CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par.
vs. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 83896
February 22, 1991
(FERNAN, C.J.)
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order
No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties
Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The
constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution
which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Memebers of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely:
(i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to
prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet
members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and
deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be
considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries
or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO
284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
1987 Constitution itself.
Public Center Interest v. Elma
G.R. No. 138965. March 2007
Chico-Nazario, J.
Facts: Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on 30 October 1998. Thereafter,
during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment,
but waived any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC. Petitioners, thus,
sought to have both appointments declared as unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the concurrent appointments of the respondent as
PCGG Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional
Held: Yes. the Court declared that the concurrent appointments of the
respondent as PCGG Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional.
It ruled that the concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of
Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these are
incompatible offices. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent
and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive
departments and agencies and reviewing investigations involving heads of
executive departments. Since the actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of
an executive agency, are subject to the review of the CPLC, such
appointments would be incompatible.
Furthermore, the strict prohibition under Section 13 Article VII of the 1987
Constitution would not apply to the present case, since neither the PCGG
Chairman nor the CPLC is a secretary, undersecretary, or assistant
secretary. Concurrent holding of positions is allowed only by the aforesaid
section if the second post is required by the primary functions of the first
appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity.
Although respondent Elma waived receiving renumeration for the second
appointment, the primary functions of the PCGG Chairman do not require his
appointment as CPLC.
Lastly, the Court ruled that respondent Elma’s concurrent appointments as
PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible
offices. This ruling does not render both appointments void. Following the
common-law rule on incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in
effect, vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the
second office as CPLC.
Funa v. Agra
G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013
Bersamin, J.
Facts:
 On 1 March 2010, President GMA appointed Justice Alberto Agra as
the Acting Secretary of Justice following a resignation by Agnes VST
Devanadera (Agnes Devanadera will run for a congressional seat in
Quezon Province).
 On 5 March 2010, GMA designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor
General in a concurrent capacity.
 On 7 April 2010, Funa filed a suit against Agra’s concurrent
appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
 After GMA’s term, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty.
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General and he will
commence his duties on 5 August 2010.
 Despite Agra forwarding a different set of facts, the Court said that
“Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact
that Agra has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently
in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of
resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.”
Issue:
W/N the appointment of Agra is unconstitutional?
Ruling:
Yes
 Agra was designated as the Acting Secreatry of Justice while acting
as the Acting Solicotor General. Agra then violated Section 13,
Article VII.
 The SC states that “Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and
spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not
validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as
the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not
otherwise so provided.”
FUNA v ERMITA (GR No. 184740)
11 FEB 2010 | CARPIO-MORALES, J.
Holding of Other Office of Appointed Deputies
FACTS:
1. 4 OCT 2006, PGMA appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
(BAUTISTA) as Usec. of the Dept. of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC).
2. 1 SEP 2008, following the resignation of the then Maritime Industry
Authority (MARINA) Administrator, Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., BAUTISTA
was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the
Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary.
3. Petitioner filed an action of prohibition and mandamus and prayed for
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of the said additional designation of BAUTISTA
 Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as
DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
4. 5 JAN 2009, during the pendency of the case, BAUTISTA was
appointed Administrator of the MARINA and she assumed her duties
and responsibilities as such on 2 FEB 2009
ISSUE: W/N DOTC Usec. BAUTISTA’s designation as OIC and
Administrator of MARINA is unconstitutional, YES
RULING:
1. Respondents failed to clearly demonstrate that her designation as
such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary
functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport.
2. Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct
application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:
 Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
 privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
3. Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the
Authority, SC is hardly persuaded by BAUTISTA’s submission that
her designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of
additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED. Designation of respondent Ma. Elena H.
Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry
Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary
for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being
violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore,
NULL and VOID.
Flores vs. Drilon
GR No. 104732 June 22, 1993
BELLOSILLO, J.
Powers of the Executive Department
DOCTRINE:
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has
the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment,
deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the
necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing
power (Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate
Court).
CASE SUMMARY:
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act
of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations,
the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the
chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.
FACTS:
 Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at
subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian
Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, questions the
constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as
the “Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992.”
 Under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was
appointed as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority
(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority
with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex
oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however,
That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this
Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the
chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.
 Petitioners, maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above
quoted in italics infringes on the following constitutional and statutory
provisions:
(a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that
"[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation
in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure,"
because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and
the subject posts are public offices;
(b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he
President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint",4ince it was
Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who
appointed the Mayor to the subject posts;5 and,
(c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code because the
appointment of the respondent was within the prohibited 45-day
period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections.
ISSUE:
Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states,
"Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity
of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the
chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the
constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective
officials to other government posts
HELD/ RATIO:
Yes.
The proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.
In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
 No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
In the case at bar, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint
an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional
proscription seeks to prevent which is to prevent the concentration of
several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or
employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in
the delivery of public services, there is not doubt to conclude that the
proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution.
In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another
post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the
clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art.
IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of
multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more
stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or
designation of an elective official to the government post, except as are
particularly recognized in the Constitution itself.
The Congress also the appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the
incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the posts
in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to
choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the
essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very
nature itself of appointment. As appointment was defined by Mr. Justice
Malcolm
"appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the
exercise of discretion."
and held in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate
Court:
“The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing
power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according
to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among
those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a
prerogative of the appointing power…”
Indeed, appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint.
Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such
conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint, hence, it
cannot limit the choice of the president into only one candidate.
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for
appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of
SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that
contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains
Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily
null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer who may retain the
benefits he may receive from the position he may have assumed
SC DECISION: WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A.
7227, which states: ". . . Provided, however, That for the first year of its
operations from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo
shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority," is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL; consequently, the
appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent
Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by
respondent Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
may be retained by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him in
the exercise of his authority as officer de facto of SBMA are hereby
UPHELD.
SARMIENTO III vs. MISON
GR No. 79974 | December 17, 1987
Powers of the President → Commission on Appointment Confirmation
Facts: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the
functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and
respondent Carague as Secretary of the Dept of Budget from
disbursing payments for Mison’s salaries and emoluments on the ground that
Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments (CA). On the other hand, respondents
maintain the constitutionality of Mison’s appointment without the confirmation
of the (CA). It is apparent in Sec 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution that there are
four groups of officers whom the president shall appoint.
 2. Confirmation of head of bureau would lead to political influence
Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Mison is unconstitutional.
The clear and expressed intent of the framers of the
Held: 1987 Constitution is to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation
No. on the CA except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first
- The 1935 Constitution requires confirmation by the CA of all sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII. Therefore, the confirmation on
presidential appointments. This has resulted in horse-trading and similar the appointment of Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs by the CA is
malpractices. not required.
- Under the 1973 Constitution, the president has the absolute power
of appointment with hardly any check on the legislature. The appointment of Mison without submitting his nomination the CA is within
Given these two extremes, the 1987 Constitution struck a “middle- the constitutional authority of the President.
ground” by requiring the consent of the CA for the 1st group
of appointments and leaving to the President without such confirmation MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO
the appointments of the other officers:
FACTS:
1st group:
 the heads of the exec departments, ambassadors, other public ministers 2 February 1999 COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner Angelina Matibag
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or as Acting Director IV of the Education and Information Department.
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
15 February 2000 Chairperson Harriet Demetriou renewed the appointment
in the Constitution,
of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a Temporary capacity.
Specifically:
-Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council [Art. VIII, Sec. Commissioner Rufino Javier renewed again the appointment of petitioner to
8(2)] the same petitioner and capacity.
-Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commi [Art.
IX-C, Sec. 1 (2)]; 22 March 2001 President GMA appointed, ad interim, respondent Benipayo
-Chairman and Commissioners of the COA [Art. IX-D, Sec. 1 as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC
(2)]; Commissioners for a term of 7 years each (expiring 2 Feb 2008)
-Members of the regional consultative commission (Art. X, Sec.
18.) The Office of the President submitted to the COA the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra, and Tuason for confirmation but was not
The rest of the appointments mentioned in sec. 16 are not subject to acted upon.
confirmation:
1 June 2001 GMA renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra,
2nd group: and Tuason to the same position and term.
 all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, The appointments were transmitted to COA for confirmation however, the
Congress adjourned before COA could act on the appointments.
3rd group:
 those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint and GMA renewed the ad interim appointments for the third time, submitted
appointments for confirmation to COA, and took oaths of office.
4th group:
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman issued a Memorandum addressed to
 officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
petitioner reassigning the latter to the Law Department but was objected by
vest in the President alone.
COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol Sadain on the ground of
failure to consult to him such reassignment.
Reason:
1. Position of bureau director is quite low
Petitioner requested respondent to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the
EID her reassignment to the Law Department invoking Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 reminding heads of government
offices that transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election
period →DENIED
Petitioner appealed denial to COMELEC en banc as well as an
administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against
Benipayo alleging her reassignment is in violation of laws, rules, and
regulations.
During the pendency of the complaint, petitioner filed an instant petitioner
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayom
Borram and Tuason.
Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments violate the constitutional
provisions on the independence of COMELEC as well as on the prohibitions
on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and
members.
6 September 2001 GMA renewed once again the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo (Chairman), Borra, Tuason (members) for a term of 7 years and
took their oaths of office thereafter.
Petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment to COMELEC is temporary
appointment which is prohibited by Sec. 1 (2) Art. IX of the Constitution
ISSUE:
WON the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the
basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to
a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution;
RULING:
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes
effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office.
The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or
next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by
the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time
and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is DISMISSED.
PIMENTEL V. ERMITA
G.R. No. 164978
October 13, 2005
CARPIO, J
FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments
issued by PGMA through Executive Secretary Ermita to Florencio B. Abad,
Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M.
Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap
(respondents) as acting secretaries of their respective departments. The
petition also seeks to prohibit respondents from performing the duties of
department secretaries.
The Congress commenced their regular session on 26 July 2004. The
Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives,
was constituted on 25 August 2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued
appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments, all before August 25. They were appointed in an acting
capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed
a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA
cannot make such appointment without the consent of the Commission on
Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective
departments should be designated in an acting capacity and not anyone
else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the
president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in
session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary
designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary
designation shall not exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting
capacity.
 the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from the
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid. “pressure or influence of politics.” PD 15 increased the members of CCP’s
Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issued
HELD: YES on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11.

The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon
safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the C. Aquino asked for the courtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP
temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a trustees and appointed new trustees to the Board. Eventually, during the
year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga,
was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments – this also proves Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili (“Cabili”),
that the president was in good faith. and Manuel T. Mañosa (“Mañosa”).
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the
On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed
president. The choice is the president’s to make and the president normally
seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the
appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose
Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. The seven new
the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether
trustees were:
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot
1. Armita B. Rufino - President, vice Baltazar
impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
N. Endriga
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is
in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the 2. Zenaida R. Tantoco - Member, vice Doreen Fernandez
acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s
confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but 3. Federico Pascual - Member, vice Lenora A.
practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also Cabili
be the permanent appointee.
4. Rafael Buenaventura - Member, vice Manuel
Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 T. Mañosa
also provides that the president “may temporarily designate an officer already
in the government service or any other competent person to perform the
5. Lorenzo Calma - Member, vice Ma. Paz D.
functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even
Lagdameo
appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as
long as the President deems that person competent.
6. Rafael Simpao, Jr. - Member, vice Patricia C.
Sison

Rufino vs Endriga 7. Freddie Garcia - Member, vice Irma Ponce-Enrile

G.R. No. 139554
July 21, 2006
Ponente: CARPIO, J
On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30) creating the Cultural Center of the
Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of seven members to
preserve and promote Philippine culture.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial
Law, President Marcos issued PD 15, the CCP’s charter, which converted
Potenciano
Except for Tantoco, the Rufino group took their respective oaths of
office and assumed the performance of their duties in early January 1999.
On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo
warranto before this Court questioning President Estrada’s appointment
of seven new members to the CCP Board. The Endriga group alleged that
under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board “shall be filled by
election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular
meeting x x x.” In case “only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be
filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of
the [CCP].” The Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is
entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies,
acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada
appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration
of Mañosa’s term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees.
The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the
supervision and control of the President. The Endriga group cited Section 3
of PD 15, which states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and
operation x x x.”
On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals granted the quo
warranto petition. The Court of Appeals declared the Endriga group lawfully
entitled to hold office as CCP trustees. On the other hand, the appellate
court’s Decision ousted the Rufino group from the CCP Board.
In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted that the
law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower
in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer on the
CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the
latter would be officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of
PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be
declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of “officers lower in rank”
than the appointing power.
On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group’s
motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals also denied the Endriga
group’s motion for immediate execution of the 14 May 1999 Decision.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is constitutional and CCP
trustees have the authority to appoint and elect their fellow trustees when
there is vacancy.
RULING:
NO. The SC ruled that Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 as
amended which authorizes the remaining trustees to fill by election
vacancies in the Board of Trustees of CCP is unconstitutional.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the
CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the President’s
power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The
intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political
influence and pressure, specifically from the President. Section 6(b) and (c)
of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the
control of the President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist
under the 1987 Constitution.
Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP “shall enjoy
autonomy of policy and operation this provision does not free the CCP from
the President’s control, for if it does, then it would be unconstitutional. This
provision may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating
policies and undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies and activities
are all subject to the President’s power of control.
The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the
President’s control over the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the
President’s influence. By stating that the “President shall have control of all
the executive offices,” the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not
only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive branch,
including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.
Aytona v. Castillo
BENGZON, C.J.:
Appointing Power – Midnight Appointments
FACTS:
Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed by outgoing president Carlos
Garcia during the last day of his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad
interim governor of the Central Bank. When the next president, Diosdado
Macapagal took his office, he issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytona’s
position and at the same time he appointed Andres Castillo as the new
governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo warranto proceeding
claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that
he was validly appointed by the former president. Macapagal averred that the
ex-president’s appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done,
contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to subvert the
incoming presidency or administration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post. → No
HELD:
Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have
the right to continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in
his post as he is competent enough, his appointment can nevertheless be
revoked by the president. Garcia’s appointments are hurried maneuvers to
subvert the upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the policies of the
next president. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his appointment
should not be revoked but in here it may be since his appointment was
grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it is not
only legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness.
De Castro vs JBC
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Ponente: J. Bersamin
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by
May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May
10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010,
or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation
to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits
the President or Acting President from making appointments within two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for
the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of
the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice
Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had
the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on
the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure
its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President
shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC
properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the
oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the
JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the
President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill
a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section
15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4.
(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three,
five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character,
in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section
14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the
Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that
every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to
assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14
and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely
inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.
AGUINALDO (IBP) V AQUINO
G.R. No. 224302
February 21, 2017
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
 The Court En Banc previously dismissed the instant petition for Quo
Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit, declaring
the clustering of nominees by the Judicial Bar Council (JBC) as
unconstitutional while the appointments of the respondent Associate
Justices of the Sandiganbayan as valid. Hence, this petition.
 JBC asserts that in submitting six short lists for six vacancies, it was
only acting in accordance with the clear mandate of Article VIII,
Section 93 of the 1987 Constitution for the JBC to submit a list for
every vacancy. The JBC submitted the list despite the fact that it
received copies of the appointments of the six Sandiganbayan
Justices from the Office of the President (OP).
 According to the JBC, its new practice of "clustering," in fact, is more
in accord with the purpose of the JBC to rid the appointment process
to the Judiciary from political pressure as the President has to
choose only from the nominees for one particular vacancy.
Otherwise, the President can choose whom he pleases, and thereby
completely disregard the purpose for the creation of the JBC.
 On the other hand, the President did cross-reach into the lists
submitted by the JBC, an independent creature created by the
Constitution. This was not contested as it was within, as admitted by
the petitioners, the powers of the President. President Aquino then
proceeded with his appointment of the six Associate Justices of
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
W/N JBC’s act of “clustering” is unconstitutional and that President
Aquino can intervene with the list of nominees of justices which the JBC
submitted.
HELD: YES
 In this case of six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice, the JBC acted beyond its constitutional mandate
in clustering the nominees into six separate short lists and President
 Aquino did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the
said clustering.
 The independence and discretion of the JBC, however, is not without
limits. It cannot impair the President's power to appoint members of
the Judiciary and his statutory power to determine the seniority of the
newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. The Court
cannot sustain the strained interpretation of Article VIII, Section 9 of
the 1987 Constitution espoused by the JBC, which ultimately
curtailed the President's appointing power.
 The Court ruled that the clustering impinged upon the President's
appointing power in the following ways:
1. The President's option for every vacancy was limited to the five to
seven nominees in each cluster. Once the President had appointed a
nominee from one cluster, then he was proscribed from considering
the other nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies.
2. All the nominees applied for and were found to be qualified for
appointment to any of the vacant Associate Justice positions in the
Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to explain why one nominee
should be considered for appointment to the position assigned to one
specific cluster only. Correspondingly, the nominees' chance for
appointment was restricted to the consideration of the one cluster in
which they were included, even though they applied and were found
to be qualified for all the vacancies.
3. By designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC
established the seniority or order of preference of the new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, a power which the law (Section
1, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 160616), rules (Rule II,
Section 1 (b) of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan17),
and jurisprudence (Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent
Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals18), vest exclusively upon the President.
VELICARIA-GARAFIL vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 203372
June 16, 2015
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800
appointments to various positions in several government offices.
The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date
for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the
ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments
only "temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety."
None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.
On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and
revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated
the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
The entirety of EO 2 reads:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2
RECALLING, WITHDRAWING, AND REVOKING APPOINTMENTS
ISSUED BY THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL BAN ON MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
On 6 August 2010, Sol. Gen. Cadiz instructed a Senior Assistant Solicitor
General to inform the officers and employees affected by EO 2 that they
were terminated from service effective the next day.
Atty. Velicaria-Garafil reported for work on 9 August 2010 without any
knowledge of her termination. She filed a petition praying for the nullification
of EO 2, and for her reinstatement as State Solicitor II without loss of
seniority, rights and privileges, and with full backwages from the time that her
salary was withheld. There were other similar petitions from fellow
appointees.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution
2. Whether EO 2 is constitutional.
RULING:
1. The petitions have no merit. All of petitioners' appointments are
midnight appointments and are void for violation of Section 15,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
 2. EO 2 is constitutional.
RATIO:
"None of the petitioners have shown that their appointment papers (and
transmittal letters) have been issued (and released) before the ban.” The
dates of receipt by the MRO, which in these cases are the only reliable
evidence of actual transmittal of the appointment papers by President
Macapagal-Arroyo, are dates clearly falling during the appointment ban.
Constitutionality of EO 2: Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment
to a government post is a process that takes several steps to complete. Any
valid appointment, including one made under the exception provided in
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the President
signing an appointee's appointment paper to a vacant office, the official
transmittal of the appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of
the appointment paper by the appointee, and acceptance of the appointment
by the appointee evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or her
assumption to office.
MR. DAVIDE: The idea of the proposal is that about the end of the term of
the President, he may prolong his rule indirectly by appointing people to
these sensitive positions, like the commissions, the Ombudsman, the
judiciary, so he could perpetuate himself in power even beyond his term of
office; therefore foreclosing the right of his successor to make appointments
to these positions. We should realize that the term of the President is six
years and under what we had voted on, there is no reelection for him. Yet he
can continue to rule the country through appointments made about the end of
his term to these sensitive positions.
The dissent allows an appointment to take effect during the ban, as long as
the President signed and transmitted the appointment before the ban, even if
the appointee never received the appointment paper before the ban and
accepted the appointment only during the ban. An integral part of the
appointment process ignores the reason for the limitation of the President's
power to appoint, which is .to prevent the outgoing President from continuing
to rule the country indirectly after the end of his term.
The President exercises only one kind of appointing power. There is no need
to differentiate the exercise of the President's appointing power outside, just
before, or during the appointment ban. The Constitution allows the President
to exercise the power of appointment during the period not covered by the
appointment ban, and disallows (subject to an exception) the President from
exercising the power of appointment during the period covered by the
appointment ban.
"The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the
appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by
the appointee in order to render it effective."
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which
should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment:
(1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority
(2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal
(3) a vacant position at the time of appointment
(4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by
the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid
appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers
were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand,
petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment
ban. Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare
EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid
and constitutional.
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Paño
No. L-27811
November 17, 1967
Power of Control and Supervision
Ponente: Sanchez
-Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Davao-
Facts:
1. Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a pasture
land in Davao (said land was later declared an agricultural
zone). Magallanes then ceded a portion of his rights and
interest to Lacson-Magallanes, Co., Inc (plaintiff corporation).
2. Jose Paño and friends protested and asserted that they are
actual occupant of the said portion thereof covered by their
own sales application. The Director of Lands denied Paño’s
request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his
petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President.
3. Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the President,
ruled in favor of Paño.
4. The feelings of the Plaintiff corporation got hurt and they
asserted that aforementioned decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture was conclusive and beyond appeal as well as it
 had full force and effect contrary to the decision made by the
Pajo. Plaintiff also contests that there was undue delegation
of power stating that the Constitution does not contain any
provision where presidential power of control may be
delegated to the Executive Secretary and it is a
Constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon
the matter
Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Secretary Pajo, acting by authority of
the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that had been
affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, or;
whether the power of control vested upon the Chief Executive by the
Constitution may be delegated to Executive Secretary Pajo.
Ruling:
Yes. The Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by the
authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify or
even reverse any order that the Secretary of Agriculture including the
Director of lands may issue.
Ratio:
The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So,
too, in his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department
heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too,
is in the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and
directs their acts. Implicit, then, is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or
reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may
not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of
a department secretary.
The President is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the
Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule
which has thus gained recognition is that under our constitutional set-up the
Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the
President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse
any order that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including
the Director of Lands, may issue. Where the Executive Secretary acts “by
authority of the President,” his decision is that of the President. Such
decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed
authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the
President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to
do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is “disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive,” that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot
be successfully assailed.
Concurring opinion of Justice Fernando:
The learned opinion of Justice Sanchez possesses merit and inspires assent.
A further observation may not be amiss concerning that portion thereof which
speaks of “the standard practice” allowing appeals from [decisions of
Secretary of Natural Resources affirming the action taken by the Director of
Lands] to the Office of the President. That for me is more than a “standard
practice.” It is sound law. The constitutional grant to the President of the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices yields
that implication
IRENEO ROQUE, petitioner-appellant, v. THE HONORABLE, THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS; THE HONORABLE, THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT and JOSE FACUN; G.R. No. L-25373.
July 1, 1976; FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Roque allege that he had been in occupation of the disputed
portion since 1937, for the whole of Lot No. 4507. Likewise Respondent
Facun filed his homestead application on the same land in 1935 and
submitted the final proof therefore in 1939.
In settling the dispute, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
decided in favor of Roque but upon re investigation it is found out that Roque
submitted his sales application for the disputed portion in 1948, only during
the course of the investigation of his protest and it was verified during the re
investigation of this case that the appellee (Roque) entered upon the
disputed portion in 1951 only. So the President, through respondent
Assistant Executive Secretary awarded the land in favor of the respondent
Facun.
The petitioner prayed that the order of the respondent Honorable Director of
Lands and the decision of the respondent Honorable Assistant Executive
Secretary, be set aside on the alleged ground that the said order of the
Director of Lands was issued with grave abuse of discretion, consisting of
unqualified reliance and the biased report and recommendation. And said
that the decision of the Honorable Executive Secretary exceeded his
jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse of discretion disregarding the sales
award of the land in question in favor of the herein petitioner having already
paid is for the price of the same, and praying further that the decision of the
Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be sustained.
Respondent Jose Facun, through Atty. Cipriano A. Tan, filed an answer to
the petition denying specifically the allegation of abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness and excess of jurisdiction of the Honorable Director of Lands
and Assistant Executive Secretary is perfectly valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Assistant Executive Secretary lacks the power to overrule
the descision of Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources?
RULING:
No, to contend that the Office of the President, through respondent Assistant
Executive Secretary, lacks the power to overrule the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources is to betray lack of awareness of the
implications of what Justice Laurel referred to in Villena v. Secretary of the
Interior as " As was further stressed by him: "Without minimizing the
importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in
reality but the projection of that of the President…. the acts of the secretaries
of such departments, performed and Promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptive the acts of the Chief Executive.”
The President has control of all the executive departments, bureaus or
offices and under Pelaez v. Auditor General "The power of control under this
provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such
discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act
in lieu of such officers." Clearly then, there is nothing to prevent the
President to disapprove the act of a department head.
Assistant Executive Secretary of the President is correct for sustaining the
award by the Director of Lands of a homestead application and thus
overruling the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, because it is
in conformity with the policy of the law. Petitioner, himself a previous
beneficiary of the statute, would seek to add to his holding by a sales
application. The prevailing party, private respondent Jose Facun, on the
other hand, had applied for the disputed lot as a homesteader as far back as
1935, and had submitted his final proof in 1948.
ANG-ANGCO v. CASTILLO
G.R. No. L-17169 – November 30, 1963
Power of Control & Supervision
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
FACTS:
 Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-Angco allowed the release of certain
commodities from the customs house even without the necessary
permit for its withdrawal. For this, he was charged for an
administrative case.
 Later, Executive Secretary Natalio Castillo, by authority of the
President, rendered a decision on the case on finding Ang-Angco
“guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service”, and
considering him resigned effective from the date of notice, with
prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs.
 He then questioned the propriety of his removal contending that it
violated the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers and
employees in the classified service as enshrined in the Civil Service
Act.
ISSUE:
 Whether the President has the power to take direct action on the
case of the petitioner even if he belongs to the classified service in
spite of the provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959.
HELD/RATIO:
 No.
 The action taken by the Executive Secretary, even with the authority
of the President, in taking direct action on the administrative case of
petitioner, without submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil
Service, is contrary to law and should be set aside.
 As stated in the case of Lacson v. Romero (84 Phil. 740, 754): “To
hold that Civil Service officials hold their office at the will of the
appointing power subject to removal or forced transfer at any time,
would demoralize and undermine and eventually destroy the whole
Civil Service System and structure. The country would then go back
to the days of the old Jacksonian Spoils System under which a
victorious Chief Executive, after the elections could if so minded,
sweep out of office, civil service employees differing in Political color
or affiliation from him, and sweep his Political followers and
adherents, especially those who have given him help, political or
otherwise.”
 There is some point in the argument that the Power of control of the
President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or
remove officers and employees who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the
classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the
power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, but not with
regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified
service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised.
  This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive,
"the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent
officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of duty to faithfully execute the laws. Further, there is no valid delegation from the
department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to congress that would warrant the creation of the commission because P.D. 1416, as
these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of amended by P.D. No. 1772 where the respondent anchors its legality was already held
departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their functus oficio. Thus, it begs the question of where does the Truth Commission of 2010
removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such finds legal basis? This is answered by the second issue herein.
law is the Civil Service Act of 1959. 2. YES. While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on
the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds
justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The Presidents power
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, J. MENDOZA to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case,
Pursuant to Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution which mandates the fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the
President to faithfully execute all laws, the President may create ad hoc committees President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to
such as truth commissions to investigate against class of previous administrations graft conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly
and corruptions. mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such
Facts: authority.Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
This is a consolidated petition assailing Executive Order No.1 dated July faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, a separate body under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant
dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported casesto this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This
of graft and corruption during the previous administration. Petitioners Louis Biraogo flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress executed.
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of
the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. In addition,Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that
Biraogo claims that it is unconstitutional for it is not under the President’s continuingthere will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds
authority to reorganize the Office of the President. Finally, E.O. No. 1 accordingly, already appropriated.
violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and 3. NO. It violates the equal protection clause. The intent to single out the
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. In this regard, it must be borne in
In defense, the Office of the Solicitor General claims that,E.O. No. 1 doesmind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the Presidents past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. Also, E.O. No. 1 does not sanction.
usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but
a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress. And that the Truth Almario v. Exec. Secretary (G.R. No. 189028; July 16, 2013)
Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created
for laudable purposes. FACTS:
Issues:
1. Whether the Creation of the Truth Commission of 2010’s basis is the On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
President’s power of control. Proclamation No. 1001and, upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees
2. Whether the Creation of the Truth Commission of 2010’s basis is the of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), created the category of
President’s duty to faithfully execute the laws under Section 17,Article VII. Award and Decoration of National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos who have
3. Whether the Truth Commission of 2010 is constitutional. made distinct contributions to arts and letters. In the same issuance,
Ruling: Fernando Amorsolo was declared as the first National Artist.
1. NO. The creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of
control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the Creating the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed into
judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely
law. It established the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA)
and gave it an extensive mandate over the development, promotion and
preservation of the Filipino national culture and arts and the Filipino cultural
heritage.
CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to
promote, develop and protect the Philippine national culture and the arts, and
authorized to give awards to deserving Filipino artists, the two bodies
decided to team up and jointly administer the National Artists Award.
On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met. A total of 87 nominees
were considered during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist of 32
names was compiled.
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel shortlisted 13 out of the 32
names in the preliminary shortlist.On May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was
conducted by the 30-member Final Deliberation Panel comprised of the CCP
Board of Trustees and the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the living
National Artists.From the 13 names in the second shortlist, a final list of four
names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro
Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
CCP and NCCA submitted this recommendation to the President. According
to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the
President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the
President allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural
groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents Cecile
Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Masa and Jose
Moreno. The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these
nominations and invited resource persons to validate the qualifications and
credentials of the nominees.
Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel
Conde a National Artist was issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on July
6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro
Francisco, Federico AguilarAlcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. This was
subsequently announced to the public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita on July 29, 2009.
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be
conferred the Order of National Artists and to set the standard for entry into
that select group, petitioners instituted this petition for prohibition, certiorari
and injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying that the Order of
National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the
Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa
and Moreno be enjoined and declared to have been rendered in grave abuse
of discretion.
All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely
abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening
and selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her
own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels. According to petitioners, the
Presidents discretion to name National Artists is not absolute but limited. In
particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be exercised in the absence of
or against the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP.
ISSUE: Was there grave abuse of discretion committed by former President
Arroyo?
HELD:
Legal Standing
The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a statute or an official
act must have a direct and personal interest. They must show not only that
the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that they sustained or are
in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some indefinite way.
In this case, the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or
privilege to which they are entitled as members of the Order of National
Artists as a result of the conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno. In particular, they will be denied the
privilege of exclusive membership in the Order of National Artists.
Equal Protection
It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to
be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while
respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist
and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist. Yet, the
four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they
were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the
CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Masa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny.No real and substantial
distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that
would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures,
and placing respondents in an exceptional position. The undue classification
was not germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law
and well-established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law
into effect. While petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order of
National Artists, he is entitled to be given an equal opportunity to vie for that
honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right
to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him
standing in this case.
Limits of the President’s Discretion
The "power to recommend" includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or
indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon
the party to whom it is made."
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the
President may or may not adopt the recommendation or advice of the NCCA
and the CCP Boards. In other words, the advice of the NCCA and the CCP is
subject to the Presidents discretion.
Nevertheless, the Presidents discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered,
nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless. The Presidents
power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws. Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the
President
The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists
should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the
relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation
imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power.
In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP Boards in
connection with the conferment of the Order of National Artists by executive
issuances were institutionalized by two laws, namely, Presidential Decree
No. 208 dated June 7, 1973 and Republic Act No. 7356. In particular,
Proclamation No. 1144 dated May 15, 1973 constituted the CCP Board as
the National Artists Awards Committee and tasked it to "administer the
conferment of the category of National Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists
with the mandate to "draft the rules to guide its deliberations in the choice of
National Artists".
By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the
conferment of the National Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP decided to
work together and jointly administer the National Artist Award. They reviewed
the guidelines for the nomination, selection and administration of the National
Artist Award. An administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the
force and effect of law. Thus, the rules, guidelines and policies regarding the
Order of National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the
NCCA pursuant to their respective statutory mandates have the force and
effect of law. Until set aside, they are binding upon executive and
administrative agencies,including the President himself/herself as chief
executor of laws.
In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and as a
consequence of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the
discretion of the President in the matter of the Order of National Artists is
confined to the names submitted to him/her by the NCCA and the CCP
Boards. This means that the President could not have considered
conferment of the Order of National Artists on any person not considered and
recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. That is the proper import
of the provision of Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that the NCCA and the
CCP "shall advise the President on the conferment of the Order of National
Artists." Applying this to the instant case, the former President could not have
properly considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno, as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP
Boards. Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection and meticulous
screening process be rendered futile, the respective mandates of the NCCA
and the CCP Board of Trustees under relevant laws to administer the
conferment of Order of National Artists, draft the rules and regulations to
guide its deliberations, formulate and implement policies and plans, and
undertake any and all necessary measures in that regard will also become
meaningless.
Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009 proclaiming
respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas,
Francisco Masa, and Jose Moreno, respectively, as National Artists are
declared INVALID and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
De Leon Vs. Carpio
178 SCRA 457
Alter Ego
FACTS:
Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister of
Justice Neptali A. Gonzales. Upon appeal to the Review Committee, the said
body declined to act on their petitions for reconsideration on the ground that
it had lost its jurisdiction with the ratification of the new Constitution. They
were advised instead to seek relief from the Civil Service Commission.

The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their dismissals were
invalid and unconstitutional, having been done in violation of their security of
tenure under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the Board ordered their
reinstatement.
However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders issued
by the Secretary of Justice to CSC “without action,” claiming that they were
null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit and direct
order issued to him by the Secretary of Justice
HELD:
NO.
It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in the
Constitution and honored not in the breach but in the observance, that all
executive departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the
President of the Philippines.
The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus
and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department. The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-
executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its
exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature.
Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of his Cabinet
and may appoint them as he sees fit or shuffle them at pleasure, subject only
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and replace them in his
discretion. Once in place, they are at all times under the disposition of the
President as their immediate superior. “Without minimizing the importance of
the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the
projection of that of the President. Hence, their acts, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.” (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior)
In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed the respondent
to reinstate the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was acting in the regular discharge
of his functions as an alter ego of the President. His acts should therefore
have been respected by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is in the
Department of Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a
subordinate in this department, the respondent was (and is) bound to obey
the Secretary’s directives, which are presumptively the acts of the President
of the Philippines.
Manalang-Demigillo vs Trade and Investment Development Corporation
of the Philippines
Facts: On February 12, 1998, the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee was renamed Trade and Investment Development Corporation of
the Philippines (TIDCORP) pursuant to Republic Act No. 8494 entitled An Act
Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 1080, As Amended, by
Reorganizing And Renaming the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation, Expanding Its Primary Purpose, and for Other
Purposes. Republic Act No. 8494 reorganized the structure of TIDCORP.
The issuance of appointments in accordance with the reorganization ensued.
Petitioner Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo) was appointed as Senior
Vice President (PG 15) with permanent status, and was assigned to the
Legal and Corporate Services Department (LCSD) of TIDCORP. Petitioner
was evaluated and given a ‘poor’ rating for two consecutive evaluations due
to her unimproved performance resulting to her name being dropped from
the rolls of TIDCORP.
Issue: Whether or not the reorganization is valid resulting to Demigillo’s
reassignment valid.
Held: Yes. Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board of
Directors effected the assailed 2002 reorganization, they were acting as the
responsible members of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP constituted
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080, as amended by Republic Act No.
8494, not as the alter egos of the President. We cannot stretch the
application of a doctrine that already delegates an enormous amount of
power. Also, it is settled that the delegation of power is not to be lightly
inferred.
The result of the lengthy consultations and close coordination was the
comprehensive reorganization plan that included a new organizational
structure, position classification and staffing pattern, qualification standards,
rules and regulations to implement the reorganization, separation incentive
packages and timetable of implementation. Undoubtedly, TIDCORP effected
the reorganization within legal bounds and in response to the perceived need
to make the agency more attuned to the changing times.
Having found the 2002 reorganization to be valid and made pursuant to
Republic Act No. 8494, we declare that there are no legal and practical
bases for reinstating Demigillo to her former position as Senior Vice
President in the LCSD. To be sure, the reorganization plan abolished the
LCSD, and put in place a setup completely different from the previous one,
including a new staffing pattern in which Demigillo would be heading the
RCMSS, still as a Senior Vice President of TIDCORP. With that abolition,
reinstating her as Senior Vice President in the LCSD became legally and
physically impossible.
Demigillo’s contention that she was specifically appointed to the position of
Senior Vice President in the LCSD was bereft of factual basis. The records
indicate that her permanent appointment pertained only to the position of
Senior Vice President. Her appointment did not indicate at all that she was to
hold that specific post in the LCSD. Hence, her re-assignment to the RCMSS
was by no means a diminution in rank and status considering that she
maintained the same rank of Senior Vice President with an accompanying
increase in pay grade.
The assignment to the RCMSS did not also violate Demigillo’s security of
tenure as protected by Republic Act No. 6656. We have already upheld
reassignments In the Civil Service resulting from valid reorganizations. Nor
could she claim that her reassignment was invalid because it caused the
reduction in her rank, status or salary. On the contrary, she was reappointed
as Senior Vice President, a position that was even upgraded like all the other
similar positions to Pay Grade 16, Step 4, Level II. In every sense, the
position to which she was reappointed under the 2002 reorganization was
comparable with, if not similar to her previous position.
BACULI V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 188681
The Case:
 G.R. No. 188681 is the appeal of petitioner Francisco T. Baculi
assailing the decision promulgated on October 29, 2008,1 whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld in CA-G.R. SP No. 82629 the
decision of the Office of the President dismissing him from the
service.
 The law abhors the indefinite preventive suspension of public officials
and employees, whether they are presidential appointees or not. For
presidential appointees, the suspension should last only within a
reasonable time. For non-presidential appointees, the maximum
period of preventive suspension is 90 days. Once the allowable
period of preventive suspension had been served, the public officials
and employees must be automatically reinstated.
FACTS:
 On July 16, 1988, the petitioner was appointed as Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO) II of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) - Cagayan by then President Corazon C. Aquino. In 1991,
acting in his capacity as PARO II, he entered into several contracts
with various suppliers for the lease of typewriters, computers,
computer printers, and other accessories.
 However, revealed that the foregoing transactions were tainted with
irregularities.
 On September 4, 1992, DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, issued a
formal charge against the petitioner for gross dishonesty, abuse of
authority, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. Simultaneous to the charge, the petitioner was
placed under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days pending the
investigation of the complaint.
 The petitioner then appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Seeing no reversible error, CSC affirmed the dismissal of the
petitioner. Asked for reconsideration, but denied.
 CA reversed the decision (First dismissal). However, instructed to
forward his findings and recommendations to the Office of the
President.
 The DAR Secretary forwarded his findings and recommendations to
the Office of the President. The Office of the President, dismissed
petitioner from the service.
 CA upheld his dismissal pursuant to the order of the Office of the
President (Second dismissal).
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the order of dismissal issued by the Acting Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs was valid
RULING:
 1.) The FIRST Dismissal of Baculi was invalid.
 Section 38(a) of Presidential Decree No. 807 has drawn a definite
distinction between subordinate officers or employees who were
presidential appointees, on the one hand, and subordinate officers or
employees who were non-presidential appointees, on the other.
Without a doubt, substantial distinctions that set apart presidential
appointees from non presidential appointees truly existed. For one,
presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of
the President pursuant to the well-settled principle that, in the
 absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is
lodged in the same authority in whom the power to appoint is vested.
Having the power to remove or to discipline presidential appointees,
therefore, the President has the corollary authority to investigate
them and look into their conduct in office.
 Thus, Baculi, as a presidential appointee, came under the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the President in line with the principle that
the "power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. “ As such,
the DAR Secretary held no disciplinary jurisdiction over him. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 807 has expressly specified the procedure
for disciplinary actions involving presidential appointees.
 2.) The SECOND Dismissal of Baculi was valid
 There was yet no administrative complaint when the DAR-RIC
conducted its investigation. Such administrative complaint came to
exist only when Secretary Garilao brought the formal charge for
gross dishonesty, abuse of authority, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
 Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite neither exceeded his
authority, nor usurped the power of the President. Although the
powers and functions of the Chief Executive have been expressly
reposed by the Constitution in one person, the President of the
Philippines, it would be unnatural to expect the President to
personally exercise and discharge all such powers and functions.
Somehow, the exercise and discharge of most of these powers and
functions have been delegated to others, particularly to the members
of the Cabinet, conformably to the doctrine of qualified political
agency. Accordingly, we have expressly recognized the extensive
range of authority vested in the Executive Secretary or the Deputy
Executive Secretary as an official who ordinarily acts for and in
behalf of the President. As such, the decisions or orders emanating
from the Office of the Executive Secretary are attributable to the
Executive Secretary even if they have been signed only by any of the
Deputy Executive Secretaries.
 Given the foregoing, the dismissal of Baculi through the order of
June 25, 2003, being by authority of the President, was entitled to full
faith and credit as an act of the President herself.
 Drilon v. Lim
 August 4, 1994
 G.R. No. 112497
 J. Cruz
 Subject: Powers of control and supervision
 himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
 Facts:
 The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187
of the Local Government Code. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal
to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No.
7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with
the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing
certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

 The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the
ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional
because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in
violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is
constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment
of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had
indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court
due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but
reinstated it anyway.)

 Issue:
 Whether or not Section 187 of the LGC, vesting on the Secretary of
Justice the power of control over LGUs, is unconstitutional.

 Ratio/Held:
 No, it is constitutional. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of
Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax
ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of
these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted
the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue
Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code
should be. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in
reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the
grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government
Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere
supervision.

 An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they
are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or
re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
discretion to modify or replace them.
  Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of
 Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local
Autonomy Act. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to
suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or
fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.
Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment
or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the
requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it
would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power
was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the
Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under
Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the
constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right
to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive
or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact,
Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two
grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions
and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment.
These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or
reasonableness, of the tax measure.
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284,
August 15, 2000
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
Because of the growing number of criminal incidents around Metro Manila,
then President Estrada gave a verbal directive to the PNP and Marines to
conduct a joint visibility patrols to prevent and suppress crimes. The
Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of
Staff of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government
were tasked to execute and implement the said order. A Letter of Instruction
02/2000 (“LOI”) which detailed the manner of the “TASK FORCE
TULUNGAN” was released by PNP.
The IBP questioned the necessity of calling for the Marines and filed petition
to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Marines,
unconstitutional on the ground that:
(a) There was no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would
justify such deployment (violates Art 2, Sec. 3 of the constitution),
(b) Deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the military in a civilian
function of government (violates Art. 16, Sec. 5) (c) Deployment creates a
dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian functions of the
government. Unwittingly making the military more powerful than hat it should
be under the constitution
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify
the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the
Section 3, Article II.
Issue: Whether the deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian
supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police
force.
Held: NO.
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is
evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the
metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the
real authority belonging to the PNP.
In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-
Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are
tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. Chief of
Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has
been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited
provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is
lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members
of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of.
Additionally, the Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to
requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and execution
of certain traditionally “civil” functions (e.g. elections, Red Cross, disaster
response, etc.)
SANLAKAS v Executive Secretary
421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085
February 3, 2004
FACTS
 During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior
officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation,
command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized
the Oakwood Building in Makati.
 Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared
their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the
resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP
Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised
 Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of
Rebellion.
 Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks
in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No.
435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
 In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed:
 (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec.
18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and
that there is no factual basis for such proclamation.
 (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same
Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit
a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation
of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any
such power to the President.
 (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and
Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that
there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by
Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.
 (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for
the crime of rebellion.
ISSUES
1. Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional
2. Whether or not declaring state of rebellion is needed to declare
General order No 4
3. Whether or not presidential issuances cannot be construed as an
exercise of emergency powers
4. Whether or not there was usurpation of the power of Congress
granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution
5. Whether or not declaration of state rebellion is an avenue for
warrantless arrests for rebellion
HELD
First and second issue
 Both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit
declaring state or rebellion.
 The mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate
constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does
not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with
more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not
bring about these conditions. The presidential issuances themselves
call for the suppression of the rebellion with due regard to
constitutional rights
Third issue
 The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is
conferred by the Constitution executive powers. President has full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power.
 Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without factual
basis.
 The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there
was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or
that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts.
Fourth Issue
 The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of
no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and
in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of
her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are
purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and
18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
Fifth issue
 The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person
may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a
crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a
valid warrantless arrest is present.
David vs. Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396
May 3, 2006 Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Doctrine:
Presidential Proclamation No 1017 is limited to the calling out by the
President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. Upon implementing pursuant to G.O. No. 5, if the military and the
police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution,
SC has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.”
Facts:
There are 7 consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5
(G.O. No. 5) for violating the Sec 17 Art 12 of the Constitution
Through PP 1017, The president states “I hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any
act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to
all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”
The basis for PP1017 is due to the political opposition represented by
extreme left and extreme right hindering growth and economic progress,
providing a clear and present danger.
Respondents’ argue that there was conspiracy among military officers and
NPA members in a plot to unseat or assassinate Arroyo.Instances of such
basis have been apparent due to the Magdalo Group vowing to remain
defiant, bomb being found at a party GMA was supposed to attend, CPP-
NPA calling for a revolutionary within the military, bombing of
telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan, directive of
the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join
5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass
protests.
Then through Proc. No. 1021 lifted state of national emergency on Mar. 3
and that the Constitution grants full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces.
The petitioners argue that constitutional rights were trampled upon.
They state that due to the delarations, there has been cancellation of
programs relative to celebration of EDSA anniversary, revocation of permit to
hold rallies, and announcement that warrantless arrests and take-over of
facilities can be implemented. Prof. Randy David and Akbayan Pres. Ronal
Llamas were arrested without a warrant during a rally. Daily Tribune office
was raided. Administration asked for “balanced reporting” and warned that
disobedience can be ground for arrest and suspension.
Issue: whether or not given the facts, the President has full discretion on
determining or exercising calling out power was bereft/lack factual basis?
Held/Ruling:
Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
In times of national emergency, Constitution reasonably demands that we
have faith in wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges
him to operate within Constitutional limitations.
Lock’s “theory of prerogative,” to Watkins’ doctrine of “constitutional
dictatorship” and, eventually, to McIlwain’s “principle of constitutionalism” aim
to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., allotting increasing
areas of discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such
powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under
effective limitations and checks.
Facial review of PP 1017 is uncalled for. The overbreadth doctrine is an
analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech
cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases, it is
inapplicable to the matter being discussed.
President cannot issue Decrees.
Administrative Code of 1987, Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, limits
Presidential Issuances to the following: Eos, AOs, Memorandum Orders,
Memorandum Circulars, General and Special Orders
PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law, hence no justification for the acts
alleged to have violated constitutional rights.
It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed
forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Mendoza identifies such acts: (a) arrests and seizures without judicial
warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and
agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees,
are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief
only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus.
“Acts of terrorism” found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and
made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the
said G.O
G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the
“necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism and lawless violence.”
Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism.
The absence of a law defining “acts of terrorism” may result in abuse and
oppression on the part of the police or military.
President’s judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions.
Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking
into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition
and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the
administration.
SUMMARY
PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied
power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all
laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any
form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional.
Under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the
absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and
private business affected with public interest.
Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President – acting
as Commander-in-Chief – addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out
the provisions of PP 1017.
It provides valid standard – that the military and the police should take only
the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence.” But the words “acts of terrorism” found in
G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress
and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O.
the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2)
the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-
KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior
restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices
and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other
materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence.
Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Relevant Laws:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce
VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain
law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”
Sec. 18, Article VII pertains to calling out power of the President, whom, as
declared in Sanlakas, is in the best position to determine the factual basis for
it since s/he has access to a vast network of intelligence.
However, state of national emergency must be distinguished from state of
rebellion, the declaraition of which has no legal effect. In declaring a state of
national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article
XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-
owned public utility and business affected with public interest.
Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this
Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the
emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority
from Congress.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives.” Neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor
a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees.
Purpose of invoking section 17 is to have authority to take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest.
A body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that
during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress
to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it
wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject
to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.[124]
Jamar M. Kulayan et al vs Gov. Abdusakur Tan
G.R. No. 187298 , July 3, 2012
Sereno, J.
POWER OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
4. MILITARY POWERS
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to
the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justifies by the invocation of Section
465 of the Local Government Code.
FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul,
Sulu. Andres Notter, a Swiss national, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national, and
Marie Jean Lacaba, a Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water
and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water
and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by
three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG). The leader of the alleged kidnappers was identified as Raden
Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports linked Abu to
Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.
The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee,
convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the
Provincial Governor of Sulu, organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF),
a group of armed male civilians coming from different municipalities.The
organization of the CEF was embodied in a "Memorandum of Understanding"
entered into between three parties: the provincial government of Sulu,
represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police, represented
by P/SUPT. Latag.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-
09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the
kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a
terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security.
On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report
to respondent P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim. Upon arriving at the police station,
he was booked, and interviewed about his relationship to Musin, Jaiton, and
Julamin, who were all his deceased relatives. Upon admitting that he was
indeed related to the three, he was detained. After a few hours, former
Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi, companions were arrested. The affidavit
of the apprehending officer alleged that they were suspected ASG supporters
and were being arrested under Proclamation 1-09.
Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines
were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and
18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to
exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of
the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Provincial
Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces under
his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own
private army.
On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji
Mohammad Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli, residents
of Patikul, Sulu, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. I. Transcendental public Importance warrants a relaxation of the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
Doctrine provides that where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also
within the competence of the CA or the RTC, it is in either of these courts
and not in the Supreme Court, that the specific action for the issuance of
such writ must be sought unless special and important laws are clearly and
specifically set forth in the petition.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
Every bad, unusual incident where police officers figure in generates public
interest and people watch what will be done or not done to them. Lack of
disciplinary steps taken against them erode public confidence in the police
institution. As petitioners themselves assert, the restrictive custody of
policemen under investigation is an existing practice, hence, the issue is
bound to crop up every now and then. The matter is capable of repetition or
susceptible of recurrence. It better be resolved now for the education and
guidance of all concerned.
Hence, the instant petition is given due course, impressed as it is with
transcendental public importance.
II. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-
in-chief of the Republic
It has already been established that there is one repository of executive
powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else.
ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they
are exercised by one president
One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief
powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The
President’s Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the
legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the second paragraph of Section
23, Article 6 of the Constitution:
The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central
powers inherently vested in the National Government, especially not the
prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of
security and defense.
The intent behind the powers granted to local government units is fiscal,
economic, and administrative in nature. The Code is concerned only with
powers that would make the delivery of basic services more effective to the
constituents, and should not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out
powers on local executives.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted said proclamation and
guidelines are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
Datu Zaldy Ampatuan vs. Ronaldo Puno
GR No. 190259 JUNE 07 2011
ABAD, J.
DOCTRINE: (TOPIC: EXECUTIVE - MILITARY POWER)
It is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of
the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless
violence; Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave
abuse of discretion, the court will accord respect to the President’s judgment
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency in the three places mentioned; the calling out of the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President; she did not need a congressional
authority to exercise the same.
FACTS:
 On November 24, 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre of 57
men and women, including news reporters, President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (GMA) issued Proclamation 1946 placing “ the Provinces of
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and City of Cotabato under state of
emergency.
 GMA directed the AFP and PNP “to undertake such measures as may be
allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence”
 On November 27, 2009, GMA issued Administrative Order 273
“transferring” the supervision of the Autonomous Reguon of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG)
 However, due to issues raised over the term “transferring”, AO 273-A
amending the former by “delegating” instead ot “transferring” the
supervision of ARMM to DILG.
 Petitioners Datu Zaldy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong and Regie Sahali-
Generale, all ARMM officials, filed a petition for prohibition.
1. Petitioners alleged that the President’s issuances encroached on
the ARMM’s autonomy.
 Proclamation and orders empowered DILG Secretary to
take over AMRR operations and seize regional
government control, which is in violation of principle of
local autonomy under RA 9054 (Expanded ARMM Act)
and the Constitution.
 President gave DILG Secretary not merely
administrative supervision but control over the ARMM
since DILG Secretary could suspend ARMM officials and
replace them.
2. Petitioners claimed that President had no factual basis for
declaring state of emergency especially in the Province of Sultan
Kudarat and City of Cotabato, where no violent incidents
occurred.
3. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and
273-A be declared unconstitutional and DILG Secretary, AFP
and PNP be enjoined in implementing such.
 OSG insisted that the President issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive
ARMM of autonomy but to restore peace and order in the place.
 The president issuance was pursuant to her “calling out” power
as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution.
 The need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.
 Her judgment based on intelligence report and best information
available to her to call our the armed forces to suppress and
prevent lawless violence.
 OSG also averred that the President merely delegated through AOs 273
and 273-A her supervisory powers over ARMM to DILG Secretary who
was her alter ego.
 The orders did not authorize DILG to take over ARMM.
 It did not give blanket authority to suspend or replace ARMM
officials.
 Only needed to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the
principle of local autonomy under Sec. 16 Article X and Sec. 1 Article V
of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act?
2. Whether or not the President invalidly exercised emergency powers
when she called out the AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence?
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions?
HELD/ RATIO:
The Court ruled that Primo is found guilty of Attempted rape not
consummated statutory rape.
1. No.
DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of ARMM. After the
law was enforced, agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody
for the alleged Maguindanao massacre incident. The Vice-Governmor,
Adiong, assumed vacated post on December 10, 2009, pursuant to the rule
of succession provided in Article VII, sec. 12 of RA 9054 (Expanded ARMM
Act). With this, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of ARMM
Regional Assembly, Sahali-Generale, acting ARMM Vice-Governor.
Therefore, DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations
of ARMM.
2. No.
The emergency powers when the President deployed AFP and PNP is not
an exercise of emergency powers as stated in Sec 23 (2) of Article Vi of the
Constitution which provides:
“SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.”
The President did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorizes the President to exercise extraordinary powers but the President
only proclaimed a state of emergency in the 3 places pursuant to the calling
out power of the president. The calling out of armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence is a power that the Constitution vests in the
President. Therefore, the President did not need a congressional authority to
exercise the same.
3. Yes.
The President’s calling out power is pursuant to Sec. 18 Article VII which
provides:
“SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x”
While the Court may inquire into the factual bases of the President’s exercise
of such power, it would generally defer the President’s judgment on the
matter.
The Constitution clearly entrust the determination of the need for calling out
the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless the it’s
shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion,
the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.
If the petitioner fails to support the assertion that President acted without
factual basis, then the Court cannot undertake an independent investigation
beyond pleadings.
Also, in the exercise of such power, on-the-spot decisions may be necessary
in emergency situation to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction. Definitely, the decision to call out the military to prevent and
suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to
have any effect.
In the case, the petitioners failed to show that such declaration of state of
emergency in the Provinces of Maguinadao, Sultan Kudarat and City of
Cotabato as well as the President’s calling out power had no factual basis.
They only alleged that since the areas under ARMM were place under state
of emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire ARMM by DILG
Secreatary had no basiss too.
OSG clearly explained the factual bases of the President. The Ampatuan and
Mangudadatu clans are known to have arsenals of armed follower who hold
elective position in various parts of ARMM and the rest of Mindanao
Considering the fact that the principal victims of massacre were members of
Mangudadatu family and the main perpetrators of the brutal kills are
members and followers of Ampatuan family. Both the military and police had
to prepare for and prevent reported retaliatory actions from Mangudadatu
and additional offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.
Through Proclamation 1946, the President had to act to prevent further
bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Given the progress reports
which indicated that there were movenemnt in these places of firearms and
armed men who were sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, in order to pacify W/N the President has the authority to issue an order that prevents the AFP
the fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive from testifying before a legislative inquiry
action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose
firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the Ruling:
peace and security of the affected areas. Yes
 Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so,
by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
SC DECISION: SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice.
 SC sttes that “the ability of the President to prevent military officers
from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege,
Gudani v. Senga but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control
G.R. No. 170165 15 August 2006 the actions and speech of members of the armed forces “
Tinga, J.  The constitutions gives the President the title of commander-in-chief
not the Senate. If a military officer is torn “between obeying the
Facts: President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation
 On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the
invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a public Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate,
hearing (28 Sept.) before the Senate Committee on National who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.”
Defense and Security. The hearing was concerning the conduct of 
the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations
of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt
purportedly of a phone conversation between President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo and then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano. (Garci tapes). The petitioners, Gen. Gudani and Col.
Butuan was tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during
the 2004 elections.
 On the evening of 27 Sept. 2005, a message was transmitted to the
PMA Superintendent from the office of Gen. Senga “PER
INSTRUCTION OF HER EXCELLENCY PGMA, NO AFP
PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL
OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. INFORM
BGEN FRANCISCO F GUDANI AFP AND LTC ALEXANDER
BALUTAN PA (GSC) ACCORDINGLY.”
 A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their
testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted
that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee in spite of
the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval.
The two were held to have disobeyed a legal order, in violation of
A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence
they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings.
 GMA issued EO 464. The EO enjoined officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing
in any legislative inquiry without her approval.

ISSUE: