KKK vs Calderon-Bargas eight parcels of land within 20 days.

The parties then filed a Motion to

PETITIONER: KKK FOUNDATION, INC., Approve Compromise Agreement
RESPONDENTS: HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS, in her capacity as ● Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Compromise
Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 78 of Morong, Rizal, Agreement since the other property owner and other trustees of
SHERIFF IV SALES T. BISNAR, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR MORONG, RIZAL, petitioner were not consulted prior to the signing of the agreement.
and IMELDA A. ANGELES Angeles opposed the motion.
● Judge Calderon-Bargas issued an Order stating that record shows that the
Doctrine: Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Compromise Agreement and Motion to
Approve Compromise Agreement both failed to comply with Sec[s]. 4 and
A notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process to afford the
5,Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure. Both proceedings have no specific date
adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court.
of hearing. Thus, these are considered mere scrap[s] of paper.
Through such notice, the adverse party is given time to study and answer the
● The trial court approved the Compromise Agreement.
arguments in the motion.
● Angeles then moved for the issuance of a writ of execution.
● On September 9, 2002, the trial court required petitioner to comment on
Even if the court fails to set the date of the hearing, the court gave the petitioner 10
the motion within ten (10) days. On October 3, 2002, the trial court
days to comment on the notice received. Such was the period to bring to the court's
directed the Clerk of Court to issue a writ of execution.
attention any flaws on the notice.
● Petitioner came to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari alleging
that Judge Calderon-Bargas committed grave abuse of discretion
FACTS:
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she granted the Motion
● Petitioner KKK Foundation, Inc. filed a complaint for Annulment of Extra-
for Issuance of Writ of Execution although it lacked the requisite notice of
judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage and/or Nullification of
hearing. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Sheriffs Auction Sale and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of
● Hence, this recourse.
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioner against Angeles.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in granting the Motion for Issuance of
● Judge Adelina Calderon-Bargas issued a temporary restraining order
Writ of Execution although it lacked the requisite notice of hearing?
preventing Angeles from consolidating her ownership to the foreclosed
properties. On even date, petitioner and Angeles executed a Compromise
RULING: YES
Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to pay Angeles the bid price of the
A motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of
Court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon.
Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of the time and the place of
hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to
comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally defective. However,
there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptions are: (1)
where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned
final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals
contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3)
where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious
discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.
A notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process to afford
the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court.
Through such notice, the adverse party is given time to study and answer the
arguments in the motion.
In this case, records show that while Angeles’ Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution contained a notice of hearing, it did not particularly state the date and
time of the hearing. However, the Court still find that petitioner was not denied
procedural due process. Upon receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution, the trial court issued an Order dated September 9, 2002 giving
petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment. The trial court ruled on the motion
only after the reglementary period to file comment lapsed. Clearly, petitioner was
given time to study and comment on the motion for which reason, the very
purpose of a notice of hearing had been achieved.
Camarines Sur IV Electric Cooperative Inc. vs Aquino
GR No. 167691
September 23, 2008
Doctrine:
There is a cause of action when the following elements are present: (1) the legal right
of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
A motion that it fatally defective cannot be cured even the court takes cognizance of
the case.
Petitioner: Camarines Sur IV Electric Corp, Inc.,
Respondent: Expedita Aquino
Facts:
1. Respondent Aquino wanted to establish a computer gaming business. For this
purpose, she purchased several computers, leased a commercial building in
Tigaon, Camarines Sur and had the electric service in the building be restored.
2. Respondent paid reconnection fee and electric consumption bills covering the
period of April 17, 2002 to May 16, 2002 to petitioner Cam Sur in Mrs.
Paglinawan’s name (former tenant of the building). However, respondent failed to
pay the electric bills in the succeeding months.
3. Petitioner then conducted an inspection. Its report shows that there is a
pilferage of electricity with a notation: Disconnected with lights/illegal tapping.
This report was made known to the respondent.
4. Petitioner alleges that respondent violated RA No. 7832 and required her to pay
the differential billing and the penalty within 48 hrs, otherwise, the electric service
would be disconnected.
5. In a conciliatory conference, respondent refused to choose any of the options
provided by the petitioner as the respondent felt that to do so would be
tantamount to admission of guilt. Consequently, the electric service was
permanently disconnected.
6. Respondent then filed a complaint for damages against petitioner in RTC. She
alleged that due to the disconnection her business operation was interrupted
causing her damages in the form of unrealized income. Petitioner however raised
an affirmative defense that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
According to him, no contract to supply electricity was entered into between them.
7. The trial court initially denied Motion to Dismiss and held that respondent was
in possession of the premises to which petitioner supplied electricity, there was in
a way contract between parties.
8. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and the court, in its December 22, 2003
order, made a turnaround and ruled in petitioner’s favor (second RTC order)
9. On the next day respondent received a copy of the second RTC order and moved
for reconsideration thereof on January 5, 2004. Respondent mailed a copy of her
motion for reconsideration (with notice of hearing) to petitioner’s counsel only on
the same date. It indicated that the hearing of the motion was set on January 9,
2004. Petitioner filed an opposition alleging, that the motion should be denied as
respondent did not comply with the 3-day rule (as provided in the Rules of Court).
10. Trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent filed an appeal
to the Court of Appeals. The Appellate court held that RTC erred in dismissing the
complaint. It ruled that the matter of whether or not a contract, express or implied
existed between the parties was a matter of defense that must be resolved in a
trial on the merits.
11. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the complaint for damages stated a cause of action against the
petitioner.
2. Whether or not respondent appeal was filed on time.
Ruling:
1. YES
There is a cause of action when the following elements are present: (1)
the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. Based on
the allegations in the amended complaint, respondent stated a cause of action for
damages. Here, respondent was in possession of the property supplied with
electricity by petitioner when the electric service was disconnected. This resulted
in the alleged injury complained of which can be threshed out in a trial on the
merits. Whether one is a party or not in a contract is not determinative of the scheduled on January 9, 2004. Expectedly, the mail did not reach petitioner’s
existence of a cause of action. Participation in a contract is not an element in counsel on time.
considering whether or not a complaint states a cause of action because even a
As a consequence, non-compliance this rule is a fatal defect and motion
third party outside the contract can have a cause of action against either or both
was treated a mere scrap of paper. The fact that the RTC took cognizance of a
contracting parties.
defective motion, such as requiring the parties to set it for hearing and denying
2. NO the same for lack of merit, did not cure the defect of said motion. Based on the
foregoing, respondent’s defective motion for reconsideration did not stop the
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was fatally flawed for the failure
running of her period to appeal. Thus, the appeal in the CA should have been
to comply with the 3 day rule under Section 4 Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. In this
dismissed outright as the decision of the RTC had by then already become final
case, the respondent mailed a copy of her motion for reconsideration with notice
and executory.
of hearing to petitioner on January 5, 2004 although the hearing was already
Gliceria Sarmiento v. Emerita Zaratan
GR No. 167471
February 5, 2007
Doctrine:
1) An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is
not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate civil
action under Rule 65.
2) Reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored
by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present
case.
Facts:
This petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
nullify the Court of Appeals.
On 2 September 2002, petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case
against respondent Emerita Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Quezon City. The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently
established her causes against the defendant and hereby order
the defendant and all persons claiming rights under her:
1. to pay plaintiff the monthly rentals of P3,500.00 for
the said premises from August 1, 2002 until defendant vacates
the premises;
2. to pay plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 plus P1,500.00
per appearance of counsel in court, as and for attorneys fees; and
to pay the cost of suit.
Respondent filed her notice of appeal. In the Notice of Appealed Case, the RTC
directed respondent to submit her memorandum in accordance with the
provisions of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court and petitioner to file a
reply memorandum within 15 days from receipt.
Respondents counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had until 3
June 2003 within which to file the requisite memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he
filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due to his failure to finish the draft
of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the delay of filing his illness
for one week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood compounded
by the grounding of the computers because the wirings got wet. But the
motion remained unacted.
On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. On 19 June 2003,
the RTC dismissed the appeal as follows:
Record shows that defendant-appellant received the
Notice of Appealed Case, through counsel, on May 19, 2003. Thus,
under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, she had fifteen (15) days or until June 3,
2003 within which to submit a memorandum on appeal. As
further appears on record, however, the required
Memorandum was filed by defendant-appellant only on June
9, 2003 (Record, p. 623), or six (6) days beyond the expiration
of the aforesaid fifteen day period.
It should be stressed that while the rules should be
liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are
strictly applied as they are deemed indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and necessary to the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business and strict compliance
therewith is mandatory and imperative. The same is true with
respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals.
Premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED.
 On the basis of the above-quoted Order, petitioner filed a Motion for
Immediate Execution, while respondent moved for the Reconsideration. Both
motions were denied. The Order in part reads:
In the main, defendant-appellants Motion for
Reconsideration is premised on the argument that she filed a
timely Motion for Extension of Time To File Memorandum, dated
and filed on June 3, 2003, but that her motion was not acted upon
by this Court. She adds that her appeal memorandum was filed
well within the period sought by her in her Motion for Extension
of Time to File Memorandum so that her appeal should not have
been dismissed.
The argument is without merit. This Court did not take
cognizance of defendant-appellants Motion for Extension of Time
to File Memorandum, and rightly so, because it did not contain a
notice of hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, an omission for which it could offer no
explanation. As declared in the case of Gozon, et al. v. court of
Appeals:
It is well-entrenched in this
jurisdiction that a motion does not meet the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15
of the Rules of Court is considered a
worthless piece of paper which the clerk has
no right to receive, and the court has no
authority to act upon.
Moreover, parties and counsel should not assume that
courts are bound to grant the time they pray for. A motion that
is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied. Thus,
defendant-appellants appeal was properly dismissed on account
of her failure to file an appeal memorandum within the fifteen
(15) day period provided under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue:
1. Whether respondents petition for certiorari should
have been dismissed in the first place;
2. Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for
Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is fatal.
Ruling:
Respondent correctly filed said petition pursuant to Section 41 of the Rules of
Court.
Petitioner assails the correctness and propriety of the remedy resorted to
by respondent by filing a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals. According
to petitioner, certiorari is not appropriate and unavailing as the proper remedy is
an appeal.
It must be noted that respondents appeal in the RTC was dismissed for
failure to file the required memorandum within the period allowed by law, as the
Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum was not acted upon for failure
to attach a notice of hearing. From the said dismissal, respondent filed a Petition
for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
Respondent correctly filed said petition pursuant to Section 41 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken
from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final
order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate civil action under Rule 65.
Petitioner also contends that the Petition for Certiorari filed in the Court
of Appeals should be dismissed as the certification of non-forum shopping was
defective.
Petitioner avers that respondent by stating in the above-quoted
certification that she was the respondent, while in truth she was the petitioner and
by stating that respondent caused the preparation of the comment on the petition,
instead of the petition itself, indicate that respondent did not understand what she
was signing. The defect of the verification all renders the petition in the Court of
Appeals without legal effect and constitutes ground for its dismissal.
The contention is baseless.

The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that
the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and
correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of pleadings and non-compliance therewith does not
necessarily render it fatally defective. Perusal of the verification in question
shows there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Rules and the
alleged defects are not so material as to justify the dismissal of the petition in the
Court of Appeals. The defects are mere typographical errors. There appears to
be no intention to circumvent the need for proper verification and certification,
which are intended to assure the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in
the petition and to discourage forum shopping.
Now, the substantial issues.
No. Considering the circumstances of the present case, we believe that
procedural due process was substantially complied with.
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the
Rules: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of
the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e)
exist in the present case.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in
question does not affect the substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to
extend the period to file Memorandum. The required extension was due to
respondents counsels illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood,
compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that
said motion was interposed to delay the appeal. As it appears, respondent sought
extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so and the memorandum was
subsequently filed within the requested extended period. Under the
circumstances, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case
to resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession of the land in question.
Further, it has been held that a motion for extension of time x x x is not a
litigated motion where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter
an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion made to the court
in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action,
in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties. As
a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the
relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights
be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. It has been said that ex
parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in
situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule
requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might
tend to defeat the objective of the motion.
Litigations, should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and
not on technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned
upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and
thereby defeat their very aims.
On the issue of immediate execution of judgment.
The applicable provision is Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
SEC. 19. Immediate Execution of judgment; how to stay
the same.- If judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal
has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial
Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents,
damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment
appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due
from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the
judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. x x x.
To stay the immediate execution of judgment in ejectment proceedings,
Section 19 requires that the defendant-appellant must (a) perfect his appeal, (b)
file a supersedeas bond, and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during
the pendency of the appeal.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, execution pending appeal
was premature as respondent had already filed a supersedeas bond and the
monthly rental for the current month of the premises in question.
The invocation of petitioner of the provisions of Section 21, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, which runs:
 Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court.- The judgment of the Regional Trial
Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory,
without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken
therefrom.

In the case at bar, the RTC order was an order dismissing respondents
appeal based on technicality. It did not resolve substantive matters relving on the
merits of the parties claim in the ejectment case. Thus, the case brought to the
Court of Appeals was the dismissal of the appeal for failure to file the required
memorandum within the period provided by law, and not on the merits of the
ejectment case.

The petition is denied.


Alberto Romulo v. Judge Eduardo Peralta
G.R. No. 165665 January 31, 2007
J. Sandoval-Gutierrez
DOCTRINE: Where service of a pleading is by registered mail, proof of such
service consists of the following: (1) an affidavit of the person mailing the pleading
containing a full statement of the date, place, and manner of service; and (2) the
registry receipt issued by the mailing office.
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 04-109201 [PAL Employees Association (PALEA), et al. v.
Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al.,]respondents PAL
Employees Association, the National Labor Union, and the National Federation of
Labor Unions assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 253
which provided for an “open skies” policy in the aviation industry. The said policy
opened two airports to international air cargo transportation providers and
foreign airlines.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition in
Civil Case No. 04-109201 for lack of cause of action.
On April 6, 2004, the OSG served by registered mail a copy of its motion to Atty.
Froilan M. Bacungan, counsel for the unions. However, on April 16, 2004, the trial
court denied OSG’s Motion to Dismiss as there was no proof of transmittal by
registered mail of a copy of the subject Motion to Dismiss dated April 5, 2004,
addressed to Bacungan.
The OSG then filed a motion for reconsideration where it attached a photocopy of
registry return receipt No. 4096. But this motion was denied by the trial court as
there was no indication that what was mailed to Atty. Bacugan was a copy of OSG's
motion to dismiss.
In a second motion to reconsideration, the OSG submitted the following: a certified
copy of registry return receipt No. 4096; certified photocopy of OSG Docket
Division Official Records Book page 374, and (3) the affidavit of Josephine S.
Masangkay-Bayongan, Records Officer III, OSG Docket Division, who said that the
mail matter sent to Atty. Bacungan on April 6, 2004 was, in fact, a copy of the
motion to dismiss the petition in Civil Case No. 04-109201 dated April 5, 2004.
Said motion was denied by the trial court as well.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the service of the Motion to Dismiss to Atty. Bacungan was
valid.
RULING: NO
The service of the Motion to Dismiss to Atty. Bacungan was invalid.
It is clear that where service of a pleading is by registered mail, proof of such
service consists of the following: (1) an affidavit of the person mailing the pleading
containing a full statement of the date, place, and manner of service; and (2) the
registry receipt issued by the mailing office.
In denying its first motion for reconsideration, the trial court noted that the OSG
only attached a photocopy of registry return receipt No. 4096 and that it could not
determine on its face whether the registered matter was actually a copy of the
motion to dismiss.
Also, in Josephine S. Masangkay-Bayongan’s affidavit, she stated that "On April 6,
2004,1 caused to be served by registered mail a copy of a Motion to Dismiss dated
April 5, 2004 in Civil Case No. 04-109021..." Clearly, she merely directed that the
motion be served by registered mail. She did not actually post the motion by
registered mail. The rule requires that the affidavit must be executed by "the
person mailing" the motion.
In this case, the registry return receipt No. 4096 does not indicate that what was
mailed to Atty. Bacugan, counsel for respondent labor unions, was a copy of
petitioners' motion to dismiss; and that Bayongan's affidavit shows she was not
the one who mailed such copy.
Petition was dismissed and the orders of the RTC were affirmed.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION v ARMI S. ABEL
G.R. No. 182547 January 10,2011
DOCTRINE: Any perceived denial of right to be heard on the bank’s motion for
execution had been cured by her motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
China Bank acquired title over the lands of Armi Abels at La Vista
Subdivision in a foreclosure sale. China Bank then filed an ex parte petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession in its favor. On 2003, the RTC granted the petition
of China Bank.
following day, June 22, 2007. Any perceived denial of her right to be heard on the
banks motion for execution had been cured by her motion for reconsideration and
the RTCs action on the same.
The order for the issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial in nature.
Such actions, cannot be regarded as dine with grave abuse of discretion. In fact, the
bank has failed to take possession of the property in question for more than 7 years
because of the maneuverings of the respondent.

CB then filed a motion for the execution with the RTC, with the hearing set on June
8, 2007. On June 7, Abel filed a motion to cancel and reset the hearing on the
ground that she needed more time. The court granted her motion and was given a
10-day period from the notice.

RTC: found that Abel failed to file her opposition and issued and order granting
CB’s motion.

Abel then elevated the matter to the CA.

CA: found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Bank’s
motion, noting that the RTC gave Abel 10 days from notice of its order, not 10 days
from the issuance of such order, within which to file her opposition. And that there
was no proof, said the CA, as to when Abel had notice of the RTC’s June 8, 2007
Order as to determine when the 10-day period actually began to run.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in setting aside the assailed RTC decision on the
ground of failure to observe due process respecting Abel right to be heard on the
banks motion for execution

RULING: YES

CA erred in attributing grave abuse of discretion to RTC. While it is true

that the RTC erred in issuing a writ of execution before it could establish that
Abel’s 10-day period has lapsed, Abel on the other hand filed with that court on
June 21, 2007 an urgent motion for reconsideration with her opposition to the
motion for execution attached. The Court, acting on her motion, denied it on the

Republic of the Philippines vs. Glasgow
G.R. No. 170281 (January 18, 2008)
Digest Author: Madarang
DOCTRINE: In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the
focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. The
determination is confined to the four corners of the complaint and nowhere
else. The test of the sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint is whether or
not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon
the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
Forfeiture proceedings are action in rem. While the case involved forfeiture
proceedings under RA 1379, the same principle applies in cases for civil
forfeiture under RA 9160, as amended, since both cases do not terminate in
the imposition of a penalty but merely in favor of the State. As an action in rem,
it is a proceeding against the thing itself instead of against the person. In
actions in rem, or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is not a prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction on the court, provided that the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served
upon the defendant in order to satisfy the requirements of due process. For
this purpose, service may be made by publication as such mode of service is
allowed in actions in rem and quasi in rem
FACTS:
Republic filed a complaint, with urgent plea for issuance of TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction, in the RTC Manila for civil forfeiture of assets against the
bank deposits maintained by Glasgow in City-state Savings bank pursuant to the
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001.
Trial court granted both the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction.
However, summons to Glasgow was returned unnerved as it could no longer be
found at its last known address.
Republic then filed an omnibus motion for the issuance of alias summons and
leave of court to serve summons by publication to which the alias summons were
granted but the motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication was
not mentioned.
The court held that there was no mention for the motion for leave of court to
serve summons because until and unless a return is made on the alias summons,
any action on motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication would be
untenable and premature.
The republic alleged that the alias summons was returned unserved as
Glasglow was no longer holding office at the given address and left no forwarding
address.
Finally, OSG received a copy of Glasgow’s motion to dismiss the case by special
appearance.
CONTENTIONS OF THE GLASGOW FOR THE MOTION TO DISMISS:
The court had no jurisdiction over its person as summons had not yet been served
on it and that the complaint was premature and stated no cause of action as there
was still no conviction for estafa or other criminal violations implicating Glasgow,
among others.
CONTENTION OF THE REPUBLIC: (Through Solicitor General)
The suit was an action quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant was not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court and that
complaint alleged ultimate facts sufficient to establish a cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint filed by the Republic is sufficient in form and
substance and that the service of summons may be by publication.
RULING:
Yes. The Complaint filed was sufficient in form and substance and that the
service of the summons may be by publication
Following the doctrine laid down above, the court ruled that the verified complaint
of the Republic contained the proper allegations to pursue the case. The form and
substance of the Republic’s complaint substantially conformed to the Rule of
Procedure in cases of civil forfeiture. It is the preliminary seizure of the property
in question which brings it within the reach of the judicial process. It is actually
within the courts possession when it is submitted to the process of the court. The
injunctive writ issued removed the bank account from the effective control of
either Glasglow or the bank or their representatives or agents and subjected it to
the process of the courts. Regardless of the absence, pendency or outcome of a
criminal prosecution for unlawful activity or for money laundering, an action for
civil forfeiture may be separately and independently prosecuted and resolved.
Also, Forfeiture proceedings are action in rem. While the case involved forfeiture
proceedings under RA 1379, the same principle applies in cases for civil forfeiture
under RA 9160, as amended, since both cases do not terminate in the imposition
of a penalty but merely in favor of the State. As an action in rem, it is a proceeding
against the thing itself instead of against the person. In actions in rem, or quasi in
rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to
conferring jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction
over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant in order
to satisfy the requirements of due process. For this purpose, service may be made
by publication as such mode of service is allowed in actions in rem and quasi in
rem.

Petition is granted.

G.R. No. 143556 March 16, 2004
EQUITABLE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK & RAFAEL B.
BUENAVENTURA v HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SANTA ROSA MINING CO.,
INC.
Doctrine: The rule is that only the allegations in the complaint may properly
be considered in ascertaining the existence of a cause of action. Lack of cause
of action must appear on the face of the complaint, and its existence may be
determined only by the allegations of the complaint.
FACTS:
On September 19, 1995, Sta. Rosa Mining Co., Inc, respondent herein, filed
before the RTC Court of Quezon City, a complaint for sum of money and damages
against petitioners, Rafael B. Buenaventura, the bank’s former President, and
Cynthia F. Lota, the manager of the Cubao Branch. Sta. Rosa alleged that it lost
income opportunity from its joint venture with Sa Amin sa San Jose Panganiban,
Inc.
In its complaint, Sta. Rosa claimed that on October 21, 1993, it opened
Savings Account No. 0453-52672-1 with PCIBANK (now Equitable), Cubao Branch
by depositing a check amounting to ₱6,389,071.35 plus ₱100 in cash. On October
22, 1993, it informed the bank of its intention to convert its account into a
savings/current/time deposit account and sought to obtain checkbooks pursuant
thereto on October 26, 1993. The bank refused to issue the checkbooks allegedly
due to a restraining order issued by the SEC and supposedly furnished by a law
office, enjoining the officers of Sta. Rosa from withdrawing the funds deposited
under Savings Account No. 0453-52672-1.
Sta. Rosa alleged further that in refusing to issue checkbooks, Lota was
guilty of misrepresentation as verification with SEC showed that a copy of the SEC
order was served on the bank only on October 27, 1993. Sta. Rosa further averred
that the continued failure of petitioners to act decisively on the release of funds
had caused undue harm and prejudice to its stockholders and the livelihood and
social development projects of its joint venture partner. Hence, Sta. Rosa is asking
for actual damages of ₱9,238,800 as unrealized profits representing its 60% share
of the net profits of the joint venture plus moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Sta. Rosa was guilty of
forum shopping and that the complaint stated no cause of action. Petitioners
averred that Sta. Rosa was guilty of forum shopping because the amount involved
in the case was also the issue in Civil Case No. 6014, entitled "Sa Amin Sa Jose
Panganiban, Inc. v. Sta. Rosa Mining Co., Inc." before Regional Trial Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte. Hence, it should have secured whatever relief before the RTC of
Daet. Also, according to petitioners, Sta. Rosa had no cause of action because as
judgment debtor in Civil Case No. 6014, Sta. Rosa has lost all rights over the funds
deposited under Savings Account No. 0453-52672-1 since the same had already
been garnished by RTC, in favor of the judgment creditor. Petitioners claim res
judicata since the issue of entitlement over the deposit account was finally laid to
rest by virtue of petitioner bank’s satisfaction of the judgment rendered by the
Daet court
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Sta. Rosa denies the allegation of forum
according to Sta. Rosa, petitioners were not direct parties in the Civil Case No.
6014, neither was Sa Amin a party in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073. Also, Civil Case
No. 6014, a case for collection of money, is based on a cause of action separate and
distinct from Civil Case No. Q-95-25073, which involves an action for damages. Sta.
Rosa, insists that petitioners failed to establish the existence of res judicata.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Sta. Rosa is guilty of forum shopping in filing Civil Case No. Q-
95-25073;
2. Whether or not Civil Case No. Q-95-25073 should be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action; and
3. Whether or not Civil Case No. Q-95-25073 should be dismissed on the ground
of res judicata.
RULING:
(1) NO. A party is guilty of forum shopping when he repetitively avails of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some
other court.15 For a charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist
between an action pending in one court and another action before
another court: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent
the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
 rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
In the cited cases, we find there is no identity of parties because the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6014, Sa Amin, is not a party in Civil Case No. Q-95-
25073, although both Sta. Rosa and petitioners are impleaded as parties in
different capacities. In Civil Case No. 6014 petitioner PCIB (now Equitable-
PCIB) is an intervenor, while Sta. Rosa is the defendant. On the other hand,
in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073, Sta. Rosa is the plaintiff while petitioners are
the defendants. Apparently, the parties represented different interests in
these cases.
Neither is there identity of rights asserted or relief sought. In Civil Case
No. 6014, Sta. Rosa is defending its right as a debtor in a collection case where
petitioners are the intervenors, while in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073, Sta. Rosa
is asserting its right as a depositor to file a damage suit against the defendant,
now petitioner bank. Indeed, the two proceedings are far from identical so
that a judgment in Civil Case No. 6014 will not amount to res judicata in Civil
Case No. Q-95-25073, a matter we shall discuss later in detail.
(2) When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action,
a ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the
complaint.17 The rule is that only the allegations in the complaint may
properly be considered in ascertaining the existence of a cause of action.
Lack of cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint, and its
existence may be determined only by the allegations of the complaint.
Consideration of other facts is out of the question, and any attempt to prove
extraneous circumstances is not allowed. Hence, the test of sufficiency of the
facts found in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer in the complaint.
In this case, for the purpose of resolving the second issue only, if the
following factual allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted, Sta. Rosa
might be entitled to relief, to wit: (1) On October 21, 1993, Sta. Rosa opened
a savings account with petitioner PCIB Cubao branch; (2) On October 22,
1993, it conveyed its interest to convert its savings account into
savings/current/time deposit accounts; (3) Sta. Rosa sought to obtain from
petitioner PCIB checkbooks but was refused allegedly due to a restraining
order from SEC; (4) A verification with the SEC shows that a copy of the
restraining order was received by PCIB only on October 27, 1993, 1:45 p.m.;
and (5) The refusal of petitioners to issue checkbooks and to allow release of
the funds prejudiced Sta. Rosa’s stockholders and the livelihood and social
development projects of their joint venture partner.
These allegations would suffice to constitute a cause of action against
petitioners. That petitioners have a valid defense is another matter. At any
rate, matters such as the propriety of refusal to release the funds by
petitioners and the actual date of receipt of the restraining order, among
others, are matters for trial. They require evidentiary proof and support that
can be better threshed out not upon a motion to dismiss but in a full blown
trial on the merits. These matters, indeed, would not yet go into the question
of the absence of a cause of action as a ground to dismiss.
(3) Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a
matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction
must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises
in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same
cause. For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court
rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there
must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and
causes of action.
In the present case, while the first three requisites may be present, the fourth
requisite is absent. As stated earlier, there is no identity of parties, subject matter
and causes of action between Civil Case No. 6014 and Civil Case No. Q-95-25073.
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the issue of damages in Civil Case No. Q-95-
25073 could not and should not have been passed upon by the Daet court as it was
not the subject matter in Civil Case No. 6014. While the deposit in Savings Account
No. 0453-52672-1 was involved in both cases, causes of actions and reliefs prayed
for are entirely different. Petitioners were forced to intervene in Civil Case No.
6014 because of their refusal to comply with the garnishment order on said funds
in a collection case by Sa Amin against Sta. Rosa. But the petitioners became the
main defendant in a damage suit filed by Sta. Rosa in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073
for the bank’s alleged bad faith when it refused to issue checkbooks to the
prejudice of Sta. Rosa. Indeed, the issue of damages was not involved in Civil Case
No. 6014, hence, the judgment in said case by the Daet court is not conclusive and
binding in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073 before the Quezon City court
Goodyear v. Sy (2005)
G.R. No. 154554
9 November 2005
Petitioner: Goodyear Philippines, Inc.
Respondents: Anthony Sy and Jose L. Lee
Doctrine:
A cause of action is an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.
Its elements are:
(4) Legal right of the plaintiff;
(5) The correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal right; and
(6) An act or omission of the defendant that violates such right
Absence of one of the abovementioned elements means the absence of a cause of
action.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts:
The case involves a 1984 Isuzu JC 6-Wheeler, which was originally owned by
Goodyear Philippines, Inc. (Goodyear), purchased from Industrial and Transport
Equipment, Inc. it had been in the service of Goodyear when it was hijacked in
1986. The hijacking was reported to the Philippine National Police (PNP) which
issued an alert that the vehicle was stolen. The vehicle was eventually recovered
also in 1986.
The vehicle was used by Goodyear until 1996 when it was sold to Anthony Sy (Sy).
Sy sold said vehicle to Jose L. Lee (Lee) in 1997, but Lee filed an action for
rescission of contract with damages against Sy due to the certification from PNP
Regional Traffic Management Office in Legazpi City that it was a stolen vehicle.
Hence, the vehicle was impounded and Lee was charged criminally.
Goodyear requested PNP to lift the stolen vehicle alarm status and Goodyear was
impleaded as third-party defendant in the third-party complaint filed by Sy.
Goodyear filed a motion to dismiss in 1998 on the grounds that the third-party
complaint failed to state a cause of action, and even if it did, the cause of action
was already extinguished. An opposition was interposed by Sy.
The RTC dismissed the third-party complaint for not expressly showing any act or
omission committed by the third party complainant. The case was brought to the
CA for appeal. The CA reversed the RTC decision, for the third-party Complaint
had stated a cause of action.
Issue:
Whether or not the third-party Complaint stated a cause of action?
Ruling:
No Cause of Action.
A cause of action is an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.
Its elements are:
 Legal right of the plaintiff;
 The correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal right; and
 An act or omission of the defendant that violates such right
The test in determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action is:
admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer?
In the present case, the third element is missing, because it did not allege any act
or omission that petitioner had committed in violation of his right to the subject
vehicle. The Complaint merely stated that the vehicle was stolen.
There was also no connection laid out between the owner’s sale of the vehicle and
its impounding by the PNP. The Deed of Sale further serves as an evidence of
Goodyear’s sale of the vehicle to Sy. The Deed stated that Goodyear was the
absolute owner of the subject vehicle. Hence, the RTC correctly observed that the
Complaint failed to show that at the time of its sale to Sy, the vehicle belonged to
a person other than Goodyear.
BENZON O. ALDEMITA,
versus
HEIRS OF MELQUIADES SILVA
Doctrine:
A cause of action, which is an act or omission by which a party violates
the right of another, has these elements:
1) the legal right of the plaintiff;
2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal
right; and
3) an act or omission of the defendant that violates such right.
Facts:
A verified complaint dated November 18, 1998 for Quieting of
Title was filed by the respondents (Heirs of Melquiades Silva) through
counsel with the RTC of Cebu.
On January 14, 1999, a verified Answer With Special And
Affirmative Defenses, Counter-claim and Cross-claim dated January 13,
1999 was filed by petitioner Heirs of Dionisia Vda. De Zabate (Heirs of
Vda. De Zabate), represented by Emelia Deiparine and Benzon O.
Aldemita
On April 22, 1999, the respondents filed an Urgent Motion To Declare
Defendants Roger Deiparine and Josephine Deiparine as a substitute for
Emilia Deiparine who died while the case is on going.
On August 12, 1999, a Pre-trial was conducted by the trial court
wherein:
-Aldemita admitted that the subject property in Cebu has been
registered in the name of Melquiades
-That the respondents have been the ones in actual physical possession
of the subject lot except a portion thereof which the petitioner is claiming
-That a document Kalig-onan sa Palit was executed by Melquiades Silva
in favor of Dionisia Vda. De Zabate involving the land in question is
actually a forged document. However, [petitioner] contended that
another document denominated as Kalig-onan sa Panagpalit nga Dayon
was executed by Melquiades Silva in favor of Dionisia Vda. De Zabate and
that thereafter this was confirmed by Proferia Silva and Emeliana Zabate
Paran in a Deed of Confirmation of Previous Deed of Sale ex.
The Trial Court issued an order appointing the PNP Regional
Crime Laboratory Office VII as commissioner of the court for the
determination of the genuiness of the signature.
On April 6, 2001, petitioner Aldemita, through his newly
retained counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action. The
Motion averred in main that the respondents should first be declared as
heirs of Melquiades Silva in a special proceeding before they can be
considered as real parties-in-interest to institute the action in this case.
RTC denied the Motion. The petitioners said motion was not
filed within the proper time, i.e., within the time for filing the answer to
the complaint as provided Section 1 of Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure
CA affirmed RTC’s decision. CA held that the question of whether
the respondents are real parties-in-interest was raised for the first time
on appeal considering that this issue was never raised in the RTC before
the case was submitted for decision and, hence, it cannot be resolved
without offending basic rules of fair play, justice and due process;
Issue: WON the respondents have a cause of action
Held: Yes.
In accordance with Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
the petitioners Motion to Dismiss should have been filed within the time
for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim. As it appears, the motion was filed in the RTC after the case has
been submitted for decision.
Petitioner must have relied on the former Section 2, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court where failure to state a cause of action was not
deemed waived even if raised after the answer has been filed. However,
the Complaint against petitioner was filed on November 25, 1998, after
the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amending the Rules
of Court. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded- Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by
statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

As it now stands, only the following defenses are not waived

even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata;
and (d) prescription on the action Failure to state a cause of action is not
an exception in said Rule. Thus, under Section 1, Rule 16, petitioner is
deemed to have waived this ground and cannot now raise it after the case
in the RTC had been submitted for decision or on appeal to the CA.

Further, a reading of the Petition for Quieting of Title readily

shows that such pleading states a cause of action.

A cause of action, which is an act or omission by which a party

violates the right of another, has these elements:
1) the legal right of the plaintiff;
2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal
right; and
3) an act or omission of the defendant that violates such right.

As the Court has ruled, the Petition for Quieting of Title

sufficiently states a cause of action. Respondents alleged that they are
the heirs of the late Melquiades Silva who died on July 3, 1961 and are
thus the true owners of a parcel of land registered in the name of the
latter (first and second elements); that the private documents allegedly
executed by the late Melquiades Silva in favor of the predecessors-in-
interest of the petitioner are forged documents (third element); and that
the existence of these documents casts a cloud over the title of the
respondents as owners of the property (fourth element).