Remrev1 Case Digest

IMELDA RELUCIO vs ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ GR No.
138497, January 16 2002
Remedial Law; Actions; A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the
defendant in violation of the legal right of the other; Elements of
.—“A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the
legal right of the other.” The elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
Same; Same; To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint
must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been
merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain
.—A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the
alleged facts were admitted or proved. In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of
cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather
than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain.
FACTS:
Herein private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for "APPOINTMENT AS
SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES,
FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio,
in the Regional Trial Court. In the petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime in
1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the private respondent, abandoned the
latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive
control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for
his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and their four
children; that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit
relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976.
A Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that private
respondent has no cause of action against her. An Order was issued by herein
respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she
is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject
properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's
denial of her motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal

property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of
action against petitioner;
Whether petitioner's inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a

complete adjudication of the controversy.
RULING:
(1.) A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the
legal right of the other. The elements of a cause of action are: (a) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her marriage to
Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. Article 128 of
the Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit: "If a spouse without just cause abandons
the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved
spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for
authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property xxx" The
administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion
of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband.
Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty
relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action.
The second cause of action is for an accounting by respondent husband. The
accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner
has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez.
The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in
property co-owned by him and petitioner. The issue is whether there is basis in law to
forfeit Alberto Lopez' share, if any there be, in property co-owned by him with petitioner.
Respondent's asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. Failure
of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds in
respondent's favor, results in a breach of an obligation to respondent and gives rise to a
cause of action. Such cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not
petitioner.
(2.) A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment of the suit. In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in
Special Proceedings.
If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party.

An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an
action. Petitioner's participation in Special Proceedings is not indispensable. Certainly,
the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of
his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to respondent and their
children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit
Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment
would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.
Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in the above Special Proceedings. A necessary
party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete
relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action. In the context of her petition in the lower
court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to
account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to
respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and
dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with respondent.
OPOSA v FACTORAN G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
Facts:
Forty-four minors, through their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of
“their generation as well as those generations yet unborn”, filed an action against the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have
him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and
desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The children
invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in
its capacity as parens patriae.
The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to
stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law, and
in violation of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was
dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Issues:
1. Do the children have the legal standing to file the case?

2. Whether the plaintiffs has a cause of action?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the
legal standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational
responsibility”. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to
preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court
recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court
said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the
police power of the state in the interest of public welfare.
2. Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by
law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one
fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is
incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with
it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many
other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary
government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the
exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural
resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in
Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the
DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said
right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful
ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be
renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be

adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
UST VS DANES SANCHEZ GR No. 165569
FACTS
This case began with a Complaint for Damages filed by respondent Danes B. Sanchez
(respondent) against the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and its Board of Directors,
the Dean and the Assistant Dean of the UST College of Nursing, and the University
Registrar for their alleged unjustified refusal to release the respondents Transcript of
Records (ToR).
In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he graduated from UST on April 2, 2002 with
a Bachelors Degree of Science in Nursing. He was included in the list of candidates for
graduation and attended graduation ceremonies. On April 18, 2002, respondent sought
to secure a copy of his Transcript of Record with the UST Registrar’s Office, paid the
required fees, but was only given a Certificate of Graduation by the Registrar. Despite
repeated attempts by the respondent to secure a copy of his Transcript of Record, and
submission of his class cards as proof of his enrolment, UST refused to release his
records, making it impossible for him to take the nursing board examinations, and
depriving him of the opportunity to make a living. The respondent prayed that the RTC
order UST to release his ToR and hold UST liable for actual, moral, and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit.
Instead of filing an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed
that they refused to release respondents Transcript of Record because he was not a
registered student, since he had not been enrolled in the university for the last three
semesters. They claimed that the respondents graduation, attendance in classes, and
taking/passing of examinations were immaterial because he ceased to be a student
when he failed to enroll during the second semester of school year 2000-2001. They
also sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action.
After the parties filed their responsive pleadings, petitioners filed a Supplement to their
Motion to Dismiss, alleging that respondent sought administrative recourse before the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) through a letter-complaint dated January 21,
2003. Thus, petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve
matters pertaining to school controversies, and the filing of the instant case was
premature.
Issues:
1. Whether or not CHED exercises quasi-judicial power over controversies

involving school matters and has primary jurisdiction over respondents demand
for the release of his ToR.
2. Whether or not the Complaint failed to state a cause of action, since

respondent admitted that he was not enrolled in UST in the last three semesters
prior to graduation.
Held:
1. The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency
exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Thus, an essential requisite for
this doctrine to apply is the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. However,
petitioners have not shown that the CHED possesses any such power to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions. Indeed, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722
otherwise known as the Higher Education Act of 1994, certainly does not contain
any express grant to the CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power.
3. The Complaint states a cause of action. Under Rule 16, Section 1(g) of the Rules
of Court, a motion to dismiss may be made on the ground that the pleading
asserting the claim states no cause of action. To clarify the essential test required
to sustain dismissal on this ground, we have explained that the test of the
sufficiency of the facts found in a petition, to constitute a cause of action, is
whether admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon
the same in accordance with the prayer of the petition. Stated otherwise, a
complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears
solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for. The Complaint makes the following essential allegations: that petitioners
unjustifiably refused to release respondents ToR despite his having obtained a
degree from UST; that petitioners claim that respondent was not officially enrolled
is untrue; that as a result of petitioners unlawful actions, respondent has not been
able to take the nursing board exams since 2002; that petitioners actions violated
Articles 19-21 of the Civil Code; and that petitioners should be ordered to release
respondents ToR and held liable for P400,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00
as exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs of suit, and
P15,000.00 as actual damages.
Yuk Ling Ong vs. Benjamin T. Co G.R. No. 206653, February 25, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent
Benjamin Co (respondent), a Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982.
Sometime in November 2008, petitioner received a subpoena from the Bureau of

Immigration and Deportation (BID) directing her to appear before the said agency
because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation
proceedings. Reportedly, her marriage with respondent was nullified by the court.
When petitioner appeared before the BID, she was furnished with the copies of the
following documents: (1) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed; (2)
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent as void ab initio; and (3) their marriage contract with the subject
decision annotated thereon. Petitioner was perplexed that her marriage with respondent
had been declared void ab initio.
The above documents showed that on April 26, 2001, respondent filed a petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC
Respondent indicated that petitioner’s address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2
Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued summons. In
his Server’s Return, process server Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that, on August 1, 2002,
substituted service of summons with the copy of the petition was effected after several
futile attempts to serve the same personally on petitioner. The said documents were
received by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a security officer.
Petitioner alleged that first, respondent committed extrinsic fraud because he

deliberately indicated a wrong address to prevent her from participating in the trial;
second, jurisdiction over her person was not acquired because of an invalid substituted
service of summons as no sufficient explanation, showing impossibility of personal
service, was stated before resorting to substituted service of summons; third, the
alleged substituted service was made on a security guard of their townhouse and not on
a member of her household; and fourth, she was not psychologically incapacitated to
perform her marital obligations.
Petitioner argues that there was an invalid substituted service of summons. The process
server’s return only contained a general statement that substituted service was resorted
to “after several futile attempts to serve the same personally,” without stating the dates
and reasons of the failed attempts.
In his Comment, filed on July 9, 2014, respondent contended that the server’s return
satisfactorily stated the reason for the resort to a substituted service of summons on
August 1, 2002; and it was improbable that petitioner failed to receive the summons
because it was sent to the same address which she declared in this present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.
Held:
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or
the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not voluntarily
appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of
summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc) thoroughly discussed the rigorous

requirements of a substituted service of summons, to wit:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by
the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month
which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several
attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In
addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and
the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date
and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the
defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant
and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or
residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the
defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of
the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the
defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons.
The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the
process server to personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made
a general statement that summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve
the same personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to
perform the personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the
attempts were made; and the underlying reason for each unsuccessful service. He did
not explain either if there were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the
defendant in the case. These important acts to serve the summons on petitioner, though
futile, must be specified in the return to justify substituted service.
The server’s return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on
behalf of petitioner. It simply stated that the summons was received “by Mr. Roly
Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.” It did not
expound on the competence of the security officer to receive the summons.
Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met and there was an
invalid substituted service of summons. The decision in Civil Case must be declared null
and void.
The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was meant to address "the
numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of
a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher
courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses." Although the
decision in Civil Case was promulgated as early as December 11, 2002, the Court must
strike it down for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. The favorable
judgment enjoyed by respondent cannot be categorized as a genuine victory because it
was fought against an adversary, who was ignorant of the existing dispute. Whatever
prize bestowed upon the victor in such a void decision must also be undone.
Respondent, if he wishes to pursue, must start from scratch and institute his action for
declaration of nullity again; this time with petitioner fully aware and ready for litigation.
Goodland Company, Inc. vs. Asia United Bank G.R. No. 195561, March 14, 2012
Facts:
Goodland Company mortgaged its two parcels of land situated in Sta. Rosa,
Laguna through a Third Party Real Estate Mortgage (REM) with Smartnet to secure the
loans extended by Asia United Bank (AUB). Petitioner also executed another REM for
its Makati properties. Both the REMs were signed by its President Gilbert Guy. AUB
registered the mortgages with the Registry of Deed at the concerned properties.
Afterwards, Goodland repudiated the REMs. Hence, Goodland filed a complaint for
annulment of mortgage before the RTC of Bian, Laguna on the ground that the REM
was falsified and against the agreement that the blank mortgage would only serve as a
comfort document and not to be registered by AUB.
Smartnet defaulted on its loan obligation which prompted AUB to extra-judicially

foreclose the REM and then was issued a Certificate of Sale registered with the
Registry of Deeds. Goodland filed another case seeking for the annulment of the
foreclosure sale and enjoin consolidation of the title in favor of AUB. AUB moved to
dismiss both the cases filed by Goodland on the ground of forum shopping and litis
pendentia. It was granted. On appeal, the decision of the RTC were reversed. As to the
Makati properties, the same case was filed by Goodland including the President of AUB
and the notarizing lawyer whose signature was falsified. The same was contradicted by
AUB but this time, the motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping, non-payment
of proper docket fees, and litis pendentia were denied. AUB argued that there was no
service of summons, thus the court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondents. On appeal, the CA held Goodland guilty of forum shopping for failing to
inform AUB of the other case filed while the case on the REM is pending.
Issue:
Is Goodland Company guilty of forum shopping?
Ruling:
Yes. All the elements of forum shopping are present in this case. There is forum
shopping when the following elements are present:
a. identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions;
b. identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and
c. the identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in
the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.
There can be no dispute that the prayer for relief in the two cases was based on
the same attendant facts in the execution of REMs over petitioner’s properties in favor
of AUB. While the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, consolidation of ownership in
AUB and issuance of title in the latter’s name were set forth only in the second case,
these were simply the expected consequences of the REM transaction in the first case.
There is also identity of parties. The parties in the first and second case are
substantially the same as they represent the same interest and offices. Goodland’s
argument that the certification and verification appended to its complaint satisfactorily
conforms with the requirements of the required certificate of non-forum shopping.
However, the Supreme Court disagrees. Goodland filed a certificate which is partly false
and misleading.
The elements of litis pendentia are also present. It refers to the situation where
two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that
one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against
multiplicity of suits.
Fortich vs Corona GRNo. 131475
FACTS:
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a “win-win” Resolution
which reopened case O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution substantially
modified its March 29, 1996 Decision. The OP had long declared the said Decision final
& executory after the DAR’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied for having been
filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. The SC then struck down as void the OP’s
act, it being in gross disregard of the rules & basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations. The respondents contended in their instant motion that
the “win-win” Resolution of November 7, 1997 is not void since “it seeks to correct an
erroneous ruling,” hence, the “March 29, 1996 decision…could not as yet become final
and executory as to be beyond modification”. They further explained that the DAR’s
failure to file their Motion for Reconsideration on time was “excusable”.
ISSUE:
Was the OP’s modification of the Decision void or a valid exercise of its powers and
prerogatives?
1. Whether the DAR’s late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration is excusable.
2. Whether the respondents have shown a justifiable reason for the relaxation of rules.
3. Whether the issue is a question of technicality.
HELD:
1. No. Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, mandates that
‘decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall…become final after the
lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof xxx’ unless a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof is filed within such period. The respondent’s explanation that the DAR’s office
procedure ‘made it impossible…to file its Motion for Reconsideration on time’ since the
said decision had to be referred to its different departments cannot be considered a
valid justification. While there is nothing wrong with such referral, the DAR must not
disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation. The rules relating to
reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal office procedure of
an administrative body.
2. No. The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no longer be disturbed or
substantially modified. Res judicata has set in and the adjudicated affair should forever
be put to rest. Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard
since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening
problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The
Constitution guarantees that “all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.” While litigation is
not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly & speedy administration of justice. The
flexibility in the relaxation of rules was ‘never intended to forge a bastion for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity.’ A liberal interpretation & application of the
rules of procedure can only be resorted to in proper cases and under justifiable causes
and circumstances.
3. No. It is a question of substance & merit. A decision/resolution/order of an

administrative body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same
was rendered Without or in Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of Discretion, is
a mere technicality of law or procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory
requirement before a case or controversy can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still
invalid if done in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. In the instant
case, several fatal violations of law were committed. These grave breaches of law, rules
& settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature. When the March
29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by
the petitioners, and all others who should be benefited by the said Decision. In the
words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory Board vs
CA, et al., “just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his/her case.”
ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 203775 August 5,

2014
Facts:
The Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) is a Party-List which won in the party-list
elections in the 2010 national elections. However, the party list was disqualified by the
COMELEC. The disqualification of the ABC Party-List resulted in the re-computation of
the party-list allocations in the House of Representatives.
The COMELEC then issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0859, in which it resolved among
others:
1. TO GRANT the September 14, 2012 Urgent Motion for Proclamation of Alay Buhay
Community Development Foundation, Inc. (Alay Buhay) Party-List;
2. TO DENY the September 20, 2012 Very Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens of the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens) Party-List;
3. TO NOTE the September 24, 2012 Opposition to Senior CitizensParty-List’s "Very
Very UrgentEx-Parte Motion" of Alay Buhay Community Development Foundation, Inc.
(Alay Buhay) Party-List;
4. TO CONFIRM the herein RE-COMPUTATION OF THE ALLOCATION OF SEATS of

the Party-List System of Representation in the House of Representatives in the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections;
5. TO PROCLAIM Alay Buhay Community Development Foundation, Inc. (Alay Buhay)

Party-List as a winning party-list group in the Party-List System of Representation in the
House of Representatives in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections;
and
6. TO DECLARE the First (1st) NOMINEE of Alay Buhay Community Development

Foundation, Inc. (Alay Buhay) Party-List, as the FIRST (1st) SITTING
REPRESENTATIVE in the Party-List System of Representation in the House of
Representatives in accordance with the Order of Nominees per the List appearing in its
March 17, 2010 Certificate of Nomination.
Petitioners Association of Flood Victims and Jaime Aguilar Hernandez (Hernandez) filed
a special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
and asserts that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued
Minute Resolution No. 12-0859. Furthermore, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ
of mandamus to compel publication of the COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0859.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners considered parties-in-interest to file the case?
Ruling:
No.
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court mandates that "facts showing the capacity of a
party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a
party, must be averred."
In the present case, petitioner Association of Flood Victims is an unincorporated

association not endowed with a distinct personality of its own. An unincorporated
association, in the absence of an enabling law, has no juridical personality and thus,
cannot sue in the name of the association. Such unincorporated association is not a
legal entity distinct from its members. If an association, like petitioner Association of
Flood Victims, has no juridical personality, then all members of the association must be
made parties in the civil action. In this case, other than his bare allegation that he is the
lead convenor of the Association of Flood Victims, petitioner Hernandez showed no
proof that he was authorized by said association. Aside from petitioner Hernandez, no
other member was made signatory to the petition. Only petitioner Hernandez signed the
Verification and Sworn Certification Against Forum Shopping, stating that he caused the
preparation of the petition. There was no accompanying document showing that the
other members of the Association of Flood Victims authorized petitioner Hernandez to
represent them and the association in the petition.
FEDMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION versus FEDERICO AGCAOILI

G.R. No. 165025 August 31, 2011
FACTS:
Fedman Development Corporation (FDC) the owner and developer of a
condominium project known as Fedman Suites Building (FSB). On June 18, 1975,
Interchem Laboratories Incorporated (Interchem) purchased FSBs Unit 411 under a
contract to sell. On March 31, 1977, FDC executed a Master Deed with Declaration of
Restrictions, and formed the Fedman Suite Condominium Corporation (FSCC) to
manage FSB and hold title over its common areas.
On October 10, 1980, Interchem, with FDCs consent, transferred all its rights in
Unit 411 to respondent Federico Agcaoili (Agcaoili) as consideration for the transfer,
Agcaoili agreed: (a) to pay Interchem ₱150,000.00 upon signing of the deed of transfer;
(b) to update the account by paying to FDC the amount of ₱15,473.17 through a 90
day-postdated check; and (c) to deliver to FDC the balance of ₱137,286.83 in 135 equal
monthly installments of ₱1,857.24 effective October 1980, inclusive of 12% interest per
annum on the diminishing balance. The obligations Agcaoili assumed
totaled₱302,760.00.
In December 1983, the centralized air-conditioning unit of FSBs fourth floor broke
down. On January 3, 1984, Agcaoili, being thereby adversely affected, wrote to Eduardo
X. Genato (Genato), vice-president and board member of FSCC, demanding the repair
of the air-conditioning unit. Not getting any immediate response, Agcaoili sent follow-up
letters to FSCC reiterating the demand, but the letters went unheeded. He then
informed FDC and FSCC that he was suspending the payment of his condominium
dues and monthly amortizations.
On August 30, 1984, FDC cancelled the contract to sell involving Unit 411 and
cut off the electric supply to the unit. Agcaoili was thus prompted to sue FDC and FSCC
in the RTC, Makati City, Branch 144 for injunction and damages. The parties later
executed a compromise agreement that the RTC approved through its decision of
August 26, 1985. As stipulated in the compromise agreement, Agcaoili paid FDC the
sum of ₱39,002.04 as amortizations for the period from November 1983 to July 1985;
and also paid FSCC an amount of ₱17,858.37 for accrued condominium dues, realty
taxes, electric bills, and surcharges as of March 1985. As a result, FDC reinstated the
contract to sell and allowed Agcaoili to temporarily install two window-type air-
conditioners in Unit 411.
On April 22, 1986, FDC again disconnected the electric supply of Unit
411.Agcaoili thus moved for the execution of the RTC decision dated August 26,
1985. On July 17, 1986, the RTC issued an order temporarily allowing Agcaoili to obtain
his electric supply from the other units in the fourth floor of FSB until the main meter
was restored.
On March 6, 1987, Agcaoili lodged a complaint for damages against FDC and
FSCC in the RTC.He alleged that the disconnection of the electric supply of Unit 411 on
April 22, 1986 had unjustly deprived him of the use and enjoyment of the unit; that the
disconnection had seriously affected his law practice and had caused him sufferings,
inconvenience and embarrassment; that FDC and FSCC violated the compromise
agreement; that he was entitled to actual damages amounting to ₱21,626.60, as well as
to moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees as might be proven during the
trial; that the payment of interest sought by FDC and FSCC under the contract to sell
was illegal; and that FDC and FSCC were one and the same corporation. He also
prayed that FDC and FSCC be directed to return the excessive amounts collected for
real estate taxes.
In its answer, FDC contended that it had a personality separate from that of
FSCC; that it had no obligation or liability in favor of Agcaoili; that FSCC, being the
manager of FSB and the title-holder over its common areas, was in charge of
maintaining all central and appurtenant equipment and installations for utility services
(like air-conditioning unit, elevator, light and others); that Agcaoili failed to comply with
the terms of the contract to sell; that despite demands, Agcaoili did not pay the
amortizations due from November 1983 to March 1985 and the surcharges, the total
amount of which was ₱376,539.09; that due to the non-payment, FDC cancelled the
contract to sell and forfeited the amount of ₱219,063.97 paid by Agcaoili, applying the
amount to the payment of liquidated damages, agents commission, and interest; that it
demanded that Agcaoili vacate Unit 411, but its demand was not heeded; that Agcaoili
did not pay his monthly amortizations of ₱1,883.84 from October 1985 to May 1986,
resulting in FSCC being unable to pay the electric bills on time to the Manila Electric
Company resulting in the disconnection of the electric supply of FSB; that it allowed
Agcaoili to obtain electric supply from other units because Agcaoili promised to settle his
accounts but he reneged on his promise; that Agcaoilis total obligation was ₱55,106.40;
that Agcaoilis complaint for damages was baseless and was intended to cover up his
delinquencies; that the interest increase from 12% to 24% per annum was authorized
under the contract to sell in view of the adverse economic conditions then prevailing in
the country; and that the complaint for damages was barred by the principle of res
judicata because the issues raised therein were covered by the RTC decision dated
August 26, 1985.
As compulsory counterclaim, FDC prayed for an award of moral and exemplary
damages each amounting to ₱1,000,000.00, attorneys fees amounting to ₱100,000.00
and costs of suit.
On its part, FSCC filed an answer, admitting that the electric supply of Unit 411
was disconnected for the second time on April 22, 1986, but averring that the
disconnection was justified because of Agcaoilis failure to pay the monthly amortizations
and condominium dues despite repeated demands. It averred that it did not repair the
air-conditioning unit because of dwindling collections caused by the failure of some unit
holders to pay their obligations on time; that the unit holders were notified of the
electricity disconnection; and that the electric supply of Unit 411 could not be restored
until Agcaoili paid his condominium dues totaling ₱14,701.16 as of April 1987.
By way of counterclaim, FSCC sought moral damages and attorneys fees

of ₱100,000.00 and ₱50,000.00, respectively, and cost of suit.
On August 28, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Agcaoili, holding that
his complaint for damages was not barred by res judicata; that he was justified in
suspending the payment of his monthly amortizations; that FDCs cancellation of the
contract to sell was improper; that FDC and FSCC had no separate personalities; and
that Agcaoili was entitled to damages.
FDC appealed, but the CA affirmed the RTC. Hence, FDC comes to us on further
appeal.
ISSUES:
a) FDC claims that there was a failure to pay the correct amount of docket fee herein
because the complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees; that the payment of the prescribed docket fee by Agcaoili
was necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case; and that, consequently,
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over this case.
b) FDC also claims that the proceedings in the RTC were void because the jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action pertained to the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB); and that both the RTC and the CA erred in ruling: (a) that
Agcaoili had the right to suspend payment of his monthly amortizations; (b) that FDC
had no right to cancel the contract to sell; and (c) that FDC and FSCC were one and
same corporation, and as such were solidarily liable to Agcaoili for damages. [22]
HELD:
a) In Rivera v. Del Rosario the Court, resolving the issue of the failure to pay the
correct amount of docket fees due to the inadequate assessment by the clerk of court,
ruled that jurisdiction over the complaint was still validly acquired upon the full payment
of the docket fees assessed by the Clerk of Court. Relying on Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the Court opined that the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vested a trial court
with jurisdiction over the claim, and although the docket fees paid were insufficient in
relation to the amount of the claim, the clerk of court or his duly authorized deputy
retained the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, and the party filing the
action could be required to pay the deficiency, without jurisdiction being automatically
lost.
Even where the clerk of court fails to make a deficiency assessment, and the
deficiency is not paid as a result, the trial court nonetheless continues to have
jurisdiction over the complaint, unless the party liable is guilty of a fraud in that regard,
considering that the deficiency will be collected as a fee in lien within the contemplation
of Section 2,Rule 141 (as revised by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC). The reason is that to
penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is not fair if the party has acted in
good faith.
Herein, the docket fees paid by Agcaoili were insufficient considering that the
complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that Agcaoili paid the assessed docket
fees. Such payment negated bad faith or intent to defraud the
Government. Nonetheless, Agcaoili must remit any docket fee deficiency to the RTCs
clerk of court.
b) FDC is now barred from asserting that the HLURB, not the RTC, had
jurisdiction over the case. As already stated, Agcaoili filed a complaint against FDC in
the RTC on February 28, 1985 after FDC disconnected the electric supply of Unit 411.
Agcaoili and FDC executed a compromise agreement on August 16, 1985. The RTC
approved the compromise agreement through its decision of August 26, 1985. In all that
time, FDC never challenged the RTCs jurisdiction nor invoked the HLURBs authority.
On the contrary, FDC apparently recognized the RTCs jurisdiction by its voluntary
submission of the compromise agreement to the RTC for approval. Also, FDC did not
assert the HLURBs jurisdiction in its answer to Agcaoilis second complaint (filed on
March 6, 1987). Instead, it even averred in that answer that the decision of August 26,
1985 approving the compromise agreement already barred Agcaoili from filing the
second complaint under the doctrine of res judicata. FDC also thereby sought
affirmative relief from the RTC through its counterclaim.
c) We sustain the aforequoted findings and ruling of the CA, which were
supported by the records and relevant laws, and were consistent with the findings and
ruling of the RTC. Factual findings and rulings of the CA are binding and conclusive
upon this Court if they are supported by the records and coincided with those made by
the trial court.
FDCs claim that it was distinct in personality from FSCC is unworthy of

consideration due to its being a question of fact that cannot be reviewed under Rule 45.
Clearly, FDC was liable for damages. Article 1171 of the Civil Code provides that
those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for
damages.
PETITION was DENIED.
Lourdes Suites et al. vs Noemi Binary G.R No. 204729, August 6, 2014
Facts:
Lourdes Suites is the owner and operator of a hotel. It executed two (2) contracts with
respondent, Noemi Binarao for room accommodation for two groups of student for a
total contract price of P4, 262,010.00.
According to Lourdes Suites, Noemi has an unpaid balance of P47, 810.00 representing
the charges for damages to the furniture, a lost key and excess guests. A demand letter
was sent by to Noemi by the petitioner for the unsettled amount. However, respondent
failed to pay the amount and claimed it was charged twice. Thus, a Statement of Claim
for collection of sum of money plus damages before the MeTC was filed.
The MeTC ruled in favor of Noemi for failure of Lourdes Suites to prove by
preponderance of evidence the existence of such obligation. The MeTC dismissed the
complaint with prejudice for lack of cause of action.
On the Counter Claim ordering Lourdes Suites to pay the defendant the sum of Php43,
060.00 in refund of overpayment made to plaintiff plus moral damages.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC arguing that a dismissal
based on the ground that the complaint states “cause of action cannot be deemed a
dismissal with prejudice under the Rules and lack of cause of action is not a valid
ground for dismissal of case, much more dismissal with prejudice.”
The RTC ruled against petitioner, and found that there was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the MeTC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was also
denied by the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC is correct in dismissing the case with prejudice for lack of cause
of action?
Ruling:
Yes. The RTC correctly upheld the MTC Decision.
Justice Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the

distinction: What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of action which
is provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading. Sec.
5 of Rule 10, which was also included as the last mode for raising the issue to the court,
refers to the situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of action. This is,
therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a cause of action is
different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move for
dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence;
hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. The procedure
would consequently be to require the pleading to state· a cause of action, by timely
objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is
warranted.
As correctly stated by the RTC:

The basis of the public respondent in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of
action is the failure of petitioner to preponderantly establish its claim against the private
respondent by clear and convincing evidence. Hence, public respondent did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action,
as he referred to the evidence presented and not to the allegations in the Complaint.
The dismissal of the complaint with prejudice is likewise not an exercise of wanton or
palpable discretion. It must be noted that this case is an action for small claims where
decisions are rendered final and unappealable, hence, a decision dismissing the same
is necessarily with prejudice.
Wherefore, the petition is denied, the decision of the RTC of Makati is affirmed.
BERNARDO DE LEON vs PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY (PEA)

G.R. No. 181970 August 3, 2010
Facts:
On January 15, 1993, petitioner Bernardo De Leon filed a Complaint for Damages with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City against
respondent Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government-owned corporation, as well as
its officers. The suit for damages hinged on the alleged unlawful destruction of De
Leon’s fence and houses constructed on Lot 5155, San Dionisio, Parañaque, which De
Leon claimed has been in the possession of his family for more than 50 years.
The court a quo found merit in De Leon’s application for writ of preliminary injunction
and thus issued the Order dated 8 February 1993.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, on 30 September 1993, rendered a Decision

discerning that the RTC did not act in a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of
power in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against PEA.
PEA appealed to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Certiorari insisting that Lot 5155
was a salvage zone until it was reclaimed through government efforts in 1982. The land
was previously under water on the coastline which reached nine to twenty meters deep.
In 1989, PEA started constructing R-1 Toll Expressway Road for the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road, which project directly traversed Lot 5155. PEA argued that the
documentary evidence presented by De Leon to bolster his fallacious claim of
possession and ownership were procured only in 1992, thus negating his very own
allegation that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in occupation since time
immemorial.
The Supreme Court reversed the CA’s decision and declared that Lot 5155 was a public
land so that De Leon’s occupation thereof, no matter how long ago, could not confer
ownership or possessory rights. Prescinding therefrom, no writ of injunction may lie to
protect De Leon’s nebulous right of possession.
The aforesaid Decision became final and executory as no motion for reconsideration
was filed. In due course, PEA moved for the issuance of a writ of execution praying that
De Leon and persons claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate and peaceably
surrender possession of Lot 5155.
De Leon moved for reconsideration thereof and quashal of the writ of execution. He
adamantly insisted that the Order for the issuance of the writ of execution completely
deviated from the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court’s Decision as it did not
categorically direct him to surrender possession of Lot 5155 in favor of PEA. The motion
was denied.
De Leon filed another Motion for Reconsideration dated July 1, 2005, but the same was
denied by the RTC in an Order dated July 27, 2005.
On July 26, 2006, PEA filed a Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Demolition
praying that the RTC issue a Special Order directing De Leon and persons claiming
under him to remove all improvements erected inside the premises of the subject
property and, in case of failure to remove the said structures, that a Special Order and
Writ of Demolition be issued directing the sheriff to remove and demolish the said
improvements.
On October 11, 2006, the RTC issued an Order holding in abeyance the Resolution of
PEA’s Motion. PEA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC in
an Order dated January 12, 2007.
Issue:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of execution
placing PEA in possession of the disputed property, and whether there is still a need for
PEA to file an ejectment proceeding.
Ruling:
The question of ownership and rightful possession of the subject property had already
been settled and laid to rest. In this case, the land in question is admittedly public.
As a general rule, a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the
decision to be executed; an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original
judgment or award. The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must
conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, and may not
vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of
the judgment sought to be executed.
In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to

place the prevailing party in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to
surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper
officer should oust him. No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the
decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such event the
sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the improvements on
the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time. The
removal of the improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed read
into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special order by the court for the
removal of the improvements.
It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the
decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. In the
present case, it would be redundant for PEA to go back to court and file an ejectment
case simply to establish its right to possess the subject property. Contrary to De Leon’s
claims, the issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court did not constitute an
unwarranted modification of this Court’s decision, but rather, was a necessary
complement thereto. Such writ was but an essential consequence of this Court’s ruling
affirming the nature of the subject parcel of land as public and at the same time
dismissing De Leon’s claims of ownership and possession. To further require PEA to file
an ejectment suit to oust de Leon and his siblings from the disputed property would, in
effect, amount to encouraging multiplicity of suits.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied.
Mayor Marcial Vargas, et al vs Fortunato Cajucom

GRNo. 171095 June 22, 2015
The Facts:
In his complaint for Mandamus and abatement of nuisance against Mayor Marcial
Vargas, et al. (Petitioners) of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, Fortunato Cajucom (respondent)
alleged that he intended to start a gasoline station business on his lot, but several illegal
structures built on the road shoulder by Rodel Puno and others obstructed access to his
site, and despite demand, Puno et al refused to comply, frustrating his plan. He tried
enlisting the help of Mayor Vargas and Engr. Raymundo del Rosario, to no avail, thus
he prayed that after trial, the court command Mayor Puno et al to cause the removal of
the illegal structures built on the road shoulder by Puno , et. al.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favour of Cajucom. It held that Mayor Vargas failed to
perform their duties under he Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160), among which duties is the duty to order the
demolition or removal of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures on
the road shoulder. It granted the petition for mandamus, ordering Mayor Vargas and
Engr. Del rosario to comply with the above-cited provision of law. Cajucom then filed a
Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution after the decision became final and
executory. Subsequently the court issued a Writ of Execution, which was served by the
court sheriff on May 28, 2001. In his Return of Service, the sheriff stated that as of June
13, 2001, the judgment has not been executed.
On April 13, 2005, Cajucom filed a Motion to Compel Defendants to Implement the
Writ of Execution and to Explain Why They Should Not Be Cited In Contempt; in
response, the petitioners filed their Opposition, and their now Motion To Quash Writ of
Execution. Cajucom also filed a Motion to Punish Mayor Vargas and Engr. Del Rosario
for Contempt of Court, which the petitioners opposed.
The RTC ruling on all the motion except the Motion to Punish petitioners in
Contempt of Court, denied the motion to quash writ of execution filed by the petitioners.
It averred that the issuance of the writ was not premature as Cajucom had previously
demanded removal of the structures to no avail. It merely noted the Explanation on why
their should not be cited for contempt of court, and gave them 30 days from receipt to
implement the decision of the court with respect to private defendants Puno, et al
pursuant to Art. 87(b)(3)(VI) of Rule XV of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Local Government Code of 1991.
The petitioners elevated their case to the Supreme Court
The Issue:
Whether or not the writ of execution should be quashed.
The Ruling:
The Court is now confronted with the singular issue of whether grounds exist to
quash the subject writ of execution.
It is a consistent practice that once a judgment has become final and executory, a
writ of execution is issued as a matter of course, in the absence of any order restraining
its issuance. In addition, even a writ of demolition, if the case calls for it, is ancillary to
the process of execution and is logically also issued as a consequence of the writ of
execution earlier issued.
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is clear:
“Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. —Execution shall issue as a

matter of right, or motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or
proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been
duly perfected. (la)
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith
be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting
therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders
sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.”
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.Stated differently, once a
judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of
execution. Its issuance is, in fact, the trial court’s ministerial duty, the only limitation
being that the writ must conform substantially to every essential particular of the
judgment promulgated, more particularly, the orders or decrees in the dispositive portion
of the decision. Even the holding in abeyance of the issuance of a writ of execution of a
final and executory judgment can be considered abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court.
In sum, this Court has explained the principle as follows:
“It is not disputed that the judgment sought to be executed in the case at bar had
already become final and executory. It is fundamental that the prevailing party in a
litigation may, at any time within five (5) years after the entry thereof, have a writ of
execution issued for its enforcement and the court not only has the power and authority
to order its execution but it is its ministerial duty to do so. It has also been held that the
court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or
quash it, or order its stay, for, as a general rule, the parties will not be allowed, after final
judgment, to object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or of law, except when
there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution
inequitable or when it appears that the controversy has ever been submitted to the
judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been
improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong
party, or that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has
been issued without authority. Defendant-appellant has not shown that she falls in any
of the situations afore-mentioned. Ordinarily, an order of execution of a final judgment is
not appealable.
Otherwise, as was said by this Court in Molina v. De la Riva, a case could never
end. Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties
before it are deemed resolved and its judicial function as regards any matter related to
the controversy litigated comes to an end. The execution of its judgment is purely a
ministerial phase of adjudication. The nature of its duty to see to it that the claim of the
prevailing party is fully satisfied from the properties of the loser is generally ministerial.”
And equally settled is the rule that when a judgment is final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect,
except to correct clerical errors or to make mine pro tune entries, or when it is a void
judgment. Outside of these exceptions, the court which rendered judgment only has the
ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution. A decision that has attained finality
becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. Any
amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose. Thus, an order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds
the terms thereof is a nullity.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the trial court’s decision had become final
and executory, as petitioners themselves did not appeal the same. In the current
petition, neither is there an allegation that the judgment is a void one. But even if there
is such an allegation, the issue is a settled one, as this Court itself, in the petition for
annulment of judgment filed by petitioner’s co-obligors, i.e., Puno et al., had upheld the
judgment rather than declare the same void. That petition also alleged lack of
jurisdiction and raised other issues which are similarly raised in the instant petition.
Therefore, at this late stage, nothing more may be done to disturb the said final
judgment.
As for the regularity of the issuance of the writ of execution itself, it is uncontested that
all the requirements for the issuance of such a writ, as laid down in the rules, were
followed in the case a bar. No issue was raised before the trial court which qualifies as
an exception to the general rule that parties may not object to its issuance. Instead, for
the most part, the petition appears to pray for a quashal of the writ of execution on
grounds that, when closely examined, go into the merits of the case and the judgment
being executed and are not based on any defect in the writ of execution itself or in its
issuance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit

SPS RENATO & ANGELINA LANTIN vs. HON. JANE AURORA LANTION
G.R. No. 160053 August 28, 2006
FACTS:
Spouses Lantin took several loans from Planters Developmet Bank (PDB) and
executed real estate mortgages and promissory notes to cover it. However, the spouses
defaulted on paying their loans so the bank foreclosed the mortgaged properties. Later
on, the Lantins filed a complaint against PDB before the RTC of Lipa City to annul the
foreclosure because the REM only covered the peso loans which they have already
paid and not the dollar loans. PDB moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
improper venue since their loan agreements restricted the venue of any suit in Metro
Manila. Judge Lantion dismissed the case for improper venue. The Lantins sought for
reconsideration which was denied. They appealed the case and claimed that the venue
stipulated in the loan documents was not an exclusive venue stipulation under Section
4(b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether the stipulation on the loan agreement is an exclusive venue stipulation
as provided in Section 4 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
HELD:
Yes.Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of
the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on
the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case
in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In
the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as
merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place.
Under the loan agreement, the parties agreed that any suit arising out of or in
connection with the mortgage and/or promissory note should be brought exclusively in
proper court of Makati, Metro Manila or to any other venue chosen by the bank and
spouses Lantin waived their right to choose the venue of the action. Clearly, the words
“exclusively” and “waiving for this purpose any other venue” are restrictive and used
advisedly to meet the requirements.
SPS FLORENTINO & CONSOLACION TABALNO v. PAULINO T. DINGAL, SR. AND
JUANITA GALOLA VDA. DE DINGAL , G.R. No. 191526, October 05, 2015
FACTS
The present petition traces its roots to the Forcible Entry case, docketed as Civil Case
No. 3682, filed by Paulino Dingal, Sr. (Paulino) before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Abuyog, Leyte (MCTC), against spouses Florentino and Consolacion Tabalno
(petitioners), Victoriano Tuale, Dionesio Mansueto, Inego "Dondon" Cabus, and
Bienvenido Dinglasa.
In a decision dated March 31, 2008, the MCTC ordered the petitioners, et al., to: vacate
the premises and' restore its possession to Paulino; demolish any and all structures
illegally constructed therein at their expense.`
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the RTC. 6
Paulino, through his motion dated June 30, 2008, sought the dismissal of the
petitioners' appeal and prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution. 7
On August 20, 2008, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution, in
accordance with the MCTC decision, for the petitioners' failure to file a supersedeas
bond.
The petitioners sought to reconsider the RTC's August 20, 2008 order, which the RTC
denied in its order dated September 30, 2008. 8
On October 27, 2008, while the forcible entry case was still pending appeal before the
RTC, the petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for review under Rule
42 of the Rules of Court.
In a resolution dated February 17, 2009, the CA dismissed the petitioners' Rule 42
petition for review. In its November 27, 2009 resolution, the CA subsequently dismissed
the petitioners' Rule 42 petition with finality.
Meanwhile, on January 28, 2009, the RTC again issued an order for the issuance of a
Writ of Execution, in accordance with the MCTC decision. The RTC Clerk of Court
issued the Writ of Execution on February 23, 2009.
On March 26, 2009, the Sheriff submitted a Report stating that the writ of execution
was "partially served [on] the defendant, Sps. Tabalno [who] refuses [sic] to demolish
the structure inside the property On the other hand, the RTC affirmed in toto the March
31, 2008 decision of the MCTC in its order 10dated July 31, 2009.
The assailed RTC orders
The RTC granted, in its September 28, 2009 order, 11 the manifestation with omnibus ex
parte motion for substitution filed by respondent Juanita Galola vda. de Dingal ( Juanita);
the RTC ordered the substitution of Paulino (who in the interim died) by his surviving
spouse Juanita.
In its November 9, 2009 order, 12 the RTC denied, for lack of merit, the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners from its September 28, 2009 order, The RTC
explained that the appealed forcible entry case was still pending before it, and even
before the CA via the petitioners' Rule 42 petition, thus barring Juanita's substitution of
her husband. Moreover, their motion for reconsideration lacked the required notice of
hearing; hence, it was pro forma.
In its March 1, 2010 order, 13 the RTC denied the petitioners' second motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Issue
Whether the substitution of Juanita, in place of her deceased husband, was legally
proper.
Held
The SC resolves to DISMISS the petition.
The principle of immutability of final judgments presupposes a final and executory

judgment.
The principle of immutability of a final judgment stands as one of the pillars supporting a
strong, credible, and effective court. 17 The principle prohibits any alteration, modification,
or correction of final and executory judgments as what remains to be done is the purely
ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment.
On this point, the Court has repeatedly declared:
It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as
what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the
judgment.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public

policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment of
adjudicating bodies must become final and executory on some definite date fixed by
law. The Supreme Court reiterated that the doctrine of immutability of judgment is
adhered to by necessity notwithstanding occasional errors that may result thereby, since
litigations must somehow come to an end for otherwise, it would be even more
intolerable than the wrong and injustice it is designed to protect.
Before the finality of the judgment, however, a court has plenary power to alter, modify,
or altogether set aside its own decision. Thus, in situations where the judgment has not
yet become final and executory, the principle of immutability of judgments will not and
cannot apply.
Obviously, therefore, the principle of immutability of judgments presupposes the

existence of a final and executory judgment. Where no final and executory judgment
exists - because the case is still under review by the appellate or higher court or there
still are incidental matters under consideration by the court — the principle simply
cannot operate. The court would have plenary power not only to modify its judgment,
but also to address all matters incidental to the case.
In the present case, we find that, notwithstanding the petitioners' assertion, the forcible
entry case was, in fact, still under the RTC's review when it issued the assailed orders.
In fact, as the petitioners no less pointed out, the forcible entry case was also
simultaneously then under the CA review while the case was still pending before the
RTC.
A forcible entry case survives the death of a party; hence, Juanita properly substituted
for her deceased husband Paulino.
In this jurisdiction, there are three kinds of actions available for the recovery of
possession of real property: (1) accion interdictal or ejectment case; (b) accion
publiciana; and (3) accion reivindicatoria. These actions survive the death of a party.
Under Section 16, Rule 3 19 of the Rules of Court, the heirs of a deceased party may be
substituted for the latter on a pending action where the claim is not thereby
extinguished.
Forcible entry, as well as unlawful detainer, belongs to the class of action known
as accion interdictal- where the issue is the right of physical or material possession of
the subject real property that, therefore, survives the death of a party.
We note, however, that Juanita did not join the proceeding pursuant to Section 4 of Rule
3 when she, as Paulino's wife, should have sued jointly with Paulino. Rather, Juanita
joined the proceeding pursuant to Section 16 of Rule 3 which allows her, as her
husband's heir, to substitute for Paulino in the case. In other words, she was merely
taking over her husband's place, not belatedly joining as an additional party, to protect
Paulino's rights and interests that the proceedings may affect.
The purpose for allowing the heirs to substitute for the deceased litigant proceeds from
"the right to due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected by the
intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself or herself protected, as he/she
continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative of his estate. The spirit behind the general rule requiring a formal
substitution of heirs is not really because substitution of heirs is a jurisdictional
requirement, but because noncompliance therewith results in the undeniable violation of
the right to due process of those who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, are
substantially affected by the decision rendered therein.”
Accordingly, the RTC correctly allowed Juanita to substitute for Paulino upon the latter's
death.
Execution of the MCTC decision in the forcible entry case pending appeal before the
RTC is allowed by the Rules of Court.
We note, in this case, that Paulino prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution
(through the Motion to Dismiss the Appeal dated June 30, 2008) just a few days after
the petitioners appealed the case before the RTC. The petitioners, however, failed to file
the required supersedeas bond; thus, the RTC issued the August 20, 2008 Order for the
issuance of a writ of execution.
Thus, the RTC acted within the rules and within its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance
of the writ of execution. Under the facts, rules, and jurisprudence, execution of the
MCTC's decision in this case was proper.
Since Juanita properly substituted for Paulino, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed orders.
The Court's supervisory jurisdiction over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the
lower court on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or
legal soundness of the decision. As long as the lower court has jurisdiction over the
case, the certiorari writ will not issue even when the lower court's findings are incorrect.
More so when, as in this case, the RTC did not commit any error when it allowed
Juanita's substitution for her deceased husband Paulino.
COMGLASCO CORP./AGUILA GLASS v. SANTOS CAR CHECK CENTER CORP.

G.R. No. 202989, March 25, 2015
FACTS:
Santos Car Check Center and Comglasco Corporation entered into a contract of
lease for five years of a showroom in Iloilo City. However, Comglasco advised Santos
Car Check Center that it is pre-terminating the lease effective December 1, 2001, to
which Santos did not accede, citing that their contract was for five years. Comglasco
vacated the premises, and stopped paying any rentals. Despite several demands,
Comglasco ignored the demand letters, hence Santos filed a case for breach of
contract. In its answer, Comglasco averred that business setbacks caused by the 1997
financial crisis caused it to pre-terminate the contract. Invoking Article 1267 of the Civil
Code, it averred that it is authorised to pre-terminate the contract before the lapse of the
three years.
Santos moved for a judgment on the pleading, which the RTC granted. It held
Comglasco liable for unpaid rentals as well as attorneys fees, litigation expenses and
exemplary damages. Comglasco appealed to the CA, but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not judgment on the pleadings is proper
HELD:
Yes judgment on the pleadings is proper. Comglasco cannot cite Article 1267 of the
Civil Code, and that it must be deemed to have admitted the material allegations in the
complaint. Section 1, Rule 34 reads:
“Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.”
A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based

exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the
accompanying annexes It is settled that the trial court has the discretion to grant a
motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted matter in
the case after the answer is filed A genuine issue of fact is that which requires the
presentation of evidence, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
issue. Come to think of it, under Rule 35, on Summary Judgments, Comglasco had
recourse to move for summary judgment, wherein it could have adduced supporting
evidence to justify its action on the parties’ lease, but it did not do so. Section 2 of Rule
35 provides:
“Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. – A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any
time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favour as to all or any part thereof.”
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
FLOR GILBUENA RIVERA v. HON. LEANDRO C. CATALO,
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2422
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that he was one of the heirs of Juan Gilbuena; that TCT No.
3460 was registered under the name of Gilbuena; and that the owner's duplicate copy of
the said title had remained missing despite their diligent efforts to locate the same.
When the case was called for hearing, no oppositor appeared before the RTC. Upon
motion, complainant was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. On May 18, 2012,
Judge Catalo rendered his decision granting the petition for issuance of new owner's
duplicate copy on the basis of the evidence presented by complainant, particularly the
affidavit of loss and the certification issued by the Register of Deeds. Respondent judge
ordered the Register of Deeds to issue a new Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title.
The Register of Deeds, through Acting Records Officer Vivian V. Dacanay, formally
filed her Manifestation before the RTC stating that upon examination, it appeared that
TCT No. 3460 had long been cancelled as early as 1924 because it was discovered that
the title was not lost, rather, it was cancelled by virtue of valid transactions and
conveyance. Acting thereon, Respondent Judge after hearing recalled and set aside its
earlier decision. Aggrieved, complainant filed the subject administrative complaint
against Judge Catalo for gross misconduct. In its Report, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) opined that Judge Catalo was administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law. It recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of
P21,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent judge is administratively liable in recalling his earlier decision?
RULING:
No. The Court declined the recommendation of the OCA. The Court is not at all
convinced that Judge Catalo committed gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, under the
doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect. Like any other rule, however, there are recognized exceptions to this general
rule such as (1) the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, (2) void judgments, and (3) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable.
Under the second exception, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment
at all. It neither is a source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it
can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void.
Judge Catalo correctly recalled the judgment because the second and third
exceptions on the doctrine of finality of judgments were squarely applicable.
Where there is no original, there can be no duplicate. Respondent stressed that a court
had no jurisdiction to order the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a certificate
of title when it was, in fact, not lost. Here, the original title was not lost but officially
cancelled. Hence, Judge Catalo correctly exercised his judicial prerogative to amend
and control his factually and legally infirm decision.
The validity of a final judgment may be attacked on the ground that the judgment or
order is null and void, because the court had no power or authority to grant the relief or
no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both. The aggrieved party
may attack the validity of the final judgment by a direct action or proceeding in order to
annul the same, as certiorari, which is not incidental to, but is the main object of the
proceeding. The validity of a final judgment may also be attacked collaterally as when a
party files a motion for the execution of the judgment and the adverse party resists the
motion by claiming that the court has no authority to pronounce the judgment and that
the same is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the
parties. Hence, Judge Catalo committed no gross ignorance of the law. Consequently,
the complaint against respondent Judge Leandro C. Catalo is DISMISSED.
Estrellita J. Tamano vs. Hon. Rodolfo Ortiz, et. Al

G.R No. 126603, June 29, 1998
Facts :
Sen. Tamano and Zorayda Tamano married in civil rites. Before Sen. Tamano
died, he married Estrellita in civil rites too. A year after Sen. Tamano’s death, Zorayda
and her son filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage of her husband and
Estrellita with the RTC where Ortiz is the sitting judge on the ground that it was
bigamous. Zorayda further claimed that her husband claimed to be divorced and
Estrellita as single, hence, their marriage was fraudulent. Estrellita filed a motion to
dismiss alleging that RTC has no jurisdiction because only a party to a marriage could
file an action for annulment against the other spouse.
Estrellita also contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and
married in Muslim rites, the jurisdiction to hear and try the case is vested in Sharia
courts pursuant to Art 155 of Code of Muslim. RTC denied the petition and ruled it has
jurisdiction since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code.
Motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner referred to SC which ruled that it
should be referred to CA first.
The CA ruled that the case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia
courts only when filed in places where there are sharia courts. But in places where there
are no sharia courts, the instant petition could be at RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Sharia courts and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject case and
the nature of action.
HELD:
No.The Court held that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the subject
case. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Regional Trial Courts have
jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.
There should be no question by now that what determines the nature of an action and
correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the
plaintiff in this case.
The Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the
instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita and
Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court’s jurisdiction
cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss,
or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon allegations of the complaint. Further,
the court held that assuming that indeed the petitioner and Tamano were likewise
married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari’a courts are not vested
with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under
both civil and Muslim laws.
Bonilla vs. Leon Barrens G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Bonilla, mother of minors Rosalio and Salvacion, wife of
Ponciano Bonilla (petitioner) instituted a civil action to quiet title over certain parcles of
land located in Abra. Respondents opposed and when Fortunata died, moved to dismiss
the same since a dead person has no legal capacity to sue. CFI dismissed the civil
action earlier instituted and although counsel for the plaintiff prayed that Rosalio and
Salvacion be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, the same was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not children of the deceased be allowed to substitute the deceased plaintiff.
RULING:
If the plaintiff dies, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who
died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted.
Rule 16, Sec 3 ROC states, “whenever a party to a pending case dies… it shall
be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death… and to
give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other
legal representative.”
This duty was complained with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff but the court,
instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the petition on the ground that a dead
person has no legal personality to sue. Art 777 NCC provides “the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
When Fortunata therefore died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation was
not extinguished but was transferred to her heirs upon death.
Limuel C. Narciso vs. Pacific Traders and Manufacturing Corporation
G.R. No. 194176
Facts:
Petitioners were the employees of PTMC, a domestic corporation engaged in the

business of manufacturing furniture and fixtures for export. They were hired on different
dates from 1999 to 2002 and in various capacities such as framer, attacher, finisher,
assembler. Tabok Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TWMPC) is a cooperative duly
registered with the Cooperative Development Authority among the purposes of which is
"to engage in job out works of rattan and wood companies to the Pacific Rattan
Manufacturing Corporation and other manufacturing companies." The present
controversy arose when the petitioners filed complaints for illegal dismissal with money
claims against PTMC and TWMPC before the Regional Arbitration Branch and NLRC
RAB-VII.
The petitioners alleged that they were regular employees of PTMC. PTMC referred
them to TWMPC in view of PTMC's refusal to sign a casual or probationary employment
contract with them. They claimed to have been treated indifferently by TWMPC and
were not given the proper labor benefits. When they reported the matter to the DOLE,
TWMPC terminated them from employment without just or authorized cause.l PTMC
denied that the petitioners were its regular employees and instead claimed that they
were hired on a contractual or casual basis to meet the volume of orders from its foreign
buyers which can no longer be accommodated by its regular employees. The petitioners
were assigned to PTMC by TWMPC, one of its legitimate job contractors. PTMC
asserted that the petitioners were paid all the salaries and benefits due them under the
law and when their contracts expired, they voluntarily executed "Releases and
Quitclaims." PTMC also averred that when it found out about the petitioners' illegal
dismissal complaint, it had long terminated its relations with them.a TWMPC confirmed
that the petitioners were its bonafide members.
The LA ruled that the petitioners were not illegally dismissed. However, TWMPC was
directed to pay their separation pay as well as the amount of benefits due them as
members of the cooperative. The LA declared that the petitioners were not employees
of PTMC which was accordingly discharged from any liability. The LA dismissed the
petitioners' money claims for lack of factual basis.
The petitioners and TWMPC appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed both
appeals outright for failure to attach the requisite Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping.
The NLRC reasoned that appeal is a mere statutory privilege and the period and
manner for its perfection are not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. Petitioners
moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing order. They also submitted a Motion
to Admit Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping pleading for a liberal application of
procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice.
The NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration. The NLRC Resolution became
final and executory on July 10, 2006 and an entry of judgment was issued on August 10,
2006.b
The petitioners persisted in their cause and elevated the matter to the CA via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ascribing grave abuse of
discretion to the NLRC. The CA dismissed the petition upon finding that the petitioners
failed to file the certificate of non-forum shopping within the reglementary period of filing
a Memorandum of Appeal. Instead, they belatedly submitted the same in their motion
for reconsideration of the NLRC resolution dismissing their appeal. The CA also ruled
that the petitioners failed to cite any compelling reason which will warrant a relaxation of
procedural rules. The CA stressed that the petitioners were not denied their right to
appeal because it is actually a mere statutory privilege which must be perfected in the
manner provided by law. The CA reiterated the NLRC's ruling that rules on perfection of
appeal are not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well.l The petitioners moved for
reconsideration but their motion was denied in the CA Resolution. Hence, the present
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in "strictly applying the requirement of certificate of

non-forum shopping despite the presence of highly exceptional situation.
Held:
The petition is denied. It bears to emphasize that "the findings of the NLRC are
generally binding and should be treated with finality. The CA only looks at the facts to
determine if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in appreciating the facts." c Grave abuse of
discretion connotes utter absence of any basis for the NLRC ruling. The attendant facts
and records on hand show otherwise. A certificate of non-forum shopping is a requisite
for the perfection of an appeal. This is clearly enunciated in Section 4, Rule VI of the
2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 NLRC Rules), thus:
“Sec. 4. Requisites For Perfection Of Appeal. - a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed
within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified by the
appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as
amended; 3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds
relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a
statement of the date the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order;
4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i) proof of
payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in
Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of service
upon the other parties.”
The petitioners aver that the CA should have granted their petition for certiorari and
relaxed the NLRC Rules of Procedure because on page 53 of their memorandum on
appeal is the caption "Verification and Certification." However, the counsel for the
petitioners inadvertently deleted the paragraphs intended for the certification of non-
forum shopping. They assert that they were in a hurry in preparing the memorandum
due to the very limited time of 10 days to file the same. They proffer these as justifiable
causes for their non-compliance with the NLRC Rules of Procedure and submit that
their belated filing of the certificate in their motion for reconsideration was substantial
compliance. They further aver that the outright dismissal of their appeal on a mere
technicality would seriously impair the orderly administration of justice.
The petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. The subsequent compliance with the
requirement does not excuse a party's failure to comply therewith in the first instance.
While the Court, in certain cases, has excused non-compliance with the requirement to
submit a certificate of non-forum shopping, such liberal posture has always been
grounded on special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict
application of the rule clearly unjustified or inequitable. The reasons cited by the
petitioners for their failure to attach the certificate in their appeal memorandum can
hardly be considered as special circumstances or compelling reasons to warrant a
liberal application of the rules of procedure. Moreover, based on the facts of the case, a
strict application of a technical rule will not prejudice the administration of justice in view
of the petitioners' unmeritorious claims.
In fine, in the absence of justifiable and compelling reasons, a liberal application of

procedural rules is not warranted in this case. The Court thus agrees with the CA that
no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the NLRC when it found no justification to
excuse the absence of a certificate of non-forum shopping in the petitioners'
memorandum on appeal.
REMEGIO A. CHING vs. SAN PEDRO COLLEGE BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. 213197, October 21, 2015
FACTS:
Remegio Ching is one of the original incorporators of San Pedro College Business
Administration (SPCBA) who tendered an irrevocable resignation. Understanding his
resignation as not only a trustee and treasurer but also a member, SPCBA paid him
P20, 000, 000.00 as the buy-out price of his interest.
Remegio filed an intra-corporate case to inspect the books and documents of SPCBA,
invoking his right as a member. The RTC granted his prayer. SPCBA filed a notice of
appeal to the CA, but it was dismissed as it was the wrong mode. As a result, SPCBA
elevated the case to the Supreme Court, but it was also dismissed. The judgment
became final and executory on April 4, 2012.
To prevent Remegio from filing nuisance and/or harassment suits, SPCBA filed a
complaint against him, praying for his declaration as legally removed in his capacity as
trustee, treasurer and member of SPCBA. Thus, he has no right to inspect its books and
accounts.
In his answer, Remegio invoked res judicata, alleging that his membership in SPCBA
cannot be made an issue again in another case as it was already decided in the earlier
case he filed against SPCBA. The RTC ruled in favor of Remegio, but the CA reversed
it. Remegio moved for reconsideration, but it was likewise denied. Thus, he elevated the
case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether res judicata applies to a case where the issue is related to the issue on an
earlier case decided upon by the Supreme Court involving the same parties.
HELD
Yes. Under Section 47 (b and c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it was provided that
judgments or final orders apply to matters directly adjudged and those necessarily
included thereto. Thus, matters that are deemed included are precluded to be relitigated
on a different cause of action.
Preclusion applies if the following are met: (1) the issue or fact must be identical to the
issue or fact determined in the former suit; (2) the party to be precluded must be party to
or was in privity with a party to the former proceeding; (3) there was a final judgment on
the merits in the former proceedings; and (4) the party against whom the principle is
asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate issues in the prior
proceedings.
The issue on Remegio’s membership with SPCBA was fully determined in the former
case he filed against SPCBA as it is essential for his permission to inspect SPCBA’s
books and documents. This indispensability by factual determination supports res
judicata and the preclusion of relitigation of the same issues involving the same parties.
Spouses Abelardo and Francisca Valarao vs. MSC and COMPANY
(G.R. No. 185331, June 8, 2016)
FACTS:
MSC and Company (MSC) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Spouses
Valarao to develop the latter’s landholding in Angat, Bulacan for residential use. The
parties had subsequent Contract Agreement where Spouses Valarao undertook to
reimburse MSC’s expenses for the project’s topographic survey, site relocation,
subdivision plans and specifications.
They also agreed to give an advance payment of P8,550,000.00 as mobilization

expenses for land development which will be paid upon the contract's execution.
However, Spouses Valarao failed to pay after demand and even after MSC completed
30% of the project. MSC instituted the court action for collection of sum of money,
damages and rescission.
On April 5, 2006, RTC rendered its decision in favor of MSC, ordering the spouses to
pay the former P16,349,035.60 and other reliefs sought by MSC. Aggrieved by the
decision, Spouses Valarao appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) but was denied
appeal in its decision dated February 21, 2008 and affirming the decision of the RTC.
The CA’s decision became final on March 19, 2008 considering that no motion for
reconsideration or Supreme Court petition has been filed by MSC and that no Supreme
Court petition has been filed by Spouses Valarao. Spouses Valarao brought the matter
to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, claiming that they have timely submitted a Motion for Reconsideration on March
11, 2008.
ISSUE:
Did the decision of CA dated February 21, 2008 become final and executory considering
The alleged timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on March 11, 2008?
HELD:
Yes, the decision of CA dated February 21, 2008 had become final and executory.
The alleged timely submitted Motion for Reconsideration filed on March 11, 2008 was
not properly filed in its due form considering that the copy of the motion attached to the
petition lacked material portions, including the end of its prayer and the required
signature of counsel.
Further, the counsel of Spouses Valarao failed to file a timely Motion for Extension or
Petition with the Supreme Court despite the receipt of the May 28, 2008 resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration.
The doctrine of finality or immutability of judgment has already set in. Under this
doctrine, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must
immediately be struck down. Although there are exceptions to this doctrine, none of the
circumstance attends the above-mentioned case.

Remrev1 Case Digest

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Remrev1 Case Digest

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

IMELDA RELUCIO vs ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ GR No.

138497, January 16 2002

Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal

Whether petitioner's inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a

If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party.

1. Do the children have the legal standing to file the case?

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be

UST VS DANES SANCHEZ GR No. 165569

1. Whether or not CHED exercises quasi-judicial power over controversies

2. Whether or not the Complaint failed to state a cause of action, since

Sometime in November 2008, petitioner received a subpoena from the Bureau of

Petitioner alleged that first, respondent committed extrinsic fraud because he

The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc) thoroughly discussed the rigorous

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

(2) Specific Details in the Return

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

Smartnet defaulted on its loan obligation which prompted AUB to extra-judicially

Is Goodland Company guilty of forum shopping?

Fortich vs Corona GRNo. 131475

3. Whether the issue is a question of technicality.

3. No. It is a question of substance & merit. A decision/resolution/order of an

ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 203775 August 5,

4. TO CONFIRM the herein RE-COMPUTATION OF THE ALLOCATION OF SEATS of

5. TO PROCLAIM Alay Buhay Community Development Foundation, Inc. (Alay Buhay)

6. TO DECLARE the First (1st) NOMINEE of Alay Buhay Community Development

Whether or not petitioners considered parties-in-interest to file the case?

In the present case, petitioner Association of Flood Victims is an unincorporated

FEDMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION versus FEDERICO AGCAOILI

By way of counterclaim, FSCC sought moral damages and attorneys fees

FDCs claim that it was distinct in personality from FSCC is unworthy of

PETITION was DENIED.

Hence, this petition.

Yes. The RTC correctly upheld the MTC Decision.

Justice Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the

As correctly stated by the RTC:

BERNARDO DE LEON vs PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY (PEA)

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, on 30 September 1993, rendered a Decision

In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to

The petition for review on certiorari is denied.

Mayor Marcial Vargas, et al vs Fortunato Cajucom

The petitioners elevated their case to the Supreme Court

Whether or not the writ of execution should be quashed.

“Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. —Execution shall issue as a

In sum, this Court has explained the principle as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit

The SC resolves to DISMISS the petition.

The principle of immutability of final judgments presupposes a final and executory

On this point, the Court has repeatedly declared:

The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public

Obviously, therefore, the principle of immutability of judgments presupposes the

COMGLASCO CORP./AGUILA GLASS v. SANTOS CAR CHECK CENTER CORP.

Whether or not judgment on the pleadings is proper

“Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

FLOR GILBUENA RIVERA v. HON. LEANDRO C. CATALO,

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2422

Whether respondent judge is administratively liable in recalling his earlier decision?

Estrellita J. Tamano vs. Hon. Rodolfo Ortiz, et. Al

Limuel C. Narciso vs. Pacific Traders and Manufacturing Corporation

G.R. No. 194176

Petitioners were the employees of PTMC, a domestic corporation engaged in the

Whether or not the CA erred in "strictly applying the requirement of certificate of