Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA;
Regalian Doctrine GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that
these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation
of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the
IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the
natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted
by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources
are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the
right to alienate the same.
Notes:
Puno: "When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it
introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide
with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other
natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated
without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This
Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of
our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfil the
constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to
their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to
our indigenous people."
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or
indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants
these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The
ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law
which traces its origin to native title.
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people
or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized
community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people
have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of
ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of language,
customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance
to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also
include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest
or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional
territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier
proposed a bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the
principle of parens patriae.
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas
generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas,
and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a
consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into
by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to
ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare.
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied,
possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the
ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to
the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces
or paddies, private forests, widen farms and tree lots."
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be
acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains;
or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with
respect to ancestral lands only.
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under
a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are
deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have
been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest.
Article 12
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases
of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain
may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase,
homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development,
and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine,
by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed,
held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific
limits of forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the
ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and
may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide
for such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered
forests and watershed areas.
Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing
property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domain.
Section 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents
shall contribute to the common good. Individuals and private groups, including
corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the right
to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the
State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so
demands.

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
G.R. No. 70722 July 3, 1991
CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN, FLORA VELASQUEZ, BENJAMIN VELASQUEZ,
RODOLFO VELASQUEZ, ALFREDO VELASQUEZ, NAPOLEON VELASQUEZ,
MANUEL VELASQUEZ, JULIO VELASQUEZ, VICTORIA VELASQUEZ,
CARLOS VELASQUEZ, LEONOR VELASQUEZ, ELENA VELASQUEZ,
PATROCINIO VELASQUEZ, PATRICIA VELASQUEZ, SANTIAGO ZAPANTA,
HERMINIGILDO SISON, ALFREDO AGAPITO, MOISES SANTOS,
MAGDALENA PAGKATIPUNAN, AGAPITO MANALO, MIGUEL ANGELES,
MATIAS ALVAREZ, PATRICIO LAYSA, TEOFILO DE LUNA, ISIDRO ANINAO,
APOLINAR CASAL, MOISES GALLARDO, BONIFACIO PEREZ, DELFIN
LAYBA, AND HERMOGENES FLORES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE R. VELASQUEZ, JR.,
LOURDES VELASQUEZ, EDGARDO VELASQUEZ, LOLITA VELASQUEZ,
MINERVA VELASQUEZ, CYNTHIA VELASQUEZ, CESAR GONZALES,
ADOLFO GONZALES, EVELYN GONZALES, AMELITA GONZALES, RUBEN
GONZALES, AND CARMENCITA GONZALES, respondents.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Ascuna & Bengson for petitioners.
Tomas P. Añonuevo for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:p
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-G.R. CV No. 68431 dated February 7, 1986,
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Laguna, Branch II, Santa Cruz, Laguna, in Civil Case No. SC-894, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is affirmed, with the
following modification:
The entire house and lot on West Avenue, Quezon City, shall be divided as
follows:
One-half value of said house and lot to defendant-appellant Canuta Pagkatipunan
and her 13 co-defendants-appellants children (now petitioners) to the extent of
their respective proportional contributions as stated above; and
The other one-half value of the said house and lot goes to the second conjugal
partnership of the deceased husband and his second spouse Canuta
Pagkatipunan to be partitioned one-fourth to Canuta Pagkatipunan and the other
one-fourth appertaining to the deceased Jose Velasquez, Sr. to be divided equally
among his 18 heirs as follows:
1/18 undivided portion to Canuta Pagkatipunan;
1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiff-appellee Lourdes Velasquez;
1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellees Edgardo, Lolita, Minerva, Cynthia,
and Jennifer, all surnamed Velasquez;
1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellee Teresa Magtibay and her children,
Ricardo, Lourdes, Celia and Aida, all surnamed Velasquez;
1/1 8 undivided portion to the plaintiffs-appellees Cesar, Adolfo, Evelyn, Angelita,
Ruben, and Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales;
1/18 undivided portion to each of the 13 defendants-appellants Flora, Leonor,
Patrocinio, Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Julio, Elena, Patricia,
Victoria, and Carlos, all surnamed Velasquez.
SO ORDERED. (p. 55, Rollo)
The facts from the records are as follows:
The principal litigants in this case are the successors- in-interest of Jose
Velasquez, Sr. who died intestate on February 24, 1961. Petitioner Canuta
Pagkatipunan is the surviving spouse of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and the other 13
petitioners are their children namely: Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio, Julio, Benjamin,
Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Elena, Patricia, Victoria and Carlos. On the
other hand, the private respondents are the descendants of Jose Velasquez, Sr.
with his first wife Victorina Real who died in 1920 at Santa Cruz, Laguna. Private
respondents Jose Velasquez, Jr. (substituted after his death during the pendency
of this suit by his surviving spouse Teresa Magtibay and their children Ricardo,
Lourdes, Celia and Aida), and Lourdes Velasquez are two of the five children of
Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. The other three, Amelia, Guillermo and
Lutgarda, all surnamed Velasquez, all died before the commencement of this case.
Amelia Velasquez died without any issue. Guillermo Velasquez was survived by 2. Tax Declaration No. 3125. A Secano land located in Luya and with an area of
private respondents Edgardo, Lolita, Minerva, Cynthia and Jennifer, all surnamed 12,540 square meters;
Velasquez, his children, forced heirs and lawful successors-in-interest. Lutgarda
Velasquez was survived by private respondents Cesar, Adolfo, Evelyn, Amelita, 3. Tax Declaration No. 2623. A Cocal and Forestal, situated in Salang-Bato
Ruben and Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales, likewise her children, forced heirs (Macasipac) and with an area of 500,000 square meters;
and successors-in-interest.
4. Tax Declaration No. 2096. A riceland, situated in Islang Munti and with an area
This case was judicially instituted by the private respondents against the of 40,328 square meters;
petitioners in 1969 in a complaint entitled "accion reivindicatoria, annulment of
deeds of sale, partition and damages." However, both the trial and the appellate
5. A Cocal and Forestal land situated in Bankang Bato containing an area of
courts considered that the real controversy in this case is the liquidation of the
240,000 square meters;
conjugal partnership properties acquired by the deceased Jose Velasquez, Sr. in
his two marriages, one with Victorina Real, who predeceased him, and the other
with Canuta Pagkatipunan, as well as the partition of the estate of said Jose 6. Tax Declaration No. 4251. A Cocal, Secano and Cogonal land situated in
Velasquez, Sr. among his heirs. Cambuja and containing an area of 163,121 square meters;

It appears that after the death of Victorina Real in 1920, no dissolution of the first 7. Tax Declaration No. 1342. A parcel of land situated in Bagumbayan and
conjugal property has been made. Consequently, Jose Velasquez, Sr. enjoyed full containing an area of 80,258 square meters;
possession, use, usufruct and administration of the whole conjugal property of the
first marriage. 8. Tax Declaration No. 3541. A Cocal and Secano land, situated in Bagumbayan
and containing an area of 20 hectares;
In 1930, Jose Velasquez, Sr. took Canuta Pagkatipunan as his second wife
although they cohabited as early as 1921, when she was 16, soon after his first (Total area as surveyed is 392,503 square meters. This includes the area of the
wife's death. From this marriage, the other 13 co-petitioners were born. Neither land stated in Item 7 of the Inventory).
had there been any liquidation of the second conjugal partnership after the death
of Jose Velasquez, Sr. in 1961. This situation gave rise to the controversies in the 9. Tax Declaration No. 82. A Cogonal land situated in Tungkod (Ikalong Tumid),
instant case spawned by the parties' conflicting claims from both sides of the two containing an area of 385,324 square meters;
marriages.
10. Tax Declaration No. 1500. A riceland, situated in Pague, containing an area of
The trial court appointed two sets of commissions — one on January 31, 1975, for 9,228 square meters;
the purpose of making an inventory of the estate of Jose Velasquez, Sr., and the
other on November 15, 1976, to determine which of the parcels of land listed in 11. Tax Declaration No. 5688
such inventory submitted by the first set of commissioners belong to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage or to the conjugal partnership of the second
a) A parcel of land situated in NAPSE (Masinao), containing an area of 24,725
marriage.
square meters;
Based on the Report and Inventory submitted on May 29, 1975, the
b) A parcel of land situated in NAPSE (Masinao), containing an area of 25,000
commissioners listed the following properties as acquired by the late Jose
square meters;
Velasquez, Sr. during his marriage with Victorina Real:

12. Tax Declaration No. 543. A parcel of land situated in Gomez Street, containing
1. Tax Declaration No. 2718. A riceland, located in Luya and with an area of
an area of 755 square meters;
93,662 square meters;
13. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an
area of 367.2 square meters;
14. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an
area of 367.2 square meters.
15. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an
area of 367.2 square meters.
16. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an
area of 367.2 square meters.
17. Tax Declaration No. 4139. A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an
area of 1,275 square meters.
18. Tax Declaration No. 804-A. Three parcels of land situated in Salang Bato,
containing an area of 450,000 square meters;
19. Tax Declaration No. 2560. A parcel of land situated in Salang Bato which area
is included in item no. 18.
20. A parcel of land situated in Burgos St. (Papers cannot be located but subject
lot is known to both parties).
21. A parcel of land situated in Burgos St., containing an area of 5,000 square
meters. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties).
22. A parcel of land situated in Gomez St., containing an area of 300 square
meters. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties).
23. A parcel of land situated in Gomez St., containing an area of 1,050 square
meters. (Papers cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties).
24. A parcel of land situated in Gomez St. (Papers cannot be located but subject
lot is known to both parties).
25. A parcel of land situated in Zamora St., containing an area of 3,605. (Papers
cannot be located but subject lot is known to both parties).
26. Tax Declaration No. 2412: A parcel of land situated in Caboan, containing an
area of 12,867 square meters;
27. A parcel of land situated in Dra. Amelia St.
On the other hand, the commissioners listed the following properties as acquired
by Jose Velasquez, Sr. on February 11, 1921 or after the death of Victorina Real:
28. Tax Declaration No. 2547. A parcel of land situated in Barandilla, containing an
area of 21,566 square meters;
29. A parcel of land situated in Barandilla, containing an area of 93.191 square
meters. (Commissioner's Inventory, Rollo, pp. 355-360)
Worth noting are the following findings of the commissioners:
3) That among the properties acquired by the late Jose Velasquez, Sr. during his
lifetime, only the one mentioned in Item 7 of the Inventory (Annex "A") is still intact.
It is situated in Bagumbayan, Sta. Maria, Laguna, and is containing an area of
80,258 square meters, more or less;
4) That Item 8 of the Inventory is only 200,000 square meters, more or less in Tax
Declaration No. 3541, but as per Survey caused by the defendants (which is not
yet approved) it contains an area of 330,345 square meters. That the Tax
Declaration of said parcel of land is under the name of Canuta Pagkatipunan, but
plaintiff Jose Velasquez, Jr. is the one in possession of said property. That the
area as contained in the Survey includes the area of the land mentioned in Item 7
of the Inventory (80,258 sq. m.);
5) That the other properties of the late Jose Velasquez Sr. were disposed of by the
said decedent during his lifetime and some were sold and/or disposed of by the
parties and heirs of the late Jose Velasquez, Sr.;
6) That the Barandilla properties, as evidenced by the Venta Absoluta dated
February 11, 1921 executed by Pedro Villanueva in favor of Jose Velasquez Sr.,
were disposed of portion by portion. It was sold by the late Jose Velasquez who
disposed of some portions and the rest by either the plaintiffs or defendants. An
area of 11,200 square meters more or less was DONATED (donacion propter
Nupcias) in favor of Canuta Pagkatipunan by the decedent Jose Velasquez, Sr. as
evidenced by Kasulatan ng Panibagong Documento Donacion Propter Nupcias
notarized under Inst. 135; Page 47; Book 1; Series of 1947 of Notary Public
Bonifacio de Ramos;
7) That the parcels of land appearing in Items 5 and 6 of the Inventory (Annex "A")
were DONATED by the late Jose Velasquez Sr. to Guillermo Velasquez;
8) That parcels of land mentioned in Items 18 and 19 of the Inventory (Annex "A")
were DONATED by the late Jose Velasquez, Sr. to Jose Velasquez, Jr. Said
properties were sold by the Donee to Sps. Santiago Recio and Filomena
Dimaculangan;
9) The property mentioned in Item 27, page 3 of the Inventory was given by the
late Jose Velasquez, Sr. to one of his daughters, Dra. Amelia Velasquez while she
was still living and now owned by her heirs;
10) A residential lot at 7 West Avenue, Quezon City, titled in the name of Canuta
Pagkatipunan, was acquired from the PHHC (People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation, now National Housing Authority) and presently occupied by the
defendants. (Rollo, pp. 351-353)
There is divergence of findings and opinion among the three members of the
second set of commissioners with respect to the properties covered by Items 7 and
8 and the property in the unnumbered item relating to Lot 2-A West Avenue,
Quezon City and the house thereon of the Inventory submitted by the first set of
commissioners. They refuse to make findings as to the nature of the properties
because the petitioners had caused the issuance of titles covering said properties.
However, all the commissioners were in agreement that all the other properties
listed in the Inventory belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
The records before Us will show that the properties covered by items 7 and 8 were
originally declared for taxation purposes in the names of the spouses Real and
Velasquez. This has been admitted by Canuta Pagkatipunan during the hearing
before the Commissioner and is duly supported by documentary evidence.
After the death of Jose Velasquez, Sr. the full possession of said property was
acquired by Canuta Pagkatipunan. On March 4, 1967, she sold the same property
to the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan, her brother-in-law
and sister, respectively (they were previously impleaded in the trial court as party-
defendants). Subsequently, Tax Declaration No. 4843 was issued in the names of
the said spouses who later resold the same property to Canuta Pagkatipunan.
Thereafter, tax declaration covering said property was issued in her name, During
the pendency of this suit, this property was subdivided and assigned by Canuta
Pagkatipunan in favor of her thirteen children. The latter caused the issuance of
separate free patent titles in their favor covering the subdivided lots conveyed to
them by their mother. Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-2000 to P-2012 were
accordingly issued in their names.
With regard to the West Avenue property it is not disputed that said residential lot
was purchased on installments from People's Homesite and Housing Corporation
(now National Housing Authority) by the spouses Jose Velasquez Sr. and Canuta
Pagkatipunan. The installments were paid by the said spouses until Jose
Velasquez, Sr. died on February 24, 1961. Canuta Pagkatipunan, with the help of
some of her children, shouldered the payment of the remaining installments until
said property was fully paid in 1965. On February 23, 1968, the PHHC executed a
deed of absolute sale conveying the said house and lot to Canuta Pagkatipunan.
On August 11, 1980, a judgment was rendered by the trial court:
1) Declaring the properties listed in the Inventory submitted by the Commissioners
on May 9, 1975, as belonging to the estate of the conjugal partnership of the
deceased spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real;
2) Confirming all the conveyances, either by way of sale or donation, executed by
Jose Velasquez, Sr. during his lifetime;
3) Declaring null and void, sham and fictitious, the following sales, transfers,
assignments or conveyances: (a) the sale executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in
favor of her sister Magdalena Pagkatipunan in favor of Canuta Pagkatipunan (sic);
(b) the deeds of assignments executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her
children, covering the properties listed in Items 7 and 8 of the Inventory; and
ordering defendants (petitioners) to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs (private
respondents) the parcels of land covered by Patent Titles Nos. P-2000 to P-2012;
4) Declaring as null, fictitious and fraudulent the sales by Canuta Pagkatipunan in
favor of her children and her sister Magdalena Pagkatipunan and brother-in-law
Moises Santos, listed in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint; declaring the
plaintiffs owners of the said properties; and ordering the defendant Canuta
Pagkatipunan and her children-defendants to deliver possession of said properties
to the plaintiffs;
5) Ordering the partition of the house and lot in West Avenue, Quezon City in the
following manner:
(a) One-half undivided portion to defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan; and the other
half appertaining to Jose Velasquez, Sr. to be divided among his heirs, to wit:
1/18 undivided portion to Canuta Pagkatipunan;
1/18 undivided portion to Lourdes Velasquez;
1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Edgardo, Lolita, Minerva, Cynthia and
Jennifer, all surnamed Velasquez;
1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Teresa Magtibay and her children Ricardo,
Lourdes, Celia and Aida, all surnamed Velasquez;
1/18 undivided portion to the plaintiffs Cesar, Adolfo, Evelyn, Angelita, Ruben and
Carmencita, all surnamed Gonzales;
1/18 undivided portion to each of the defendants Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio,
Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Julio, Elena, Patricia, Victoria and
Carlos, all surnamed Velasquez;
Petitioners appealed to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.
On February 7, 1985, the Intermediate Appellate Court, Third Civil Cases Division
promulgated a decision, affirming the decision of the trial court, with the
modification that the entire house and lot in West Avenue, Quezon City be divided
into two; one-half value to the petitioners Canuta Pagkatipunan and her 13 children
to the extent of their respective proportional contributions and the other half value,
to the second conjugal partnership of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Canuta
Pagkatipunan to be partitioned one-fourth to the wife and the other one-fourth
appertaining to the deceased Jose Velasquez, Sr. to be divided equally among his
heirs.
Hence, this instant petition for review pointing out the following four (4)
assignments of error, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ENTIRE ESTATE LISTED
IN THE INVENTORY SUBMITTED BY THE COMMISSIONERS ON MAY 9, 1975
AS BELONGING TO THE DECEASED SPOUSES JOSE VELASQUEZ, SR. AND
VICTORINA REAL.
II
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONFIRMING ALL THE
CONVENYANCES EITHER BY WAY OF SALE OR DONATION EXECUTED BY
JOSE VELASQUEZ, SR. DURING HIS LIFETIME.
III
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID, SHAM
AND FICTITIOUS THE FOLLOWING SALES: a) THE SALE EXECUTED BY
CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN IN FAVOR OF HER SISTER MAGDALENA
PAGKATIPUNAN AND BROTHER-IN-LAW MOISES SANTOS; b) THE RESALE
EXECUTED BY MOISES SANTOS AND MAGDALENA PAGKATIPUNAN IN
FAVOR OF CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN; c) THE DEEDS OF ASSIGNMENT
EXECUTED BY CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN IN FAVOR OF HER CHILDREN:
COVERING THE PROPERTIES LISTED IN ITEMS 7 AND 8 OF THE
INVENTORY; AND ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CANUTA
PAGKATIPUNAN AND HER CHILDREN DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS TO
RECONVEY IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES THE PARCELS OF
LAND COVERED BY PATENT TITLES NOS. P2-000 TO P-2012.
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PARTITION OF THE
HOUSE AND LOT IN WEST AVENUE, QUEZON CITY, ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED
PORTION TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CANUTA PAGKATIPUNAN AND THE
OTHER HALF TO JOSE VELASQUEZ, SR. (pp. 21-22, Rollo)
After a careful review of the records and the arguments presented by both parties,
the Court finds that both the trial court and the respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court failed to consider some basic principles observed in the law on succession
Such an oversight renders the appealed decision defective and hard to sustain.
It is a basic rule that before any conclusion about the legal share due to the heirs
may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. In the assailed
decision, the respondent court affirmed the trial court's ruling, that Jose Velasquez,
Sr. had already disposed of and exhausted his corresponding share in the conjugal
partnership owned by him and Victorina Real, so that his heirs have nothing more
to inherit from him, and that accordingly, whatever remaining portion of the
conjugal property must necessarily appertain only to the private respondents as
heirs of the deceased Victorina Real. Clearly, the trial court failed to consider
among others, the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the
testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not
include those imposed in the will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations
by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime
of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
It is undeniable that numerous donations inter vivos were made by Jose
Velasquez, Sr. in favor of some of his compulsory heirs. They include among
others, the donation made in favor of Guillermo Velasquez on February 26,1953,
consisting of 403,000 square meters (Items 5 and 6); the donation made in 1926 in
favor of Jose Velasquez, Jr., consisting of 450,000 square meters (Item No. 18);
the donation in favor of Amelia Velasquez (Item No. 27); and the donation in favor
of Canuta Pagkatipunan, consisting of 11,000 square meters (part of Item No. 29)
(Commissioner's Report, Rollo, pp. 355-360).
It appears that there was no determination whatsoever of the gross value of the
conjugal properties of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real. Obviously it is
impossible to determine the conjugal share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. from the said
property relationship. Likewise, no collation of the donations he executed during
his lifetime was undertaken by the trial court. Thus, it would be extremely difficult to
ascertain whether or not such donations trenched on the heirs' legitime so that the
same may be considered subject to reduction for being inofficious.
Article 909 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 909. Donations given to children shall be charged to their legitime.
Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the estate of which
the testator could have disposed by his last will.
Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the disposable portion, they shall
be reduced according to the rules established by this Code.
With the avowed specific provisions of the aforesaid laws respecting collation,
which are ruled controlling even in intestate succession, this Court finds that the
lower court's ruling adjudicating the remaining portion of the conjugal estate to the
private respondents is purely speculative and conjectural.
Relative to the sale executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan to the spouses Magdalena
Pagkatipunan and Moises Santos; the resale of the same property to her; and the
subsequent deeds of assignment she executed in favor of her children, the trial
court had clearly established that Canuta Pagkatipunan employed fraudulent acts
to acquire title over the said properties. Hence, the trial court, as well as the
respondent court are correct in ruling that the said sales and assignments are null
and void, sham and fictitious.
The pertinent portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:
From the evidence adduced by the parties during the hearing before this Court and
before the Commissioners, these properties were acquired on November 19, 1918
by the spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real from Estanislao Balasoto
(Exh. H-5 Commissioner). Said property was originally declared for taxation
purposes in the names of said spouses. (Exh. H Commissioner) On March 4,
1967, defendant Canuta Pagkatipunan sold the same property to the spouses
Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan (Exh. H-1-Commissioner). The
vendee Magdalena Pagkatipunan is the sister of the defendant Canuta
Pagkatipunan. Subsequently, Tax Declaration No. 4843 (Exh. H-2 Commissioner)
was issued in the names of the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena
Pagkatipunan resold (sic) the same property to Canuta Pagkatipunan (Exh. H-3
Commissioner). Thereafter, tax declaration covering said property was issued in
the name of Canuta Pagkatipunan (Exhibit H-4 Commissioner). During the
pendency of this suit, this property was subdivided and assigned by Canuta
Pagkatipunan in favor of her children, the defendants Flora, Leonor, Patrocinio,
Benjamin, Rodolfo, Alfredo, Napoleon, Manuel, Elena, Patricia, Julio, Victoria and
Carlos, all surnamed Velasquez. Said defendants-children of Canuta
Pagkatipunan caused the issuance of free patent titles in their favor covering the
subdivided lots conveyed to them respectively by their mother (Exh. 2, 2-A to 2-L)
It is evident that the parcels of land under Items 7 and 8 of the Inventory belonged
to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real.
Canuta Pagkatipunan had no right to alienate the same. Her conveyance of the
same property to her brother-in-law and sister is fictitious or simulated. Ten (10)
days after she executed her sale, the same property was resold to her by the
vendees. She utilized said conveyance and reconveyance only for the purpose of
securing a tax declaration in her name over said property. Her subsequent
subdivision of said lot and transfer of the subdivided lots to each of their children
further show her fraudulent intent to deprive the plaintiffs of their rightful shares in
the disputed property. (Rollo, pp. 606-607)
Despite the several pleadings filed by the petitioners in this Court, they did not
rebut the foregoing findings of the trial court but merely held on to their argument
that since Free Patent Titles Nos. P-2000 to P-2012 were already issued in their
names, their title thereto is indefeasible and incontrovertible. This is a misplaced
argument.
The fact that they had succeeded in securing title over the said parcels of land
does not warrant the reversal of the trial court's ruling that the above mentioned
sales and assignments were sham and fictitious. A Torrens title does not furnish a
shield for fraud notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a
constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that
if the registration of the land is fraudulent and the person in whose name the land
is registered thus holds it as a mere trustee, the real owner is entitled to file an
action for reconveyance of the property within a period of ten years (Pajarillo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72908, August 11, 1969, 176 SCRA 340).
Since petitioners asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the said parcels of
land but acted in fraud of the private respondents, the former may be held to act as
trustees for the benefit of the latter, pursuant to the provision of Article 1456 of the
Civil Code:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
But while the trial court has the authority to order the reconveyance of the
questioned titles, We cannot agree that the reconveyance should be made in favor
of the private respondents. The reason is that it is still unproven whether or not the
private respondents are the only ones entitled to the conjugal properties of Jose
Velasquez, Sr. and Victoria Real. It is to be noted that as the lawful heirs of Jose
Velasquez Sr. the herein petitioners are also entitled to participate in his conjugal
share. To reconvey said property in favor of the private respondents alone would
not only be improper but will also make the situation more complicated. There are
still things to be done before the legal share of all the heirs can be properly
adjudicated.
Relative to the last assignment of error, We find the ruling made by the respondent
appellate court proper and in accord with law insofar as it adjudicated the one-half
(1/2) portion of the house and lot situated at West Avenue, Quezon City, as
belonging to the petitioners to the extent of their respective proportional
contributions, and the other half to the conjugal partnership of Jose Velasquez, Sr.
and Canuta Pagkatipunan. We must modify it, however, as it readily partitioned the
conjugal share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. (1/2 of the conjugal property or 1/4 of the
entire house and lot) to his 18 heirs.
As already said, no conclusion as to the legal share due to the compulsory heirs
can be reached in this case without (1) determining first the net value of the estate
of Jose Velasquez, Sr.; (2) collating all the donations inter vivos in favor of some of
the heirs; and (3) ascertaining the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court as modified by the respondent
appellate court is hereby SET ASIDE except insofar as it:
(a) declared the properties listed in the Inventory submitted by the commissioners
on May 9, 1975 as belonging to the estate of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real;
(b) declared null and void, sham and fictitious, the following sales, transfers,
assignments or conveyances:
1) the sale executed by Canuta Pagkatipunan in favor of her sister Magdalena
Pagkatipunan; 2) the resale of the same property executed in favor of Canuta
Pagkatipunan; and 3) the deeds of assignments executed by Canuta
Pagkatipunan in favor of her 13 children; covering the properties listed in Items 7
and 8;
(c) declared as null and void all the other conveyances made by Canuta
Pagkatipunan with respect to Item No. 13 of the inventory; and
d) dismissed the case against the other defendants except Canuta Pagkatipunan
and her children and the spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena Pagkatipunan.
Civil Case No. SC-894 is hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Laguna,
for further proceedings and the same Court is directed to:
a) follow the procedure for partition herein prescribed;
b) expand the scope of the trial to cover other possible illegal dispositions of the
first conjugal partnership properties not only by Canuta Pagkatipunan but also by
the other heirs as can be shown in the records;
c) include the one-fourth (1/4) share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. in the residential
house in Quezon City with his conjugal share under his first marriage, if any, to
determine his net estate at the time of his death.
The trial court's pronouncement as to cost and damages is hereby deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim
areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the
Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,
tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred
to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and
Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all
future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to
PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the
Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands
known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a
Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another
250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said
lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the
agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known
as the “mother of all scams”).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to
AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President
Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves
claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII
of the 1987 Constitution w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of
whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as
agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged
areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify
the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer
needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
Republic vs Naguiat
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land
located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner
of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous
owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for
more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer
no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any
interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior
thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question
have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable
property.
ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable
lands of the public domain?
HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and
continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For,
unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession;
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have
to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what
the land actually looks like.

Rural Bank of Anda Inc. vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen,
Dagupan G.R No. 155051; May 29, 2007
Ponente: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
The lot in dispute, Lot 736 is located in Binmaley, Pangasinan. The disputed lot
together with Lot 737, which is also known as Imelda’s Park and Lot 739, which is
awaiting shed for commuters form part of Lot 3. The disputed land is titled in the
name of respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop. An annotation on Transfer
Certificate Title states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both
respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley. The Rector of the seminary ordered
the construction of the fence separating Lot 736 from the national road to prevent
the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse manure was already
bothering the priests living in the seminary. The Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley,
Pangasinan passed Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 which converted Lot 736 from
an institutional lot to a commercial lot and authorized the municipal mayor to enter
into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of
Lot 736 respectively. The Municipal Mayor of Binmaley came to the seminary to
discuss the situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the
construction of the building for the Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped. Later
on, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the construction of the building of
the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing to discuss with
respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736. Respondent filed a
complaint in the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in favor of the respondent
stating that Lot 736 is property of public dominion. Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan
exceeded its authority when it adopted the two Resolutions. The Court of Appeals
affirmed its decision. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE
: Whether or not the disputed land is a property of public dominion
HELD:
The property must be held as property of public domain because there was no
evidence that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or their
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public
lands. For it is well settled "that no public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the government." It is indispensable
then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law. This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine
which holds that the state owns all lands and waters of the public domain.
Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government
lands without prior grant from the government. Since Lot 736 is owned by the
state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bin maley exceeded its authority in passing
Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and
consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the
Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.
Aranda vs. Republic,24 August 2011
FACTS
ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. (ICTSI-WI) filed a petition For original registration of a
9,103-square meter parcel of land in San Andres, Malvar, Batangas before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the
petition, saying that the land is part oF the public domain and the applicant has not
acquired a registrable title thereto. ICTSI-WI later amended the application to
make the petitioner Ramon Aranda, the vendor. Aranda alleged open, continuous,
public, and adverse possession of the subject land in the concept oF owner For
more than 30 years. Petitioner’s sister, Merlita A. Enriquez, testified that their
Father, Anatalio Aranda, donated the land to petitioner in 1965. The document
signifying the donation was however eaten by rats. Witness, Luis Olan, testified
that they had open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the land in
the concept of owner until his Father, Lucio Olan, sold the land in 1946 to Anatalio.
Luis had no copy of the document oF sale since it was given by his mother to
Anatalio. The trial court granted the petition but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed
the trial court.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in reversing the trial court and dismissing the application For judicial
confrmation of title?
RULING
No. The Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) provides For original
registration of land in an ordinary registration proceeding. Under Section14 (1)
thereof, a petition may be granted upon compliance with the Following requisites:
(a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. In this case, the status of the land applied for as
alienable and disposable was not clearly established. Moreover, the court Found
out that petitioner started paying taxes on the land just three years before the fling
of the application For original registration. As a rule, tax declarations or realty tax
payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership; nevertheless they
are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, For no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes For a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession. Petitioner thus failed to meet the quantum of proof required by law
and his petition must be denied.

Republic v Roxas
 VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the Decision2 dated
June 18, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90383, which
affirmed the Orders dated October 11, 20073 and November 27, 20074 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), of Pasig City (Taguig City Hall of Justice), Branch 153
in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11573-TG.

The facts follow.

On March 26, 2007, respondent Crisanto S. Raneses (respondent) filed an

Application5 for Original Registration of Land Title docketed as LRC No. N-11573-
TG over two parcels of land identified as Lot No. 3085-A, Csd- 00-001621 and Lot
No. 3085-B,Csd-00-001621 both located at Barangay Napindan, Taguig City,
Metro Manila with a total area of twenty-two thousand six hundred (22,600) square
meters (subject properties).

On September 24, 2007, during the initial hearing, respondent marked several
documents to establish compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. There
being no opposition filed, the RTC issued an Order of General Default 6against all
persons except herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) and
granted respondent’s Motion to Present his Evidence Ex-Parte.7

On October 1, 2007, respondent testified that despite the fact that the earliest tax
declaration on record over the subject properties was issued only in 1980, his
parents had been in continuous possession and occupation of the same as early
as June 1945.8 He narrated that his father, the late Pedro Raneses (Pedro), was a
farmer who cultivated the subject properties by planting palay and other crops
thereon. Respondent further narrated that since the subject properties were near
the lake, Pedro used a portable irrigation system to suck water from Laguna de
Bay and a mechanized harvester to harvest the palay. However, he claimed that
when Pedro died on November 15, 1982,9 the cultivation of the subject properties
was likewise stopped. Respondent averred that Pedro declared the subject
properties for real estate tax purposes, as evidenced by several tax
declarations10issued in Pedro’s name. Respondent claimed that he acquired
ownership over the subject properties when his mother, Nina Raneses, 11 and his
G.R. No. 189970 June 9, 2014 sisters, Annabelle R. San Juan and Belinda R. Bayas, executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Deed of Waiver12 (Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate) on
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, April 24, 1997,whereby they agreed to partition and adjudicate among themselves
vs. the subject properties, and thereafter, waive all their rights, interest and
CRISANTO S. RANESES, Respondent. participation over the same in favor of respondent.13 Subsequently, respondent
had the subject properties declared for real estate tax purposes under his own
DECISION name.14
Respondent also testified that there were no other persons or entities who
occupied the subject properties. Correlatively, a Conversion Subdivision
Plan15 covering the subject properties was prepared by a private Geodetic
Engineer named Andrew DG.Montallana (Engr. Montallana).16 Said Plan noted
that the subject properties were "[s]urveyed in accordance with Survey Authority
No. LMS-SA-007607-310 dated August 29, 2006 issued by the CENRO, South
[S]ector" and that the subject properties were "inside alienable and disposable land
area [P]roj. [N]o. 27-B as per LC Map No. 2623 certified by the Bureau of Forestry
on January 3, 1968."17 Respondent also presented before the RTC an Inter-Office
Memorandum18 dated March 26, 2007 (Inter-Office Memorandum) prepared and
signed by the Engineering and Construction Division (ECD) of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) composed of Engineer Ramon D. Magalonga, Jr.
(Engr. Magalonga), Fredisvindo A. Latoza and Renato Q. Medenilla (ECD Team)
and addressed to the Division Chief-III of the ECD. Said Memorandum provided
that after an actual field verification, the ECD Team found that the subject
properties are "presently above (back filling) the reglementary 12.5-meter
elevation."
Catalina Raneses (Catalina), the mother of respondent, also testified that she and
her husband Pedro had been in possession of the subject properties since the
Japanese occupation. She narrated that Pedro cultivated the subject properties for
palay production. However, after Pedro’s death in 1982, the subject properties
were no longer used for palay production, and were, instead, at times leased out
for the production of watermelons. Catalina corroborated respondent’s testimony
that sometime in 1997, she, her daughters and respondent executed the
aforementioned Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, wherein all of them waived their
rights and interests over the subject properties in favor of respondent for a
consideration.19
On October 11, 2007, the RTC issued its first assailed Order20 granting
respondent’s application for land registration, the dispositive portion of which
reads, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the application is Granted. Judgment is hereby rendered declaring
applicant Crisanto S. Raneses, the owner in fee simple of Lot 3085-A, Csd-00-
001621, with an area of Fifteen Thousand Two Hundred Forty (15,240) square
meters situated in Brgy. Napindan, City of Taguig, Metro Manila; and Lot 3085-B,
Csd-00-001621 with an area of seven thousand three hundred sixty (7,360)square
meters situated in Brgy. Napindan, City of Taguig, Metro Manila.
After this Order shall become final and executory, let the Land Registration
Authority issue the corresponding decree of registration.
SO ORDERED.21
On October 25, 2007, the LLDA filed its Opposition22 to the application alleging
that the subject properties are below the 12.50-meter elevation, hence, forming
part of the bed of Laguna Lake and are, therefore, inalienable, indisposable and
incapable of registration. To support its cause, the LLDA attached to its Opposition
a Memorandum23 dated September 24, 2007 (ECD Memorandum) prepared and
signed by no less than Engr. Magalonga of the ECD and concurred by the ECD’s
Division Chief-III, Engr. Donato C. Rivera, Jr. which stated that upon the projection
of the subject properties in the LLDA’s topographic map, the same were below the
reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters.1âwphi1 Moreover, the LLDA posited that
in the absence of any declaration by the Director of Lands, the subject properties
remain inalienable and indisposable.
In its Order24 dated October 25, 2007, the RTC directed respondent to comment
on the Opposition of LLDA. In the meantime, petitioner through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Notice of Appeal25 on November 7, 2007. For
orderly proceedings, the RTC took note of the Notice of Appeal as it awaited the
respondent’s comment in order for it to judiciously resolve the pending Opposition
of the LLDA.26 In compliance with the RTC’s Order, respondent filed his Comment
and Motion27 to the said Opposition, arguing that the RTC should give more
credence to the Inter-Office Memorandum as the findings therein were based on
an actual field inspection rather than the ECD Memorandum, the findings of which
were based on a mere table survey. Moreover, respondent argued that the ECD
Memorandum should not be considered by the RTC as the same was not formally
offered in evidence. Respondent prayed that his Comment and Motion be noted.
He also manifested before the RTC that he is amenable to the reopening of the
case so that the LLDA can present controverting evidence, if it wants to, and for
him to present his rebuttal.
Thus, on November 27, 2007, the RTC issued its second assailed Order, 28 finding
merit in respondent’s arguments and dismissing LLDA’s Opposition, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, no probative value is therefore attached to
the basis of LLDA’s opposition filed fourteen (14) days late after the application for
registration of Crisanto S. Raneses was granted.
SO ORDERED.29
For the LLDA’s failure to take any action against its second assailed Order, the
RTC, in its Order30 dated January 8, 2008,approved the Notice of Appeal filed by
the OSG and directed the transmittal of the records of this case to the CA.
On June 18, 2009, the CA upheld the RTC which gave more credence to the
findings contained in the Inter-Office Memorandum than that of the ECD
Memorandum and in granting respondent’s application. The CA found that
respondent had adequately proven that the subject properties form part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain. The CA disposed of the case
in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by
us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the Orders dated
October 11, 2007 and November 27, 2007 rendered by Branch 153 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig City
in LRC Case No. N-11573-TG.
SO ORDERED.31
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration32 which the CA, however, denied in
its Resolution33 dated October 5, 2009.
Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT
THE SUBJECT LANDS ARE PART OF THE DISPOSABLE AND ALIENABLE
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN[; AND]
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE
LAND REGISTRATION COURT WHICH GRANTED RESPONDENT’S
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE OVER SUBJECT PARCELS OF
LAND NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE SAME ARE CONSIDERED
PART OF PUBLIC LAND, BEING BELOW THE 12.50-METER ELEVATION AS
CERTIFIED BY THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA).34
Petitioner through the OSG avers that respondent, having the burden to prove by
incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are alienable and disposable,
failed by relying simply on the Conversion Subdivision Plan and the Inter-Office
Memorandum of the LLDA. Invoking this Court’s ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,35 the OSG argues that respondent as an applicant and in order to prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. Lastly, the OSG
posits that the EDC Memorandum being a later issuance should be given more
credence than the Inter-Office Memorandum.36
On the other hand, respondent counters that, as held by the RTC and the CA, no
consideration should be accorded to the EDC Memorandum as it was not formally
offered in evidence. He asserts that, even if considered, the Inter-Office
Memorandum should be given more credence than the EDC Memorandum
because the former was the result of an actual verification inspection while the
latter was merely based on a table survey. Relying on the findings of the RTC and
the CA, respondent claims that the subject properties had already been classified
as alienable and disposable as provided in the Conversion-Subdivision Plan’s
annotation.37
Essentially, the sole issue the petition presents is whether or not the subject
properties in this case are alienable or disposable land of the public domain.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual
findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the
assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. It is not the function of
this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing
that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly
erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.38
In this case, the records do not support the findings made by the RTC and the CA
that the subject properties are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain.
Respondent bases his right to registration of title on Section 14 (1) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529,otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
which provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The afore-quoted provision authorizes the registration of title acquired in
accordance with Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, which reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
Thus, under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529, a petition may be granted upon
compliance with the following requisites: (a) that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such
possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The Regalian doctrine, embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source
of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain39 for land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. It must be proved.40 And the applicant bears
the burden to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable. 41
Respondent failed to hurdle this burden.
It bears noting that in support of his claim that the subject properties are alienable
and disposable, respondent merely presented the Conversion Subdivision Plan
which was prepared by Engr. Montallana with the annotation that the subject
properties were "inside alienable and disposable land area [P]roj. [N]o. 27-B as per
LC Map No. 2623 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968"42 and
the Inter-Office Memorandum from the LLDA.
Respondent’s reliance on the said annotation and Inter-Office Memorandum is
clearly insufficient.
In Republic v. Dela Paz43 citing Republic v. Sarmiento,44 this Court ruled that the
notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion
and subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable
area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the
Bureau of Forestry," is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible
evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable
public domain.
In contrast, this Court has held that the applicant must present a certificate of land
classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO)45 or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO)46 of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and
disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey
by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by
the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.47
Clearly, the pieces of evidence submitted by respondent before the RTC in this
case hardly satisfy the aforementioned documentary requirements. Given the lack
of evidence that the subject properties are alienable and disposable, it becomes
unnecessary for this Court to resolve whether the Inter-Office Memorandum should
be given more credence over the ECD Memorandum. On this matter, this Court’s
ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Lydia Capco de Tensuan 48 is enlightening:
While we may have been lenient in some cases and accepted substantial
compliance with the evidentiary requirements set forth in T.A.N. Properties, we
cannot do the same for Tensuan in the case at bar.
We cannot afford to be lenient in cases where the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) or the DENR oppose the application for registration on the ground that the
land subject thereof is inalienable. In the present case, the DENR recognized the
right of the LLDA to oppose Tensuan's Application for Registration; and the LLDA,
in its Opposition, precisely argued that the subject property is part of the Laguna
Lake bed and, therefore, inalienable public land. We do not even have to evaluate
the evidence presented by the LLDA given the Regalian Doctrine. Since Tensuan
failed to present satisfactory proof that the subject property is alienable and
disposable, the burden of evidence did not even shift to the LLDA to prove that the
subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed. (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 18, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90383, affirming the Orders dated
October 11, 2007 and November 27, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 153 in Land Registration Case No. N-11573-TG, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The application for registration of title filed by respondent Crisanto S.
Raneses over two parcels of land identified as Lot No. 3085-A, Csd-00-001621
and Lot No. 3085-B, Csd-00-001621 both located at Barangay Napindan, Taguig
City, Metro Manila, is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.