Legal Medicine ARTICLE III

THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS; REGISTRATION OF

1. Law and Medicine
Medical jurisprudence
That science which applies the principles and practice of the different
branches of medicine to the elucidation of doubtful questions in courts of
justice. By some authors, it is used in a more extensive sense and also
comprehends Medical Police, or those medical precepts which may prove
useful to the legislature or the magistracy. Some authors, instead of using
the phrase medical jurisprudence, employ, to convey the same idea, those of
legal medicine, forensic medicine, or, as the Germans have it, state medicine.
Legal Medicine
- Is that branch of medicine that applies, medical and
surgical concepts, scientific knowledge and skills to medico legal
PHYSICIANS
Section 8. Prerequisite to the practice of medicine. No person shall engage
in the practice of medicine in the Philippines unless he is at least twenty-one
years of age, has satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination,
and is a holder of a valid Certificate of Registration duly issued to him by the
Board of Medical Examiners.
Section 9. Candidates for board examination. Candidates for Board
examinations shall have the following qualifications:
(1) He shall be a citizen of the Philippines or a citizen of any foreign
country who has submitted competent and conclusive documentary
evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing
that his country's existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to
practice medicine under the same rules and regulations governing
citizens thereof;

issues, in order to assist the trier of facts in the proper dispensation (2) He shall be of good moral character, showing for this purpose
certificate of civil status;
of justice.
(3) He shall be of sound mind;

Medical Jurisprudence (4) He shall not have been convicted by a court of competent
jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude; and
- is the study of the Medical Law and its applicable
(5) He shall be a holder of the degree of Doctor of Medicine or its
Jurisprudence that governs, regulates and defines the practice of equivalent, conferred by a college of medicine duly recognized by the
medicine. Department of Education.

Functions of the Board of Medical Examiners (Board of

Medicine)
 The Board of Medical Examiners, with the approval of the
Professional Service Commission, shall promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the proper conduct of the
examinations, correction of examination papers, and registration of
physicians.
The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) was first created as a
national government agency by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 223 dated
June 22, 1973, signed by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, mandated to
enforce the laws regulating the various professions. It was previously called
the Office of the Board of Examiners, which was created by Republic Act No.
546 on June 17, 1950, under the aegis of the Civil Service Commission.
The PRC became operational on January 4, 1974 and was attached to the
Office of the President for general direction and coordination. On December
9, 1974, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 223 were
promulgated, paving the way for standardization of rules and procedures for
the thirty-three (33) professions then under the CSC.
On December 5, 2000, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada signed
Republic Act No. 8981, otherwise known as the PRC Modernization Act of
2000, with its Implementing Rules and Regulations adopted by PRC on
February 15, 2001 through PRC Resolution No. 1 series of 2001. With the
passing of RA 8981, the Commission exercises three functions: 1) executive
functions; 2) quasi-legislative functions; and 3) quasi-judicial functions. It
had also set its new thrusts and priorities such as customer-focused service,
modernization through full computerization and re-structuring, integrity of
licensure examinations, good governance, protection and promotion of
Filipino professionals, and support to national development priorities.
In fulfillment of its legal mandate, the PRC performs two important
functions: 1) to conduct and administer licensure examinations to
aspiring professionals, and 2) to regulate and supervise the practice
of the professions in partnership with the forty-three (43)
Professional Regulatory Boards (PRBs) in the fields of health,
business, education, social sciences, engineering, and technology.
The PRBs govern their respective professions’ practice and ethical standards
and accredit the professional organization representing the professionals.
On September 11, 2006, as supplemented by Executive Order No. 565-A,
PRC was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for
administrative supervision and control. Being an attached agency of the
DOLE, the PRC works closely to the mandate of its mother agency.
The PRC serves more than 4.3 million professionals from 43 various
regulated professions and the hundreds of thousands of aspiring
professionals who take the licensure examinations every year. Thus, PRC
stakeholders include the professionals, would-be professionals, accredited
professional organizations, foreign professionals seeking temporary permit to
practice their professions in the country, schools and academe, and other
government agencies.
To better carry out its mandate and in order to implement the PRC
Modernization Act, the PRC was given approval by the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) on April 20, 2013 to implement a reorganization of
its organizational structure.
On June 8, 2016, the new Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern
(OSSP) pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 8981 was approved by DBM. The
Notice of Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action (NOSCA)
formalizing the approved OSSP of PRC Central Office, effective not earlier
than June 8, 2016, has been transmitted by DBM on October 10, 2016.
Further, the Office of the President, through the Executive Secretary, issued
a Memorandum on May 16, 2017 on the approval of the creation of PRC new
offices/services: Regional Offices in NCR & Regions I, III, IV-B, XII and XIII,
Legal Service, International Affairs Office, Information and Communications
Technology Service, and Planning, Management and Financial Service. The
NOSCA formalizing the approved OSSP of the approved new offices and
positions and the reclassification of key positions was issued by DBM on
August 2, 2017.
2. LAWS REGULATING THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE IN
THE PHILIPPINES
General practice of Medicine (Art 3 Section 8)
No person shall engage in the practice of medicine in the Philippines
unless:
(1) he is at least twenty-one years of age,
(2) has satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board of Examination and
(3) is a holder of a valid Certificate of Registration duly issued to him by the
Board of Medical Examiners.
Rule on Reciprocity
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 223 [30] also provides in Section (j)
thereof that:
j) The [Professional Regulation] Commission may,
upon the recommendation of the Board concerned, approve
the registration of and authorize the issuance of a certificate
of registration with or without examination to a foreigner who
is registered under the laws of his country: Provided, That
the requirement for the registration or licensing in said
foreign state or country are substantially the same as
those required and contemplated by the laws of the
Philippines and that the laws of such foreign state or
country allow the citizens of the Philippines to practice
the profession on the same basis and grant the same
privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign
state or country: Provided, finally, That the applicant shall
submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence,
confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that
his country's existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to
practice the profession under the rules and regulations
governing citizens thereof. The Commission is also hereby
authorized to prescribe additional requirements or grant
certain privileges to foreigners seeking registration in
the Philippines if the same privileges are granted to or some
additional requirements are required of citizens of
the Philippines in acquiring the same certificates in his
country; (Case: BOARD OF MEDICINE vs. YASUYUKI
OTA, 2008)
3. Acts Constituting Practice of Medicine (Section 10)
A person shall be considered as engaged in the practice of medicine
(1) who shall, for compensation, fee, salary or reward in any form,
paid to him directly or through another, or even without the same,
physical examine any person, and diagnose, treat, operate or
prescribe any remedy for any human disease, injury, deformity,
physical, mental or physical condition or any ailment, real or
imaginary, regardless of the nature of the remedy or treatment
administered, prescribed or recommended; or
 Unethical Conduct of Physicians:
(2) who shall, by means of signs, cards, advertisements, written or
printed matter, or through the radio, television or any other means
of communication, either offer or undertake by any means or
method to diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe any remedy for any Section 24. Grounds for reprimand, suspension or revocation of
human disease, injury, deformity, physical, mental or physical registration certificate. Any of the following shall be sufficient
condition; or
(3) who shall use the title M.D. after his name. ground for reprimanding a physician, or for suspending or revoking
a certificate of registration as physician:
Exemptions (Section 11):
(1) Conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction of any criminal
The preceding section shall not be construed to affect offense involving moral turpitude;
1. any medical student duly enrolled in an approved medical
college or school under training, serving without any (2) Immoral or dishonorable conduct;
professional fee in any government or private hospital,
provided that he renders such service under the direct (3) Insanity;
supervision and control of a registered physician;
2. any legally registered dentist engaged exclusively in the
practice of dentistry; (4) Fraud in the acquisition of the certificate of registration;
3. any duly registered masseur or physiotherapist, provided
that he applies massage or other physical means upon
written order or prescription of a duly registered (5) Gross negligence, ignorance or incompetence in the practice of his
physician, or provided that such application of massage or or her profession resulting in an injury to or death of the patient;
physical means shall be limited to physical or muscular
development; (6) Addiction to alcoholic beverages or to any habit forming drug
4. any duly registered optometrist who mechanically fits or
sells lenses, artificial eyes, limbs or other similar rendering him or her incompetent to practice his or her profession, or
appliances or who is engaged in the mechanical to any form of gambling;
examination of eyes for the purpose of constructing or
adjusting eye glasses, spectacles and lenses; (7) False or extravagant or unethical advertisements wherein other
5. any person who renders any service gratuitously in cases
of emergency, or in places where the services of a duly things than his name, profession, limitation of practice, clinic hours,
registered physician, nurse or midwife are not available; office and home address, are mentioned.
6. any person who administers or recommends any
household remedy as per classification of existing (8) Performance of or aiding in any criminal abortion;
Pharmacy Laws; and
7. any psychologist or mental hygienist in the performance of
his duties, provided such performance is done in (9) Knowingly issuing any false medical certificate;
conjunction with a duly registered physician.
 (10) Issuing any statement or spreading any news or rumor which is
derogatory to the character and reputation of another physician
without justifiable motive;
(11) Aiding or acting as a dummy of an unqualified or unregistered
person to practice medicine;
(12) Violation of any provision of the Code of Ethics as approved by
the Philippine Medical Association.
ILLEGAL PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
Section 28. Penalties. Any person found guilty of "illegal practice of
medicine" shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand pesos
nor more than ten thousand pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, or by imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five
years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Section 29. Injunctions. The Board of Medical Examiners may file an action
to enjoin any person illegally practicing medicine from the performance of
any act constituting practice of medicine if the case so warrants until the
necessary certificate therefore is secured. Any such person who, after having
been so enjoined, continues in the illegal practice of medicine shall be
punished for contempt of court. The said injunction shall not relieve the
person practicing medicine without certificate of registration from criminal
prosecution and punishment as provided in the preceding section.
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144681. June 21, 2004]
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC) VS. DE GUZMAN
(PRC REFUSES TO ISSUE CERT OF REGISTRATION)
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure seeks to nullify the Decision,[1] dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283. The appellate court affirmed the
judgment[2] dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530. The trial court allowed the
respondents to take their physicians oath and to register as duly licensed
physicians. Equally challenged is the Resolution[3] promulgated on August 25,
2000 of the Court of Appeals, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of this case are as follows:
The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of
Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure
Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board).
Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their
names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-
nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult
subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and
Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally
high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100%
in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored
99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed
from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a
mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates
from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the
unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a
record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure
Examination.
On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the
registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of
Medicine.[4] The PRC asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993
Physician Licensure Examination.
Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F.
Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and authority in statistics, and later
president of the Ateneo de Manila University, to conduct a statistical analysis
of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the said examination.
On June 10, 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a
comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of
the Fatima College examinees with those of examinees from De La Salle
University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that the scores
of Fatima College examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually
clustered close to each other. He concluded that there must be some unusual
reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a
cause strong enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should
expect from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort,
energy, etc.[5]
For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate
of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the
conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test
questions.[6]
On July 5, 1993, respondents Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses,
Celerina S. Navarro, Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera, and
Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan (Arlene V. De Guzman et al., for brevity)
filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66530 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition was adopted by the
other respondents as intervenors.
Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993,
charging respondents with immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit
in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It
recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. The
case was docketed as Adm. Case No. 1687 by the PRC.
On July 28, 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 93-66530
granting the preliminary mandatory injunction sought by the respondents. It
ordered the petitioners to administer the physicians oath to Arlene V. De
Guzman et al., and enter their names in the rolls of the PRC.
The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 31701.
On October 21, 1993, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 31701,
with the dispositive portion of the Decision ordaining as follows:
WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by the lower court against petitioners is hereby
nullified and set aside.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Arlene V. de Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing Decision to this
Court in G.R. No. 112315. In our Resolution dated May 23, 1994, we denied
the petition for failure to show reversible error on the part of the appellate
court.
Meanwhile, on November 22, 1993, during the pendency of the instant
petition, the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 93-66530 was held. Then,
the parties, agreed to reduce the testimonies of their respective witnesses to
sworn questions-and-answers. This was without prejudice to cross-
examination by the opposing counsel.
On December 13, 1993, petitioners counsel failed to appear at the trial in
the mistaken belief that the trial was set for December 15. The trial court
then ruled that petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the witnesses.
On January 27, 1994, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation and
Motion stating the reasons for her non-appearance and praying that the
cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing parties be reset. The
trial court denied the motion for lack of notice to adverse counsel. It also
denied the Motion for Reconsideration that followed on the ground that
adverse counsel was notified less than three (3) days prior to the hearing.
Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from proceeding with
Adm. Case No. 1687, the respondents herein moved for the issuance of a
restraining order, which the lower court granted in its Order dated April 4,
1994.
The petitioners then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari docketed
as G.R. No. 115704, to annul the Orders of the trial court dated November
13, 1993, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994. We referred the petition to
the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506.
On August 31, 1994, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 34506
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary
restraining order/preliminary injunction is GRANTED and the Orders of
December 13, 1993, February 7, 1994, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994
of the RTC-Manila, Branch 52, and all further proceedings taken by it in
Special Civil Action No. 93-66530 are hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID. The
said RTC-Manila is ordered to allow petitioners counsel to cross-examine the
respondents witnesses, to allow petitioners to present their evidence in due
course of trial, and thereafter to decide the case on the merits on the basis
of the evidence of the parties. Costs against respondents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[8]
The trial was then set and notices were sent to the parties.
A day before the first hearing, on September 22, 1994, the petitioners
filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion praying for the partial
reconsideration of the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, and
for the outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. The petitioners asked
for the suspension of the proceedings.
In its Order dated September 23, 1994, the trial court granted the
aforesaid motion, cancelled the scheduled hearing dates, and reset the
proceedings to October 21 and 28, 1994.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the partial
motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. Thus, petitioners filed
with the Supreme Court a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 117817,
entitled Professional Regulation Commission, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al .
On November 11, 1994, counsel for the petitioners failed to appear at
the trial of Civil Case No. 93-66530. Upon motion of the respondents herein,
the trial court ruled that herein petitioners waived their right to cross-
examine the herein respondents. Trial was reset to November 28, 1994.
On November 25, 1994, petitioners counsel moved for the inhibition of
the trial court judge for alleged partiality. On November 28, 1994, the day
the Motion to Inhibit was to be heard, petitioners failed to appear. Thus, the
trial court denied the Motion to Inhibit and declared Civil Case No. 93-66530
deemed submitted for decision.
On December 19, 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment in Civil
Case No. 93-66530, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to allow the
petitioners and intervenors (except those with asterisks and footnotes in
pages 1 & 2 of this decision) [sic],[9] to take the physicians oath and to
register them as physicians.
It should be made clear that this decision is without prejudice to any
administrative disciplinary action which may be taken against any of the
petitioners for such causes and in the manner provided by law and consistent
with the requirements of the Constitution as any other professionals.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
As a result of these developments, petitioners filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 118437,
entitled Professional Regulation Commission v. Hon. David G. Nitafan ,
praying inter alia, that (1) G.R. No. 118437 be consolidated with G.R. No.
117817; (2) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 be nullified for its failure to decree the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 93-66530, and in the alternative, to set aside the decision of
the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, order the trial court judge to inhibit
himself, and Civil Case No. 93-66530 be re-raffled to another branch.
On December 26, 1994, the petitioners herein filed their Notice of
Appeal[11] in Civil Case No. 93-66530, thereby elevating the case to the Court
of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37283.
In our Resolution of June 7, 1995, G.R. No. 118437 was consolidated
with G.R. No. 117817.
On July 9, 1998, we disposed of G.R. Nos. 117817 and 118437 in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 117817 is DISMISSED for being moot.
The petition in G.R. No. 118437 is likewise DISMISSED on the ground that
there is a pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. Assistant Solicitor
General Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang is advised to be more circumspect in her
dealings with the courts as a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with accordingly.
SO ORDERED.[12]
While CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 was awaiting disposition by the appellate
court, Arnel V. Herrera, one of the original petitioners in Civil Case No. 93-
66530, joined by twenty-seven intervenors, to wit: Fernando F. Mandapat,
Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T.
Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero,
Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M.
Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo,
Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D.
Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario L. Leonor-Lacandula,
Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-
Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-
Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, manifested that they were no
longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal. A
similar manifestation and motion was later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I.
Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador,
Belinda C. Rabara, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B.
Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan,
Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J.
Caedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo
A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. The Court of
Appeals ruled that its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 would not apply to
them.
On May 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. SP No. 37283,
with the following fallo, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, We
hereby AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the instant appeal.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
 In sustaining the trial courts decision, the appellate court ratiocinated
that the respondents complied with all the statutory requirements for
admission into the licensure examination for physicians in February 1993.
They all passed the said examination. Having fulfilled the requirements of
Republic Act No. 2382,[14] they should be allowed to take their oaths as
physicians and be registered in the rolls of the PRC.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment in CA-G.R. SP No.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAVE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
MANDAMUS AGAINST PETITIONERS IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESOLUTION OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO. 112315 AFFIRMING THE COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DECLARING THAT IF EVER THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS
TO THE MORAL FITNESS OF EXAMINEES, THE ISSUANCE OF LICENSE TO
PRACTICE MEDICINE IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED TO THE
SUCCESSFUL EXAMINEES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS COULD PROCEED
DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1687, WHICH WAS
PRECISELY LODGED TO DETERMINE THE MORAL FITNESS OF
RESPONDENTS TO BECOME DOCTORS.[15]
To our mind, the only issue is: Did the Court of Appeals commit a
reversible error of law in sustaining the judgment of the trial court that
respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus?
The petitioners submit that a writ of mandamus will not lie in this case.
They point out that for a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have
a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and it is
the duty of the respondent to perform the act required. Thus, mandamus
may be availed of only when the duty sought to be performed is a ministerial
and not a discretionary one. The petitioners argue that the appellate courts
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 upholding the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 93-66530 overlooked its own pronouncement in CA-G.R. SP
No. 31701. The Court of Appeals held in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701 that the
issuance of a license to engage in the practice of medicine becomes
discretionary on the PRC if there exists some doubt that the successful
examinee has not fully met the requirements of the law. The petitioners
stress that this Courts Resolution dated May 24, 1994 in G.R. No. 112315
held that there was no showing that the Court of Appeals had committed any
31701. The petitioners point out that our Resolution in G.R. No. 112315 has
long become final and executory.
Respondents counter that having passed the 1993 licensure
examinations for physicians, the petitioners have the obligation to administer
to them the oath as physicians and to issue their certificates of registration
as physicians pursuant to Section 20 [16] of Rep. Act No. 2382. The Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, found that respondents complied with all
the requirements of Rep. Act No. 2382. Furthermore, respondents were
admitted by the Medical Board to the licensure examinations and had passed
the same. Hence, pursuant to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, the
petitioners had the obligation to administer their oaths as physicians and
register them.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction,
in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court,
tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from
the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from
operation of law.[17] Section 3 of Rule 65[18] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure outlines two situations when a writ of mandamus may issue, when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station; or (2) excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which the other is entitled.
We shall discuss the issues successively.
 1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of Medicine To Issue
Certificates of Registration as Physicians under Rep. Act No. 2382.
For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the officer,
board, or official concerned, has a clear legal duty, not involving discretion.
[19]
Moreover, there must be statutory authority for the performance of the
act,[20] and the performance of the duty has been refused. [21] Thus, it must be
pertinently asked now: Did petitioners have the duty to administer the
Hippocratic Oath and register respondents as physicians under the Medical
Act of 1959?
As found by the Court of Appeals, on which we agree on the basis of the
records:
It bears emphasizing herein that petitioner-appellees and intervenor-
appellees have fully complied with all the statutory requirements for
admission into the licensure examinations for physicians conducted and
administered by the respondent-appellants on February 12, 14, 20 and 21,
1993. Stress, too, must be made of the fact that all of them successfully
passed the same examinations. [22]
The crucial query now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding
that petitioners should allow the respondents to take their oaths as
physicians and register them, steps which would enable respondents to
practice the medical profession[23] pursuant to Section 20 of the Medical Act
of 1959?
The appellate court relied on a single provision, Section 20 of Rep. Act
No. 2382, in concluding that the petitioners had the ministerial obligation to
administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as
physicians. But it is a basic rule in statutory construction that each part of a
statute should be construed in connection with every other part to produce a
harmonious whole, not confining construction to only one section. [24] The
intent or meaning of the statute should be ascertained from the statute taken
as a whole, not from an isolated part of the provision. Accordingly, Section
20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended should be read in conjunction with the
other provisions of the Act. Thus, to determine whether the petitioners had
the ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents
and register them as physicians, recourse must be had to the entirety of the
Medical Act of 1959.
A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that
the law uses the word shall with respect to the issuance of certificates of
registration. Thus, the petitioners shallsign and issue certificates of
registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements
of the Board. In statutory construction the term shall is a word of
command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies
the requirements for the grant of his physicians license, the Board is obliged
to administer to him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to
Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 22[25] of the Medical Act of 1959.
However, the surrounding circumstances in this case call for serious
inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements
by the respondents. The unusually high scores in the two most difficult
subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant of PRC on
the matter, and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the
tests. These doubts have to be appropriately resolved.
Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the
power to conduct administrative investigations and disapprove applications
for examination or registration, pursuant to the objectives of Rep. Act No.
2382 as outlined in Section 1 [26] thereof. In this case, after the investigation,
the Board filed before the PRC, Adm. Case No. 1687 against the respondents
to ascertain their moral and mental fitness to practice medicine, as required
by Section 9[27] of Rep. Act No. 2382. In its Decision dated July 1, 1997, the
Board ruled:
WHEREFORE, the BOARD hereby CANCELS the respondents[] examination
papers in the Physician Licensure Examinations given in February 1993 and
further DEBARS them from taking any licensure examination for a period of
ONE (1) YEAR from the date of the promulgation of this DECISION. They
may, if they so desire, apply for the scheduled examinations for physicians
after the lapse of the period imposed by the BOARD.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be
ascertained, according to petitioners, the Board has discretion to hold in
abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic Oath and the issuance of the
certificates to them. The writ of mandamus does not lie to compel
performance of an act which is not duly authorized.
The respondents nevertheless argue that under Section 20, the Board
shall not issue a certificate of registration only in the following instances: (1)
to any candidate who has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction
of any criminal offense involving moral turpitude; (2) or has been found
guilty of immoral or dishonorable conduct after the investigation by the
Board; or (3) has been declared to be of unsound mind. They aver that none
of these circumstances are present in their case.
Petitioners reject respondents argument. We are informed that in Board
Resolution No. 26,[29] dated July 21, 1993, the Board resolved to file charges
against the examinees from Fatima College of Medicine for immorality,
dishonesty, fraud, and deceit in the Obstetrics-Gynecology and Biochemistry
examinations. It likewise sought to cancel the examination results obtained
by the examinees from the Fatima College.
Section 8[30] of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a
person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have
satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination. Section 22, in
turn, provides that the oath may only be administered to physicians who
qualified in the examinations. The operative word here is satisfactorily,
defined as sufficient to meet a condition or obligation or capable of dispelling
doubt or ignorance.[31] Gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, the licensing
authority apparently did not find that the respondents satisfactorily passed
the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the
examination results obtained by the respondents.
2. On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As Physicians
The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one
that has been established by law. If no legal right has been violated, there
can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal
remedy for a legal right.[32] There must be a well-defined, clear and certain
legal right to the thing demanded.[33] It is long established rule that a license
to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government. [34]
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right [35] of every
citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable,
and equitable admission and academic requirements. [36] But like all rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. [37] Thus, persons
who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or
technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes
particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who
would practice medicine. In a previous case, it may be recalled, this Court
has ordered the Board of Medical Examiners to annul both its resolution and
certificate authorizing a Spanish subject, with the degree of Licentiate in
Medicine and Surgery from the University of Barcelona, Spain, to practice
medicine in the Philippines, without first passing the examination required by
the Philippine Medical Act.[38] In another case worth noting, we upheld the
power of the State to upgrade the selection of applicants into medical schools
through admission tests.[39]
It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the
exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by
the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A
political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the
authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain
conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up ones
constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. [40] Under the view
that the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or
refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike
down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or
refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or
activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of
said officials in the exercise of their power.[41]
In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for in
Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which prescribes the requirements for
admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the
board examinations, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds
for denying the issuance of a physicians license, or revoking a license that
has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the
applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with
all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing
authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than
satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is
distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied.
Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and
conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of
mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.
3. On the Ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus
Lastly, the petitioners herein contend that the Court of Appeals should
have dismissed the petition for mandamus below for being premature. They
argue that the administrative remedies had not been exhausted. The records
show that this is not the first time that petitioners have sought the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 93-66530. This issue was raised in G.R. No. 115704, which
petition we referred to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 34506. On motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506,
the appellate court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the
prayers for the nullification of the order of the trial court and the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 93-66530 were inconsistent reliefs. In G.R. No. 118437, the
petitioners sought to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 34506 insofar as it did not order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-
66530. In our consolidated decision, dated July 9, 1998, in G.R. Nos. 117817
& 118437, this Court speaking through Justice Bellosillo opined that:
Indeed, the issue as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in not ordering
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530 sought to be resolved in the instant
petition has been rendered meaningless by an event taking place prior to the
filing of this petition and denial thereof should follow as a logical
consequence.[42] There is no longer any justiciable controversy so that any
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. [43] It should be
recalled that in its decision of 19 December 1994 the trial court granted the
writ of mandamus prayed for by private respondents, which decision was
received by petitioners on 20 December 1994. Three (3) days after, or on 23
December 1994, petitioners filed the instant petition. By then, the remedy
available to them was to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
they in fact did, by filing a notice of appeal on 26 December 1994.[44]
The petitioners have shown no cogent reason for us to reverse the
aforecited ruling. Nor will their reliance upon the doctrine of the exhaustion
of administrative remedies in the instant case advance their cause any.
Section 26[45] of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the administrative
and judicial remedies that respondents herein can avail to question
Resolution No. 26 of the Board of Medicine, namely: (a) appeal the
unfavorable judgment to the PRC; (b) should the PRC ruling still be
unfavorable, to elevate the matter on appeal to the Office of the President;
and (c) should they still be unsatisfied, to ask for a review of the case or to
bring the case to court via a special civil action of certiorari. Thus, as a rule,
mandamus will not lie when administrative remedies are still available.
[46]
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply where, as in this case, a pure question of law is raised. [47] On this issue,
no reversible error may, thus, be laid at the door of the appellate court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 37283, when it refused to dismiss Civil Case No. 93-66530.
As we earlier pointed out, herein respondents Arnel V. Herrera, Fernando
F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-
Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza,
Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-
Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa,
Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N.
Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario
Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda
L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin
C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro manifested to the Court
of Appeals during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, that they were no
longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal
insofar as they were concerned. A similar manifestation and motion were
later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano,
Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabarra, Yolanda P.
Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez,
Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D.
Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Caedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L.
Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C.
Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. Following these manifestations and motions, the
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 decreed that its ruling would not
apply to them. Thus, inasmuch as the instant case is a petition for review of
the appellate courts ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, a decision which is
inapplicable to the aforementioned respondents will similarly not apply to
them.
As to Achilles J. Peralta, Evelyn O. Ramos, Sally B. Bunagan, Rogelio B.
Ancheta, Oscar H. Padua, Jr., Evelyn D. Grajo, Valentino P. Arboleda, Carlos
M. Bernardo, Jr., Mario D. Cuaresma, Violeta C. Felipe, Percival H. Pangilinan,
Corazon M. Cruz and Samuel B. Bangoy, herein decision shall not apply
pursuant to the Orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, dropping
their names from the suit.
Consequently, this Decision is binding only on the remaining
respondents, namely: Arlene V. de Guzman, Celerina S. Navarro, Rafael I.
Tolentino, Bernardita B. Sy, Gloria T. Jularbal, Hubert S. Nazareno, Nancy J.
Chavez, Ernesto L. Cue, Herminio V. Fernandez, Jr., Maria Victoria M.
Lacsamana and Merly D. Sta. Ana, as well as the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, (1) the
assailed decision dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 37283, which affirmed the judgment dated December 19, 1994, of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530,
ordering petitioners to administer the physicians oath to herein respondents
as well as the resolution dated August 25, 2000, of the appellate court,
denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; and (2) the writ of mandamus, issued in Civil Case No. 93-66530, and
affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 is NULLIFIED AND
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION VS. ALFONSO
(CLOSING SUB-STANDARD MEDICAL SCHOOL)
Petitioners, the Board of Medical Education, the government agency which
supervises and regulates the country's medical colleges, and Secretary
Lourdes R. Quisumbing of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports,
as Chairperson of the Board, pray for a writ of certiorari to nullify and set
aside the order issued by respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso, Regional Trial
Court, Antipolo, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 1385 restraining the enforcement of
petitioner Quisumbing's order of closure of the respondent Philippine Muslim-
Christian College of Medicine Foundation, Inc. (hereafter simply the
College).lâwphî1.ñèt
The, College, a private educational institution, was founded in 1981 for the
avowed purpose of producing physicians who will "emancipate Muslim
citizens from age-old attitudes on health." The, unstable peace and order
situation in Mindanao led to the establishment of the College in Antipolo,
Rizal, which granted it a temporary permit to operate in the municipality,
instead of in Zamboanga City where the school was first proposed to be
located. It has since adopted Antipolo as its permanent site and changed its
name to the Rizal College of Medicine.
In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the
Board of Medical Education (BME) authorized the Commission on Medical
Education to conduct a study of all medical schools in the Philippines. The,
report of the Commission showed that the College fell very much short of the
minimum standards set for medical schools. 1 The, team of inspectors,
composed of Doctors Florentino Herrera, Jr., Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Horacio
Estrada, Jose V. Silao, Jr. and Andres L. Reyes, recommended the closure of
the school 2 upon the following findings, to wit:
(a) the College was not fulfilling the purpose for which it had
been created because of its inappropriate location and the
absence in its curriculum of subjects relating to Muslim culture
and welfare;
(b) its lack of university affiliation hindered its students from
obtaining a "balanced humanistic and scientific" education;
(c) it did not have its philosophy base hospital for the training
of its students in the major clinical disciplines, as required by
the DECS;
(d) more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach in the
College full-time, resulting in shortened and irregular class
hours, subject overloading, and in general, poor quality
teaching.
The, school disputed these findings as biased and discriminatory. At its
request, the Board of Medical Education, in May, 1987, sent another team of
doctors 3 for a re-evaluation of the College. After inspection, the team
confirmed the previous findings and recommended the phase-out of the
school. 4
The, first two reports were verified on June 23, 1987 by a third team of
inspectors. 5 A year thereafter, the College failed another test what was in
effect the fourth evaluation of its fitness to continue as a medical school
conducted on March 4 and 5, 1988 by a team from the Board of Medical
Education determining the eligibility of medical schools for government
recognition. The, College was adjudged "inadequate" in all aspects of the
survey, to wit, college, curriculum, facilities, teaching hospital, and
studentry. 6 The, inspectors, Doctors Nilo Rosas, Macario Tan and Elena Ines
Cuyegkeng, accordingly recommended denial of government; recognition.
Accordingly, the Board of Medical Education recommended to the DECS the
closure of the College, effective the end of the school year 1988-1989. The,
College however succeeded in having the Board form yet another team to
review the previous findings. Doctors Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Alberto
Romualdez, Artemio Ordinaria Joven Cuanang and Nilo L. Rosas conducted
their inspection on June 18, 1988. Their findings: although there had been a
"major effort to improve the physical plant for classroom instructions and the
library, serious deficiencies remain(ed) in the areas of clinical facilities and
library operations;" "faculty continue(d) to be quite inadequate with no
prospects for satisfactory growth and development;" "student profile ... (was)
below par from the point of view of credentials (NMAT and transfer records)
as well as level knowledge and preparedness at various stages of medical
education," and "the most serious deficiency ... (was) the almost total lack of
serious development efforts in academic medicine — i.e., seeming lack of
philosophy of teaching, no serious effort to study curricula, almost non-
existent innovative approaches." Again, the recommendation was to close the
College with provisions for the dispersal of its students to other medical
schools. 7
In her letter of June 23, 1988, Secretary Quisumbing informed the Chairman
of the College's Board of Trustees, Mr. Victor Sumulong, of the decision of
the Board of Medical Education to close the College. Mr. Sumulong instead
proposed a gradual phase-out starting the school year 1989-1990 in order
not to dislocate the students and staff and to minimize financial loss. 8 The,
Board subsequently allowed the College to continue its operations but only
until May, 1989, after which it was to be closed, this decision being "final and
unappealable." The, College was, however, assured of assistance in the
relocation of its students and in its rehabilitation as an institution for health-
related and paramedical courses. 9
The, College appealed the decision to the Office of the President, imputing
grave abuse of discretion to the Secretary. 10 On February 16, 1989,
Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., finding "no reason to disturb" the
contested decision, affirmed it. 11
On March 2, 1989, the College went to court. It filed Civil Case No. 1385 in
the court of respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso against Secretary
Quisumbing in her capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports,
questioning the decision as illegal, oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory
and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain its implementation.
The, writ issued as prayed for by order of the respondent Judge dated May
10, 1989. 12 His Honor ruled that the inspection of June 18, 1988 was the
principal basis of the closure order, and on such basis sustained the claim of
the College that the inspection was done in an "arbitrary and haphazard
manner" by a team of inspectors who had already prejudged the school.
Judge Alfonso held that there was no evidence supporting the findings in the
report of June 18, 1988, and declared that his philosophy ocular inspection of
the College disclosed that the deficiencies mentioned in the report were non-
existent, and that on the contrary, the laboratory and library areas were "big
enough," and in the operations of the proposed base hospital were going on
smoothly at the time of the ocular inspection."
The, school thereupon promptly advertised in major newspaper dailies for
enrollees in all levels of the medical college and in its pre-board review
classes. 13
Hence the present petition, assailing the order of injunction dated May 10,
1989 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and praying for a
restraining order against its enforcement as well as for the dismissal of the
action instituted in the court a quo. The, Court on June 1, 1989 ordered the
respondent College to desist from advertising and admitting students, and
the respondent judge to refrain from enforcing his injunction order.
The, College in its Comment would justify its entitlement to the questioned
injunction on the ground that the closure order against which it was directed
was issued without factual basis and in violation of the right of the College to
due process of law, and that it violates MECS Order No. 5 (Series of 1986) to
the effect that the penalty of closure cannot be imposed earlier than three
(3) years from the last evaluation, which in this instance was made, on June
18, 1988.
Resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the determination by the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports that the College is unfit to
continue its operations is in this case clearly unavailing. There is, to begin
with, no law authorizing an appeal from decisions or orders of the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports to this Court or any other Court. It is not the
function of this Court or any other Court to review the decisions and orders
of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution
meets the norms and standards required for permission to operate and to
continue operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power or
prerogative to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is
obviously not expected that any Court would have the competence to do so.
The, only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the determination
of whether or not the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports has acted
within the scope of powers granted him by law and the Constitution. As long
as it appears that he has done so, any decision rendered by him should not
and will not be subject to review and reversal by any court.
Of course, if it should be made, to appear to the Court that those powers
were in a case exercised so whimsically, capriciously, oppressively,
despotically or arbitrarily as to call for peremptory correction — or stated
otherwise, that the Secretary had acted with grave abuse of discretion, or
had unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty, or excluded another from the use or enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled — it becomes the Court's duty to
rectify such action through the extraordinary remedies of certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus, whichever may properly apply. Yet even in these
extreme instances, where a Court finds that there has been abuse of powers
by the Secretary and consequently nullifies and/or forbids such an abuse of
power, or compliance whatever is needful to keep its exercise within bounds,
the Court, absent any compelling reason to do otherwise, should still leave to
the Secretary the ultimate determination of the issue of the satisfy action or
fulfillment by an educational institution of the standards set down for its
legitimate operation, as to which it should not ordinarily substitute its over
judgment for that of said office.
In any case, the recorded facts quite clearly fail to support the College's claim
of grave abuse of discretion containing the order of closure, and on the
contrary convincingly show the challenged decision to be correct. From 1985,
no less than five (5) surveys were conducted of respondent institution to
determine its compliance with the minimum standards established for a
medical college. The, first survey, that undertaken by the Commission on
Medical Education, disclosed such various and significant deficiencies in the
school as to constrain the inspectors to recommend its closure. Four (4)
other surveys were thereafter made by as many different committees or
teams, at the school's instance or otherwise, all of which basically confirmed
the results of that first survey. Moreover, the findings of all five (5) surveys
were affirmed by the Office of the President. Indeed, the petitioner, through
the Chairman of its Board of Trustees, to all intents and purposes accepted
the validity of the findings of those five (5) survey groups when it proposed,
in 1988, a gradual phase-out of the school starting in 1989. The, respondent
College knew that the recommendation for its closure was made, as early as
1986, that recommendation was reiterated and reaffirmed four (4) times
thereafter until it was finally approved and acted upon by the Secretary,
whose action was confirmed by the Office of the President. Said respondent
was given notice in June 1988, that in consequence of all these, the time for
its definite closure had been unalterably set at May, 1989, a notice which was
accompanied by assurances of assistance in the relocation of its students
before June, 1989 and in its rehabilitation as a school for other courses. After
having resorted to the whole range of administrative remedies available to it,
without success, it sought to obtain from the respondent Court the relief it
could not obtain from those sources, and what can only be described as a
deliberate attempt to frustrate and obstruct implementation of the decision
for its closure as of June, 1989 openly solicited, by newspaper
advertisements or otherwise, enrollment of new and old students.
Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports exercises the power to enjoin compliance with
the requirements laid down for medical schools and to mete out sanctions
where he finds that violations thereof have been committed, it was a grave
abuse of discretion for the respondent judge to issue the questioned
injunction and thereby thwart official action, in the premises correctly taken,
allowing the College to operate without the requisite government permit. A
single ocular inspection, done after the College had been pre-warned thereof,
did not, in the circumstances, warrant only the findings of more qualified
inspectors about the true state of the College, its faculty, facilities,
operations, etc. The, members of the evaluating team came from the
different sectors in the fields of education and medicine, 14 and their
judgment in this particular area is certainly better than that of the
respondent Judge whose sole and only visit to the school could hardly have
given him much more to go on than a brief look at the physical plant and
facilities and into the conduct of the classes and other school activities.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in substituting his judgment
for theirs. It is well-settled doctrine that courts of justice should not generally
interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions; that courts
have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the
administrative departments of the government; involving the exercise of
judgment and findings of facts, because by reason of their special knowledge
and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter are in a
better position to pass judgment on such matters andn their findings of facts
in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the
courts. 15 There are, to be sure, exceptions to this general rule but none of
them obtains in this case.
The, claim of denial of due process likewise holds no water, as the record
clearly shows that the College was given every opportunity to so improve
itself as to come up to requirements, but remained sadly sub-standard after
the inspections conducted by the evaluating teams. It had, in fact, admitted
its failure to have up to the desired standards when it proposed its gradual
phase-out in its letter dated June 27, 1988 to Secretary Quisumbing. It was
also precisely because of its complaints of bias and prejudice that the Board
of Medical Education dispatched new teams to survey and re-evaluate its
performance. It had even gone all the way up to the Office of the President
to seek a reversal of the order of closure. There is thus no reason for it to
complain of a lack of opportunity to be heard and to explain its side as well
as to seek reconsideration of the ruling complained of.
There is also no merit in respondent College's argument that the closure
violated NMCS ORDER No. 5, Series of 1986, because it was sought to be
effected before the lapse of the three-year period therein snowed, which in
this case is sought to be counted from June 18, 1988, or the date of the last
evaluation. The, provision referred to reads:
The following sanction shall be applied against any medical
school, for failure to comply with the specific requirements of
the essentials, viz.:
xxx
c. Withdrawal or cancellation of the school's government;
authority to operate, for failure to fully comply with the
prescribed requirements after three (3) years from the last
evaluation conducted on the school.
It must at once be obvious from a reading of the provision, paragraph c, that
the situation therein contemplated — where a school is found to have failed
to "fully comply with the prescribed requirements," i.e., has not complied
with some requirements and has failed to do so within three (3) years from
the last evaluation is quite distinct from that obtaining in the case at bar —
where respondent school was found to have deficiencies so serious as to
warrant its immediate closure. Said paragraph c should not be construed to
prohibit absolutely the withdrawal or cancellation of government; authority to
operate until after three (3) years from the last evaluation conducted on the
school; or, stated otherwise, it does not unexceptionally prescribe a three-
year waiting period before authority to operate may be withdrawn. Rather, it
should be read as giving the Secretary of Education the discretion, depending
on the seriousness of the discovered deficiencies, to afford an educational
institution which has failed to comply with some requirement or other, time
not exceeding three (3) years to correct the deficiencies before applying the
sanction of withdrawal or cancellation of the government; authority to
operate. The, circumstances in the case at bar are far from nominal and, to
repeat, are different from those obviously envisioned by the paragraph in
question. There had never been a recommendation that the College be
granted an opportunity to comply with certain requirements. From the
outset, the proposal had been that it be forthwith closed, its discovered
deficiencies as a medical college being of so serious a character as to be
irremediable. The, other four (4) surveys were conducted, not to determine if
in the course of time the petitioner school had already fully complied with all
the prescribed requisites, but rather, whether or not the original
recommendation for its closure was correct and should be sustained. And, as
already mentioned, the subsequent surveys, over a period of more than
three (3) years, served but to confirm the validity of that initial proposal for
its closure. Under these circumstances, therefore, even if it be assumed that
the provision, paragraph c, applied to petitioner school, it must be held that
there has been substantial compliance therewith.
Having thus disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case, the Court
sees no useful purpose to be served by remanding the case to the Trial Court
for further proceedings. The, only acceptable reason for such a remand
would be so that the Trial Court may determine whether or not the
petitioners' first have acted within the scope of their powers or grossly
abused them, a matter that this Court has already passed upon here. Such a
remand cannot be justified on the theory that the Trial Court will make its
philosophy independent determination of whether or not respondent medical
institution has complied with the minimum standards laid down for its
continued operation, since, as here ruled, it has not that power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and the
temporary restraining order issued by the Court is made, permanent. The,
questioned writ of preliminary injunction dated May 10, 1989 is set aside and
respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1385.
SO ORDERED.
TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ
(CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NMAT)
he petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the
school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did
not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required
by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and
administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition
with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382,
as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985
and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for
securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT
as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition
for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on
20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously
scheduled.
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this
Court to set aside the Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known
as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following
manner:
Section 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern
(a) the standardization and regulation of medical education (b) the
examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision,
control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines.
(Underscoring supplied)
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which
is composed of (a) the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly
authorized representative, as Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his
duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his
duly authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or his
duly authorized representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical
Association; (f) the Dean of the College of Medicine, University of the
Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine Medical
Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of Philippine Medical
Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education
specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into a
recognized college of medicine;
(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical
facilities of colleges of medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals,
equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances,
laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and
delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used for
didactic and practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;
(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum
qualifications of teaching personnel, including student-teachers ratio;
(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum
leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine;
(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical
curriculum in a medical school that has exceptional faculty and
instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may prescribe
admission and graduation requirements other than those prescribed
in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students shall be enrolled
in the experimental curriculum;
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical
school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to
collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each
which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical
Education;
(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments
of the hospitals for training which comply with the minimum specific
physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof; and
(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and
regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing functions.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical
schools:
Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any
student who has not been convicted by any court of competent
jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who
presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science
or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school
from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral
character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal
arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to
inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the
preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed
admissible.
xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis supplied)
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education,
Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform
admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an
additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission
into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-
1987. This Order goes on to state that:
2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward
upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical
 schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education
in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based
on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the
Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant,
together with the other admission requirements as presently called
for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the
prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission into the medical
colleges.
3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical
Education, each medical college may give other tests for applicants
who have been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility for
admission that will yield information on other aspects of the
applicant's personality to complement the information derived from
the NMAT.
xxx xxx xxx
8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for
Admission (CEA), or admitted for enrollment as first year student in
any medical college, beginning the school year, 1986-87, without the
required NMAT qualification as called for under this
Order. (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center
conducted NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during the school year
1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987, respondent Center
conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the school
year 1987.1988.1avvphi1
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary
injunction may be issued to enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f)
of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and
administrative order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It
scarcely needs documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary
injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order
has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the
mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a
clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course
the constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution
which are, in their assertion, violated by the continued implementation of
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows:
(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect of human rights. "
(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation building and shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate in
the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs."
(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education,
science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism
and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote total
human liberation and development. "
(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. "
 (e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements."
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State
policies" which the government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The
petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent
or in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail collide
with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in
other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This
burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is
relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or
operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where
the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II
is cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic
objectives of State policy and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The
petitioners have not made their case, even a prima facie case, and we are
not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation
impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional
provisions pointed to by the petitioners.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once
more petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation
they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary we may note-in
anticipation of discussion infra — that the statute and the regulation which
petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the
level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section
5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase of
Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really
enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible
to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional
school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify
under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.
" necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice
2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a)
and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the
constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative
power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the
delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The general principle of non-
delegation of legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces the
more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the
three great departments of government, 1 must be applied with
circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal
with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education and
the practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed
this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public
Service Commission:2
One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle
of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non
potest delegare or delegate potestas non potest delegare , adopted
this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E.
Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is
also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has
been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government ,
giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits of the principle of
"subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England
but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and
Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the
approval of the practice by the courts." 3
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making
authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are
Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4 —
 The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the
non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy
and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads . 5
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section
1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical
education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the
statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance
with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52,
s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which
results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify
just what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and
"unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the
NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added on top of the admission
requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other
admission requirements established by internal regulations of the various
medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to
relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But
constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has
neither commission or competence to pass upon questions of the desirability
or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative regulation. Those
questions must be address to the political departments of the government
not to the courts.
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the
legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them constitute, to the
mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The
police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable
power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the
important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general
community.6 An important component of that public order is the health and
physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no
one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. 7
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is
some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a
condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing
of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation
of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. 8 That
the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and
pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power. 9 Similarly, the establishment of minimum
medical educational requirements — i.e., the completion of prescribed
courses in a recognized medical school — for admission to the medical
profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory
authority of the state.10 What we have before us in the instant case is closely
related: the regulation of access to medical schools . MECS Order No. 52, s.
1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of
medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the
process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for
medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain,
and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools
in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our
social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like
the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the
selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the
quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today
of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States
of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] 11 and quite probably
in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our
own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even
attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the
public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in
those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or
trauma.
4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in
conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically,
petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS Order which provides that
the cutoff score for the successful applicants , based on the scores on
the NMAT, shall be determined every-year by the Board of Medical 11
Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical
Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)
infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words,
that students seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988,
when subjected to a different cutoff score than that established for an, e.g.,
earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS
Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent
than real. Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated
by differing conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate
cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the number
of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding
year; the number of places available in medical schools during the current
year; the average score attained during the current year; the level of
difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish
a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in
circumstances from year to year, may wen result in an unreasonable rigidity.
The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or
capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of
flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum
scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the
Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the
respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) VS.
SAN DIEGO
(FAILING THE NMAT THRICE)
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has
thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it
again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take
the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall
not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a
degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took
the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to
take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the
aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights
to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the
private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16,
1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed
with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS
Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional
grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989,
declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his
right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the
police power. 3
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT
as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those
who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is
whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission
to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the
health and safety of the general community, on the other
hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by
recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power
to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized
to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation
and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to
practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment
of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical
school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority
of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is
closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the
rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the
student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought
by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity
consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those
who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical
studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in
our professional schools in general, and medical schools in
particular, in the current state of our social and economic
development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an
admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its
stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into
[our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of
medical education in the country." Given the widespread use
 today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools
in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission
Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far
more developed educational resources than our own, and
taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to
even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that
the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate
end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is
useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in
those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for
disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case
was not applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for
the admission test and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the
case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the
applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and,
indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be
regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical
profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to
repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the
police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to
insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom
patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the
purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is
intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which
the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge
to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human
resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not
used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of
satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his
patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he
should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a
plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By
the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist
cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate
this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not
absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to
choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements. 6
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to
those better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be
accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more
reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is
not well-taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all
persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between
medical students and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and
the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of
the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more
vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an
equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility
as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the
tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance.
In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality
education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is
entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent
has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say
the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is
stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute
incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is
a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that
has not excited his interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is
more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate
calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his
potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be
a brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who
should never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied
banking and teachers who could be better as merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our
system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is
best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may
be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because
we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court
dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private
respondent. It is so ordered.
REYES VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(CONFLICT IN ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS)
The controversy over the admission of certain students to the University of
the Philippines College of Medicine is now presented before Us in two related
petitions for resolution on the merits. The parties in both cases are practically
the same.
The first petition, G.R. No. 94961, is for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The petitioners pray
for: (1) the reversal of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which
upheld the Board of Regents' (BOR) 1031 st resolution; (2) a temporary
restraining order and after hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
respondents from enforcing the questioned BOR Order and from proceeding
with the charges against the Dean and Secretary of the University of the
Philippines College of Medicine and enforcing their preventive suspension;
and (3) a Writ of Prohibition declaring the questioned BOR Order null and
void for being ultra-vires and violative of petitioners' academic freedom. In
addition, they seek the disqualification of Justice Irene Cortes from
participating in the deliberation of this case.
The other petition, G.R. No. 96491, is likewise
for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. The petitioners seek to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50,
dated June 27, 1990, directing the admission of the respondent-students to
the college and July 2, 1990, requiring the petitioners to show cause why
they should not be held in contempt for disobeying and resisting the first
court order.
Essentially, the facts giving rise to this controversy are as follows:
respondent-students (students, for brevity) as then applicants to the
University of the Philippines College, of Medicine (UPCM) obtained scores
higher than 70 percentile in the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
which was the cutoff score prescribed for academic year 1986-1987 by the
UPCM Faculty in its meeting of January 17, 1986 as approved by the
University Council (UC) on April 8, 1986. However, their scores were lower
than the 90 percentile cut-off score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty in its
meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic year 1987-88. Upon
appeal of some concerned Pre-Med students, the BOR in its 996 th resolution
dated February 24, 1987 reverted to the NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile.
The BOR reiterated its 996th resolution in its 997th resolution dated March
24, 1987. Subsequently, the University General Counsel, pursuant to the
instruction of the Chancellor, conducted an investigation on the student's
case and recommended inter alia the admission of all applicants obtaining a
percentile rating ranging from 70 to 90 "as a matter of right". The Dean of
the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the BOR directive for them to admit
the students. This prompted the students to file a petition
for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On June 11, 1987, the
trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction for their admission.
After the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction, the BOR in its 1001st
meeting resolved inter alia that "the act of fixing cut-off scores in any
entrance examination required in any college of the University is within the
authority of the College Faculty. Any question regarding the exercise of such
act should be elevated and resolved finally by the University Council of the
autonomous campus." (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, p. 33)
In the interim, the RTC's order was brought before Us in G.R. No. 78927
(University of the Philippines College of Medicine Committee Admissions, et
al. v. Hon. Ruben Reyes, et al.) which We dismissed for lack of merit in the
resolution of April 14, 1988. Hence, the students were admitted to the UPCM
and passed three years in the college.
Before the onset of school year 1990-91, the students, upon advice of the
U.P. President and burdened with "three agonizing years of uncertain
relationship in the College" as well as the BOR's 1001 st resolution, wrote a
letter to the UPCM Faculty where they manifested that they never intended
to question the Faculty's right to academic freedom; that they believed the
issue was simply on the question of observance of the proper procedure in
implementing admission requirements; that they felt they no longer have any
moral right to pursue the court action; that they would leave to the Faculty
the determination of humanitarian consideration of their case; that they
apologized for offending the Faculty and that they would like to appeal for a
chance to remain in the college (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, pp. 5-7). Shortly
thereafter, the students filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss and attached
thereto their letter to the UPCM Faculty. In an Order dated June 15, 1990,
the RTC dismissed their case with prejudice. In view of this development, the
UPCM Faculty held an emergency meeting on June 22, 1990 where it denied
the appeal of the students by a vote of 86 on the ground that they were not
qualified for admission to the UPCM. As a result, the students filed with the
RTC a motion to reconsider its order of dismissal. On June 27, 1990, the RTC
issued an order for the admission of the students to the college. Whereupon,
the petitioners moved to lift the ex-partemandatory order.
Meanwhile, the BOR in its 1031st meeting dated June 28, 1990, invoking its
plenary power under the Charter of the University over matters affecting
university affairs, resolved to approve the admission of the students in the
interest of justice and equity and to order the petitioners to admit them
(Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, pp. 38-39). The petitioners questioned the said
BOR order with the respondent Court of Appeals on a petition for prohibition
(CA-G.R. S.P. No. 22136). The Dean and Secretary of the UPCM refused to
follow the BOR directive. Consequently, the UP President issued a formal
charge of Grave Misconduct against them and later, issued an Order for their
Preventive Suspension.
On July 20, 1990, the RTC, on the other hand, issued an Order which (a)
required petitioners to show cause why they should not be held in contempt
for disobeying and resisting its order dated June 27, 1990 and (b) denied the
petitioners' motion to lift injunction. Petitioners appealed these orders to the
Court of Appeals by way of certiorariand prohibition (CA-G.R. S.P. No.
22344).
On August 14, 1990, the appellate court (Fourth Division) dismissed the
petition for prohibition (Rollo of G.R. No. 94691, p. 508). Petitioners' motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied in the resolution of August 23, 1990
(Rollo of G.R. No. 94691, pp. 569). They then came to Us in a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and
temporary restraining order docketed as G.R. No. 94691.
On September 5, 1990, the Court of Appeals (Thirteenth Division) dismissed
the petitioners' petition for certiorariand prohibition (Rollo of G.R. No. 96491,
p. 237). It ruled that the issue before the RTC has been rendered moot and
academic by the decision of the court (Fourth Division) dated August 14,
1990 and that the Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed orders. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was also denied in
the resolution dated December 10, 1990 ( Rollo of G.R. No. 96491, p. 231).
Petitioners assailed the respondent court's decision before Us in a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order docketed as G.R. No. 96491.
At the outset, We agree with the respondent court (Thirteenth Division) that
the issues raised before the RTC on the validity of the BOR's 996 th and
997th resolution and on the students' qualification for admission to the UPCM
have become moot due to the decision of the respondent court (Fourth
Division) dated August 14, 1990. We meticulously reviewed the records
of G.R. No. 94961 and found that in all their pleadings before the respondent
court (Fourth Division), petitioners, beside assailing the questioned BOR
1031st resolution dated June 29, 1990, argued tenaciously that the students
never qualified for admission. It was, thus, inevitable and proper for that
court to pass upon this argument and to resolve the case in its totality
considering that the resolution of the issue on the validity of the BOR
1031st resolution is inextricably linked with the issue on the qualification of
the students to enter UPCM Petitioner's vehement denial of the fact that the
RTC case has already been mooted by the decision of August 14, 1990
in G.R. No. 96491 cannot be given merit as their own petition in G.R. No.
94691 had admitted that the appellate court passed upon the issue raised
before the RTC and even cited this fact as one of the errors committed by
the court. Premises considered, the comment which We required the
respondents in G.R. No. 96491 to submit pursuant to Our resolution dated
January 22, 1991 could now be dispensed with.
Several issues have been presented in the herein petitions but the most basic
and crucial issue to Us is whether or not the BOR could validly direct the
petitioners to admit the students to the college of medicine. We rule in the
affirmative.
The powers vested in the BOR and the UC by the UP Charter (Act No. 1870)
are clear. To the former belongs the governance and the general powers of
administration of the university (secs. 4, 5 and 6) and to the latter, the
power to fix the admission requirements to any college in the university (sec.
9). On the other hand, the University Code, Title II, Chapter 43, Article 324
thereof (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, p. 388) grants to the College Faculty the
power to determine the entrance requirements of the college subject to the
approval of the autonomous UC. From the foregoing, it is evident that any
entrance requirement that may be imposed by the College Faculty must bear
the UC's approval. Otherwise, the same becomes unenforceable.
In University of the Phil. College of Medicine Committee on Admissions, et al.
v. Reyes, et al., supra, it was an undisputed fact that at the time the
students took the NMAT, the new UPCM Faculty prescribed NMAT cut-off
score of 90 percentile was without the UC'S approval. Consequently, the
UPCM cannot legally implement any change in the NMAT cut-off score. The
fact that the students knew beforehand of the 90 percentile NMAT cut-off
score would not cure this defect. It follows then that the previously approved
NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile remains the prescribed passing grade.
The Court of Appeals was correct to rule that:
When the Board of Regents retained the cut off score in the NMAT at
70TH percentile (p. 161, Rollo) which was the cut off score approved
by the University Council on 8 April 1986 it did not exercise the power
to prescribe the entrance requirements. It merely upheld the power
of the University Council under the law to fix the requirements for
admission to the UPCM and rendered ineffective the action of the
UPCM Faculty, which attempted to exercise that power to increase the
cut off score in NMAT to 90 percentile without the approval of the
University Council and the President of the University in violation of
Section 324 of the University Code (supra) which is very explicit on
this matter. (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, p. 511, Emphasis supplied)
The BOR only exercised its power of governance and its duty in seeing to it
that all the units abide with the law, university rules and regulations. It did
not assume a power which it did not possess in the first place. The BOR's
1001st resolution made this point more evident when it recognized and
emphasized the UC's jurisdiction over admission matters. Since the faculty
prescribed NMAT cut-off score of 90 percentile had become legally
inefficacious, the students have all the right to stay in the college inasmuch
as they met the cut-off score of 70 percentile imposed by the UC Such right
could not be abridged or denied by the resolutions of the UC Manila dated
July 20, 1990 and September 5, 1990 which sustained the Faculty's refusal to
admit the students. Under the Constitution, the students have the right to
select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements (Article XIV, Section 5(3)).
While it may be true that the UC could ratify the acts of the College regarding
admission requirements, the same should be done within a reasonable time.
It is to be recalled that the controversy regarding the students' admission
started in 1987. It is surprising that despite petitioners' insistence on the UC's
jurisdiction over admission requirements, they did not seek recourse to it
immediately. From the records, there appears to be no physical or legal
hindrance to the calling for a UC meeting on the students' case. To validate
these resolutions at this point in time would not be fair and equitable to the
students. In the span of three years, they have proved their mettle by
passing the academic requirements of the college.
Petitioners assert that the UC in its meeting dated April 8, 1986 did not
approve the NMAT and its cut-off score of 70 percentile and that instead, the
UC empowered the UPCM Faculty to choose any entrance examination and to
set the cut-off score for the same. Such claims cannot be given credence.
The minutes of the UC's meeting on that date do not support the petitioners'
stand. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
Approval of the Entrance Requirements of the College of Medicine —
(Annex P & P-1) — Approved It was moved and seconded that the
Entrance Requirements as proposed be approved. Approved. ( Rollo of
G.R. No 94961, p. 405, emphasis supplied)
Annexes "P" (Rollo of G. R. No. 94961, p. 690) and "P-1" ( Rollo of G.R. No.
94961, p. 691) also do not show any delegation of authority to the UPCM
Faculty. We quote with approval the appellate court's findings on this point:
Annex "P" refers to Memorandum 86-017 dated 27 January 1986 of
the Dean, College of Medicine for the Chancellor, UP Manila,
submitting the Entrance Requirements of the College (Annex "P-l") for
submission to the University Council.
Attached to said memorandum is Annex "P-1" entitled "Entrance
Requirements of the College of Medicine, University of the Philippines,
Manila for courses leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine"
prepared by the Chairman, Admission Committee and approved for
submission to the University Council by the Dean of the College of
Medicine.
It will be noted, the UPCM Dean, in his memorandum 86-017 for the
Chancellor, UP Manila, (Annex "P") manifested that all of the items in
this submission (referring to Annex "P-l') were approved by the
College Faculty in its 17 January 1986 meeting.
The minutes of the meeting of the College Faculty on 17 January
1986 does not mention the approval of an entrance requirement "to
pass written test(s) of achievement and aptitude in natural sciences
as prescribed by the College of Medicine Faculty."
What was actually approved in said meeting of the College of
Medicine Faculty are: "NMAT has replaced CMET" and "It was moved
by Dr. Talusan and seconded by Dr. Reodica that 70% be the cut off
point of NMAT for all categories. The motion was carried without any
objection.
Evidently, the written test(s) "as prescribed by the College of
Medicine faculty" in paragraph b(3) of annex "P-l" paraphrased the
approval by the UPCM faculty in its meeting on 17 January 1986 of
the NMAT with a cut off score of 70%.
The clause "as prescribed by the College of Medicine faculty" cannot
possibly be interpreted as a delegation or grant of authority to
prescribe the written test(s) of achievement and aptitude in natural
sciences without the approval of the University Council. The clause is
worded in the past tense and can only refer to an accomplished act of
the faculty which in the light of the memorandum of the UPCM Dean
(Annex "P") refers to the NMAT with a cut off score of 70% approved
by the UPCM faculty on 17 January 1986. ( Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, p.
569)
Petitioners remonstrate against the respondent court's mention of the
aforesaid annexes which it obtained from the UPCM directly without
informing the petitioners. They aver that these annexes were not on record.
We do not see this as an error. The fact is that petitioners submitted the
minutes of April 8, 1986 meeting of the UC where the subject annexes were
cited. Hence, these annexes were on record except that no copies of the
same were submitted. The appellate court's resourcefulness in securing
copies of these annexes was meant to let the records speak the truth. Such
initiative should be commended rather than condemned. Besides, petitioners
failed to show that they sustained substantial injury due to the court's action.
Moreover, the then Ex-Officio Secretary of the UC, UP Manila, Dr. Sofronio P.
San Juan executed an affidavit which corroborated the appellate court's
findings. Thus, he stated:
5. At the said meeting, when the University Council took up Item No.
8 in the Agenda regarding the entrance requirements of the UP
College of Medicine for the courses leading to the degree of Doctor of
Medicine, the members of the College of Medicine Admissions
Committee discussed and explained its proposal to adopt the National
Medical Admissions Test NMAT rating of seventy (70%) percentile as
the cut-off score as one of the entrance requirements of students
seeking admission to the UP College of Medicine, instead of the
national cut-off score of forty-five (45%) percentile.
6. Upon motion made by Prof. ANTONIO TALUSAN to adopt the
NMAT rating of seventy (70%) percentile, instead of the national cut-
off rating of forty-five (45%) percentile, as the cut-off score for
students seeking admission to the UP College of Medicine, which was
duly seconded by Dr. ROBERTO REODICA JR., who was then the
Chairman of the Admissions Committee of the College of Medicine,
the University Council approved the motion and adopted the aforesaid
proposal.
7. While it may be true that the details of the discussion in the
proposal to increase the national cut-off score of forty-five (45%)
percent to seventy (70%) percent were not embodied in the minutes,
it is no less true that the aforesaid proposal was discussed, moved for
adoption and duly approved by the members of the University Council
present at the meeting.
8. Being the then Secretary of the University Council of UP Manila on
the 08 April 1986 meeting, I scribbled handwritten notes on my copy
of the hand-outs based on the deliberations on the floor, which now
form part of the official book-bound copy of the minutes deposited in
the Office of the UP-Manila Registrar.
A certified true xerox copy of the hand-outs bearing my handwritten
notes is hereto attached as Annex "A"and made an integral part
hereof.
9. This Affidavit is executed to attest to the truthfulness of all the
foregoing facts and to prove that at the meeting of the UP-Manila
University Council held on 08 April 1986, at the BSLR East, after the
members of the UP College of Medicine Admissions Committee
discussed and explained their proposal to adopt the NMAT rating of
seventy (70%) percentile as the cut-off score for students seeking
admission to the UP College of Medicine, which is a big leap from the
national cut-off score of forty-five (45%) percent for all other medical
colleges in the Philippines, Prof. ANTONIO TALUSAN moved for its
adoption and was duly seconded by Dr. ROBERTO REODICA JR., and
was duly approved by the members of the University Council present,
as well as for all legal intents and purposes. ( Rollo of G.R. No. 94961,
pp. 688-689)
We are, likewise, unconvinced by petitioners' arguments that the BOR's
1031st is contrary to justice and equity because the students themselves
judicially confessed that they have no right to admission. In their letter to the
Faculty, copy furnished the trial court, the students stated that "(they) feel
that (they) no longer have any moral right to further pursue court action" and
that "(they) cannot continue the court case without any moral leg to stand
on." (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, pp. 5-6). The student's aforesaid feeling does
not amount to a categorical admission of the absence of a legal right.
Somehow, there is still a tinge of doubt expressed in the statement rather
than a firm conviction on the students' part that indeed they do not possess
any right to admission. Even assuming that an admission was made, the
same cannot be accepted as it involves a conclusion of law based on the
students' misapprehension of their legal right. We find that the letter appears
to be predicated more on an overwhelming sense of hopelessness in view of
the circumstances which they perceived to be against them like the BOW's
1001st resolution and the "three agonizing years of uncertain relationship
spent in the college" (see letter, supra) than a realization of the absence of a
right. The records show a few of the difficulties the students encountered.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Respondent Reyes (now one of petitioners in these cases upon
being informed that the students would be enrolled that day) ordered
the security guards to prevent the six students from entering the
premises of the College.
(3) When Chancellor Domingo allowed the students to enrol,
respondent Reyes, in a written note (Annex "B"), advised the Cashier
of U.P. Manila to defer acceptance of any payment from the students.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Despite the July 5, 1990 letter of the University Registrar to
respondent Reyes which categorically states that the registration of
the students is valid, the Form 5's (Dean's Copy) of the students were
returned to the University Registrar with the statement that they were
not qualified to be admitted to the Medicine Program. ( Rollo of 94961,
p. 614)
and
3. Before, and after, the filing of this Petition on July 5, 1990, the
Intervenors have experienced at the hands of the Petitioners various
attempts to frustrate their admission to their classes with full
privileges as duly enrolled students, to wit:
Intervenor Decano — on July 9, 1990, Doctor Napoleon Apolinario,
Chairman of the Department of Orthopedics told Decano that she will
not be admitted to her classes. Decano was also transferred to
another student block (another group of students) in the Department
of Medicine after she was told she cannot rotate in the Section of
Neurology.
Intervenors Muldong and Nazareno — after the completion of their
rotation in the Department of Ear, Nose and Throat, they were told
that their grades will be withheld until after the resolution of the case.
Intervenors Santos, Ruiz and Villanueva — From July 9 to 20, 1990
(for Intervenors Santos and Ruiz), and from July 2 to 6,1990 (for
Intervenor Villanueva), they were repeatedly told by Dr. Mario
Gutierrez, Chairman of the Department of Family Medicine and by Dr.
Mila Barzaga of the same Department that they should not attend
classes in this Department because they have not been admitted as
students of the College. (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, p. 575).
Considering such antagonistic conditions, We can empathize with the
students' mental anxiety and emotional strain in their three years in college
in the company of some professors who looked down on them as academic
pretenders. Furthermore, the students were pressed for time as they have
only one more year before graduation. These circumstances combined with
the advice of the U.P. President unduly influenced the students to write this
reconciling letter.
With Our findings in these cases, petitioners' argument that the BOR violated
their academic freedom cannot be sustained. The individual faculty member
has the freedom to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and
thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear
that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are
found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the
political, economic, or academic establishments (Garcia v. The Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, L-40779, November 28,
1975, 68 SCRA 277). In contrast, the University has the academic freedom to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study (Garcia
case, ibid, citing Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 US 234, 263 [19571). As a corporate body, the University
has entrusted to its academic staff the de facto control of its function of
admission and examination of students (see Garcia, ibid). Petitioners now
claim to be in charge of that function with respect to fixing the admission
requirements in the college. We disagree. Under the UP Charter, the power
to fix admission requirements is vested in the University Council of the
autonomous campus which is composed of the President of the University of
the Philippines and of all instructors holding the rank of professor, associate
professor or assistant professor (Section 9, Act 1870). Consequently, the UC
alone has the right to protest against any unauthorized exercise of its power.
Petitioners cannot impugn these BOR directives on the ground of academic
freedom inasmuch as their rights as university teachers remain unaffected.
As succinctly explained by the appellate court:
Under the UP Charter, the power to fix the requirements for
admission to any college of the university is vested in the University
Council (Sec. 9). The power to prescribe the courses of study is
vested in the University Council subject to the approval of the Board
of Regents (Sec. 9). The power to appoint the academic staff, fix their
compensation, hours of service and other conditions is vested in the
Board of Regents [Sec. 6(e)]. The power to allocate the income
among the different categories of expenditures is vested in the Board
of Regents [Sec. 6(a)].
Academic freedom may be asserted by the University Council or by
the Board of Regents or both in so far ( sic) as it relates to the
functions vested in them by law which are essential to institutional
academic freedom.1âwphi1
The academic freedom claimed by the faculty to have been violated
by the Board of Regents when it issued the questioned order is
related to the right of the University to fix admission requirements.
This right and power to fix admission requirements is clearly vested
by law in the University Council. The College Faculty was merely
empowered by the Board of Regents under Article 324 of the
University Code to initially determine the admission requirements,
subject to the approval of the University Council and the President of
the University.
The questioned order of the Board of Regents in upholding the
admission requirement approved by the University Council in 1986 is
supportive of right of the University Council to fix or approve
admission requirements, against the UPCM faculty and Dean who
changed the admission requirements approved by the University
Council without following the prescribed rules and procedures of the
University. (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, p. 513).
One final note. While We recognize and affirm the BOR's power of
governance in the instant petitions, We, however, can not give Our
imprimatur to its claim of plenary power over admission requirements. Such
claim has no basis in law. The UC has the final say in admission requirements
provided the same conforms with law, rules and regulations of the university.
In the event the power is abused or misused, it becomes the duty of the
BOR, being the highest governing body in the university, to step in and to
correct the anomaly.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are DISMISSED and the decisions of the Court
of Appeals dated August 14, 1990 and September 5, 1990 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FARHAD HATANI y ABOLHASSAN
This is an appeal from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105,
Quezon City, convicting appellant in Criminal Cases No. Q-11867 and No. Q-
11868.
The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused Farhad Hatani y Abolhassan, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal practice of medicine in violation of
R.A. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959 (Secs.
8, 10) penalized by Section 28 thereof with "a fine of not less
than one thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos
 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, or by
imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five
years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion
of the court; and considering the circumstances of the case
and the ignominy caused by him to his two teen-aged, female,
then unmarried victims, this Court exercising its discretion
granted under said Section 28 of the law, hereby SENTENCES
said accused FARHAD HATANI Y ABOLHASSAN to pay a fine of
ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency AND to suffer
imprisonment of five (5) years; and to pay the costs.
This Court further recommends that after service of his
sentence the accused be deported as undesirable alien ( Rollo,
p. 35).
The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11868 reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused, FARHAD HATANI y ABOLHASSAN, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby SENTENCES said
accused to suffer life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua; and
to indemnify the complainant, Precila Borja, in the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and to pay costs (Rollo, p. 41).
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 charged appellant with illegal
practice of medicine, in violation of R.A. No. 2382, otherwise known as the
Medical Act of 1959, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City,
Philippines the above named accused, knowing fully well that
he has not satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board
Examination, neither is he a holder of a valid Certificate of
Registration duly issued by the Board of Medical Examiners, as
in fact he does not even appear to have taken or completed
the course leading to a medical degree, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for compensation, fee and
salary, paid to him directly, physically examined Priscila ( sic)
Borja Y Loquero and Wilma Borja Y Loquero, diagnosed,
treated and administer injections on the persons of Prescila
(sic) Borja Y Loquero and Wilma Borja Y Loquero, in Violation
of Section 10, in relation to Section 28, Republic Act No. 2382
(Records, Vol. I, p. 1).
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11868, charged appellant with Rape,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, and
while she was deprived of reason or unconscious after having
been drugged or administered medicine, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with the undersigned PRECILA BORJA Y LOQUERO without her
consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice in
such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the
Civil Code (Records, Vol. II, p. 1).
It appears that in the morning of July 6, 1979, Agustina Borja visited
her comadre, Maura Fontreras, and requested malunggay leaves as
medication for her 16-year old daughter, Precila, who had high fever and
loose bowel movement. Upon learning that Precila was sick, Marita, Maura's
daughter, introduced Agustina to her husband, appellant herein, whom she
said was a medical doctor. Marita suggested that her husband treat Precila
and Agustina agreed.
Appellant and Marita went to the Borja residence, where he examined
Precila. He gave her tablets to take and administered two injections (to her),
one in the morning and the second at noon. After each injection, Precila
would feel dizzy and fall asleep.
It was appellant's diagnosis that Precila was a drug addict and required
further observation and treatment. Appellant offered to attend to Precila at
his house and again, Agustina agreed in the belief that her daughter was a
drug addict.
In the evening of the same day, Precila was fetched by appellant and Marita
and was brought to appellant's house. Again, Precila was given an injection
which caused her to sleep. When she awoke, she realized that she was
naked and her entire body was in pain. Appellant was seated on the bed and
was fondling her private parts. Shocked, Precila called for her mother and
tried to get up. Appellant, however, punched her on the chest and forced her
to lie down. He pressed a pillow on her face and injected her again, causing
her to fall asleep.
When Precila awoke the second time, she found appellant in bed with her.
He was naked and fondling her private parts. The pain all over her body
lingered. When Precila touched her private parts, she saw blood stains on her
hand. She tried to stand up but she was too weak. Appellant gave her
another injection rendering her unconscious.
The following morning, Agustina went to fetch Precila. Upon reaching the
Fontreras' residence, she went straight to the bedroom, where, to her great
dismay, she found Precila and appellant both asleep and naked. She hurriedly
dressed up Precila and brought her home.
When Precila woke up, she noticed she was already home and her mother
was crying. Precila remained dizzy, with throbbing pains all over her body.
When talked to, she was incoherent.
That evening, Precila's oldest sister, Josefina, a nurse by profession, came
home and saw Precila looking very weak. Her mother, who was crying
narrated what she had witnessed that morning. She also told Josefina that
appellant was in the other bedroom, treating another sister, Wilma whom he
also diagnosed as a drug addict. Josefina immediately proceeded to the
bedroom and saw appellant about to inject Wilma.
Josefina saw the open bag of appellant, which contained empty capsules of
dalmane and empty vials of valium. She inquired on the need of the injection
and appellant replied that a second shot of plain distilled water was required
to cure Wilma of her drug addiction. Josefina told appellant to stop but he
persisted. Only upon threat that she would call the police did appellant stop.
Appellant and his wife then left the Borja residence.
The following day, Agustina and Josefina brought Precila and Wilma to the
Philippine Constabulary Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where
Josefina and Wilma gave their statements (Exhs. "D" and "F"). Precila was
physically examined by a doctor, whose medical report stated that Precila's
hymen and "deep, healing lacerations" and that "subject is in non-virgin state
physically" (Exh. A). Several needle puncture marks were also found on
Precila's arms and buttocks.
A physical examination was likewise done on Wilma, which showed that she
too had a needle puncture, as shown in the Medico-Legal Report (Exh. "L").
Acting on the complaint filed before the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit
(CANU), a surveillance of appellant's residence was conducted. Subsequently,
a search warrant was secured from Judge Jose P. Castro of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City. Armed with the warrant, CANU agents raided
appellant's residence on July 15, 1979.
Assorted drugs, such as dalmane, valium and mogadon, as well as
prescription pads in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap (Exhs. "H" "H-4") and other
medical instruments, such as a "thermometer, a "hygomonometer ( sic),
stethoscope, syringes and needles, were seized.
The Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. "I") on the prescription slips
showed that these were written by the appellant himself. The report on the
chemistry examination of the seized tablets and capsules (Exhs. "J" "J-1")
confirmed the presence of mogadon, dalmane and valium.
After the preliminary investigation, separate informations for rape and
violation of R.A. No. 2382 were filed. Appellant pleaded not guilty to both
crimes.
The defense's version is that in the evening of July 6, 1976, Agustina and
Precila Borja visited the mother-in-law of the appellant, Maura Fontreras. In
the course of the conversation, Agustina asked Marita if she could help
Precila. Marita obliged and agreed to take care of Precila for the night and
allow her to sleep in her bedroom.
Precila and Marita chatted the whole night. Accordingly, Precila confessed
that she was not really sick. She merely related her personal problems,
involving her parents. She also admitted her vice, such as drinking, smoking
and taking drugs.
Their talk lasted until the wee hours of the morning and during their
conversation, appellant would occasionally enter the room but he never
joined their discussion.
Precila and Marita shared the same bed. Appellant; who was wearing only his
pajama pants, slept on the floor at the opposite end of the room.
The following morning Agustina arrived and Marita related some of Precila's
problems. Nothing untoward happened that day and Agustina headed for
home while Precila and Marita followed later.
At past midnight of July 15, 1979, a raid was conducted by CANU agents in
the house of the appellant under the supervision of C1C Agustin Timbol, Jr.
The raid was made upon Josefina's complaint for illegal possession of drugs.
Appellant and his wife were driven out of their bedroom, while three-men
remained. Later, appellant was called to join them in the bedroom and he
was shocked to see assorted drugs scattered around. Appellant denied
owning them. Photographs were taken of him with the drugs. A barangay
official was called to attest to the list of the confiscated drugs. Appellant,
however, refused to sign the said list.
C1C Timbol offered to fur the case in exchange of money. Instead of
acceding, appellant demanded to see the search warrant. C1C Timbol failed
to show a warrant on the pretext that they were military men without need
of any identification or search warrant. Appellant, his wife and brother-in-law
were forced to join C1C Timbol for questioning in Camp Crame. Upon
boarding the van, appellant saw Josefina aboard kissing C1C Timbol and both
exchanged victory signs.
The trial court rendered two separate decisions and convicted the appellant
of both crimes. In finding appellant guilty of illegal purchase of medicine,
considerable weight was given to the prosecution's exhibits.
The Professional Regulation Commission certified that appellant is not among
the list of registered physicians nor among those with special permit to
practice medicine in a limited scope (Exh. "K").
Appellant failed to refute the Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. "I")
released by the PC Crime Laboratory showing that the signature of Dr. Jesus
D. Yap (Exhs. "H" — "H-4") prescribing medicine belonged to him. The
pictures also taken during the raid (Exhs. "G" - "G-8'" undeniably reveal
several medical equipment used by practicing physicians.
Notwithstanding the trial court's finding that there was no direct evidence of
rape, it concluded that circumstantial evidence indicate that rape was
consummated by appellant considering the following:
1. The medico-legal examination of victim Precila, taken on
July 8, 1979 at 10:25 in the morning or less than 48 hours
from the evening of July 6, 1979 found "hymen with deep,
healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o'clock position"; thus
indicating that the lacerations were recent as they are in the
process of healing; (Exh. "A-1")
2. The above undeniable findings of the expert confirms the
statement of the victim, a young girl of 16 or 17 years of age,
that when she held private parts which were painful then, she
noticed blood. (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 4-5).
The fresh laceration of the hymen further confirms the carnal assault.
(People vs. Ocampo, L-47335, Aug. 13, 1986)
3. In the two short waking moments of the victim she noticed
she was naked and beside her on the same bed was the
accused, also naked. (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 3-5)
4. The accused, then 21 years of age was in the prime of
youth, and the unconscious girl beside him was just 16 or 17
years of age, thus in the full bloom of womanhood. The sexual
excitement on the part of the accused was therefore
exceedingly great.
5. When the mother, Agustina, came into the room of the
accused that early morning of July 7, 1979 she saw her
daughter and the accused on the same bed and both naked.
(tsn., Rogato, Jan. 27, 1981, p. 9)
6. The medico-legal found several needle puncture marks on
the arms and buttocks of Precila (Exh. "A"); thus confirming
Precila's testimony that she had been injected by the accused,
rendering her unconscious (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 4-5;
tsn., Nenita, May 21, 1984, pp. 3-6; also pp. 29-30).
7. The medico-legal found the victim "in non-virgin state
physically." (Exh; "A-i")
8. At the time of the medico-legal examination, i.e. morning of
July 8, 1979, the victim was found to be "incoherent." (Exh. A)
— after effect of the injections or drugs.
9. At the time of the incident (July 6, 1979) the Borjas and
Frontreras (sic) were "comadres" and neighbors. There is no
enmity between and among them.
10. Between accused and Marita on one hand, and the victim,
her mother, and sisters, on the other hand, there was no
misunderstanding before the incident. There is absolutely
absence of any ulterior motive for the teen-aged victim or her
family to file the serious charge of rape which would expose
her to embarrassment of examination of her private parts and
public trial (Rollo, pp. 38-39).
In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.
Appellant faults complainant for recounting her ordeal only after four years
when she took the witness stand. This argument is misleading. The record
shows that the day after the rape, Josefina and Wilma Borja, accompanied by
their mother, Agustina, issued their statements at Camp Crame. Agustina
gave her statement twice on separate days. Precila did not give any
statement due to her weak condition but it cannot be denied that she was
instead physically examined. Suffice it to say, the Medico Legal Report (Exh.
"A") indicates swellings and lacerations and concludes that Precila was no
longer a virgin. Although the records fail to show any sworn statement by
Precila, such is not fatal where the sworn affidavits of her mother, her two
sisters and the medico-legal report are sufficient to show probable cause of
rape (People v. Yambao, 193 SGRA 571 [1991]).
Precila was either dizzy or unconscious at the time she was sexually abused.
We find her testimony consistent and credible. While her testimony is limited
to the times when she would gain her consciousness, it is not unlikely that
such traumatic incidents would still be engraved on her mind even four years
after.
Appellant's assertion that Precila failed to inform her family of his misdeeds is
explainable. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Precila was still
dizzy and incoherent as a consequence of the injections administered by
appellant. In fact, when Precila was physically examined by the doctor the
day after, she was still sleepy and groggy (TSN, March 31, 1980, pp. 7-8).
Appellant also finds it strange that considering the acts allegedly committed
by him against Precila, the medico-legal report fails to specify any injuries on
the body of Precila. Appellant need not inflict heavy blows on Precila for the
simple reason that she was under sedation. The absence of the injuries does
not negate the commission of rape (People v. Torrevillas, 203 SCRA 576
[1991]; People v. Arenas, 198 172 [1991]) for rape may be committed after
rendering a woman unconscious (Art. 335, Revised Penal Code; People v.
Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 [1991]).
Appellant alleges that Precila was no longer a virgin on that fateful day and
that her bleeding was actually the start of her menstrual cycle. It is settled
jurisprudence that virginity is not an essential element of rape (People v.
Corro, 197 SCRA 121 [1991]; People v. Banayo, 195 SCRA 543 [1991]). To
claim that Precila's menstrual cycle began on that day is highly speculative.
Appellant claims that the sworn statements of the Borjas (Exhs. "D", "E" and
"F") were antedated and were prepared after the illegal search was
conducted in his residence. He also cites some inconsistencies in said
statements. We find the claim to be devoid of merit. It is only now on appeal
that appellant disputes the execution of these affidavits. When they were
presented and offered as evidence, appellant failed to raise such objections
and to refute them.
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
merely refer to minor details, which cannot destroy their credibility (People v.
Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632 [1991]). This is also true where statements made
while on the witness stand are claimed to be inconsistent with the affidavit,
which are generally incomplete (People v. Lagota, 194 SCRA 92 [1991];
People v. Avanzado, 158 SCRA 427 [1988]).
With regard to the second assignment of error, appellant insists that his
conviction arose from insufficient evidence and his failure to prove his
innocence.
Indeed, the circumstantial evidence established at the trial are more than
sufficient to prove the guilt of appellant. The Medico-Legal Report on Precila,
taken within 48 hours from the commission of rape confirmed that her
hymen had "deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o'clock position" and
Precila was "in non-virgin state physically" (Exh. "A"). Furthermore, the
report confirms that Precila had at least six needle puncture marks and
swellings, which confirm that appellant had injected her several times.
On the two occasions that Precila woke up, she positively stated that
appellant was with her on the bed and that they were both naked. She also
tried to free herself on both attempts from accused, but, he made her
unconscious through injections (TSN, February 9, 1984, pp. 3-5). This is
corroborated by the testimony of Agustina, who saw her daughter and
accused together naked on bed (TSN, January 27, 1981, p. 9). These
unbroken chain of events leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion that
accused actually raped Precila.
As held in People v. Yambao, supra, credence is given to the findings of the
trial court where the rape victim's testimony is buttressed by the
corroborative testimony of the mother and the medico-legal report, as well as
the report of the police investigator.
It must also be borne in mind that at the time of the commission of the
crime, Precila was just sixteen years old. No young lady at the prime of her
youth would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
intimate parts and later bare herself to the disgrace brought to her honor in a
public trial unless she was motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit
apprehended and brought to justice (People v. Patilan, 197 SCRA 354
[1991]; People v. Yambao, 193 SCRA 571 [1991]).
Appellant claims that his right to be presumed innocent was violated. He cites
the trial court's decision holding that it. —
. . . finds that with these circumstantial evidences ( sic) pieced
together the prosecution has proved the crime of rape, and
the burden shifted on the defense to show the contrary ( Rollo,
p. 40).
Appellant was afforded a fair trial and in fact he availed of surrebuttal
evidence. The statement of the trial court, as correctly argued by the Solicitor
General, implies that the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support
appellant's conviction unless the defense is able to provide evidence to the
contrary.
With respect to his conviction of illegal practice of medicine, appellant
presented inconsistent claims. On one hand, he claims that the drugs and
other paraphernalia were planted by the raiding team; while on the other
hand, he claims that these were seized without any warrant.
If indeed the evidence were all planted, how can appellant explain his
handwriting on the prescription pads in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap? A perusal
of the photographs showing accused during the raid, fails to indicate any
protestation by him. In fact, the other photographs (Exhs. "G-l", "G-2", "G-4"
— "G-8") do not bear any sign of disorder, in contrast to appellant's
testimony that his room was made into a mess during the raid.
The records fail to disclose a copy of a search warrant. However, the
prosecution was able to present its return (Exh. "ZZ") and we are satisfied
that indeed a lawful search warrant was obtained. Besides, the judge who
granted the search warrant was the same judge who initially heard both
criminal cases. It can therefore be presumed, that the search was made with
a search warrant and absent of any showing that it was procured maliciously,
the items seized are admissible in evidence (People v. Umali, 193 SCRA 493
[1991]).
The evidence is overwhelming that appellant actually treated and diagnosed
Precila and Wilma Borja. The positive testimony of Agustina, Precila, Wilma
and Josefina Borja; the medico-legal reports (Exhs. "A", "A-7", "C", "L" and
"L-1") which attest to the needle marks; the Handwriting Identification
Report (Exh. I); the photographs (Exhs. "G-l — "G-8") showing assorted
drugs and medical equipment in appellant's room; and the chemistry reports
(Exhs. "J" — "J-1") prove that appellant was engaged in the practice of
medicine. And as to his allegation that there was no proof of payment, the
law specifically punishes said act whether or not done for a fee.
Appellant claims that Precila admitted in her cross-examination that she was
in school the whole day of July 6, 1979 and it was therefore impossible for
him to have treated and diagnosed her on that date. An accurate reading of
the transcript, however, will show that Precila's testimony was in response to
a question regarding her school schedule for that day.
Finally, appellant claims that the ponente of both decisions was not the trial
judge, ergo said judge was thus deprived of the opportunity to assess the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Admittedly, the ponente's participation was limited to the resolution of the
cases. The fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who
rendered the judgment, and for that reason the latter did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but
merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment
erroneous (People v. Ramos, Jr., 203 SCRA 237 [1991]; People v. Villamayor,
199 SCRA 472 [1991]), especially where the evidence on record is sufficient
to support its conclusion.
WHEREFORE, the judgments appealed from are AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
CRISOSTOMO VS. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
In his petition for certiorari, 1 the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside
the en banc resolution dated February 14, 1989 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission in SEC EB Case No. 191 and the concurring opinions
thereto (Annexes F, G, and H, pp. 39-62, Rollo), as well as its orders dated
June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (Annexes M and 0, pp. 83-86, Rollo)
directing the corporate secretary of the United Doctors Medical Center, Inc.
(hereafter "UDMC") to call a special meeting of the stockholders to elect the
officers and directors in the implementation of the SEC's aforementioned en
banc resolution of February 14, 1989, which the Court of Appeals affirmed in
its decision dated June 8, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17435, entitled "Sixto
Crisostomo, petitioner vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, Spouses Dr.
Shoji Yamada and Michiyo Yamada, and Spouses Dr. Tomotada Enatsu and
Edita Enatsu, respondents." On August 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied
Crisostomo's motion for reconsideration of its decision. On August 24, 1989,
he filed a petition for review of said decision in this Court (G.R. No. 89555)
which was originally assigned to the Third Division, but was later
consolidated with G.R. No. 89095.
At first blush, the petitions sound like a patriotic defense of the Constitution,
but, at bottom they are only an artful scheme to defraud a group of foreign
investors who had been persuaded by the officers of UDMC to invest P57
million to save the corporation (its assets as well as those of the
Crisostomo's) from imminent foreclosure by the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) to which UDMC was indebted in the sum of P55 million. It
is the kind of operation that sullies our collective image as a people and sets
back our government's heroic efforts to attract foreign investments to our
country.
The antecedent facts, culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
Sixto Crisostomo, Felipe Crisostomo (deceased), Veronica
Palanca, Juanito Crisostomo, Carlos Crisostomo, Ricardo
Alfonso, Regino Crisostomo and Ernesto Crisostomo (known as
the Crisostomo group) were the original stockholders of the
United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) which was organized in
1968 with an authorized capital stock of P1,000,000 (later
increased to P15,000,000 in 1972). They owned approximately
40% of UDMC's outstanding capital stock, while the 60%
majority belonged to the members of the United Medical Staff
Association (UMSA), numbering approximately 150 doctors
and medical personnel of UDMC.
Despite their minority status, the Crisostomo group has
managed UDMC from its inception, with Juanito Crisostomo as
president, Ricardo Alfonso, Sr. as chairman of the board,
Carlos Crisostomo as corporate secretary and Sixto Crisostomo
as director and legal counsel.
In 1988, UDMC defaulted in paying its loan obligation of
approximately P55 million to the DBP. In the last quarter of
1987, UDMC's assets (principally its hospital) and those of the
Crisostomos which had been given as collateral to the DBP,
faced foreclosure by the Asset Privatization' rust (APT), which
had taken over UDMC's loan obligation to the DBP.
To stave off the threatened foreclosure, UDMC, through its
principal officers, Ricardo Alfonso and Juanito Crisostomo,
persuaded the Yamadas and Enatsu (Shoji Yamada and
Tomotada Enatsu are Japanese doctors) to invest fresh capital
in UDMC. The wife of Tomotada Enatsu, Edita Enatsu, is a
Filipina. They invested approximately P57 million in UDMC.
The investment was effected by means of: (1) a Stock
Purchase Agreement; and (2) an Amended Memorandum of
Agreement whereby the group subscribed to 82.09% of the
outstanding shares of UDMC.
Both transactions were duly authorized by the board of
directors and stockholders of UDMC. They were submitted to,
scrutinized by, and, finally, approved by the Board of
Investments, the Central Bank of the Philippines, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The elaborate
governmental approval process was done openly and with full
knowledge of all concerned, including Sixto Crisostomo, the
corporate legal counsel. Upon the completion of the
governmental approval process, shares of stock, duly signed
by UDMC's authorized officers, were issued to the Yamadas
and Enatsus.
This capital infusion not only saved the assets of the UDMC
(especially the hospital) from foreclosure but also freed the
Crisostomos from their individual and solidary liabilities as
sureties for the DBP loan.
As it had been agreed in the Amended Memorandum of
Agreement between UDMC and the Japanese group that upon
the latter's acquisition of the controlling interest in UDMC, the
corporation would be reorganized, a special stockholders'
meeting and board of directors' meeting were scheduled to be
held on August 20, 1988.
However, on the eve of the meetings, i.e., on August 19,
1988, Sixto Crisostomo, supposedly acting for himself,
filed SEC Case No. 3420 against Juanito Crisostomo, Ricardo
Alfonso, Shoji Yamada, Michiyo Yamada, Tomotada Enatsu
and Edita Enatsu, praying, among other things, (1) to stop the
holding of the stockholder's and board of directors' meetings;
(2) to disqualify the Japanese investors from holding a
controlling interest in UDMC and from being elected directors
or officers of UDMC; and (3) to annul the Memorandum of
Agreement and Stock Purchase Agreement because they
allegedly did not express the true agreement of the parties
(pp. 194-203, Rollo).
Two weeks later, on September 2, 1988, Crisostomo filed Civil
Case No. 88-1823 in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila, where he also sought a preliminary injunction and the
Identical reliefs prayed for by him in SEC Case No. 3420 (pp.
317-335, Rollo). It was dismissed by the trial court for lack of
jurisdiction and is pending appeal in the Court of Appeals
where it is docketed as CA-G.R. No. 20285-CV.
On September 13, 1988, the hearing officer, Antonio Esteves,
granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the respondents —
... from holding the special meeting of the
stockholders and of the Board of Directors of
United Doctors Medical Center, [Inc.] (UDMC)
scheduled on August 20, 1988 or any
subsequent meetings; from adopting
resolutions to elect new directors and appoint
new officers; from approving resolutions
directly or indirectly affecting the operations,
organizational structure, and financial condition
of the corporation, ... and from disbursing
funds of the said corporation except those
ordinary day-to-day expenses pending the final
termination of this case. (p. 30, Rollo.)
The private respondents' motion for reconsideration of this
order was denied by the hearing officer on November 16,
1988. In the same order, he created a management
committee to administer UDMC (pp. 32-35, Rollo).
The respondents appealed by certiorari to the SEC en banc.
On February 14,1989, Commissioner Jose C. Laureta, with
whom Commissioners Rosario N. Lopez and Gonzalo T. Santos
separately concurred, set aside the preliminary injunction
issued by Esteves and the management committee which he
created. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition for
certiorari is GRANTED and the Commission en banc ORDERS:
1. That the questioned orders of the hearing
officer in SEC Case No. 3420 of September 13,
1988 and November 16, 1988, be immediately
vacated;
2. That a special stockholders' meeting of
UDMC be held for the purpose of allowing the
stockholders of record of the corporation to
elect a new board of directors, which special
meeting is hereby directed to be scheduled
within 10 days from receipt of a copy of this
resolution by the incumbent corporate secretary
or acting corporate secretary of UDMC, and to
this end, that such officer be, as he hereby is,
directed: (a) to issue a call for such special
meeting and serve notice thereof on all
stockholders of record of the corporation, in
accordance with section 6 of article VII of
UDMC's by-laws; and (b) to submit to the
Commission, through the Commission
Secretary, a written report of his compliance
with this particular order of the Commission,
not later than 5 days prior to the scheduled
date of the proposed UDMC special
stockholders' meeting;
3. That upon the election of a new board of
directors of UDMC, that such board be, as it
hereby is, enjoined to meet as promptly as
possible for the purpose of electing a new set
of officers of the corporation in order to ensure
its proper management;
4. That the hearing officer be, as he hereby is,
directed to continue with the proceedings of
 SEC Case No. 3420, and to do so with all
deliberate speed, for the purpose of resolving
the alleged violation of certain rights of Sixto
Crisostomo, as a stockholder of UDMC
particularly, his right to inspect the corporate
books and records of UDMC, his preemptive
right to subscribe to the P60 million increase in
the authorized capital of UDMC, and his
appraisal rights; and
5. That the board of directors and officers of
UDMC be, as they hereby are, ordered to
submit to the Commission, through the
Chairman, a written report as to its plans as
regards its nursing school, such report to be
submitted at least one month prior to the
commencement of the school year 1989-1990.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 49-50, Rollo.)
Sixto Crisostomo sought a review of the SEC's en banc resolution in the Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 17435).
On June 8, 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition and lifted the
temporary restraining order that it had issued against the SEC's resolution
(Annex K, pp. 65-81, Rollo). Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (pp.
418-434, Rollo). The Court of Appeals required the private respondents to
comment but it denied the petitioner's motion to reinstate the writ of
preliminary injunction (Annex L, p. 82, Rollo),
On motion of the private respondents (Annex K, p. 413, Rollo), the SEC en
banc issued an order on June 27, 1989 directing the secretary of UDMC to
call a special stockholders' meeting to elect a new board of directors and
officers of the corporation (Annex F). Petitioner asked the SEC to recall that
order on account of his pending motion for reconsideration in the Court of
Appeals. The motion was opposed by the private respondents. On July 21,
1989, the SEC denied petitioner's motion (p. 86, Rollo). Whereupon, he filed
this petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for preliminary
injunction alleging that the SEC en banc abused its discretion:
1. in setting aside Esteves' orders
2. in allowing the Japanese group to have control of UDMC for
it will result in culpable violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which provides that no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals or corporations
qualified to acquire or hold land of the public domain, meaning
corporations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by Filipino citizens (Sec. 2, Article XII, 1987
Constitution); and
3. in allowing the Japanese investors to own more than 40%
of the capital stock of UDMC (which operates a nursing and
midwifery school) in violation of Section 4 (2) Article XIV of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that educational
institutions ... shall be owned solely by citizens of the
Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens.
The public and private respondents, in their comments on the petition, asked
that the petition be dismissed and that the petitioner be cited for contempt
for forum-shopping.
We find no merit in the petition. The first allegation that the SEC en
banc erred in reversing the orders of the hearing officer, Esteves, is the same
ground raised by the petitioner in CA-G.R. No. SP 17435. The issue is
frivolous for the authority of the SEC en banc to review, revise, reverse, or
affirm orders of its hearing officers is too elementary to warrant any debate.
Equally unmeritorious are the second and third grounds of the petition —
that the P57 million investment of the Japanese group in UDMC violates the
constitutional provisions restricting the transfer or conveyance of private
lands (Art. XIII, Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution) and the ownership of educational
institutions (Art. XVI, Sec. 14[a], 1987 Constitution), to citizens of the
Philippines or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipino citizens. While 82% of UDMC's capital stock is indeed subscribed by
the Japanese group, only 30% (equivalent to 171,721 shares or P17,172.00)
is owned by the Japanese citizens, namely, the Yamada spouses and
Tomotada Enatsu. 52% is owned by Edita Enatsu, who is a Filipino.
Accordingly, in its application for approval/registration of the foreign equity
investments of these investors, UDMC declared that 70% of its capital stock
is owned by Filipino citizens, including Edita Enatsu. That application was
approved by the Central Bank on August 3, 1988 (p. 249, Rollo,).
The investments in UDMC of Doctors Yamada and Enatsu do not violate the
Constitutional prohibition against foreigners practising a profession in the
Philippines (Section 14, Article XII, 1987 Constitution) for they do not
practice their profession (medicine) in the Philippines, neither have they
applied for a license to do so. They only own shares of stock in a corporation
that operates a hospital. No law limits the sale of hospital shares of stock to
doctors only. The ownership of such shares does not amount to engaging
(illegally,) in the practice of medicine, or, nursing. If it were otherwise, the
petitioner's stockholding in UDMC would also be illegal.
The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing the
secretary of UDMC to call a stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not premature,
despite the petitioner's then pending motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its writ
of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 17435 cleared the way for the
implementation by the SEC's en banc resolution in SEC EB Case No. 191. The
SEC need not wait for the Court of Appeals to resolve the petitioner's motion
for reconsideration for a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a preliminary
injunction is immediately executory. It "shall not be stayed after its rendition
and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal." (Sec. 4,
Rule 39, Rules of Court; Marcelo Steel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA
89 [1973]; Aguilar vs. Tan, 31 SCRA 205 [1970]; Sitia Teco vs. Ventura, 1
Phil. 497 [1902]; Watson & Co., Ltd. vs. M. Enriquez, I Phil. 480 [1902]).
We now address the public and private respondents' separate motions to
dismiss the petition and to cite Crisostomo and his counsel for contempt of
court for forum-shopping. The records show that Crisostomo had two actions
pending in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP 17435 and CA-G.R. No.
20285 CV) when he filed the petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 89095) in this
Court on July 27, 1989. The case docketed as CA-G.R. No. 20285-CV, is his
appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, dismissing his
complaint for annulment of the Memorandum of Agreement and the Stock
Purchase Agreement between UDMC and the Japanese investors. CA-G.R.
No. SP 17435 is his petition for certiorari to review the SEC's en
banc resolution upholding those transactions and ordering the holding of a
stockholders meeting to elect the directors of the UDMC, and of a board of
directors meeting to elect the officers.
Notwithstanding the pendency of those two cases in the Court of Appeals,
Crisostomo filed this petition for certiorari 1 and prohibition on July 27, 1989
where he raises the same issues that he raised in the Court of Appeals.
The prayer of his petition in CA-G.R. No. SP 17435 reads thus:
3) After hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered:
a) Annulling and setting aside the questioned
rulings of the respondent COMMISSION 2for
having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and
 b) Making permanent the preliminary injunction
issued in this case against the respondents. (p.
241, Rollo.)
In his petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 89095), he also prays that —
1. Upon the filing of this petition, a temporary restraining
order issue enjoining respondents, their representatives or
agents from implementing or executing the SEC opinions
(Annexes "F", "G" and "H") and its June 27 and July 21,1989
orders (Annexes "M" and "O") until further orders from the
Honorable Court.
xxx xxx xxx
3. After notice, this petition be given due course and a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued for the same purpose and
effect upon such terms and conditions the Honorable Court
may impose; and thereafter, judgment be rendered granting
the writ prayed for and annulling and setting aside the said
opinions rendered by the SEC in their stead, affirming the
orders of the Hearing Officer (Annexes "A" and "B"). (pp. 27-
28, Rollo.)
Additionally, in his petition for review (G.R. No. 89555) he prays this Court to
giant "all the reliefs" prayed for by him in CA-G.R. SP No. 17435. Here is a
clear case of forum-shopping.
There is forum-shopping whenever as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other
than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies
not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in
connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order
to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an
unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling.
This is specially so, as in this case, where the court in which
the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction. (Villanueva
vs. Adre, G.R. No. 8063, April 27, 1989.) (p. 303, Rollo)
Forum-shopping is prohibited by the Interim Rules of Court for it trifles with
the courts and abuses their processes (E. Razon, Inc. vs. Phil. Port Authority,
101 SCRA 450). Section 17 of the Interim Rules of Courts provides:
17. Petitions for writs of certiorari, etc ., — No petition for
certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus or quo
warranto may be filed in the Intermediate Appellate Court if
another similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the
Supreme Court. Nor may such petition be filed in the Supreme
Court if a similar petition has been filed or is still pending in
the Intermediate Appellate Court, unless it be to review the
action taken by the Intermediate Appellate Court on the
petition filed with it. A violation of this rule shall constitute
contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary
dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of
appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned.
(Interim Rules of Court.)
Forum-shopping makes the petitioner subject to disciplinary action and
renders his petitions in this Court and in the Court of Appeals dismissible (E.
Razon, Inc. vs. Philippine Port Authority, et al., G.R. No. 75197, Resolution
dated July 31, 1986; Buan vs. Lopez, Jr., 145 SCRA 34, 38-39; Collado vs.
Hernando, L-43886, May 30, 1988). For this reason, if not for their lack of
merit, the petitions should be, as they are hereby, dismissed.
WHEREFORE, these petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. The temporary
restraining order which this Court issued on August 7, 1989 in G.R. No.
89095 is hereby lifted. The Court of Appeals is ordered to immediately
dismiss CA-G.R. CV No. 20285. The petitioner and his counsel are censured
for engaging in forum-shopping. The petitioner is further ordered to pay
double costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. VENTURA
Statement. —This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal finding Guillermo I. Ventura guilty of illegal practice of
medicine under Section 770 in connection with Section 2678 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and sentencing him, this being his second offense, to
pay a fine in the sum of P500.00, with the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay costs.
Appellant, the accused, was charged with the above offense in an
information which alleged that in February, 1955, he did, .
"willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and for compensation and
reward, practice medicine in the said City (Pasay) by treating and
applying electrical appliances to patients for the purpose of curing
them with their ailments, diseases, pains, and physical defects from
which they are suffering and by holding out himself to the public by
means of signs, advertisements, and other means, to be a Doctor of
Medicine."
Facts. — lower court found, as facts, the following:
"... in the year 1949, the accused herein, Guillermo I. Ventura, was
convicted by the court of first instance of Rizal of a 'similar offense' or
illegal practice of medicine in the municipality of Pasay, now Pasay
City and sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 under the same legal
provisions, or Section 770 in connection with Section 2678 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
"... by reason of certain complaints the National Bureau of
Investigation had received from the President of the Philippine
Federation of Private Medical Practitioners and from the Chairman of
the Board of Medical Examiners, the National Bureau of Investigation
on December 16, 1955, sent its morgue attendant Jose Natayan to
the clinic of the accused at No. 2454 M. de la Cruz Street, Pasay City.
Natayan was at that time suffering from pains in his back and he
asked the accused to see his sickness. The accused attended to
Natayan; wrote something on a piece of paper; and then he told him
that he (Natayan) 'was sick of lumbago'. Thereupon, the accused
asked Natayan to pay P5.00 and then asked him to pay the amount
to a lady employee in the clinic which Natayan did. At the request of
the accused, Natayan, then went around the other side of the clinic
where he was given an enema of hot water by a male attendant.
Then Natayan was asked to lie down on a table where his back was
exposed to a big bulb for around fifteen minutes and afterwards to a
red colored bulb for another ten minutes. Thereafter Natayan went
back to the accused, who told him to come back to his clinic for six
consecutive days. After that Natayan went back on the same day or
December 16, 1955 to his office in the National Bureau of
Investigation.
The following day, Natayan returned to the clinic of the accused with
the National Bureau of Investigation raiding party composed of two
agents, two attorneys and one photographer. After he was dropped
by the National Bureau of Investigation agents about seven meters
away from the clinic of the accused, Natayan proceeded to the office
of the accused, who then and there told him that another treatment
would be applied to him and that he would pay P3.00. After paying
this amount and while Natayan was lying on a table about to be given
treatment the National Bureau of Investigation agents raided the
place.
 The accused herein, Guillermo I. Ventura, is not a duly registered
masseur or a physician qualified to practice medicine.
Issues. —Appellant seeks a reversal here of aforementioned judgment of
conviction on the grounds: (1) that the offense charged in the information
had already prescribed; (2) that the laws involved are unconstitutional and
void; (3) that granting that the said laws are valid, the accused should not
have been prosecuted thereunder because he was not engaged in the
practice of medicine; (4) that Congress, in passing House Bills Nos. 2405 and
357 recognized and believed in the efficacy of the drugless systems of
healing and although said bills were vetoed by the President of the
Philippines and thereby did not become regular statutes, they may be
considered as concurrent resolutions formally establishing the drugless
system of healing as a separate and distinct profession, not covered by
Section 770 of the Medical Law; (5) that the complainants and the
Government are estopped from prosecuting the accused under Section 770
because they were the ones who induced him to practice drugless healing
after his conviction in 1949; and (6) that the accused has an implied license
to practice drugless healing from the people of the Philippines and the
Chairman of the Medical Board of Examiners.
Discussion. — Appellant, testifying on his behalf admitted that for the past 35
years, he had been practicing as a naturopathic physician, "treating human
ailments without the use of drugs and medicines" and employing in his
practice "electricity, water and hand" without a license to practice medicine;
that during this time he had treated 500,000 patients, more or less about
90% of whom were healed, and that he had studied drugless healing in the
American University, Chicago, Illinois for about four years.
Invoking prescription, he argues that in view of the fact that he had begun
the alleged practice of medicine thirty five years ago without the required
license, the crime charged in the information had already prescribed. 1
The records reveal that the accused began practicing his method of drugless
healing 35 years ago. This practice was first discovered by the authorities in
1949. He was prosecuted and convicted therefor the same year. Sometime
after he again set up a clinic. He had a lucrative clientele and nobody
bothered him.1äwphï1.ñët
However, at about February, 1955, the President of the Philippine Federation
of Private Medical Practitioners, complained to the National Bureau of
Investigation that appellant was advertising himself as capable of treating
human ailments without drugs. Upon investigation, appellant was found to be
without certificate of registration to practice such profession either from the
Board of Medical Examiners or from the Committee of Examiners of
Masseurs. So, this prosecution started in 1956. It is clear that the four-year
period of prescription of the offense charged should be computed from
February, 1955 when the National Bureau of Investigation discovered
appellant's alleged illegal practice of Medicine.
Appellant also questions the constitutionality of Section 770 in relation to
Section 775 of the Revised Administrative Code. It is appellant's theory that
to require, of any person whose business is merely to stimulate by
mechanical means the nerves of the body, many years of study in medical
schools, taking up obstetrics, general surgery, gynecology, bacteriology and
many other sciences, is curtailment of the exercise of one's calling, a
violation of the constitutional principle that all men have the right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and are entitled to the equal protection
of the law. It is furthermore theorized that inasmuch as drugless healing is
not taught in any of the medical schools prescribed, how could the members
of the Medical Board of Examiners pass on the competence of these drugless
healers? .
This same contention was presented to and settled by this Court in the case
of People vs. Buenviaje who was convicted of illegal practice of medicine for
practicing chiropractor.2 It held:
 There is very little force in this argument. The subjects in which an
examination is required relate to matters of which a thorough
knowledge seems necessary for the proper diagnosis of diseases of
the human body and it is within the police power of the State to
require that persons who devote themselves to the curing of human
ills should possess such knowledge.
In the instant case, we must again uphold these immutable concepts of the
police power of the State. Under this power, the State may prescribe such
regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general
welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequences of ignorance
and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. As one means to this end, it
has been the practice of different States, from time immemorial to exact in
any pursuit, profession or trade, a certain degree of skill and learning upon
which the community may confidently rely, their possession being generally
ascertained in an examination of parties by competent persons, or inferred
from a certificate to them in the form of a diploma or license from an
institution established for instruction on the subjects, scientific or otherwise,
with which such pursuits have to deal.3
Appellant claims that his act of stimulating the affected nerves of the patients
without use of any drug or medicine is not practice of medicine; that
"practice of medicine" is confined only to the systems taught by the medical
schools, namely, the regular, the homeopathic and the eclectic schools or
systems.
Section 770 of the Revised Administrative Code in no uncertain terms covers
appellant's acts. The statutory definition as to what acts constitute illegal
practice of medicine its provided in said Section 770 includes the acts and
practices performed by appellant, By his own statements, he admitted to
have continuously diagnosed and treated more or less 500,000 instances of
different kinds of human ailments and to have prescribed remedies therefor.
As regards the contention that there are at least two concurrent resolutions
declaring formally that Congress has recognized the drugless methods of
healing, we need not elaborate further than to say that not until such
recognition is actually embodied in a statute, shall we extend consideration of
such method.
Appellant pleads that the lower court erred in not holding that the
complainants and the government are estopped from prosecuting him
because they were the ones who induced him to practice drugless healing
after his conviction in 1949. He tried to show that medical practitioners,
members of Congress, provincial governors, city mayors and municipal board
members wrote to him requesting his help for persons suffering from all
kinds of ailments; that municipal ordinances and resolutions were also
passed authorizing him not only to practice his method of healing but also to
put up clinics in some of municipalities; that he was even extended free
transportation facilities to work in the Central Luzon Sanitarium in Tala,
Caloocan, Rizal.
Above plea cannot be sustained by this Court. The doctrine of estoppel does
not apply to the government.4 It is never stopped by mistakes or errors on
the part of its agents, even assuming without conceding that said
municipalities had encouraged appellant's practice. We cannot allow the
bargaining away of public health and safety for the semblance of benefit to a
few government officials, people or even municipalities.
Similarly, there is no such thing as implied license to practice drugless
healing by the mere fact that the Chairman of the Board of Medical
Examiners had permitted appellant to serve free in the Central Luzon
Sanitarium in Tala, Caloocan, Rizal, or that countless people persisted in
engaging his services. For one thing, these people might have contracted his
services on the mistaken notion that he was duly licensed to practice his
profession; for another, a repetition of illegal acts can never make them
legal.
As additional argument, appellant urges acquittal under the new Medical Act
of 19595 wherein the practice of physiotherapy is recognized as a distinct
science. He claims coverage of said law on the ground that he practices
physiotherapy by massage through physical devices and upon the
recommendation of duly registered physicians.
The above argument has no merit because there is strong evidence to the
effect that appellant alone diagnoses his patients' ailments and applies the
remedies therefor6 without written order or prescription by a registered
physician.
Judgment. — Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all
parts and respects. Costs against appellant.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. JOVITA V. BUENVIAJE, Defendant-Appellant.
Francisco and Lualhati and Ariston Rivera for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
The defendant is accused of the violation of the Medical Act, the information
alleging "that on or about the first day of June, 1923, and for some time prior
to said date, the said accused without having obtained from the Board of
Medical Examiners the corresponding certificate of registration for the
practice of medicine in the Philippine Islands, voluntarily, illegally and
criminally and for compensation, practiced medicine in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, assisting, treating and manipulating the head and body of
Regino Noble for the purpose of curing him of the ailments, diseases, pains
and physical defects from which he pretended to suffer, and advertising and
offering her services as a physician, by means of cards which she distributed
and by letterheads and signs which she exposed on the door of her office,
situated at No. 712 Calle Asuncion, and in newspapers which are published
and circulated in the City of Manila, in which cards, letterheads, signs and
advertising she added and prefixed to her name the letters `Dra.,' which is
the abbreviation of the word `doctor,' for the purpose of causing the public
to believe that she, the said defendant, had received the corresponding title
of doctor."chanrobles virtual law library
To this information the defendant demurred in the court below on the
grounds: (1) That it stated more than one offense, and (2) that it was not
drawn in accordance with the form prescribed by law. The demurrer was
overruled and the defendant pleaded not
guilty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At the trial of the case the defendant made the following admissions: "That
on the first of June, 1923, she had no certificate from the Board of Medical
Examiners authorizing her to practice medicine in the Philippine Islands; that
on that day she treated and manipulated the head and body of Regino Noble
in order to cure him of ailments from which he pretended to suffer, the
treatment consisting in a `thrust' by means of the application of the hand to
the spinal column; that she for such treatment received and collected from
said Regino Noble the sum of P1; that the said treatment took place in her
office situated at No. 712 Calle Asuncion, District of Binondo, City of Manila,
Philippine Islands; that she on or about the first day of June, 1923, and for
some time prior to that date, advertised herself as a `doctor of chiropractic,'
in said City of Manila, said advertisement appearing upon her business cards
and in the newspaper `El Debate,' in its issue of April 29, 1923, edited and
published in Manila and in which cards and newspaper advertisement the
defendant prefixed the abbreviation `Dra.' to her name; that she was
graduated a doctor in chiropractic on the 13th day of August, 1919, as
evidenced by a certificate marked Exhibit I and issued by the American
University School of Chiropractic of Chicago, Illinois."chanrobles virtual law
library
Upon this admission and some other evidence to the same effect, the trial
court found the defendant guilty as charged in the information and, in
accordance with section 2678 of the Administrative Code, sentenced her to
pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs. From this judgment the defendant appeals to this court and
presents four assignments of error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
I. In the first assignment of error counsel contends that the demurrer to the
information should have been sustained on the ground that said information
charged more than one offense. The Medical Law is contained in sections 758
to 783 of the Administrative Code and it is argued that inasmuch as some of
the illegal acts with which the defendant is charged are prohibited by section
770 of the Code and others by section 783, the defendant is in reality
accused of two separate and distinct offenses, namely, illegal practice of
medicine and illegally representing oneself as a opium and a pipe at the same time. If that were true then every person who
doctor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We cannot accept this view. It may be noted that the Medical Law itself, as it
appears in the Administrative Code, does not declare any of the therein
prohibited acts penal offenses. The penal provisions relating thereto are
contained in section 2678 of the Code, which reads as follows:
SEC. 2678. Violation of Medical Law . - A person violating any provision of the
Medical Law shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than
three hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
The offense here penalized is "violation of the Medical Law." The statute
makes no distinction between illegal practice of medicine and illegally
advertising oneself as a doctor. Both are in violation of the Medical Law and
carry the same penalty. They are merely different ways or means of
committing the same offense and both of these means are closely related to
each other and usually employed
together.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In these circumstances and where, as alleged in the information in the
present case, the various violations have taken place simultaneously, we do
not think it was the intention of the legislator that each single act should be
regarded as a separate offense and separate informations presented for
each. The language of this court in the case of United States vs. Poh Chi (20
Phil., 140), in regard to the Opium Law, is opposite to the present case.
It is true that the Commission has provided a certain punishment for the
possession of a pipe used in the smoking of opium, for the smoking of
opium, as well as a punishment for the illegal possession of opium, but it is
not believed that it was the intention of the legislature to have separate
complaints filed against a person who was found in the illegal possession of
was found to be smoking opium could be charged in three different
complaints: First, with the illegal possession of the pipe; second, the illegal
possession of the opium; and third, for smoking the opium. Certainly the
legislature did not intend any such consequences.
In the case of United States vs. Douglass (2 Phil., 461), the court said:
It is not objectionable, when a single offense may be committed by the use
of different means, to charge, in the alternative, the various means by which
the crime may have been committed. (U.S. vs. Potter, 27 Fed. Cases, 604;
Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, sec. 434.)
The same rule was followed in the case of United States vs. Dorr (2 Phil.,
332); United States vs. Tolentino (5 Phil., 682); and United States vs. Gustilo
(19 Phil., 208) and is in harmony with the views of the courts in other
jurisdictions. That the various means of committing the offense is described
in more than one section of the statute does not necessarily effect the
general principle involved; the subdivision of a statute into section is merely
a matter of convenience and while it sometimes may be of some aid in
ascertaining the legislative intent, it is, of course, not conclusive
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
II. Under the second assignment of error the appellant argues in substance
that chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that the practice of
that profession can therefore not be regarded as practice of medicine. There
is no merit whatever in this contention. Assuming without conceding that
chiropractic does not fall within the term "practice of medicine" in its ordinary
acceptation, we have the statutory definition contained in section 770 of the
Administrative Code and which clearly includes the manipulations employed
in chiropractic. The statutory definition necessarily prevails over the ordinary
one.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the same assignment of error the defendant also argues that the
examination prescribed by section 776 of the Administrative Code for
admission to the practice of medicine, embraces subjects which have no
connection with chiropractic and that to require chiropractors to take that
examination is unreasonable and, in effect amounts to prohibition of the
practice of their profession and therefore violates the constitutional principle
that all men have the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and
are entitled to the equal protection of the
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is very little force in this argument. The subjects in which an
examination is required by section 778 of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 3111, relate to matters of which a thorough knowledge
seems necessary for the proper diagnosis of diseases of the human body and
it is within the police power of the State to require that persons who devote
themselves to the curing of human ills should possess such knowledge.
(State vs. Edmunds, 127 Iowa, 333; 69 L.R.A., 504; Underwood vs. Scott, 43
Kan., 714; People vs. Blue Mountain Joe, 129 Ill., 370; State vs. Mylod, 20 R.
I., 632; 41 L.R.A., 428; Stewart vs. Raab, 55 Minn., 20; Matthei vs. Wooley,
69 Ill. App., 654; State vs. Buswell, 40 Neb., 158; 24 L.R.A., 68; O'Connor vs.
State, 46 Neb., 157; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218.)chanrobles virtual
law library
III. The third assignment of error is closely related to the foregoing. The
appellant contends that the prohibition in section 783 against the
unauthorized use of the title "doctor" must be understood to refer to "Doctor
of Medicine" and has no application to doctors of chiropractic. Under different
circumstances that might possibly be so, but where, as here, chiropractic is
by statute made a form of the practice of medicine, it necessarily follows that
a person holding himself out as a doctor of chiropractic in legal effect
represents himself as a doctor of
medicine.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
IV. In her fourth assignment of error the appellant attacks the
constitutionality of Act No. 3111, amending section 770 of the Administrative
Code, on the ground that the subject of the Act is not sufficiently expressed
in its title and that it embraces more than one subject. There is no merit in
this contention. The title of Act No. 3111 reads as follows:
An Act to amend sections seven hundred and fifty-nine, seven hundred and
sixty, seven hundred and sixty-one, seven hundred and sixty-two, seven
hundred and sixty-five, seven hundred and sixty-seven, seven hundred and
seventy, seven hundred and seventy-four, seven hundred and seventy-five,
seven hundred and seventy-six, seven hundred and seventy-eight, seven
hundred and eighty, seven hundred and eighty-two, seven hundred and
eighty-three, and twenty-six hundred and seventy-eight of Act Numbered
Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, known as the Administrative Code,
increasing the number of the members of the Board of Medical Examiners,
conferring upon the same certain additional powers and responsibilities and
for other purposes.
All of the sections enumerated in the title quoted relate to the same general
subject, namely, defining and regulating the practice of medicine, and section
770 is expressly mentioned as one of the sections
amended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This is sufficient. Under constitutional provisions similar to ours the general

rule is that a title which declares the amendatory statute to be an act to
amend a designated section or the like of a specified Code is sufficient and
the precise nature of the amendatory Act need not be further stated.
(Ross vs. Aguirre, 191 U.S., 60; Udell vs. Citizens Street R. Co., 152 Ind.,
507; McGuire vs. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 131 Iowa, 340; Lankford vs. County
Commissioners of Somerset County, 73 Md., 105; Tabor vs. State, 34 Tex.
Crim., 631; Com. vs. Brown, 91 Va., 762.) For a full and authoritative
discussion of this subject, see Note to Lewis vs. Dunne, 55 L.R.A., 833. See
also Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binalonan and
Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia (32 Phil., 634) and Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad (p. 385,ante).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

We find no error in the judgment appealed from and the same is therefore
affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINES