FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132428. October 24, 2000]

GEORGE YAO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, George Yao (hereafter
YAO) assails the 25 April 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 16893 which dismissed his appeal and ordered the
remand of the records of the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 52, Caloocan* City (hereafter MeTC) for execution. YAO was
convicted by said MeTC for unfair competition.

YAOs legal dilemma commenced in June 1990 when the

Philippine Electrical Manufacturing Company (hereafter PEMCO)
noticed the proliferation locally of General Electric (GE) lamp
starters. As the only local subsidiary of GE-USA, PEMCO knew that it
was a highly unlikely market situation considering that no GE starter
was locally manufactured or imported since 1983. PEMCO
commissioned Gardsmarks, Inc. to conduct a market survey.
Gardsmarks, Inc., thru its trademark specialist, Martin
Remandaman, discovered that thirty (30) commercial establishments
sold GE starters. All these establishments pointed to Tradeway
Commercial Corporation (hereafter TCC) as their source.
Remandaman was able to purchase from TCC fifty (50) pieces of
fluorescent lamp starters with the GE logo and design. Assessing that
these products were counterfeit, PEMCO applied for the issuance of a
search warrant. This was issued by the MeTC, Branch 49, Caloocan
City. Eight boxes, each containing 15,630 starters, were thereafter
seized from the TCC warehouse in Caloocan City.

Indicted before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City for unfair
competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code were YAO,
who was TCCs President and General Manager, and Alfredo Roxas, a
member of TCCs Board of Directors. The indictment[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif] charged YAO and Roxas of having mutually and in

conspiracy sold fluorescent lamp starters which have the General

Electric (GE) logo, design and containers, making them appear as
genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters; and inducing the public to
believe them as such, when they were in fact counterfeit. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. C-155713.

Both accused pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the prosecution

presented evidence tending to establish the foregoing narration of
facts. Further, the State presented witnesses Atty. Hofilena of the
Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon Law Offices who underwent a
familiarization seminar from PEMCO in 1990 on how to distinguish a
genuine GE starter from a counterfeit, and Allan de la Cruz, PEMCOs
marketing manager. Both described a genuine GE starter as having a
stenciled silk-screen printing which includes the GE logo... back to
back around the starter, a drumlike glowbulb and a
condenser/capacitor shaped like an M&M candy with the numbers
.006." They then compared and examined random samples of the
seized starters with the genuine GE products. They concluded that the
seized starters did not possess the full design complement of a GE
original. They also observed that some of the seized starters did not
have capacitors or if they possessed capacitors, these were not shaped
like M&M. Still others merely had sticker jackets with prints of the GE
logo. Mr. de la Cruz added that only Hankuk Stars of Korea
manufactured GE starters and if these were imported by PEMCO,
they would cost P7.00 each locally. As TCCs starters cost P1.60 each,
the witnesses agreed that the glaring differences in the packaging,
design and costs indisputably proved that TCCs GE starters were
counterfeit.

The defense presented YAO as its lone witness. YAO admitted

that as general manager, he has overall supervision of the daily
operation of the company. As such, he has the final word on the
particular brands of products that TCC would purchase and in turn
sold. He also admitted that TCC is not an accredited distributor of GE
starters. However, he disclaimed liability for the crime charged since
(1) he had no knowledge or information that the GE starters supplied
to TCC were fake; (2) he had not attended any seminar that helped
him determine which TCC products were counterfeit; (3) he had no
participation in the manufacture, branding, stenciling of the GE
names or logo in the starters; (4) TCCs suppliers of the starters
delivered the same already branded and boxed; and (5) he only
discussed with the suppliers matters regarding pricing and peak-
volume items.
 In its 13-page 20 October 1993 decision,[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] the
MeTC acquitted Roxas but convicted YAO. In acquitting Roxas, the
trial court declared that the prosecution failed to prove that he was
still one of the Board of Directors at the time the goods were seized. It
anchored its conviction of YAO on the following: (1) YAOs admission
that he knew that the starters were not part of GEs line products
when he applied with PEMCO for TCCs accreditation as distributor;
(2) the prosecutions evidence (Exhibit G-7), a delivery receipt dated
25 May 1989 issued by Country Supplier Center, on which a TCC
personnel noted that the 2000 starters delivered were GE starters
despite the statement therein that they were China starters; this fact
gave rise to a presumption that the TCC personnel knew of the
anomaly and that YAO as general manager and overall supervisor
knew and perpetrated the deception of the public; (3) the fact that no
genuine GE starter could be sold from 1986 whether locally
manufactured or imported or at the very least in such large
commercial quantity as those seized from TCC; and (4) presence of
the elements of unfair competition.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

For the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused,
Alfredo Roxas, of Unfair Competition under Article 189 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code ... i.e., to prove that he was Chairman of the
Board of the Tradeway Commercial Corporation on October 10, 1990,
as well as to have him identified in open court during the trial, he is
acquitted of the same.
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused,
George Yao, beyond reasonable doubt as principal under the said
Article 189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In
the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances
alleged/proven, and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year
and five (5) months of prision correccional.

This case was prosecuted by the law offices of Castillo Laman Tan and
Pantaleon for ... PEMCO ... Considering that no document was
submitted by the private complainant to show how the claim of
P300,000 for consequential damages was reached and/or computed,
the court is not in a position to make a pronouncement on the whole
amount. However, the offender, George Yao, is directed to pay
PEMCO the amount of P20,000 by way of consequential damages
under Article 2202 of the New Civil Code, and to pay the law offices of
Castillo, Laman Tan and Pantaleon the amount of another
P20,000.00 as PEMCOs attorneys fees under Article 2208 (11) of the
same.
This decision should have been promulgated in open court on July
28, 1993 but the promulgation was reset for August 31, 1993 in view
of the absence of parties; it was again re-set for today.

Promulgated this 20th day of October, 1993 in Kalookan City,

Philippines.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC denied
in its order[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] of 7 March 1994.
YAO appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
(RTC). The appeal was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-47255(94)
and was assigned to Branch 121 of the court.
On 24 May 1994, Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of
Branch 121 issued an order[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] directing the parties
to file their respective memoranda.
On 4 July 1994 YAO filed his Appeal Memorandum.[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif]

Without waiting for the Memorandum on Appeal of the

prosecution, which was filed only on 20 August 1994,[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif] Judge Adoracion Angeles rendered on 27 July

1994 a one-page Decision[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] which affirmed in toto

the MeTC decision. In so doing, she merely quoted the dispositive
portion of the MeTC and stated that [a]after going over the evidence
on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of
the Metropolitan Trial Court.
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] and
assailed the decision as violative of Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of
Court.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] In its order[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] of 28
September 1994, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration as
devoid of merit and reiterated that the findings of the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on
appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons.
On 4 October 1994, YAO appealed to the Court of Appeals by
filing a notice of appeal.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
The appealed case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 16893. In its
Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] of 28 February 1995, the Court of
Appeals granted YAO an extension of twenty (20) days from 10
February or until 12 March 1995 within which to file the Appellants
Brief. However, on 25 April 1995 the Court of Appeals promulgated a
Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] declaring that [t]he decision
rendered on July 27, 1994 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121,
has long become final and executory and ordering the records of the
case remanded to said court for the proper execution of judgment.
The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:
In Our resolution, dated February 28, 1995, accused-appellant was
granted an extension of twenty (20) days from February 10, 1995, or
until March 12, 1995 within which to file appellants brief.
To date, no appellants brief has been filed.
From the Manifestation, filed on March 24, 1995, by City Prosecutor
Gabriel N. dela Cruz, Kalookan City, it would appear that:
xxx
2. George Yao received a copy of the RTCs decision on August 16,
1994, and filed a motion for reconsideration on August 30, 1994. On
October 3, 1994, George Yao received a copy of the RTCs order, dated
September 28, 1994, denying his motion for reconsideration.

3. On October 4, 1994, George Yao filed a notice of appeal by

registered mail.
We will assume from the said Manifestation that the decision of the
RTC and the order denying YAOs motion for reconsideration were
sent to and received by YAOs counsel.

Proceeding from said assumption, Yao had fifteen (15) days from
August 16, 1994 to elevate his case to this Court. On August 30, 1994,
or fourteen (14) days thereafter, Yao filed a motion for
reconsideration. When he received the Order denying his aforesaid
motion on October 3, 1994, he had one more day left to elevate his
case to this Court by the proper mode of appeal, which is by petition
for review. Yao, however, on October 4, 1994, filed a notice of appeal
by registered mail informing the RTC that he is appealing his
conviction to the Court of Appeals. By then, the fifteen (15) day period
had already elapsed.
That notwithstanding, the Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 121,
transmitted to this Court the entire records of the case, thru a
transmittal letter, dated October 13, 1994, and received by the
Criminal Section of this Court on October 28, 1994. YAOs counsel, on
February 20, 1995, filed with this Court, a motion for extension of
period to file brief for accused-appellant which was granted in Our
resolution mentioned in the opening paragraph of this resolution.

Petitions for review shall be filed within the period to appeal. This
period has already elapsed even when Yao filed a notice of appeal by
registered mail, with the RTC of Kalookan City. Worse, the notice of
appeal is procedurally infirm.
YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment
contending that the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically
dismiss the appeal, for which reason, there was no judgment on
which an entry of judgment could be issued. He also argued that the
attendant procedural infirmities in the appeal, if any, were cured with
the issuance of the 28 February 1995 resolution granting him twenty
(20) days from 10 February 1995 or until 12 March 1995 within which
to file an appellants brief and in compliance thereto, consequently
filed his appellants brief on 2 March 1995.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
In its Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] of 26 January 1998, the
Court of Appeals denied the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of
Judgment for lack of merit. It considered the 25 April 1995 resolution
as having in effect dismissed the appeal, [hence] the Entry of
Judgment issued on May 26, 1995... was proper.
In this petition for review on certiorari, YAO reiterates the
arguments he raised in his Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of
Judgment of the Court of Appeals, thus: (1) that the entry of
judgment was improvidently issued in the absence of a final
resolution specifically dismissing the appeal; (2) the procedural
infirmity in the appeal, if any, has been cured; and (3) the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying him (YAO) due process of law.
In support of his first argument, YAO cites Section 1, Rule 11 of
the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, thus:
SEC. 1. Entry of Judgment. -- Unless a motion for reconsideration is
filed or an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court, judgments and final
resolutions of the Court of Appeals shall be entered upon the
expiration of fifteen (15) days after notice to parties.
YAO claims that the 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of
Appeals was not a judgment on his appeal nor was it a final resolution
contemplated in the Internal Rules since it did not specifically
dismiss his appeal. A fortiori, the entry of judgment was
improvidently issued for lack of legal basis.
YAO also repeats his argument that any procedural infirmity in
the appeal was cured when the RTC gave due course to the appeal,
elevated the records to the Court of Appeals which in turn issued on
13 December 1994 a notice to file his Appellants Brief and granted
him until 12 March 1995 within which to file the appellants brief.
Finally, YAO asserts that he was denied due process considering
that (1) none of the elements of unfair competition are present in this
case; (2) he filed his appeal to the Court of Appeals within the
reglementary period; and (3) notwithstanding his filing of a notice of
appeal (instead of a petition for review), it was a mere procedural
lapse, a technicality which should not bar the determination of the
case based on intrinsic merits. YAO then invokes the plethora of
jurisprudence wherein the Supreme Court in the exercise of equity
jurisdiction decided to disregard technicalities; decided [the case] on
merits and not on technicalities; found manifest in the petition strong
considerations of substantial justice necessitating the relaxing of the
stringent application of technical rules, or heeded petitioners cry for
justice because the basic merits of the case warrant so, as where the
petition embodies justifying circumstances; discerned not to sacrifice
justice to technicality; discovered that the application of res judicata
and estoppel by judgment amount to a denial of justice and or a bar to
a vindication of a legitimate grievance.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that the
petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. It maintains that
although the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically state that
the appeal was being dismissed, the intent and import are clear and
unequivocable. It asserts that the appeal was obviously dismissed
because the RTC decision has long become final and executory. YAO
failed to challenge the RTC decision, within the reglementary period,
by filing a petition for review of the same with the Court of appeals
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Instead, he
filed an ordinary appeal by way of a notice of appeal. Hence, the
period to file the correct procedural remedy had lapsed.
There is no dispute that YAO availed of the wrong procedural
remedy in assailing the RTC decision. It is clear from the records that
YAO received a copy of the adverse RTC judgment on 16 August 1994.
He has fifteen (15) days or until 31 August 1994 within which to file
either a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals. Fourteen (14) days thereafter or on 30 August 1994,
YAO opted to file a motion for reconsideration the pendency of which
tolled the running of the period. He received a copy of the RTCs order
denying the motion for reconsideration on 3 October 1994. He had
therefore, only one day left, 4 October 1994 as the last day, within
which to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. [if
!supportFootnotes][18][endif] However, on said date, YAO filed a notice of

appeal. He palpably availed of the wrong mode of appeal. And since

he never instituted the correct one, he lost it.
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent
right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore,
available only if granted or provided by statute.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due
process, it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] Corollarily, its
requirements must be strictly complied with.
That an appeal must be perfected in the manner and within the
period fixed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional.[if
!supportFootnotes][21][endif] Non-compliance with such legal requirements is

fatal,[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] for it renders the decision sought to be

appealed final and executory,[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] with the end
result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the
decision.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif]
In the light of these procedural precepts, YAOs petition appears
to be patently without merit and does not deserve a second look.
Hence, the reasons he enumerated to persuade this Court to grant his
petition and reinstate his appeal are obviously frivolous if not
downright trivial. They need not even be discussed here.
In the normal and natural course of events, we should dismiss
the petition outright, if not for an important detail which augurs well
for YAO and would grant him a reprieve in his legal battle. The
decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO palpably
transgressed Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
xxx
Let us quote in full the RTC judgment:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 52, Kalookan City, in Crim. Case No. C-155713, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
xxx
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused,
George Yao; beyond reasonable doubt as principal under the said
Article 189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is convicted of the same. In
the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances
alleged/proven, and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year
and five (5) months of prision correccional.
xxx
After going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
WHEREFORE, this Court affirms in toto the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court dated October 20, 1993.
SO ORDERED.
That is all there is to it.
We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having
substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional
injunction notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which
they were written and even if there (was left) much to be desired in
terms of (their) clarity, coherence and comprehensibility provided
that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were
based,[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] as when they stated the legal
qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the
modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty
imposed and the civil liability;[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] or discussed the
facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the
information, and accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the
corresponding penalty;[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] or quoted the facts
narrated in the prosecutions memorandum but made their own
findings and assessment of evidence, before finally agreeing with the
prosecutions evaluation of the case.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif]
We have also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions,[if
!supportFootnotes][29][endif] a specie of succinctly written decisions by

appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Section 40, B.P.

Blg. 129[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] on the grounds of expediency,
practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. We have
also declared that memorandum decisions comply with the
constitutional mandate.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif]
 In Francisco v. Permskul,[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] however, we laid
down the conditions for the of validity of memorandum decisions,
thus:
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the
findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by
remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not
easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be
allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law
being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to
the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision
authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody
the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an
annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no
study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision
was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and
the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed
statement should suggest that such an examination has been
undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being
adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as
no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum
decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse
for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity that this
kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are
in the main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the
judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will
require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The
memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only,
such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously
groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.
xxx
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the
requirements herein set forth both as to the form prescribed and the
occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon
the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution
and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.
Tested against these standards, we find that the RTC decision at
bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the
constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief indeed, but it is
starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its
form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a
simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy
speaks for itself.
We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a
memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures
of validity laid down in Francisco v. Permskul. It merely affirmed in
toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or resolution,
especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for
resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.[if
!supportFootnotes][33][endif]

We therefore reiterate our admonition in Nicos Industrial

Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif] in that while
we conceded that brevity in the writing of decisions is an admirable
trait, it should not and cannot be substituted for substance; and again
in Francisco v. Permskul,[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] where we cautioned
that expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-
compliance with the constitutional requirements.
This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated
and concise decisions, but never at the expense of scholarly analysis,
and more significantly, of justice and fair play, lest the fears
expressed by Justice Feria as the ponente in Romero v. Court of
Appeals[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] come true, i.e., if an appellate court
failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, said
court deprived the appellant of due process since he was not accorded
a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate.
This situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases, as in this
case, where not only property rights are at stake but also the liberty if
not the life of a human being.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII
of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due
process and fair play.[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] It is likewise demanded by
the due process clause of the Constitution.[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif] The
parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with
an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment
is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without
any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled
to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if
permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A
decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law
on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable
to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal.[if !supportFootnotes][39][endif] More than that, the requirement is an
assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so
through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard
against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding
ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the
Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of
passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the
judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained
public confidence in the justness of his decision.[if !supportFootnotes][40][endif]

Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts
and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the
constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not
only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed
fealty to the Constitution.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, a decision, resolution or
order which: contained no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor
reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions; contained
nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of
both parties;[if !supportFootnotes][41][endif] convicted the accused of libel but
failed to cite any legal authority or principle to support conclusions
that the letter in question was libelous;[if !supportFootnotes][42][endif]
consisted merely of one (1) paragraph with mostly sweeping
generalizations and failed to support its conclusion of parricide;[if
!supportFootnotes][43][endif] consisted of five (5) pages, three (3) pages of

which were quotations from the labor arbiters decision including the
dispositive portion and barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two
[2] sentences each) of its own discussion or reasonings[if
!supportFootnotes][44][endif]; was merely based on the findings of another

court sans transcript of stenographic notes;[if !supportFootnotes][45][endif] or

failed to explain the factual and legal bases for the award of moral
damages.[if !supportFootnotes][46][endif]
In the same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTC decision
in question.
 In sum, we agree with YAO that he was denied due process but
not on the grounds he ardently invoked but on the reasons already
extensively discussed above. While he indeed resorted to the wrong
mode of appeal and his right to appeal is statutory, it is still an
essential part of the judicial system that courts should proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of the prerogative, but instead
afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities.[if !supportFootnotes][47][endif]
In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most
mandatory character in terms of compliance, may be relaxed.[if
!supportFootnotes][48][endif] In other words, if strict adherence to the letter of

the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice[if

!supportFootnotes][49][endif] or where the merit of a partys cause is apparent

and outweighs consideration of non-compliance with certain formal

requirements,[if !supportFootnotes][50][endif] procedural rules should definitely
be liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather
than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere
technicalities.[if !supportFootnotes][51][endif] We therefore withhold legal
approbation on the RTC decision at bar for its palpable failure to
comply with the constitutional and legal mandates thereby denying
YAO of his day in court. We also remind all magistrates to heed the
demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. It is their
solemn and paramount duty to uphold the Constitution and the
principles enshrined therein, lest they be lost in the nitty-gritty of
their everyday judicial work.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in this case

is GRANTED. The questioned 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893 is hereby SET ASIDE and the 27 July
1994 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Kalookan
City rendered in its appellate jurisdiction is NULLIFIED. The records
are hereby remanded to said Regional Trial Court for further
proceedings and for the rendition of judgment in accordance with the
mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.