Taguinod, Harlene Kaye D.

11 – 00550

Case No. 1
G.R. No. L-9620 June 28, 1957
In Re Guardianship Of The Minor Roy Reginald Lelina. Severo
Viloria Vs. Administrator Of Veterans Affairs

Facts: Constancio Lelina served as a member of the US

Armed Forces during the Japanese war, and had a son named Roy
Reginald Lelina. When he died, his son received the arrears pay,
insurance, and other benefits from the US Veterans
Administration.

Severo Viloria was appointed guardian of Roy Reginald and

was authorized to withdraw from the estate of his ward the sum
of P30 a month for the boy’s support and other expenses.

Subsequently, herein respondent filed a motion to stop

further payment of monthly allowances to the minor after having
received certain letters from its central office that the deceased
was not engaged in guerilla or other service in the armed forces
of US, hence, he was not entitled to the payment of gratuitous
National Service Life Insurance. The administrator now seeks for
a refund of the balance of the insurance benefits wrongfully paid
which was still in deposit with PNB.

Petitioner opposed and submitted evidence to show that

Constancio was duly recognized by both RP and US Armies but
was denied, hence moving for allowance to withdraw the P4000
from the wards estate to meet his needs. The Administrator of
Veteran Affairs opposed arguing that the minor's rights to
National Service Life Insurance is governed exclusively by the S.S.
Code Annotated, which provides that decisions of the
administrator shall be final and conclusive on all questions of
law or fact and no other official of the us, except a judge or
judges of the united states courts, shall have jurisdiction to
review such decisions.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the US Code Annotated should be applied

to the present case?

2. Whether or not a claim of improper payment to the ward

(through the guardian) of benefits is properly filed in the
guardianship proceedings?
Ruling:

1. NO. When actions are filed against the Administrator, it must

be filed strictly in accordance with the conditions imposed by
the Veteran's Act, including exclusive review by US Courts. There
is no law or treaty which would make the findings of the
VETERANS Administrator, in actions where he is a mere party,
conclusive on our courts as this would deprive our tribunals of
judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate
instrumentalities of the veterans Administrator. In submitting
itself to the jurisdiction of the court, it cannot put in issue the
legality of its order. Hence, the burden lies upon the
Administrator to satisfy the court that the alleged mistake was
really committed.

Therefore, the Philippine Court's determination of the

question is as binding upon the Veteran's Administrator as upon
any other litigant. From the time the amounts sought to be
recovered were paid to the guardian, for the ward's benefit, the
latter became their lawful possessor and he cannot be deprived
thereof on the sole allegation of the Veteran's Administrator that
the money was erroneously paid

2. NO. Conflicts regarding the ownership or title to the property

in the hands of the guardian in his capacity as such, should be
litigated in a separate proceeding, the court in the guardianship
proceeding being solely concerned with the ward’s care and
custody and proper administration of his properties.

Case No. 2
G.R. No. L-12289 May 28, 1958
LIM SIOK HUEY, ET AL. vs. ALFREDO LAPIZ, ET AL.

FACTS: This is an action to recover damages filed in the Court of

First Instance of Laguna by the plaintiffs by reason of the death
of Chua Pua Lun as a result of a collision suffered by the jeepney
in which he was a passenger.

Defendant Alfredo Capiz, the driver of the driver of the Jaguar

jeepney, alleged that the vehicle driven by him was hit by the
Kapalaran bus which was driven by defendant Vicente Reyes due
to the negligence of the latter, thereby causing the death of Chua
Pua Lun who was a passenger of the jeepney. Defendant
Victorino Sapin in turn alleged that he was not the owner of the
jeepney driven by Lapiz, while defendants Vicente Reyes and
Lazaro Limjuco, the first as driver and the second as owner of
the bus, alleged that the collision between the two vehicles was
due to the negligence of Alfredo Lapiz.

The CFI rendered decision dismissing the complaint pronouncing

that the plaintiffs are citizens of China and no written authority
granting Chua Pua Tam to claim for damages in behalf of the
widow and children of deceased.which prompted the plaintiffs to
appeal directly to this Court in view of the amount involved.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that
plaintiffs, being residents of China, have not authorized
anyone to file the present case against the defendants.
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint when the authority to prosecute the case stems from
the appointment of Chua Pua Tam as guardian ad litem of minors
Pua Sam Ben and Pua Go Kuan.

3. Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the case

when the same could be considered as prosecuted by a
negotiorum gestor; and

HELD:
(1) No. Thus, it appears that the plaintiffs who are the widow
and children of the deceased Chua Pua Lun are allcitizens and
residents of China. What the letter contained was an inquiry with
regard to the progress of the case and the administration of the
duck-raising business which the deceased left in the Philippines.
Such certainly cannot be considered as an authority to the
present counsel to file and prosecute the present case. The
present action was initiated by plaintiffs represented merely by
their counsel and the question arose as to whether the latter had
the proper authority to represent the plaintiffs all residents of a
foreign country. While a lawyer is presumed to be properly
authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, he may
however be required by the court on motion of either party to
produce his authority under which he appears (Section 20, Rule
127). Undoubtedly, the question was properly raised by
counselfor the defendants as otherwise the trial court would not
have given proper attention to the matter.

(2) It is true that one Chua Pua Tam was appointed as guardian
ad litem of two of plaintiffs who allegedly are minors to
represent them in the prosecution of the present case, the same
would not suffice to meet the requirement of the rule which
provides that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest (Section 2, Rule 3). Again, we need hereto
show that Chua Pua Tam was authorized by the heirs abroad to
act as such in behalf of the minors for it was in this belief that he
was so appointed by the trial court. No evidence showing
authority to prosecute the case or act as guardian in behalf of the
minor plaintiffs was presented. The representation is ineffective.

(3) No. The claim that Chua Pua Tam cannot be considered as
negotiorum gestio
since express authority is needed on his part to represent the
minors by virtue of an express provision of our Rules of Court
though ordinarily negotiorum gestio no authority is required.

Case No. 3

G. R. No. 4898 March 19, 1909

SALVADOR GUERRERO, guardian of the minors Maria Manuela
and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Muñoz vs. LEOPOLDO TERAN

FACTS: Salvador Guerrero, the guardian of minors Maria Manuela

and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Munoz, filed an action against
Leopoldo Teran to recover the sum of P4,129.56 on the theory
that Teran had been the administrator of the estate of Antonio
Sanchez Munoz from 1901-1906.

Teran admitted he owed Guerrero P188.39 but claimed that

the latter owed him P482.14. The CFI found that Teran, as
administrator of said estate, owed Guerrero the sum of
P3,447.46.

ISSUE: Whether or not Teran managed and administered the

estate of Sanchez Munoz from 1901-1906

HELD: NO. Teran was the duly appointed and recognized

representative of the minors Maria Manuela and Maria del
Carmen in the administration of their
interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Munoz
from Sept.17, 1901 until March 18, 1902. He entered into a bond
of 10,000 dollars, gold, for the faithful performance of his duties
as such representative.

On March 18, 1901, the CFI of Albay appointed Maria Munoz

y Gomez as guardian for said minors and she gave the required
bond for the faithful performance of her duties as such guardian.
 While there are some indications that Teran continued to act
as the administrator of said estate after the appointment of Maria
Munoz y Gomez, up to Oct.6, 1906, yet the fact exists that said
Maria Munoz was the actual representative of the minors from
and after March 18, 1902 untilOct.6, 1906, and therefore she, as
such guardian and administratrix of the estate, must be held
responsible for the property belonging to said minors during the
period while she was their actual guardian.

Maria Munoz, for the reason that she was not a

resident of the Philippines at the time of her appointment, was
removed as guardian by the CFI.

Felix Samson was then appointed as guardian. The mere fact

that she was removed as guardian did not relieve her, nor her
bondsmen from liability to the minors during the time that she
was duly acting as said guardian. If during the time that she was
the guardian she allowed other persons to handle the property of
her wards and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby,
the responsibility must fall upon her. Therefore, if any loss
occurred to the minors between March 18, 1902 and Oct.6, 1906,
they have a right of action only against said Maria Munoz y
Gomez as their legal guardian and under the law the
administratrix of the property of their estate.

Teran was liable for losses only during the time that he was
acting as the legal representative of any of the losses claimed by
Guerrero occurred within this period.

Thus, Teran is liable only for the amount of P188.39, the

amount he admitted he owed the plaintiff.

Case No. 4

G.R. No. L-6458 January 23, 1956

In Re Guardianship of the Incompetent MARCELINA ILADA

MARCELINA ILADA and CRISPINA VILLADIEGO
vs. FRANCISCO ILADA

Unreported Case - 98 Philippine Reports 993

Case No. 5

G.R. No. 45623 June 30, 1938

JESUS CRISOSTOMO vs. PASTOR M. ENDENCIA, Judge of First
Instance of Bulacan and RAMON CRISOSTOMO
FACTS:
The CFI OF Bulacan appointed Jesus Crisostomo as the
guardian of the incompetent, Petrona Crisostomo. On February
29, 1936, while the incompetent was already released from the
National Psychopathic Hospital of Mandaluyong, petitioner, as
such guardian, filed a verified petition asking that the court to
declare that the incompetent had recovered her mental faculties,
that she was able to take care of her person and to administer
her property, cancel the bond filed by the guardian, and order
the termination and filing away of the record.

The court which took cognizance of the guardianship case

was apprised of the petition and it favorably acted thereon,
issuing an order declaring that Petrona Crisostomo is able to take
care of her person and to administer her own property, it
likewise ordered the termination of the guardianship, the
cancellation of the bond of the guardian and the final filing away
of the case.

On November 9 of the same year, the respondent Ramon

Crisostomo, brother of the incompetent, filed a motion in the
guardianship proceedings and in the same court asking that the
restoration order of February 29, 1936 be set aside, that the case
be reopened, and that a new guardian of the person and property
of Petrona Crisostomo be appointed, alleging as grounds that the
aforesaid order is null and void because entered without notice
to the nearest relatives of the incompetent and without hearing
and that the latter had not yet recovered her mentality.
The petitioner objected to this petition on the ground that
the order sought to be annulled had already become final and
that the court had already lost jurisdiction to reverse or annul
the same, but on December 15, 1936, the respondent judge
issued an order annulling that of February 29 of the same year.
The said judge having denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by the petitioner, the latter sued out a writ of certiorari in
the Court of Appeals, which petition was denied, with the costs.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over the motion
filed by Ramon Crisostomo?

(2) Whether or not the order declaring the restoration to

capacity of Petrona Crisostomo dated February 29, 1936 is valid?
HELD:
(1) YES, the court has jurisdiction over the reopening of the
case commenced by Ramon Crisostomo's motion.

The procedure followed by virtue of a petition for

restoration of competency is neither new nor independent; it is a
continuation of the original guardianship. If the court had
jurisdiction to appoint a guardian of the person and property of
the incompetent, it is obvious that it had like jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and grant the petition for restoration which was
filed.

(2) NO, the order declaring restoration to capacity of Petron

Crisostomo is not valid.

In order that a court taking cognizance of the guardianship

of an incompetent may issue a valid order restoring him to
capacity it is necessary, under this section, (1) that a verified
petition be presented by the incompetent, his guardian, or any
relative of such person within the third degree, or any friend of
his; (2) that said petition should allege that the incompetent has
recovered his mental faculties or his legal capacity, as the case
may be; and (3) that upon receiving the petition the court should
set the same for hearing and notify the guardian and the
incompetent thereof. At the hearing, the guardian, the relatives
of the incompetent, and, in the discretion of the court, any other
person may oppose the remedy sought. The section does not
require notice of the hearing to any other person except the
guardian and the incompetent. In the case under study it
happened that the verified petition was signed by the guardian
himself and was supported and accompanied by the sworn
statement of the incompetent. In the petition it was stated that
the incompetent had recovered her mental faculties and this
allegation was corroborated by her in her sworn statement when
she stated that she had already recovered her mental faculties

Ramon Crisostomo should have been notified, being one of

the nearest relatives of the incapacitated, and that the want of
this notice divested the jurisdiction of the judge to issue the
aforesaid order. The Supreme Court declared the order as null
and illegal for lack of notice and for failure to hold the hearing
mentioned in section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure.