Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G..R. No. 132424 May 2, 2006

SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and FRANCISCA
FABELLA, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners spouses
Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. and Venida M. Valdez, seeks to nullify and set aside the 22 April 1997
decision1 and 30 January 1998 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43492,
which reversed the judgment, dated 8 January 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 3607, which, in turn, affirmed in toto the decision rendered
by the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 2547.

This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio and
Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella before the Municipal
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges these material facts:

2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot denominated as
Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal
which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime [i]n November 1992 by
virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex "A"
and the xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate of Title in her name marked as Annex "B";

3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot by
building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful
possession thereof;

4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to peacefully
surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they
unlawfully occupied;

5. That despite plaintiffs’ referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still refused to
heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot peacefully;
 6. That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants to settle the case
amicably, the Barangay Captain was forced to issue the necessary Certification to File
Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that the necessary cause of action be taken
before the proper court, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex "C";

7. That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded refusal of the defendants to
vacate/surrender the premises in question, the herein plaintiffs were constrained to
engage the professional services of counsel thus incurring expenses amounting to TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing acceptance fee and additional ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent a formal
demand was likewise ignored, (sic) copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "D";

8. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender the
said premises in question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious anxiety, sleepless nights, mental
torture and moral erosion; x x x2

In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to state that petitioners
had prior physical possession of the property or that they were the lessors of the former. In the
alternative, private respondents claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they had
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as attested
by an ocular inspection report from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. They
also stressed that the complaint failed to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91
regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering
private respondents to vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the same
plus attorney’s fees.

Private respondents appealed the MTC’s decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC,
in a decision dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.

Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on 10
March 1997 questioning the decision of the RTC.

In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to
show that they had given the private respondents the right to occupy the premises or that they
had tolerated private respondents’ possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful
detainer cases. It added that the allegations in petitioners’ complaint lack jurisdictional elements
for forcible entry which requires an allegation of prior material possession. The Court of Appeals
ratiocinated thus:

An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations that will support an
action for ejectment are conspicuously lacking. In particular, an allegation of prior material
possession is mandatory in forcible entry, xxx and the complaint is deficient in this respect. On
the other hand, neither does there appear to be a case of unlawful detainer, since the private
respondents failed to show that they had given the petitioners the right to occupy the premises,
which right has now [been] extinguished.

xxx

In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal Trial Court before which
the action for ejectment was filed had no jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the dismissal
thereof is in order.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and GRANTED. The decision
dated 08 January 1997 rendered by the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction.3

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated 30 January
1998.4

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners submit the following issues for the Court’s consideration5:

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY MADE

OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

B. WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF THE COMPLAINT, THE

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE IT.

Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed together.

In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make out a case for unlawful
detainer having alleged that private respondents unlawfully withheld from them the possession of
the property in question, which allegation is sufficient to establish a case for unlawful detainer.
They further contend that the summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy available to the
owner if another occupies the land at the former’s tolerance or permission without any contract
between the two as the latter is bound by an implied promise to vacate the land upon demand by
the owner.

The petition is not meritorious.

Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover
possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion
reivindicatoria.6

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion)
and unlawful detainer (desahuico).7 In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of
real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful
detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied.8 The two are distinguished from each other in
that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the
issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the
defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess.9

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal
trial court or metropolitan trial court.10 Both actions must be brought within one year from the
date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in
case of unlawful detainer.11 The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.12
It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title.13 In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one
year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession
had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an
accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership
also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.14

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered.15 Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy.16 As explained in Sarona v. Villegas17:

But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction
should be made.

If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt
that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under
Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.

xxxx

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor.
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court - provided for in the
rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy
ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the
inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a
number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe.
No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a
demand, bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in
- and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we
bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary
in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the
action.18 (Underlining supplied)

It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it
is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed
against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter
becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that
the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class
of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature.19
The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
testimony.20

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to
aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry
was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.21 Thus, in Go, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals,22 petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent alleging that
they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession which was occupied by
respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue
on whether or not petitioners’ case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled23:

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under TCT No.
C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of
their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served written
demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x

It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the
land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that
plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners’ cause of action fails.
The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the alleged
tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x

The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not
merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the
subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and
before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected clandestinely,
without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth
which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals
[224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be
recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.

And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz,24 petitioner’s complaint for
unlawful detainer merely contained the bare allegations that (1) respondent immediately
occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and
(2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance. The court, in finding
that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action for unlawful detainer, held:

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present at
the beginning of the possession. x x x

xxxx

In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of fact that would
substantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by
Respondent Cruz. The complaint contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent immediately
occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and 2)
her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.

These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioner’s theory that its cause of action is for
unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that respondent’s occupation of the
property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in
unlawful detainer cases that petitioner’s supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present
right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.25

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that
would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the
property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without
any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said
land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how
respondents’ entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express
contract existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional
facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal.26 Since the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case.27 It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals
correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the MTC Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction is hereby
AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I CAT I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofileña with Associate Justices Artemon D.
Luna and Artemio G. Tuquero, concurring.
2
Rollo, pp. 88-90.
3
Id., p. 91.
4
Id., pp. 152-155.
5
Id., p. 146.
6
Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-48050, 10 October 1994, 237 SCRA 565, 572-573.
7
Id.
8
Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, 184 (2001).
9
Id.
 10
Javier v. Veridiano II, supra note 6, pp. 572-573.
11
Id., 572.
12
Id., p. 573.
13
Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No. 152145, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 543.
14
Javier v. Veridiano II, supra note 6, pp. 572-573.
15
Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 151212, 10 September
2003, 410 SCRA 485, 490.
16
Id.
17
131 Phil. 365 (1968).
18
Id., 372-373.
19
Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 146, 156 (1995).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Supra note 8.
23
Id., pp. 184-186.
24
Supra note 5.
25
Id., pp. 490-491.
26
Unida v. Heirs of Ambrosio Urban, G.R. No. 155432, 9 June 2005, 460 SCRA 68, 75.
27
Id.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. L-3756 June 30, 1952

SAGRADA ORDEN DE PREDICADORES DEL SANTISMO ROSARIO DE FILIPINAS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.
First Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico C. Alikpala and Assistant Attorney Augusto Kalaw for
appellant.
Ramirez and Ortigas for appellee.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an action to recover the possession of a piece of real property (land and warehouses) situated in
Pandacan Manila, and the rentals for its occupation and use. The land belongs to the plaintiff, in whose
name the title was registered before the war. On January 4, 1943, during the Japanese military
occupation, the land was acquired by a Japanese corporation by the name of Taiwan Tekkosho for the
sum of P140,00, and thereupon title thereto issued in its name (transfer certificate of title No. 64330,
Register of Deeds, Manila). After liberation, more specifically on April 4, 1946, the Alien Property
Custodian of the United States of America took possession, control, and custody thereof under section
12 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat., 411, for the reason that it belonged to an enemy national.
During the year 1946 the property was occupied by the Copra Export Management Company under a
custodianship agreement with United States Alien Property Custodian (Exhibit G), and when it vacated
the property it was occupied by the defendant herein. The Philippine Government made representations
with the Office Alien Property Custodian for the use of property by the Government (see Exhibits 2, 2-A,
2-B, and 1). On March 31, 1947, the defendant was authorized to repair the warehouse on the land, and
actually spent thereon the repairs the sum of P26,898.27. In 1948, defendant leased one-third of the
warehouse to one Dioscoro Sarile at a monthly rental of P500, which was later raised to P1,000 a month.
Sarile did not pay the rents, so action was brought against him. It is not shown, however, if the judgment
was ever executed.

Plaintiff made claim to the property before the Alien Property Custodian of the United States, but as this
was denied, it brought an action in court (Court of First Instance of Manila, civil case No. 5007, entitled
"La Sagrada Orden Predicadores de la Provinicia del Santisimo Rosario de Filipinas," vs. Philippine Alien
Property Administrator, defendant, Republic of the Philippines, intervenor) to annul the sale of property
of Taiwan Tekkosho, and recover its possession. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene
in the action. The case did not come for trial because the parties presented a joint petition in which it is
claimed by plaintiff that the sale in favor of the Taiwan Tekkosho was null and void because it was
executed under threats, duress, and intimidation, and it was agreed that the title issued in the name of
the Taiwan Tekkosho be cancelled and the original title of plaintiff re-issued; that the claims, rights, title,
and interest of the Alien Property Custodian be cancelled and held for naught; that the occupant
National Coconut Corporation has until February 28, 1949, to recover its equipment from the property
and vacate the premises; that plaintiff, upon entry of judgment, pay to the Philippine Alien Property
Administration the sum of P140,000; and that the Philippine Alien Property Administration be free from
responsibility or liability for any act of the National Coconut Corporation, etc. Pursuant to the agreement
the court rendered judgment releasing the defendant and the intervenor from liability, but reversing to
the plaintiff the right to recover from the National Coconut Corporation reasonable rentals for the use
and occupation of the premises. (Exhibit A-1.)
The present action is to recover the reasonable rentals from August, 1946, the date when the defendant
began to occupy the premises, to the date it vacated it. The defendant does not contest its liability for
the rentals at the rate of P3,000 per month from February 28, 1949 (the date specified in the judgment
in civil case No. 5007), but resists the claim therefor prior to this date. It interposes the defense that it
occupied the property in good faith, under no obligation whatsoever to pay rentals for the use and
occupation of the warehouse. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff to recover from the defendant the
sum of P3,000 a month, as reasonable rentals, from August, 1946, to the date the defendant vacates the
premises. The judgment declares that plaintiff has always been the owner, as the sale of Japanese
purchaser was void ab initio; that the Alien Property Administration never acquired any right to the
property, but that it held the same in trust until the determination as to whether or not the owner is an
enemy citizen. The trial court further declares that defendant can not claim any better rights than its
predecessor, the Alien Property Administration, and that as defendant has used the property and had
subleased portion thereof, it must pay reasonable rentals for its occupation.

Against this judgment this appeal has been interposed, the following assignment of error having been
made on defendant-appellant's behalf:

The trial court erred in holding the defendant liable for rentals or compensation for the use and
occupation of the property from the middle of August, 1946, to December 14, 1948.

1. Want to "ownership rights" of the Philippine Alien Property Administration did not render illegal or
invalidate its grant to the defendant of the free use of property.

2. the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring the sale by the plaintiff to the Japanese
purchaser null and void ab initio and that the plaintiff was and has remained as the legal owner of the
property, without legal interruption, is not conclusive.

3. Reservation to the plaintiff of the right to recover from the defendant corporation not binding on the
later;

4. Use of the property for commercial purposes in itself alone does not justify payment of rentals.

5. Defendant's possession was in good faith.

6. Defendant's possession in the nature of usufruct.

In reply, plaintiff-appellee's counsel contends that the Philippine Allien Property Administration (PAPA)
was a mere administrator of the owner (who ultimately was decided to be plaintiff), and that as
defendant has used it for commercial purposes and has leased portion of it, it should be responsible
therefore to the owner, who had been deprived of the possession for so many years. (Appellee's brief,
pp. 20, 23.)

We can not understand how the trial court, from the mere fact that plaintiff-appellee was the owner of
the property and the defendant-appellant the occupant, which used for its own benefit but by the
express permission of the Alien Property Custodian of the United States, so easily jumped to the
conclusion that the occupant is liable for the value of such use and occupation. If defendant-appellant is
liable at all, its obligations, must arise from any of the four sources of obligations, namley, law, contract
or quasi-contract, crime, or negligence. (Article 1089, Spanish Civil Code.) Defendant-appellant is not
guilty of any offense at all, because it entered the premises and occupied it with the permission of the
entity which had the legal control and administration thereof, the Allien Property Administration. Neither
was there any negligence on its part. There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) between the
Alien Property Custodian and the Taiwan Tekkosho, which had secured the possession of the property
from the plaintiff-appellee by the use of duress, such that the Alien Property Custodian or its permittee
(defendant-appellant) may be held responsible for the supposed illegality of the occupation of the
property by the said Taiwan Tekkosho. The Allien Property Administration had the control and
administration of the property not as successor to the interests of the enemy holder of the title, the
Taiwan Tekkosho, but by express provision of law (Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States, 40
Stat., 411; 50 U.S.C.A., 189). Neither is it a trustee of the former owner, the plaintiff-appellee herein, but
a trustee of then Government of the United States (32 Op. Atty. Gen. 249; 50 U.S.C.A. 283), in its own
right, to the exclusion of, and against the claim or title of, the enemy owner. (Youghioheny & Ohio Coal
Co. vs. Lasevich [1920], 179 N.W., 355; 171 Wis., 347; U.S.C.A., 282-283.) From August, 1946, when
defendant-appellant took possession, to the late of judgment on February 28, 1948, Allien Property
Administration had the absolute control of the property as trustee of the Government of the United
States, with power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise, as though it were the absolute owner. (U.S vs.
Chemical Foundation [C.C.A. Del. 1925], 5 F. [2d], 191; 50 U.S.C.A., 283.) Therefore, even if defendant-
appellant were liable to the Allien Property Administration for rentals, these would not accrue to the
benefit of the plaintiff-appellee, the owner, but to the United States Government.

But there is another ground why the claim or rentals can not be made against defendant-appellant.
There was no agreement between the Alien Property Custodian and the defendant-appellant for the
latter to pay rentals on the property. The existence of an implied agreement to that effect is contrary to
the circumstances. The copra Export Management Company, which preceded the defendant-appellant,
in the possession and use of the property, does not appear to have paid rentals therefor, as it occupied it
by what the parties denominated a "custodianship agreement," and there is no provision therein for the
payment of rentals or of any compensation for its custody and or occupation and the use. The Trading
with the Enemy Act, as originally enacted, was purely a measure of conversation, hence, it is very
unlikely that rentals were demanded for the use of the property. When the National coconut
Corporation succeeded the Copra Export Management Company in the possession and use of the
property, it must have been also free from payment of rentals, especially as it was Government
corporation, and steps where then being taken by the Philippine Government to secure the property for
the National Coconut Corporation. So that the circumstances do not justify the finding that there was an
implied agreement that the defendant-appellant was to pay for the use and occupation of the premises
at all.

The above considerations show that plaintiff-appellee's claim for rentals before it obtained the judgment
annulling the sale of the Taiwan Tekkosho may not be predicated on any negligence or offense of the
defendant-appellant, or any contract, express or implied, because the Allien Property Administration was
neither a trustee of plaintiff-appellee, nor a privy to the obligations of the Taiwan Tekkosho, its title being
based by legal provision of the seizure of enemy property. We have also tried in vain to find a law or
provision thereof, or any principle in quasi contracts or equity, upon which the claim can be supported.
On the contrary, as defendant-appellant entered into possession without any expectation of liability for
such use and occupation, it is only fair and just that it may not be held liable therefor. And as to the rents
it collected from its lessee, the same should accrue to it as a possessor in good faith, as this Court has
already expressly held. (Resolution, National Coconut Corporation vs. Geronimo, 83 Phil. 467.)

Lastly, the reservation of this action may not be considered as vesting a new right; if no right to claim for
rentals existed at the time of the reservation, no rights can arise or accrue from such reservation alone.

Wherefore, the part of the judgment appealed from, which sentences defendant-appellant to pay rentals
from August, 1946, to February 28, 1949, is hereby reversed. In all other respects the judgment is
affirmed. Costs of this appeal shall be against the plaintiff-appellee.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Bautista Angelo, JJ, concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

MANUEL CATINDIG, represented by his legal G.R. No. 165851

representative EMILIANO CATINDIG-RODRIGO,

Petitioner,

- versus -
 AURORA IRENE VDA. DE MENESES,

Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------------x

SILVINO ROXAS, SR., represented G.R. No. 168875

by FELICISIMA VILLAFUERTE

ROXAS, Present:

Petitioner,

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

COURT OF APPEALS and MENDOZA, JJ.

AURORA IRENE VDA. DE

MENESES, Promulgated:

Respondents.

February 2, 2011

x-------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, docketed asG.R. No. 165851, filed by petitioner Manuel Catindig, represented by
Emiliano Catindig-Rodrigo, assailing the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 65697,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 320-M-95;
and (2) Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 168875, filed by
petitioner Silvino Roxas, Sr., represented by Felicisima Villafuerte Roxas, seeking to set aside the
Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 65697, which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 320-M-95.

The property subject of this controversy pertains to a parcel of land situated in Malolos, Bulacan, with an
area of 49,139 square meters, titled in the name of the late Rosendo Meneses, Sr., under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1749 (hereinafter referred to as the Masusuwi Fishpond). Respondent
Aurora Irene C. Vda. de Meneses is the surviving spouse of the registered owner, Rosendo Meneses, Sr..
She was issued Letters of Administration over the estate of her late husband in Special Proceedings Case
No. 91498 pending before the then Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, Branch 22. On May 17,
1995, respondent, in her capacity as administratrix of her husband's estate, filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession, Sum of Money and Damages against petitioners Manuel Catindig and Silvino
Roxas, Sr. before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, to recover possession over the Masusuwi
Fishpond.

Respondent alleged that in September 1975, petitioner Catindig, the first cousin of her husband,
deprived her of the possession over the Masusuwi Fishpond, through fraud, undue influence and
intimidation. Since then, petitioner Catindig unlawfully leased the property to petitioner Roxas.
Respondent verbally demanded that petitioners vacate the Masusuwi Fishpond, but all were futile, thus,
forcing respondent to send demand letters to petitioners Roxas and Catindig. However, petitioners still
ignored said demands. Hence, respondent filed a suit against the petitioners to recover the property and
demanded payment of unearned income, damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

In his Answer, petitioner Catindig maintained that he bought the Masusuwi Fishpond from respondent
and her children in January 1978, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Catindig further argued that
even assuming that respondent was indeed divested of her possession of the Masusuwi Fishpond by
fraud, her cause of action had already prescribed considering the lapse of about 20 years from 1975,
which was allegedly the year when she was fraudulently deprived of her possession over the property.
Petitioner Roxas, on the other hand, asserted in his own Answer that respondent has no cause of action
against him, because Catindig is the lawful owner of the Masusuwi Fishpond, to whom he had paid his
rentals in advance until the year 2001.

After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [respondent herein],

(a) Ordering the defendants [petitioners herein] to vacate the Masusuwi Fishpond and turn over the
possession/occupancy thereof to plaintiff [respondent herein];

(b) Ordering the defendants [petitioners herein] to pay and/or reimburse plaintiff [respondent herein]
the amount of P90,000.00 per year since 1985 up to the time possession of the fishpond is surrendered
to plaintiff [respondent herein];

(c) Ordering the defendants [petitioners herein] jointly and severally to pay plaintiff [respondent herein]
the amount of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.

The counterclaims of defendants [petitioners herein] are ordered dismissed, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The trial court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between respondent and petitioner
Catindig was simulated and fictitious, and therefore, did not convey title over the Masusuwi Fishpond to
petitioner Catindig. It gave due credence to the testimony of respondent that petitioner Catindig
convinced her to sign the said deed of sale, because it was intended to be a mere proposal subject to the
approval of the trial court wherein the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo
Meneses, Sr. was still pending. The court a quo was further convinced that the Deed of Absolute Sale
lacked consideration, because respondent and her children never received the stipulated purchase price
for the Masusuwi Fishpond which was pegged at PhP150,000.00. Since ownership over the property
never transferred to Catindig, the trial court declared that he has no right to lease it to Roxas. The court
also found that petitioner Roxas cannot claim good faith in leasing the Masusuwi Fishpond, because he
relied on an incomplete and unnotarized Deed of Sale.

Aggrieved, petitioners separately challenged the trial court's Decision before the CA. The CA dismissed
both the petitioners' appeals and affirmed the RTC. The CA ruled that the trial court properly rejected
petitioners' reliance on the deed of absolute sale executed between respondent and petitioner Catindig.
The CA also found that since it is settled that a Torrens title is a constructive notice to the whole world of
a property's lawful owner, petitioner Roxas could not invoke good faith by relying on the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of his lessor, petitioner Catindig.

Hence, petitioner Catindig filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, raising the following
issues:

1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS IN REALITY, ONE FOR
ANNULMENT OF CONTRACT UNDER ARTICLES 1390 AND 1391 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.

2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BASED ON ALLEGED FRAUD
AND/OR INTIMIDATION, HAS NOT PRESCRIBED.

3. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE.

On the other hand, petitioner Silvino Roxas, Sr. filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, raising this
lone issue:

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER IS JOINTLY AND
SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH HIS CO-DEFENDANT; AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT HE WAS A LESSEE IN
GOOD FAITH OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

The issues raised by petitioner Catindig could be reduced into whether the Deed of Sale was genuine or
simulated.

Petitioner Catindig maintains that the deed of sale was voluntarily signed by respondent and her
children, and that they received the consideration of PhP150,000.00 stipulated therein. Even on the
assumption that they were defrauded into signing the agreement, this merely makes the deed voidable,
at most, due to vitiated consent. Therefore, any cause of action respondent may have, had already
prescribed, and the contract was already ratified by respondent's failure to file any action to annul the
deed within four years from 1978, the year when respondent discovered the fraud.

Respondent, on the other hand, insists that the deed of sale is not merely voidable, but void for being
simulated. Hence, she could not have filed an action for annulment of contract under Articles 1390 and
1391 of the Civil Code, because this remedy applies to voidable contracts. Instead, respondent filed an
action for recovery of possession of the Masusuwi Fishpond.

The issue on the genuineness of the deed of sale is essentially a question of fact. It is settled that this
Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below.
This is especially true where the trial court's factual findings are adopted and affirmed by the CA as in
the present case. Factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may
not be reviewed on appeal.[5]

The Court finds that there exists no reason for Us to disturb the trial court's finding that the deed of sale
was simulated. The trial court's discussion on the said issue is hereby quoted:

After evaluating the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, presented by the parties, this court
is convinced that the Deed of Absolute Sale relied upon by the defendants [petitioners herein] is
simulated and fictitious and has no consideration.

On its face, the Deed of Absolute sale (Exh. G, Exh. 1) is not complete and is not in due form. It is a 3-
page document but with several items left unfilled or left blank, like the day the document was supposed
to be entered into, the tax account numbers of the persons appearing as signatories to the document
and the names of the witnesses. In other words, it was not witnessed by any one. More importantly, it
was not notarized. While the name Ramon E. Rodrigo, appeared typed in the Acknowledgement, it was
not signed by him (Exhs. G, G-1, G-4).

The questioned deed was supposedly executed in January, 1978. Defendant [petitioner herein] Catindig
testified that his brother Francisco Catindig was with him when plaintiff [respondent herein] signed the
document. The evidence, however, shows that Francisco Catindig died on January 1, 1978 as certified to
by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Malolos, Bulacan and the Parish Priest of Sta. Maria
Assumpta Parish, Bulacan, Bulacan.

The document mentions 49,130 square meters, as the area sold by plaintiff [respondent herein] and her
two (2) children to defendant [petitioner herein] Catindig. But this is the entire area of the property as
appearing in the title and they are not the only owners. The other owner is Rosendo Meneses, Jr.
[stepson of herein respondent] whose name does not appear in the document. The declaration of
defendant [petitioner herein] Catindig that Rosendo Meneses, Jr. likewise sold his share of the property
to him in another document does not inspire rational belief. This other document was not presented in
evidence and Rosendo Meneses, Jr., did not testify, if only to corroborate defendant's [petitioner herein]
claim.[6]

The Court also finds no compelling reason to depart from the court a quo's finding that respondent
never received the consideration stipulated in the simulated deed of sale, thus:

Defendant [petitioner herein] Catindig declared that plaintiff [respondent herein] and her children
signed the instrument freely and voluntarily and that the consideration of P150,000.00 as so stated in
the document was paid by him to plaintiff [respondent herein]. However, it is not denied that the title to
this property is still in the name of Rosendo Meneses, Sr., and the owner's duplicate copy of the title is
still in the possession of the plaintiff [respondent herein]. If defendant [petitioner herein] Catindig was
really a legitimate buyer of the property who paid the consideration with good money, why then did he
not register the document of sale or had it annotated at the back of the title, or better still, why then did
he not have the title in the name of Rosendo Meneses, Sr. canceled so that a new title can be issued in
his name? After all, he claims that Rosendo Meneses, Jr. [stepson of herein respondent] also sold his
share of the property to him. This will make him the owner of the entire property. But the owner's
duplicate copy of the title remains in the possession of the plaintiff [respondent herein] and no evidence
was presented to show that at anytime from 1978, he ever attempted to get it from her. Equally telling is
defendant's (Catindig) failure to pay the real estate taxes for the property from 1978 up to the present. x
x x[7]

It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but
in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack of consideration. Moreover,
Article 1471 of the Civil Code, provides that if the price is simulated, the sale is void, which applies to the
instant case, since the price purportedly paid as indicated in the contract of sale was simulated for no
payment was actually made.[8]

Since it was well established that the Deed of Sale is simulated and, therefore void, petitioners claim that
respondent's cause of action is one for annulment of contract, which already prescribed, is unavailing,
because only voidable contracts may be annulled. On the other hand, respondent's defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of the contract does not prescribe.[9]

Besides, it must be emphasized that this case is one for recovery of possession, also known as accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil proceeding, in order
to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of title. [10] The objective of the plaintiffs
in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the
issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the
right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and binding determination of the
issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership,
being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. [11]

Thus, even if we sustain petitioner Catindig's arguments and rule that the Deed of Sale is valid, this
would still not help petitioners' case. It is undisputed that the subject property is covered by TCT No. T-
1749, registered in the name of respondent's husband. On the other hand, petitioner Catindig's claim of
ownership is based on a Deed of Sale. In Pascual v. Coronel,[12] the Court held that as against the
registered owners and the holder of an unregistered deed of sale, it is the former who has a better right
to possess. In that case, the court held that:

Even if we sustain the petitioner's arguments and rule that the deeds of sale are valid contracts, it would
still not bolster the petitioners case. In a number of cases, the Court had upheld the registered owners'
superior right to possess the property. In Co v. Militar, the Court was confronted with a similar issue of
which between the certificate of title and an unregistered deed of sale should be given more probative
weight in resolving the issue of who has the better right to possess. There, the Court held that the
court a quo correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner as opposed to the
unregistered deeds of sale of respondents. x x x

Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court declared that the trial court did not err in
giving more probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent vis-a-vis the contested
unregistered Deed of Sale. x x x[13]

There is even more reason to apply this doctrine here, because the subject Deed of Sale is not only
unregistered, it is undated and unnotarized.

Further, it is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of
an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein.[14] It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein.
[15]
Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to
possession thereof.[16]

In addition, as the registered owner, respondent's right to evict any person illegally occupying her
property is imprescreptible. In the recent case ofGaudencio Labrador, represented by
Lulu Labrador Uson, as Attorney-in-Fact v. Sps. Ildefonso Perlas and Pacencia Perlas and Sps. Rogelio
Pobre and Melinda Fogata Pobre,[17] the Court held that:

As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his property. This
right is imprescriptible and can never be barred bylaches. In Bishop v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person
illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were
aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the
lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches. [18]

Petitioner Roxas assailed the Decision and the Resolution of the CA via Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65, when the proper remedy should have been the filing of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45.
While petitioner Roxas claims that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, this Court finds that the
assailed findings of the CA, that Roxas is jointly and severally liable with petitioner Catindig and in not
considering him as a lessee in good faith of the subject property, amount to nothing more than errors of
judgment, correctible by appeal. When a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and
the subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of
that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors
of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper
subjects of a special civil action for certiorari.[19] Where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom
or legal soundness of the decision, and not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the same
is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.[20]

Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action
for certiorari will not be entertained remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive.[21] Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals
in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by
filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original
case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the
specific ground therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost
remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that to be taken under Rule 45. [22] One of the requisites
of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an
appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright. [23]

In the present case, the CA issued its Decision and Resolution dated October 22, 2004 and May 20, 2005,
respectively, dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner Roxas. Records show that petitioner Roxas received
a copy of the May 20, 2005 Resolution of the CA denying the motion for reconsideration on May 30,
2005. Instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 within 15 days from receipt
thereof,[24]petitioner, in addition to his several motions for extension, waited for almost four months
before filing the instant petition on September 22, 2005. Indubitably, the Decision and the Resolution of
the CA, as to petitioner Roxas, had by then already become final and executory, and thus, beyond the
purview of this Court to act upon. [25]

It is settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
[26]
When a decision becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even
an appellate court will have the power to review the said judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to
litigation and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the
rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justifiable controversies with finality. [27]

Finally, while it is true that this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of
Court and in the interest of justice, may treat a Petition for Certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45,
the instant Petition cannot be treated as such, primarily because it was filed way beyond the 15-day
reglementary period within which to file the Petition for Review. [28] Though there are instances
when certiorari was granted despite the availability of appeal, [29] none of these recognized exceptions
were shown to be present in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 165851 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 22, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 65697, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 320-M-95, is AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No. 168875
is DISMISSED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated October 22, 2004 and May
20, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 65697, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 320-M-95, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon, with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and
Mariano C. Del Castillo, concurring; rollo, (G.R. No. 165851), pp. 27-36; (G.R. No. 168875), pp. 5-14.
[2]
Id. at 5-14; id. at 27-36.
[3]
Rollo, (G.R. No. 168875), pp. 15-16.
[4]
Rollo (G.R. No. 165851), p. 77.
[5]
Pascual v. Coronel, G.R. No. 159292, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 474, 483.
[6]
Rollo (G.R. No. 165851), p. 74.
[7]
Id. at 74-75.
[8]
Lequin v. Vizconde, G.R. No. 177710, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 407, 422.
[9]
Civil Code, Art. 1410.
[10]
Bejar v. Caluag, G.R. No. 171277, February 17, 2007, 516 SCRA 84, 90.
[11]
Asuncion Urieta Vda. de Aguilar, represented by Orlando U. Aguilar v. Spouses Ederlina B. Alfaro and
Raul Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, July 5, 2010.
[12]
Supra note 5.
[13]
Id. at 484-485.
[14]
Caa v. Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157573, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 225,
238.
[15]
Asuncion Urieta Vda. de Aguilar, represented by Orlando U. Aguilar v. Spouses Ederlina B. Alfaro and
Raul Alfaro, supra note 11.
[16]
Caa v Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines, supra note 14, at 238-239.
[17]
G.R. No. 173900, August 8, 2010.
[18]
Id. (Emphasis supplied.)
[19]
Sebastian v Hon. Morales, 445 Phil. 595, 608 (2003).
[20]
Land Bank of the Phils. v Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 787 (2003).
[21]
Iloilo La Filipina Uygongco Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170244, November 28, 2007, 539
SCRA 178, 189.
[22]
Sable v. People, G.R. No. 177961, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 619, 629.
[23]
Artistica Ceramica, Inc., Ceralinda, Inc., Cyber Ceramics, Inc. and Millennium, Inc. v. Ciudad Del
Carmen Homeowner's Association, Inc. and Bukluran Purok II Residents Association, G.R. Nos. 167583-
84, June 16, 2010.
[24]
Rule 45, Section 2 states: The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment, or final order or resolution appealed from or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new
trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. x x x.
[25]
Land Bank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 20, at 791.
[26]
Pea v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No.159520, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 383,
404.
[27]
Estinozo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150276, February 12, 2008, 544 SCRA 422, 431-432.
[28]
Iloilo La Filipina Uygongco Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 21, at 190.
[29]
(a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest
of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. (Iloilo La Filipina Uygongco Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, supra note 21)

ASUNCION URIETA VDA. DE G.R. No. 164402

AGUILAR, represented by

ORLANDO U. AGUILAR, Present:

Petitioner,

CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

DEL CASTILLO, and

PEREZ, JJ.

SPOUSES EDERLINA B. ALFARO

and RAUL ALFARO, Promulgated:

Respondents. July 5, 2010

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In an action for recovery of possession of realty, who has the better right of possession, the registered
owner armed with a Torrens title or the occupants brandishing a notarized but unregistered deed of sale
executed before the land was registered under the Torrens system?

As we previously ruled in similar cases,[1] we resolve the question in favor of the titleholder.

Factual Antecedents

On August 3, 1995, petitioner filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages [2] before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. She alleged that on May 16, 1977, her
husband Ignacio Aguilar (Ignacio) was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-9354 [3]over a 606-
square meter parcel of land designated as Lot 83 situated in Brgy. Buenavista, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro. Prior thereto, or in 1968, Ignacio allowed petitioners sister, Anastacia Urieta
(Anastacia), mother of respondent Ederlina B. Alfaro (Ederlina), to construct a house on the southern
portion of said land and to stay therein temporarily.

In 1994, Ignacio died and his heirs decided to partition Lot 83. Petitioner thus asked the respondents,
who took possession of the premises after the death of Anastacia, to vacate Lot 83. They did not heed
her demand.

Thus, petitioner filed a case for accion publiciana praying that respondents be ordered to vacate subject
property, and to pay moral, temperate, and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and the costs
of suit.

In their Answer with Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses, [4] respondents did not dispute that Ignacio
was able to secure title over the entire Lot 83.However, they asserted that on April 17, 1973, Ignacio and
herein petitioner sold to their mother Anastacia the southern portion of Lot 83 consisting of 367.5
square meters as shown by the Kasulatan sa Bilihan[5] which bears the signatures of petitioner and
Ignacio. Since then, they and their mother have been in possession thereof. Respondents also presented
several Tax Declarations[6] in support of their allegations.

Respondents also raised the defense of prescription. They pointed out that accion publiciana or an
action to recover the real right of possession independent of ownership prescribes in 10 years. However,
it took petitioner more than 25 years before she asserted her rights by filing accion publiciana. As alleged
in the complaint, they took possession of the disputed portion of Lot 83 as early as 1968, but petitioner
filed the case only in 1995.

By way of counterclaim, respondents prayed that petitioner be directed to execute the necessary
documents so that title to the 367.5-square meter portion of Lot 83 could be issued in their name. They
likewise prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for award of moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorneys fees.

In her Reply and Answer to Counterclaim,[7] petitioner denied having signed the Kasulatan sa Bilihan and
averred that her signature appearing thereon is a forgery. She presented an unsworn written declaration
dated January 28, 1994 where her husband declared that he did not sell the property in question to
anyone. As to the issue of prescription, she asserted that respondents occupation of subject property
cannot ripen into ownership considering that the same is by mere tolerance of the owner. Besides, the
purported Kasulatan sa Bilihan was not registered with the proper Registry of Deeds.

During the trial, petitioner presented the testimonies of Orlando Aguilar (Orlando) and Zenaida Baldeo
(Zenaida). Orlando testified that he has been staying in Lot 83 since 1960 and had built a house thereon
where he is presently residing; and, that his mother, herein petitioner, denied having sold the property
or having signed any document for that matter.

Zenaida also testified that in 1981, her father (Ignacio) and Ederlina had a confrontation before
the barangay during which her father denied having conveyed any portion of Lot 83 to anybody. She
further testified that she is familiar with the signature of her father and that the signature appearing on
theKasulatan sa Bilihan is not her fathers signature.

For their part, respondents offered in evidence the testimonies of Estrella Bermudo Alfaro (Estrella),
Ederlina, and Jose Tampolino (Jose). Estrella declared that she was present when Ignacio and the
petitioner affixed their signatures on the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, which was acknowledged before Notary
Public Juan Q. Dantayana on April 17, 1973. She narrated that her mother actually purchased the
property in 1954, but it was only in 1973 when the vendor executed the deed of sale. In fact, her
father Francisco Bermudo was able to secure a permit to erect a house on the disputed property from
the Office of the Mayor of Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro in 1954. [8] She was surprised to learn though
that their property is still registered in the name of the petitioner.
Ederlina corroborated the declarations of Estrella. She also alleged that her parents occupied the
property in 1954 when they built a hut there, then later on, a house of strong materials.

Jose corroborated the declarations of the other witnesses for the respondents that the disputed portion
of Lot 83 is owned by Anastacia.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision[9] dated September 21, 1998, the court a quo ordered the respondents to vacate subject
premises and denied their counterclaim for reconveyance on the grounds of prescription and laches. It
held that the prescriptive period for reconvenyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. In this case, however, it is not disputed
that OCT No. P-9354 covering the entire Lot 83 was issued to Ignacio in 1977. The trial court likewise
held that respondents are guilty of laches and that the reconveyance of the disputed property in their
favor would violate the rule on indefeasibility of Torrens title.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, and in the light of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendants, to wit:

1. Ordering the defendants and any person claiming right under them to vacate the premises in question
and surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff;

2. To pay the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as and for reasonable attorneys fees;

3. To pay the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.[10]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 7, 2004, the CA promulgated its Decision [11] reversing the trial courts Decision and dismissing the
complaint, as well as respondents counterclaim. The CA upheld the validity of the Kasulatan sa
Bilihan since it is a notarized document and disputably presumed to be authentic and duly executed. In
addition, witness Estrella categorically declared that she was present when petitioner and Ignacio signed
the Kasulatan sa Bilihan. The CA elaborated that in order to disprove the presumption accorded to a
notarized document, the party contesting its authenticity and due execution must present a clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, which the petitioner failed to do.

The CA likewise disagreed with the court a quo that respondents counterclaim should be dismissed on
the ground of indefeasibility of title. It emphasized that the Torrens system was adopted to protect
innocent third parties for value and not to protect fraud. Nonetheless, the CA did not grant the relief
sought in respondents counterclaim considering that not all interested parties were impleaded in the
case.

The dispositive portion of the CAs Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is REVERSED, and a new one ENTERED
dismissing the complaint and counterclaim.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Issue

Without seeking reconsideration of the CAs Decision, petitioner interposed the present recourse raising
the sole issue of:
WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
VALIDITY/GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE PURPORTED DEED OF SALE OF THE PORTION OF
THE LOT DESPITE THE VEHEMENT DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED VENDORS. [13]

Petitioner contends that the CA grievously erred in upholding the validity and genuineness of
the Kasulatan sa Bilihan. She alleges that she wanted to take the witness stand to disclaim in open court
her purported signature appearing on respondents Kasulatan sa Bilihan, but could not do so because she
is too old, bed-ridden and has to bear a tortuous five-hour drive to reach the court. Nevertheless, she
executed a sworn statement declaring that she and her husband never sold any portion of Lot 83 and
that their signatures appearing on said deed were forged. She avers that the assistance of an expert
witness is not even necessary to detect the patent dissimilarities between said forged signatures and
their authentic signatures.

Petitioner likewise argues that the CA erred in taking into consideration the appearance and condition of
the paper where the Kasulatan sa Bilihan is written. She posits that the fabrication of an ancient-looking
document nowadays is no longer difficult. She also points to several circumstances which cast doubt on
the authenticity and due execution of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, but which the CA inexplicably ignored

Furthermore, petitioner maintains that her title is indefeasible. And while there are exceptions to the
rule on indefeasibility of title,[14] she emphasizes that respondents never disputed her title. With regard
to the tax declarations presented by respondents, petitioner asserts that it has been the consistent ruling
of this Court that tax declarations are not necessarily proof of ownership.

In their comment, respondents assert that in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law can be raised. Factual issues are prohibited. From the arguments advanced by the
petitioner, however, it is clear that she is asking this Court to examine and weigh again the evidence on
record.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

This case falls under the exceptions where the Supreme Court may review factual issues.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari.[15] It is settled that in
the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case.[16] This rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions, [17] one of which is when the
findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court, like in the present case.

Nature and purpose of accion publiciana.

Also known as accion plenaria de posesion,[18] accion publiciana is an

ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. [19] It
refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action
or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. [20]

The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
[21]
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is
not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the
issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same
parties involving title to the property.[22] The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of
ownership.[23]

Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential guideposts, we shall now resolve the arguments raised by the
parties in this petition.

As against petitioners Torrens title, respondents Kasulatan sa Bilihan cannot confer better right to
possess.
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose
name the title appears.[24] It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described
therein.[25] It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the
property, including possession.[26] Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab,[27] this Court declared that the age-old
rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.

In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioner is the holder of a Torrens title over the
entire Lot 83. Respondents have only their notarized but unregistered Kasulatan sa Bilihan to support
their claim of ownership. Thus, even if respondents proof of ownership has in its favor a juris
tantumpresumption of authenticity and due execution, the same cannot prevail over
petitioners Torrens title. This has been our consistent ruling which we recently reiterated in Pascual v.
Coronel,[28] viz:

Even if we sustain the petitioners arguments and rule that the deeds of sale are valid contracts, it would
still not bolster the petitioners case. In a number of cases, the Court had upheld the registered owners
superior right to possess the property. In Co v. Militar, the Court was confronted with a similar issue of
which between the certificate of title and an unregistered deed of sale should be given more probative
weight in resolving the issue of who has the better right to possess. There, the Court held that the
court a quo correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner, as opposed to the
unregistered title in the name of respondents. The Court stressed therein that the Torrens System was
adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized.

Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court declared that the trial court did not err in
giving more probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedentvis--vis the contested unregistered
Deed of Sale. Later in Arambulo v. Gungab, the Court held that the registered owner is preferred to
possess the property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the person who has a
Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. (Citations omitted.)
As the titleholder, therefore, petitioner is preferred to possess the entire Lot 83. Besides, there are
telltale signs which cast doubt on the genuineness of the Kasulatan. To cite a few:

1. The date of its execution unbelievably coincides with the date the buyer, Anastacia, died;

2. Despite its alleged execution on April 17, 1973, respondents brought up the Kasulatan only
when petitioner asked them to vacate the disputed premises. Prior thereto, they neither asserted their
rights thereunder nor registered the same with the proper Registry of Deeds;

3. The lawyer who notarized the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, as well as the witnesses thereto, was not
presented in court; and,

4. The District Land Officer who signed OCT No. P-9354 by authority of the President is a public
officer who has in his favor the presumption of regularity in issuing said title.

Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack.

Moreover, respondents attack on the validity of petitioners title by claiming that their mother became
the true owner of the southern portion of Lot 83 even before the issuance of OCT No. P-9354 constitutes
as a collateral attack on said title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the
property in an accion publiciana, not in a direct action whose main objective is to impugn the validity of
the judgment granting the title.[29] This cannot be allowed. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, a certificate of title cannot be the subject of
collateral attack. Thus:

SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident to the
present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title. [30] This manner of attack is to be
distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main
objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or
to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of. [31] Thus, in Magay v.
Estiandan,[32] therein plaintiff-appellee filed an accion publiciana. In his defense, defendant-appellant
alleged among others that plaintiff-appellees Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004 was issued under
anomalous circumstances. When the case reached this Court, we rejected defendant-appellants defense
on the ground that the issue on the validity of said title can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. Also, in Co v. Court of Appeals[33] we arrived at the same conclusion and
elaborated as follows:

In their reply dated September 1990, petitioners argue that the issues of fraud and ownership raised in
their so-called compulsory counterclaim partake of the nature of an independent complaint which they
may pursue for the purpose of assailing the validity of the transfer certificate of title of private
respondents. That theory will not prosper.

While a counterclaim may be filed with a subject matter or for a relief different from those in the basic
complaint in the case, it does not follow that such counterclaim is in the nature of a separate and
independent action in itself. In fact, its allowance in the action is subject to explicit conditions, as above
set forth, particularly in its required relation to the subject matter of opposing partys claim. Failing in
that respect, it cannot even be filed and pursued as an altogether different and original action.

It is evident that the objective of such claim is to nullify the title of private respondents to the property
in question, which thereby challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. This is
apparently a collateral attack which is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of
a Torrens title. It is well settled that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the
validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. Hence, whether or not petitioners have the right to claim ownership of the
land in question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding. That should be threshed out in a
proper action.

The lower courts cannot pass upon or grant respondents counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction.
Both the trial court and the appellate court considered respondents counterclaim as a petition for
reconveyance. In which case, it should be treatedmerely as a permissive counterclaim because the
evidence required to prove their claim differs from the evidence needed to establish petitioners demand
for recovery of possession. Being a permissive counterclaim, therefore, respondents should have paid
the corresponding docket fees.[34] However, there is no proof on record that respondents paid the
required docket fees. The official receipts were neither attached to nor annotated on respondents
Answer with Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses[35] which was filed via registered mail[36] on August
19, 1995. It has been our consistent ruling that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the full amount of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. [37] The same rule applies to
permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. [38]

On a final note, and as discussed above, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue
of determining who between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final
and binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties to file an
action for the determination of the issue of ownership where the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan and
of OCT No. P-9354 can be properly threshed out.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 7, 2004
is REVERSED and SET ASIDEand the September 21, 1998 Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, insofar as it orders the respondents to vacate the premises is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1]
Co v. Militar, 466 Phil. 217 (2004); Umpoc v. Mercado, 490 Phil. 118; Arambulo v. Gungab, G.R. No.
156581, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 640; Pascual v. Coronel, G.R. No. 159292, July 12, 2007, 527
SCRA 474.
[2]
Records, pp. 1-4. The case was raffled to Branch 46 and docketed as Civil Case No. R-924.
[3]
Id. at 5.
[4]
Id. at 12-16.
[5]
Id. at 128.
[6]
Id. at 129-138.
[7]
Id. at 21-24.
[8]
Id. at 139.
[9]
Id. at 153-161; penned by Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan.
[10]
Id. at 161.
[11]
CA rollo, pp. 82-89; penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria III and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Santiago Javier Ranada.
[12]
Id. at 89.
[13]
Rollo, p. 201.
[14]
Such as when a land in possession of a rightful possessor in the concept of owner is fraudulently
registered in the name of another.
[15]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Section 1.
[16]
Santos v. Lumbao, G.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 408, 420.
[17]
The recognized exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same [are] contrary to the admissions of both parties; (7) when the
findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Sering v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 467, 471-
472; Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168 (1997)).
[18]
Bejar v. Caluag, G.R. No. 171277, February 17, 2007, 516 SCRA 84, 90; Barredo v. Santiago, 102 Phil.
127, 130 (1957).
[19]
Bejar v. Caluag, id.; Sps. Cruz v. Torres, 374 Phil. 529, 533 (1999); Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil.
286, 291 (1906); Ledesma v. Marcos, 9 Phil. 618, 620 (1908).
[20]
Encarnacion v. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 172, 179; Lopez v. David, Jr.,
G.R. No. 152145, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 543.
[21]
Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 1, 25 (2002).
[22]
Rivera v. Rivera, 453 Phil. 404, 412 (2003).
[23]
Umpoc v. Mercado, 490 Phil. 118, 136 (2005).
[24]
See Baloloy v. Hular, 481 Phil. 398, 410 (2004).
[25]
Carvajal v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 582, 594 (1997).
[26]
Supra note 24.
[27]
G.R. No. 156581, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 648.
[28]
G.R. No. 159292, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 474, 484-485.
[29]
Ugale v. Gorospe, G.R. No. 149516, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 376, 386; Caraan v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 140752, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 543, 550; Baloloy v. Hular, 481 Phil. 398, 410
(2004) and CIVIL CODE, Article 428.
[30]
Teoville Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Ferreira, G.R. No. 140086, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 459, 474.
[31]
Id.
[32]
161 Phil. 586, 587 (1976).
[33]
274 Phil. 108, 116 (1991).
[34]
See Alday v. FGU Insurance Corporation, 402 Phil. 962 (2001).
[35]
Records, pp. 12-16.
[36]
Id. at 20.
[37]
Sun Insurance Office v. Asuncion, 252 Phil. 280, 291 (1989).
[38]
Id.

G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.

Alam, Verano & Associates for petitioner.

Francisco D. Lozano for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are
the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of
232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal
issued on September 11, 1980 which canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered
on August 5, 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead
Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.

On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner
German Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023 into a residential
subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained Development Permit No. 00424 from
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property
was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to
vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of
the subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents.

Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court
of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo,
Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they have occupied and tilled
their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during the
first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a permit from the Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal,
was allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense,
subject to the condition that it shag secure the needed right of way from the owners of the lot to be
affected; that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents of their
property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence
enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other
crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and
(3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from their
respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028. 1

On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint for forcible
entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by the
Municipal Trial Court. 3

Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July 24,1986, said
court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the
Regional Trial Court. 4

The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at the
time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action
for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. 5 Petitioner moved to reconsider but
the same was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated September 26, 1986. 6

Hence, this recourse.

The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to petitioner when it
reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to file its answer and
whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner. 7

We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process to exist.
The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the issues presented in
the petition for review filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals. Having heard both
parties, the Appellate Court need not await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover, the fact
that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration negates any violation
of due process.

Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject
property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against
petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. 8

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private respondents
were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession
of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by
the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to
petitioner's act of destroying their crops.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it
presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a
forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property,
the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or
terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in
time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a
person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 10

Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's drastic action of
bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help
enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. 11 Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of
self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the
case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may
possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto.
He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke
the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs in the result.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 30-31.

2 Rollo, p. 37.

3 Rollo, p. 70.

4 Penned by J. Luis Javellana, concurred in by Mariano Zosa, Vicente Mendoza, Ricardo Tensuan, JJ. Rollo,
p. 5.

5 Reno, p. 19.
6 Rollo, pp. 27-28.

7 Rollo, p. 7.

8 Baptista vs. Carillo, No. L-32192, July 30,1976, 72 SCRA 214,

9 Drilon vs. Guarana, 149 SCRA 342; Supra and Batioco v. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312; Pitargo v.
Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5.

10 Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291.

11 Rollo, p. 38 and p. 70.

GEORGE S. TOLENTINO, MONICA S. G.R. No. 181368

TOLENTINO, GUSTAVO S. TOLENTINO, JR., MA.
MARJORIE S. TOLENTINO, MARILYN S.
TOLENTINO, MICHAEL GLEN S. TOLENTINO,
MYLENE S. TOLENTINO, MILAGROS M.
GUEVARRA, MA. VICTORIA T. RAMIREZ, Present:
LORENZA T. ANDES, MICHAEL T.
MEDRANO and JACINTO T. MEDRANO,

Petitioners,
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,
- versus
ABAD,

MENDOZA, and
PACIFICO S. LAUREL, HEIRS OF ILUMINADA
LAUREL-ASCALON, CONSUELO T. LAUREL, PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
BIENVENIDO LAUREL, HEIRS OF ARCHIMEDES
LAUREL, TEODORO LAUREL, FE LAUREL-
LIMJUCO and CLAROLAUREL,

Respondents.

Promulgated:

February 22, 2012

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated October 18,
2007 and January 22, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 78676.

The factual milieu follows.

Respondents, in their complaint before the Regional Trial Court, alleged that they are the registered
owners of a parcel of land situated in BarangayBalugo, Tagkawayan, Quezon, with an area of 1,056,275
square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-43927. For several years, petitioners
have been in actual possession of the western portion of the said property with a total area of 620,000
square meters which they tried to develop into fishponds. In the years 1993 and 1994, respondents
informed petitioners, through Gustavo C. Tolentino, Sr. (Gustavo) who was then representing them, that
the area they are occupying was inside the respondents' property and, therefore, they should vacate and
leave the same. Gustavo, however, asked for time to verify respondents' claim. If found to be true, then
the petitioners were willing to discuss with respondents the improvements that they have introduced on
the subject area. Respondents have waited for almost a year for the outcome of the intended
verification, but they waited in vain until Gustavo died. Petitioners continued to develop the area they
were occupying into fishponds, thereby manifesting their unwillingness to vacate the premises and
restore the possession thereof in favor of respondents. Hence, respondents filed a suit against
petitioners to recover the property and demand payment of unearned income, attorney's fees and costs
of suit.

Petitioners, as defendants in the trial court, averred in their Answer that the subject property is owned
by the Republic and they are occupying the same by virtue of a Fishpond Lease Agreement entered with
the Department of Agriculture. Thus, their stay over the property is lawful.

On August 27, 1996, petitioners were declared in default, for failure to appear at the pre-trial
conference. However, the trial court set aside the default order and reset the pre-trial conference.
Despite several resetting of the pre-trial conference of which petitioners were notified, petitioners failed
to appear. Hence, on March 21, 2000, the trial court issued an Order allowing respondents to present
their evidence ex parte, instead of declaring petitioners in default.[3]

After the ex parte hearing for the reception of evidence, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered to wit:

(a) Ordering the defendants [petitioners herein] George S. Tolentino, Monica S. Tolentino, Gustavo S.
Tolentino, Jr., Ma. Marjorie S. Tolentino, Marilyn S. Tolentino, Michael Glenn St. Tolentino and Mylene S.
Tolentino, their assigns, heirs and representatives to leave and vacate the portions of land they are
occupying which are part of and inside Lot 647-E of the Subdivision Plan Csd-5627-D, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-43927 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon immediately upon this
decision becoming final and executory;

(b) Commanding the aforementioned defendants [petitioners herein] jointly and severally, to pay the
plaintiffs [respondents herein] the reasonable rental value of the areas occupied by the aforesaid
defendants [petitioners herein] at the rate of P20,000.00 per annum from October 13, 1995 until
possession thereof is returned to the plaintiff. [respondents herein]; and

(c) Enjoining the aforementioned defendants [petitioners herein] jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff
[respondents herein] attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus litigation expenses in the sum
of P10,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Aggrieved, petitioners challenged the trial court's decision before the CA. The CA dismissed petitioners'
appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners,
but was denied by the CA for lack of merit.
Petitioners then filed this present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, raising the following
issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE DENIED THEIR DAY IN COURT.

2. WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PROPER TO INCLUDE THE GOVERNMENT THRU THE DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE IN THIS CASE FOR A COMPLETE DETERMINATION OF THE CASE.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FINDS

APPLICATION IN THIS CASE.

4. WHETHER OR NOT ACCION PUBLICIANA WAS THE PROPER ACTION TO BE INSTITUTED IN

THIS CASE.

Petitioners maintain that they were denied their day in court, because they were not allowed to present
their evidence before the trial court which resulted in the denial of their right to due process.

We perused the records of the case and failed to see the lack of due process claimed by petitioners. On
the contrary, petitioners were given more than ample opportunity to be heard through counsel. Lest it
be forgotten, petitioners were first declared in default on August 27, 1996, for their failure to appear at
the pre-trial conference. However, the trial court set aside the default order and the pre-trial conference
was set and reset for several times. Nonetheless, petitioners failed to appear on January 9, 1998,
[5]
March 2, 1998,[6] May 18, 1999,[7] and March 21, 2000,[8]prompting the trial court to allow the
respondents to present their evidence ex parte. Thereafter, judgment was rendered.

Sections 4 and 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Appearance of parties. − It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at
the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor, or if
a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents.

Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. − The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to
the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with
prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be
cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the
basis thereof.

From the foregoing, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the
absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear,
then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the
basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the
defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having
forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. [9]

In the case at bar, the trial court gave petitioners every chance to air their side and even reconsidered its
first order declaring petitioners in default.Notwithstanding, petitioners and their counsel failed to take
advantage of such opportunity and disregarded the legal processes, by continuously failing to appear
during the pre-trial of the case without any valid cause. Clearly, when the trial court allowed the
respondents to present evidence ex parte due to the continued failure of the petitioners to attend the
pre-trial conference, it did so in accordance with Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
with due regard to the constitutional guarantee of due process. Plainly, petitioners cannot complain that
they were denied dueprocess. What the fundamental law prohibits is total absence of opportunity to be
heard. When a party has been afforded opportunity to present his side, he cannot feign denial
of due process.[10]

In The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario,[11] the Court held that pre-trial
cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital
objective: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. The
Court said that:

The importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be overemphasized. In Balatico v. Rodriguez, the
Court, citing Tiu v. Middleton, delved on the significance of pre-trial, thus:
Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary
under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent
amendments in 1997. Hailed as "the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the
nineteenth century," pre-trial seeks to achieve the following:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute

resolution;

(b) The simplification of the issues;

(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof;

(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;

(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;

(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the
action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;

(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and

(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action. [12]

Petitioners' repeated failure to appear at the pre-trial amounted to a failure to comply with the Rules
and their non-presentation of evidence before the trial court was essentially due to their fault.

Petitioners' assertion that it was necessary to include the government, through the Department of
Agriculture, as a party to the case, in order to have a complete determination of the case, is specious, as
the same was never raised before the RTC and the CA. It is settled that points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of due process impel this rule. [13]
In the same manner, the Court cannot consider petitioners' allegation that respondents failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to the cause of the respondents, as this was not raised before
the trial court.

In substance, the appeal of petitioners hinges on their possession over the subject lot by virtue of an
alleged Fishpond Lease Agreement with the Department of Agriculture. They questioned the validity of
the respondents' title by claiming that since the property is owned by the government, it is part of the
public domain and, therefore, cannot be privately owned by the respondents. The petitioners'
submission is not meritorious.

It is a rule that a certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. Section 48 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 provides that:

Section 48. Certificate not Subject to Collateral Attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled, except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.

Petitioners' attack on the legality of TCT No. T-43927, issued in the name of respondents, is incidental to
their quest to defend their possession of the property in an accion publiciana, not in a direct action
whose main objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title. [14] To permit a collateral
attack on the title, such as what petitioners attempt, would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of
a Torrens title to meaningless verbiage.[15]

It must be pointed out that notwithstanding petitioners' submission that the subject property is owned
by the Republic, there is no showing that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) or its representatives
initiated an action for reversion of the subject property to become part of the public domain. All actions
for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines.[16] Unless and until the land is reverted to the State by virtue of a
judgment of a court of law in a direct proceeding for reversion, the Torrens certificate of title thereto
remains valid and binding against the whole world. [17]

Besides, it must be emphasized that the action filed before the trial court is an accion publiciana, which
is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil proceeding in order to determine the
better and legal right to possess, independently of title. [18] The objective of the plaintiffs in an accion
publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of
ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to
possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of
ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being
provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. [19]

It is undisputed that the subject property is covered by TCT No. T-43927, registered in the name of the
respondents. On the other hand, petitioners do not claim ownership, but allege that they are leasing the
portion they are occupying from the government.

Respondents' title over the subject property is evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a fundamental
principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. [20] It is
conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein. [21] It is also settled that
the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession. [22] Thus,
the Court held that the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrenstitle over a land is entitled to
possession thereof.[23]

Petitioners' argument that an accion publiciana is not the proper remedy available for the respondents,
because more than ten (10) years had already elapsed since the dispossession of the respondents'
property, does not hold water. As the registered owners, respondents' right to evict any person illegally
occupying their property is imprescriptible. In the case of Labrador v. Perlas,[24] the Court held that:

x x x As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his
property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred bylaches. In Bishop v. Court of Appeals,
we held, thus:

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person
illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were
aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the
lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches. [25]
As a final note, the Court finds no factual and legal basis for the award of attorneys fees and litigation
expenses. The settled rule is that the matter of attorneys fees cannot be mentioned only in the
dispositive portion of the decision. The same goes for the award of litigation expenses.[26] The reasons or
grounds for the award thereof must be set forth in the decision of the court. [27] The discretion of the
court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable
justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left
to speculation and conjecture.[28]

In the present case, the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses was mentioned only in the
dispositive portion of the RTC decision without any prior explanation and justification in its body, hence,
the same is baseless and must be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dated October 18, 2007 and January 22, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
78676, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses
isDELETED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and
Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring, rollo, pp. 20-30.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 38-40.
[3]
This is in consonance with Rule 18, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Effect of failure to appear. − The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next
preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the
plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
[4]
Records, pp. 190-191.
[5]
Id. at 157.
[6]
Id. at 159.
[7]
Id. at 168.
[8]
Id. at 172.
[9]
The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, G.R. No. 182075, September 15,
2010, 630 SCRA 607, 616.
[10]
Poltan v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 164307, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 430, 440.
[11]
Supra note 9, at 617.
[12]
Id. at 616-617.
[13]
Del Rosario v. Bonga, 402 Phil. 949, 957-958 (2001).
[14]
Urieta Vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 130, 143.
[15]
Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 173415, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 348, 380.
[16]
Public Land Act, Sec. 101.
[17]
Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68291, March 6, 1991, 194 SCRA 743, 751.
[18]
Bejar v. Caluag, G.R. No. 171277, February 15, 2007, 516 SCRA 84, 90.
[19]
Urieta Vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, supra note 14, at 140-141.
[20]
Caa v. Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157573, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 225,
238.
[21]
Urieta Vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, supra note 14, at 141.
[22]
Id.
[23]
Caa v. Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines, supra note 20, at 238-239.
[24]
G.R. No. 173900, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 265, 272.
[25]
Id. at 272. (Emphasis supplied.)
[26]
Spouses Samatra v. Vda. de Parias, 431 Phil. 255, 267 (2002).
[27]
Cagungun v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 158674, October 17, 2005, 473 SCRA 259, 274.
[28]
Delos Santos v. Papa, G.R. No. 154427, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 385, 397.