CANON 9 GUBALLA VS.

CAGUIOA 78 SCRA 207

G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977
PETITIONER: JOSE GUBALLA,
RESPONDENT:THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS AND
DOMINGO FORTEZA, JR.,
FACTS: Guballa is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved in an accident resulting to
injuries by Domingo Forteza, Jr. As a consequence, a complaint for damages was fied by Forteza against
Guballa with the CFI in Bulacan. An answer was fied on behalf of Guballa by Irineo W. Vida Jr., of the
law fim Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates. Because Guballa and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial
conference, despite due notice, Guballa was treated as in default and Forteza Jr. was allowed to present his
evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of Forteza Jr. A Motion for
Reconsideration was then fied by Guballa seeking the lifting of the order of default, the reopening of the
case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the decision. Said Motion for
Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado, another member of the law fim. Case was appealed,
although CA affied the decision in toto. Motion for Reconsideration was fied and was denied. After the
motion was denied, Guballa, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II, fied a petition for Relief from Judgment
on ground that Irineo W. Vida, Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint in the lower court, is not a
member of the Philippine Bar. Guballa alleged that his rights had not been adequately protected and his
properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law. Judge Caguioa
denied petition and said that it is a dilatory tactic by Guballa and his counsel.
ISSUE: WON Judge Caguioa properly denied petition for declatory relief of Guballa
HELD: YES. Judge Caguioa properly denied petition for declatory relief of Guballa. Respondent Judge
Caguioa‘s forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this
Petition must be denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented Guballa at the
initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the fiing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a
member of the Bar did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. Guballa was duly represented by
bona fie members of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and justifible defenses. Guballa's rights had been amply
protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel.
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

PAFLU, Entila and Tenazas v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., Court of Industrial
Relations and Quentin Muning
Facts: Petitioners PAFLU, Entila and Tenazas were complainants in Case No. 72-ULPIloilo in the Court of
Industrial Relations. The complainants were represented by Cipriano Cid & Associates thru Atty. ANastacio
Pacis and Quentin Muning, a non-layer. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favour of the
complainants; a portion of that order granted respondent Quentin Muning, a non-laywer attorney’s fees
for professional service. Thus a petition was filed seeking review of the order made by the Court of
Industrial Relations in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo.

Issue: May a non-lawyer recover attorney’s fees for legal services rendered?
Holding: Order under review is set aside.

Ratio: Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one,
he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with
PAFLU and he cannot therefore, recover attorney’s fees. Public policy demands that legal work in
representation of party litigants should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications for the
protection of the courts, clients and the public. The permission of a non-lawyer to represent a party
litigant in court does not by itself entitle the representation to compensation. For Section 24 Rule 138, of
the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 24. Compensation of Attorney’s Agreement as to Fees – An attorney shall
be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for recovery of attorney’s fees.

MANUEL L. FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ELOY B. BELLO, Judge Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, respondent.

Facts : Timotea Perreyras, through Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez as her counsel, instituted Special
Proceedings No. 3931, for her appointment as guardian over her minor brothers. Upon qualifying
as such, she petitioned the court for authority to sell a nipa land owned in common with the wards
for the purpose of paying outstanding obligations to Maximiano Umañgay. The request was
granted by Judge Villamor. A deed of sale was prepared and notarized by Atty. Fernandez which
was executed by the guardian in favor of Maximiano Umañgay for the sum of P1, 000. This sale
was approved by Judge Pasicolan on December 17, 1952.

The nipa land sold by the guardian had previously been sold with right to repurchase to Ricardo
Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay by Florentino Perreyras, father (now deceased) of the
guardian and the wards. The interest in the land of Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay
were, in turn, sold for P200.00 to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez. Of the purchase price of P1,000,
P200.00 was paid to Atty. Fernandez, redemption price of the nipa land and as assignee of the
credit in favor of Maximiano Umañgay and Ricardo Perreyras. The other P200.00 was given to
said attorney, in payment of his legal fees for services rendered by him as counsel of the father of
the wards in a civil case. However, the record does not show that these payments were authorized
by the court.

Judge Eloy Bello, who took over the court, issued an order requiring Timotea Perreyras to show
cause why she should not be punished for contempt for failing to account for the property and
money of the wards. After hearing the guardian Timotea Perreyras, the court issued another order
exonerating her of the contempt charges, disapproving all payments made by her, including that
made to Atty. Fernandez, and requiring him and Braulio Fernandez to show cause why they should
not be suspended from the practice of law and declared in contempt of court. In the same order,
the court charged said attorneys of having abused their relationship with the guardian and having
taken money from her without previous approval of the court.
Issue : Whether or not Atty. Fernandez erroneous act disqualifies him from claiming his
Attorney’s fee.

Held : As a lawyer, the petitioner is charged with the knowledge that the property and effects of
the wards are under the control and supervision of the court, and that they could not be and
expended without the latter's permission, more especially so when the money taken was to pay the
debt of the father of the wards. Petitioner deserves the reprimand for mistakes he committed
however, the mistake is not a sufficient ground for the non-payment of the fees he lawfully earned
and which his client could not pay before his death.
The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also their
duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Thus, it is justifiable for Atty. Fernandez
to claim such amount.

The judge in this case also desires that portions of petitioner's motion for reconsideration be
stricken out for employing strong language. The court believes that said strong language must have
been impelled by the same language used by the presiding judge in characterizing the act of the
petitioner as "anomalous and unbecoming" and in charging petitioner of obtaining his fee "through
maneuvers of documents from the guardian-petitioner." If any one is to blame for the language
used by the petitioner, it is the judge himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders, which
must have provoked petitioner, and the presiding judge has nothing to blame but himself. If a judge
desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the wind
will reap a storm.

FACTS:
First Contempt Case. The Supreme Court rendered a decision against MacArthur International Minerals
Corp and in their third Motion for Reconsideration, Attys. Vicente Santiago and John Beltran Sotto made
use of language that are disrespectful and contemptuous to the Court like "it seems many of our judicial
authorities believe they are chosen messengers of God", "corrupt in its face" and insinuating favoritism
and partisanship of the members of the Court, notable Chief Justice Concepcion and Justice Castro due
to alleged interest in the case (Castro's brother works for one of the parties). Santiago and Castro wanted
for the two justices to inhibit themselves in the MR. The Court demanded for Santiago and Sotto
to "show cause" why they shouldn't be cited in contempt for the said statements. Santiago insisted that
the statements he made were inadvertently included in the copy sent to the Court, and was just intended
to be in the MR's rough draft.

Second Contempt Case. Counsel for MacArthur drafted a fourth motion for reconsideration, this time
with Atty. Juanito M. Caling as counsel, and again contained language which the Court found disrespectful.
The MR assailed the decision penned by CJ Concepcion since he was out of town when the decision was
written and included seeming threats of elevating the issue to the World Court and allegations of rise of
graft and corruption in the judiciary. The Court demanded Caling to also "show cause" and he said that it
the motion was already prepared by Santiago when he took the case as was verified by Morton Meads,
an employee from MacArthur.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyers should be cited in contempt?
HELD:
First Contempt Case. Yes. The language employed by Santiago and Sotto degrades the administration of
justice which trangresses Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as well as Sec. 20 (f) of Rule 138
of the RoC which states that "a lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession". They are also expected to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers but their acts resulted in the contrary and are intended to create and
atmosphere of distrust. The inadvertence of Santiago's use of words can't be used as a shield to absolve
him of any misdeeds.
Second Contempt Case. Yes. Even if the idea of the language used in the 4th MR came from Meads, both
Santiago and Caling should've adhered to Canon 16 of the Code of Legal Ethics wherein "a lawyer should
use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which a lawyer himself
ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors,
witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing, the lawyer should terminated their
relation". Santiago is also liable here since Caling's represent didn't divest him of his capacity as counsel
for MacArthur.

#7: In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao vs. Severino G. Martinez

Facts: Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was admitted to the Bar.
Two years later, Severino Martinez charged Diao of falsifying the information in his application for such Bar Examination. Upon
further investigation, it was found that Diao did not finish his high school training, and neither did he obtain his Associate in
Arts (AA) degree from Quisumbing College in 1941.
Diao practically admits first charge, but claims that he served the US army, and took the General Classification Test which,
according to Diao, is equivalent to a High School Diploma, although he failed to submit certification for such claim from any
proper school officials.
The claim was doubtlful, however, the second charge was clearly meritorious, as Diao did not obtain his AA degree from
Quisumbing College. Diao claims that he was erroneously certified, and asserts that he obtained his AA from Arellano University
in 1949.
This claim was still unacceptable, as records would have shown that Diao graduated from the University in April 1949, but he
started his Law studies in October 1948 (second semester, AY 1948-1949) and he would not have been permitted to take the
Bar, as it is provided in the Rules, applicants under oath that “Previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily
completed the required pre-legal education (AA) as required by the Department of Private Education”

Issue: Whether Telesforo A Diao should be Disbarred.

Ruling: Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the Bar Exams, but did by falsifying information. Admission under false
pretenses thus give grounds for revoking his admission in the Bar, as passing the Bar Exam is not the only requirement to
become an attorney at law.
Thus, the name Telesforo A. Diao is deleted from the roll of attorneys and he is required to return his law diploma within thirty
days.