THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002]

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Region VIII, Tacloban City,
Represented by Regional Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO DARAMAN,
NARCISO LUCENECIO and Hon. CLEMENTE C. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 32, Calbayog City, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized representative may order the
confiscation in favor of the government of, among others, the vehicles used in the commission of offenses
punishable by the said Code.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the December
6, 1995 Decision[1] and the June 3, 1996 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch
32) in Criminal Case No. 1958. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused GREGORIO DARAMAN
and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de [o]ficio.
The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.
The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee who is taking custody of the
Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle St. Jude, with Plate No. HAJ-848, to return the said vehicle to the
owner thereof.[3]
The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last paragraph of the Decision
regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein respondents.
The Facts
In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with] violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277 in an information which is quoted
herein below:
That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, at Barangay Bulao,
Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces
of assorted sizes of lumber, with a total volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY
NINE PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any permit or
license therefor from the proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended and further Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not guilty.
Thereafter trial was conducted.
The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:
That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a Forest Ranger.
On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, while he was in his house in Brgy. Bulao,
San Jorge, Samar, a vehicle named St. Jude with Plate No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay Blanca Aurora
passed by. He stopped the said vehicle and found some lumber of assorted sizes [and] wood shavings
inside. The lumber consisted of 62 pieces of 1 x 2 x 4, 16 pieces of 1 x 24 x 2.3 and 1 piece of 1 x 2 x 4. In
his estimate at the price of P10.00 per board foot the total value of the lumber would be P729.30. He asked
the driver for [the] owner of the lumber and he was informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca
Aurora. The driver also informed him that the vehicle was owned by his employer, Narciso Lucenecio of the
Holy Cross Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then took hold of the vehicle and the assorted lumber
and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as Exhs. B and series. He also took photographs of
the lumber which are now marked as Exhs. C and series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit
with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest Ranger. When he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for some
papers for the assorted lumber, the latter replied that he had none because they were not
his. Daraman further told him that [they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from
the furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his assorted lumbers in
the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to his (Asans) house
in Barangay Abrero, Calbayog City.
The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both the prosecution and
the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that the case would be merely corroborative
[of] those already offered by Pablo Opinion. The prosecution rested its case with the admission of Exhs. A
and B and their series. Its Exhs. C and series were rejected because the photographer who took them did
not testify to identify [them].
For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused would merely offer
corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts have been established:
That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby Lucenecio instructed him to procure some
wood shavings (sinapyo) in San Jorge, Samar. He used the service vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral
Services. His companion[s] were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went
to barangay Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and thereat, they got some wood shavings from the furniture
shop owned by a certain Asan Abing. They loaded 20 sacks of wood shavings, each sack measuring 22
inches in height by 32 1/2 inches in circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings [were]
being used by the Holy Cross Funeral Services as cushions in the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood
shavings were loaded, Asan Abing asked him a favor to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his house
in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy Cross Funeral Services [was] also located. Asan himself
personally loaded his assorted lumber into the vehicle. The subject assorted lumber were already in the
furniture shop where they got the wood shavings. On their way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao, Pablo
Opinion stopped him and took the wood shavings. Opinion also inquired about the assorted lumber and he
told him that they were owned by Asan, owner of the furniture shop in Brgy. Blanca Aurora, who loaded
them in his vehicle to be brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Obrero, Calbayog City. He told Opinion
also that Asan advised him that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to tell the person
that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca Aurora, San
Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead impounded the vehicle
together with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, the vehicle was still not returned
to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and returned to his employer at Brgy. Obrero,Calbayog City and told
the latter about what happened.[4]
After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed vehicle to Lucenecio.
Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Community and
Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) of Catbalogan, Samar conducted
administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized lumber and vehicle in the presence of private
respondents.[5] The two failed to present documents to show the legality of their possession and
transportation of the lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the
Regional Executive Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance. [6] Atty.
Pastor C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, concurring with the recommendation to
forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from private respondents. The Memorandum was approved by
RED Augustus L. Momongan and Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the DENR, Region
VIII, Tacloban City.[7]
Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed
Decision, only insofar as it ordered the return of the said vehicle to the owner thereof. [8] He contended that
the vehicle had already been administratively confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the
RED approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994.[9] He further claimed that the DENR had exclusive
jurisdiction over the conveyance, which had been used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant
to Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence. The unrebutted testimony of
Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take
the lumber to the latters house in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also
located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing the authorization for the
lumber were in the formers shop in Barangay Blanca Aurora. Finding the evidence against
Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise insufficient, the RTC considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime
and ordered its delivery to him.
In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was untenable on
procedural and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar did not sign
the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign of his disapproval of the Motion.
Substantively, the trial court ruled:
x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found by the Court the owner of
the vehicle in question, St. Jude, which is the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor owned by
accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution failed to
sufficiently establish that accused Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the lumber subject of the
motion which would thereby demonstrate that he had x x x possession of the subject forest products.
Instead, as established by the evidence it was a certain Asan who owned the subject lumber. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has long become final
and executory.
Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings conducted by the OIC DENR
Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the lumber in question [was] found to be owned
by Asan Abing. But notwithstanding this fact, for reasons not known to the Court, the said Asan Abing was
never made an accused in the present case.
Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is himself a violator of P.D.
705 or has been found to have conspired with any other persons who committed the violation of Sec. 68 of
P.D. 705 or consented to the use of his vehicle in violating the said law. In the present case as shown by
the evidence, neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner accused Narciso Lucenecio has committed
a violation of P.D. 705 as already declared by the Court in its decision of December 6, 1995 nor the driver,
accused Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of the violation charged, and the decision
has not been appealed.[10]
Hence, this Petition.[11]
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:
(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order x x x the return of property already
owned by the government.
(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines.
(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason of mistake, error or failure of its
officers to perform their duties.[12]
Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated vehicle; (2)
whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3) whether, as a result of its filing of the
criminal action, petitioner is estopped from confiscating the vehicle administratively.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle
Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the return of the disputed
vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government property by virtue of the forfeiture Order
issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his duly authorized representative, under
Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation and disposition of all
conveyances -- by land, water or air -- used in illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or
abandoning forest products.
We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.[13] A comparison of the provisions of the two relevant
sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber
or forest products as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of
forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense. Section 68 reads:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: x x x.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products
cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and
tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. [14]
Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:
SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to
Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land,
water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations or policies on the matter.[15]
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal meaning and applied
without resort to interpretation, on the presumption that its wording correctly expresses its intent or will. The
courts may not construe it differently.[16]
Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial arts; [17] equipment covers
physical facilities available for production, including buildings, machineries and
tools;[18] and implementspertains to whatever may supply a want, especially an instrument, tool or
utensil.[19] These terms do not include conveyances that are specifically covered by Section 68-A. The
implementing guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in a manner that includes any type or class of
vehicle, craft, whether motorized or not, used either in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any
mode of transport used in the movement of any forest product.[20]
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of all conveyances used either by land,
water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same is vested in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly authorized representative. The DENR
secretary has supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and
wildlife laws, rules and regulations.[21]
To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-93, amending
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides the guidelines for the confiscation,
forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to private respondents to
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of
lumber, x x x without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities,
x x x. The Information did not contain any allegation pertaining to the transportation or conveyance of
illegally cut, gathered, possessed or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended.
Confiscation Without Due Process
Private respondents main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex C) is a false, falsified
and perjurious document. The Order was attached to and made part of the record only when petitioner filed
its Motion for Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only after the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision. Petitioner made it appear, according to the private respondents, that RED Momongan had
approved the Memorandum on January 26, 1994. This does not appear to be true because Atty. Marmita,
officer-in-charge (OIC) of the DENR Legal Division of Tacloban City, signed the Memorandum
recommending approval only on January 31, 1994.
Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch 32) ordered the provincial
environment and natural resources officer to transfer the confiscated vehicle and pieces of lumber in
connection with the prosecution of Criminal Case 1958. [22] Reynaldo R. Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office could not deliver the vehicle
because it was not in running condition.[23]
We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls outside the ambit of the
review of the assailed Decision and Order. The basis for the assailed Order to release the vehicle was
private respondents acquittal of the charge of violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order
issued by the DENR was based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and separate matter cognizable
by it. Petitioner is questioning only the RTCs jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the confiscated
vehicle. Private respondents have not appealed the DENRs Order of Forfeiture, the validity of which can
thus be presumed.[24]The genuineness of the Order and its proper service upon them are factual issues
that will not be dwelt upon by this Court, which is not a trier of facts.[25]
The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the main limited to reviewing
legal errors committed by a lower court.[26] Under PD 705, the actions and the decisions of the DENR
are reviewable by the courts only through special civil actions for certiorari or prohibition. [27]
Second Issue:
Construing PD 705, as Amended
Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-A, PD 705 contemplated
a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the violator or was a conspirator with other violators
of that law. Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993, provides that the proceedings for the confiscation
and the forfeiture of the conveyance shall be directed against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its
illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture.
In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of PD 705 contemplated
a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law or conspired with other persons who
violated it or consented to the use of his or her vehicle in violating it.
Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have violated PD 705, and their acquittals were
not appealed.
We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case is immaterial, because
what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement or conveyance of forest products without
legal documents. The DENR secretary or the authorized representatives do not possess criminal
jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts.
Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority.
Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial courts the confiscation of
conveyances used in violation of forestry laws. Hence, we cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal
liability of the accused before it impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber
or forest products without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice.[28]
We also uphold petitioners argument that the release of the vehicle to private respondents would defeat
the purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO
277 underscores the urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of
the present and future generations. Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected only
through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws.[29] Strong paramount public policy
should not be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably
restrict its scope.[30]
Third Issue:
Estoppel
In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioners third issue. It is no
longer material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that the assistant provincial
prosecutors failure to comment on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was an implied disapproval
thereof. The public prosecutors disapproval does not vest in the trial court the jurisdiction or authority to
release the vehicle to private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and G.R. No. 175289

ANIANO LATAYADA,
Petitioners, Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. August 31, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest laws and regulations makes
one automatically liable of violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, [1] as amended. Lack
of criminal intent is not a valid defense.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the June 28, 2005 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 which affirmed in all respects the Judgment[3] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 38, Cagayan De Oro City, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended. Likewise assailed in this
petition is the September 22, 2006 Resolution[4]denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[5]

Factual Antecedents

In a Criminal Complaint[6] filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City by
Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit under the TL
Strike Force Team of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano
Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria (Sudaria) of Tagpangi,
Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged with violation
of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. [7]

Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a
Resolution[8] dated March 13, 1996 recommending the filing of an Information for the aforesaid charge not
only against Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac but also against petitioner Crisostomo Villarin (Villarin),
then Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City. The dismissal of the complaint against
Sudaria was likewise recommended.Said Resolution was then approved by the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao through a Resolution[9] dated May 9, 1996 ordering the filing of the Information in the RTC of
Cagayan de Oro City.

Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information[10] was filed against petitioners Villarin and Latayada and their
co-accused Baillo and Boyatac, for violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as follows:

That on or about January 13, 1996, in Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, pursuant to RA 7975, the accused, Crisostomo Villarin, a public officer
being the Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, this City, with salary grade below 27, taking advantage of his
official position and committing the offense in relation to his office, and the other above-named accused, all
private individuals, namely: Marlon Baillo, Cipriano Boyatac, and Aniano Latayada, confederating and
mutually helping one another did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather and possess
sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of varying sizes belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of Four
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued at P108,150.00, without any authority and
supporting documents as required under existing forest laws and regulation to the damage and prejudice
of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]

On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. [12] They alleged that
the Joint Affidavit[13]of the personnel of the DENR which became one of the bases in filing the Information
never mentioned Villarin as one of the perpetrators of the crime while the accusations against Baillo and
Boyatac were not based on the personal knowledge of the affiants. They also asserted that their indictment
was based on polluted sources, consisting of the sworn statements of witnesses like Latayada and Sudaria,
who both appeared to have participated in the commission of the crime charged.
Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, in its Order [14] dated January 27, 1997,
directed Villarin, Boyatac, and Baillo to file their Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, it being the entity which filed the Information in Court. On March 31, 1997, only
Villarin filed a Petition for Reinvestigation[15] but same was, however, denied by the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao in an Order[16] dated May 15, 1997 because the grounds relied upon were not
based on newly discovered evidence or errors of fact, law or irregularities that are prejudicial to the interest
of the movants, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 07 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman in Criminal Cases. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao likewise opined that Villarin was
directly implicated by Latayada, his co-accused.

The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered separate pleas of not
guilty.[17] Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

On December 31, 1995, at around five oclock in the afternoon, prosecution witness Roland Granada
(Granada) noticed that a public utility jeep loaded with timber stopped near his house. The driver, petitioner
Latayada, was accompanied by four to five other persons, one of whom was Boyatac while the rest could
not be identified by Granada.[18] They alighted from the jeep and unloaded the timber 10 to 15 meters away
from the Batinay bridge at Barangay Pagalungan, Cagayan De Oro City. Another prosecution witness,
Pastor Pansacala (Pansacala), also noticed the jeep with plate number MBB 226 and owned by Sudaria,
loaded with timber.[19] Being then the president of a community-based organization which serves as a
watchdog of illegal cutting of trees,[20] Pansacala even ordered a certain Mario Bael to count the timber.[21]

At six oclock in the evening of the same day, Barangay Captain Angeles Alarcon (Alarcon)[22] noticed that
the pile of timber was already placed near the bridge. Since she had no knowledge of any scheduled repair
of the Batinay bridge she was surprised to discover that the timber would be used for the repair. After
inquiring from the people living near the bridge, she learned that Latayada and Boyatac delivered the
timber.[23]
Another prosecution witness, Ariel Palanga (Palanga), testified that at seven oclock in the morning of
January 1, 1996, Boyatac bought a stick of cigarette from his store and requested him to cover the pile of
timber near the bridge for a fee. Palanga acceded and covered the pile with coconut leaves.[24]

On January 13, 1996, at around ten oclock in the morning, prosecution witness Juan Casenas (Casenas),
a radio and TV personality of RMN-TV8, took footages of the timber[25] hidden and covered by coconut
leaves. Casenas also took footages of more logs inside a bodega at the other side of the bridge. In the
following evening, the footages were shown in a news program on television.

On the same day, members of the DENR Region 10 Strike Force Team measured the timber which
consisted of 63 pieces of Apitong flitches and determined that it totaled 4,326 board feet[26] and
subsequently entrusted the same to Alarcon for safekeeping.

Upon further investigation, it was learned that the timber was requisitioned by Villarin, who was
then Barangay Captain of Pagulangan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarin gave Sudaria the specifications for
the requisitioned timber. Thereafter, Boyatac informed Villarin that the timber was already delivered on
December 31, 1995.[27]

On January 18, 1996, Felix Vera Cruz (Vera Cruz), a security guard at the DENR Region 10 Office, received
and signed for the confiscated timber since the property custodian at that time was not around.

The filing of the aforestated Information followed.

The Version of the Defense

In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an, Tuburan and Taglinao, all
in Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin, decided to repair the impassable Batinay bridge. The project was allegedly
with the concurrence of the Barangay Council.

Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin commissioned Boyatac to inquire from
Sudaria about the availability of timber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the
specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and Boyatac to attend to the same. When the
timber was already available, it was transported from Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the timber flitches
were seized by the DENR Strike Force Team and taken to its office where they were received by Vera
Cruz, the security guard on duty.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Memorandum filed before the trial court, the defense notified the court of Boyatacs
demise.[28] However, the trial court did not act on such notice. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the culpability
of Boyatac. Thus, in its Judgment, the trial court found herein petitioners and the deceased Boyatac guilty
as charged. On the other hand, it found the evidence against Baillo insufficient. The dispositive portion of
the Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum.

Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.[29]

In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:

Without an iota of doubt, accused Crisostomo Villarin, being then a Barangay Captain of Pagalungan,
Cagayan de Oro City, was the one who procured the subject flitches, while accused Aniano Latayada and
Cipriano Boyatac mutually helped him and each other by transporting the flitches from Sitio Batinay to
the Pagalungan Bridge. The accused would like to impress upon the Court that the subject fltiches were
intended for the repair of the Pagalungan Bridge and were acquired by virtue of Barangay Resolution No.
110 of Barangay Pagalungan. The Court is not impressed by this lame excuse. There is no dispute that the
flitches were intended for the repair of the bridge. The Court finds it a laudable motive. The fact remains
though that the said forest products were obtained without the necessary authority and legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations.[30]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[31] which was denied by the

RTC in its Order[32] dated August 20, 2002.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners filed an appeal which was denied by the CA in its Decision dated June 28, 2005. The dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the court a quo finding [d]efendant-[a]ppellants
Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violating
Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree 705 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.[33]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] which the appellate court denied for lack of merit in its
Resolution[35] promulgated on September 22, 2006.

Issues

Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE] MATTER OF PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION[,] DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT;

2. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM WHAT THE SUPREME

COURT HAS ALWAYS BEEN SAYING, THAT, TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED ALL ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIME MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT and;

3. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN AFFIRMING THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY

THE COURT A QUO[,] DEPARTED FROM JURISPRUDENCE THAT EVEN IN CRIMES [INVOLVING]
VIOLATION OF SPECIAL LAWS[,] SPECIAL CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT [CAN BE CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING HAD THE VIOLATION BEEN
PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN ORDER TO REDUCE PENALTY].[36]

Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation is tantamount to a denial
of the right to due process. As Villarin was indicted in the Information despite his not being included in the
criminal complaint filed by Pioquinto of the TL Strike Force Team of the DENR, they claim that he was not
afforded a preliminary investigation. They also bewail the fact that persons who appear to be equally guilty,
such as Sudaria, have not been included in the Information. Hence, they argue that the Ombudsman acted
with grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition for reinvestigation because it deprived Villarin of his
right to preliminary investigation and in refusing and to equally prosecute the guilty. They contend that the
Ombudsman should not have relied on the prosecutors Certification[37] contained in the Information to the
effect that a preliminary investigation was conducted in the case.

Moreover, petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt since they had no intention to possess the timber and dispose of it for personal gain. They likewise
claim that there was failure on the part of the prosecution to present the timber, which were the object of
the offense.

Our Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Villarin was properly afforded his right to due process.

Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal complaint charging Sudaria, Latayada,
Baillo and Boyatac with violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.[38] The said complaint did not
state the known addresses of the accused. Neither was the notarized joint-affidavit of the complainants
attached thereto. The subpoena issued to the accused and the copy of their counter-affidavits were also
not part of the record. Moreover, the complaint did not include Villarin as a respondent. However, said
infirmities do not constitute denial of due process particularly on the part of Villarin.

It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the Office of the City Prosecutor that
Villarin and all the accused participated in the scheduled preliminary investigation that was conducted prior
to the filing of the criminal case.[39] They knew about the filing of the complaint and even denied any
involvement in the illegal cutting of timber. They were also given the opportunity to submit countervailing
evidence to convince the investigating prosecutor of their innocence.

Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the assertion that Villarin was not afforded a
preliminary investigation. Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao in denying Villarins motion for reconsideration. It validly relied on the certification
contained in the Information that a preliminary investigation was properly conducted in this case. The
certification was made under oath by no less than the public prosecutor, a public officer who is presumed
to have regularly performed his official duty.[40] Besides, it aptly noted that Villarin was implicated by x x x
Latayada in his affidavit dated January 22, 1996 before Marcelino B. Pioquinto, Chief, Forest Protection
and Law Enforcement Unit. The denial of Villarin cannot prevail over the declaration of witnesses.[41]

Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have been
waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or
require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarily involves a re-examination and re-
evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial
finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary
investigation.[42]

Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for
Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He
accepted the Ombudsman's verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and actively
participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations
and testifying on his own behalf.It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once
again assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration. [43] Whatever
argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation has therefore been
mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right
to preliminary investigation.

Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included as a principal in the commission of
the offense. However, whether Sudaria should or should not be included as co-accused can no longer be
raised on appeal. Any right that the petitioners may have in questioning the non-inclusion of Sudaria in the
Information should have been raised in a motion for reconsideration of the March 13, 1996 Resolution of
the Office of the City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against Sudaria.[44] Having failed to avail of the proper
procedural remedy, they are now estopped from assailing his non-inclusion.

Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705.

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided,
that in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authorization; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing
forest laws and regulations.[45]

The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is consummated by the mere
possession of forest products without the proper documents.

We reviewed the records and hold that the prosecution had discharged the
burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged. The evidence of the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioners were in custody of timber without the necessary legal
documents. Incidentally, we note that several transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) were not submitted
by the trial court. No explanation was provided for these missing TSNs. Notwithstanding the incomplete
TSNs, we still find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt petitioners culpability.

The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that timber was confiscated from petitioners. It
presented a Tally Sheet[46] to prove that the DENR Strike Force Team examined the seized timber on
January 13, 1996. The number, volume and appraised value of said timber were also noted in the Tally
Sheet. Seizure receipts were also presented to prove that the confiscated timber were placed in the custody
of Alarcon[47] and eventually taken to the DENR Office.[48] There was a photograph of the timber taken by
the television crew led by Casenas.[49]

The prosecution likewise presented in evidence the testimonies of eyewitnesses Granada and Pansacala
who testified that Latayada and Boyatac were the ones who delivered the timber. [50]

More significantly, Villarin admitted that he was the one who commissioned the procurement of the
timber[51] for the repair of the Batinay bridge. He even deputized Boyatac to negotiate with Sudaria and
gave Latayada P2,000.00 to transport the logs. Boyatac later informed him of the delivery of
timber. However, he could not present any document to show that his possession thereof was legal and
pursuant to existing forest laws and regulations.
Relevant portions of the testimony of Villarin are as follows:
Q As Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, of course, you heard reports prior to the incident on December 31,
1995 that Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria was also engaged in supplying forest products like forest
lumber?
A Yes, because I always go to Cagayan de Oro and I can always ride on his jeepney.

Q And you were sure that information of yours was received by you and not only by one but several persons
from Barangay Tagpangi even up to Barangay Pagalungan?
A Thats true because he even has a record with the police.

Q And you learned [this] prior to January 1995?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And your information was even to the effect that Sudaria was supplying illegally cut lumber regularly?
A What I have noticed because I always ride on his jeep wherein lumber was being loaded, the lumber will
be taken when it arrived in Lumbia, kilometer 5.

Q Even if there were already raids being conducted to the person of Camilo Sudaria, still he continued to
load illegally cut lumber?
A He slowed down after several arrest because maybe he was ashamed because he was the Barangay
Captain of Tagpangi.

Q And his arrest and the slackening of his activities of illegally cut lumber occurred prior to June 1995?
A Yes, sir.

Q [In spite] of your knowledge that he is engaged [in] illegally cut[ting] forest products, you as Barangay
Captain of Pagalungan transacted with him for the purpose of acquiring lumber [for] the bridge at
Pagalungan?
A As we rode together in his jeep, he informed me that he has some lumber to be used to build his house
and he told me he will sell it for the repair of the bridge in Pagalungan.

Q And because of that, in addition, you sent him the specifications of materials for the repair of the bridge
in Pagalungan?
A I let Boyatac go to him and [inquire] from him if he has those specifications.

Q And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of those specification?

A Yes, because he sent to Boyatac some requirements of the specifications and he let me sign it.

Q And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria?

A Yes, because I sent somebody to him and we did not talk anymore.

Q And thereafter on December 31, 1995, according to your testimony before, Aniano Latayada delivered
the lumber flitches you ordered on board the passenger jeep of Camilo Sudaria?
A When the specifications were given, we were informed that the lumber were already there. So, it was
delivered.

Q Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?

A Boyatac.

Q And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside the Batinay Bridge.

A Yes, Sir.

Q And even without personally inspecting it, you immediately paid Latayada the compensation for the
delivery of those lumber?
A There was already an advance payment for his delivery.

Q To whom did you give the advance?

A To Latayada.

Q You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?

A No, Sir.

Q In fact, the money that you paid to Latayada was specifically for the transportation of the lumber from
Tagpangi to Batinay bridge?
A Yes, Sir.

PROS. GALARRITA:
Q And at that time, you paid Latayada P2,000 as payment of the lumber?
A Yes, Sir.

COURT:
Q Did you pay Latayada?
A Yes, Sir.

Q How much?
A P2,000.

Q And you gave this to the conductor?

A Yes, Sir.

Q You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did the conductor say?

A The conductor said that the money was for the payment for the transporting of lumber from
Tagpangi.[52] (Underscoring ours.)

Violation of Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is

malum prohibitum.

As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such, criminal intent is not an
essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that petitioners had the intent to possess (animus
possidendi) the timber.[53] Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also
constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the [object of the crime] is in the immediate
physical control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the [object of the
crime] is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found.[54]

There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the timber without the requisite legal
documents. Villarin and Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage without
any license or permit issued by any competent authority. Given these and considering that the offense
is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention that the possession of the illegally cut timber was not for
personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.

Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commission of the Crime

Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the corpus delicti had not been established.
They assert that the failure to present the confiscated timber in court was fatal to the cause of the
prosecution.
We disagree. [C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or
substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping
for ransom or to the body of the person murdered[55] or, in this case, to the seized timber. Since the corpus
delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness
uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus
delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence.[56]

Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delicti was established by the documentary and
testimonial evidence on record. The Tally Sheet, Seizure Receipts issued by the DENR and photograph
proved the existence of the timber and its confiscation. The testimonies of the petitioners themselves stating
in no uncertain terms the manner in which they consummated the offense they were charged with were
likewise crucial to their conviction.

We find no reason to deviate from these findings since it has been established that factual findings of a trial
court are binding on us, absent any showing that it overlooked or misinterpreted facts or circumstances of
weight and substance.[57] The legal precept applies to this case in which the trial courts findings were
affirmed by the appellate court.[58]

The Proper Penalty

Violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is penalized as qualified theft under Article 310 in
relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The pertinent portions of these provisions read:

Art. 310. Qualified Theft The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees
than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with
grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists
of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property
is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any calamity, vehicular accident
or civil disturbance.

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for
each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be. x x x

The Information filed against the petitioners alleged that the 63 pieces of timber without the requisite legal
documents measuring 4,326 board feet were valued at P108,150.00. To prove this allegation, the
prosecution presented Pioquinto to testify, among others, on this amount. Tally Sheets and Seizure
Receipts were also presented to corroborate said amount. With the value of the timber
exceeding P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be
imposed in its maximum, the range of which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10)
years. Since none of the qualifying circumstances in Article 310 of the RPC was alleged in the Information,
the penalty cannot be increased two degrees higher.

In determining the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 is to be deducted from P108,150.00, which
results to P86,150.00. This remainder must be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less
than P10,000.00. Consequently, eight (8) years must be added to the basic penalty. Thus the maximum
imposable penalty ranges from sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to eighteen (18) years
of reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty should be taken anywhere
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, without considering the modifying circumstances. The
penalty one degree lower from prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods, the range of which is from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. Thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, erroneously fixed the minimum period of the
penalty at twelve (12) years of prision mayor.

Finally, the case against Boyatac must be dismissed considering his demise even before the RTC rendered
its Judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 28, 2005 and the Resolution
dated September 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that
petitioners Crisostomo Villarin and Aniano Latayada are each sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2)
years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The complaint against Cipriano Boyatac is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 160932 January 14, 2013
SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, ROBERTO P.
CERICOS,Petitioner,
vs.
NESTOR M. CANDA, BIENVENIDO LIPA YON, JULIAN D. AMADOR, BOHOL PROVINCIAL CHIEF,
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, AND NATIONAL DIRECTOR, RESPECTIVELY, ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ALL
SUED IN BOTH THEIR OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE CAPACITIES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and
the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a
clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.
Antecedents
The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project in Barangay Jimilia-
an in the Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping and purifying of water from the Loboc
River, and the distribution of the purified water to the residents of Loboc and six other municipalities. The
petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, seeking to be exempt
from the requirement of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1586 on the following justifications, to wit:
1) The whole project simply involves tapping of water from the Loboc River, filtering and purifying it, and
distributing the same to the consumers in the covered towns;
2) From the source to the filtration plant, then to the purifier stations, then finally to the consumers’
households, water flows through steel pipes;
3) The filtration and purifying process employs the latest technology—"electrocatalytic"—internationally
accepted for safety and environment friendliness;
4) No waste is generated, as the electrocatalytic process dissolves all impurities in the water;
5) The project involves no destruction [n]or harm to the environment. On the other hand, it is environment
friendly.1
Upon evaluating the nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the project, respondent Nestor
M. Canda, then Chief of EMB in Bohol, rendered his findings in a letter dated December 4, 2001, as follows:
1) The project is located within a critical area; hence, Initial Environmental Examination is required.
2) The project is socially and politically sensitive therefore proof of social acceptability should be
established. Proper indorsement from the Protected Area Management Bureau or PAMB should be
secured.2 (Emphasis supplied)
On January 11, 2002, the petitioner appealed Canda’s findings to respondent EMB Region 7 Director
Bienvenido L. Lipayon (RD Lipayon), claiming that it should also be issued a CNC because the project was
no different from the Loboc-Loay waterworks project of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) that had recently been issued a CNC.3
On April 3, 2002, RD Lipayon notified the petitioner that its documents substantially complied with the
procedural aspects of the EMB’s review, and that the application was assigned EMB-DENR-7 Control No.
CNC-02-080 for easy reference in case of follow-up and submission of additional requirements.4
Later on, RD Lipayon informed the petitioner that an Initial Environmental Examination document was
required for the project due to its significant impact in the area.5
On August 26, 2002, RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit the following documents to enable the
EMB to determine whether the project was within an environmentally critical area or not, to wit:
1. Certification from DENR, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) that it is not
within areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preservation area, sanctuaries
and not within the purview of Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System
(NIPAS) Act, and other issuances including international commitments and declarations;
2. Certification from the DENR Regional Office/ PENRO [that] the areas within the project do not constitute
the habitat for any endangered or threatened species or indigenous wildlife (Flora and Fauna).
3. Certification from the following:
3.1. Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) that the
area is not frequently visited or hard-hit by typhoons. This shall refer to all areas where typhoon signal no.
3 not hoisted for at least twice a year during the last five (5) years prior to the year of reckoning. Years to
be considered shall be from January 1995 to December 2001.
3.2. Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) that the area was not subjected to an
earthquake of at least intensity VII in the Rossi-Forel scale or its equivalent and hit by tsunamis during the
period of 1638 until the year 2001.
3.3. PHIVOLCS that the area was not subjected to earthquakes of at least intensity VII in the Rossi-Forel
scale or its equivalent during the period of 1949 until the year 2001.
3.4. PAGASA that the area is not storm surge-prone.
3.5. Mines and Geosciences Bureau Region 7 (MGB 7) that the area is not located along fault lines or within
fault zones and not located in critical slope.
3.6. City Mayor and/or City Engineers Office that the area is not flood prone.
3.7. Network of Protected Areas for Agriculture (NPAA) of the Bureau of Soils and Water Management
(BSWM) that the area is not classified as Prime Agricultural Land.
4. Certification from the Provincial Tourism Office or its equivalent office that areas in your project are not
set-aside as aesthetic potential tourist spot.
5. Certification from the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) that areas within your project are not
recharged areas of aquifer.
6. Certification from DENR regional Office and/or Environmental Management Bureau 7 (EMB 7) that Loboc
River is not characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions:
a. Tapped for domestic purposes;
b. With controlled and/or protected areas declared by appropriate authorities; and
c. Which support wildlife and fishery activities.
A Certificate of Non-Coverage will duly be issued to your foundation once all the above mentioned required
certifications are complied with.
Projects that are covered by P.D. 1586 or the Environmental Impact System (EIS) Law should not start
unless the Project Proponent should secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), otherwise
penalties shall be imposed.6 (Emphases supplied)
On January 28, 2003, the petitioner submitted eight certifications, 7 including the certification issued by the
Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), as follows:
That the project area, Loboc, Bohol was subjected to an earthquake of Intensity VII in the adapted Rossi-
Forel scale of I-IX last February 8, 1990. The magnitude of the earthquake is 6.8 and the highest intensity
reported was VIII, based on the Rossi-Forel Intensity Scale. During the said earthquake, the PMI Academy
Building collapsed while minor cracks were sustained by the municipal hall, public school, town church and
some other houses in the town. There were reports that immediately after the earthquake, the force of the
incoming waves from the sea caused Alijuan River in the town of Duero to flow inland. The report also
states that the waves affected 10-50 meters of the coastal beach of the towns of Jagna, Duero, Guindulman,
Garcia Hernandez and Valencia.8 (Emphases supplied)
The petitioner failed to secure a certification from the Regional Office of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
(RO-MGB) to the effect that the project area was not located along a fault line/fault zone or a critical slope
because RO-MGB did not have the data and expertise to render such finding, and thus had to forward the
petitioner’s request to the MGB Central Office.9
Upon the MGB’s advice, the petitioner sought and obtained the required certification from PHIVOLCS, but
the certification did not state whether the project area was within a critical slope. Instead, the certification
stated that the project site was approximately 18 kilometers west of the East Bohol Fault.10
Given the tenor of the certification from PHIVOLCS, RD Lipayon’s letter dated February 4, 2003 declared
that the project was within an environmentally critical area, and that the petitioner was not entitled to the
CNC, viz:
After thorough review of your submitted certifications, it was found out that the area was subjected to an
earthquake of Intensity VII in the adapted Rossi-Forel scale wherein the magnitude of the earthquake is 6.8
with the highest intensity reported of VIII and you fail to support certification that the project area is not
within critical slope. And based on the Water Usage and Classification per Department Order (DAO) 34
Series of 1990, subject river system was officially classified as Class B intended for swimming and bathing
purposes. Moreover, one component of your project involves opening of roadway connected to the
barangay road.
Therefore, we reiterate our previous stand that your project is covered by the EIS System pursuant to P.D.
1586, the Environmental Impact Statement Law.11
On March 27, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and damages in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Loay, Bohol,12 alleging that it was now entitled to a CNC as a matter of right after having complied
with the certification requirements; and that the EMB had earlier issued a CNC to the DPWH for a similar
waterworks project in the same area.
In the decision dated November 18, 2003,13 the RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus upon the
following considerations, namely: (1) PHIVOLCS certified that the project site had been subjected to an
Intensity VII earthquake in 1990; (2) the CNC issued by the EMB to a similar waterworks project of the
DPWH in the same area was only for the construction of a unit spring box intake and pump house, and the
DENR issued a cease and desist order relative to the DPWH’s additional project to put up a water filtration
plant therein; (3) the determination of whether an area was environmentally critical was a task that pertained
to the EMB; (4) the assignment of a control number by the EMB to the petitioner’s application did not mean
that the application was as good as approved; (5) the RTC would not interfere with the primary prerogative
of the EMB to review the merits of the petitioner’s application for the CNC; and (6) there was already a
pending appeal lodged with the DENR Secretary.
Hence, this appeal brought directly to the Court via petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The petitioner submits the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT, AFTER PETITIONER’S DUE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
MANDATED BY RESPONDENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-COVERAGE
(CNC) APPLIED FOR BY PETITIONER, IT IS NOW THE RIPENED DUTY OF RESPONDENTS,
THROUGH RESPONDENT EMB REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TO ISSUE SAID DOCUMENT IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER;
B. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER HAS EXHAUSTED AVAILABLE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
THROUGH AN APPEAL TO RESPONDENT DENR SECRETARY WHO HAS SAT ON SAID APPEAL UP
TO THE PRESENT;
C. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES FROM RESPONDENTS
IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITY.14
The petitioner insists that RD Lipayon already exercised his discretion by finding that the application
substantially complied with the procedural aspects for review and by assigning Control No. CNC-02-080 to
its application; that after the petitioner complied with the requirements enumerated in the August 26, 2002
letter of RD Lipayon, the EMB became duty-bound to issue the CNC to the petitioner; that the EMB issued
a CNC to a similar project of the DPWH in the same area; that it filed an appeal with the DENR Secretary,
but the appeal remained unresolved; and that it brought the petition for mandamus precisely as a speedier
recourse.
In their comment, RD Lipayon and Canda aver that the act complained of against them involved an exercise
of discretion that could not be compelled by mandamus; that the petitioner’s proposed project was located
within an environmentally critical area, and the activities to be done were so significant that they would
create massive earth movement and environmental degradation; that the petitioner violated the rule against
forum shopping; and that the petitioner had no cause of action against them for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
On his part, the DENR Secretary, through the Solicitor General, contends that the petition raises questions
of fact that are not proper in a petition for review; that the petitioner should have appealed to the CA under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; that the grant or denial of a CNC application is discretionary and cannot be
compelled by mandamus; and that the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Accordingly, the Court is called upon to resolve, firstly, whether the appeal directly to this Court from the
RTC was proper, and, secondly, whether the petition for mandamus was the correct recourse.
Ruling
The petition for review is denied for its lack of merit.
1.
Petitioner’s appeal is improper under Rule 45, Rules of Court
This appeal by certiorari is being taken under Rule 45, Rules of Court, whose Section 1 expressly requires
that the petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. Yet, the petitioner hereby
raises a question of fact whose resolution is decisive in this appeal. That issue of fact concerns whether or
not the petitioner established that its project was not located in an environmentally critical area. For this
reason, the Court is constrained to deny due course to the petition for review.
It is a settled rule, indeed, that in the exercise of our power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during
the trial of the case. The Court relies on the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals or of the trial court, and
accepts such findings as conclusive and binding unless any of the following exceptions obtains, namely:
(a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when
in making its findings the Court of Appeals or the trial court went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are
contrary to the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals or the
trial court manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.15 However, none of the aforementioned exceptions applies
herein.
2.
Mandamus was an improper remedy for petitioner
We dismiss the present recourse because the petitioner failed to exhaust the available administrative
remedies, and because it failed to show that it was legally entitled to demand the performance of the act by
the respondents.
It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an administrative
concern should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative processes. The issues that
an administrative agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily taken away from it and submitted
to a court of law without first giving the agency the opportunity to dispose of the issues upon due
deliberation.16 The court of law must allow the administrative agency to carry out its functions and discharge
its responsibilities within the specialized areas of its competence. 17 This rests on the theory that the
administrative authority is in a better position to resolve questions addressed to its particular expertise, and
that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance
to do so.18
The records show that the petitioner failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies. At the time RD
Lipayon denied the petitioner’s application for the CNC, Administrative Order No. 42 dated November 2,
200219 had just vested the authority to grant or deny applications for the ECC in the Director and Regional
Directors of the EMB. Notwithstanding the lack of a specific implementing guideline to what office the ruling
of the EMB Regional Director was to be appealed, the petitioner could have been easily guided in that
regard by the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides that the Director of a line bureau, such as the
EMB,20 shall have supervision and control over all division and other units, including regional offices, under
the bureau.21 Verily, supervision and control include the power to "review, approve, reverse or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate officials or units."22 Accordingly, the petitioner should have appealed the EMB
Regional Director’s decision to the EMB Director, who exercised supervision and control over the former.
It is relevant to mention that the DENR later promulgated Administrative Order No. 2003-3023 in order to
define where appeals should be taken, providing as follows:
Section 6. Appeal
Any party aggrieved by the final decision on the ECC/CNC applications may, within 15 days from receipt of
such decision, file an appeal on the following grounds:
a. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the deciding authority, or
b. Serious errors in the review findings.
The DENR may adopt alternative conflict/dispute resolution procedures as a means to settle grievances
between proponents and aggrieved parties to avert unnecessary legal action. Frivolous appeals shall not
be countenanced.
The proponent or any stakeholder may file an appeal to the following:
1âwphi1
Deciding Authority Where to file the appeal
EMB Regional Office Director Office of the EMB Director
EMB Central Office Director Office of the DENR Secretary
DENR Secretary Office of the President
Moreover, the petitioner states in its pleadings that it had a pending appeal with the DENR
Secretary.1âwphi1 However, the records reveal that the subject of the appeal of the petitioner was an
undated resolution of the DENR Regional Director, Region VII, denying its application for the CNC,24 not
the decision of RD Lipayon. Nonetheless, even assuming that the pending appeal with the DENR Secretary
had related to RD Lipayon’s decision, the petitioner should still have waited for the DENR Secretary to
resolve the appeal in line with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Its failure to do so
rendered its resort to mandamus in the RTC premature. The omission is fatal, because mandamus is a
remedy only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.25
Another reason for denying due course to this review is that the petitioner did not establish that the grant
of its application for the CNC was a purely ministerial in nature on the part of RD Lipayon. Hence,
mandamus was not a proper remedy.
The CNC is a certification issued by the EMB certifying that a project is not covered by the Environmental
Impact Statement System (EIS System) and that the project proponent is not required to secure an
ECC.26 The EIS System was established by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1586 pursuant to Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) that required all entities to submit an EIS for projects that
would have a significant effect on the environment, thus:
Section 4. Environmental Impact Statements. – Pursuant to the above enunciated policies and goals, all
agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities shall prepare, file and include in every
action, project or undertaking which significantly affects the quality of the environment a detailed statement
on–
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented
(c) alternative to the proposed action
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are consistent with the
maintenance and enhancement of the long-term productivity of the same; and
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or non-renewable resources, a finding must be
made that such use and commitment are warranted.
xxxx
P.D. No. 1586 exempted from the requirement of an EIS the projects and areas not declared by the
President of the Philippines as environmentally critical, 27 thus:
Section 5. Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. - All other projects, undertakings and areas not declared
by the Presidents as environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall not be required
to submit an environmental impact statement. The National Environmental Protection Council, thru the
Ministry of Human Settlements may however require non-critical projects and undertakings to provide
additional environmental safeguards as it may deem necessary.
On December 14, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2146 declaring areas and types of projects
as environmentally critical and within the scope of the EIS System, as follows:
A. Environmentally Critical Projects
I. Heavy Industries
a. Non-ferrous metal industries
b. Iron and steel mills
c. Petroleum and petro-chemical industries including oil and gas
d. Smelting plants
II. Resource Extractive Industries
a. Major mining and quarrying projects
b. Forestry projects
1. Logging
2. Major wood processing projects
3. Introduction of fauna (exotic-animals) in public/private forests
4. Forest occupancy
5. Extraction of mangrove products
6. Grazing
c. Fishery Projects
1. Dikes for fishpond development projects
III. Infrastructure Projects
a. Major dams
b. Major power plants (fossil-fueled, nuclear fueled, hydroelectric or geothermal)
c. Major reclamation projects
d. Major roads and bridges.
B. Environmentally Critical Areas
1. All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preserves and sanctuaries;
2. Areas set aside as aesthetic potential tourist spots;
3. Areas which constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened species of indigenous Philippine
Wildlife (flora and fauna);
4. Areas of unique historic, archaeological, or scientific interests;
5. Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural communities or tribes;
6. Areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities (geologic hazards, floods, typhoons,
volcanic activity, etc.);
7. Areas with critical slopes;
8. Areas classified as prime agricultural lands;
9. Recharged areas of aquifers;
10. Water bodies characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions;
a. tapped for domestic purposes
b. within the controlled and/or protected areas declared by appropriate authorities
c. which support wildlife and fishery activities
11. Mangrove areas characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions:
a. with primary pristine and dense young growth;
b. adjoining mouth of major river systems;
c. near or adjacent to traditional productive fry or fishing grounds;
d. which act as natural buffers against shore erosion, strong winds and storm floods;
e. on which people are dependent for their livelihood.
12. Coral reef, characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions:
a. with 50% and above live coralline cover;
b. spawning and nursery grounds for fish;
c. which act as natural breakwater of coastlines.
Projects not included in the foregoing enumeration were considered non-critical to the environment and
were entitled to the CNC.
The foregoing considerations indicate that the grant or denial of an application for ECC/CNC is not an act
that is purely ministerial in nature, but one that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion by the EMB
Director or Regional Director, who must determine whether the project or project area is classified as critical
to the environment based on the documents to be submitted by the applicant.
The petitioner maintains that RD Lipayon already exercised his discretion in its case when he made his
finding that the application substantially complied with the procedural requirements for review. As such, he
was then obliged to issue the CNC once the petitioner had submitted the required certifications.
The petitioner errs on two grounds.
Firstly, RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his discretion with regard to the CNC application when he
made his finding. It is clear that his finding referred to the "procedural requirements for review" only. He had
still to decide on the substantive aspect of the application, that is, whether the project and the project area
were considered critical to the environment. In fact, this was the reason why RD Lipayon required the
petitioner to submit certifications from the various government agencies concerned. Surely, the required
certifications were not mere formalities, because they would serve as the bases for his decision on whether
to grant or deny the application.
Secondly, there is no sufficient showing that the petitioner satisfactorily complied with the requirement to
submit the needed certifications. For one, it submitted no certification to the effect that the project site was
not within a critical slope. Also, the PHIVOLCS’s certification showed that the project site had experienced
an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990, a fact that sufficed to place the site in the category of "areas frequently
visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities." Clearly, the petitioner failed to establish that it had the legal
right to be issued the CNC applied for, warranting the denial of its application.
It is not amiss for us to observe, therefore, that the petitioner grossly misunderstood the nature of the
remedy of mandamus. To avoid similar misunderstanding of the remedy hereafter, a short exposition on
the nature and office of the remedy is now appropriate.
The writ of mandamus is of very ancient and obscure origin. It is believed that the writ was originally part of
the class of writs or mandates issued by the English sovereign to direct his subjects to perform a particular
act or duty.28 The earliest writs were in the form of letters missive, and were mere personal commands. The
command was a law in itself, from which there was no appeal. The writ of mandamus was not only
declaratory of a duty under an existing law, but was a law in itself that imposed the duty, the performance
of which it commanded.29 The King was considered as the fountain and source of justice, and when the law
did not afford a remedy by the regular forms of proceedings, the prerogative powers of the sovereign were
invoked in aid of the ordinary powers of the courts.30
A judicial writ of mandamus, issued in the King’s name out of the court of King’s Bench that had a general
supervisory power over all inferior jurisdictions and officers, gradually supplanted the old personal
command of the sovereign.31 The court of King’s Bench, acting as the general guardian of public rights and
in the exercise of its authority to grant the writ, rendered the writ of mandamus the suppletory means of
substantial justice in every case where there was no other specific legal remedy for a legal right, and
ensured that all official duties were fulfilled whenever the subject-matter was properly within its
control.32 Early on, the writ of mandamus was particularly used to compel public authorities to return the
petitioners to public offices from which they had been unlawfully removed. 33
Mandamus was, therefore, originally a purely prerogative writ emanating from the King himself,
superintending the police and preserving the peace within the realm. 34 It was allowed only in cases affecting
the sovereign, or the interest of the public at large.35 The writ of mandamus grew out of the necessity to
compel the inferior courts to exercise judicial and ministerial powers invested in them by restraining their
excesses, preventing their negligence and restraining their denial of justice. 36
Over time, the writ of mandamus has been stripped of its highly prerogative features and has been
assimilated to the nature of an ordinary remedy. Nonetheless, the writ has remained to be an extraordinary
remedy in the sense that it is only issued in extraordinary cases and where the usual and ordinary modes
of proceeding and forms of remedy are powerless to afford redress to a party aggrieved, and where without
its aid there would be a failure of justice.37
The writ of mandamus has also retained an important feature that sets it apart from the other remedial writs,
i.e., that it is used merely to compel action and to coerce the performance of a pre-existing duty.38 In fact,
a doctrine well-embedded in our jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a
clear legal right to the performance of the act sought to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative
duty to perform the same.39 The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to
the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform
the act.40
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy
lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are
discretionary.41 A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only
when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. 42
The petitioner's disregard of the foregoing fundamental requisites for mandamus rendered its petition in the
RTC untenable and devoid of merit.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

METROPOLITAN MANILA G.R. Nos. 171947-48

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Present:
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1] PUNO, C.J.,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, QUISUMBING,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC CARPIO,
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND CORONA,
MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE CARPIO MORALES,
COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE AZCUNA,
NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME TINGA,
GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF CHICO-NAZARIO,
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL VELASCO, JR.,
GOVERNMENT, NACHURA,
Petitioners, REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
- versus - BRION, JJ.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF
MANILA BAY, represented and
joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN,
MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH
DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA
LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA,
FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE
SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG,
HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS,
FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and Promulgated:
JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA,
Respondents. December 18, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the attention
of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the
destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage.
And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the
wound no longer simply heals by itself.[2] But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that
need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or
by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters,
rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their official
complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track
records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental
pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine life
and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and
slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that could
have otherwise made a difference.

This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies,
among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to
Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality
of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated,
stemmed from:

x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the
defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination
of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily
liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters
fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.[3]

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating
the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:

(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and
submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular inspection of
the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental
Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners,
stated that water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount
of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR
Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational
activities, or the SB level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.[4]
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other
petitioners, testified about the MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila
Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its
evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and
disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed
to shore.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed
defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore
its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation.
To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6)
months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated,
coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in
strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage
facilities for the proper disposal of waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain
waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of
other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or
adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-
use or recycling of wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life
in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.

Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and
rehabilitation of Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of
waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up
in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively
participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage
in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and
require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming
from septic tanks.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of
preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from
all forms of illegal fishing.

No pronouncement as to damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA)
individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.

On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime
Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for
review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for
consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
74944.

Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment
Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in
general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes,
petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled
by mandamus.

The CA Sustained the RTC

By a Decision[6] of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the
RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their
usual basic functions under existing laws.[7]

Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the following
ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE
HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DECLARING THAT
SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL
POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.

ARGUMENTS

I
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION
INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL

II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF
PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.

The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading
of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the
cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean
up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.

Our Ruling

We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. [8] A ministerial duty is
one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.[9] It connotes an act in which
nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions
admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.[10] Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused,
on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.

Petitioners maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid
disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the
agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions,
including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates,
all of which entail the exercise of discretion.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners duty to
comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion.
According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to
choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the
same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the
problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDAs ministerial duty to attend to such
services.

We agree with respondents.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand,
and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation
of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the
very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza[11] in which the Court directed the City
of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil
players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called Pandacan Terminals within six
months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case,the MMDAs
duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as
other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDAs
duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section
defines and delineates the scope of the MMDAs waste disposal services to include:

Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies, standards,
programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment
and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other alternative
programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)

The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003)
which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides
the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary
landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003,[12] enjoining the MMDA and local
government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and
operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled
dumps.

The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste
disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the
power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or
conscience.[13] A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform
or not to perform.[14] Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste
disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield
this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform
certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of
the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties. Consider:

(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192, [15] is the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural
resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the
DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, more
particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Acts
Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude,
extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures,
using available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution.
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated
Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which
is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:

Sec. 19 Lead Agency.The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have
the following functions, powers and responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of
this Act: Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the
need arises, said report;

b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months following
the completion of the status report;

c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months following the
completion of the framework for each designated water management area. Such action plan shall be
reviewed by the water quality management area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.

The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of completing
the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework.[16] Within twelve (12) months
thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan. [17] Again, like the MMDA,
the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the
assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-government organizations, has
completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and
time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation,
restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.

The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should more
than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing laws.

(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234, [18] is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all
waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and
several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the proper
sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can
prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and
evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish
facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water.
Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing
sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and
sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country.[19] In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA
is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga,
and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292), [20] is
designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the
conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the
Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local government units (LGUs) and
other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure
that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a
sustainable basis.[21] Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR
for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters.[22] More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be responsible for the
prevention and control of water pollution for the development, management, and conservation of the
fisheries and aquatic resources.

(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under EO
292[23] to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood control
and water resource development systems in accordance with national development objectives and
approved government plans and specifications.

In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide services
relating to flood control and sewerage management which include the formulation and implementation of
policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system.

On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA, whereby
MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the
country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of the
MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall include the removal of structures,
constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA
7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.

(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec.
6 of PD 979,[24] or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing
laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall
promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with the national rules and policies set by the
National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective implementation
and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:

a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating
craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial
and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;

b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited
either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf,
manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever
other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any
navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the bank of any
tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water,
either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be
impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water.

(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed
into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to perform all police functions over
the Philippine territorial waters and rivers. Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall
be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP
Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and perform the police functions of PCG over
marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of
laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This
was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and
PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations. [25]

(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated to establish, develop, regulate, manage and
operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national development. [26]Moreover, Sec.
6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within the

ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes
and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law
enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:
xxxx

b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as
movement within the port of watercraft.[27]

Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,[28] the Philippines,
through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the
reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such
measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other
ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the
violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and
PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.

(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill and
solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily
responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary
include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.[29]

Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are dumping
of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting
in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials in
flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of
waste management facilities without an environmental compliance certificate.

Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may
be allowed when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and
playgrounds. The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies,
can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA
7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to
rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge
wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to
implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in
violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies.

(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to
promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a
water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in
coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and
standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation of a
centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix
sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.

In accordance with Sec. 72[30] of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.1[31] of
Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of
the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the
requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal
before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.

(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is
mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels. [32]Under Sec.
118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine
Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational campaign to promote the
development, management, conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of
environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management
principles.[33]
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and revenues
so as to effectively achieve the countrys development objectives. [34]

One of the countrys development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of
2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with
the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also
provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline processes and procedures in
the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to
promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms
for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality management
that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated from concerns about water
sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a
comprehensive management program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention.

Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of RA
9275 in line with the countrys development objectives.

All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete
as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor
the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.

Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the cleanup
of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?

Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its
state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as
may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-
up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies
concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, Cleanup Operations, amended
the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues,
however, to be operational.

The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:

SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person
who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall
be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that
the same water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the
event emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the
same, the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment,
removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons
found to have caused such pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of
the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where said
disbursements were sourced.

As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real since the
amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead
agency in the cleanup operations.

Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves only
with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver
that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines
the terms cleanup operations and accidental spills, as follows:

g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged or spilled in
water to restore it to pre-spill condition.

h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from
accidents such as collisions and groundings.

Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government agencies
concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or
portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only
to water pollution incidents, which are situations that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated
pollution events requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the
point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires cleanup operations to restore the body of
water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of either intentional
or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).

As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the
application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only.
Contrary to petitioners posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of
Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only pollution
accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of
pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from
being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental
spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.

To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading of
their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the ManilaBay.
Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20
of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase cleanup operations embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec.
17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases cleanup operations and accidental
spills do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.

Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government
agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations
when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence
of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will
adversely affect its best usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when
appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any
pollution incident.

For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly
applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess
they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work
for the polluters account. Petitioners assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in
the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the
containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary
Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come
in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide
behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on
the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse
over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: PD 1152 aims
to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is better served
by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents. [35]

Granting arguendo that petitioners position thus described vis--vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is correct,
they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope
that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident. And such
impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20
of PD 1152 mentions water pollution incidents which may be caused by polluters in the waters of
the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into the
bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to any person who causes pollution in or
pollutes water bodies, which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near
the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation,
the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can
validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so undermanned
that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps
not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between.
Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution
incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations.
Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general
cleanup situation.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term
solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as
the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays,
and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would
just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate
below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves
the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them
on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up
the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline
describes as continuing mandamus,[36] the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives
with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to
clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.[37]
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do
not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR)
(Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-
Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay,
and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge their waters,
with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If
there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these
unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is
not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies
of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.[38]

Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the
Water Code,[39] which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and
other waterways. Art. 51 reads:

The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length
and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty
(40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest
of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this
zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)

Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or near
the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be
treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute to the
pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the
duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the
necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including
their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After
such period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.

At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply with
their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in
Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage
crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights of the report:

1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez
dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids
that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used
for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in the dump
sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to
sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement.

3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens
seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.[40]

Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established as
prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of
the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.No open dumps shall be established
and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute]
the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no
controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)

RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended
on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the
prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.

In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of waste
matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid
waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge
sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in the Manila Bay.Equally unabated are
violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal
of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or
solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or machine of
substances to the aquatic environment including dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters,
discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other]
radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or
other human-made structure.

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity
for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective
official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for
the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of
their respective offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be
over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring
back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may
be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded
individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through
petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.

The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their
limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable.
Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their
mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are
disturbed by petitioners hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution
incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.

RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State
shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance
with intergenerational implications.[41] Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision
specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them
cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the ManilaBay clean
and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No.
76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99
are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening events in
the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to
clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B
sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them
fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

In particular:

(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural
resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible
for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for the
Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the
earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government
departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in
accordance with its indicated completion schedules.

(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local
Government Code of 1991,[42] the DILG, in exercising the Presidents power of general supervision and its
duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine
Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the
banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-
Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water
into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment
facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If
none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up
said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and
human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure
or imposition of fines and other sanctions.

(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,[43] the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain
the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed
at the earliest possible time.

(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,[44] the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR,
is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and
safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga,
and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,[45] the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the
marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic
resources in the Manila Bay.

(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec.
124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other
existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513[46] and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping
of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked
at ports and apprehend the violators.

(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and
drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime
Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall
dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments established or built in
violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting
waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects
for flood control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite,
and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other
concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-
Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and
other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by
RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial
jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and
like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases
against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003,[47] Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water
Act), and other existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality
of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the
treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the
companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities
under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.

(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,[48] Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,[49] the DepEd shall
integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects
in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their
parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful
ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.

(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010
and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the
water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development objective to attain economic growth
in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP
Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of continuing
mandamus, shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of
the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES,
ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO HENARES, petitioners,
vs.
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation Study of 1996, 1 the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the National Capital Region, 2 a study of the Asian
Development Bank,3 the Manila Observatory4 and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources5 (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines, including
diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air
pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air
pollution and related environmental hazards.
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid
droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have
caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners
particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine combustion when these react to other
pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NO x) creates smog; with
sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia, moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form nitric
acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants. According to
petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted into the
atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO
affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.6
Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the country will use natural gas while a
number of oil and coal-fired fuel stations are being phased-out, still with the projected doubling of power
generation over the next 10 years, and with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and
transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us to the
study of the Philippine Environment Monitor 20027, stating that in four of the country's major cities, Metro
Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM10, a finer PM which can penetrate deep into the lungs
causing serious health problems, is estimated at over US$430 million. 8 The study also reports that the
emissions of PMs have caused the following:
· Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about US$140 million.
· Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued at about US$120 million.
· Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro Manila (averaging twice a year in Davao
and Cebu, and five to six times in Metro Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170 million. This is a 70
percent increase, over a decade, when compared with the findings of a similar study done in 1992 for Metro
Manila, which reported 33 million cases.9
Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing that vehicular
emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases
(COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent
prevalence of respiratory symptoms among school children and 15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors.
The studies also revealed that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function
than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.
To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of
CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although
containing small amounts of propane and butane,10 is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest
fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent
less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon
emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although, according
to petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that it produces more methane, one of the gases blamed for
global warming.11
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus
to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, 12 Article II of the
1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise
known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners' motion to implead the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent.
In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General, cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and explains that the writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may
be issued only to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is required to be done,
when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.15 Further citing existing jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains that in
contrast to a discretionary act, a ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done.
The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke, prohibits the use
of gasoline and diesel by owners of motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act
No. 8749 does not even mention the existence of CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this law is
amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use
CNG as alternative fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not
the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover, he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 26 16 of
Rep. Act No. 8749, that is required to set the specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related products to
improve fuel compositions for improved efficiency and reduced emissions. He adds that under Section
2117 of the cited Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards for motor
vehicles, and the herein respondents cannot alter, change or modify the emission standards. The Solicitor
General opines that the Court should declare the instant petition for mandamus without merit.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the administrative and regulatory powers to
implement measures in accordance with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749,
specifically Section 218 and Section 21.19 Petitioners state that under these laws and with all the available
information provided by the DOE on the benefits of CNG, respondents cannot ignore the existence of CNG,
and their failure to recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as alternative fuel while air pollution brought
about by the emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the environment and the people, is tantamount to
neglect in the performance of a duty which the law enjoins.
Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to the
very same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that the Solicitor General invokes.
In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO BRING THE PRESENT
ACTION
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY LAW
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE OF REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED
NATURAL GAS (CNG)
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY
VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS20
Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before
us? Second, Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative
fuel?
According to petitioners, Section 16,21 Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the policy statement that bestows
on the people the right to breathe clean air in a healthy environment. This policy is enunciated
in Oposa.22 The implementation of this policy is articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749. These, according to
petitioners, are the bases for their standing to file the instant petition. They aver that when there is an
omission by the government to safeguard a right, in this case their right to clean air, then, the citizens can
resort to and exhaust all remedies to challenge this omission by the government. This, they say, is
embodied in Section 423 of Rep. Act No. 8749.
Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government agencies clothed with
power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies' awareness
and knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that
these are curbed falls under respondents' functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.
The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent government agencies, the
DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor
General explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards set forth
in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of
vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General avers that the
petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG
as alternative fuel.
Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only procedural. Petitioners challenge this
Court to decide if what petitioners propose could be done through a less circuitous, speedy and unchartered
course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his ponencia in the Oposa case,24 describes
as "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Now, as to petitioners' standing. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before
this Court. Even respondents do not question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal
right of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court
is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the
importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the
transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.
Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance to petitioners for it concerns
the air they breathe, but it is also impressed with public interest. The consequences of the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due to emissions of motor vehicles
immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. On these considerations, the legal standing of the
petitioners deserves recognition.
Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and if the writ could issue against
respondents.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against
any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation,
board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 we said,
…It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty,
this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a
course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it is
essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues
in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must however,
be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is
his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers
powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform
a duty already imposed. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced hinges on a constitutional and
a statutory policy already articulated in operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine Clean
Air Act of 1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically provides that when PUVs are concerned,
the responsibility of implementing the policy falls on respondent DOTC. It provides as follows:
SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the emission standards for motor
vehicles set pursuant to and as provided in this Act. To further improve the emission standards, the
Department [DENR] shall review, revise and publish the standards every two (2) years, or as the need
arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all major pollutants to ensure substantial improvement in air
quality for the health, safety and welfare of the general public.
Paragraph (b) states:
b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and LGUs, shall develop an action plan
for the control and management of air pollution from motor vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air
Quality Framework . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission standards
for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves
upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action
plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
In Oposa26 we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. We also said, it is clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies
to advance the said right.
Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for issuance of a
writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel.
Although both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel, particularly
the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles.
Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport
(NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. The program recognized, among others, natural gas as a
clean burning alternative fuel for vehicle which has the potential to produce substantially lower pollutants;
and the Malampaya Gas-to-Power Project as representing the beginning of the natural gas industry of the
Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as one of its objectives, the use of CNG as a
clean alternative fuel for transport. Furthermore, one of the components of the program is the development
of CNG refueling stations and all related facilities in strategic locations in the country to serve the needs of
CNG-powered PUVs. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002, designated
the DOE as the lead agency (a) in developing the natural gas industry of the country with the DENR, through
the EMB and (b) in formulating emission standards for CNG. Most significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks
the DOTC, working with the DOE, to develop an implementation plan for "a gradual shift to CNG fuel
utilization in PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon through the
issuance of directives/orders providing preferential franchises in present day major routes and exclusive
franchises to NGVs in newly opened routes…" A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that
implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had
been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of
mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is
available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law
that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At
most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and
exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results
of the DOTC surveys."
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the
obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.27 The need for future changes in both legislation and its
implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is
procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient
time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in
this petition.
In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology
with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice"
in Oposa,28 where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do
we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation to clean air. In Oposa we
said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution even if
the right is "assumed to exist from the inception of humankind,… it is because of the well-founded fear of
its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those
to come. . ."29
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed on the
protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air
pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants
are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants
emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that
imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling
the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide
first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before
any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED
WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, Joined in and Represented
herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as
Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards of God's
Creations, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE),
SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-Region VII and in
his capacity as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board, Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR
Regional Director for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD.
(JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC. Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 181527
CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), CERILO D. ENGARCIAL,
RAMON YANONG, FRANCISCO LABID, in their personal capacity and as representatives of the
SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN,
CEBU, AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF FILIPINOS
WHOSE RIGHTS ARE SIMILARLY AFFECTED, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE),
JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in his capacity as DENR Regional Director-Region
VII and as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board, ALAN
ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity as Director - Environmental Management Bureau-Region VII, DOE
Regional Director for Region VIII1 ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO.,
LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
"Until one has loved an animal,
a part of one 's soul remains unawakened."
Anatole France
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result, with the following additional reasons.
I
In G.R. No. 180771, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their personal
capacity, alleging that they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human
petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser life-forms and
as responsible stewards of God's Creations."1 They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.2 as basis for their claim,
asserting their right to enforce international and domestic environmental laws enacted for their benefit under
the concept of stipulation pour autrui.3As the representatives of Resident Marine Mammals, the human
petitioners assert that they have the obligation to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon
Strait as well as to protect the environment, especially in light of the government's failure, as primary
steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public trust.4
Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through this case, this court will have
the opportunity to lower the threshold for locus standi as an exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction." 5
The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their desire to protect the environment and to continue to define
environmental rights in the context of actual cases is commendable. However, the space for legal creativity
usually required for advocacy of issues of the public interest is not so unlimited that it should be allowed to
undermine the other values protected by current substantive and procedural laws. Even rules of procedure
as currently formulated set the balance between competing interests. We cannot abandon these rules when
the necessity is not clearly and convincingly presented.
The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create substantive and procedural rights for animals
through their allegation that they can speak for them. Obviously, we are asked to accept the premises that
(a) they were chosen by the Resident Marine Mammals of Tañon Strait; (b) they were chosen by a
representative group of all the species of the Resident Marine Mammals; (c) they were able to communicate
with them; and (d) they received clear consent from their animal principals that they would wish to use
human legal institutions to pursue their interests. Alternatively, they ask us to acknowledge through judicial
notice that the interests that they, the human petitioners, assert are identical to what the Resident Marine
Mammals would assert had they been humans and the legal strategies that they invoked are the strategies
that they agree with.
In the alternative, they want us to accept through judicial notice that there is a relationship of guardianship
between them and all the resident mammals in the affected ecology.
Fundamental judicial doctrines that may significantly change substantive and procedural law cannot be
founded on feigned representation.
Instead, I agree that the human petitioners should only speak for themselves and already have legal
standing to sue with respect to the issue raised in their pleading. The rules on standing have already been
liberalized to take into consideration the difficulties in the assertion of environmental rights. When standing
becomes too liberal, this can be the occasion for abuse.
II
Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:
SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or entities that may be authorized
by statute to be parties in a civil action.
Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in our Civil Code:
ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect,
is acquired and may be lost.
Article 40 further defines natural persons in the following manner:
ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified 'in the following article.
Article 44, on the other hand, enumerates the concept of a juridical person:
ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that we amend, rather than simply construe, the provisions
of the Rules of Court as well as substantive law to accommodate Resident Marine Mammals or animals.
This we cannot do.
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further defines real party in interest:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest.-A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a)6
A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from the judgment of a case is a real party in
interest.7 When a case is brought to the courts, the real party in interest must show that another party's act
or omission has caused a direct injury, making his or her interest both material and based on an enforceable
legal right.8
Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are parties acting in representation of the real party in
interest, as defined in Rule 3, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the
case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express
rust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting
in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the
principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.(3a) 9
The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines .a representative as a party who is not bound to directly or actually
benefit or suffer from the judgment, but instead brings a case in favor of an identified real party in
interest.10 The representative is an outsider to the cause of action. Second, the rule provides a list of who
may be considered as "representatives." It is not an exhaustive list, but the rule limits the coverage only to
those authorized by law or the Rules of Court.11
These requirements should apply even in cases involving the environment, which means that for the
Petition of the human petitioners to prosper, they must show that (a) the Resident Marine Mammals are
real parties in interest; and (b) that the human petitioners are authorized by law or the Rules to act in a
representative capacity.
The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species inhabiting Tañon Strait."12 While relatively new in Philippine jurisdiction, the issue of whether
animals have legal standing before courts has been the subject of academic discourse in light of the
emergence of animal and environmental rights.
In the United States, anim4l rights advocates have managed to establish a system which Hogan explains
as the "guardianship model for nonhuman animals":13
Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by which nonhuman animals may obtain
judicial review to enforce their statutory rights and protections: guardianships. With court approval, animal
advocacy organizations may bring suit on behalf of nonhuman animals in the same way court-appointed
guardians bring suit on behalf of mentally-challenged humans who possess an enforceable right but lack
the ability to enforce it themselves.
In the controversial but pivotal Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects,
Christopher D. Stone asserts that the environment should possess the right to seek judicial redress even
though it is incapable of representing itself. While asserting the rights of
speechless entities such as the environment or nonhuman animals certainly poses legitimate challenges -
such as identifying the proper spokesman -the American legal system is already well-equipped with a
reliable mechanism by which nonhumans may obtain standing via a judicially established guardianship.
Stone notes that other speechless - and nonhuman - entities such as corporations, states, estates, and
municipalities have standing to bring suit on their own behalf. There is little reason to fear abuses under
this regime as procedures for removal and substitution, avoiding conflicts of interest, and termination of a
guardianship are well established.
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible. The court
indicated that AL VA might have obtained standing in its own right if it had an established history of
dedication to the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund for Animals had standing
and indicated that another more well-known advocacy organization might have had standing as well. The
court further concluded that an organization's standing is more than a derivative of its history, but history is
a relevant consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action.
ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities demonstrating its
recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action. The
court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated commitment to a cause could
indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.
This Comment advocates a shift in contemporary standing doctrine to empower non-profit organizations
with an established history of dedication to the cause and relevant expertise to serve as official guardians
ad !item on behalf of nonhuman animals interests. The American legal system has numerous mechanisms
for representing the rights and interests of nonhumans; any challenges inherent in extending these pre-
existing mechanisms to nonhuman animals are minimal compared to an interest in the proper administration
of justice. To adequately protect the statutory rights of nonhuman animals, the legal system must recognize
those statutory rights independent of humans and provide a viable means of enforcement. Moreover, the
idea of a guardianship for speechless plaintiffs is not new and has been urged on behalf of the natural
environment. 'Such a model is even more compelling as applied to nonhuman animals, because they are
sentient beings with the ability to feel pain and exercise rational thought. Thus, animals are qualitatively
different from other legally protected nonhumans and therefore have interests deserving direct legal
protection.
Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of nonhuman animals threatens the integrity of
the federal statutes designed to protect them, essentially rendering them meaningless. Sensing that laws
protecting nonhuman animals would be difficult to enforce, Congress provided for citizen suit provisions:
the most well-known example is found in the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Such provisions are evidence
of legislative intent to encourage civic participation on behalf of nonhuman animals. Our law of standing
should reflect this intent and its implication that humans are suitable representatives of the natural
environment, which includes nonhuman animals.14 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals are considered as similarly situated
as individuals who have enforceable rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g., cognitive disability), are unable
to bring suit for themselves. They are also similar to entities that by their very nature are incapable of
speaking for themselves (e.g., corporations, states, and others).
In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing
to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in interest. The same cannot be said
about animals.
Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the environment. While we, as humans,
may feel the need to nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we represent their best
interests and can, therefore, speak for them before the courts. As humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to
argue that we know the suffering of animals and that we know what remedy they need in the face of an
injury.
Even in Hogan's discussion, she points out that in a case before the United States District Court for the
Central District of California, Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger, 15 the court held that an
emotional response to what humans perceive to be an injury inflicted on an animal is not within the "zone-
of-interest" protected by law.16Such sympathy cannot stand independent of or as a substitute for an actual
injury suffered by the claimant.17 The ability to represent animals was further limited in that case by the
need to prove "genuine dedication" to asserting and protecting animal rights:
What ultimately proved fatal to ALVA 's claim, however, was the court's assertion that standing doctrine
further required ALVA to differentiate its genuine dedication to the humane treatment of animals from the
general disdain for animal cruelty shared by the public at large. In doing so, the court found ALVA 's asserted
organizational injury to be abstract and thus relegated ALVA to the ranks of the "concerned bystander. "
....
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible. The court
indicated that ALVA might have obtained standing in its own right if it had an established history of
dedication to the cause of the humane treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund for Animals had standing
and indicated that another more well-known advocacy organization might have had standing as well. The
court further concluded that an organization's standing is more than a derivative of its history, but history is
a relevant consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action.
ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities demonstrating its
recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action. The
court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated commitment to a cause could
indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.18(Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)
What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of guardianship is the principle of human stewardship
over the environment in a citizen suit under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. A citizen suit
allows any Filipino to act as a representative of a party who has enforceable rights under environmental
laws before Philippine courts, and is defined in Section 5: .
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet
unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a
citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and
the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general
circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to implead and feign representation
on behalf of animals. To have done so betrays a very anthropocentric view of environmental advocacy.
There is no way that we, humans, can claim to speak for animals let alone present that they would wish to
use our court system, which is designed to ensure that humans seriously carry their responsibility including
ensuring a viable ecology for themselves, which of course includes compassion for all living things.
Our rules on standing are sufficient and need not be further relaxed.
In Arigo v. Swift,19 I posed the possibility of further reviewing the broad interpretation we have given to the
rule on standing. While representatives are not required to establish direct injury on their part, they should
only be allowed to represent after complying with the following: [I]t is imperative for them to indicate with
certainty the injured parties on whose behalf they bring the suit. Furthermore, the interest of those they
represent must be based upon concrete legal rights. It is not sufficient to draw out a perceived interest from
a general, nebulous idea of a potential "injury."20
I reiterate my position in Arigo v. Swift and in Paje v. Casiño21 regarding this rule alongside the appreciation
of legal standing in Oposa v. Factoran22 for environmental cases. In Arigo, I opined that procedural liberality,
especially in cases brought by representatives, should be used with great caution:
Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.
That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call attention to environmental concerns in
light of emerging international legal principles. While "intergenerational responsibility" is a noble principle,
it should not be used to obtain judgments that would preclude future generations from making their own
assessment based on their actual concerns. The present generation must restrain itself from assuming that
it can speak best for those who will exist at a different time, under a different set of circumstances. In
essence, the unbridled resort to representative suit will inevitably result in preventing future generations
from protecting their own rights and pursuing their own interests and decisions. It reduces the autonomy of
our children and our children 's children. Even before they are born, we again restricted their ability to make
their own arguments.
It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be allowed only
when a) there is a clear legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based squarely
upon an existing legal right; c) there is no possibility of any countervailing interests existing within the
population represented or those that are yet to be born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for such
standing because there is a threat of catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is
necessary. Better still, in the light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together. 23 (Emphasis
in the original)
Similarly, in Paje:
A person cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction if he or she has no right or interest to protect. He or she who
invokes the court's jurisdiction must be the "owner of the right sought to be enforced." In other words, he or
she must have a cause of action. An action may be dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action if
the person who instituted it is not the real party in interest. 24 The term "interest" under the Rules of Court
must refer to a material interest that is not merely a curiosity about or an "interest in the question involved."
The interest must be present and substantial. It is not a mere expectancy or a future, contingent interest.
A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if he or she is suing as representative of
a .real party in interest. When an action is prosecuted or defended by a representative, that representative
is not and does not become the real party in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in
interest. The representative remains to be a third party to the action instituted on behalf of another.
....
To sue under this rule, two elements must be present: "(a) the suit is brought on behalf of an identified party
whose right has been violated, resulting in some form of damage, and (b) the representative authorized by
law or the Rules of Court to represent the victim."
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen's suit. A citizen's suit under this
rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors
or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties
in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest.
The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors and generations yet unborn is a
recognition of this court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran. This court recognized the capacity of minors
(represented by their parents) to file a class suit on behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept
of intergenerational responsibility to ensure the future generation's access to and enjoyment of [the]
country's natural resources.
To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future generations, is dangerous
for three reasons:
First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit, putting
into. question its representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in arguments that are
bordering on political issues, the resolutions of which do not fall upon this court. Third, automatically
allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors and generations yet unborn may result in the
oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in light of the impossibility of determining
future generation's true interests on the matter.
In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may file suits for others. Uninterested
persons will argue for the persons they represent, and the court will decide based on their evidence and
arguments. Any decision by the court will be binding upon the beneficiaries, which in this case are the
minors and the future generations. The court's decision will be res judicata upon them and conclusive upon
the issues presented.25
The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its potential to
diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real party in interest" to
the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will potentially
result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a right. It is
impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are. At best, humans can only surmise the extent
of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress before this court cannot
be a product of guesswork, and representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably
cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded arguments"26 on behalf of those they represent.
Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome. However, they should be considered
carefully so that no unintended or unwarranted consequences should follow. I concur with the approach of
Madame Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant ponencia as it carefully narrows down the
doctrine in terms of standing. Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners have no legal standing
to file any kind of petition.
However, I agree that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, namely, Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development
Center,. Engarcial, Yanong, and Labid, have standing both as real parties in interest and as representatives
of subsistence fisherfolks of the Municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungahan, Cebu, and their families,
and the present and future generations of Filipinos whose rights are similarly affected. The activities
undertaken under Service Contract 46 (SC-46) directly affected their source of livelihood, primarily felt
through the significant reduction of their fish harvest. 27 The actual, direct, and material damage they
suffered, which has potential long-term effects transcending generations, is a proper subject of a legal suit.
III
In our jurisdiction, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the concept of implied petitioners, most
especially when the implied petitioner was a sitting President of the Republic of the Philippines. In G.R. No.
180771, apart from adjudicating unto themselves the status of "legal guardians" of whales, dolphins,
porpoises, and other cetacean species, human petitioners also impleaded Former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as "unwilling co-petitioner" for "her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN
Charter to protect Tañon Strait."28
No person may implead any other person as a co-plaintiff or co-petitioner without his or her consent. In our
jurisdiction, only when there is a party that should have been a necessary party but was unwilling to join
would there be an allegation as to why that party has been omitted. In Rule 3, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. -Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is
asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why
he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of
the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of
the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the
judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party. 29
A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose consent cannot be obtained should be
impleaded as a defendant in the nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule 3, Section 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be
obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint. 30
The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be part of the action but who do
not consent should be put within the jurisdiction of the court through summons or other court processes.
Petitioners. should not take it upon themselves to simply imp lead any party who does not consent as a
petitioner. This places the unwilling co-petitioner at the risk of being denied due process.
Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to this suit. As a co-equal
constitutional department, we cannot assume that the President needs to enforce policy directions by suing
his or her alter-egos. The procedural situation caused by petitioners may have gained public attention, but
its legal absurdity borders on the contemptuous. The Former President's name should be stricken out of
the title of this case.
IV
I also concur with the conclusion that SC-46 is both. illegal and unconstitutional.
SC-46 is illegal because it violates Republic Act No. ·7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992, and Presidential Decree No. 1234,31 which declared Tañon Strait as a protected
seascape. It is unconstitutional because it violates the fourth paragraph of Article XII, Section 2 of the
Constitution.
V
Petitioner Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center asserts that SC-46 violated Article XII, Section
2, paragraph 1 of the .1987 Constitution because Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) is 100%
Japanese-owned.32 It further asserts that SC-46 cannot be validly classified as a technical and financial
assistance agreement executed under Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 4 of the 1987 Constitution. 33 Public
respondents counter that SC-46 does not fall under the coverage of paragraph 1, but is a validly executed
contract under paragraph 4.34· Public respondents further aver that SC-46 neither granted exclusive fishing
rights to JAPEX nor violated Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center's right to preferential use of
communal marine and fishing resources.35
VI
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception. of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may
be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution. (Emphasis supplied)
I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration, development, and use of
natural resources, but only through either financial agreements or technical ones. This is the clear import
of the words "either financial or technical assistance agreements." This is also
the clear result if we compare the 1987 constitutional provision with the versions in the 1973 and 1935
Constitution:
1973 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIV
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OF THE NATION
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, of exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or association
at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Batasang Pambansa, in the
national interest, may allow such citizens, corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for
financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign person or entity for the
exploitation, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources. Existing valid and
binding service contracts for financial, the technical, management, or other forms of assistance are hereby
recognized as such. (Emphasis supplied)
1935 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIII
CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral. lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited
to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception
of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may
be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The clear text of the Constitution in light of its history prevails over any attempt to infer interpretation from
the Constitutional Commission deliberations. The constitutional texts are the product of a full sovereign act:
deliberations in a constituent assembly and ratification. Reliance on recorded discussion of Constitutional
Commissions, on the other hand, may result in dependence on incomplete authorship; Besides, it opens
judicial review to further subjectivity from those who spoke during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations who may not have predicted how their words will be used. It is safer that we use the words
already in the Constitution. The Constitution was their product. Its words were read by those who ratified it.
The Constitution is what society relies upon even at present.
SC-46 is neither a financial assistance nor a technical assistance agreement.
Even supposing for the sake of argument that it is, it could not be declared valid in light of the standards
set forth in La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos:36
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted m accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform
terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the
possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is
presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to
ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch
of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if
any.37 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Based on the standards pronounced in La Bugal, SC-46' S validity must be tested against three important
points: (a) whether SC-46 was crafted in accordance with a general law that provides standards, terms,
and conditions; (b) whether SC-46 was signed by the President for and on behalf of the government; and
(c) whether it was reported by the President to Congress within 30 days of execution.
VII
The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-46's validity is Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972.1âwphi1 It is my opinion that this law is unconstitutional in that it
allows service contracts, contrary to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. (Emphasis supplied)
The deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of the kind of agreements the President may enter
into with foreign-owned corporations for exploration and utilization of resources means that service
contracts are no longer allowed by the Constitution. Pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution,38 this inconsistency renders the law invalid and ineffective.
SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. The Main Opinion emphasizes an
important point, which is that SC-46 did not merely involve exploratory activities, but also provided the rights
and obligations of the parties should it be discovered that there is oil in commercial quantities in the area.
The Tañon Strait being a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234 39 requires that the
exploitation and utilization of energy resources from that area are explicitly covered by a law passed by
Congress specifically for that purpose, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992:
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy R6'sources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, hereof,
protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for
the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the
least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a program
approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted
to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found
within NIP AS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by Congress. 40 (Emphasis supplied)
No law was passed by Congress specifically providing the standards, terms, and conditions of an oil
exploration, extraction, and/or utilization for Tañon Strait and, therefore, no such activities could have been
validly undertaken under SC-46. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 is clear that
exploitation and utilization of energy resources in a protected seascape such as Tañon Strait shall only be
allowed through a specific law.
VIII
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not the signatory to SC-46, contrary to the requirement set
by paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2 for service contracts involving the exploration of petroleum. SC-46
was entered into by then Department of Energy Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr., on behalf of the
government. I agree with the Main Opinion that in cases where the Constitution or law requires the President
to act personally on the matter, the duty cannot be delegated to another public official.41 La Bugal highlights
the importance of the President's involvement, being one of the constitutional safeguards against abuse
and corruption, as not mere formality:
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the ConCom deliberations,
as follows:
• In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term service contracts in
referring to agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance. • They spoke of service
contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution.
• It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate service contracts.
• Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to. put in place safeguards that would eliminate or m minimize
the abuses prevalent during the marital law regime.42 (Emphasis in the original)
Public respondents failed to show that. Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was involved in the
signing or execution of SC-46. The failure to comply with this constitutional requirement renders SC-46 null
and void.
IX
Public respondents also failed to show that Congress was subsequently informed of the execution and
existence of SC-46. The reporting requirement is an equally important requisite to the validity of any service
contract involving the exploration, development, and utilization of Philippine petroleum. Public respondents'
failure to report to Congress about SC-46 effectively took away any opportunity for the legislative branch to
scrutinize its terms and conditions.
In sum, SC-46 was executed and implemented absent all the requirements provided under paragraph 4 of
Article XII, Section 2. It is, therefore, null and void.
X
I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with the 1987 Constitution, is also null and void
for being violative of environmental laws protecting Tañon Strait. In particular, SC-46 was implemented
despite falling short of the requirements of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.
As a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234, 43 Tañon Strait is covered by the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992. This law declares as a matter of policy:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. Cognizant of the profound impact of man's activities on all components of
the natural environment particularly the effect of increasing population, resource exploitation and industrial
advancement and recognizing the critical importance of protecting and maintaining the natural biological
and physical diversities of the environment notably on areas with biologically unique features to sustain
human life and development, as well as plant and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State
to secure for the Filipino people of present and future generations the perpetual existence of all native
plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas
within the classification of national park as provided for in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, possess common ecological values
that may be incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage; that effective
administration of these areas is possible only through cooperation among national government, local and
concerned private organizations; that the use and enjoyment of these protected areas must be consistent
with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS), which shall
encompass outstanding remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare
and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether
terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated as "protected areas." 44 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to this law, any proposed activity in Tañon Strait must undergo an Environmental Impact
Assessment:
SEC. 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are outside the scope of the
management plan for protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment as required
by law before they are adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-
making process.45(Emphasis supplied)
The same provision further requires that an Environmental Compliance Certificate be secured under the
Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment System before arty project is implemented:
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where
such activities are allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner
as will minimize any adverse effects and take preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The
proponent shall be liable for any damage due to lack of caution or indiscretion. 46 (Emphasis supplied)
In projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources, the National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992 additionally requires that a program be approved by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, which shall be publicly accessible. The program shall also be
submitted to the President, who in turn will recommend the program to Congress. Furthermore, Congress
must enact a law specifically allowing the exploitation of energy resources found within a protected area
such as Tañon Strait:
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, hereof,
protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for
the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the
least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a program
approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted
to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found
within NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through a taw passed by Congress. 47 (Emphasis supplied)
Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the procedural requirements of obtaining an
Environmental Compliance Certificate.48 At any rate, they assert that the activities covered by SC-46 fell
under Section 14 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, which they interpret to be
an exception to Section 12. They argue that the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not a strict
requirement for the validity of SC-46 since (a) the Tañon Strait is not a nature' reserve or natural park; (b)
the exploration was merely for gathering information; and ( c) measures were in place to ensure that the
exploration caused the least possible damage to the area.49
Section 14 is not an exception to Section 12, but instead provides additional requirements for cases
involving Philippine energy resources. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 was
enacted to recognize the importance of protecting the environment in light of resource exploitation, among
others.50 Systems are put in place to secure for Filipinos local resources under the most favorable
conditions. With the status of Tañon Strait as a protected seascape, the institution of additional legal
safeguards is even more significant.
Public respondents did not validly obtain an Environmental Compliance Certificate for SC-46. Based on the
records, JAPEX commissioned an environmental impact evaluation only in the second subphase of its
project, with the Environmental Management .Bureau of Region
VII granting the project an Environmental Compliance Certificate on March 6, 2007. 51
Despite its scale, the seismic surveys from May 9 to 18, 2005 were conducted without any environmental
assessment contrary to Section 12 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.
XI
Finally, we honor every living creature when we take care of our environment. As sentient species, we do
not lack in the wisdom or sensitivity to realize that we only borrow the resources that we use to survive and
to thrive. We are not incapable of mitigating the greed that is slowly causing the demise of our planet. Thus,
there is no need for us to feign representation of any other species or some imagined unborn generation in
filing any action in our courts of law to claim any of our fundamental rights to a healthful ecology. In this
way and with candor and courage, we fully shoulder the responsibility deserving of the grace and power
endowed on our species.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote:
(a) to DISMISS G.R. No. 180771 for lack of standing and STRIKE OUT the name of Former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the title of this case;
(b) to GRANT G.R. No. 181527; and
(c) to DECLARE SERVICE CONTRACT 46 NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic
Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1234.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 131442 July 10, 2003
BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK, DIWATA MAGBUHOS, ANGELITA BINAY, ELMA GARCIA, VIRGILIO
PANGUIO, ARSENIO CASTILLO, ARIEL PANGUIO, ANTONIO PANGUIO, ANTONIO BUNQUIN,
GENEROSO BUNQUIN, CHARLIE DIMAYACYAC, RENATO PANGUIO, ATILANO BUNQUIN, CARLOS
CHAVEZ, JUAN DIMAYACYAC, FILEMON BUNQUIN, MARIO MAGBUHOS, MAURO MAGBUHOS,
NORA MAGBUHOS, JEOVILYN, GENALYN and JORVAN QUIMUEL, minors, represented by their
parents FELICIANA and SABINO QUIMUEL, MARICAR MAGBUHOS, minor, represented by her
parents CARMELITA and ANTONIO MAGBUHOS, MARLO BINAY, minor, represented by his parents
EFRENITA and CHARLITO BINAY, and the BANGUS, BANGUS FRY and other MARINE LIFE OF
MINOLO COVE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ENRICO LANZANAS as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII,
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES — Region IV, represented by
its Regional Executive Director and its Regional Director for Environment, THE NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, ORIENTAL MINDORO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF
ORIENTAL MINDORO, herein represented by GOVERNOR RODOLFO VALENCIA, PUERTO GALERA
MAYOR GREGORIO DELGADO, VICE MAYOR ARISTEO ATIENZA, and MEMBERS OF THE
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF PUERTO GALERA, JUAN ASCAN, JR., RAFAEL ROMEY, CENON
SALCEDO, JERRY DALISAY, SIMON BALITAAN, RENATO CATAQUIS, MARCELINO BANAAG,
DANIEL ENRIQUEZ, AMELYN MARCO, GABRIEL ILAGAN, MUNICIPAL ENGINEER RODEL RUBIO,
and MUNICIPAL PLANNING and DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR WILHELMINA
LINESES, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Order2 dated 7 November 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 7 ("Manila RTC"), dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe ("RED Principe") of Region IV,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR"), issued an Environmental Clearance
Certificate ("ECC") in favor of respondent National Power Corporation ("NAPOCOR"). The ECC authorized
NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro,
Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a
mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.3
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCOR's power barge, which, due to
turbulent waters at its former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site
like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power barge would provide the main source of power for the entire
province of Oriental Mindoro pending the construction of a land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro. The ECC for the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its date of issuance or until
30 June 1999.4
Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera, 5 sought reconsideration of the
ECC issuance. RED Principe, however, denied petitioners' plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July 1997,
petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the
ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility. Impleaded
as defendants were the following: (1) NAPOCOR, (2) RED Principe, (3) DENR Region IV Technical Director
for Environment Oscar Dominguez, (4) Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative ("ORMECO"), which is
engaged in the distribution of electricity in Oriental Mindoro, and (5) certain officials of Puerto
Galera.6 Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint to include as additional defendants the elective
officials of Oriental Mindoro represented by then Governor Rodolfo G. Valencia. Petitioners further prayed
for the demolition of mooring structures that respondents had already built.
On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended complaint, the trial court issued a 20-day temporary
restraining order enjoining the construction of the mooring facility. However, the trial court lifted the same
on 6 August 1997 on NAPOCOR's manifestation that the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro was
the one undertaking the construction of the mooring facility.7
On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents ORMECO and the provincial officials of
Oriental Mindoro moved to dismiss the complaint. These respondents claimed that petitioners failed to
exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the complaint without cause of action. They also asserted that
the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the construction of the mooring facility in Oriental Mindoro,
which lies outside the Manila RTC's territorial jurisdiction.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies.
They argued that the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of Presidential Decree No. 1605, 8
Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160,9 and the provisions of DENR Department Administrative
Order No. 96-37 ("DAO 96-37") on the documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also claimed that
the implementation of the ECC was in patent violation of its terms.
In its order of 7 November 1997, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed petitioners' complaint.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court's order dismissing the complaint reads in part:
After careful evaluation and analysis, this Court finds the Motion to Dismiss tenable and meritorious.
Petitioners have clearly failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before taking this legal action in Court
x x x.
It is x x x worth mentioning that the decision of the Regional Director may still be x x x elevated to the Office
of the Secretary of the DENR to fully comply with the process of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
And well settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that before bringing an action in or resorting to the Courts of
Justice, all remedies of administrative character affecting or determinative of the controversy at that level
should first be exhausted by the aggrieved party (Pestanas vs. Dyogi, L-25786, February 27, 1978). And
petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies renders his [sic] petition dismissible (Chia vs. Acting
Collector of Customs, 177 SCRA 755). And a dismissal on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action (Baguiro vs. Basa, Jr., 214 SCRA
437; Pineda vs. CFI of Davao, 111 Phil. 643; Sarabia vs. Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources, L-
16002, May 23, 1961; Gone, et al. vs. District Engineer, et. al., L-22782, August 29, 1975; Abe-Abe, et al.
vs. Manta, et. al., L-4827, May 31, 1979) although it does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter (Mun. of La Trinidad, et al. vs. CFI of Baguio-Benguet, et al., L-33889, June 28, 1983).
Moreover, this Court finds the Opposition of the Petitioners highly untenable and bereft of merits that the
controverted act in question is patently illegal and there was an immediate need for judicial intervention.
The ECC in question was issued by the Regional Office of the DENR which has jurisdiction and authority
over the same . . .. And corollary to this, the issue as to whether or not the Minolo Cove is within the
enclosed coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera bay and protected by Medio island is a clear
question of fact which the DENR may appropriately resolve before resorting to [the] Court[s].
This Court is likewise aware and cognizant of its territorial jurisdiction in the enforcement of Writ of
Injunction. That truly, [a] writ of injunction can only be enforced within [the] territorial jurisdiction of this Court
but not for acts which are being or about to be committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Thus, in Philippine
National Bank vs. Pineda, 197 SCRA 1, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled: "Regional Trial Courts can
only enforce their writs of injunction within their respective designated territories. Furthermore, we find the
issuance of the preliminary injunction directed against the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental a
jurisdictional paux [sic] pas (from Black Dictionary means jurisdictional falsity) as the Courts of First Instance
now Regional Trial Court[s], can only enforce their writs of injunction within their respective designated
territories.
And finally, this Court is not unmindful of the relevant and square application in the case at bar of
Presidential Decree No. 1818, Executive Order No. 380 dated November 27, 1989, and Circular No. 2-91
of the Supreme Court that the National Power Corporation (NPC) is a public utility, created under special
legislation, engaged in the generation and distribution of electric power and energy. The mooring site of
NPC in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro is one of its infrastructure projects falling within the mantle of
Executive Order No. 380, November 27, 1989 x x x.
And as held by the Supreme Court in the case of National Power Corporation vs. Honorable Abraham P.
Vera, et al., 170 SCRA 721, courts are without jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against [the] National
Power Corporation. The latter enjoys the protective mantle of P.D. 1818, (Circular No. 2-91).
xxx xxx xxx
Injunction in this case is not a mere ancillary [sic] writ but the main action itself together with the Annulment
of the Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC). Even assuming arguendo that the court [can] annul the
ECC how can the latter enforce the same against the Provincial Government of Oriental Mindoro which
was impleaded by the petitioners as a necessary party together with the Oriental Mindoro Electric
Cooperative and the government officials of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, whose acts and functions are
being performed outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court? x x x Indisputably, the injunction and
annulment of ECC as prayed for in the petition are inseparable x x x.
The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that petitioners have failed to exhaust all the available
administrative remedies and this Court has no jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ prayed for in the
Amended [Complaint].10
The Issue
The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause action and
lack of jurisdiction.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the reliefs
sought.11
A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners' principal cause of action is the alleged
illegality of the issuance of the ECC. The violation of laws on environmental protection and on local
government participation in the implementation of environmentally critical projects is an issue that involves
the validity of NAPOCOR's ECC. If the ECC is void, then as a necessary consequence, NAPOCOR or the
provincial government of Oriental Mindoro could not construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary issue of
non-compliance with pertinent local ordinances in the construction of the mooring facility becomes
immaterial for purposes of granting petitioners' main prayer, which is the annulment of the ECC. Thus, if
the court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it has jurisdiction to hear
and decide petitioners' complaint.
Petitioners' complaint is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It falls within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts under Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691. The question of whether petitioners should file their complaint in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila or Oriental Mindoro then becomes a matter of venue, to be determined by
the residence of the parties.12
Petitioners' main prayer is the annulment of the ECC. The principal respondent, DENR Region IV, has its
main office at the L & S Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Regional Executive Director Principe of the
DENR Region IV, who issued the ECC, holds office there. Plainly, the principal respondent resides in
Manila, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. Thus, petitioners filed their complaint in
the proper venue.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited to acts
committed or about to be committed within their judicial region. 13 Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818
("PD No. 1818") prohibited14 courts from issuing injunctive writs against government infrastructure projects
like the mooring facility in the present case. Republic Act No. 8975 ("RA No. 8975"), which took effect on
26 November 2000, superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the coverage of the prohibition,
reserves the power to issue such writs exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for its
violation.15 Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental Mindoro RTC can issue an injunctive writ to
stop the construction of the mooring facility. Only this Court can do so under PD No. 1818 and later under
RA No. 8975. Thus, the question of whether the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint considering
that its injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is academic.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, although it
could not issue an injunctive writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the construction of the
mooring facility could not proceed without a valid ECC, the validity of the ECC remains the determinative
issue in resolving petitioners' complaint.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The settled rule is before a party may seek the intervention of the courts, he should first avail of all the
means afforded by administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery is still
available, with a procedure prescribed pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the
controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before resorting to the courts. The premature
invocation of a court's intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such
ground.16
RED Principe of the DENR Region IV Office issued the ECC based on (1) Presidential Decree No. 1586
("PD No. 1586") and its implementing rules establishing the Environmental Impact Statement System, (2)
DAO 96-3717 and (3) the Procedural Manual of DAO 96-37. Section 418 of PD No. 1586 requires a
proponent of an environmentally critical project, or a project located within an environmentally critical area
as declared by the President, to secure an ECC prior to the project's operation. 19 NAPOCOR thus secured
the ECC because the mooring facility in Minolo Cove, while not an environmentally critical project, is located
within an environmentally critical area under Presidential Proclamation No. 2146, issued on 14 December
1981.20
The rules on administrative appeals from rulings of the DENR Regional Directors on the implementation of
PD No. 1586 are found in Article VI of DAO 96-37, which provides:
SECTION 1.0. Appeal to the Office of the Secretary. — Any party aggrieved by the final decision of the
RED may, within 15 days from receipt of such decision, file an appeal with the Office of the Secretary. The
decision of the Secretary shall be immediately executory.
SECTION 2.0. Grounds for Appeal. — The grounds for appeal shall be limited to grave abuse of discretion
and serious errors in the findings of fact which would cause grave or irreparable injury to the aggrieved
party. Frivolous appeals shall not be countenanced.
SECTION 3.0. Who May Appeal. — The proponent or any stakeholder, including but not limited to, the
LGUs concerned and affected communities, may file an appeal.
The DENR Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 explains these provisions thus:
Final decisions of the RED may be appealed. These decisions include those relating to the issuance or
non-issuance of an ECC, and the imposition of fines and penalties. By inference, the decision of the
Secretary on the issuance or non-issuance of the ECC may also be appealed based on this
provision. Resort to courts prior to availing of this remedy would make the appellant's action dismissible on
the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The right to appeal must be exercised within 15 days from receipt by the aggrieved party of such decision.
Failure to file such appeal within the requisite period will result in the finality of the RED's or Secretary's
decision(s), which can no longer be disturbed.
An appeal shall not stay the effectivity of the RED's decision, unless the Secretary directs otherwise.
The right to appeal does not prevent the aggrieved party from first resorting to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration with the RED, to give the RED an opportunity to re-evaluate his decision. (Emphasis added)
Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed the DENR Secretary and immediately
filed their complaint with the Manila RTC, depriving the DENR Secretary the opportunity to review the
decision of his subordinate, RED Principe. Under the Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 and applicable
jurisprudence, petitioners' omission renders their complaint dismissible for lack of cause of
action.21 Consequently, the Manila RTC did not err in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of
action.
On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC
Petitioners nevertheless contend that they are exempt from filing an appeal with the DENR Secretary
because the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of existing laws and regulations. These are (1)
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1605, as amended, (2) Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991), and (3) the provisions of DAO 96-37 on the documentary requirements
for the zoning permit and social acceptability of the mooring facility.
Petitioners' contention is without merit. While the patent illegality of an act exempts a party from complying
with the rule on exhaustion Of administrative remedies,22 this does not apply in the present case.
Presidential Decree No. 1605
Presidential Decree No. 1605 ("PD No. 1605"),23 as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1605-A and
1805, declares as ecologically threatened zone "the coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera Bay as
protected by Medio Island." This decree provides in part:
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction of marinas, hotels,
restaurants, other commercial structures; commercial or semi-commercial wharfs [sic]; commercial docking
within the enclosed coves of Puerto Galera; the destruction of its mangrove stands; the devastation of its
corals and coastline by large barges, motorboats, tugboat propellers, and any form of destruction by other
human activities are hereby prohibited.
Section 2. x x x
No permit for the construction of any wharf, marina, hotel, restaurants and other commercial structures in
Puerto Galera shall be issued without prior approval of the Office of the President upon the recommendation
of the Philippine Tourism Authority. (Emphasis supplied)
NAPOCOR claims that since Minolo Cove lies outside of "Puerto Galera Bay as protected by Medio
Island",24 PD No. 1605 does not apply to this case. However, petitioners assert that Minolo Cove is one of
the "enclosed coves of Puerto Galera"25 and thus protected under PD No. 1605. This is a question of fact
that the DENR Secretary should have first resolved. In any event, there is no dispute that NAPOCOR will
use the mooring facility for its power barge that will supply 14.4 megawatts of electricity to the entire
province of Oriental Mindoro, including Puerto Galera. The mooring facility is obviously a government-
owned public infrastructure intended to serve a basic need of the people of Oriental Mindoro. The mooring
facility is not a "commercial structure; commercial or semi-commercial wharf or commercial docking" as
contemplated in Section 1 of PD No. 1605. Therefore, the issuance of the ECC does not violate PD No.
1605 which applies only to commercial structures like wharves, marinas, hotels and restaurants.
Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160
Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government Code to emphasize the legislative
concern "for the maintenance of a sound ecology and clean environment."26 These provisions require every
national government agency or government-owned and controlled corporation to hold prior consultations
with the local government unit concerned and to secure the prior approval of its sanggunian before
implementing "any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-
renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species."
Sections 26 and 27 respectively provide:
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. — It shall be
the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorized or involved in
the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change,
depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal
or plant species, to consult with the local government units, non-governmental organizations, and other
sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the
people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be
undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. — No project or program shall be implemented by government
authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Section . . . 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects
are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
In Lina, Jr. v. Paño,27 the Court interpreted these provisions in this manner:
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof x x x.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and
programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Sections 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may
cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable
resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal
or plant species; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.
Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners admit, 28 the mooring facility
itself is not environmentally critical and hence does not belong to any of the six types of projects mentioned
in the law. There is no statutory requirement for the concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of
the mooring facility. It is another matter if the operation of the power barge is at issue. As an environmentally
critical project that causes pollution, the operation of the power barge needs the prior approval of the
concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this Court is only the construction of the mooring facility,
not the operation of the power barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not violate Sections 26 and 27
of RA No. 7160.
Documentary Requirements for ECC Applications
Under DAO 96-37, an ECC applicant for a project located within an environmentally critical area is required
to submit an Initial Environment Examination, which must contain a brief description of the environmental
setting and a documentation of the consultative process undertaken, when appropriate. 29 As part of the
description of the environmental setting, the ECC applicant must submit a certificate of locational clearance
or zoning certificate.
Petitioners further contend that NAPOCOR, in applying for the ECC, did not submit to the DENR Region IV
Office the documents proving the holding of consultations and the issuance of a locational clearance or
zoning certificate. Petitioners assert that this omission renders the issuance of the ECC patently illegal.
The contention is also without merit. While such documents are part of the submissions required from a
project proponent, their mere absence does not render the issuance of the ECC patently illegal. To justify
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies due to the patent illegality of the ECC, the public officer must
have issued the ECC "[without any] semblance of compliance, or even an attempt to comply, with the
pertinent laws; when manifestly, the officer has acted without jurisdiction or has exceeded his jurisdiction,
or has committed a grave abuse of discretion; or when his act is clearly and obviously devoid of any color
of authority."30
RED Principe, as chief of DENR Region IV, is the officer duly authorized under DAO 96-3731 to issue ECCs
for projects located within environmentally critical areas. RED Principe issued the ECC on the
recommendation of Amelia Supetran, the Director of the Environmental Management Bureau. Thus, RED
Principe acted with full authority pursuant to DENR regulations. Moreover, the legal presumption is that he
acted with the requisite authority.32 This clothes RED Principe's acts with presumptive validity and negates
any claim that his actions are patently illegal or that he gravely abused his discretion. While petitioners may
present proof to the contrary, they must do so before the proper administrative forum before resorting to
judicial remedies.
On the Alleged Non-Compliance with the Terms of the ECC
Lastly, petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately seeking judicial recourse because NAPOCOR
is guilty of violating the conditions of the ECC, which requires it to secure a separate ECC for the operation
of the power barge. The ECC also mandates NAPOCOR to secure the usual local government permits, like
zoning and building permits, from the municipal government of Puerto Galera.
The contention is similarly without merit. The fact that NAPOCOR's ECC is subject to cancellation for non-
compliance with its conditions does not justify petitioners' conduct in ignoring the procedure prescribed in
DAO 96-37 on appeals from the decision of the DENR Executive Director. Petitioners vigorously insist that
NAPOCOR should comply with the requirements of consultation and locational clearance prescribed in
DAO 96-37. Ironically, petitioners themselves refuse to abide with the procedure for filing complaints and
appealing decisions laid down in DAO 96-37.
DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to address complaints for the cancellation of
an ECC. Under Article IX of DAO 96-37, complaints to nullify an ECC must undergo an administrative
investigation, after which the hearing officer will submit his report to the EMB Director or the Regional
Executive Director, who will then render his decision. The aggrieved party may file an appeal to the DENR
Secretary, who has authority to issue cease and desist orders. Article IX also classifies the types of
violations covered under DAO 96-37, including projects operating without an ECC or violating the conditions
of the ECC. This is the applicable procedure to address petitioners' complaint on NAPOCOR's alleged
violations and not the filing of the instant case in court.
A Final Word
The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to safeguard and maintain the ecological
balance of Minolo Cove. This Court recognizes the utmost importance of protecting the
environment.33 Indeed, we have called for the vigorous prosecution of violators of environmental
laws.34 Legal actions to achieve this end, however, must be done in accordance with established rules of
procedure that were intended, in the first place, to achieve orderly and efficient administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.