IPL DIGESTS- NOV. 10, 2017 RULING: Yes. The news footage is copyrightable.
GMA’s mere act of rebroadcasting ABS-CBN’s news footage without
(1) ABS-CBN v. GOZON
FACTS: On August 13, 2004, ABS-CBN filed the Complaint for copyright
infringement under Sections 177 and 211 of the IPO because respondent
GMA aired footage of the arrival and homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz
at NAIA from Iraq without petitioner’s consent.
ABS-CBN allowed Reuters Television Service (Reuters) to air the footages it
had taken earlier under a special embargo agreement. ABS-CBN alleged
that under the special embargo agreement, any of the footages it took would
be for the "use of Renter's international subscribers only, and shall be
considered and treated by Reuters under 'embargo' against use by other
subscribers in the Philippines. . . . No other Philippine subscriber of Reuters
would be allowed to use ABS-CBN footage without the latter's consent.
GMA-7 subscribes to both Reuters and Cable News Network (CNN). It
received a live video feed of the coverage of Angelo dela Cruz's arrival from
Reuters. GMA-7 immediately carried the live newsfeed in its program "Flash
Report," together with its live broadcast. Allegedly, GMA-7 did not receive
any notice or was not aware that Reuters was airing footages of ABS-CBN.
Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo Venturanza issued the Resolution finding
probable cause to indict Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas (GMA-7).
Respondents filed the Petition for Review before the DOJ, wherein
(Gonzalez Resolution) ruled in favor of respondents and held that good faith
may be raised as a defense in the case.
DOJ Acting Secretary Agra issued the Resolution (Agra Resolution) that
reversed the Gonzalez Resolution and found probable cause to charge Dela
Peña-Reyes and Manalastas for violation of the Intellectual Property Code.
Eventually, the Court of Appeals granted the temporary restraining order
preventing the DOJ from enforcing the Agra Resolution, stating that petitioner
has copyright of its news coverage, but respondent’s act of airing 5 seconds
of the homecoming footage without notice of the "No Access Philippines"
restriction of the live”Reuter’s video feed, was undeniably attended in good
faith and thus, serves to exculpate from criminal liability under the IPO.
ISSUE: Whether there is probable cause to charge respondents with
infringement under Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the
Intellectual Property Code.
authority from the latter gives rise to the probability that a crime was
committed under the Intellectual Property Code. That they (respondents Dela
Peña-Reyes and Manalastas) could have prevented the act of infringement
had they been diligent in their functions as Head of News Operations and
Program Manager. They knew that there would be consequences in carrying
ABS-CBN's footage in their broadcast. That is why GMA-7 allegedly cut the
feed from Reuters upon seeing ABS-CBN's logo and reporter.
The general rule is that acts punished under a special law are malum
prohibitum. "An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal
intent is completely immaterial." Crimes mala in se presuppose that the
person who did the felonious act had criminal intent to do so, while crimes
mala prohibita do not require knowledge or criminal intent. The court also
stated that PH laws on copyright infringement does not require criminal intent
and does not support good faith as a defense. Thus, the act of infringement
and not the intent is the one that causes the damage.
ABS-CBN’s video footage is copyrightable. IPO is clear about the rights
afforded to authors of various kinds of work. Under the Code, "works are
protected by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their mode or form
of expression, as well as of their content, quality and purpose." These include
audio-visual works and cinematographic works and works produced by a
process analogous to cinematography or any process for making audiovisual
recordings.
It is true that under Section 175 of the Intellectual Property Code, "news of
the day and other miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of
press information" are considered unprotected subject matter. However, the
Code does not state that expression of the news of the day, particularly when
it underwent a creative process, is not entitled to protection.
An idea or event must be distinguished from the expression of that idea or
event. An idea has been likened to a ghost in that it "must be spoken to a
little before it will explain itself." It is a concept that has eluded exact legal
definition. Thus, the court stated that “only the expression of an idea is
protected by copyright, not the idea itself.”
In this case, however, respondents admitted that the material under review
— which is the subject of the controversy — is an exact copy of the original.
Respondents did not subject ABS-CBN's footage to any editing of their own.
The news footage did not undergo any transformation where there is a need
to track elements of the original.
1
(2) ABS-CBN v. Phil. MultiMedia
FACTS: Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI) is a signal provider
which has cable and satellite services. It is providing its satellite services
through Dream Broadcasting System. PMSI has its “Free TV” and “Premium
Channels”. The Free TV includes ABS-CBN, GMA-7, and other local
networks. The premium channels include AXN, Jack TV, etc which were paid
by subscribers before such channels can be transmitted as feeds to a
subscriber’s TV set which has been installed with a Dream satellite.
ABS-CBN broadcasts television programs by wireless means to Metro
Manila and nearby provinces, and by satellite to provincial stations through
Channel 2 and Channel 23. The programs aired over Channels 2 and 23 are
either produced by ABS-CBN or purchased from or licensed by other
producers. ABS-CBN also owns regional television stations which pattern
their programming in accordance with perceived demands of the region.
Thus, television programs shown in Metro Manila and nearby provinces are
not necessarily shown in other provinces.
In May 2002, ABS-CBN sued PMSI for allegedly engaging in rebroadcasting
and thereby infringing on ABS-CBN’s copyrights; that the transmission of
Channels 2 and 23 to the provinces where these two channels are not
usually shown altered ABS-CBN’s programming for the said provinces. PMSI
argued that it is not infringing upon ABS-CBN’s copyrights because it is
operating under the “Must-Carry Rule” outlined in NTC (National
Telecommunications Commission) Circular No. 4-08-88.
ISSUE: Whether or not PMSI infringed upon the copyrights of ABS-CBN.
RULING: No.
No. The “Must-Carry Rule” under NTC Circular No. 4-08-88 falls under the
limitations on copyright. The Filipino people must be given wider access to
more sources of news, information, education, sports event and
entertainment programs other than those provided for by mass media and
afforded television programs to attain a well informed, well-versed and
culturally refined citizenry and enhance their socio-economic growth. The
very intent and spirit of the NTC Circular will prevent a situation whereby
station owners and a few networks would have unfettered power to make
time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own
views on public issues, people, and to permit on the air only those with whom
they agreed – contrary to the state policy that the (franchise) grantee like
ABS-CBN, and other TV station owners and even the likes of PMSI, shall
provide at all times sound and balanced programming and assist in the
functions of public information and education.
PMSI was likewise granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act No.
8630, Section 4 of which similarly states that it “shall provide adequate public
service time to enable the government, through the said broadcasting
stations, to reach the population on important public issues; provide at all
times sound and balanced programming; promote public participation such
as in community programming; assist in the functions of public information
and education.
The “Must-Carry Rule” favors both broadcasting organizations and the public.
It prevents cable television companies from excluding broadcasting
organization especially in those places not reached by signal. Also, the rule
prevents cable television companies from depriving viewers in far-flung areas
the enjoyment of programs available to city viewers.
PMSI does not produce, select, or determine the programs to be shown in
Channels 2 and 23. Likewise, it does not pass itself off as the origin or author
of such programs. Insofar as Channels 2 and 23 are concerned, PMSI
merely retransmits the same in accordance with Memorandum Circular 04-
08-88. With regard to its premium channels, it buys the channels from
content providers and transmits on an as-is basis to its viewers. Clearly,
PMSI does not perform the functions of a broadcasting organization; thus, it
cannot be said that it is engaged in rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23.
(3) FILSCAP v. TAN
FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant is a non-profit association of authors, composers
and publishers duly organized under the Corporation Law of the Philippines
and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Said
association is the owner of certain musical compositions among which are
the songs entitled: "Dahil Sa Iyo", "Sapagkat Ikaw Ay Akin," "Sapagkat Kami
Ay Tao Lamang" and "The Nearness Of You."
- On the other hand, defendant-appellee is the operator of a restaurant
known as "Alex Soda Foundation and Restaurant" where a combo with
professional singers, hired to play and sing musical compositions to entertain
and amuse customers therein, were playing and singing the above-
mentioned compositions without any license or permission from the
appellant.
- Accordingly, appellant demanded from the appellee payment of the
necessary license fee for the playing and singing of aforesaid compositions
but the demand was ignored. Thereafter, the appellant filed a complaint with
2
the lower court for infringement of copyright for allowing the playing in
defendant-appellee's restaurant of said songs copyrighted in the name of the
former.
- Defendant-appellee, however, countered that the complaint states no cause
of action. While not denying the playing of said copyrighted compositions in
his establishment, appellee maintains that the mere singing and playing of
songs and popular tunes even if they are copyrighted do not constitute an
infringement under the provisions of Section 3 of the Copyright Law.
- The lower court ruled in favor of the defendant and dismissed the plaintiff’s
complaint. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the playing and signing of musical compositions
which have been copyrighted under the provisions of the Copyright Law (Act
3134) inside the establishment of the defendant-appellee constitute a public
performance for profit within the meaning and contemplation of the Copyright
Law of the Philippines; and assuming that there were indeed public
performances for profit, whether or not appellee can be held liable therefor.
HELD: NO. "The playing of music in dine and dance establishment which was
paid for by the public in purchases of food and drink constituted
"performance for profit" within a Copyright Law." Thus, it has been explained
that while it is possible in such establishments for the patrons to purchase
their food and drinks and at the same time dance to the music of the
orchestra, the music is furnished and used by the orchestra for the purpose
of inducing the public to patronize the establishment and pay for the
entertainment in the purchase of food and drinks.
- The defendant conducts his place of business for profit, and it is public; and
the music is performed for profit. In the case at bar, it is admitted that the
patrons of the restaurant in question pay only for the food and drinks and
apparently not for listening to the music. As found by the trial court, the music
provided is for the purpose of entertaining and amusing the customers in
order to make the establishment more attractive and desirable. Nevertheless,
appellee cannot be said to have infringed upon the Copyright Law.
- Appellee's allegation that the composers of the contested musical
compositions waived their right in favor of the general public when they
allowed their intellectual creations to become property of the public domain
before applying for the corresponding copyrights for the same is correct.
- The Supreme Court has ruled that "Paragraph 33 of Patent Office Administrative Order
No. 3(as amended, dated September 18, 1947) entitled 'Rules of Practice in the
Philippines Patent Office relating to the Registration of Copyright Claims' promulgated
pursuant to Republic Act165, provides among other things that an intellectual creation
should be copyrighted thirty (30)days after its publication, if made in Manila, or
within the (60) days if made elsewhere, failure of which renders such creation
public property." Indeed, if the general public has made use of the object sought to be
copyrighted for thirty (30) days prior to the copyright application the law deems the object
to have been donated to the public domain and the same can no longer be copyrighted.
- A careful study of the records reveals that the song "Dahil Sa Iyo" which
was registered on April 20, 1956 became popular in radios, juke boxes, etc.
long before registration, while the song "The Nearness Of You" registered on
January 14, 1955 had become popular twenty five (25) years prior to 1968,
(the year of the hearing) or from 1943and the songs "Sapagkat Ikaw Ay Akin"
and "Sapagkat Kami Ay Tao Lamang" both registered on July 10, 1966,
appear to have been known and sang by the witnesses as early as 1965 or
three years before the hearing in 1968.
- The testimonies of the witnesses at the hearing of this case on this subject
were unrebutted by the appellant. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the
musical compositions in question had long become public property, and are therefore
beyond the protection of the Copyright Law.
(4) SISON OLANO v. LIM ENG CO.
FACTS: The petitioners are the officers and/or directors of Metrotech Steel
Industries, Inc. (Metrotech). Lim Eng Co (respondent), on the other hand, is
the Chairman of LEC Steel Manufacturing Corporation (LEC), a company
which specializes in architectural metal manufacturing.
- LEC was invited by the architects of the Manansala Project (Project), to
submit design/drawings and specifications for interior and exterior hatch
doors. LEC complied by submitting shop plans/drawings, including the
diskette therefor, embodying the designs and specifications required for the
metal hatch doors. After a series of consultations and revisions, the final
shop plans/drawings were submitted and thereafter copied and transferred to
3
the title block of Ski-First Balfour Joint Venture (SKI-FB), the Project's
contractor, and then stamped approved for construction
- LEC was thereafter subcontracted by SKI-FB, to manufacture and install
interior and exterior hatch doors for the 7th to 22nd floors of the Project based
on the final shop plans/drawings. Thereafter, LEC learned that Metrotech
was also subcontracted to install interior and exterior hatch doors for the
Project's 23rd to 41st floors.
- LEC demanded Metrotech to cease from infringing its intellectual property
rights. Metrotech, however, insisted that no copyright infringement was
committed because the hatch doors it manufactured were patterned in
accordance with the drawings provided by SKI-FB.
- On July 2, 2004, LEC deposited with the National Library the final shop
plans/drawings of the designs and specifications for the interior and exterior
hatch doors of the Project and was issued a Certificate of Copyright
Registration and Deposit showing that it is the registered owner of
plans/drawings for interior and exterior hatch doors under Registration Nos.
1-2004-13 and 1-2004-14, respectively. This copyright pertains to class work
"I" under The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, which covers
"illustrations, maps, plans, sketches, charts and three-dimensional works
relative to geography, topography, architecture or science."
- On December 9, 2004, LEC was issued another Certificate of Copyright
Registration and Deposit showing that it is the registered owner of
plans/drawings for interior and exterior hatch doors as "original ornamental
designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or not registrable as
an industrial design, and other works of applied art."
- When Metrotech still refused to stop fabricating hatch doors based on
LEC's shop plans/drawings, the latter sought the assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which in turn applied for a search warrant
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 24. The
application was granted thus resulting in the confiscation of finished and
unfinished metal hatch doors as well as machines used in fabricating and
manufacturing hatch doors from the premises of Metrotech.
- The respondent filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the DOJ against the
petitioners for copyright infringement.
RTC: quashed the search warrant on the ground that copyright infringement
was not established.
- Petitioners admitted manufacturing hatch doors for the Project. They
denied, however, that they committed copyright infringement and averred
that the hatch doors they manufactured were functional inventions that are
proper subjects of patents and that the records of the Intellectual Property
Office reveal that there is no patent, industrial design or utility model
registration on LEC's hatch doors.
- Metrotech further argued that the manufacturing of hatch doors per se is not
copyright infringement because copyright protection does not extend to the
objects depicted in the illustrations and plans. Moreover, there is no artistic or
ornamental expression embodied in the subject hatch doors that would
subject them to copyright protection.
DOJ: The investigating prosecutor dismissed the respondent's complaint
based on inadequate evidence showing that: (1) the petitioners committed
the prohibited acts under Section 177 of R.A. No. 8293; and (2) the interior
and exterior hatch doors of the petitioners are among the classes of
copyrightable work enumerated in Sections 172 and 173 of the same law.
- Upon the respondent's motion for reconsideration, however, the Resolution
of the DOJ reversed and set aside the Resolution dated August 18, 2005 and
directed the Chief State Prosecutor to file the appropriate information for
copyright infringement against the petitioners. The DOJ reasoned that the
pieces of evidence adduced show that the subject hatch doors are artistic or
ornamental with distinctive hinges, door and jamb, among others. The
petitioners were not able to sufficiently rebut these allegations and merely
insisted on the non-artistic nature of the hatch doors.
- Aggrieved, the petitioners moved for reconsideration. This time, the DOJ
made a complete turn around by granting the motion, and declaring that the
evidence on record did not establish probable cause because the subject
hatch doors were plainly metal doors with functional components devoid of
any aesthetic or artistic features.
CA: The fact that LEC enjoys ownership of copyright not only on the
illustrations of the hatch doors but on the hatch doors itself and that the
4
petitioners manufactured the same is sufficient to warrant a finding of
probable cause for copyright infringement.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, Metrotech, is guilty of copyright
infringement.
- The manufacturing of hatch doors per se does not fall within the purview of
copyright infringement because copyright protection does not extend to the
objects depicted in the illustrations and plans.
HELD: NO. A copyright refers to "the right granted by a statute to the
proprietor of an intellectual production to its exclusive use and enjoyment to
the extent specified in the statute." Under Section 177 of R.A. No. 8293, the
Copyright or Economic Rights consist of the exclusive right to carry out,
authorize or prevent the following acts:
177.1 Reproduction of the work or substantial portion of the work;
177.2 Dramatization, translation, adaptation, abridgment, arrangement
or other transformation of the work;
177.3 The first public distribution of the original and each copy of the
work by sale or other forms of transfer of ownership;
177.4 Rental of the original or a copy of an audiovisual or
cinematographic work, a work embodied in a sound recording, a
computer program, a compilation of data and other materials or a
musical work in graphic form, irrespective of the ownership of the
original or the copy which is the subject of the rental;
177.5 Public display of the original or a copy of the work;
177.6 Public performance of the work; and
177.7 Other communication to the public of the work.
- Copyright infringement is thus committed by any person who shall use
original literary or artistic works, or derivative works, without the copyright
owner's consent in such a manner as to violate the foregoing copy and
economic rights. For a claim of copyright infringement to prevail, the
evidence on record must demonstrate: (1) ownership of a validly copyrighted
material by the complainant; and (2) infringement of the copyright by the
respondent.
- While both elements subsist in the records, they did not simultaneously
concur so as to substantiate infringement of LEC's two sets of copyright
registrations. Futhermore, the raid conducted by the NBI on Metrotech's
premises yielded no copies or reproduction of LEC's copyrighted
sketches/drawings of hatch doors. What were discovered instead were
finished and unfinished hatch doors.
- Certificate of Registration Nos. 1-2004-13 and 1-2004-14 pertain to class
work "I" under Section 172 of R.A. No. 8293 which covers "illustrations,
maps, plans, sketches, charts and three-dimensional works relative to
geography, topography, architecture or science."51 As such, LEC's copyright
protection there under covered only the hatch door sketches/drawings and
not the actual hatch door they depict.
- Since the hatch doors cannot be considered as either illustrations, maps,
plans, sketches, charts and three-dimensional works relative to geography,
topography, architecture or science, to be properly classified as a
copyrightable class "I" work, what was copyrighted were their
sketches/drawings only, and not the actual hatch doors themselves. To
constitute infringement, the usurper must have copied or appropriated the
original work of an author or copyright proprietor, absent copying, there can
be no infringement of copyright.
- From the foregoing, it is clear that the hatch doors were not artistic works
within the meaning of copyright laws. A copyrightable work refers to literary
and artistic works defined as original intellectual creations in the literary and
artistic domain. A hatch door, by its nature is an object of utility. It is
intrinsically a useful article, which, as a whole, is not eligible for copyright.
- A "useful article" defined as an article "having an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information" is excluded from copyright eligibility.
5
The only instance when a useful article may be the subject of copyright
protection is when it incorporates a design element that is physically or
conceptually separable from the underlying product. This means that the
utilitarian article can function without the design element. In such an
instance, the design element is eligible for copyright protection.
- In the present case, LEC's hatch doors bore no design elements that are
physically and conceptually separable, independent and distinguishable from
the hatch door itself. The allegedly distinct set of hinges and distinct jamb,
were related and necessary hence, not physically or conceptually separable
from the hatch door's utilitarian function as an apparatus for emergency
egress. Without them, the hatch door will not function.
- More importantly, they are already existing articles of manufacture sourced
from different suppliers. Based on the records, it is unrebutted that: (a) the
hinges are similar to those used in truck doors; (b) the gaskets were
procured from a company named Pemko and are not original creations of
LEC; and (c) the locking device are ordinary drawer locks commonly used in
furniture and office desks.
- Being articles of manufacture already in existence, they cannot be deemed
as original creations. As earlier stated, valid copyright ownership denotes
originality of the copyrighted material. Originality means that the material was
not copied, evidences at least minimal creativity and was independently
created by the author.70 It connotes production as a result of independent
labor.71 LEC did not produce the door jambs and hinges; it bought or
acquired them from suppliers and thereafter affixed them to the hatch doors.
No independent original creation can be deduced from such acts.
(5) HABANA vs ROBLES
FACTS: Pacita Habana and two others were the authors of College English
for Today Series 1 and (CET). While they were researching for books to
assist them in updating their own book, they chanced upon the book of
Felicidad Robles entitled Developing English Proficiency Books 1 and 2
(DEP). They discovered further that the book of Robles was strikingly similar
to the contents, scheme of presentation, illustrations and illustrative
examples of CET. They then sued Robles and her publisher (Goodwill
Trading Co.) for infringement and/or unfair competition with damages.
On the other hand, Robles contends that the book DEP is the product of her
own intellectual creation, and was not a copy of any existing valid
copyrighted book and that the similarities may be due to the authors' exercise
of the "right to fair use of copyrighted materials, as guides."
TRIAL COURT—ruled in favor of the respondents, absolving them of any
liability.
CA—rendered judgment in favor of respondents Robles and Goodwill
Trading Co., Inc.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is infringement of Habana’s copyright?
HELD: YES. A perusal of the records yields several pages of the book DEP
that are similar if not identical with the text of CET. In several other pages the
treatment and manner of presentation of the topics of DEP are similar if not a
rehash of that contained in CET. The similarities in examples and material
contents are so obviously present in this case. How can similar/identical
examples not be considered as a mark of copying? Robles’ act of lifting from
the book of Habana et al substantial portions of discussions and examples,
and her failure to acknowledge the same in her book is an infringement of
Habana et al’s copyrights.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that in determining the question of
infringement, the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted work is an
important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that
the whole or even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so
much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the
labors of the original author are substantially and to an injurious extent
appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute piracy.
(6) JOAQUIN vs DRILON
FACTS: BJ Productions, Inc. is the grantee of a copyright certificate over
“Rhoda and Me,” a dating game show which aired from 1970 to 1977. On
June 1973, “It’s a Date” aired on RPN Channel 9. When this came to the
attention of herein petitioner Joaquin, he sent the producers of the show a
letter informing them of the issued copyright over the material, and asked
them to cease and desist from airing the said show. Subsequently, an
information for violation of copyright was filed before the court. However, IXL
Productions (who produced the latter show), moved for a review of the
information before the DOJ, who, through secretary Franklin Drilon, moved
6
for the information to be discarded, contending that a particular format of a
game show is non-copyrightable.
ISSUE: Whether or not IXL violated copyright law?
HELD: No. The format of a game show is not copyrightable. Philippine and
U.S. law concur in the principle that there is no copyright except that which is
both created and secured by an act of Congress. Unfortunately for BJ
Productions, the format of a particular television program does not fall among
those protected by section 2 of P.D. No. 49. What was registered therefore,
were the episodes of “Rhoda and Me,” but not an exclusive right to air any
show with the same theme.
This provision is substantially the same as 172 of the INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (R.A. No. 8293). The format or
mechanics of a television show is not included in the list of protected works in
2 of P.D. No. 49. For this reason, the protection afforded by the law cannot be
extended to cover them.
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new
or independent right granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing
right regulated by the statute. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such
as the statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to
the subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the
statute.
(7) KHO v. CA
FACTS: On 1991, Elidad C. Kho filed a complaint for injunction and
damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
against the Summerville General Merchandising and Company (Summerville,
for brevity) and Ang Tiam Chay.
The petitioner's complaint alleges that petitioner, doing business under the
name and style of KEC Cosmetics Laboratory, is the registered owner of the
copyrights Chin Chun Su and Oval Facial Cream Container/Case, as shown
by Certificates of Copyright Registration No. 0-1358 and No. 0-3678; that she
also has patent rights on Chin Chun Su & Device and Chin Chun Su for
medicated cream after purchasing the same from Quintin Cheng, the
registered owner thereof in the Supplemental Register of the Philippine
Patent Office on February 7, 1980 under Registration Certificate No. 4529;
that respondent Summerville advertised and sold petitioner's cream products
under the brand name Chin Chun Su, in similar containers that petitioner
uses, thereby misleading the public, and resulting in the decline in the
petitioner's business sales and income; and, that the respondents should be
enjoined from allegedly infringing on the copyrights and patents of the
petitioner.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged as their defense that Summerville is
the exclusive and authorized importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun
Su products manufactured by Shun Yi Factory of Taiwan; that the said
Taiwanese manufacturing company authorized Summerville to register its
trade name Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream with the Philippine Patent Office
and other appropriate governmental agencies; that KEC Cosmetics
Laboratory of the petitioner obtained the copyrights through
misrepresentation and falsification; and, that the authority of Quintin Cheng,
assignee of the patent registration certificate, to distribute and market Chin
Chun Su products in the Philippines had already been terminated by the said
Taiwanese Manufacturing Company.
 RTC – granted the application of Kho.
 CA – ruled in favour of Summerville and Ang Tiam Chay
ISSUE: WON the copyright and patent over the name and container of a
beauty cream product would entitle the registrant to the use and ownership
over the same to the exclusion of others?
RULING: The Court ruled in favour of Summerville and Ang Tiam Chay.
Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that
cannot be interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign
capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of
an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. In
relation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation identifying or
distinguishing an enterprise. Meanwhile, the scope of a copyright is confined
to literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the
literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their
creation. Patentable inventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical
solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an
inventive step and is industrially applicable.15
Petitioner has no right to support her claim for the exclusive use of the
subject trade name and its container. The name and container of a beauty
cream product are proper subjects of a trademark inasmuch as the same
falls squarely within its definition. In order to be entitled to exclusively use the
same in the sale of the beauty cream product, the user must sufficiently
prove that she registered or used it before anybody else did. The petitioner's
copyright and patent registration of the name and container would not
7
guarantee her the right to the exclusive use of the same for the reason that
they are not appropriate subjects of the said intellectual rights. Consequently,
a preliminary injunction order cannot be issued for the reason that the
petitioner has not proven that she has a clear right over the said name and
container to the exclusion of others, not having proven that she has
registered a trademark thereto or used the same before anyone did.
(8) LAKTAW v. PAGLINAWAN
FACTS: Laktaw was, according to the laws regulating literary properties, the
registered owner and author of a literary work entitled Diccionario Hispano-
Tagalog (Spanish-Tagalog Dictionary) published in the City of Manila in 1889
by the printing establishment La Opinion while Paglinawan, without the
consent of the plaintiff, reproduced said literary work, improperly copied the
greater part thereof in the work published by him and entitled Diccionariong
Kastila-Tagalog (Spanish-Tagalog Dictionary) which is a violation of article 7
of the Law of January 10, 1879, on Intellectual Property, caused irreparable
injuries to Laktaw, who was surprised when, on publishing his new work
entitled Diccionario Tagalog-Hispano (Tagalog-Spanish Dictionary) he
learned of the fact, and damages occasioned to the plaintiff by the
publication of defendant's work amounted to $10,000.
Laktaw prayed the court to order the defendant to withdraw from sale all
stock of the work herein identified as Exhibit B and to pay the plaintiff the
sum of $10,000, with costs.
Paglinawan his answer denied generally each and every allegation of the
complaint and prayed the court to absolve him from the complaint.
 RTC – absolved Paglinawan
ISSUE: WON Laktaw has no right of action and that the remedy sought by
him could not be granted?
RULING: Laktaw cannot be denied the legal protection which he seeks,
and which is based on the fact that the dictionary published by him in
1889 is his property — said property right being recognized and having
been granted by article 7, in connection with article 2, of said law — and
on the further fact that said work was reproduced by the defendant
without his permission.
In said judgment some words of the defendant's dictionary are transcribed,
the equivalents and meanings of which in Tagalog are exactly the same as
those that are given in the plaintiff's dictionary, with the exception, as to some
of them, of only one acceptation, which is the defendant's own production.
And with respect to the examples used by the defendant in his dictionary,
which, according to the judgment, are not copied from the plaintiff's — the
judgment referring to the preposition a (to), in Tagalog sa — it must be noted
that the defendant, in giving in his dictionary an example of said preposition,
uses the expression "voy a Tayabas" (I am going to Tayabas) instead of
"voy aBulacan" (I am going to Bulacan), as the plaintiff does in his dictionary,
or what is the same thing, that one speaks of Bulacan while the other speaks
of Tayabas. This does not show that there was no reproduction or copying by
the defendant of the plaintiffs work, but just the opposite, for he who intends
to imitate the work of another, tries to make it appear in some manner that
there is some difference between the original and the imitation; and in the
example referred to, with respect to the preposition a (to), that dissimilarity as
to the province designated seems to effect the same purpose.
EVIDENCE na ginaya:
1. of the 23,560 Spanish words in the defendant's dictionary, after
deducting 17 words corresponding to the letters K and X (for the
plaintiff has no words corresponding to them), only 3,108 words are
the defendant's own, or, what is the same thing, the defendant has
added only this number of words to those that are in the plaintiff's
dictionary, he having reproduced or copied the remaining 20,452
words.
2. Paglinawan also literally reproduced and copied for the Spanish
words in his dictionary, the equivalents, definitions and different
meanings in Tagalog, given in plaintiff's dictionary, having
reproduced, as to some words, everything that appears in the
plaintiff's dictionary for similar Spanish words, although as to some
he made some additions of his own. Said copies and reproductions
are numerous as may be seen, by comparing both dictionaries and
using as a guide or index the defendant's memorandum and notes,
first series, Exhibit C, in which, as to each word, the similarities and
differences between them are set forth in detail.
3. printer's errors in the plaintiff's dictionary as to the expression of
some words in Spanish as well as their equivalents in Tagalog are
also reproduced, a fact which shows that the defendant, in preparing
his dictionary, literally copied those Spanish words and their
meanings and equivalents in Tagalog from the plaintiff's dictionary.
(9) MANLY SPORTWEAR MANUFACTURING, INC. vs. DADODETTE
ENTERPRISES
FACTS: NBI applied for a search warrant before the RTC based on the
information that Dadodette Enterprises and/or Hermes Sports Center were in
8
possession of goods, the copyright of which belonged to Manly Sportswear
Mfg. RTC issued the search warrant.
Dadodette Enterprises thereafter moved to quash and annul the search
warrant They insisted that the sporting goods manufactured by and/or
registered in the name of MANLY are ordinary and common hence, not
among the classes of work protected under Section 172 of RA 8293.
RTC granted the motion to quash and declared Search Warrant null and void
based on its finding that the copyrighted products of MANLY do not appear to
be original creations and were being manufactured and distributed by
different companies locally and abroad under various brands, and therefore
unqualified for protection under Section 172 of RA 8293. MANLY’s
certificates of registrations were issued only in 2002, whereas there were
certificates of registrations for the same sports articles which were issued
earlier than MANLY’s, thus further negating the claim that its copyrighted
products were original creations.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court acted within bounds when it ruled, in an ancillary
proceeding, that the copyrighted products of petitioner are not original
creations.
RULING: YES. This is because in the determination of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance or quashal of a warrant, it is inevitable that
the court may touch on issues properly threshed out in a regular proceeding.
In so doing, it does not usurp the power of, much less preclude, the court
from making a final judicial determination of the issues in a full- blown trial.
MANLY’s assertion that the trial court’s order quashing the warrant
preempted the finding of the intellectual property court has no legal basis. the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it entertained the motion to quash
considering that no criminal action has yet been instituted when it was filed.
The trial court also properly quashed the search warrant it earlier issued after
finding upon reevaluation of the evidence that no probable cause exists to
justify its issuance in the first place.
The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested with the trial judges
in the exercise of their judicial function. As such, the power to quash the
same also rests solely with them. After the judge has issued a warrant, he is
not precluded to subsequently quash the same, if he finds upon re-evaluation
of the evidence that no probable cause exists.
(10) UNILEVER PHILIPPINES (PRC), INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: A P&G subsidiary in Italy used a key visual in the advertisement of
its laundry detergent and bleaching products. This key visual known as the
double-tug or tac-tac demonstration shows the fabric being held by both
hands and stretched sideways. The tac-tac was conceptualized for P&G by
the advertising agency Milano and Gray of Italy in 1982. The tac-tac was
used in the same year in an advertisement entitled All aperto to demonstrate
the effect on fabrics of one of P&GP’s products, a liquid bleach called Ace.
P&G has used the same distinctive tac-tac key visual to local consumers in
the Philippines.
Unilever on 24 July 1993 substantially and materially imitating the aforesaid
tac- tac key visual of P&GP and in blatant disregard of P&GP’s intellectual
property rights Unilever started airing a 60 second television commercial
TVC of its Breeze Powerwhite laundry product called Porky. The said TVC
included a stretching visual presentation and sound effects almost [identical]
or substantially similar to P&GP’s tac-tac key visual.
On July 15, 1994, P&GP aired in the Philippines, the same Kite television
advertisement it used in Italy in 1986, merely dubbing the Italian language
with Filipino for the same produce Ace bleaching liquid which P&GP now
markets in the Philippines.
Unilever filed a Complaint with the Advertising Board of the Philippines to
prevent P&GP from airing the Kite television advertisement.
Unilever does not deny that the questioned TV advertisements are
substantially similar to P&GP’s double tug or tac-tac key visual. However, it
submits that P&GP is not entitled to the relief demanded, which is to enjoin
petitioner from airing said TV advertisements, for the reason that petitioner
has Certificates of Copyright Registration for which advertisements while
P&GP has none with respect to its double-tug or tac-tac key visual. In other
words, it is petitioner’s contention that P&GP is not entitled to any protection
because it has not registered with the National Library the very TV
commercials which it claims have been infringed by petitioner.
RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and fixed a bond
of P100,000. On the same date, P&GP filed the required bond issued by
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
9
ISSUE: W/N Unilever is entitled to protection even if “ double-tug or tac-tac
“ key visual is not registered with the National Library.
RULING: YES. Section 2 of PD 49 stipulates that the copyright for a work or
intellectual creation subsists from the moment of its creation. Accordingly, the
creator acquires copyright for his work right upon its creation.⁄ Contrary to
petitioner’s contention, the intellectual creator’s exercise and enjoyment of
copyright for his work and the protection given by law to him is not contingent
or dependent on any formality or registration. Therefore, taking the material
allegations of paragraphs 1.3 to 1.5 of P&GP’s verified Complaint in the
context of PD 49, it cannot be seriously doubted that at least, for purposes of
determining whether preliminary injunction should issue during the pendency
of the case, P&GP is entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for in its
Complaint.
(11) RAPPLER v. BAUTISTA
EN BANC
G.R. No. 222702, April 05, 2016
RAPPLER, INC., Petitioner, v. ANDRES D. BAUTISTA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
Petitioner Rappler, Inc. (petitioner) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against Andres D. Bautista (respondent), in his capacity as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The petition seeks to nullify Part VI
(C), paragraph 19 and Part VI (D), paragraph 20 of the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) on the 2016 presidential and vice-presidential debates, for
being executed without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and for violating the
fundamental rights of petitioner protected under the Constitution. The MOA,
signed on 13 January 2016, was executed by the COMELEC through its
Chairman, respondent Bautista, and the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas (KBP), and the various media networks, namely: ABS-CBN
Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., Nine Media Corporation, TV5 Network, Inc.,
Philstar Daily, Inc., Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc., Manila Bulletin Publishing
Corporation, Philippine Business Daily Mirror Publishing, Inc., and petitioner.
Under the MOA, the KBP was designated as Debate Coordinator while ABS-
CBN, GMA, Nine Media, and TV5, together with their respective print media
partners were designated as Lead Networks.
Petitioner alleged that on 21 September 2015, respondent called for a
meeting with various media outlets to discuss the "PiliPinas 2016 Debates,"
for presidential and vice-presidential candidates, which the COMELEC was
organizing.1 Respondent showed a presentation explaining the framework of
the debates, in which there will be three presidential debates and one vice
presidential debate. Respondent proposed that petitioner and Google, Inc. be
in charge of online and social media engagement. Respondent announced
during the meeting that KBP will coordinate with all media entities regarding
the organization and conduct of the debates.
On 22 September 2015, petitioner sent a proposed draft for broadcast pool
guidelines to COMELEC and the KBP. A broadcast pool has a common
audio and video feed of the debates, and the cost will be apportioned among
those needing access to the same. KBP informed petitioner that the proposal
will be discussed in the next meeting.
On 19 October 2015, another meeting was held at the COMELEC office to
discuss a draft MOA on the debates. In the draft, petitioner and Google's
participation were dropped in favor of the online outlets owned by the Lead
Networks. After the meeting, the representatives of the Lead Networks drew
lots to determine who will host each leg of the debates. GMA and its partner
Philippine Daily Inquirer sponsored the first presidential debate in Mindanao
on 21 February 2016; TV5, Philippine Star, and Businessworld sponsored
the second phase of presidential debate in the Visayas on 20 March 2016;
ABS-CBN and Manila Bulletin will sponsor the presidential debate to be held
in Luzon on 24 April 2016; and the lone vice-presidential debate will be
sponsored by CNN, Business Mirror, and petitioner on 10 April 2016.
Petitioner alleged that the draft MOA permitted online streaming, provided
proper attribution is given the Lead Network.
On 12 January 2016, petitioner was informed that the MOA signing was
scheduled the following day. Upon petitioner's request, the draft MOA was
emailed to petitioner on the evening of 12 January 2016. Petitioner
communicated with respondent its concerns regarding certain provisions of
the MOA particularly regarding online streaming and the imposition of a
maximum limit of two minutes of debate excerpts for news reporting.
Respondent assured petitioner that its concerns will be addressed
afterwards, but it has to sign the MOA because time was of the essence. On
13 January 2016, petitioner, along with other media networks and entities,
executed the MOA with the KBP and the COMELEC for the conduct of the
three presidential debates and one vice-presidential debate. Petitioner
alleged that it made several communications with respondent and the
10
COMELEC Commissioners regarding its concerns on some of the MOA
provisions, but petitioner received no response. Hence, this petition.
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner prays for the Court to
render judgment:
a. Declaring null and void, for being unconstitutional, pertinent parts of the
Memorandum of Agreement that violate the rights of the Petitioner,
specifically Part VI (C), paragraph 19 and Part VI (D), paragraph 20 [of the
MOA];
b. Prohibiting the Respondent from implementing specifically Part VI (C),
paragraph 19 and Part VI (D), paragraph 20 of the MOA;
c. Pending resolution of this case, issuing a Preliminary Injunction enjoining
the Respondent from implementing Part VI (C), paragraph 19 and Part VI
(D), paragraph 20 of the MOA; and
d. Pending resolution of this case, issuing a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
requiring the Respondent to ensure an unimpaired and equal access to all
mass media, online or traditional, to all the Debates.2
Part VI (C), paragraph 19 and Part VI (D), paragraph 20 of the MOA read:
VI
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LEAD NETWORKS
xxxx
C. ONLINE STREAMING
xxxx
19. Subject to copyright conditions or separate negotiations with the Lead
Networks, allow the debates they have produced to be shown or streamed
on other websites;
D. NEWS REPORTING AND FAIR USE
20. Allow a maximum of two minutes of excerpt from the debates they have
produced to be used for news reporting or fair use by other media or entities
as allowed by the copyright law: Provided, that the use of excerpts longer
than two minutes shall be subject to the consent of the Lead Network
concerned;3
Respondent argues that the petition should be dismissed for its procedural
defects. In several cases, this Court has acted liberally and set aside
procedural lapses in cases involving transcendental issues of public interest, 4
especially when time constraint is a factor to be considered, as in this case.
As held in GMA Network, Inc. v. Commission on Elections:5
Respondent claims that certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies
that petitioners have taken to question the assailed Resolution of the
COMELEC. Technically, respondent may have a point. However, considering
the very important and pivotal issues raised, and the limited time, such
technicality should not deter the Court from having to make the final and
definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment and
guidance. "[T]his Court has in the past seen fit to step in and resolve petitions
despite their being the subject of an improper remedy, in view of the public
importance of the issues raised therein.6
The urgency to resolve this case is apparent considering that the televised
debates have already started and only two of the scheduled four national
debates remain to be staged.7 And considering the importance of the
debates in informing the electorate of the positions of the presidential and
vice-presidential candidates on vital issues affecting the nation, this case falls
under the exception laid down in GMA Network, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections.
Petitioner is a signatory to the MOA. In fact, the sole vice-presidential debate,
to be held in Manila on 10 April 2016, will be sponsored by CNN Philippines
(owned and operated by Nine Media Corporation) and its partners Business
Mirror and petitioner. Petitioner, however, is alleging that it is being
discriminated particularly as regards the MOA provisions on live audio
broadcast via online streaming. Petitioner argues that the MOA grants radio
stations the right to simultaneously broadcast live the audio of the debates,
even if the radio stations are not obliged to perform any obligation under the
MOA. Yet, this right to broadcast by live streaming online the audio of the
debates is denied petitioner and other online media entities, which also have
the capacity to live stream the audio of the debates. Petitioner insists that it
signed the MOA believing in good faith the issues it has raised will be
resolved by the COMELEC.
The provisions on Live Broadcast and Online Streaming under the MOA
read:
VI
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LEAD NETWORKS
11

xxxx
B1. LIVE BROADCAST
10. Broadcast the debates produced by the Lead Networks in their respective
television stations and other news media platforms;
11. Provide a live feed of the debate to other radio stations, other than those
of the Lead Network's, for simultaneous broadcast;
12. Provide a live feed of the debates produced by them to radio stations not
belonging to any of the Lead Networks for simultaneous broadcast;
xxxx
C. ONLINE STREAMING
17. Live broadcast the debates produced by the Lead Networks on their
respective web sites and social media sites for free viewing by the public;
18. Maintain a copy of the debate produced by the Lead Network on its on-
line site(s) for free viewing by the public during the period of elections or
longer;
19. Subject to copyright conditions or separate negotiations with the
Lead Networks, allow the debates they have produced to be shown or
streamed on other websites;8 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner's demand to exercise the right to live stream the debates is a
contractual right of petitioner under the MOA. Under Part VI (C), paragraph
19 of the MOA, the Lead Networks are expressly mandated to "allow the
debates they have produced to be shown or streamed on other
websites," but "subject to copyright conditions or separate
negotiations with the Lead Networks." The use of the word "or" means
that compliance with the "copyright conditions" is sufficient for petitioner to
exercise its right to live stream the debates in its website.
The "copyright conditions" refer to the limitations on copyright as provided
under Section 184.1(c) of the Intellectual Property Code (IPC), thus:
SEC. 184. Limitations on Copyright. - 184.1 Notwithstanding the provisions of
Chapter V, the following acts shall not constitute infringement of copyright:
x x x x
(c) The reproduction or communication to the public by mass media of
articles on current political, social, economic, scientific or religious topic,
lectures, addresses and other works of the same nature, which are
delivered in public if such use is for information purposes and has not
been expressly reserved; Provided, That the source is clearly indicated;
(Sec. 11, P.D. No. 49) (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Under this provision, the debates fall under "addresses and other works of
the same nature." Thus, the copyright conditions for the debates are: (1) the
reproduction or communication to the public by mass media of the
debates is for information purposes; (2) the debates have not been
expressly reserved by the Lead Networks (copyright holders); and (3) the
source is clearly indicated.
Condition 1 is complied because the live streaming by petitioner is obviously
for information purposes. Condition 2 is also complied because Part VI (C),
paragraph 19 of the MOA expressly "allow[s] the debates x x x to be
shown or streamed on other websites," including petitioner's website. This
means that the "reproduction or communication (of the debates) to the public
by mass media x x x has not been expressly reserved" or withheld. Condition
3 is complied by clearly indicating and acknowledging that the source of the
debates is one or more of the Lead Networks.
Part VI (C), paragraph 19 of the MOA, which expressly allows the debates
produced by the Lead Networks to be shown or streamed on other websites,
clearly means that the Lead Networks have not "expressly reserved" or
withheld the use of the debate audio for online streaming. In short, the
MOA expressly allows the live streaming of the debates subject only to
compliance with the "copyright conditions." Once petitioner complies with the
copyright conditions, petitioner can exercise the right to live stream the audio
of the debates as expressly allowed by the MOA.
Under the MOA, the Lead Networks are mandated to promote the debates
for maximum audience.9 The MOA recognizes the public function of the
debates and the need for the widest possible dissemination of the
debates. The MOA has not reserved or withheld the reproduction of the
debates to the public but has in fact expressly allowed the reproduction
of the debates "subject to copyright conditions." Thus, petitioner may
live stream the debate in its entirety by complying with the "copyright
conditions," including the condition that "the source is clearly indicated" and
that there will be no alteration, which means that the streaming will include
the proprietary graphics used by the Lead Networks. If petitioner opts for a
12
clean feed without the proprietary graphics used by the Lead Networks, in copyright condition that the source is clearly indicated. Due to the time
order for petitioner to layer its own proprietary graphics and text on the same, constraint, this Resolution is immediately executory.
then petitioner will have to negotiate separately with the Lead Networks.
Similarly, if petitioner wants to alter the debate audio by deleting the SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
advertisements, petitioner will also have to negotiate with the Lead Networks.

Once the conditions imposed under Section 184.1(c) of the IPC are complied
with, the information - in this case the live audio of the debates -now forms
part of the public domain. There is now freedom of the press to report or
publicly disseminate the live audio of the debates. In fact, the MOA
recognizes the right of other mass media entities, not parties to the MOA, to
reproduce the debates subject only to the same copyright conditions. The
freedom of the press to report and disseminate the live audio of the debates,
subject to compliance with Section 184.1(c) of the IPC, can no longer be
infringed or subject to prior restraint. Such freedom of the press to report and
disseminate the live audio of the debates is now protected and guaranteed
under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "[N]o law
shall be passed abridging the freedom x x x of the press."

The presidential and vice-presidential debates are held primarily for the
benefit of the electorate to assist the electorate in making informed choices
on election day. Through the conduct of the national debates among
presidential and vice-presidential candidates, the electorate will have the
"opportunity to be informed of the candidates' qualifications and track record,
platforms and programs, and their answers to significant issues of national
concern."10 The political nature of the national debates and the public's
interest in the wide availability of the information for the voters' education
certainly justify allowing the debates to be shown or streamed in other
websites for wider dissemination, in accordance with the MOA.

Therefore, the debates should be allowed to be live streamed on other

websites, including petitioner's, as expressly mandated in Part VI (C),
paragraph 19 of the MOA. The respondent, as representative of the
COMELEC which provides over-all supervision under the MOA, including the
power to "resolve issues that may arise among the parties involved in the
organization of the debates,"11 should be directed by this Court to implement
Part VI (C), paragraph 19 of the MOA, which allows the debates to be shown
or live streamed unaltered on petitioner's and other websites subject to the
copyright condition that the source is clearly indicated.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. Respondent Andres D.

Bautista, as Chairman of the COMELEC, is directed to implement Part VI
(C), paragraph 19 of the MOA, which allows the debates to be shown or live
streamed unaltered on petitioner's and other websites subject to the

13