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(Cutler)
Laboratoryof ExperimentalPsychology
Universityof Sussex
Brighton, BNI 9QG, U.K.
(Fay)
Bell Laboratories
Naperville, Illinois 60566
On the DifferencebetweenEatingandEatingSomething:ActivitiesversusAccomplishments
Anita Mittwoch
1. Classical TG derived (1) from (2) by a deletion transformation(Katz and Postal (1964,
81ff.)).
(1) John ate.
(2) John ate something.
Bresnan (1978) treats (1) as syntactically intransitive but functionally transitive and
captures the semantic relationshipbetween (1) and (2) by a lexical mappingrule:
(3) eat: V, [ NP], NP1 EAT NP2
[ ],3y,NP1EATy
Fodor and Fodor (1980) point out that eat and eat something are not equivalent in
combination with other quantifiersor in opaque contexts (the same is true for other
verbs that behave like eat):
(4) a. Everybody ate something.
b. Everybody ate.
(5) a. Bill believes that John ate something.
b. Bill believes that John ate.
In (4a) and (5a) something can have narrowor wide scope but in (4b) and (5b) the implicit
pronouncan have only the narrowscope reading.Fodor and Fodor accordinglypropose
that the inference from (1) to (2) should be capturedneither on the syntactic nor on the
functional level, on both of which eat without an object would be intransitive,and that
typical contexts. There are special contexts in which it does not hold; some of these
will be mentionedbelow.) Since something is usually considered to be a quantifiedNP,
the "accomplishment"natureof eat somethingis hardlysurprising.3However, the exact
status of this NP is puzzling and has not, to my knowledge, been discussed in the
literature.I shall take it up in an appendixto this remark.
2. I shall now present six differencesbetween the two kinds of predicate.The first three
involve cooccurrence restrictions;the last three are purely semantic.
2.1. Atelic durationalphrases likefor 10 minutesoccur with activities but not (normally)
with accomplishments(cf. Mittwoch (1971; 1980)):
(10) John ate (peanuts/porridge)for 10 minutes.
(11) a. *John ate half a pound of peanuts/fourhelpings of porridgefor 10 minutes.
b. *John ate some peanuts/porridgefor 10 minutes.
(12) *John ate somethingfor 10 minutes.
In contrast to (10), which is well-formed, (12) is normally deviant. (12) may become
acceptable to some speakers under the pressure of special contexts. Consider the fol-
lowing conversation:
(13) A. John ate porridgefor 10 minutes.
B. I don't think it was porridgebut he certainlyate somethingfor 10 minutes.
Here, for want of a pronounthat is [ - delimitedquantity](a point to which I shall return
below), the speaker treats something as though it were such a pronoun, or else gives
it a partitive reading.
There are other contexts in which atelic durationals can occur with predicates
consisting of process verbs and quantifiedobject NPs:
(14) John ate a piece of cheese/something savory after dinnerfor years.
3The fact that something is quantifiedemerges most clearly from the followingexamples:
(i) John wrote poetry and Bill translatedit.
(ii) John wrote a poem and Bill translatedit.
(iii) John wrote somethingand Bill translatedit.
In (iii) as in (ii), but not in (i), Bill must have translatedJohn's productions.
Somethingmay occur in certainenvironmentsthat are characteristicof bare pluralsand mass nouns, for
example as subject of be rare, be found in (cf. Carlson(1977)):
(iv) Gold is rare.
(v) *Several pieces of gold are rare.
(vi) Somethingas rare as gold is highly prized.
QuantifiedNPs can however occur in such environmentsif they can be interpretedas denotingtypes rather
than tokens or if their head nouns themselves denote somethinglike "kind":
(vii) Three swallows are found in Israel.
(viii) A substance as rare as this is highly prized.
Hence, somethingcan have a type interpretationin this context. I mentionthis fact because, as we shall see,
on the type interpretationof something, eat somethingbehaves like an activity predicate.
(15) John and Bill had a bet about which of them could keep up boozing longer.
John dranka 1968Beaujolaislsomethingveryheadyfor 10minutes,afterwhich
he was sick; Bill managedto drinka much lighter wine for 12 minutes. So Bill
won.
The sentences in (14) have an iterative reading, so that the object NPs are understood
to refer to a series of entities. In (15) the italicized NPs have the type interpretation(cf.
note 2). In both cases the predicates are used to denote activities rather than accom-
plishments.
The cooccurrence restrictions of telic durationalssuch as in 10 minutes will be
discussed in the appendix.
2.2. There is a curious cooccurrence restriction on certain unspecified quantity pro-
nominals such as a lot, too much, more than. When these follow intransitivestate or
process verbs, their meaning is indeterminate(or ambiguous)between durationor fre-
quency (or a combinationof both):
(16) John slept/fasted/prayed/swama lot.
With eat, read, etc., the meaningvacillates between duration/frequencyand the amount
of the understood object:
(17) John ate/read/knitteda lot.
Moreover, the verbs in (16) and (17) can be coordinatedbefore these pronominals:
(18) During the week-end he ate and slept a lot.
We also find a lot after a process verb followed by an unquantifiedobject:
(19) He read poetry a lot.
However, (20) strikes me as impossible even on the frequency readingof a lot:
(20) He read something a lot.
The restrictionof this use of a lot to states and activities may be connected with the fact
that in its use as part of an NP a lot occurs with bare pluralsand mass nouns, witness
a lot of cakelcakes but *a lot of a cakelsome cakeslthreecakes.4 It has been pointed out
that there is a certain mereologicalanalogy between Vendler's time schemataand NPs,
such that states and activities correspondto unquantifiedNPs whereas accomplishments
and achievements correspond to quantifiedones. The analogy is this. If John sleeps or
eats peanuts during a certain time-span, then duringany subdivision of this time-span
he is also sleeping or eating peanuts. Similarly,for any quantityof porridgeor peanuts
we can imaginea subportionof that quantitywhich itself consists of porridgeor peanuts.
4 Note however that a lot of the cake is well-formed.Normallythe + N behaves like a quantifiedNP;
witness the ill-formednessof He ate the cakefor 10 minutes.The reasonfor this differenceis not clear to me.
(24a,b) are most naturally interpreted as referringto a single occasion because the
quantifiedobject is taken to refer to a single entity. In (24c) and even more so in (24d)
the absence of a quantifiedobject suggests a habitualreadingof the past tense.
Consider also (25a,b), with also focusing on John.
(25) a. John also sang something.
b. John also sang.
For (25a)John must have been a solo (or at least principal)performer;(25b)is compatible
with John's participatingin a choir.
2.5. The question What happened?, which picks out accomplishments and achieve-
ments, can be answered by (26) but not by (27):
(26) John typed some letters/something.
(27) John typed (letters).
(27) could at most serve as an answer to the question Whatwent on (in the kitchen last
night)?.
2.6. I conclude this section with a well-known distinctionfirst noted independentlyby
Garey (1957) and Kenny (1963). The inference in (28) is valid, whereas the inference in
(29a) is not valid if the reference of something is taken as identicalin the two sentences,
and the inference in (29b) is always invalid:
(28) John was eating D John ate.
(29) a. John was eating something D John ate something.
b. (3x (John was eating x) D (John ate x))
3. There remainsthe problemof how to account for the fact that any sentence with eat,
read, etc., implies a second argumentto the verb. An utteranceof (1) entitles us to ask:
What did he eat? But the answer to this question need not contain a quantifier.It can
take the form of (30):
(30) He ate peanuts/porridge.
Hence, the interrogativepronounwhat lacks the feature [ + delimitedquantity]inherent
in something.8 An utterance of (30) does of course entitle the questioner to persevere
with How many peanutslhow much porridge did he eat? But it is here that the tense is
crucial. (30) is in the simple past tense; the process of eating peanuts or porridge is
viewed as having come to an end. That is also why the inferencefrom (1) to (2) is valid.
If we play the question-and-answergame with (8), which representsa more typical use
of intransitiveeat than (1), we run into trouble.
8
Note that the derivationof what from wh+something (Katz and Postal (1964), Katz (1972, 205)) also
becomes untenable.
9 Cf. Allwood, Andersson, and Dahl (1977, 169). For an analysis of bare pluralsin terms of Montague
grammar,see Carlson(1977).
" I am not aware of any languagethat does, in fact, possess an unquantified
indefinitepronounor that
can makeits indefinitepronounpartitive.Thus, the Frenchpartitivepronounen is anaphoric;and the partitive
use of de, as in II mange du pain, does not occur with quelquechose. Nor do analogousconstructionsoccur
with the Russianand Finnishpronounsfor something.It wouldbe interestingto establishwhetheror not there
are languagesthat have either of these possibilities.
References
Allwood, J., L. G. Andersson, and 0. Dahl (1977) Logic in Linguistics, CambridgeUniversity
Press, Cambridge.
Bach, E. (1980) "Tenses and Aspects as Functions on Verb-Phrases,"in C. Rohrer, ed., Time,
Tense, and Quantifiers:Proceedings of the StuttgartConferenceon the Logic of Tense and
Quantification,Niemeyer, Tubingen.
Bresnan, J. (1978) "A Realistic TransformationalGrammar," in M. Halle, J. Bresnan, and
G. Miller,eds., Linguistic Theoryand Psychological Reality, MITPress,Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts.
Carlson,G. N. (1977)"A UnifiedAnalysis of the EnglishBarePlural,"Linguistics and Philosophy
1, 413-458.
Comrie, B. (1976)Aspect, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge.
Fodor, J. A. and J. D. Fodor (1980)"FunctionalStructure,Quantifiers,and MeaningPostulates,"
LinguisticInquiry 11, 759-770.
Garey, H. B. (1957) "Verbal Aspect in French," Language 33, 91-110.
Inoue, K. (1978) "How Many Senses Does the English Present Perfect Have?" in Papers from
the FourteenthRegional Meeting of the Chicago LinguisticSociety, Universityof Chicago,
Chicago, Illinois, 167-178.
Jespersen,0. (1949)A ModernEnglish Grammaron HistoricalPrinciples,Part7, Allen& Unwin,
London.
Katz, J. J. (1972) Semantic Theory, Harperand Row, New York.
Katz,J. J. andP. M. Postal(1964)An Integrated Theoryof LinguisticDescriptions, MITPress,
Cambridge,Massachusetts.
Kenny, A. (1963)Action, Emotion and Will, Routledge, London.
Leech, G. N. (1971)Meaning and the English Verb, Longman,London.
Lyons, J. (1977) Semantics, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge.
McCawley, J. D. (1971) "Tense and Time Reference in English," in C. J. Fillmore and D. T.
Langendoen, eds., Studies in Linguistic Semantics, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New
York.
Mittwoch, A. (1971) "Idioms and Unspecified NP Deletion," Linguistic Inquiry 2, 255-259.
Mittwoch, A. (1980) "The Grammarof Duration," Studies in Language 4, 201-227.
Department of English
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
Section 1 of this article points out descriptive shortcomingsof two recent accounts of
English to contraction in terms of "trace theory" (TT), Jaeggli (1980) and Chomsky
(1980b). Section 2 reviews ten distinct attempts by TT advocates to handle the data in
this domain, and shows why all, includingthe latest two, fail to yield a viable description.
Section 3 offers an informalgeneralizationindependentof TT which accounts for all the
data underlyingthe decade-long debate about to contraction. Section 4 suggests some
conclusions to be drawn from the fact that the ten mutuallycontradictoryTT accounts
all fail descriptively as well as, a fortiori, at the level of explanation,and comments on
the fact that TT enthusiasts continue to cite to contraction as an explanatory success
of TT.
1. "Case-marked" Traces and Two Further "Trace Theory" Failures
The data to be accounted for include contrasts like those between (1) and (2).
(1) a. Who do you want to kiss?
b. Who do you want to kiss you?
(2) a. Who do you wanna kiss?
b. *Who do you wanna kiss you?
The burgeoning literature on this problem is reviewed in section 2; we assume that
readers are familiar with most of it. The newest proposed solutions appear in Jaeggli
(1980)and Chomsky (1980b, 158-160). Althoughthey are very similar,we must consider
them independentproposals since neither one cites the other. Both utilize certain prin-
ciples suggested in Chomsky (1980a) for markingNPs with "Case". (The capital C is
Chomsky's; our quotation marks indicate that this use of the word "Case" does not
relate directly to the English morphological distinction on pronouns. "Case" is an
abstract feature of NPs, including "empty" NP nodes.)
The authors would like to thank G. Carden, D. Frantz, F. J. Newmeyer, W. Plath, A. Radford,R. P.
Stockwell, and an anonymousLI referee for helpfulcommentson an earlierdraft. Any remainingerrorsare
attributableto evil spirits.