witnesses, but the Court found
otherwise, citing the testimonies taken during the trial contradicting this claim. A
similar objection was made by the accused in People v. Nuñez,52 but the Court noted
the testimony of the officer conducting the search who stated that it was made in the
presence of the accused himself and two barangay officials.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124461. September 25, 1998]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE
ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 83,
QUEZON CITY; and AIDEN LANUZA, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The People of the Philippines, through this petition for review, seeks the reversal
of the order of respondent Judge Estrella T. Estrada, dated December 7, 1995, which
granted private respondent Aiden Lanuzas motion to quash Search Warrant No. 958
(95), as well as the order dated April 1, 1996 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the earlier order.
On June 27, 1995, Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal,
Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD),
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, an application for the
issuance of a search warrant against Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana
Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, for violation of Article 40 (k) of Republic Act 7394 (The
Consumer Act of the Philippines).
In her application for search warrant, Atty. Cabanlas alleged, among others, as
follows:
1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of LICD, I received
reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence Group IV,
Intelligence Command of the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City sold to
said Officer Cabiles various drug products amounting to Seven Thousand Two
Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (P 7,232.00) on May 29, 1995;
1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street,
Mabolo, Cebu City has no license to operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug products
from the BFAD;
1.c. Distribution, sale or offer for sale or transfer of drug products without license to
operate from BFAD is in violation of Art. 40 (k) of RA 7394 (or the Consumer Act).
2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report and the
various drug products sold and purchased contained in a (sic) plastic bags marked
Lanuza Bag 1 of 1 and Lanuza Bag 2 of 2 were enclosed; and the same are likewise
submitted herewith.
xxx xxx xxx. [1] (Emphasis supplied)
The application, however, ended with the statement that the warrant is to search
the premises of another person at a different address:
3. This is executed to support affiants application for a search warrant on the
premises of Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay Cebu.[2] (Emphasis
supplied)
In support of the application, the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles, a member
of the Regional Intelligence Group IV of the PNP Intelligence Command, Camp Vicente
Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, was attached thereto, wherein he declared that:
1. Upon the request for assistance by BFAD, he conducted surveillance for persons
distributing, selling or transferring drug products without license to operate from
BFAD.
2. On May 29, 1995, a certain Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City sold to him various drug products amounting to P7,232.00 and
3. Upon further verification in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or premises, the
said person and place have in fact no license to operate.
4. Earlier than May 29, 1995, affiant saw a delivery of drug products from the
residence of Mrs. Lanuza in 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City to
another person.
5. Accompanying this affidavit are the various products sold to/and purchased by the
affiant contained in two (2) plastic bags marked Lanuza Bag 1 of 1 and Lanuza Bag 2
of 2.
This is executed in support of the affiants report to BFAD and for whatever legitimate
purpose this may serve.[3] (Emphasis supplied)
The BFAD also submitted with the application a copy of the sketch [4] of the
location of Aiden Lanuzas residence at her stated address.
On the same day the application was filed, the respondent Judge issued Search
Warrant No. 958 (95), which reads in full:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 83 QUEZON CITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,
- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)
AIDEN LANUZA,
Defendant.
X---------------------------X
SEARCH WARRANT
It appears to the satisfaction of this Court, after examining under oath Atty. Lorna
Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and Compliance Division (LICD)
of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) and her witness, Manuel P. Cabiles,
member of the Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence Command, PNP, Camp Vicente
Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a violation
of Article 40(k) in relation to Article 41 of Republic Act No. 7394 (Consumer Act) has
been committed or about to be committed and there are good and sufficient reasons
to believe that Ms. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose dela Montana Street, Cebu City
has in her possession and control at said address the following described properties:
medicines and drugs of undetermined quantity among which are Bricanyl Tablet,
Bisolvon Tablet, Buscopan Tablet, Buscopan Ampoule, Mucosolvan Ampoule,
Persantin Tablet, Tegretol Tablet, PZA-Ciba Tablet, Voltaren Tablet, Zantac
Ampoule, Ventolin Tablet, Ventolin Inhaler, Dermovate Cream, Fortum Vial,
Zinacef Vial, Feldene 1M Ampoule, Norvasoc Tablet, Bactrim Forte Tablet,
Rochephin Vial, Tilcotil Tablet, Librax Tablet, Methergin Tablet and Tagamet
Tablet
which she is selling, distributing and transferring without the necessary license from
the Department of Health.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the DAY or
NIGHT of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of
the undetermined amount of drugs and medicines subject of the offense and to bring
the same to this Court to be dealt with as the law directs.
You are further directed to submit a return of this Search Warrant within ten (10) days
from today.
This Search Warrant is valid within a period of ten (10) days from the date of issue.
GIVEN UNDER THE HAND AND SEAL of this Court this 27th day of June 1995 at
Quezon City.
(Sgd.)ESTRELLA T.
ESTRADA
Second Vice Executive
Judge[5]
(Emphasis supplied)
On June 28, 1995, the search warrant was served at private respondent Lanuzas
residence at the indicated address by a composite team of policemen from the PNP
7th Criminal Investigation Command, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City.
How the search warrant was implemented was briefly narrated in the Joint
Affidavit,[6] dated June 29, 1995, of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Marckbilly
Capalungan, both members of the search and seizure team. They stated in their
affidavit that their team, armed with the search warrant, conducted a raid at the
premises of one AIDEN LANUZA of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City x x
x; that the raid was witnessed by Luis Rivera, Demetrio Panimdim and Francisco
Ojales, both (sic) Brgy. Tanod of Kasambagan, Cebu City; that the service of the
(search) warrant resulted in the confiscation of fifty-two (52) cartoons (sic) of assorted
medicines from the possession and control of AIDEN LANUZA; and that the said items
were brought to the 7CICRO office for detailed inventory headed by Atty. Lorna F.
Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and Compliance Division of the BFAD,
Manila.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
The present petition, however, narrates a different account of what actually
happened during the implementation of the search warrant. Paragraph 5 of the petition
states: At the commencement of the search, the members of the team discovered that
the premises described as 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was
actually a five thousand (5,000) square meter compound containing at least fifteen (15)
structures which are either leased residences, offices, factories, workshops or
warehouse. The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private respondent
Lanuza at Lot No. 41 of said address. Finding no drug products thereat, they
proceeded to search a nearby warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compoundand
address above stated. This search yielded fifty-two (52) cartons of assorted drug
products which were then inventoried in due course. x x x.[8] (Emphasis supplied)
In an order[9] dated July 3, 1995, the respondent Judge noted the inventory of the
seized drugs and authorized the BFAD to retain custody of the same, to have samples
of the drugs analyzed and be brought to the registered drug manufacturers for parallel
testing.
On August 22, 1995, private respondent Aiden Lanuza filed a verified
motion[10] praying that Search Warrant No. 958 (95) be quashed and that the seized
articles be declared inadmissible in any proceeding and ordered returned to the
warehouse owned by Folk Arts Export & Import Company located at Lot No. 38 inside
the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City. The motion is based
on the grounds that the search warrant is illegal and null and void because: (1) it was
applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay,
Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of private respondent Aiden Lanuza at
516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City; (2) it was issued for a non-existing
offense; (3) Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas was not duly authorized by applicant
BFAD to apply therefor; (4) it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized; (5) the applicant's witnesses had no personal knowledge
of the facts upon which it was issued; and (6) its implementation was unreasonable as
it was enforced on a different or wrong place which was lawfully occupied by a different
or wrong person.[11]
Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas, who appeared for the BFAD, opposed [12] the
motion to quash the search warrant, to which the private respondent countered with a
reply.
After the contending parties had submitted their respective positions without
further oral arguments, the respondent Judge issued the assailed order [13] dated
December 7, 1995, quashing Search Warrant No. 958 (95). Accordingly, the order
dated July 3, 1995 was revoked and all the articles seized were declared inadmissible
in any and all proceedings against private respondent Aiden Lanuza. Also, the BFAD
was ordered to return at its expense all the seized items to the warehouse of Folk Arts
Import & Export Company at Lot No. 38, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo,
Cebu City within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice of the said order. [14]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the December 7, 1995 order was denied
in an order[15] dated April 1, 1996, impelling petitioner to file the present petition
asserting that the respondent Judge erred:
a) In holding that the defect appearing in BFAD's application for a
search warrant is so "grave" in nature as to warrant quashal of
the search warrant issued thereunder, considering that such
variance is actually a harmless clerical error.
b) In holding that Atty. Cabanlas was not authorized by the BFAD to
apply for a search warrant concerning the unlicensed distribution
of drugs, considering that the grant of BFAD authorization upon
her to investigate fake, misbranded, adulterated or unregistered
drugs necessarily contemplates the authority to investigate the
unlicensed activities above noted.
c) In holding that applicant BFAD had failed to discharge the burden of
proving probable cause for issuance of a search warrant, by
failing to present documentary proof indicating that private
respondent had no license to sell or distribute drug products,
considering that under the authority of Carillo v. People (229
SCRA 386) the BFAD only had the burden of proving the
negative ingredient of the offense charged on the basis of the
best evidence procurable under the circumstances.
d) In holding that the place sought to be searched had not been
described with sufficient particularity in SW No. 958 (95),
considering that Aiden Lanuza's residence at Lot No. 41, 516
San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was not so
conspicuously or notoriously represented to the public as such by
her as to contradict the investigating and serving officers'
perception of the outward appearance of her dwelling, which led
them to believe that the more general address of 516 San Jose
de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City referred to her dwelling.
e) In ordering the return of the things seized, the possession of which
is prohibited.[16]
We granted the petitioners application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order in a resolution[17]dated June 26, 1996 and restrained the implementation of the
assailed orders, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.
Private respondent Aiden Lanuza later filed her comment [18] on the petition, but
petitioner's reply thereto was not admitted by this Court in a resolution[19] dated January
13, 1997, for failure by the Solicitor General to file the same within his first extension of
thirty (30) days, that was granted, but with a warning that no further extension would
be given. Instead of filing his reply, the Solicitor General asked for two (2) more
extensions of time, which were denied.
Now to the assigned errors of the respondent Judge raised by petitioner.
The requirements for the issuance of a search warrant are inscribed in Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
"SEC. 2. THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR
PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS, AND EFFECTS AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF WHATEVER
NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE, AND NO
SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE
EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED
PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH
OR AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE
MAY PRODUCE, AND PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE PLACE TO
BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED."
(Emphasis supplied)
In quashing the subject search warrant, it is the finding of the respondent Judge
that the application for its issuance suffered from a grave defect, "which escaped (her)
attention," considering that it was applied to search the premises of one Belen
Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the
residence of herein private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana
St., Cebu City.[20]
We nonetheless find such error in the application for search warrant a negligible
defect.
The title of the questioned application, which reads:
"PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,
- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)
AIDEN LANUZA, For: Violation of Article
516 San Jose de la 40 (k) in relation to
Montana Street, Mabolo, Article 41 of Republic
Cebu City, Act No. 7394 (or the
Defendant. Consumer Act).
x------------------------------------------------------
- -x"[21] (Emphasis supplied)
and the allegations contained therein, pertinent portions of which we quote:
 1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of LICD,
I received reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional
Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence Command of the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City sold to said Officer Cabiles various drug products
amounting to Seven Thousand Two Hundred Thirty Two Pesos
(P 7,232.00) on May 29, 1995;
1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City has no license to operate,
distribute, sell or transfer drug products from the BFAD;
xxxxxxxxx
2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report
and the various drug products sold and purchased contained in a (sic)
plastic bags marked Lanuza Bag 1 of 1 and Lanuza Bag 2 of 2 were
enclosed; and the same are likewise submitted herewith.
x x x x x x x x x. [22] (Emphasis supplied)
unmistakably reveal that the said application was specifically intended against private
respondent Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu
City. She has been the only one identified in the application, as well as in the
aforequoted affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles upon which the application was based,
as having allegedly sold to said SPO4 Cabiles various drugs amounting to P7,232.00
on May 29, 1995, without any license to do so, in alleged violation of Article 40 (k) of
R.A. 7394. It is noteworthy that, as stated in the above-quoted paragraph 2 of the
application, the plastic bags which contained the seized drugs and which were
submitted together with the application, were marked as "Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and
"LanuzaBag 2 of 2." These markings with the name "Lanuza" obviously refer to no other
than the herein private respondent. And when the respondent Judge issued the search
warrant, it was directed solely against private respondent Aiden Lanuza at her address:
516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
The Solicitor General explained the error in the application by saying that on the
same day applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas filed the questioned application on
June 27, 1995, another application for search warrant was also filed against one Belen
Cabanero at her residence at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu City. This can be
deduced from the following examination conducted by respondent Judge on Atty.
Cabanlas:
"(COURT)
Q. And who is your respondent?
A. Mrs. Aiden Lanuza and the other one is Belen Cabanero.
Q. Where are they situated?
A. Mrs. Lanuza is situated in No. 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City.
Q. About the other?
A. New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu.
Q. Do you have any specific address at New Frontier Village?
A. It was reported by Mr. Manuel Cabiles.
Q. Will he be testifying?
A. Yes Ma'am. Your Honor, this is the vicinity of the New Frontier Village, Cebu
(witness presenting a sketch) (sic)
Q. How about this San Jose de la Montana. This is just in Cebu City?
A. At 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City." [23]
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the name and address of one
Belen Cabanero were erroneously copied in paragraph 3 of the application in
question. Such defect, as intimated earlier, is not of such a gravity as to call for the
invalidation of the search warrant.
There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as
she was not convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure
of the applicant to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza had no license to sell drugs.
It must be noted that in the application for search warrant, private respondent is
charged with the specific offense of selling drugs without the required license from the
Department of Health, which is in violation of Article 40 (k) of R. A. 7394, and penalized
under Article 41 thereof. The said application was supported by the affidavit of SPO4
Manuel Cabiles where, in paragraph 3 thereof, he declared that he made a "verification
in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or premises" and discovered that private
respondent Aiden Lanuza had "no license" to sell drugs.
We agree with the respondent Judge that applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas
should have submitted documentary proof that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had
no such license. Although no explanation was offered by respondent Judge to support
her posture, we hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify
the issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must show facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched."[24]
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best
evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such
evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence of the
negative ingredient of the offense charged - for instance, the absence of a license
required by law, as in the present case - and such evidence is within the knowledge
and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence
could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable
reason therefor during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring
stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give
meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and
personalties. As well stated by this Court through former Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando in Villanueva vs. Querubin:[25]
It is deference to ones personality that lies at the core of this right, but it
could be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected
area, primarily ones home but not necessarily thereto confined (Cf. Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293 [1966]). What is sought to be guarded is a
mans prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that
haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of
who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around
him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access
except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from
any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life (Cf.
Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757, Brennam, J. and Boyd v. United
States, 116 US 616, 630). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative
work, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court (1966), could fitly
characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of a spiritual
concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to
afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is
no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under
stringent procedural safeguards (Ibid, p. 47).(Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove
that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to
that effect from the Department of Health.SPO4 Manuel could have easily procured
such certification when he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed
persons or entity. No justifiable reason was introduced why such certification could not
be secured. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a license by private respondent
is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. The presumption of
regularity cannot be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify
it.[26] We apply by analogy our ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et. al.:[27]
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated
films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against
those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioners argument to the
effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be
necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of
whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants
is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were
necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which
allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films
belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial
similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant
must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased
evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an
unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the
pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere
allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant. (Emphasis supplied)
Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient
particularity in the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent
Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana
St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse
at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is owned by a different
person. Again, the respondent Judge is correct on this point.
This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is
feasible.[28] In the present case, it must be noted that the application for search warrant
was accompanied by a sketch[29]of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private
respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are
residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this
sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of
private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other
buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely
indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does
not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the
description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has
characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of
the constitutional requirement.
While the questioned search warrant had all the characteristic of a general
warrant, it was correctly implemented. For, the searching team went directly to the
house of private respondent Aiden Lanuza located at Lot No. 41 inside the compound
known as 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.However, the team
did not find any of the drug products which were the object of the search. Frustrated,
and apparently disappointed, the team then proceeded to search a nearby warehouse
of Folk Arts Export & Import Company owned by one David Po located at Lot No. 38
within the same compound. It was in the warehouse that drug products were found and
seized which were duly receipted. In the Joint Affidavit of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and
SPO2 Markbilly Capalungan, members of the searching team, is a statement that the
confiscated 52 cartons of assorted medicines were found in the possession and
control of private respondent Aiden Lanuza. This is a blatant falsehood and is
aggravated by the fact that this was committed by officers sworn to uphold the law. In
searching the warehouse of Folk Arts Export & Import Company owned by one David
Po, the searching team went beyond the scope of the search warrant. As the trial court
aptly observed:
x x x. The verified motion to quash and reply also show that the search at
the house of defendant-movant yielded negative result and the confiscated
articles were taken from another place which is the warehouse of Folk Arts
Import and Export Company owned by another person. In the return of the
 search warrant, it is stated that Search Warrant No. 958 (95) was served at
the premises of 516 San Jose dela Montana St., Cebu City and that during
the search, drug products were found and seized therefrom which were
duly receipted. Accompanying said return is the Joint Affidavit of two (2)
members of the searching team, namely: SPO2 Froctuoso Bete and SPO2
Markbilly Capalingan, both of the 7th Criminal Investigation Command,
PNP, with station at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gerardo Avenue, Cebu City
which also mentioned only the address as 516 San Jose dela Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City and the confiscation of 52 cartoons(sic) of assorted
medicines purportedly from the possession and control of defendant-
movant. However, as indicated in the sketch attached to the application for
search warrant, said Folk Arts Import and Export Company is owned by one
David Po, which is a concrete proof that the searching team exceeded their
authority by conducting a search not only in the residence of defendant-
movant Lanuza but also in another place which the applicant itself has
identified as belonging to another person, David Po. The foregoing are
strong reasons to support the conclusion that there has been an
unreasonable search and seizure which would warrant the quashal of the
search warrant.[30]
The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the motion to quash the search
warrant.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued in a resolution dated June 26, 1996 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172607 April 16, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appelle,
vs.
RUFINO UMANITO, Appellant.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In our Resolution dated 26 October 2007, this Court resolved, for the very first time, to
apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence (DNA Rules) 1 in a
case pending before us – this case. We remanded the case to the RTC for reception
of DNA evidence in accordance with the terms of said Resolution, and in light of the
fact that the impending exercise would be the first application of the procedure,
directed Deputy Court Administrator Reuben Dela Cruz to: (a) monitor the manner in
which the court a quo carries out the DNA Rules; and (b) assess and submit periodic
reports on the implementation of the DNA Rules in the case to the Court.
To recall, the instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito
(Umanito) was found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch
67 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Umanito was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the private
complainant in the sum of ₱50,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals offered the
judgment of the trial court. Umanito appealed the decision of the appellate court to
this court.
In its 2007 Resolution, the Court acknowledged "many incongruent assertions of the
prosecution and the defense."2At the same time, the alleged 1989 rape of the private
complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, a girl
hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, a well as the defense of alibi
raised by Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering of whether or not Umanito is the
father of BBB greatly determinative of the resolution of the appeal. The Court then
observed:
x x x With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now
be determined with reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's
child. If he is not, his acquittal may be ordained. We have pronounced that if it can be
conclusively determined that the accused did not sire the alleged victim's child, this
may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis. If he is
found not to be the father, the finding will at least weigh heavily in the ultimate
decision in this case. Thus, we are directing appellant, AAA and her child to submit
themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the New Rule
on DNA Evidence (the Rules), which took effect on 15 October 2007, subject to
guidelines prescribed herein.3
The RTC of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67, presided by Judge Ferdinand A. Fe, upon
receiving the Resolution of the Court on 9 November 2007, set the case for hearing
on 27 November 20074 to ascertain the feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to
the standards set in Sections 4(a), (b), (c) and (e) of the DNA Rules. Both AAA and
BBB (now 17 years old) testified during the hearing. They also manifested their
willingness to undergo DNA examination to determine whether Umanito is the father
of BBB.5
A hearing was conducted on 5 December 2007, where the public prosecutor and the
counsel for Umanito manifested their concurrence to the selection of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) as the institution that would conduct the DNA testing.
The RTC issued an Order on even date directing that biological samples be taken
from AAA, BBB and Umanito on 9 January 2008 at the courtroom. The Order likewise
enjoined the NBI as follows:
In order to protect the integrity of the biological samples, the [NBI] is enjoined to
strictly follow the measures laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court in the instant
case to wit:
Moreover, the court a quo must ensure that the proper chain of custody in the
handling of the samples submitted by the parties is adequately borne in the records,
i.e.; that the samples are collected by a neutral third party; that the tested parties are
appropriately identified at their sample collection appointments; that the samples are
protected with tamper tape at the collection site; that all persons in possession thereof
at each stage of testing thoroughly inspected the samples for tampering and
explained his role in the custody of the samples and the acts he performed in relation
thereto.
The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the parties in Court. The
[NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA test
results.
The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all
results or other information obtained from DNA testing and is hereby ordered to
preserve the evidence until such time as the accused has been acquitted or served
his sentence.6
Present at the hearing held on 9 January 2008 were AAA, BBB, counsel for Umanito,
and two representatives from the NBI. The RTC had previously received a letter from
the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prisons informing the trial court that Umanito
would not be able to attend the hearing without an authority coming from the Supreme
Court.7 The parties manifested in court their willingness to the taking of the DNA
sample from the accused at his detention center at the New Bilibid Prisons on 8
February 2008.8 The prosecution then presented on the witness stand NBI forensic
chemist Mary Ann Aranas, who testified on her qualifications as an expert witness in
the field of DNA testing. No objections were posed to her qualifications by the
defense. Aranas was accompanied by a laboratory technician of the NBI DNA
laboratory who was to assist in the extraction of DNA.
DNA samples were thus extracted from AAA and BBB in the presence of Judge Fe,
the prosecutor, the counsel for the defense, and DCA De la Cruz. On 8 February
2008, DNA samples were extracted from Umanito at the New Bilibid Prisons by NBI
chemist Aranas, as witnessed by Judge Fe, the prosecutor, the defense counsel,
DCA De la Cruz, and other personnel of the Court and the New Bilibid Prisons. 9
The RTC ordered the NBI to submit the result of the DNA examination within thirty
(30) days after the extraction of biological samples of Umanito, and directed its duly
authorized representatives to attend a hearing on the admissibility of such DNA
evidence scheduled for 10 March 2008. The events of the 28 March 2008 hearing, as
well as the subsequent hearing on 29 April 2008, were recounted in the Report dated
19 May 2008 submitted by Judge Fe. We quote therefrom with approval:
2. That as previously scheduled in the order of the trial court on 09 January 2008, the
case was set for hearing on the admissibility of the result of the DNA testing.
At the hearing, Provincial Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Opiana, presented Mary Ann T.
Aranas, a Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation who testified on
the examination she conducted, outlining the procedure she adopted and the result
thereof. She further declared that using the Powerplex 16 System, Deoxyribonuncleic
acid analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from
[AAA], [BBB], and Rufino Umanito y Millares, to determine whether or not Rufino
Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete
Match in all of the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y
Milalres and [BBB]; That based on the above findings, there is a 99.9999% probability
of paternity that Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB] (Exhibits
"A" and series and "B" and series).
After the cross-examination of the witness by the defense counsel, the Public
Prosecutor offered in evidence Exhibits "A" and sub-markings, referring to the Report
of the Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila on the DNA
analysis to determine whether or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father
of [BBB] and Exhibit "B" and sub-markings, referring to the enlarged version of the
table of Exhibit "A," to establish that on the DNA examination conducted on [AAA],
[BBB] and the accused Rufino Umanito for the purpose of establishing paternity, the
result is 99.9999% probable. Highly probable.
The defense did not interpose any objection, hence, the exhibits were admitted.
1. That considering that under Section 9, A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, if the value of the
Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of
paternity, the instant case was set for reception of evidence for the accused on April
29, 2008 to controvert the presumption that he is the biological father of [BBB].
During the hearing on April 29, 2008, the accused who was in court manifested
through his counsel that he will not present evidence to dispute the findings of the
Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation.
The DNA samples were collected by the forensic chemist of the National Bureau of
Investigation whose qualifications as an expert was properly established adopting the
following procedure:
a) The subject sources were asked to gargle and to fill out the reference
sample form. Thereafter, the chemists informed them that buccal swabs will
be taken from their mouth and five (5) droplets of blood will also be taken
from the ring finger of their inactive hand;
b) Pictures of the subject sources were taken by the NBI Chemist;
c) Buccal swabs were taken from the subject sources three (3) times;
d) Subject sources were made to sign three (3) pieces of paper to serve as
label of the three buccal swabs placed inside two (2) separate envelopes
that bear their names;
e) Blood samples were taken from the ring finger of the left hand of the
subject sources;
f) Subject sources were made to sign the FTA card of their blood samples.
The buccal swabs and the FTA cards were placed in a brown envelope for
air drying for at least one hour.
g) Finger prints of the subject sources were taken for additional identification;
h) The subject sources were made to sign their finger prints.
i) Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela Cruz and
Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Oplana, in that order, were made to sign as
witnesses to the reference sample forms and the finger prints of the subject
sources.
j) After one hour of air drying, the Buccal Swabs and the FTA papers were
placed inside a white envelope and sealed with a tape by the NBI Chemists;
k) The witnesses, Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator
Reuben dela Cruz, Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Opiana including the NBI
Chemist, affixed their signatures on the sealed white envelope;
l) The subjects sources were made to sign and affix their finger prints on the
sealed white envelope;
 m) The chemists affixed their signatures on the sealed envelope and placed
it in a separate brown envelope;
n) The subjects sources were made to affix their finger prints on their
identification places and reference forms.
The same procedure was adopted by the Forensic Chemists of the NBI in the taking
of DNA samples from the accused, Rufino Umanito at the New Bilibid Prison in the
afternoon of February 8, 2008.
Mary Ann Aranas, the expert witness testified that at the NBI the sealed envelope was
presented to Ms. Demelen dela Cruz, the supervisor of the Forensic Chemistry
Division to witness that the envelope containing the DNA specimens was sealed as it
reached the NBI. Photographs of the envelope in sealed form were taken prior to the
conduct of examination.
With the procedure adopted by the Forensic Chemist of the NBI, who is an expert and
whose integrity and dedication to her work is beyond reproach the manner how the
biological samples were collected, how they were handled and the chain of custody
thereof were properly established the court is convinced that there is no possibility of
contamination of the DNA samples taken from the parties.
At the Forensic Laboratory of the National Bureau of Investigation, the envelopes
containing the DNA samples were opened and the specimens were subjected to
sampling, extraction, amplification and analysis. Duplicate analysis were made. The
Forensic Chemist, Mary Ann Aranas caused the examination of the blood samples
and the buccal swabs were separately processed by Mrs. Demelen dela Cruz.
In order to arrive at a DNA profile, the forensic chemists adopted the following
procedure: (1) Sampling which is the cutting of a portion from the media (swabs and
FTA paper); (2) then subjected the cut portions for extraction to release the DNA; (3)
After the DNA was released into the solution, it was further processed using the
formarine chain reaction to amplify the DNA samples for analysis of using the
Powerplex 16 System, which allows the analysis of 16 portions of the DNA samples.
The Powerplex 16 System are reagent kits for forensic purposes; (3) After the target,
DNA is multiplied, the amplified products are analyzed using the genetic analyzer.
The Powerplex 16 System has 16 markers at the same time. It is highly reliable as it
has already been validated for forensic use. It has also another function which is to
determine the gender of the DNA being examined.
Mary Ann Aranas, the Forensic Chemist, in her testimony explained that the DNA
found in all cells of a human being come in pairs except the mature red blood cells.
These cells are rolled up into minute bodies called "chromosomes," which contain the
DNA of a person. A human has 23 pairs of chromosomes. For each pair of
chromosome, one was found to have originated from the mother, the other must have
came from the father. Using the Powerplex 16 System Results, the variable portions
of the DNA called "loci," which were used as the basis for DNA analysis or typing
showed the following: under "loci" D3S1358, the genotype of the locus of [AAA] is 15,
16, the genotype of [BBB] is 15, 16, one of the pair of alleles must have originated
and the others from the father. The color for the allele of the mother is red while the
father is blue. On matching the allele which came from the mother was first
determined [AAA], has alleles of 15 or 16 but in the geno type of [BBB], 15 was
colored blue because that is the only allele which contain the genotype of the accused
Rufino Umanito, the 16 originated from the mother, [AAA]. In this marker [BBB] has a
genotype of 15, 16, 16 is from the mother and 15 is from the father.
The whole process involved the determination which of those alleles originated from
the mother and the rest would entail looking on the genotype or the profile of the
father to determine if they matched with those of the child.
In the analysis of the 16 loci by the Forensic Chemists, amel on the 13th row was not
included because this is the marker that determines the gender of the source of the
loci. The pair XX represents a female and XY for a male. Rufino Umanito has XY
amel and [BBB] and [AAA] have XX amel. For matching paternity purposes only 15
loci were examined. Of the 15 loci, there was a complete match between the alleles of
the loci of [BBB] and Rufino (Exhibits "A" and "B").
To ensure reliable results, the Standard Operating Procedure of the Forensic
Chemistry Division of the NBI in paternity cases is to use buccal swabs taken from the
parties and blood as a back up source.
The said Standard Operating Procedure was adopted in the instant case.
As earlier mentioned, DNA samples consisted of buccal swabs and blood samples
taken from the parties by the forensic chemists who adopted reliable techniques and
procedure in collecting and handling them to avoid contamination. The method that
was used to secure the samples were safe and reliable. The samples were taken and
handled by an expert, whose qualifications, integrity and dedication to her work is
unquestionable, hence, the possibility of substitution or manipulation is very remote.
The procedure adopted by the DNA section, Forensic Chemistry Division of the
National Bureau of Investigation in analyzing the samples was in accordance with the
standards used in modern technology. The comparative analysis of DNA prints of the
accused Rufino Umanito and his alleged child is a simple process called parentage
analysis which was made easier with the use of a DNA machine called Genetic
Analyzer. To ensure a reliable result, the NBI secured two (2) DNA types of samples
from the parties, the buccal swabs as primary source and blood as secondary source.
Both sources were separately processed and examined and thereafter a comparative
analysis was conducted which yielded the same result.
The National Bureau of Investigation DNA Section, Forensic Division is an accredited
DNA testing laboratory in the country which maintains a multimillion DNA analysis
equipment for its scientific criminal investigation unit. It is manned by qualified
laboratory chemists and technicians who are experts in the field, like Mary Ann
Aranas, the expert witness in the instant case, who is a licensed chemists, has
undergone training on the aspects of Forensic Chemistry fro two (2) years before she
was hired as forensic chemists of the NBI and has been continuously attending
training seminars, and workshops which are field related and who has handled more
than 200 cases involving DNA extraction or collection or profiling.
The accused did not object to the admission of Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of their
sub-markings. He did not also present evidence to controvert the results of the DNA
analysis.
Umanito’s defense of alibi, together with his specific assertion that while he had
courted AAA they were not sweethearts, lead to a general theory on his part that he
did not engage in sexual relations with the complainant. The DNA testing has evinced
a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA, Umanito had fathered the child
she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day she said she was raped
by Umanito.

Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: "If the value of the Probability of
Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.
DNA analysis conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Division on
the buccal swabs and blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB] and
Rufino Umanito y MillAres for DNA analysis to determine whether or not Rufino
Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB] gave the following result:
"FINDINGS: Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis using the
Powerplex 16 System conducted on the
above-mentioned, specimens gave the
following profiles;
Still, Umanito filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February 2009. By filing
such motion, Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the indemnification of the private complainant in
the sum of ₱50,000.00. Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing
conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, and that no cause is presented for
us to deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to deny
Umanito’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Consequently, the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 15 February 2006 would otherwise be deemed final if the
appeal is not withdrawn.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February 2009 is
GRANTED. The instant case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.
xxx

xxx

There is a COMPLETE MATCH in all the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of
Rufino Umanito y Millares and [BBB].

REMARKS: Based on the above findings, there is a

99.9999% Probability of Paternity that
Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological
Father of [BBB]"

Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted

and overcome by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of Court).

The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was
not contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did
not object to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B"
inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to rebut the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial court rules that based on the result of
the DNA analysis conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation, Forensic
Division, RUFINO UMANITO y MILLARES is the biological father of [BBB]. 10

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996]
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief,
Special Actions and Investigation Division, DENR, respondents.
[G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA DIZON-
CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and RI
CHUY PO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996]
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY.
VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), ATTY.
NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H.
CALLORINA, JR., respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally
assigned to the Second and Third Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were
subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan
Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village,
Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with
the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-
092590-0469. Its permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent
A. Robles were, during all the time material to these cases, the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the
Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches,
shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct
surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw
coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded
with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver
could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the
truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas
Avenue, Quezon City.[1] The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because
of the refusal of the owner.[2]
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive
Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioners lumberyard
four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra
lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.[3]
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner 's lumberyard
in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because
the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber
origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the
invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. [4]
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner
retains the physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles
is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from
disposing them until further orders.[5]
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an
extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required documents
covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber
origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the motion on the
ground that the documents being required from the petitioner must accompany the
lumber or forest products placed under seizure.[6]
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to
Secretary Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of
Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and
resaw mill and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie)
without the required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including
the truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now
at the DENR compound in the event its owner fails to submit documents
showing legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten days from date
of seizure;
 3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang
Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal
possession of narra and almaciga lumber and shorts if and when
recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV-458 as well as
the lumber loaded therein for transport lumber using recycled
documents.[7]
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately
the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the
petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should
not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles
informing the latter that the petitioner had already secured the required documents and
was ready to submit them.None, however, was submitted. [8]
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting
the events which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered CONFISCATED in
favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law the approximately
311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside
the petitioner's lumberyard.[9]
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order or preliminary
injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A.
Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case
No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 o the said court. The petitioner questioned
therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and seizure order issued by
a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting
of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and dimensions with a total value of
P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior
notice and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705
(The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were committed and
acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a
team of DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner located at No.
1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila. The team caught the petitioner operating as a
lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had already been suspended on 23
April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was open, the team went inside
and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the
team was informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the
petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The
members of the team then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who
turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy
Po, who was then out of town. The team's photographer was able to take photographs
of the stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting
machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The team
thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan
lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt therefor. [10]
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter,
the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned to
Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint
against the petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate preliminary
investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a
resolution[11] whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information
be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately
200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of
almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series
of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs
covered by legal documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa. [12]
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III,
who served as Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging. [13]
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the
DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation
of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the information
reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within
the premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads
of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations.[14]
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision [15] in the
FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation
in favor of the Government the approximately 311,000 board feet of
lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and
seized from the lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune
Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990
(Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated, and instead the
respondents are required to report and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio,
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
 the said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts
and sticks, to be dealt with as directed by law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate
action before the proper court regarding the lauan and almaciga lumber
of assorted sizes and dimensions loaded in petitioner's truck bearing
Plate No. CCK-322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990
shall be rendered functus oficio upon compliance by the respondents
with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment;
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the lauan, supa and almaciga
lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
judgment be returned to said petitioner, is withheld in this case until after
the proper court has taken cognizance and determined how those
lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and
seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of
lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not
offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a valid
warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where
warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle.[16]As to
the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected
on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a continuation of that
made the previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant
issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even
question.[17] And, although the search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that the
executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of
the search.[18]
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990
ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the reason
that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive
Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with the directive
in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court
ruled that the same had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the
petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner admitted
in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to
the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to
Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the
information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed
to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even
granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same
may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal
seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST
CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of
the seizure, raises a prejudicial question.[19]
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and possession thereof without the required legal
documents is penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order
No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that
exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to
minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest
resources.[20]
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE,[21] respondent Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the
ground that "possession of lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws
and regulations is not a crime."[22]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October
1991,[23] the People filed a petition for certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424,
wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [24] in CA-G.R.
SP No. 25510dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in
the FIRST CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As to
the claim that the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law
punishing the possession of lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose possession
without the required legal documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the
Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product
involved has always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate
business of lumber dealership. But what is important to consider is that when appellant
was required to present the valid documents showing its acquisition and lawful
possession of the lumber in question, it failed to present any despite the period of
extension granted to it.[25]
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court
of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March 1992.[26] Hence, the petitioner came to this Court
by way of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed on 2
May 1992.[27]
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision
in the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition
because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when the seizure
was made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its
license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D.
No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was justified as a warrantless search and
seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed
the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.
In its decision[28] of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's
appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied
upon by the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition
of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the
market," and by the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood,
esp. when suitable or adapted for various building purposes," the respondent Court
held that since wood is included in the definition of forest productin Section 3(q) of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the
term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can
seize the forest product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant
to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part as follows:
SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or employee of the
Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police
shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in
his presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and
confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing
the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the
process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the
cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products or
possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals
in the resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February
1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. 106424 with which the
other two were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-
91 on the ground that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-
Capulong granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the
CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the
required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information
may be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an
offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the
sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense, [29] and
matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information,
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations,
or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the
penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well
as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal
of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any
authority; and (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex
gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage,
do the facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation
of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion
that lumber is not solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged
to be in the possession of the private respondent, without the required legal documents,
are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.
The almaciga and lauan specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as lumber.
They cannot refer to the lumber in no. (2) because they are separated by the words
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. with the conjunction and, and not with the preposition of.
They must then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under Section 3(q)
of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 3. Definitions.
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum,
wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub,
and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational
and geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The
public and the private respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the
information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items
therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the
information validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting
opinion that this Court go beyond the four corners of the information for enlightenment
as to whether the information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings
and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that only lumber has been
envisioned in the indictment.
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the
rule that only the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be
considered in determining whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his
conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman
Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred to, [30] cannot lead one to infer that
what the team seized was all lumber.Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4)
truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra
lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited wood species. (Italics
supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution [31] of the investigating
prosecutor, which served as the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit
itself to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information
be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and
lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of
1987. (Italics supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an
affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the
coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof
without the required legal documents is not a crime.On the contrary, this Court rules
that such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the
term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of
either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in
paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in
the definition of Processing plant; which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine
used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In
the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for the market. [32] Simply put,
lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.[33] And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents
is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between
raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distanguit nec nos distinguere
debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the
RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
motion to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said
case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed decision
of 29 November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No.
CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied with
the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo
was a valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section
80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was
conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted without a
search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to
the constitutional mandate[34] that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue
of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable
cause. The other exceptions are (1) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure
of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless
search.[35]
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under
and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge
Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime
of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object
or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the
following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one
day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following day,
provided it is still within the ten-day period.[36]
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession
of lumber without the required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor included in the
term forest product, the same hardly merits further discussion in view of our ruling in
G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpably fail to
show prima facie that a reversible error has been committed by the Court of Appeals in
its challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to
require the respondents to comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the
judgment of the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed
the fact that its lumber-dealer's license or permit had been suspended by Secretary
Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was never lifted, and since the license had
only a lifetime of up to 25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to
possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his
authorized representative had the authority to seize the lumber pursuant to Section 68-
A of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals
to cover up blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No.
705), as amended.They are presumably trifling attempts to block the serious efforts of
the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the public
in light of the urgent need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers of our
forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to the generations to come, if not
the present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The
Government must not tire in its vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting
without fear or favor any person who dares to violate our laws for the utilization and
protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and
ANNULLING, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion,
the challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October 1991 of
respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91,
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po; (c) REINSTATING the
information in the said criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING the
respondent Judge on her successor to hear and decide the case with
purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for
utter failure of the petitioner to show that the respondent Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decisions of
29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE
and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 in the SECOND CIVIL
CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.

Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. In all cases of violations of this Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .

The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must
also fail in view of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No.
106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which
involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the violation of the suspension of
the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
 On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch Order from the
Republic of the Philippines desk officer directing him and three (3) other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest,
SUPREME COURT issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with
Manila ransom.6

THIRD DIVISION After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on Valeroso checking
his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team members
proceeded to the Integrated National Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat,
G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009 Quezon City, where they saw Valeroso about to board a tricyle. Disuanco and his
team approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest, informed him of his
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner, constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. They found a Charter Arms revolver,
vs. bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5) pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his waist. 7
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning. Upon verification in
RESOLUTION the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito presented a
certification8 that the subject firearm was not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in
NACHURA, J.: the name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila. 9

For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso
(Valeroso) praying that our February 22, 2008 Decision 2 and June 30, 2008
Resolution3 be set aside and a new one be entered acquitting him of the crime of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
The facts are briefly stated as follows:
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as
follows:
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian
Yuson testified for the defense. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house of his
children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was
awakened by four (4) heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at
him and pulled him out of the room.10 The raiding team tied his hands and placed him
near the faucet (outside the room) then went back inside, searched and ransacked
the room. Moments later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy,
may nakuha akong baril sa loob!"11

That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his/her possession and under his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live
ammo.
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest.
However, the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant. 12
Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum Receipt 13 dated July 1,
1993 covering the subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of
Col. Angelito Moreno.14

without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper
authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty." 5 Trial on the merits ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO)2
Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Central
Police District Command; and Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the
Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame. Their testimonies are summarized
as follows:
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City, convicted
Valeroso as charged and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum.
The gun subject of the case was further ordered confiscated in favor of the
government.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision but the minimum
term of the indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months.
On petition for review, we affirmed17 in full the CA decision. Valeroso filed a Motion for
Reconsideration18 which was denied with finality19 on June 30, 2008.
Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal20 imploring this Court to once
more take a contemplative reflection and deliberation on the case, focusing on his
breached constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure. 21
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to timely file its
Comment on Valeroso’s Motion for Reconsideration, it instead filed a Manifestation in
Lieu of Comment.22
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now recommends
Valeroso’s acquittal. After a second look at the evidence presented, the OSG
considers the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense more credible and thus
concludes that Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More importantly, the
OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by the police officers
in violation of Valeroso’s constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, and
should thus be excluded from the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that
the subject firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be convicted
of the crime, since he was able to establish his authority to possess the gun through
the Memorandum Receipt issued by his superiors.
After considering anew Valeroso’s arguments through his Letter-Appeal, together with
the OSG’s position recommending his acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial
rights must ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to
reconsider.23
The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration.
While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading,
it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with
prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby. 24
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a
particular case from the operation of the rules. In De Guzman v.
Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De Guzman’s motion for reconsideration, we
still entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the
case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner’s evidence. In
that case, we said that if we would not compassionately bend backwards and flex
technicalities, petitioner would surely experience the disgrace and misery of
incarceration for a crime which he might not have committed after all. 26 Also in
Astorga v. People,27 on a second motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier
decision, re-examined the records of the case, then finally acquitted Benito Astorga of
the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa
Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En
Banc Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First Division to suspend the
Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve respondent’s second motion for
reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral arguments. After a re-examination
of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion for reconsideration and set
aside our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination
of the findings of fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. They are conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the
courts in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical
rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around.
Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote
justice, it would always be within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular
case from its operation.29
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where Valeroso was
arrested, is different from the version of the defense. The prosecution claims that
Valeroso was arrested near the INP Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City,
while he was about to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the
arresting officers bodily searched him, and they found the subject firearm and
ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the
boarding house of his children. After serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for
kidnapping with ransom), some of the police officers searched the boarding house
and forcibly opened a cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of the joint appeal
for acquittal by Valeroso and the OSG, we find that we must give more credence to
the version of the defense.
Valeroso’s appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure alleged to have been violated by the arresting
police officers; and if so, would render the confiscated firearm and ammunition
inadmissible in evidence against him.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article
III of the Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general rule, the
procurement of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize
the person, house, papers, or effects of any individual.30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of an
individual against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly
declares in Article III, Section 3(2), that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding."31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-
recognized instances where searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid
warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they
are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire,
sanitary and building regulations.33
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search
or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely
a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of reasonableness laid
down above, is the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition
valid?
We answer in the negative.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is not without
limitations. In People v. Leangsiri,35People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v.
Estella,37 we had the occasion to lay down the parameters of a valid warrantless
search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered,
and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the
suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. 39Otherwise stated, a
valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the
person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.40 The phrase
"within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 41 A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as
one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.42
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly
for kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding
house of his children. He was awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily
armed. They pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the
room, tied his hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco. 43 The other police
officers remained inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet 44 where they
found the subject firearm and ammunition.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was
charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting
officers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They
placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing
him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to
Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within his
immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to
destroy any evidence that could be used against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso,
as well as the tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon that might
be used against the former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no
comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the
other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.46
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an
incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the
person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the
latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be
strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. 47 In the case before us, search
was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been within Valeroso’s
immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered
as an incident to a lawful arrest.48
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view
doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant’s guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v. Leangsiri:51
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which[,] he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. 52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valeroso’s children,
because they were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In
other words, the police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently,
any evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be used against Valeroso.
However, in this case, the police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject
firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any
statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of an individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price
to pay for the loss of liberty.53
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers
who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions. 54
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped
naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government
becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article
III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way
above the articles on governmental power.55
Without the illegally seized firearm, Valeroso’s conviction cannot stand. There is
simply no sufficient evidence to convict him.56 All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the required moral certainty for
conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome
the presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be better
to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict
one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.57
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the other issues
raised by Valeroso.
One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of
basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome
investigative and prosecutory powers of the government. 58
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30,
2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is
hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
SO ORDERED.

Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of
said right is inadmissible in evidence against him.1avvphi1

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional
guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times
be necessary for public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without