SECOND DIVISION

FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, A.C. No. 7298

Complainant, [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]

Present:

- versus - QUISUMBING, J.,

Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:

June 25, 2007

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RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of
which threatened complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of
documents.

Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C. Hufana in
an illegal dismissal case before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Sometime in
August 2005, complainant Fernando Martin O. Pena, as President of MOF Company, Inc.
(Subic), received a notice from the Conciliation and Mediation Center of the NLRC for a
mediation/conciliation conference. In the conference, respondent, in behalf of his client,
submitted a claim for separation pay arising from her alleged illegal dismissal. Complainant
rejected the claim as being baseless. Complainant thereafter sent notices to Hufana for the latter
to explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this return to work notice, respondent
wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his client’s claim for separation pay. The letter also
contained the following threat to the company:

BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and
claim bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under
established precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges
like:
 1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the
government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.

These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts
as settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[1]

Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical standards,
complainant filed an administrative complaint[2] with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondent filed an Answer with Impleader (Motion to
Dismiss and Counterclaims)[3] claiming that Atty. Emmanuel A. Jocson, complainant’s legal
counsel, also played an important part in imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated
charges against him. Respondent also pointed out that the complaint had no certification against
forum shopping and was motivated only to confuse the issues then pending before the Labor
Arbiter. By way of counterclaim, respondent asked for damages and for the disbarment of Atty.
Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse the prosecution of Atty. Jocson for Usurpation
of Public Functions[4] and for violation of the Notarial Law.[5]

A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent failed to

appear.[6] Both parties were thereafter required to submit their position papers.

The Report and Recommendation[7] of Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan

found that complainant, failed to file his position paper and to comply with Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 requiring a certificate against forum shopping and, accordingly,
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent. On 26 May 2006, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.[8] On 10 July 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the
Supreme Court the notice of said Resolution and the records of the case.[9] Thereafter, on 18
August 2006, respondent filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration (for Modification of
Decision)[10] reiterating his claim of damages against complainant in the amount of four hundred
million pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in dollars, for filing the “false, malicious,
defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal fabricators [sic], malevolent[,] oppressive, evasive filing [of] a
groundless and false suit.”[11]

Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline)[12] alleging that he personally submitted and filed with the IBP
his position paper, after serving a copy thereof on respondent by registered mail. He further
alleges that he was deprived of his right to due process when the IBP dismissed his complaint
without considering his position paper and without ruling on the merits thereof.
 Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26 May 2006
Resolution[13] of the IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the case to the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline for proper adjudication and disposition on the merits.

Based on the records, there is truth to complainant’s assertion that he filed his position
paper on 21 December 2005, after serving a copy of the same to respondent. The IBP stamp on
the front page of said document shows that it was received by the IBP on 21 December 2005.
The registry receipt attached to the same document also shows that it was sent by registered mail
to respondent on the same date. [14]

Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition before this Court
for his failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in his complaint against
respondent.

The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally required by

Circular No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court for every petition filed with the
Court or the Court of Appeals. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April
1994, expanded the certification requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial
agencies below this Court and the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs
(1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[15] Said rule states that a violation thereof would constitute
contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to
the taking of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned.[16]

The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took against
complainant his failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to his complaint and
consequently dismissed his complaint. This Court, however, disagrees and, accordingly, grants
the petition. However, a remand of the case to the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.

The Court’s determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of disbarment

proceedings, the reasons for the certification against forum shopping requirement, complainant’s
subsequent compliance with the requirement, and the merit of complainant’s complaint against
respondent.

The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,[17] dwelt on the sui generis character of
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, thus:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
 the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.[18] [Emphasis supplied]

In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum shopping
to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings, must refer to another
administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same respondent, because such other
proceedings or “action” is one that necessarily involves “the same issues” as the one posed in the
disbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.

Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to
apprise the Court of the pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping
situation. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes,[19] which
tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and
adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[20] Furthermore, the rule
proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and their
clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to promote the orderly administration of
justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of the
courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies
rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.[21]

It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a certification
against forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem that the scenario sought to be
avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely
happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either “taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person.”[22] Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a
certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary action against the
same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. We have previously held that the rule
requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading,
“should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure—which is to achieve substantial
justice as expeditiously as possible.”[23]

At any rate, complainant’s subsequent compliance with the requirement cured the
supposed defect in the original complaint. The records show that complainant submitted the
required certification against forum shopping on 6 December 2006 when he filed his
Comment/Opposition to respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the present petition.
 Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainant’s case against respondent justifies the grant of
the present petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the threatening letter to
complainant, even spiritedly contesting the charge that the letter is unethical.

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall represent
his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,” reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer’s
duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client’s success is
wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law
and ethics.[24] In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a “lawyer shall employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in
any case or proceeding.” Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any
unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to
secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the
lawyer’s client.[25]

In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through
his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as
settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple
charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to
operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but
they also amount to blackmail.

Blackmail is “the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure

or opposition in the public prints,…obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining
from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his
prejudice.” In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous
with extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an
injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating
on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the
follies, or the crime of the victim.[26]

In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr.,[27] we held that “[a]n accusation for blackmail and
extortion is a very serious one which, if properly substantiated, would entail not only
respondent’s disbarment from the practice of law, but also a possible criminal
prosecution.”[28] While the respondent in Boyboy was exonerated for lack of evidence, the same
may not be said of respondent in the present case for he admits to writing the offensive letter.

In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same
as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with
boldness, asserting that “a lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government
commission of offenses punishable by the State.”[29] He further asserts that the writing of
demand letters is a standard practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the
settlement of disputes.
 Respondent’s assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that
respondent’s threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to
compel the latter to give in to his client’s demands. It was not respondent’s intention to point out
complainant’s violations of the law as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains
an implied promise to “keep silent” about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on
the date indicated.

Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this
jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has
with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be
tasked to enforce his client’s claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing
a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case
contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory
charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his client’s claim for separation pay.
The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their
claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule
under which a private communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is not
actionable. The privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent used it to blackmail
complainant and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client.

However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold that
disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the
same out of his overzealousness to protect his client’s interests. Accordingly, the more
appropriate penalty is reprimand.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May

2006 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby found liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon
19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly meted out the penalty of
REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court
however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a
neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and
seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight
(8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993
imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four
(4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994
submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that
he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges,
and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a
scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing
victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to
comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his
son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide
but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying
abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of
one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy
Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart
attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son.
However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in
his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the
gruesome manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the
bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual
and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and
efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out"
lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal
importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing
the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for
allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless
beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness
required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and
uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which]

makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then
possessed of good moral character. 1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The
suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due
to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third
parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the
cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused
is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the
circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now
morally fit to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino
is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he
is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of
Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the
sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted
themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for
everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been
giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and
other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take

the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and,
thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]

EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE

SILVA, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos.
96-1346 to 96-1353, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for
Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled “People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused.” During the proceedings, respondent Atty.
Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check No.
0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the Philippine
National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her
client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the
same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a
lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent
was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted
from participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the
dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the
drawee bank for the reason: “Account Closed.” On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a
letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the check. [1] However, his
demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against
her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22,
1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva.[2]
On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for
disbarment of respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath. [3]
In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondent’s given address at
Carmelo Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to
comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.[4] However, it was returned
unserved with the notation “Moved”.[5] The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP
submitted the latest address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City. [6]
On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the
administrative complaint filed against her was served at the aforesaid address. This
was again returned unserved with the notation: “Refused”. Thus, the case was referred
to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[7]
In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C.
Rous found respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for two (2) years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-
554 which adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her
personal check by way of settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad,
with the assurance that the check will have sufficient funds when presented for
payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his complaint against
her client in exchange for a check which she drew against a closed account.
It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing
check amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should
be accordingly penalized.[8] Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties
for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefore. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.

The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of
good moral character. Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to
enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which
puts the lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in
the practice of law.[9]
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her
suspension or disbarment,[10] because it is important that members of the legal
brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality.[11] Any wrongdoing
which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-
professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading
payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak
well of a member of the bar, for a lawyer’s professional and personal conduct must at all
times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.[12]
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices
served on her betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the
nobility of the legal profession.[13] Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of
respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw
in her psyche which renders highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the
practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of
justice because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every
lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law
when she disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost
command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE

CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondent’s persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders

directed at her with not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which
merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.[14] We can not tolerate any misconduct
that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE
SILVA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective
upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and
be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO,respondent.
 [G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR

DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant
Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the
July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads:
“ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.”[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an
interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of
property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee
of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half
after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000
issues of theManila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of
his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that
advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to
change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest
of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the
Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-
old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all
the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of
legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order
as long as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation
of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section
27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year
with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The
IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, [8] which
was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, “Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents.” This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s
Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
 In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest
whether or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.[10] Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not
submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other
hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.[12] It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.[15] The following
elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which

one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice involving

thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.[16]

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings
hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded
for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight
months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14,
2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the
same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such
acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority.
 What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-
styled “Annulment of Marriage Specialist,” he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed,
in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months
from the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have
otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage
bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity
of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring
no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name
or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well
as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.[21] Publication in reputable
law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of
brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep
v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of
law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations
and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings
in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the
bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his
name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of
law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is

found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He
is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
 Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6707 March 24, 2006

GISELA HUYSSEN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This treats of a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L.
Gutierrez.

Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied
for Philippine Visas under Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that in
order that their visa applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a
certain sum of money for a period of one year which could be withdrawn after one year. Believing
that the deposit was indeed required by law, complainant deposited with respondent on six different
occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepared
receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the complainant but refused
to give her copies of official receipts despite her demands. After one year, complainant demanded
from respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured her that said amount would be returned.
When respondent failed to return the sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which
complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to respondent for the immediate return of the
money. In a letter dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to release the amount not later than 9
March 1999. Failing to comply with his promise, the World Mission for Jesus sent another demand
letter. In response thereto, respondent sent complainant a letter dated 19 March 1999 explaining the
alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited amount. He enclosed two blank checks
postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the amounts. When
complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due dates, the same were dishonored because
respondent had stopped payment on the same. Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to complainant
dated 25 April 1999, explained the reasons for stopping payment on the checks, and gave
complainant five postdated checks with the assurance that said checks would be honored.
Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates but they were all dishonored for
having been drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped by
respondent. After respondent made several unfulfilled promises to return the deposited amount,
complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who sent two demand letters to respondent. The
demand letters remained unheeded.

Thus, a complaint2 for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required3 respondent to
submit his answer within 15 days from receipt thereof.

In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,4 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint
claiming that having never physically received the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not
have appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the amount was used as payment for services
rendered for obtaining the permanent visas in the Philippines. Respondent explained thus:
a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the complainant,
the latter was introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem
concerning their stay in the Philippines, herself and three sons, one of which is already of
major age while the two others were still minors then. Their problem was the fact that since
they have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years as holders of missionary
visas (9G) they could no longer extend their said status as under the law and related
polic[i]es of the government, missionary visa holders could only remain as such for ten (10)
years after which they could no longer extend their said status and have to leave the country.

b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they better secure a
permanent visa under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as
Quota Visa and thereafter, provided them with list of the requirements in obtaining the said
visa, one of which is that the applicant must have a $40,000 deposited in the bank. I also
inform that her son Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age, has to have the same
amount of show money separate of her money as he would be issued separate visa, while
her two minor children would be included as her dependents in her said visa application. I
advised them to get a lawyer (sic), complainant further requested me to refer to her to a
lawyer to work for their application, which I did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an
Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the complainant and her family.

c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until the
same was finished and the corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant
and her family. Her son Marcus Huyssen was given an independent permanent visa while
the other two were made as dependents of the complainant. In between the processing of
the papers and becoming very close to the complainant, I became the intermediary between
complainant and their counsel so much that every amount that the latter would request for
whatever purpose was coursed through me which request were then transmitted to the
complainant and every amount of money given by the complainant to their counsel were
coursed thru me which is the very reason why my signature appears in the vouchers
attached in the complaint-affidavit;

d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for services of a
lawyer that I myself began to wonder why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza
and inquired from him regarding the matter and the following facts were revealed to me:

1) That what was used by the complainant as her show money from the bank is not
really her money but money of World Mission for Jesus, which therefore is a serious
violation of the Immigration Law as there was a misrepresentation. This fact was
confirmed later when the said entity sent their demand letter to the undersigned
affiant and which is attached to the complaint-affidavit;

2) That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was the very same
amount used by her son Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining his separate permanent visa.
These acts of the complainant and her son could have been a ground for deportation
and likewise constitute criminal offense under the Immigration Law and the Revised
Penal Code. These could have been the possible reason why complainant was made
to pay for quite huge amount.

e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family became very close to
undersigned and my family that I was even invited to their residence several times;

f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their money given and
surprisingly they want to recover the same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no
longer around, he died sometime 1997;

g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden and that the
amount of money is now being sought to be recovered from me;

h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the consequences of
having signed the same and therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund
needed but up to the present my standby loan application has not been released and was
informed that the same would only be forthcoming second week of August. The same should
have been released last March but was aborted due to prevalent condition. The amount to
 be paid, according to the complainant has now become doubled plus attorney’s fees
of P200,000.00.

Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her Formal
Offer of Evidence on 25 August 2003.

On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondent’s evidence but the
scheduled hearings (11 settings) were all reset at the instance of the respondent who was allegedly
out of the country to attend to his client’s needs. Reception of respondent’s evidence was scheduled
for the last time on 28 September 2004 and again respondent failed to appear, despite due notice
and without just cause.

On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her

report5 recommending the disbarment of respondent. She justified her recommendation in this
manner:

At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent received the amount of
US$20,000 from complainant, as respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes
A to F of complainant) showing his receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however
claims that he did not appropriate the same for himself but that he delivered the said amount to a
certain Atty. Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is untenable considering the documentary
evidence submitted by complainant. On record is the 1 March 1999 letter of respondent addressed
to the World Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint) where he stated thus:

"I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of the deposit but I repeat, nobody
really intended that the thing would happen that way. Many events were the causes of the said delay
particularly the death of then Commissioner L. Verceles, whose sudden death prevented us the
needed papers for the immediate release. It was only from compiling all on the first week of January
this year, that all the said papers were recovered, hence, the process of the release just started
though some important papers were already finished as early as the last quarter of last year. We are
just going through the normal standard operating procedure and there is no day since January that I
do not make any follow – ups on the progress of the same."

and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated thus:

"I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your good
self in connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family. It might take
some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers are
being still compiled are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved
your visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all
the documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay."

From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash
Vouchers were issued by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official
receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his
personal checks to cover the return of the money to complainant if said amount was really officially
deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable
conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated the same for his
personal use. It should also be noted that respondent has failed to establish that the "late Atty.
Mendoza" referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There is not one correspondence from
Atty. Mendoza regarding the visa application of complainant and his family, and complainant has
also testified that she never met this Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position
with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more
reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted
that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
reads:

"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties."
On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved6 the Investigating Commissioner’s
report with modification, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violation of
Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the amount with legal interest from
receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for
prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice
for appropriate administrative action.

We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be severely sanctioned.

We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
task have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more
severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.7

It is undisputed that respondent admitted8 having received the US$20,000 from complainant as
shown by his signatures in the petty cash vouchers9 and receipts10 he prepared, on the false
representation that that it was needed in complainant’s application for visa with the BID. Respondent
denied he misappropriated the said amount and interposed the defense that he delivered it to a
certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their application for visa in the
BID.11 Such defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit evidence on the matter. While
he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate of said Atty.
Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has been naturally
silenced by fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a member of
the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue
and overcome the evidence against him.12 He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell
short of his duty. Records show that even though he was given the opportunity to answer the
charges and controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation, he failed, without any
plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case was set for reception of his evidence
despite due notice.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is
inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-
culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value.

When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the
charge. Such admissions were also apparent in the following letters of respondent to complainant:

1) Letter13 dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:

Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said deposit is forthcoming, the latest of
which is 09 March 1999. Should it not be released on said date, I understand to pay the same to you
out of my personal money on said date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody here
at the office on that day and the amount would be given to you wether (sic) from the Bureau or from
my own personal money.

2) Letter14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:

I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your goodself
in connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family.

It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent
papers are still being compiled and are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles,
who approved your visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be
fine later as all the documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay.

xxxx
As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one dated April 6, 1999
and the other one dated April 20, 1999. I leave the amount vacant because I would want you to fill
them up on their due dates the peso equivalent to $10,000 respectively. This is to be sure that the
peso equivalent of your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have postdated them to enable me to
raise some more pesos to cover the whole amount but don’t worry as the Lord had already provided
me the means.

3) Letter15 dated 25 April 1999 provides:

Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I have done my very best for the
early return of your money but the return is becoming bleak as I was informed that there are still
papers lacking. When I stopped the payment of the checks I issued, I was of the impression that
everything is fine, but it is not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact that I really have to
personally return the money out of my own. The issue should stop at my end. This is the truth that I
must face. It may hurt me financially but it would set me free from worries and anxieties.

I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to secure one last Saturday the
releases of which are on the following:

May 4, 1999- 200,000

May 11, 1999 -200,000

May 20, 1999-200,000

June 4, 1999-200,000

I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my collateral.

I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks which I assure you will be
sufficiently funded on their due dates by reason of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the
last time, if any of these checks, is returned, don’t call me anymore. Just file the necessary action
against me, I just had to put an end to this matter and look forward. x x x

4) Letter16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:

The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first check I issued. In
fact I stopped all payments to all other checks that are becoming due to some of my creditors to give
preference to the check I issued to you.

This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead of returning the other checks I
requested for stop payment - instead honored them and mistakenly returned your check. This was a
very big surprise to me and discouragement for I know it would really upset you.

In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in cash which I initially plan to
withdraw from the Bank. However, I could not entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I bring
the same to your place considering that its quite a big amount. I am just sending a check for you to
immediately deposit today and I was assured by the bank that it would be honored this time.

Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of
another. As correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have
issued his personal checks if said amount were officially deposited with the BID. This is an
admission of misconduct.

Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter’s pending
application for visas is violative of Rule 1.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful
acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.0218 of the Code which bars lawyers in
government service from promoting their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or
which may be affected by the functions of his office.19 Respondent’s conduct in office betrays the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high
public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with
high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.

In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing

another by issuing several worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.

In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct,20 as the effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless
commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black’s
definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he
owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and
duty, justice, honesty or good morals."21

Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude.22

Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant;
worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover
up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue, being a member of the bar.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special
privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A
lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal
profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes suspension and
disbarment.23 More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground
for the revocation of such privilege.24

Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and
discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal
profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath have proven them unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.25 These pronouncement gain practical
significance in the case at bar considering that respondent was a former member of the Board of
Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing also that government lawyers who are public servants
owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more
sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified
in the public eye.26

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict
demands and high standards of the legal profession.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude ;
(6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
(8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.27

In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,28 we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during her tenure as
OIC, Legal Services, Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money as consideration
for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona,29 we
also disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor Relations Commission, who was caught by the
National Bureau of Investigation in the act of receiving and counting money extorted from a certain
person.
Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high
standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent
deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.30

WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered
to return the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the
money until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal
prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice
for appropriate administrative action. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be
spread on the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its
chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6313 September 7, 2006

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual.
As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being
the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in
those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.1

Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug
(complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of "he said, she said,"
the parties' conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented.

Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she was
looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"), the biological father of her minor
daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to
respondent. After several meetings with complainant, respondent sent a demand letter2 in her behalf
to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give,
plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for her
congenital heart ailment.

At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started having a sexual
relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent started calling on her
shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her,
giving her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant,
to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her
daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support against Aquino.
Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by respondent's claim
that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of
Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit") categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the
birth certificate4 of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read the
contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the document meant
nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and
educational support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that despite the Affidavit, she
could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a public document.
Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document "without even taking a
glance at it."5

On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00
cash andP58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her
daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his personal check6 in the
amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter.
However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the
said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the position of
Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.

Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept part
of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore,
he did not file the case against Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr.
("Atty. Tolentino").

Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as
well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was
decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement.7 It was only when said cases
were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit.

Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the
Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making
false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his marriage
had already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires.
Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour, her
weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was able to appropriate for
himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent's
aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon
7.8 Hence, she filed the instant complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.

Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer
who would file the aforementioned action for support. Complainant's former high school classmate
Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits
sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child.10 Subsequently, he
and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquino's infidelity, his
relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the spouses were willing to
give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not
the father of her daughter.

Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her to
study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and
cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court
settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued
until the amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four postdated
checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to
rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount
was P188,000.00.

Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent
prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document
and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and that she
signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft before the actual payment was made. He
notes that complainant is a college graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and
understands English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketingP58,000.00 of the settlement
proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum
of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the
remainingP38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he
assumed that it was for his attorney's fees.

As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He,
however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a
"chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies
that he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent
devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married when
they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that, first, they had met
through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of hers. Second, they
had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently,
complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so
disturbing to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the
Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay
Council ("ABC") and as such was anex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua,
Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his
locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that
she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him in his
campaign.

Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked out,
complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in
the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job never came so that she had to
return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted,
she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition
for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her "to look for
the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also informed her that he
could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit.
He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.

In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give
her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to
meet and have communicated only through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant
begged him to continue the assistance until June when her alleged fiancé from the United States
would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance for
the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to her.

Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told him
that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to
relay the message to respondent. According to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared
complaint against respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court should the latter not
accede to her request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand.
True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.

On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for
investigation, report and recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their respective position
papers and supporting documents, the Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and
Recommendation14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties' conflicting factual
versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and concluded that
respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:

Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good
moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and
renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer,
are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which
throughout the passage of time have been compendiously described as MORAL
CHARACTER.

Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant
to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling
complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for
the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular
 calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes and
emotional dependency.

xxxx

Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x15

It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months
and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report and Recommendation in a
Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's obviously taking
advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his client and
attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for
one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was
likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to complainant.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Questioning18 ("Motion") dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for
Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own
version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events that transpired between him and
complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who
depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing
that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning
in order to determine who between them is telling the truth.

In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no more
jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.

While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has
recommended.

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree"20 in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of
law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.21 As officers
of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community.22 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.24 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community.25

While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,26 it is not
so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.28

By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful
conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy
his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due to his promises
of financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her former
lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with
her. Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that
time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free
legal assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is suffering from any mental or
physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part.29Respondent's
numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of
her. At best, it proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which
the finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid
does not induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if
not badgering, him for financial support.

Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire
belief. We find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of
his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former
classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she
knew his residence phone number and that she had called him there. She also knew that
respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001.
Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on
several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that
she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering that she
previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to
have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a short
time without verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred "to change [her] life for the
better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations of deceit were
not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.31 We are left with the
most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship
with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.

Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over
her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without
explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted
as counsel for Aquino.

We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from Aquino
especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could
abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk the
welfare of her child by signing without even reading a document she knew was related to the support
case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a single page. It
is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.

Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the
Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her "to use her
head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandra's medical and educational support if
she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows
that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which
the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on
whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate or that she
knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are
understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit
voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.

The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document
disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.

It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after
explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of
pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.33 Moreover, there is no
showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of complainant's daughter as paternity
remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with
Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the
record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel in the
settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that cannot be
considered evidence.34 Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary
evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in
accordance with his oath.35

Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to
her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal
check in the amount ofP150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his
fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.

The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to return
the amount ofP58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.

We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of
complainant's claim for support. The parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount
of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she should have received more as there were
two postdated checks amounting toP58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her.
Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 – but
only P38,000.00 more – and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his
attorney's fees.

We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two
postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent
admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement
for attorney's fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on record
a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in
his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers that he
cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did
not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.

We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of
either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only
on the written assertions of the parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the
assertions through the question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a
more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the substantial evidence level
tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further reception of evidence
solely on this aspect.

We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her
child's DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.

Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees. Suffice it to
state that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a
criminal action.36 It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal
profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the
public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence.37 As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress
for private grievance.38 The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
lawyer's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.39

Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court
meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the
respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with his
paramour,41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an innocent woman into marriage,43 or was
found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases.
We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46 respondent was
found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought
understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit
relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral
attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47 where
respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that
he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite
his retirement during the pendency of the case.

We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over
his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs
that his is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating
circumstances in his favor.48 Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine
of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this
case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and
impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., J.J., , concur.

FIRST DIVISION

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, Adm. Case No. 6290

Complainant,
Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,

- versus - PANGANIBAN,
SANTIAGO,
CARPIO, and
AZCUNA, JJ.

ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

July 14, 2004

X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie
Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law
office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office.
 On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely
representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and
subsisting marriage with another woman. However, through spurious means, the
respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false marriage
contract,[1] which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in
Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila[2] and the National Statistics
Office (NSO)[3] prove that no record of marriage exists between them. The false date
and place of marriage between the two are stated in the birth certificates of their two
children, Donnabel Tenorio[4] and Felicisimo Tenorio III.[5] But in the birth certificates
of their two other children, Oliver Tenorio[6] and John Cedric Tenorio,[7] another date
and place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon.

As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent

caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City
Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The respondent would often openly and sarcastically
declare to the complainant and her co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor
Jacome.

On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that

the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a
member of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her client’s money to her own use and
benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the
complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the statement “Isang bala ka
lang” to deter them from divulging respondent’s illegal activities and transactions.

In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the
charge of deceit, she declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.
They were married on 12 February 1980 as shown by their Certificate of Marriage,
Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil Registry of Quezon City.[8] Her husband has no
prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.

As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she
caused the dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against Councilor
Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor Jacome who caused the execution of said
document. Additionally, the complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers who
went around the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting a survey but did so to
besmirch respondent’s good name and reputation.

The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied
by the respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Office is registered with
the Department of Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its
Certificate of Registration of Business Name.[9] Hence, she has no partners in her law
office. As to the estafa case, the same had already been dropped pursuant to the Order of
14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. [10] The
respondent likewise denied that she threatened the complainant with the words “Isang
bala ka lang” on 24 January 2000.

Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the
complainant to get even with her. She terminated complainant’s employment after
receiving numerous complaints that the complainant extorted money from different
people with the promise of processing their passports and marriages to foreigners, but
she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is politically
motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the complainant and her cohorts should
they initiate this complaint, which they did and for which they were re-hired. The
respondent also flaunted the fact that she had received numerous awards and citations
for civic works and exemplary service to the community. She then prayed for the
dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.

The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H.

Tantuico.

During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant
would submit a Reply to respondent’s Answer, while the respondent would submit a
Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the
attached affidavits would constitute as the respective direct testimonies of the parties
and the affiants.[11]

In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated
in the illegal practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-
Tenorio Law Office[12] where the name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior
partner; and (2) a Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card[13] signed by
the respondent as Chairperson where her husband is identified as “Atty. Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr.” She added that respondent’s husband even appeared in court hearings.

In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership
with her husband nor allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If there
was an instance that her husband appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her
law firm. The letterhead submitted by the complainant was a false reproduction to show
that her husband is one of her law partners. But upon cross-examination, when
confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office bearing her signature, she
admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A.
Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners because they have
investments in her law office.[14]

The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on
12 February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their marriage
contract was not registered she applied for late registration on 5 April 2000. She then
presented as evidence a certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of
the Civil Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in the
birth certificates of her children as to the place and date of her marriage were merely
an oversight.[15]

Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and
Memoranda, the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13 November
2002 after allegedly realizing that this disbarment complaint arose out of a
misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer interested in
pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP

Commissioner on Bar Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant failed
to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. However, she found
the respondent guilty of the charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of law by
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the letterhead
of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner;
(2) the Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card of “Atty. Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr.,” signed by respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June
1997 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729 – 20734,
wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as counsel and even moved
for the provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the private complainants to
appear and for lack of interest to prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San
Juan recommended that the respondent be reprimanded.

In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner San Juan. The modification consisted in increasing the penalty from
reprimand to suspension from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a
similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.

We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as

approved and adopted with modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.

At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to
Withdraw Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs.
Rayos,[16] we declared:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed

by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case
of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the
 facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is
not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have
in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record
warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.

Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case

should proceed accordingly.

The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
were not substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving his case by convincing evidence.[17] With respect to the estafa case which is the
basis for the charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the respondent is
not yet convicted thereof. In Gerona vs. Datingaling,[18] we held that when the criminal
prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative
disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to
avoid contradictory findings.

We, however, affirm the IBP’s finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in
the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to
misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and
Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:

Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the

unauthorized practice of law.

Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person

the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.

The term “practice of law” implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out
to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration
of his services. Holding one’s self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of
that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of
a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of
law.[19] Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.
 In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as
one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized
practice of the legal profession.

At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio

Law Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D.
Battung as senior partners. She admitted that the first two are not lawyers but
paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law office as senior partners because
they have investments in her law office.[20] That is a blatant misrepresentation.

The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that
the respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the public that
he is a lawyer. Notably, the identification card stating that he is “Atty. Felicisimo
Tenorio, Jr.,” bears the signature of the respondent as Chairperson of the Group.

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the
bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes
it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.[21]

WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is
herebySUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective
immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will
be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorio’s record

as attorney in this Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 6323 April 13, 2007

PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or OLIVARES REALTY CORPORATION, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint1 for disbarment and suspension2 against respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.
by Pablo R. Olivares and/or Olivares Realty Corporation for violation of Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the rule on forum shopping.

In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondent’s client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-Rasheed,
repeatedly sued him for violations of the lease contract which they executed over a commercial
apartment in Olivares Building in Parañaque.3

In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.4 The case was dismissed for improper
venue.5

Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed filed an action for breach of contract with damages in
the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274. 6 The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0233,
was dismissed for failure to prosecute.7 Al-Rasheed, through counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a review
of the order dismissing Civil Case No. 99-0233 but the Court of Appeals did not give due course to
her appeal.8 The subsequent petition for review on certiorari filed in the Supreme Court was likewise
denied. 9

On January 29, 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit in the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque,
Branch 27410where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 0J-04-009.11 It was dismissed on the grounds
of res judicata and prescription.12

Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was only performing his legal obligation as a lawyer
to protect and prosecute the interests of his client.13 He denied that he was forum shopping as his
client, in her certificate of non-forum shopping,14 disclosed the two previous cases involving the
same cause of action which had been filed and dismissed.15 Respondent further claims he could not
refuse his client’s request to file a new case because Al-Rasheed was the "oppressed party" in the
transaction.16

This Court referred the complaint, together with respondent’s comment, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.17

The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found that respondent assisted Al-Rasheed in
repeatedly suing Olivares for the same cause of action and subject matter.18 It opined that
respondent should have noted that the 1999 case was dismissed for lack of interest to
prosecute.19 Under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, such dismissal had the effect of an
adjudication on the merits.20 The CBD recommended the suspension of respondent for six months
with a warning that any similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.21

The IBP adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rule 12.02, Canon
12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the proscription on forum shopping. It,
however, modified the recommended penalty to reprimand.22

We adopt the findings of the IBP except its recommendation as to the penalty. 1a\^/phi 1.net

All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality. When
they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the
sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. 23 As the first Canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes."24 Moreover, according to the lawyer’s oath they took, lawyers
should "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same."25

With all this in mind, respondent should have refrained from filing the second complaint against
Olivares. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice since it had the
effect of an adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse not to know this elementary principle of
procedural law.

The facts of this case reveal that Atty. Villalon purposely filed the second complaint. Respondent
appealed the 1999 case to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. Both actions were
dismissed for lack of merit, not on mere technicality. The certificate of non-forum shopping attached
to the 2004 complaint disclosed that Al-Rasheed previously sued Olivares for violating their lease
contract. As if such disclosure was a sufficient justification, Atty. Villalon unapologetically reproduced
his 199926 arguments and assertions in the 200427complaint. Respondent obviously knew the law
and tried to go around it. This Court therefore concludes that respondent willfully violated Rule
12.02, Canon 12 which provides that:

A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

Furthermore, he violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.

A lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice.28 Lawyers
have the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Filing multiple actions
constitutes an abuse of the Court’s processes. It constitutes improper conduct that tends to impede,
obstruct and degrade justice. Those who file multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to
disciplinary action for incompetence or willful violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good
fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions that appear to be just and consistent with
truth and honor.29

Everything considered, this Court finds that a reprimand is insufficient and rules instead that CBD’s
recommendation for a six-month suspension from the practice of law to be more commensurate to
the violation committed. However, in view of respondent’s death on September 27, 2006,30 the
penalty can no longer be imposed on him. This development has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary
case moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

ADM. CASE No. 7006 October 9, 2007

RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE

PROSECUTOR.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 5144,
entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.

Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao
City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the
Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was
sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel
for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z.
Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto
mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not
subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.1

In an Order dated August 30, 2002,2 Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case
because of the "harsh insinuation" of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he "lacks the cold
neutrality of an impartial magistrate," by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the
amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.

The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose Manuel
P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the
Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002, which motion
was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003, respondent
appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals
(CA).

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article
regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold
Star Daily. The article, entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder
suspect to bail out," reads:

SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a murder
suspect to go out on bail.

Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a
bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .

Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.

Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense. But Bagabuyo admitted
that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence
of the prosecution is weak.

But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it, Judge
F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case
for an unclear reason.

xxx

Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan's decision before the Court of Appeals and would file
criminal and administrative charges of certiorari against the judge.

Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.

"This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are
displaying judicial arrogance." he said.3

In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent and
the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court on
September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the
publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies and
misrepresentation.

The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser described the
evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only for
homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear
reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open court in the presence of
respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent
that he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the Mindanao Gold
Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent, in a press conference,
stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When asked by the trial court why he printed such
lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was respondent.4 Mr. Francisco clarified that in the
statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason, the
phrase "for an unclear reason," was added by the newspaper's Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.5

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer
whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For
his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court.6 The Court's Order dated September 30, 2003 reads:

ORDER

Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth to give it a
semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for
obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be cited for contempt and admitting that the
article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003 and quoted in the
Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is contemptuous was caused by him to be
published, is hereby adjudged to have committed indirect contempt of Court pursuant to
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of
30 days in jail. The BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he
does not put up a bond ofP100,000.00.

SO ORDERD.7

Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He appealed
the indirect contempt order to the CA.

Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for interviews in
Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial court's disposition in
the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.

In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent to
explain and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held in
contempt for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and why he
should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 118 and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.9

In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that the
interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news program between 6:00 and
8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003,
between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly
called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord due
process to the people.

The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.

On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to
Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and needed ample time to
answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly prepare for his defense.
In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill of
particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that respondent's actions and statements
are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.

On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor informed
the court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003 cancelling the
hearing "to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for," and ordered him to appear on
January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not be cited in contempt of court
pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003. However, respondent did not
appear in the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.

On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondent's Answer dated January 8, 2004.
Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He,
however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by someone
who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment does not fall
within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was interviewed by his
friend, Tony Consing, at the latter's instance. He justified his response during the interview as a
simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or
malign, and was without malice.

On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has grossly

violated the Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave professional misconduct,
rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging
to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law.

Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is hereby ordered
to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served at the Surigao City
Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00). Future acts
of contempt will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review and for further determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of Prosecutor
Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.10

The trial court found respondent's denials to be lame as the tape of his interview on October 2, 2003,
duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:

TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamay'ng panahon ang
samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa ba ni. O ingnon nato duna na bay pagbag-o sa
imong huna-huna karon?

(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed your mind yet?)

BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang pagsiguro, ang
mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka abogado, mao kana.

(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are ignorant of the law
should be disbarred. That's it.)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga hunahuna
mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay magkalami. Kada
adlao nagatoon ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga bag-ong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron
sa pagsiguro gayod nga inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso nga disbarment niining di mahibalo
nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga
Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod, pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili
sa pagka-abogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton, ang iyang
pagkabakakon . . . .
(That's true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are ignorant of the law is
made firmer by time. I study everyday. I read new jurisprudence and the law to insure that
when I file the disbarment case against this Judge who does not know his law, I am certain
that he loses his license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of the law should not only be
removed as a judge but should also be disbarred. Just take a look at his Order, Ton, and see
what a liar he is . . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako nga bakakon
kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order given in open court, ang kalooy sa dios, ang
iyang order sa Korte wala siya mag-ingon ug kantidad nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .

(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that this Order was
"given in open court," and in God's mercy, he did not state the amount of P100,000.00 as
bail bond. . . .)

BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako

siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug miingon
siya, BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.

(Because he does not know the law, I said, "Your Honor, I have the right to appeal." Then he
came back and said, "BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.")

xxx

BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.

Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross ignorance of the law. . . .

(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will see his gross
ignorance of the law. . . . )

xxx

TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?

(So what is your plan now?)

BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangtang na siya sa
pagka abogado. . . .

(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang hibaw-an nga
ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug ang akong
gisulti mao lamang ang balaod nga siya in fact at that time I said he is not conversant of the
law, with regards to the case of murder. . . .

(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that it is not for a judge
to determine if a person is a braggart. . . .And what I said was based on the law. In fact, at
that time, I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder . . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana, pero unsa may
iyang katuyoan – ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya akong
pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man lagi mahibalo sa
balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon por dios por Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon
 ug balaod, naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong hunahuna nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na
ang diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and everyone is entitled
to due process of law – you did not accord me due process of law . . . .

(I sat down. . . . That's it. But what was his purpose? He made me come in order to humiliate
me because he wanted me arrested, he wanted me imprisoned, but because he is ignorant
of the law, he ordered the BMJP. For God's sake, Mr. Tan, what's wrong with you, Mr. Tan?
Please read the law. What is your thinking? That when you are a judge, you are also a
dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and everyone is entitled to
due process of law – you did not accord me due process of law. . . .)

TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga maaksiyonan

kini, with all this problem sa Korte Suprema.

(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action with all the problems
in the Supreme Court.)

BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang akong jurisprudence, nga ang
mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka Huwes. . .
. Apan unsa man intawon ang balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno
siya madjongero, mao bitaw na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?

(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges who are ignorant of
the law must be removed from the Bench. But what law has he been reading? I heard that he
is a mahjong aficionado(mahjongero) and that is why he is studying mahjong.11

The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote distrust in the
administration of justice.

The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law under Sec.
28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court12 for any of the causes mentioned in Sec. 2713 of the same Rule.
Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held that the
requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.

In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,14 Rule 138 and Sec. 9,15 Rule 139 of the Rules of
Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant the
Statement of Facts of respondent's suspension from the practice of law, dated July 14, 2005,
together with the order of suspension and other relevant documents.

In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in the
August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and
independence of the court and its officers, and respondent's criticism of the trial court's Order dated
November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No.
5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that the requirement of due
process was complied with when respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent
chose to remain silent.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial court's order of
suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been reiterated
in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.16 that:

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of
his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross
misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the
practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful
appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are
not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of
 impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A
lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions
precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued
membership therein.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend;
and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence.17 Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.18 Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities
only."

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press
conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the
accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial
arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder
suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily.
Respondent's statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still
pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that "a lawyer shall not make
public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party."

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress
of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the
court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a
mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath, as he has sworn to "conduct [himself] as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to [his] clients."

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of
observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v.
Gica19 held:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer
of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes
fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of
our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.

The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly
provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution
must always be maintained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating Rule
11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of
violating the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
effective upon finality of this Decision, with aSTERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of
Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ADM. CASE NO. 6876 March 7, 2008

HEIRS OF LYDIO "JERRY" FALAME, namely: MELBA FALAME, LEO FALAME and JERRY
FALAME,petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

On Petition for Review1 is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio "Jerry" Falame
(complainants) against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1191.

In their Complaint2 against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991, their father, the
late Lydio "Jerry" Falame (Lydio), engaged the services of respondent to represent him in an action
for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. A-2694 (the first civil case) and entitled "Heirs of Emilio
T. Sy, represented by Anastacia Velayo Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio 'Jerry' Falame,
Raleigh Falame and Four (4) John Does," in which Lydio was one of the defendants.3

Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer to the
complaint in the first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required to
file their respective position papers, respondent used and submitted in evidence the following: (1) a
special power of attorney dated 1 July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh
Falame, appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh Falame dated
23 July 1988, executed before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property
subject of the first civil case.4

Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had ruled in favor of
the defendants in the first civil case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his legal adviser
and counsel for his businesses until Lydio's death on 8 September 1996.5

However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, respondent
filed a case against complainants allegedly involving the property subject of the first civil case,
entitled "Spouses Rally F. Falame and Noemi F. Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame, Jerry
A. Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporations, their representatives, agents
and persons acting in their behalf" and docketed as Civil Case No. 5568 (the second civil case)
before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6. The complaint sought the declaration of
nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
20241 issued as a consequence of the registration of the deed of sale, and the real estate mortgage
on the said property. Alternatively, it prayed for specific performance and reconveyance or legal
redemption and damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order.6

Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second civil
case wherein they were impleaded as defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as
an attorney. Plainly, they contended that the spouses Falame's interests are adverse to those of his
former client, Lydio.7

Secondly, complainants claimed that respondent knowingly made false statements of fact in the
complaint in the second civil case to mislead the trial court. In so doing, respondent violated
paragraph (d), Section 208 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,9 complainants asserted further.
Lastly, complainants alleged that the second civil case is a baseless and fabricated suit which
respondent filed as counsel for complainants' uncle against the heirs of respondent's deceased
client. Specifically, they averred that respondent filed the case for the sole purpose of retaining,
maintaining and/or withholding the possession of the subject property from complainants who are its
true owners. Complainants concluded that respondent violated paragraph (g), Section 2010 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.11

In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,12 respondent controverted complainants' allegations. He

emphasizes that it was only Raleigh Falame who personally engaged his legal services for him and
on Lydio's behalf and that, in fact, it was Raleigh who paid him the attorney's fees. He also stated
that he signed the jurat in Raleigh's affidavit, which was submitted as evidence in the first civil case,
believing to the best of his knowledge that there is good ground to support it. Insisting that he did not
betray the confidence reposed in him by Lydio as the latter's counsel in the first civil case,
respondent maintained that he did not reveal or use any fact he acquired knowledge of during the
existence of the attorney-client relation in the first civil case as he had never even conferred with nor
talked to Lydio in the first place. Respondent likewise contended that he did not knowingly make any
misleading or untruthful statement of fact in the complaint in the second civil case and neither did he
employ any means inconsistent with truth and honor in the hearing of the case.13

Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any case or
transaction. Stressing the long interval of twelve years separating the termination of the first civil
case and his acceptance of the second civil case, respondent pointed out that the first civil case was
not between Lydio and Raleigh but rather between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand and Lydio
and Raleigh on the other where physical possession of property was at stake. Respondent further
averred that in contrast the second civil case is one involving the spouses Raleigh and Noemi
Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame, and Sugni Realty Holdings
and Development Corporation, as defendants—a case which arose from the wrongful acts
committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after Lydio's death.14

Respondent maintained that since the second civil case was still pending before the trial court, the
IBP had no jurisdiction over the instant administrative case. He added that complainants filed this
administrative case when Raleigh could no longer testify in his own favor as he had died a year
earlier.15

In their Position Paper16 dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their previous charges against
respondent, complainants claimed that respondent violated Rule 15.0317 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he represented the cause of the spouses Falame against that of his former
client, Lydio.18

On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-167 adopting and
approving Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan's report and recommendation for the
dismissal of this administrative case, thus:19

x x x The charge lacks specification as to what part of the lawyer's oath was violated by the
respondent and what confidence was disclosed. The complainants may have in mind the
prohibition against disclosure of secret information learned in confidence, but there is no
specification in the complaint what secret or information learned in confidence under Civil
Case No. A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed by respondent in Civil Case No. 5568. In
administrative complaints for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the complainant
must specify in the affidavit-complaint the alleged secrets or confidential information
disclosed or will be disclosed in the professional employment (Uy v. Gonzalez, 426 SCRA
422; 431). In the absence of such specification, the complaint must fail.

In the complaint, there is no specific charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15,
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility about the prohibition against
representation of conflicting interest. So, the allegation in paragraph 1, page 8 and 9 of
complainants' position paper stating: With all due respect, it is submitted that respondent
violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility"cannot be
countenanced. The reason being that it is an elementary principle of due process to which
the respondent is entitled that only those charged in the complaint can be proved by the
complainants. A charge not specified in the complaint cannot be proved (Uy v. Gonzales, id.)

x x x But still this charge will not proper for lack of sufficient bases.
 xxx

Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced on 03 October 2000, or three years since the
complainants became owners of Lydio Falame's properties, is a suit against the
complainants, not as representatives of Lydio Falame, but as owners of their respective
aliquot interests in the property in question (Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104; 107-108). The
complainants are sued not on the basis of the acts, rights, obligations and interest of Lydio
Falame on the material possession of the improvements found on Lot 345 litigated in Civil
Case No. A-2694 nor even on such land itself, but rather on the facts alleged in the second
amended and supplemental complaint which give rise to their cause of action against them.

While the complainants could not specify under what circumstances the respondent
committed [the] alleged breach of confidence, breach of secrecy or revelation of secret or
confidential information[,] the respondent has shown that he did not commit any violation of
such duties or obligations of an attorney.

It is clear that only Raleigh Falame engaged the legal services of the respondent for his and
Lydio Falame's defense in Civil Case No. A-2694.

xxx

The other allegations of the complainants that the respondent violated paragraph (d), Section
20 of Rule 139, Rules of Court, and his lawyer's oath when he allegedly betrayed the trust
and confidence of his former client by denying knowledge of the fact that the land was owned
by Lydio Falame and when he did not disclose to the Court that at one time his present
clients categorically declared and unconditionally recognized the full ownership of the late
Lydio Falame and complainant Melba Falame over subject matter of both cases equally
lacks evidentiary basis.

xxx

It is beyond the competence of the complainants to conclude and is outside the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Commission to rule as to whether or nor (sic) the complaint in Civil Case
No.5568 is baseless or fabricated. It is only the Honorable Court which has the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the same and cannot be the subject of an administrative complaint
against the respondent.

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this complaint be

dismissed on grounds of prescription, the same having been filed four (4) years after the
alleged misconduct took place and for lack of merit.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.20

Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
reiterating their allegations in the complaint and their position paper.21 They likewise assert that the
IBP erred in holding that the instant administrative complaint had been filed out of time since it was
filed on 16 January 2004, or three (3) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16) days after the second
civil case was filed on 23 October 2000.22 In addition, in their Consolidated Comment (should be
Consolidated Reply),23 complainants invoke the Court's ruling in Frias v. Bautista-Lozada24to support
their contention that administrative complaints against members of the bar do not prescribe.25

In his Comment,26 respondent principally maintains that the charges imputed to him have never been
proven by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence which is the quantum of proof required in
administrative cases against lawyers, and that complainants have the burden to prove their
accusations as he enjoys the presumption of innocence.27 Respondent likewise asserts that in
accusing him of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility only in their
position paper and in the instant petition, complainants infringed his right to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.28

There is merit in the petition.

At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not barred by prescription. As
early as 1947, the Court held in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo,29 to wit:

The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does
the circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime,
prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment
proceeding x x x (5 Am. Jur. 434)30

This doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. Bautista-Lozada31where the
Court held that Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP, which provides for a
prescriptive period for the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers, should be struck down
as void and of no legal effect for being ultra vires.32

Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of prescription, the Court concurs with the
Investigating Commissioner's opinion that some of the charges raised by complainants in their
complaint are unsubstantiated.

There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. While this charge was not raised in the initiatory pleading, it
was put forward in complainants' position paper filed with the IBP and in the petition filed with the
Court. In fact, respondent proffered his defenses to the charge in his position paper before the IBP
and likewise in his comment before the Court. In his very first pleading before the IBP, the answer
with motion to dismiss, he denied having Lydio as his client. Such absence of attorney-client
relationship is the essential element of his defense to the charge of conflict of interest, as articulated
in his subsequent submissions.

The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that respondent has been adequately apprised of and heard
on the issue. In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full
adversarial proceedings. Actual adversarial proceedings only become necessary for clarification
when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies.
Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit evidence in support of their arguments.33

Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.34 The test is whether, on behalf of
one client, it is the lawyer's duty to contest for that which his duty to another client requires him to
oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop.35 The rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used.36 In addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or
merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
interests.37

The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that
representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a
lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter
that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation.
The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.38 In the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and
strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree. 39

The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an

interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed
should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment. Even after the severance of
the relation, a lawyer should not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any
matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's
confidences acquired in the previous relation.40
In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His
highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to
himself.41 The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of
the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or
by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.42

In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants
in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was
established despite the fact that it was only Raleigh who paid him. The case of Hilado v. David43tells
us that it is immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised or charged for.44

As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely owned
the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the same property, respondent, as
counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the
same property in common with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts
which debase respondent's rights as a co-owner.

The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydio's death or through the
completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to
advocate a position opposed to that of Lydio.45 Precedents tell us that even after the termination of
his employment, an attorney may not act as counsel against his client in the same general matter,
even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his
client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment.46 And while complainants have never
been respondent's clients, they derive their rights to the property from Lydio's ownership of it which
respondent maintained in the first civil case.

For representing Raleigh's cause which is adverse to that of his former client—Raleigh's supposed
co-ownership of the subject property— respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.
Having previously undertaken joint representation of Lydio and Raleigh, respondent should have
diligently studied and anticipated the

potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, disciplinary action is warranted.47 Heretofore, respondent is

enjoined to look at any representation situation from "the point of view that there are possible
conflicts"; and further, "to think in terms of impaired loyalty" that is to evaluate if his representation in
any way will impair loyalty to a client.48Considering, however, that this is respondent's first offense,
the Court resolves to reprimand respondent, with admonition to observe a higher degree of fidelity in
the practice of his profession.49

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing conflicting

interests and meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further admonished to observe a higher
degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession and to bear in mind that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Acting Chairperson Carpio-Morales, Azcuna*, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
 DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.

The Facts

Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate. 1Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan in 1992. 4

Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber
concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered
it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint
entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal
complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and
control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without
valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary

investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651
Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. 13

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent,

being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of
Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding
the case filed by Taggat employees. 14Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated
the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an
affidavit to support the complaint. 15

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while
working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent
received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000
for the months of April and May 1995, 17and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.

Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved
by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19

Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat
for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to
Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when
he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit
respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and
filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25

Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that
respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s statement
during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:

xxx

Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?

A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was
supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat
employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 27Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that
respondent’s act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28

Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened
and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because
complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29

Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of
retainer fees from complainant but claims that it

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were
paid for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is
not the same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not
prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:

x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the
respondent’s asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for
retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of ‘conflict of interest’.
Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor
complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32

Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was
filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained
counsel or legal consultant. 33

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651
Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of
Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was
dismissed. 35

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas
("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned to
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with
modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding
respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating
the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the
practice of law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of
whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and
Legal Counsel of Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors
Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as
having the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent
undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt
with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and
related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much
familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the
mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.

A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client,
the duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91
Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)

Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any
interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to
a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case,
matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as
Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor
Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been
labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel.
But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of
Taggat.

xxxx

While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in
I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the
very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an
employee of the corporation and part of its management.

xxxx

As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while
being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are
prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto
Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act
of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those
acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in
or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and
calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing
of criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former
client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a
government prosecutor. 40

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b),
Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent
committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").

Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent
conflicting interests." 44However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent
conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all
concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship
exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty. 46

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct."
Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to
"engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47

Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting
interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One
test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client
any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 49 In
essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to
refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously
represented him. 50

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal
complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.
Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned
sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to
prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired
through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to
the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that
basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his
previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to
charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client
does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent
of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that
he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus,
respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51

"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was
not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit
because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as
long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working
as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were
for "Retainer’s fee."53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the
prohibition in RA 6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713
– the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts
involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent
stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely
suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll
of Attorneys on the following grounds:

xxxx

d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his
dealings with the public. 54

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts. 55

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized
private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. 56 We find this
penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B.
Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department
of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
 EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1526. January 31, 2005]

NAZARIA S. HERNANDEZ (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY LUCIANO

S. HERNANDEZ, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE C.
GO, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

For our resolution is the verified letter-complaint for disbarment against

[1]

Atty. Jose C. Go dated June 23, 1975 filed by Nazaria S. Hernandez (now
deceased). Both parties are from Zamboanga City.
The allegations in the letter-complaint are:
Sometime in 1961, complainant’s husband abandoned her and her son,
Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr. Shortly thereafter, her husband’s numerous
creditors demanded payments of his loans. Fearful that the various mortgage
contracts involving her properties will be foreclosed and aware of impending
suits for sums of money against her, complainant engaged the legal services
of Atty. Jose C. Go, herein respondent.
Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness, fear,
embarrassment, and social humiliation. He advised her to give him her land
titles covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and 849-P at Zamboanga City so he could
sell them to enable her to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to
execute deeds of sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable
consideration. Complainant agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and
from the proceeds pay her creditors.
Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A, likewise located in
Zamboanga City, which were mortgaged to her creditors. When the
mortgages fell due, respondent redeemed the lots. Again, he convinced her
to execute deeds of sale involving those lots in his favor. As a result,
respondent became the registered owner of all the lots belonging to
complainant.
Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that respondent did not sell
her lots as agreed upon. Instead, he paid her creditors with his own funds
and had her land titles registered in his name, depriving her of her real
properties worth millions.
In our Resolution dated September 24, 1975, respondent was required to
file his comment on the complaint.
Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the complaint is premature since there is pending before
the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City Civil Case No. 1781 for
[2]
recovery of ownership and declaration of nullity of deeds of sale filed by
complainant against him involving the subject lots.
On November 14, 1975, we issued a Resolution denying respondent’s
motion and requiring him to submit his answer.
In his answer dated December 19, 1975, respondent denied the
allegations in the instant complaint. He averred that he sold, in good faith,
complainant’s lots to various buyers, including himself, for valuable
consideration. On several occasions, he extended financial assistance to
complainant and even invited her to live with his family. His children used to
call her “Lola” due to her frequent visits to his residence. He prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
On January 17, 1977, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
It was only on March 13, 1990 or after 13 years, 1 month and 26 days that
the OSG filed a motion to refer the instant case to the IBP for the retaking of
the testimonies of complainant’s witnesses and the submission of its report
and recommendation.
On April 4, 1990, we issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004 of Atty. Lydia A.
Navarro, Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, is quoted
as follows:

“A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties

showed that all the properties of the complainant are presently owned by the
respondent by virtue of several deeds of sale executed by the complainant in favor of
the respondent without monetary consideration except Lot 849-D situated in Tomas
Claudio which was returned by the respondent to the complainant on September 5,
1974.

It is evident from the records that respondent was the one who notarized the
documents involving the said properties redeemed or repurchased by the complainant
from her creditors which ended up in respondent’s name like in the deed of sale
executed by Victoriano Dejerano in favor of Nazaria Hernandez over Lots 1141-A-3-
A and 1141-A-3-B; deed of sale executed by Antonio Masrahon on September 3,
1961regarding Lot No. 1141-A; deed of absolute sale executed by Francisco Esperat
over the Curuan properties on November 9, 1971 and the cancellation of the mortgage
executed by Alfonso Enriquez on July 18, 1964 over the Tomas Claudio properties.

The foregoing legal activities and operations of the respondent in addition to his
having discussed, advised and gave solutions to complainant’s legal problems and
liabilities to her creditors and even requested her creditors for extension of time to pay
complainant’s accounts constitute practice of law as legal counsel for consultation
aside from representing complainant in other cases; a mute proof of a lawyer-client
relations between them, a fact also admitted by the respondent.

It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a detailed report to the

complainant on how he paid complainant’s creditors without selling her
properties. Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, he paid them out of his own
funds; then later on admitted that he was one of the purchasers of complainant’s
properties in utter disregard of their agreement and no evidence was submitted by the
respondent concerning the value of the said sale of complainant’s properties.

As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his obligation and duty
as complainant’s legal adviser and counsel when he took advantage of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the complainant in ultimately putting complainant’s
properties in his name and possession in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommends

that respondent Atty. Jose C. Go be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months from receipt hereof and the IBP Chapter where he is a registered
member be furnished a copy of the same for implementation hereof, subject to the
approval of the Honorable Members of the Board of Governors.”

On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-
2004-39 adopting and approving the Report of Commissioner Navarro with
modification in the sense that the recommended penalty of suspension from
the practice of law was increased from six (6) months to three (3) years.
We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding that
respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. However, we
have to modify its recommended penalty.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the principal source
of ethical rules for lawyers in this jurisdiction, provides:

“A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.”

Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring for himself

complainant’s lots entrusted to him are, by any standard, acts constituting
gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment. Such conduct on the part of respondent degrades not only himself
[3]

but also the name and honor of the legal profession. He violated this Court’s
mandate that lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealing with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach. [4]

Canon 17 of the same Code states:

“A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.”

The records show that complainant reposed such high degree of trust and
confidence in herein respondent, that when she engaged his services, she
entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him to sell her lots, believing that
the proceeds thereof would be used to pay her creditors. Respondent,
however, abused her trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties
to others but to himself and spent his own money to pay her obligations. As
correctly observed by Investigating IBP Commissioner Lydia Navarro,
respondent is duty-bound to render a detailed report to the complainant on
how much he sold the latter’s lots and the amounts paid to her
creditors. Obviously, had he sold the lots to other buyers, complainant could
have earned more. Records show that she did not receive any amount from
respondent. Clearly, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his
duty as complainant’s counsel.
Undoubtedly, respondent’s conduct has made him unfit to remain in the
legal profession. He has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he
engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. We have
been exacting in our demand for integrity and good moral character of
members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which
[5]

might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal
[6]

profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney

[7]

is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it
becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him
one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to
withdraw the privilege. Respondent, by his conduct, blemished not only his
[8]

integrity as a member of the Bar, but also the legal profession.

Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his best efforts and
ability to protect the interests of his clients. A lawyer who performs that duty
with diligence and candor not only protects his client’s cause; he also serves
the ends of justice and does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect
of the community to the legal profession.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the legal profession. [9]

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of the following
acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6)
violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority to do so. [10]

In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, we ordered the disbarment of lawyer when

[11]

he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting him with all her money and
later refused to return the same despite demand. In Navarro vs.
Meneses III, we disbarred a member of the Bar for his refusal or failure to
[12]

account for the P50,000.00 he received from a client to settle a

case. In Docena vs. Limson, we expelled from the brotherhood of lawyers,
[13]

an attorney who extorted money from his client through deceit and
misrepresentation. In Busiños vs. Ricafort, an attorney was stripped of his
[14]

license to practice law for misappropriating his client’s money.

Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP too light. It bears reiterating that a lawyer who
takes advantage of his client’s financial plight to acquire the latter’s properties
for his own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of Canon 16
and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which constitutes
gross misconduct, and consistent with the need to maintain the high
standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal
profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from
the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.
WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross
misconduct and is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ 94-995. September 5, 2002]

LUZ ALFONSO, NESTOR ALMOGUERRA, ERNESTO AQUINO,

CARMELITA ARCENAS, IMELDA ARISTORENAS,
CARLOS ATENTAR, ENRIQUE ATENTAR, DELFIN BANAAG,
MERCEDITA BELARMINO, SHEILA BOMBAY, MA. LUISA
BONGHANOY, CRISANTO DE CASTRO, MILAGROS DE
CASTRO, DIANA CRUZ, ROBERTO DAULAT, MA. TERESITA
DIZON, AMAR DOCTOLERO, OLGA SOCORRO DYCUECO,
OMAR ESPINA, CONCEPCION GATBONTON, MARY ANN
GONZALES, GLENN CLEMENT KAPUNAN, CECILIA LALIC,
ASUNCION LANSANG, RODELITO LAUNIO, JOSE MARANAN,
ROWENA MATIBAG, JOCELYN MORALDE, HONRICO DAVID
NAVARRO, REBECCA OLLODO, RITA ONGKIKO, ERNESTO
PADOLINA, CARY PAUL RUDI, RENATO SAN JUAN, MARCIANO
SALAMAT, SUSAN TAGROS, TERESITA TESIORNA, ROSALINA
L. TIMBANG, TRANQUILINO TUPAZ, ALICIA VALDEZ, and
GERONIMO VILLANUEVA, complainants, vs. ROSE MARIE
ALONZO-LEGASTO, Executive Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Quezon City, EMELITA CAMAYA, Clerk of Court III, Office of the
Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, and
REMEDIOS "BABY" GARCIA, Records Officer I, Office of the
Clerk of Court, metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon
City,respondents.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
 This resolves the instant complaint for various administrative charges against
respondent Judge Rose Marie Alonzo-Legasto, then Executive Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),[1]Quezon City, along with co-respondents Assistant
Clerk of Court Emelita Camaya and Records Officer Remedios Garcia, both of the
Office of the Clerk of Court, MeTC-Quezon City (OCC-MeTC), consisting of graft and
corruption, rendition of an unjust interlocutory order, fraud against the public treasury,
malversation of public funds, estafa, discrimination, favoritism, grave abuse of authority,
and grave and serious misconduct.
Complainants Luz Alfonso, Nestor Almoguerra, Ernesto Aquino, Carmelita Arcenas,
Imelda Aristorenas, Carlos Atentar, Enrique Atentar, Delfin Banaag, Mercedita
Belarmino, Sheila Bombay, Ma. Luisa Bonghanoy, Crisanto De Castro, Milagros De
Castro, Diana Cruz, Roberto Daulat, Ma. Teresita Dizon, Amar Doctolero, Olga Socorro
Dycueco, Omar Espina, Concepcion Gatbonton, Mary Ann Gonzales, Glenn Clement
Kapunan, Cecilia Lalic, Asuncion Lansang, Rodelito Launio, Jose Maranan, Rowena
Matibag, Jocelyn Moralde, Honrico David Navarro, Rebecca Ollodo, Rita Ongkiko,
Ernesto Padolina, Cary Paul Rudi, Renato San Juan, Marciano Salamat, Susan Tagros,
Teresita Tesiorna, Rosalina L. Timbang, Tranquilino Tupaz, Alicia Valdez and Geronimo
Villanueva, forty-one (41) in all, were employees of the City Government of Quezon
City. They were appointed by various city mayors at different times under separate
appointment papers[2] and received salaries and other benefits from the City
Government.[3] They held positions under the Office of the City Mayor, Special
Assistance for the Metropolitan Trial Court and were assigned at the OCC-MeTC and
the different branches of the MeTC-Quezon City to assist the organic staff of the
judiciary.[4]
On 16 August 1993 respondent Judge Rose Marie Alonzo-Legasto wrote a letter to
Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr. returning all but one[5] of the forty-one (41) complainants to the
Quezon City Government allegedly to –

“x x x x utilize the maximum potentials and resources of all National and City paid
employees, and in view of the observation of Honorable Vice Mayor, Charito Planas,
in the recent personnel survey, that the Office of the Clerk of Court, MTC, is
overstaffed, I am returning herewith the following City employees assigned in the
said office x x x x The return of the said employees is necessary, in the meantime,
in order for the undersigned to properly assess, determine and evaluate the actual
number of support employees from the City in the effective and efficient operation of
the Office of the Clerk of Court. I shall in due time notify your good office of the
number of City employees needed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in line with my
further desire to eliminate manpower excesses (undersoring supplied). [6]

The letter returning the MeTC employees was based on an alleged plan to
reorganize the OCC-MeTC which dated back to the time of former Executive Judge
Guillermo Loja.[7] The transfer was, however, formally initiated sometime in June or July
1993 through an assessment undertaken by the office of then Vice Mayor Charito
Planas. A certain Victor Ala[8] supposedly assessed the work aptitude of complainants by
clandestinely observing them for several days during a two (2)-week period at the
OCC[9] and obtaining documents from Clerk of Court III Emelita Camaya allegedly
necessary for the purpose.[10] The results of the observation were reduced into a
confidential Aide Memoire[11] which concluded that "there was general breakdown of
office functions [as] personnel were engaged in lively and animated conversation
among themselves, accompanied by boisterous laughter unbecoming of an office [and]
non-productive moving about [was] also an ordinary sight," and which blamed "over-
population" and poor "enforcement of office rules and regulations" as causes of the
disorderly office decorum.[12]
 Prior to the submission of her letter, repondent Judge met with then Clerk of Court
Herman R. Cimafranca and respondent Camaya to discuss the possibility of reducing
personnel in the OCC.[13] Judge Legasto likewise convened all the employees of the
office, including complainants, and divulged the plan to streamline the workforce. [14] It
was agreed that after the reorganization, she would further study the need for additional
manpower as she committed herself to seek the recall of any of the complainants
subsequently found to be necessary in the interest of the service. [15]
On 17 August 1993 Mayor Mathay issued Office Order No. 47 reassigning the forty-
three (43) City Government employees including herein forty-one (41) complainants to
different offices of the Quezon City Government.[16] The reassigned employees,
particularly complainants, suffered no diminution of salary or benefits nor, were, in any
manner, subjected to difficulties as a result of the personnel movement since the offices
they reported to were just meters away from the OCC-MeTC.[17] They also retained their
respective items under the Office of the City Mayor, Special Assistance for the
Metropolitan Trial Court, under which their salaries and benefits were paid.[18]
After executing the transfer, Judge Legasto convened the supervisors of all the
units in the OCC-MeTC and ordered them to evaluate the work requirements of their
respective units by matching the number of personnel with the desired work
output.[19] The reports of the supervisors allegedly found the reorganization to be
beneficial and instrumental in achieving an efficient and effective work atmosphere in
their respective units: Civil Case Section (Exh. “44”); Criminal RPC Unit (Exh. “45”);
Ordinance Clearance and Probation Section (Exh. “46”); Traffic Case Unit (Exh. “47”);
Marriage Section (Exh. “48”); and Receiving Section (Exh. “49”). [20] None of the
complainants who had been transferred was ever recalled by Judge Legasto. [21]
The transfer of complainants to other offices in the City Government was admittedly
the root of the instant administrative complaint.[22] Complainants averred conspiracy
between respondents Camaya and Remedios “Baby” Garcia, the alleged girl Friday of
respondent Judge, on one hand, and on the other, Judge Legasto, purportedly to favor
some of her “favorite” national employees,i.e. from the organic staff of the judiciary over
City Government employees; hence, their arbitrary transfer to other offices and the
unfair treatment as shown in the recording of attendance and in the bringing of children
to the OCC during office hours. Respondent Judge was likewise charged with doctoring
a payroll to fraudulently collect thirty (30) days of election-related work during the 11
May 1992 elections when she should have been credited with only five (5) days of work.
Complainants also alleged that respondents Camaya and Garcia were “fixing the raffle”
and the disposition of cases for a fee. Camaya was further accused of having a low
intelligence quotient necessary for her position of Clerk of Court III but was ironically
perceived by complainants to have been one of the masterminds of the reorganization,
the other being respondent Garcia. It was also claimed that Camaya usurped for corrupt
purposes the authority of then Clerk of Court Herman R. Cimafranca in signing
vouchers and purchase request papers so she could collect bribe money from
suppliers of court equipment and supplies. Complainants claimed that, in one instance,
Camaya received P5,000 from a supplier. Finally, they accused respondent Garcia of
falsifying three (3) daily time records (DTR’s), Exhs. “M,” “N” and “O,” for two and a half
(2½) months, i.e., in December 1989 and in January and February 1990, wherein she
made it appear that she reported for work when in fact she did not. Based on this
dishonest claim, she was indeed paid the corresponding salary and other benefits.
Respondents filed their respective comments/answers to the instant complaint. On
8 March 1995 we referred the case to Executive Judge Alfredo J. Gustilo, RTC-Br. 116,
Pasay City, for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from
notice of the referral. On 18 January 1996 Judge Gustilo recommended the
exoneration of respondents. On 21 August 1996 we required Judge Gustilo to conduct a
more exhaustive and thorough investigation of the case. To reiterate the mandatory
principle that all complainants and witnesses must be summoned to testify or otherwise
shed light on their knowledge of facts relevant to the integrity and competence of judges
and staff alike, we said -

“In his letter of 30 September 1996 Judge Gustilo manifested that he had a full-blown
hearing but was at a loss as to what further investigation to conduct, and requested for
instructions on the matter.

“We cannot see how Judge Gustilo can claim to be ‘at a loss as to what further
investigation to conduct.’ Out of the forty-one (41) complainants listed, only six (6)
were presented as witnesses. The various annexes attached to the complaint were not
even touched upon in the process. The complainants in this case are lowly city
employees who may not ordinarily be expected to present very ably their arguments
sustaining their 23-page complaint, exclusive of annexes ‘A’ to ‘K,’ as well as their
32-page reply. Judge Gustilo should have looked into the basis of the charges by
propounding questions himself, clarificatory or otherwise, to the complainants who
should have been notified individually of the hearings and asked to testify.

“A more thorough investigation is equally important to determine the liability of

complainants for giving false testimonies in case the charges, which appear to be
serious, later on turn out to be false and unfounded. Specifically, the veracity of the
allegations in the complaint, comment and reply of the parties as well as contents of
the various annexes attached thereto should be examined and delved into, and the
parties concerned confronted with them. Judge Gustilo should not have been content
with the seeming nonchalant attitude of counsel for complainants in presenting only
six (6) witnesses.

“This is an administrative case where the Court is interested in determining the

integrity, competence and moral fitness of its employees, judges not excluded. This is
not a civil case where generally only private rights are involved. An administrative
matter partakes the nature of a criminal case in which the government is interested
specifically in pursuing to cleanse its ranks.

“In his Investigation Report dated 18 January 1996 Judge Gustilo observed that
complainants did not clearly specify in their complaint and in their reply as to what
acts were committed by respondents which would consitute any of the charges
included in the complaint. (N.B. Investigation Report of Judge Gustilo dated 18
January 1996, pp. 67-70). If that be true, Judge Gustilo himself should have inquired
into the basis and specifics of those charges from the complainants and the witnesses
they (complainants) may produce. That is among the duties of an administrative
investigator who in this case, incidentally, was particularly designated by this
Court. But Judge Gustilo, apparently, failed in this regard; instead, he took his
responsibility and the trust of this Court too lightly x x x

“Forty-one (41) complainants, whose addresses are clearly stated in their complaint,
should be given their day in court, after which, respondents should likewise be heard
in their defense.”

On 25 February 1998 we reiterated the directive to probe deeper into the complaint
by receiving additional evidence and proffering clarificatory questions. In the meantime,
Judge Gustilo was appointed to the Sandiganbayan, so that the Court designated his
replacement as Executive Judge, Judge Lilia C. Lopez, and directed her to commence
forthwith with the hearing and complete the same within ninety (90) days from notice of
the directive. In due time, Judge Lopez recommended the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against respondents for insufficiency of evidence, despite our
Resolution of 25 February 1998 hereinbefore quoted.
At the outset we stress that the instant complaint does not seek to invalidate
the Office Order of Mayor Mathay which precipitated the transfer of complainants to
different offices within the Quezon City Government. Mayor Mathay has not in fact
been impleaded in this case. Neither are we minded to tackle the peculiar[23] character of
complainants' status — an aberration as Chief Justice Enrique Fernando would observe
in another case[24] — within the personnel structure of the OCC-MeTC. These
employees, as we have stated, were appointed by various Quezon City mayors,
presumably pursuant to RA 1575 (1956)[25] empowering them to appoint clerks and other
office personnel which the City Council may provide in the office of the clerk of the
municipal court as the needs of the service demanded.[26] To emphasize, the present
disciplinary proceedings are circumscribed by the sole issue of administrative culpability
of respondents as alleged in the complaint.
We find some merit in the complaint.
First. Respondent Judge Legasto violated rules and regulations governing the
detail, reassignment or transfer of court employees including locally-funded court
personnel. It is our considered opinion that her decision to return the forty-one (41) City
Government employees previously detailed with the MeTC exceeded her authority
under Sec. IV of Administrative Order No. 6 which is limited to the temporary re-
assignment of court employees, i.e., for a period of three (3) months extendible only
once for the same period.[27] She had no authority to cause the permanent transfer of
court employees, as was done in the instant case, since the jurisdiction for such action
devolved solely upon the Office of the Court Administrator and not in her capacity as
Executive Judge.[28]
Furthermore, it was Judge Legasto's duty to apprise this Court of the personnel
requirements of the OCC-MeTC and the alleged need to streamline the staffing pattern
before informing the local government of the return of its employees, as it might unduly
prejudice the services rendered by the court to the residents of Quezon City. Instead,
what Judge Legasto did was to refer the matter personally to the office of then Vice-
Mayor Charito Planas for evaluation and assessment, which is contrary to Sec. III
of Administrative Circular No. 30-91 vesting in the Office of the Court Administrator the
sole responsibility "for all liaison and coordination activities with the Legislative and
Executive departments as well as with local government officials x x x" and to Sec. IV
ofAdministrative Order No. 6[29] requiring prior notice to this Court, at least the Office of
the Court Administrator, as regards the purported transfer of a considerable number of
employees, as in the instant case, which would not only affect the individual employees'
rights but would also compromise the administration of justice. The personnel action
initiated by Judge Legasto was a clear derogation of the power of administrative
supervision of this Court over court employees and unfortunately fell short of Rule 3.08
of the Code of Judicial Conduct requiring judges to "maintain professional competence
in court management," among others.
Judge Legasto cannot hide behind the authorization issued by Mayor Mathay for the
transfer of forty-one (41) court employees to give an impression of legality to her
action. While it was proper for her to consult the responsible officials of the Quezon
City Government, without of course transgressing the authority of the Office of the Court
Administrator, she undoubtedly had the correlative duty to promote the proper discharge
of the Court's mandate to improve judicial services and facilitate the dispensation of
justice by keeping this Court duly informed of the plan to considerably reduce court
personnel. The courtesy of prior notice, at least, could have afforded us the opportunity
to assess the propriety of such action prior to its implementation. Needless to stress, it
is absolutely essential to the proper administration of justice that courts have full control
over the official actions of those through whom the administration of the affairs of the
court proceeds. As keenly observed by Chief Justice Fernando in Bagatsing vs.
Herrera,[30] “[f]or judicial independence to be a reality, the least interference by or
influence from other governmental departments is of the essence.” [31] Lest it be again
ignored, we stress in this regard that only this Court has the authority to order a
personnel accounting of locally-funded employees assigned in the lower courts to
determine the necessity of their detail[32] and that, accordingly, all requests for detail of
locally-funded employees, including complainants herein, must pass the Office of the
Court Administrator for review and appropriate action.[33]
Second. Other than the fact that all forty-one (41) employees were appointees of
the Quezon City Government, there were no common derogatory records which would
explain respondent Judge's recommendation for their collective transfer. On the other
hand, respondent Garcia would herself admit that some of the complainants had been
commended for their punctuality and excellent attendance[34] and by respondent Camaya
for their outstanding performance.[35] We can reasonably infer from these admitted facts
that the move to return complainants was not based on any valid and substantive
ground. Judge Legasto defended her action by claiming that she only wanted to
improve the working conditions in the OCC-MeTC.[36] But if this was indeed the case,
then she should have forthwith identified the recalcitrant employees and charged each
of them with various administrative offenses. The recommendation to transfer wholesale
forty-one (41) employees, without regard to individual responsibilities, exhibited her
unfairness if not lack of judiciousness in dealing with the situation. Furthermore, the
conclusion in the Aide Memoire that the OCC-MeTC was over-staffed is hardly credible
since the records show that, after the wholesale transfer of complainants, three (3) City
Government employees were hired to take over vacant items in the OCC-MeTC[37] and
that at least three (3) City Government employees were retained at the OCC-
MeTC.[38] Thus we cannot help but conclude that Judge Legasto acted with manifest bias
and partiality against complainants.
Third. Complainants accused respondent Garcia of falsifying three (3) daily time
records (DTR's), Exhs. “M,” “N” and “O,” for two and a half (2½) months, i.e., in
December 1989 and in January and February 1990, wherein she made it appear that
she reported for work when in fact she did not, so she could collect the corresponding
salary and other benefits. Respondent Garcia, however, denied executing these DTR's
and alleged that she reported for work for one-half month in December 1989 and that,
for the rest of the month, she applied for a leave of absence to accommodate her
husband who was vacationing from abroad.[39] Allegedly for the next two (2) months,
January and February 1990, she was on sick leave for asthma on the basis of a leave
application she filed in the last week of January 1990.[40] She also testified that she
submitted her daily time records for the three (3) months in question, allegedly not Exhs.
“M,” “N” and “O,” with time-in and time-out notations for the first half of December 1989
and a red bar on the face of the DTR's for the second half of December 1989, and for
the whole months of January and February 1990, allegedly to indicate her absences for
this period.[41] A certification dated 6 April 1990 from the Office of the Court
Administrator, Exh. “V,” would, however, confirm that respondent Garcia did not file an
application for leave during the period 1 December 1989 to 28 February 1990. [42] After an
absence of two-and-a-half (2-1/2) months, respondent Garcia reported back to work in
the first week of March 1990.[43]
Respondent Garcia also testified that she received her salary for the month of
December 1989 on 13 December 1989, and on 27 December 1989. [44] She further
alleged that she got her salary for the month of January 1990 [45] but was unable to collect
her pay for February 1990 since then Clerk of Court Atty. Sonia Perez allegedly took the
money in her behalf and pocketed the same while she was on leave of absence.[46] She
further averred that sometime between August and September 1990 she learned that
three (3) sets of DTR's for December 1989, January and February 1990,[47] namely,
Exhs. “M,” “N” and “O,” were falsified by indicating her name and purported signature as
well as the date and time of her supposed attendance for these months when she was
admittedly on leave.[48] She allegedly investigated these anomalous DTR's and found
that they were certified to be true by Atty. Sonia Perez[49] but she never discovered who
falsified her signature and the attendance entries therein.[50] Nonetheless she failed to
offer in evidence the genuine DTR's she had allegedly executed which showed her
absences and instead blamed Atty. Perez for the supposedly mysterious loss or
concealment of her records through the latter's manipulation. [51] In place of the
supposedly missing or misplaced authentic DTR's, Garcia offered another set of
DTR's[52] bearing her genuine entries and signatures for comparison with the ones
allegedly falsely attributed to her. Furthermore, she claimed that Atty. Perez knelt
before certain employees of the OCC begging them not to file a complaint against her
since she was then about to retire,[53] which consequently influenced respondent Garcia
not to file a complaint against her to rectify the DTR's, Exhs. “M,” “N” and “O,” being
credited to her.[54]
We hold that respondent Garcia has not satisfactorily explained the entries in the
allegedly falsified DTR's, Exhs. “M,” “N” and “O,” upon which she drew the
corresponding salary and other benefits. Hence we find her to be the person
responsible for the dishonest act of falsifying these DTR's.
The falsified DTR's for December 1989, January and February 1990, which were
offered by complainants as their Exhs. “M,” “N” and “O,” are copies certified on file by
the Assistant Chief of Office of the Administrative Services of the Office of the Court
Administrator and are therefore admissible public documents, as respondents
themselves would stipulate.[55] “In the case of public documents, the mere production of
an admissible copy is generally sufficient to satisfy any requirement of proof of due
execution of the document, in accordance with the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite et
solemniter esse acta.”[56] Accordingly, respondent Garcia is presumed to be the author of
Exhs. “M,” “N” and “O” purposely to falsify or cover up the fact that she was not
reporting for work for two-and-a-half (2-1/2) months.[57] While this presumption may be
rebutted, it may only be done by clear, strong and convincing evidence. [58]
Respondent Garcia was not able to rebut this presumption. Her defense was mere
unsubstantiated denial[59] which of course is a weak defense. Furthermore, if we are to
compare the signatures on Exhs. “M,” “N” and “O” with the admitted standard signatures
of respondent Garcia, Exhs. “33” and “34,” we would see no marked difference between
them. “The test of genuineness,” Chief Justice Moran stressed in his standard treatise,
“ought to be the resemblance, not to the formation of the letters in some other specimen
or specimens, but to the general character of writing, which is impressed on it as the
involuntary and unconscious result of constitution, habit, or other permanent course,
and is, therefore, itself permanent.”[60] It appears to the Court that there is a visible
general resemblance between the questioned signatures and the standard signatures,
which similarity is particularly marked in respect of Exhs. “M” and “O.”
Other circumstances prove that Exhs. “M,” “N” and “O” were truly recorded by
respondent Garcia. For one, Garcia exerted no effort to show who falsified her
signature on the questioned DTR’s and to explain the loss of her supposedly genuine
DTR’s. She certainly could have checked with the Office of the Court Administrator or
subpoenaed Atty. Sonia Perez to shed light on this issue since, as she herself admitted,
Atty. Perez as then Clerk of Court certified Exhs. “M,” “N” and “O” although they were
allegedly falsified. We also cannot accept her explanation that her genuine DTR’s for
December 1989 and January and February 1990 could have already been lost and
could no longer be retrieved. It must be stressed that these are official documents
under formal custodianship and for this reason would not disappear overnight. Finally
the certification issued by this Court, i.e., Exh. “V,” unmistakably states that she did not
file any application for leave of absence during the period in question and explains thus
the existence of Exhs. “M,” “N” and “O.” It is obvious respondent Garcia failed to prove
diligent efforts to locate the allegedly missing DTR’s which she must have done if they
truly existed.
 We also find respondent Judge responsible for Garcia’s act of dishonesty in
falsifying the three (3) sets of DTR’s. Although Judge Legasto was not yet the
Executive Judge when the offense took place in 1990, it became incumbent upon her to
initiate the proper investigation when the dishonorable act finally surfaced during her
term as Executive Judge. She was appointed Acting Executive Judge in June of
1992[61] and was subsequently reappointed to the post in 1993[62] yet she did not exert
any effort at all throughout her tenure to seek the truth. The attitude of Judge Legasto
favored respondent Garcia to the point that the latter almost got away with the
fraudulent act. This conduct is anathema to the unmistakable mandate of Rule 3.10 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct to “x x x initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against
x x x court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become
aware.”
In view of the foregoing, respondents Judge Legasto and Garcia should both be
equally reminded that public office is a public trust. This principle assumes greater
importance among judges and court personnel who in the administration of justice, must
always adhere to the tenets of accountability, responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.[63] From the executive judge to the lowest clerk, each should ensure that
public confidence in the judiciary is maintained. In sanctioning errant judicial officers and
employees, we have always stressed that the dispensation of justice is a sacred task
and that public servants involved in it must live up to its highest
standards.[64] Unfortunately, repondent Judge and Garcia are found wanting in this
regard.
This brings us to the accusations of complainants which were not substantiated by
evidence.
First, after a thorough examination of the records, we find no credible evidence that
respondent Camaya received a P5,000 bribe from a supplier of the OCC-MTC. The
respective testimonies of complainants Rita Ongkiko, Diana Cruz and Gerry Kapunan
contradicted each other.
Diana Cruz testified that Camaya required her to demand grease money from the
supplier to be used in purchasing gifts for Judge Legasto. [65] Since Diana Cruz was not
the one dealing with the suppliers,[66] she asked the help of Supply Officer Glenn
Kapunan to relay the demand to them.[67] She found out later that Kapunan delivered the
bribe money to Camaya.[68] On the other hand, complainant Kapunan testified that in
response to Camaya’s demand on Diana Cruz for bribe money, he gave the P5,000 to
the latter who in turn gave it to Camaya.[69] Kapunan also claimed that respondent
Camaya personally knew the supplier from whom the P5,000 had been taken [70] and that
it was she who arranged for the payoff.[71] Kapunan further testified that he and Camaya
were not on speaking terms[72] although he perpetrated the criminal act for her
benefit. He quoted Camaya as saying “Isauli mo iyan sa supplier” when Diana Cruz
gave the P5,000 to her.[73]
Rita Ongkiko had still another version of the P5,000 bribe. According to her, Glenn
Kapunan received P2,000 out of the P5,000 given by the supplier while the remainder of
P3,000 was paid to and pocketed by respondent Camaya. [74] She also testified that
Kapunan told her that he returned the P2,000 to the supplier [75] who subsequently turned
over the money to Camaya.[76] Ongkiko admitted that she and Diana Cruz reported the
alleged bribery to Judge Legasto who was allegedly infuriated by the corrupt practices
of her subordinates[77] and that this incident was reported to but dismissed by the Office
of the Ombudsman.[78]
On these three (3) versions rests the case of corruption against respondent
Camaya. No coherent story worthy of credit appears to have been presented. Diana
Cruz claimed that it was Glenn Kapunan who gave the P5,000 bribe to Camaya. But
Kapunan contradicted her, testifying that it was she who gave the P5,000 to
Camaya. The complainants made no effort to reconcile this contradiction. Furthermore,
complainants quoted varying amounts of the bribe: Rita Ongkiko declared that P2,000
was given to Glenn Kapunan and P3,000 to Camaya, while Diana Cruz and
Glenn Kapunan reported that P5,000 was delivered to her. They likewise never
explained why respondent Camaya would say “Isauli mo iyan sa supplier” when it was
she who allegedly instructed them to mulct the supplier.
There is also no reasonable explanation for the apparent audacity of Camaya in
ordering complainants Diana Cruz and Glenn Kapunan, who were her known enemies,
to commit bribery in her behalf. Nor do we find any credible reason for respondent
Camaya to relay her demand for bribe through complainant Diana Cruz when it was not
the latter’s job to deal with the concerned businessman.[79] Complainants even admitted
that respondent Camaya know the supplier[80] and had in fact arranged the alleged
meeting between Glenn Kapunan and the supplier.[81] In sum, if she really wanted to
engage in corruption, Camaya could have very well talked directly to the supplier to ask
bribe money from him. Indeed it defies human nature that respondent would be so
reckless as to expose herself to Glenn Kapunan who had previously declared that as
supply officer, he was instituting a policy of cleansing his office of corruption. [82] Clearly,
there is no substantial evidence[83] to prove the alleged corrupt disposition of respondent
Camaya.
Second, we also do not believe that respondents Camaya and Garcia were the real
authors of the transfer of complainants. While it is true that Judge Legasto consulted
respondent Camaya about the impending reorganization, she did so in a meeting
attended by then Clerk of Court Herman Cimafranca. The consultation with Camaya
could hardly be called extraordinary since she was then the Assistant Clerk of Court of
the OCC-MTC. No credible evidence was likewise offered to show that respondents
Camaya and Garcia were engaged in fixing cases for a fee. The accusation stands on
sheer speculation and is therefore bereft of merit.[84]
Third, there was also nothing irregular in the collection by Judge Legasto of
compensation equivalent to thirty (30) days of election-related activities since she, along
with other judges of first and second level courts, was assigned by this Court “to receive
the sixth copy of the election returns in the election for President, Vice-President,
Senators and members of the House of Representatives, and the fifth copy of the
election returns for local officials in the May 11, 1992” from the fourth (4th) congressional
district of Quezon City.[85] Her area of responsibility covered one thousand two hundred
and forty-three (1,243) precincts in thirty-eight (38) barangays and her task took more
than one (1) month to complete.[86] She was compensated P9,750.00 for rendering
election-related duties from 11 May to 10 June 1992 under a payroll [87] duly approved by
Quezon City Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., passed in audit by the Commission on Audit
representative and certified to be correct and truthful by complainants’ own witness
Lourdes Lansang who signed as then City Personnel Officer.[88] Significantly, while
complainant Ernesto Aquino who held the position of Administrative Assistant was paid
P19,200.00 for election-related duties for the period 13 May to 5 June 1992, just like his
co-complainants who received varying amounts as payment for services rendered in
connection with the 11 May 1992 elections, none of them ever questioned the
correctness of the payroll under which they received their respective compensations. [89]
Fourth, complainants were not able to prove that respondents barred them from
signing the logbook of attendance in the OCC-MTC whenever they reported late for
work. As admitted by complainants themselves, the OCC adopted the practice of
securing the logbook in the office of respondent Judge after 8:15 a.m. and 1:15 p.m. to
prevent the insertion of the wrong time of arrival or attendance of City Government
employees and organic judiciary staff alike.[90] In the same manner, no evidence proved
the accusation that children of City Government employees, particularly complainants
Rowena Matibag and Teresita Tesiorna, were barred from the OCC during office hours
while children of the organic staff of the judiciary could stay there anytime. The
allegedly aggrieved employees did not testify on the supposedly unfair treatment
despite the opportunity to do so in the proceedings a quo, and worse, the evidence of
complainants did not provide details of the allegedly inequitable situation except to state
the generalization that Matibag and Tesiorna “were sent home when they had their
children with them and [respondents Camaya and Garcia] told them [that the OCC was]
not a nursery.”[91]
Finally, we find no sufficient evidence to demonstrate that respondent Camaya
usurped the authority of then Clerk of Court Herman R. Cimafranca to sign vouchers
and purchase request papers so she could collect bribe money from suppliers of court
equipment and supplies. Documents and testimonies proved that it was Clerk of Court
Cimafranca who routinely signed vouchers and purchase documents [92] and that Camaya
signed such documents only when Cimafranca was absent,[93] a practice consistent with
the Manual for Clerks of Courts.
In resumè, the substantial evidence establishes the administrative liability of
respondent Judge for abuse of authority and neglect of duty while respondent Garcia is
hereby held responsible for dishonesty and falsification of official documents. Bearing
in mind the nature of the offenses committed and the evidence presented to prove their
culpability and considering further their individual circumstances, i.e., that this is their
first administrative case, that respondent Garcia was commended several times for her
punctuality and attendance,[94] and that they have long served the judiciary
with Garcia having completed at least 26 years,[95] the appropriate penalties, following
jurisprudence,[96] are as against respondent Judge Rose Marie Alonzo-Legasto, a fine of
P10,000.00, and, as regards respondent Remedios “Baby” Garcia, suspension from
office for one (1) month or, in lieu thereof, in case such penalty has become
inappropriate or can no longer be enforced, a fine equivalent to P20,000.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Rose Marie Alonzo-Legasto, in her capacity as
then Executive Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, is FINED
P10,000.00 to be paid within twenty (20) days from notice of this Decision for abuse of
authority in connection with the transfer of herein complainants, forty-one (41) in all,
from the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, to different
offices within the Quezon City Government, and for neglect of duty for her failure to
initiate an investigation into the falsified daily time records of respondent Remedios
“Baby” Garcia. On the other hand, respondent Remedios “Baby” Garcia, in her capacity
as Records Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City,
is found GUILTY of using falsified daily time records for 16-31 December 1989 and the
whole months of January and February 1990, and is hereby SUSPENDED from office
for a period of one (1) month without pay effective immediately. However, if her
suspension from office can no longer be imposed for any reason, respondent Remedios
“Baby” Garcia is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P20,000 within twenty (20) days from
notice of this Decision in lieu of such suspension. Both are WARNED that a graver
penalty shall be imposed for any repetition of the same or similar
act. The Administrative Complaint against Emelita Camaya, in her capacity as Clerk of
Court III, Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SECOND DIVISION

LUCILA TAN, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563

Complainant, (Formerly A.M. OCA
IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ)

Present:

Puno, J.,
 Chairman,
*
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr.,
Tinga, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.

Promulgated:
Judge MAXWEL S. ROSETE,
Respondent. September 8, 2004

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete,
former Acting Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan,
Metro Manila,[1] for violation of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).

The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in
Criminal Case No. 59440 and Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled People of
the Philippines vs. Alfonso Pe Sy and pending before Branch 58, Metropolitan
Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, then presided by respondent judge. Before
the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of his staff to
talk to complainant. They met at Sangkalan Restaurant along Scout Albano, near
Timog Avenue in Quezon City. The staff member told her that respondent was
asking for P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was
shown copies of respondent judge’s Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and
66120, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints against the accused. She was
told that respondent judge would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she
remits the amount demanded. The staff member allowed complainant to keep the
copy of the draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. Complainant, however, did
not accede to respondent’s demand because she believed that she had a very strong
case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were eventually dismissed
by respondent judge.[2]
 Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant.
He instead stated that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange
for a favorable decision. She even tried to delay and to derail the promulgation of
the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120. Complainant also sought
the intervention of then San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, to obtain judgment in
her favor. Mayor Estrada allegedly talked to him several times to ask him to help
complainant. The former even called him over the phone when he was in New
Zealand, persuading him to hold in abeyance the promulgation of the Decisions in
said cases. But he politely declined, telling him that there was no sufficient
evidence to convict the accused, and moreover, he had already turned over the
Decisions to Judge Quilatan for promulgation. Respondent further stated that
complainant kept bragging about her close relations with Mayor Estrada who was
her neighbor in Greenhills, San Juan, and even insinuated that she could help him
get appointed to a higher position provided he decides the suits in her
favor. Respondent judge also claimed that complainant offered to give cash for the
downpayment of a car he was planning to buy. But he refused the offer. Finally,
respondent judge denied that a member of his staff gave complainant a copy of his
draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. He said that he had entrusted to Judge
Quilatan his Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120 before he left for
New Zealand on study leave. Thus, he asserted that it was impossible for him to
thereafter change the resolution of the cases and it was likewise impossible for any
member of his staff to give complainant copies of said Decisions.[3]

In a resolution dated December 2, 2002, the Court referred the complaint to

the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for investigation,
report and recommendation.[4]

First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several hearings on

the administrative case. Only complainant Lucila Tan testified for her side. She
presented as documentary evidence the copy of the unsigned Decision in Criminal
Case No. 59440 dated February 23, 2001 which was allegedly handed to her by a
member of respondent judge’s staff.[5] Respondent judge, on the other hand,
presented four (4) witnesses: Josefina Ramos, Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), Fernando B.
Espuerta, and Joyce Trinidad Hernandez. His documentary evidence consists of the
affidavits of his witnesses,[6] copy of the Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal
Case No. 59440,[7] and various documents composed of the machine copy of the
Order of Arrest in Criminal Case No. 117219, machine copy of the letter dated
December 29, 1997, machine copy of Certification dated Nov 13, 2000, front and
dorsal sides of Check No. QRH-0211804, Bank Statement dated March 31, 1998,
Stop Payment Order dated April 6, 1998, Current Account Inquiry, and
Transaction Record, which documents were allegedly given by complainant to
respondent’s witness, Fernando B. Espuerta.[8]

The Investigating Judge summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as

follows:
COMPLAINANT’S VERSION:

1. LUCILA TAN

Complainant Lucila Tan testified that she knew Respondent

Judge because she had a case in Branch 58, MeTC, San Juan, Metro
Manila. She alleged that, in September 1998, she filed two cases
involving B.P. 22 and Other Deceits with the Prosecutor’s Office in
Pasig. After resolution, the cases were filed in the MeTC, San
Juan. One case went to Branch 57 and the other one went to Branch
58, where Respondent Judge Rosete was the Presiding Judge. Judge
Quilatan was the Presiding Judge of Branch 57. Upon advise of a
friend, she moved for consolidation and the two cases were
transferred to Judge Quilatan in Branch 57. Subsequently, in view of
the Motion for Inhibition filed by Complainant’s lawyer, Judge
Quilatan inhibited himself and the two cases were transferred to the
sala of Respondent Judge Rosete (TSN, pp. 9-16, Hearing of March
3, 2003). After several hearings, the Clerk of Court, named Joyce,
called up the Complainant and advised her to talk to San Juan Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada to seek for (sic) assistance. Joyce gave her the phone
number of the Office of the Mayor (TSN, pages 17-18, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). Complainant then called up the Office of the Mayor
but her call was intercepted by Josie, the Mayor’s Secretary. When
she told Josie why she called, the latter asked her if she wanted to
meet the Judge and when Complainant answered in the affirmative,
Josie made arrangements for Complainant to meet the Judge (TSN,
pages 19-21, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant called up the
Office of the Mayor sometime in November or late October 2000 and
she met the Judge on November 10. She, Josie and Respondent Judge
met at the Cravings Restaurant in Wilson, San Juan (TSN, page 22,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). During the meeting, Complainant “told
the Judge regarding this matter, how this happened and that he will
convince the Accused to pay me as soon as possible” (TSN, page 23,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). When she went to the restroom for a
few minutes, Respondent Judge and Josie were left alone. After she
came back, they went home. On the way home, Josie told her to give
something to [the] Judge, “Sabi niya magbigay tayo ng kaunti para
bumilis iyong kaso mo” (TSN, page 24, Hearing of March 3,
2003). At first, Josie did not mention any amount but when the
Complainant asked her how much, the former mentioned Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). Complainant asked for a lesser
amount, Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) (TSN, page 25,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie agreed, she sent the amount
of P20,000.00 to Josie through her driver after two days (TSN, pages
26-27, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie received the money,
the Clerk of Court, Joyce, also called her (Complainant) on that
date. The Clerk of Court asked her if she sent money. At first,
Complainant denied it but the Clerk of Court said that Josie went there
and there was money in the drawer (TSN, pages 28-29, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). After that, several hearings were on-going, and
before the resolution, Joyce called up the Complainant again around
February 2001. Complainant was in Baguio when Joyce called saying
that she had an important thing to tell to (sic) the Complainant. After
Complainant got back to Manila, Joyce called her again and said that
she will show Complainant something. When they were in
Complainant’s car in San Juan, Joyce showed Complainant two
unsigned Decisions of the case[s]. After reading the Decisions,
Complainant saw that the cases were dismissed and that it will be
dismissed if she will not accede to Joyce’s request (TSN, pages 30-
33, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant claimed that Joyce
asked for Php 150,000.00 for each case. “Sabi niya it [was] for Judge
daw, kailangan daw ni Judge because he is leaving at that
time” (TSN, page 34, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant
identified the copy of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 for
Other Deceits, dated 23 February 2001, which was marked as Exhibit
“A” for the Complainant (TSN, pages 35-38, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant further alleged “Sabi niya, if I will accede to that
request of P150,000.00 for each case then they will (sic) going to
reverse the Decision” and “Si Judge daw” will reverse the
Decision. Complainant met with Joyce around February 2001 (TSN,
page 39, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant further claimed
that Joyce told her to go to Mayor because he is a friend of the
Judge. Complainant went again to the Office of the Mayor to seek the
Mayor’s help and she met the Mayor at his Office in San Juan. The
Mayor called up the Judge but he was not around so the Clerk of
Court, Joyce, was called. Joyce went to the Office of the Mayor and
when she arrived, she said that the Judge was out of the
country (TSN, pages 40-41, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The Mayor
asked for the phone number of Respondent Judge Rosete, which Joyce
gave. Mayor Estrada was able to get in touch with the Judge. While
the Mayor was talking in (sic) the phone with the Judge, Complainant
was in front of the Mayor (TSN, pages 42-43, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant heard the Mayor “because his voice is very
loud.” He said, “Judge, Saan ka? Sabi niya New Zealand. When
were you coming back? I do not know what is the answer and then he
said, you help my friend naswindler siya, pabilisin mo ang kaso niya
para matapos na kasi matagal na iyan” (TSN, page 43, Hearing of
March 23, 2003). After that they left the Office of the Mayor and
Complainant was not able to approach Mayor Estrada again. Since
the Complainant was still carrying the Decision, and being afraid that
it will be promulgated already, she sought the advi[c]e of her friends.
The Complainant showed the decision to the Prosecutor in San Juan at
that time (TSN, pages 44-45, Hearing of March 3, 2003). The
Prosecutor told the Complainant that she is going to meet with the
Judge when he comes back from New Zealand. Complainant testified
that, sometime in April, in Sangkalan, Quezon City, a night life
restaurant, she met Respondent Judge Rosete. She was with two (2)
Prosecutors. When she arrived at Sangkalan at about 8:30 in the
evening, Judge Rosete was already in the company of several men
whom she got to know as Fernan and Buboy (TSN, pages 46-48,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). After eating and drinking, the
Complainant left at around 10:30 in the evening. While they were
inside, Complainant claimed that she did not say anything at all and it
was the Prosecutor who talked in her behalf. She was the one who
paid all the bills which amounted to Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00). When Complainant left, only they, three (3) girls, left
while the Judge and his company were still there drinking. While
Complainant was waiting for her car outside, a man came over from
behind (TSN, pages 49-50, Hearing of March 3,
2003). Complainant did not know him but she asked the Prosecutor
later after the man left. The Complainant said that the man asked if he
could have an advance, which she understood as a payment, and she
told the Prosecutor. Complainant heard the Prosecutor say that she
already talked to the Judge. The man left and went back inside the
restaurant (TSN, page 51, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant
said that when she did not give the money she was still scared because
there will already be a promulgation and she did not know whether it
will be in her behalf (sic) or not. Complainant did not give anything
aside from the P20,000.00 because her case was very strong and she
had all the papers and evidence and that she promised them that she
will give them after she was (sic) able to collect all the
debts. Complainant did not know the actual date of the promulgation
but somebody from the Office of Respondent Judge called her up in
her house and told her not to go to the promulgation. When
Complainant asked why, “Sabi niya baka mapaiyak daw ako kasi
alam na daw nila ang decision. Sabi niya ako na lang ang
magdedeliver ng case ng promulgation.” She received the decision
when she sent her driver to pick it up. The caller said that the decision
was unfavorable to her (TSN, pages 52-55, Hearing of March 3,
2003).
 RESPONDENT’S VERSION:

1. JOSEFINA RAMOS

She testified that she was the Private Secretary of Mayor

Jinggoy Estrada, the former Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, since
he was Vice Mayor of San Juan. In 2000 and 2001, she was already
the Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy (TSN, page 7, Hearing of
September 9, 2003). She met Lucila Tan when the latter went to the
Mayor’s Office together with Tita Pat, the sister of President Estrada,
but she could no longer remember the year. Lucila Tan went to the
Office, together with Tita Pat, and they were seeking the help of
Mayor Jinggoy because they have a case. She did not know the case
because they were talking to Mayor Jinggoy. She could no longer
remember how many times Lucila Tan went to the Office of Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada. She did not know what Lucila Tan wanted from
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or how close Lucila Tan was to him (TSN,
pages 8-11, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She denied that she met
Lucila Tan at the Cravings Restaurant and that she suggested to Lucila
Tan to give Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Judge Rosete to
speed up or facilitate her cases but that Lucila Tan agreed for only
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). She claimed that she did not
know what Lucila Tan was talking about regarding the money. There
was no occasion that she suggested or even intimated to Lucila Tan
the idea of giving money to Judge Rosete. She denied that she met
with Lucila Tan and Respondent Judge at Cravings Restaurant along
Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila. She identified her Sworn
Statement, subscribed on February 5, 2003, which was marked as
Exhibit “1”(TSN, pages 12-16, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She
denied that Lucila Tan gave anything to her (TSN, page 17, Hearing
of September 9, 2003).

2. RODOLFO CEA

He testified that his acquaintances usually call him “Buboy”

and for about two years or more he had no occupation. Two years
before, he was a Clerk III at Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San
Juan. He knows Lucila Tan because, when he “was still working as
Clerk in San Juan, she approached me and asked if I can introduce her
to Judge Rosete and eventually asked for a favorable decision against
her case.” He could not remember anymore when that was because
“it was a long time ago” (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing of September 22,
2003). It was when he was still with the MeTC, Branch 58, San Juan,
Metro Manila. He met Lucila Tan at the corridor of the Metropolitan
Trial Court when she approached him and asked if he can introduce
her to Judge Rosete. He agreed to introduce Lucila Tan to Judge
Rosete but he was not able to actually introduce Lucila Tan to Judge
Rosete “because aside from the introduction, she wants me to ask
Judge Rosete for a favorable decision against (sic) her case and I told
her that Judge Rosete don’t (sic) like his staff (to) indulge on that kind
of transaction” (TSN, pages 8-9, Hearing of September 22,
2003). As far as he knows, the meeting he had with Lucila Tan in the
corridor of the Court in San Juan was “the first and the last
time.” When asked about the claim of Lucila Tan that he approached
her and demanded from her a sum of money to represent an advance
payment for a favorable decision in her cases then pending before
Judge Rosete, he answered “I don’t know about that, sir.” (TSN,
page 10, Hearing of September 22, 2003.) He identified the Sworn
Statement, subscribed on February 6, 2003, and confirmed and
affirmed the truthfulness of the contents of the Affidavit, which was
marked as Exhibit “2” (TSN, pages 11-12, Hearing of September
22, 2003). He denied that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan
Restaurant around 8:30 in the evening of an unspecified date(TSN,
page 13, Hearing of September 22, 2003).

3. FERNANDO B. ESPUERTA

He testified that he is a government employee employed at the

Supreme Court with the position Budget Officer III since November
9, 1981. His first job was Casual and he became Budget Officer in
1997 (TSN, page 46, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He recalled
having met Lucila Tan sometime just before Christmas in October or
November 2000. The first time he saw Lucila Tan was in a restaurant
in Quezon City where she was introduced to him by Fiscal Reyes. He
went to the restaurant alone. He was invited by Judge Rosete because
they had not been together for a long time and they were long time
friends. They ate at the restaurant. When he arrived, Judge Rosete
and Buboy were already there. They stayed in the restaurant until
11:00 [eleven] o’clock in the evening (TSN, pages 47-49, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). He met Lucila Tan in that restaurant when
Fiscal Reyes pointed him to Lucila Tan as Fernan of the Supreme
Court. When he arrived there, Buboy and Judge Rosete were already
there. Later, the three (3) girls arrived, namely: Fiscal Reyes, Lucila
Tan and the sister of the Fiscal (TSN, page 50, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). They ordered and ate but they were in a
separate table. He recalled that Judge Rosete paid for their bill
because he saw him get a credit card and sign something. He did not
know about Mrs. Tan but he saw Judge Rosete sign and give to the
waiter. The incident where he met Lucila Tan in the restaurant in
Quezon City came before the incident when she went to his
Office (TSN, pages 51-52, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He
could not remember the month when Lucila Tan went to his Office
but he remembers that it was nearing Christmas in 2000. “Pumunta
siya sa akin parang may ipinakiusap siya sa akin, katunayan nandito
po dala ko.” Lucila Tan asked him to help her in her case with
Alfonso Sy. “Meron siyang inalok sa akin. Sabi bibigyan niya ako
ng three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) para iabot kay Judge
Rosete. Ang sagot ko nga sa kanya, hindi ganun ang aking
kaibigan. Matagal na kaming magkaibigan niyan noong
nagpapractice pa yan. Iyon ang sagot ko sa kanya.” He told Judge
Rosete about that and the latter got mad at him. In their second
meeting, Lucila Tan gave him papers. He presented a Motion for
Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440, which was marked as
Exhibit “3” (TSN, pages 53-56, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He
presented the papers actually given to him by Lucila Tan. He claimed
that the xerox copy was the exact same document given to him by
Lucila Tan when she went to his Office. The other documents that
Lucila Tan gave to him when she went to his Office were marked as
Exhibit “4” and submarkings (TSN, pages 57-63, Hearing of
September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan told him the contents of the
documents and how the case against Alfonso Sy came about. When
Lucila Tan asked him, he answered her that his friend (Respondent
Judge) was not like that and they had been together for a long time
and it is not possible. When he told Judge Rosete about that, the latter
got mad at him. Lucila Tan also mentioned to him that she knew the
son of the Chief Justice (TSN, pages 64-66, Hearing of September
22, 2003). Lucila Tan was insisting that he give Judge Rosete so that
her case will win but he answered that his friend was not like
that(TSN, pages 67-68, Hearing of September 22, 2003).

4. JOYCE TRINIDAD HERNANDEZ

She testified that she was a government employee connected

with the Judiciary at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San
Juan, Metro Manila. She knew Complainant Lucila Tan because in
the year 2000 she had a case in their court. She first came to know
Lucila Tan when the latter went to their Office with Ellen Sorio, the
Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 57, who introduced Lucila Tan to
her. Ellen Sorio said, “may kaso ito sa inyo, pinapasabi ni Mayor kay
Judge” (TSN, pages 7-11, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She
did not say anything but Lucila Tan asked “may tumawag na ba sa
Mayor’s Office?” and she said “yes, ma’am.” After that there was a
hearing and the sister of former President Estrada went to their Office
looking for Judge Rosete. She told her that Judge Rosete was on a
hearing and the former told her to tell Judge Rosete about the case of
Lucila “na pinakikiusap ni Mayor” (TSN, page 12, Hearing of
September 29, 2003). She told Judge Rosete about the things that the
sister of the former President told her and that Judge Rosete said
nothing. She denied the testimony of Complainant on March 3, 2003
that, sometime in November 2000, she (Joyce Hernandez) called up
Lucila Tan by telephone and said that she saw money stuffed inside
the drawer of the Respondent in his Office and that she asked the
Complainant whether the latter was the one who sent the money
stuffed inside the drawer. What she remembers is that Lucila Tan
called her and asked if Josie went to their Office and she told Lucila
Tan that Josie never went to their Office. She also denied that she
called up Lucila Tan sometime in February 2001 and claimed that
 Lucila Tan was the one who called her up and told her that she (Lucila
Tan) was going to show her something. Lucila Tan showed her a copy
of the Decision and she was surprised when the former showed her the
copy. When she asked where Lucila Tan got the copy, the latter did
not answer and said that Mayor Jinggoy wanted to talk to her (TSN,
pages 13-16, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She immediately
went to the Office of the Mayor with Lucila Tan and Mayor Jinggoy
talked to her. The Mayor asked her where Judge Rosete was and she
answered that he was in New Zealand on study leave. When the
Mayor asked if she knew the telephone number of the Judge, she gave
him the telephone number in New Zealand. She was present when the
Mayor called up Respondent Judge and talked to him (TSN, page 17,
Hearing of September 29, 2003). “He said ‘Pare ko, ano na itong
kaso na pinakikiusap ko sa iyo?’ I don’t know what was your
answer(ed) [sic] to him, you were talking and then he said ‘ganun
ba?’ then Mayor Jinggoy said ‘o sige, okay na’ and then we left the
Office.” She denied that she gave two advance copies of the
Decisions in Complainant’s two cases inside the latter’s parked car in
San Juan, Metro Manila and claimed that Complainant was the one
who showed her the copy in their Office. She likewise denied the
testimony of the Complainant that she allegedly demanded
Php150,000.00 for each of the two cases then pending before Branch
58, which were decided by Respondent Judge, in return for a
favorable decision(TSN, pages 18-21, Hearing of September 29,
2003). She claimed that it was the Complainant who offered to
her. She identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed and sworn to on
February 5, 2003, which was marked as Exhibit “5,” and confirmed
and affirmed the truthfulness of all the contents thereof (TSN, pages
22-25, Hearing of September 29, 2003).[9]

The Court is now faced with two opposing versions of the

story. Complainant claims that respondent judge, through his staff, required her to
pay the amount ofP150,000.00 for him to render judgment in her favor in the two
criminal cases she filed against Alfonso Pe Sy. Respondent judge, on the other
hand, asserts that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him by offering to pay
for the downpayment of the car he was planning to buy, and she even sought the
intervention of then San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to persuade him to rule for
the complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120.

The issue in this administrative case thus boils down to a determination of

the credibility of the parties’ evidence.
 After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as
the documentary evidence presented by both parties, we find the complainant’s
version more trustworthy. Not only did she testify with clarity and in full detail,
but she also presented during the investigation the unsigned copy of the draft
decision of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 59440 given to her by a
member of his staff. Said documentary evidence supports her allegation that a
member of complainant’s staff met with her, showed her copies of respondent
judge’s draft decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, and demanded, in
behalf of respondent judge, that she pays P150,000.00 for the reversal of the
disposition of said cases. It would be impossible for complainant to obtain a copy
of a judge’s draft decision, it being highly confidential, if not through the judge
himself or from the people in his office. And an ordinary employee in the court
cannot promise a litigant the reversal of a case’s disposition if not assured by the
judge who drafted the decision.

The respondent’s evidence did not overcome the facts proved by

complainant. We note that the testimonies of two of respondent’s witnesses
contradict each other. Fernando Espuerta confirmed complainant’s claim that she
met respondent judge and his two companions, Espuerta himself and Rodolfo Cea
(Buboy), at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City. Rodolfo Cea, on the other hand,
denied that he met complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant and swore that he never
went out with respondent judge in non-office functions. The Investigating Judge
observed:
Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the testimony of the
Respondent Judge’s two witnesses, Rodolfo Cea and Fernando B.
Espuerta, regarding the incident at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon
City where Complainant claimed that she met Respondent Judge, a
certain Fernan, and Buboy, while she was with two
Prosecutors. Fernando B. Espuerta testified that he was at Sangkalan
Restaurant with Respondent Judge and Buboy (Rodolfo Cea), while
the latter (Rodolfo Cea) denied that he met the Complainant at
Sangkalan Restaurant.[10] (citations omitted)

Hence, we are more inclined to believe complainant’s version that she met with
respondent judge and his companions at Sangkalan Restaurant sometime in April
2001.
 We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid with
the Court as regards the dates when he went to New Zealand and when he came
back to the Philippines. Respondent asserts that he was already in New Zealand at
the time when complainant claims that he met with her. However, the evidence he
presented only shows his New Zealand visa and the dates when he entered said
country.[11] He did not show to the investigating body the dates when he left and
returned to the Philippines. Apparently, he entered New Zealand on two dates:
March 4, 2001 and May 1, 2001. We may therefore infer that complainant was in
the Philippines before May 1, 2001, which is consistent with complainant’s
testimony, as well as that of Fernando Espuerta, that she met with respondent judge
and his companions, Fernando and Buboy in April 2001.

We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of

judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but above
suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting standards of conduct
demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary because the people’s confidence in the judicial
system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence
of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and
moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes
the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in
disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a
judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life,
be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.[12]

Respondent’s act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant

and show copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside
the office premises beyond office hours violate the standard of judicial conduct
required to be observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross
misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete
is SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for FOUR (4)
MONTHS.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697. October 15, 2003]

EUGENIO K. CHAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON,

Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 23, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are complaints for non-feasance, impropriety, partiality, and

inefficiency filed against respondent Jose S. Majaducon, former Presiding [1]

Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,General Santos City.

The Facts

In an undated letter, a “concerned citizen” charged respondent Judge Jose

S. Majaducon (“respondent judge”) with “not wearing [a] black robe during
court sessions” and with being habitually tardy. [2]

In another complaint, dated 3 November 2000, complainant Eugenio K.

Chan (“complainant”) charged respondent judge with committing “acts of
improprieties [and] irregularities.” Complainant alleged that respondent judge
—
1. xxx starts his hearings at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and 2:30-3:00 o’clock in the
afternoon.
2. xxx does not wear his robe despite the requirement of the Supreme Court xxx;
3. xxx entertains lawyer[s] in his sala despite the absence of the opposing lawyer[s];
4. xxx continued to hear cases despite obvious appearance of impartiality [sic]. He
insist [sic] to hear the case despite the fact that her [sic] daughter being [sic]
involved in the defendant bank;
5. xxx was already reprimanded by the Honorable Supreme Court and he is a subject
of adverse write ups in the newspapers;
 6. xxx does not prepare or study the cases. He reads the cases during the hearing
time.[3]

The Court required respondent judge to submit his Comment on the

complaints. In his Indorsement dated 5 February 2001, respondent judge
controverts the allegations against him as follows:
1. On his refusal to wear the judicial robe during court sessions.
Respondent judge states that upon his doctor’s advice, he stopped wearing
the judge’s robe during court sessions because doing so allegedly triggers
and aggravates his hypertension. He promised to resume wearing the robe
once his blood pressure had stabilized.
2. On conducting hearings behind schedule. Respondent judge admits
that he takes breaks from court sessions at 10 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. to
take merienda or attend to personal needs. However, respondent judge
claims that he starts the hearings in his court on time and that his sessions
sometimes even last for more than eight hours in a day. According to
respondent judge, if ever his hearings started late, it was either because he
had to attend to other equally pressing matters such as signing/revising
Orders/Resolutions or because the litigants and/or their counsels were late.
3. On entertaining counsels/litigants in his chambers. Respondent admits
entertaining litigants and their counsels with pending cases in his sala as his
“chamber’s two doors are always open.” He claims, however, that he never
discusses with his visitors the merits of their cases and that he has never
been “influenced” by them.
4. On “studying” cases during hearings. Respondent judge explains that
while he does consult the records of cases during hearings, it is only to verify
contested matters. He states that this is necessary, as he cannot memorize all
the details of cases, especially the voluminous ones that he had inherited from
the previous judge.
Respondent judge claims that complainant, who had sought his inhibition
from a case, may have wanted to get back at him (respondent judge) for his
[4]

refusal to inhibit himself. Respondent judge also suspects that complainant’s

counsel, a certain Atty. Fontanilla, is the “concerned citizen” who filed the
anonymous complaint against him. [5]

On 30 January 2001, complainant withdrew his complaint against

respondent judge, stating that he had “realized that [respondent judge] is only
rightly doing his job.”
[6]

On 16 May 2001, respondent judge informed the Court that since

February 2001, he had resumed wearing the judicial robe as his blood
pressure had stabilized. [7]

In his Memorandum of 27 February 2003, respondent judge reiterated the

reasons for his earlier refusal to wear the judicial robe during court sessions.

The OCA’s Report and Recommendation

 In its Report of 11 March 2002 (“Report”), the Office of the Court
Administrator (“OCA”) found respondent judge liable for violation of
Administrative Circular No. 25 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
However, the OCA recommends the dismissal of the other charges against
respondent judge for lack of merit. The OCA recommends that respondent
judge be finedP5,000. The Report reads:

Complainant herein accuses respondent Judge of starting the hearings late at 10:00
o’clock in the morning and 2:30-3:00 o’clock in the afternoon. In his comment,
respondent Judge denies the same contending that he conducts hearings [for] four (4)
hours, mornings and afternoons. In view of the absence of proof in support of the
accusation against him, respondent Judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty.

As regards the non-wearing of a black robe during trials, respondent Judge should be
reminded of Administrative Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 19[8]9 Re: Use of Black
Robes by Trial Judges xxx.

Based on the aforecited circular, trial judges are enjoined to wear the black robe
during court sessions. In the instant case, prudence dictates that respondent Judge
should have informed the [C]ourt, through the Office of the Court Administrator, of
his health problems and requested exemption from said circular. Admittedly, he took
it upon himself to dispense with the wearing of a black robe due to
hypertension. Although his reason may be considered in his favor, it could not
entirely exculpate him from administrative responsibility for clear violation of the
circular.

As to the charge that respondent entertains lawyers in his sala despite [the] absence of
the opposing lawyer, respondent candidly admits the same by saying that for purposes
of transparency he allows lawyers and litigants to freely enter his chambers to ask
about their cases without however discussing the merits thereof. This is [a] highly
xxx improper practice. In-chambers sessions without the presence of the other party
and his counsel must be avoided (Capuno vs. Jaramillo, 243 SCRA 213). The
prohibition is to maintain impartiality. Judges should not only be impartial but should
appear impartial (Fernandez vs. Presbitero, 79 SCRA 60). The court should
administer justice free from suspicion of bias and prejudice; otherwise, parties-
litigants might lose confidence in the judiciary and destroy its nobleness and decorum
(Nestle Phils., Inc. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542).

The charge that respondent continues to hear cases despite obvious appearance of
partiality must fail as complainant failed to specify the cases being alluded to and in
what manner respondent appeared to be partial.

Finally, as to the charge that respondent does not prepare for or study the cases and
merely reads the cases during trial, we find his explanation thereon satisfactory
because referral to court records are at times unavoidable.

In sum, respondent is found to have violated Circular No. 25 xxx, but the fact that he
had been suffering from hypertension shall be taken in his favor. He is also found to
have violated Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for his act of allowing in-
chamber sessions without the presence of the other party and his counsel. [8]
 The Ruling of the Court

Except for the recommended penalty, the Court finds the Report well
taken.

On Respondent Judge’s Refusal to Wear

the Mandated Judicial Robe

Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 1989, (“Circular No. 25”) provides:

Pursuant to Sections 5 and 6, Article [VIII] of the Constitution and in order to

heighten public consciousness on the solemnity of judicial proceedings, it is hereby
directed that beginning Tuesday, August 1, 1989, all Presiding Judges of all Trial
Courts shall wear black robes during sessions of their respective Courts.

Respondent judge admits violating Circular No. 25. Nevertheless, he seeks

exculpation from administrative liability for his non-compliance because of his
illness. Respondent judge’s plea is futile.
The wearing of robes by judges during official proceedings, which harks
back to the 14th century, is not an idle ceremony. Such practice serves the
[9]

dual purpose of “heighten[ing] public consciousness on the solemnity of

judicial proceedings,” as Circular No. 25 states, and of impressing upon the
judge the exacting obligations of his office. As well put by an eminent jurist of
another jurisdiction:

[J]udges [are] xxx clothed in robes, not only, that they who witness the administration
of justice should be properly advised that the function performed is one different
from, and higher, than that which a man discharges as a citizen in the ordinary walks
of life; but also, in order to impress the judge himself with the constant consciousness
that he is a high priest in the temple of justice and is surrounded with obligations of a
sacred character that he cannot escape and that require his utmost care, attention and
self-suppression.[10]

Consequently, a judge must take care not only to remain true to the high
ideals of competence and integrity his robe represents, but also that he wears
one in the first place.
While circumstances, such as the medical condition claimed by
respondent judge, may exempt one from complying with Circular No. 25, he
must first secure the Court’s permission for such exemption. He cannot simply
excuse himself, like respondent judge, from complying with the requirement.
Neither does the fact that respondent judge, if he is to be believed, has
resumed wearing the robe exculpate him from liability. Such does not alter the
fact that at the time the complaints in the present case were filed, respondent
judge was openly violating Circular No. 25. Respondent judge’s medical
condition and his subsequent compliance serve only to mitigate his liability.

On Respondent Judge’s Practice of Entertaining Lawyers

 and Litigants with Pending Cases in his Sala

The Code of Judicial Conduct (“Code”) provides:

Rule 1.01. — A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and

independence.

CANON 2 — A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE

APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.

Rule 2.01. — A judge should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Court cannot emphasize enough the pivotal role lower court judges play
in the promotion of the people’s faith in the judiciary. Unlike the appellate court
justices, they are the so-called “front-liners” who give human face to the
judicial branch at the “grassroots” level in their interaction with litigants and
those who do business with the courts. The admonition in Canon 2 that
[11]

judges must not only “avoid impropriety [but also] the appearance of
impropriety” is more sternly applied to them. It is in this light that the Court
[12]

frowns upon the holding by trial court judges of in-chamber meetings with
litigants or their counsels without the presence of the adverse party. [13]

Instead of taking heed of this ethical prohibition, respondent judge readily

admitted transgressing it. Worse, he reveals his ignorance of the prohibition’s
purpose by claiming that his in-chamber dealings are above-board as nothing
illegal or improper transpires during those meetings. Respondent judge
should have realized that his very conduct of entertaining litigants and their
counsels in his chamber without the presence of the adverse party or his
counsel constitutes an impropriety. While judges are not expected to shun the
world, neither are they supposed to make themselves freely accessible under
such circumstances as to invite suspicions of impropriety if not
bias. Respondent judge should have borne in mind — and all those in the
bench who are similarly disposed as him are reminded — that:

[N]o position is more demanding as regards xxx uprightness of any individual than a
seat on the Bench xxx. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration
of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the
judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, xxx can
bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of
integrity and justice. In insulating the Bench from unwarranted criticism, thus
preserving our democratic way of life, it is essential that judges, like Caesar’s wife,
should be above suspicion. [14]

On the Other Charges Against Respondent Judge

The Court subscribes to the OCA’s finding that complainant failed to

substantiate the other charges against respondent judge. Mere allegation that
respondent judge was habitually tardy or had shown partiality in a case,
without more, does not suffice to hold respondent judge administratively liable.
On the other hand, there is nothing improper in consulting case records during
hearings to clarify contested matters. It is usual for judges to do so, especially
for lower court judges who, in addition to their heavy caseloads, have to
conduct marathon hearings and thus need to consult the records of each case
more frequently.

On the Appropriate Penalty to be Imposed Against Respondent Judge

The OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined P5,000. However,

in Gallo v. Judge Cordero, the Court imposed a fine of P10,000 on a judge
[15]

for impropriety in meeting with a litigant in his office and for other irregular
conduct. Under the circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate to impose
similarly a fine of P10,000 on respondent judge.
Neither complainant’s desistance nor respondent judge’s retirement
precludes the Court from holding respondent judge liable and imposing on him
the penalty of P10,000 fine. A complainant’s desistance from an
administrative complaint against a member of the bench will not, by itself,
warrant the dismissal of the case. This is especially true in the instances
[16]

where, as in the present case, the respondent judge admits some if not all of
the material allegations in the complaint. Similarly, the Court is not ousted of
[17]

its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of
his case.[18]

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Jose S. Majaducon, former Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City guilty of violating
Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 1989, Rules 1.01 and 2.01 and Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent Jose S. Majaducon is ordered to pay a
fine of P10,000, the same to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits
he is entitled.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-97-1375. October 16, 1997]

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANGELITO

C. TEH, Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Rosario,
Batangas, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
 In a letter, dated 01 April 1996, Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal related to the
Court the actuations of Judge Angelito C. Teh, Executive Judge and the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas,
relative to Election Case No. R-95-001.
It would appear that Judge Teh issued a resolution adverse to the client of
Atty. Macalintal in the aforenumbered election case. Atty. Macalintal
questioned the resolution, via a petition forcertiorari, before the Commission
on Elections ("COMELEC"). While the case was pending at the COMELEC,
Judge Teh actively participated in the proceedings by filing his comment on
the petition and, still later, an urgent manifestation. Complainant lawyer
forthwith filed a motion to prevent respondent Judge from further acting on
Election Case No. R-95-001. Instead of acting on the motion for inhibition,
Judge Teh hired his own lawyer and filed his answer before his own court,
with the prayer:
"1. That Judgment be rendered dismissing the Motion for Inhibition for lack of
sufficient factual and legal basis;
"2. Ordering the movant to pay the undersigned respondent in the amount
of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses for litigation;
"3. Cost of this suit.
"Respondent respectfully prays for such other reliefs and remedies as may be
deemed just and equitable in the premises."
[1]

In its resolution of 19 August 1996, the Court required respondent to

comment on the letter-complaint.
In his comment, dated 20 September 1996, respondent Judge admitted
that he had filed his own pleadings with the COMELEC out of respect and in
deference to the order of 16 November 1995 of the COMELEC En Banc
requiring respondents to comment on the petition. The urgent manifestation
he filed was meant to rectify the assertion of complainant that he had
erroneously cited Section 8, Rule 35, of the Omnibus Election
Code. Attached to his comment before this Court was his resolution, dated 31
July 1996, where respondent Judge, ruling on the motion for inhibition, held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court hereby
rendered this resolution on the pending incidents to wit:
"1. The protestee's unverified Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike
Out Opposition are hereby DENIED for lack of sufficient legal and
factual basis;
"2. The Motion for Inhibition is likewise DENIED for lack of
sufficient legal and factual basis;
"3. And for compelling the respondent Judge to engage the services
of counsel who prepared the Answer to the Motion for Inhibition, the
Protestee's counsel, Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal is hereby ordered to
pay P100,000.00 as Attorney's Fees and litigation expenses incident
to his Motion for Inhibition.

"SO ORDERED." [2]

 In its resolution, dated 12 March 1997, the Court resolved to:

"(a) DIRECT Judge Angelito Teh to ACT on the motion for inhibition in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in Section 2, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court;

"(b) TREAT the letter dated April 1, 1996 of complainant as an administrative

complaint against Judge Angelito Teh and docket accordingly;

"(c) CONSIDER the comment dated September 20, 1996 of Judge Teh filed in
compliance with the resolution of August 19, 1996 as comment on the complaint; and

"(d) require the parties to MANIFEST within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof
whether they are willing to submit this case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings already filed herein." [3]

In his manifestation, dated 29 April 1997, respondent Judge expressed his

willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis of his comment
which he repleaded and reproduced. He also made his observation that the
complaint of Atty. Macalintal had not been under oath.
In his compliance, dated 24 April 1997, complainant informed the Court
that his letter of 01 April 1996 was not intended as an administrative complaint
but that he was leaving the matter of treating it as such to the discretion of this
Court in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over the
members of the judiciary. He likewise manifested his willingness to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed. He, in passing,
informed the Court that the resolution of 31 July 1996 issued by respondent
judge was found by the COMELEC to be "irrational."
While Rule 140 of the Rules of Court requires that complaints against
Judges should be sworn to, the Court deems it proper to dispense with the
requirement since the letter of Atty. Macalintal, upon the recommendation of
the Office of the Court Administrator, has heretofore been treated as an
administrative complaint and considering, further, that respondent Judge, in
his comment, practically admitted all pertinent allegations of
complainant. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its
authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show
gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct. [4]

Section 5, Rule 65, of the Rules of Court provides:

[5]

"Sec. 5. Defendants and costs in certain cases. - When the petition filed
related to the acts or omissions of a court or judge, the petitioner shall join, as
parties defendant with such court or judge, the person or persons interested in
sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such person
or persons to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf
of the court or judge affected by the proceedings, and costs awarded in such
proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the person or persons in
interest only, and not against the court or judge."
Evidently, the active participation of respondent judge, being merely a
nominal or formal party in the certiorari proceedings, is not called for. In
[6]

Turqueza vs. Hernando, the Court has explained:

[7]
 "x x x (U)nder Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a judge whose order
is challenged in an appellate court does not have to file any answer or take
active part in the proceeding unless expressly directed by order of this
Court. It is the duty of the private respondent to appear and defend, both in
his/her behalf and in behalf of the Court or judge whose order or decision is at
issue. The judge should maintain a detached attitude from the case and should
not waste his time by taking an active part in a proceeding which relates to
official actuations in a case but should apply himself to his principal task of
hearing and adjudicating the cases in his court. He is merely a nominal party
to the case and has no personal interest nor personality therein." [8]

Respondent's folly did not stop there. When complainant filed a motion for
respondent's inhibition in Election Case No. R-95-001, the latter, instead of
acting thereon in accordance with Section 2, Rule 137, of the Rules of Court,
hired his own lawyer, filed his answer to the motion and forthwith denied the
same, ordering, at the same time, Atty. Macalintal to pay P100,000.00 by way
of attorney's fees and litigation expenses "for compelling the respondent
Judge to engage the services of counsel who prepared the Answer to the
Motion for Inhibition." Respondent Judge, in fine, acted both as a party litigant
and as a judge before his own court.
In the Court's resolution of 12 March 1997, respondent was directed to act
on the motion for inhibition in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
Section 2, Rule 137, of the Rules of Court. Respondent Judge either
[9]

misunderstood or chose to misunderstand the directive for, in his order, dated

17 April 1997, he granted the motion for inhibition "in compliance with the
resolution" of the Court. Clearly, the Court, in its resolution of 12 March 1997,
merely required respondent Judge to act on the motion for inhibition in
accordance with the Rules, i.e., "to either proceed with the trial, or withdraw
therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his
disqualification." Certainly, he was not directed by the Court either to grant or
deny the motion.
Respondent judge should be reminded that decisions of courts need not
only be just but must be perceived to be just and completely free from
suspicion or doubt both in its fairness and integrity. Judges, being the visible
[10]

representation of the law and, most importantly, of justice, should be the [11]

embodiment of independence, competence, and integrity. Once again, the

[12]

Court would also wish to say that a member of the bench must continuously
keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments and show
acquaintance with statutes, procedural rules and authorities doctrines. Not [13]

for a moment, indeed, does the learning process in law cease.

In the case before us, respondent's gross deviation from the acceptable
norm for judges is clearly manifest. In Castaños vs. Escaño, Jr., the Court [14]

has had occasion to state:

"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a
rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that
the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order. After all, faith
in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that
occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles."
[15]

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge Angelito C. Teh guilty of gross

ignorance of the law, the Court hereby dismisses him from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any other
branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-
owned and controlled corporations.
Judge C. Teh is hereby enjoined upon his receipt hereof to cease and
desist from performing any and all acts pertaining to his office.
This decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to the records of Judge Angelito C.
Teh with this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., on leave.

N BANC

[A.M. No. MTJ 02-1444. July 22, 2004]

JORDAN P. OKTUBRE, complainant, vs. JUDGE RAMON P.

VELASCO, Municipal Trial Court, Maasin, Southern
Leyte, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for Grave Misconduct, Abuse of Authority, Oppression,

and Gross Ignorance of the Law filed by Jordan P. Oktubre (“complainant”)
against Judge Ramon P. Velasco (“respondent Judge”) of the Municipal Trial
Court, Maasin City, Southern Leyte (“MTC Maasin”).
Complainant is the attorney-in-fact of one Peggy Louise D’Arcy vda. De
Paler (“D’Arcy”), a non-resident American. D’Arcy is the widow of Abraham
Paler (“Abraham”), a resident of MaasinCity, Southern Leyte. Respondent
Judge is Abraham’s nephew.
During his lifetime, Abraham built a four-storey commercial and residential
building (“Paler building”) in Maasin City on a lot he owned in common with his
siblings. After Abraham died, none of his heirs petitioned for the settlement of
his estate. D’Arcy, through complainant, administered the Paler building. At
the time material to this case, three tenants occupied the Paler building with
[1]

some rooms reserved for Abraham’s relatives. While he had a room in the
Paler building, complainant rarely used it as he stayed most of the time in
Javier, Sogod, Southern Leyte. The tenants pay their rent to complainant.
Shortly after his appointment to the MTC Maasin in March 1998,
respondent Judge, with D’Arcy’s permission, stayed in the Paler building for a
few days. He sought an extension of his stay but D’Arcy turned down his
request since during her next visit to the country she would use the room
respondent Judge then occupied. Nevertheless, respondent Judge was able
to continue staying in the Paler building by transferring to a room reserved for
a sister of Abraham.
Complainant alleges that D’Arcy’s refusal to grant extension to respondent
Judge’s stay triggered the following series of events narrated in his Complaint:

6. In April 2000[,] Judge Velasco in a surprise move sent letters xxx to the tenants
of the building in which he passed himself off as the administrator of the estate of
Gaspar Paler [Abraham’s father] and co-heir of Abraham Paler, and directed said
tenants to deposit their monthly rentals to his office at [the] Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Maasin City despite the fact that no action has been filed yet for that matter
in court;

xxx

10. In August 2000[,] Judge Velasco sent a strongly worded letter to Dr. [D’Arcy]
with the very obvious purpose of intimidating the latter. The letter contains
categorical declarations that he is taking over possession of the building,
misrepresentation among others of Judge Velasco that he did it in collaboration with
his other relatives, legal arguments, and mostly intimidating words coming from a
Judge-Lawyer. Worse, he used his office’s (MTC) letterhead [for] this personal but
threatening 5-page letter xxx;

xxx

12. [On September 9, 2000], Judge Velasco without my knowledge and permission
moved out from the garage [of the Paler building] the service jeep owned by Dr.
[D’Arcy] and put it outside of the building causing it to be exposed to the sun and
rain;

xxx

14. Worried about the vehicle, Dr. [D’Arcy] right away instructed me to return the
vehicle (jeep) to the garage and to do something in such a way that it could not
anymore be removed by Judge Velasco;

15. On September 15, 2000, I proceeded to Maasin City with the sole intention of
having the vehicle returned to its rightful place. Upon arrival, I was thankful that
Judge Velasco was then at Cebu City so that I could be able to return the jeep without
fear of opposition by or confrontation with him. With the assistance of xxx two
[others], I returned the vehicle to the garage and removed one of its wheels and placed
it inside the computer room of the building;

xxx
17. On September 22, 2000, Judge Velasco destroyed the padlock of my room and
changed it with another one including the second floor entrance padlock to the third
floor with the precise purpose of controlling the ingress and egress of the said
building;[2]

On 28 September 2000, complainant filed a complaint against respondent

Judge with the Punong Barangay of Abgao, Maasin City. Complainant
charged respondent Judge for changing the lock of his room and of the door
leading to the third floor of the Paler building. Complainant also charged
respondent Judge for taking the jeep out of the garage of the Paler
building. On 2 October 2000, complainant and respondent Judge met at the
Office of Punong Barangay of Abgao for mediation but there was no
settlement as respondent Judge questioned complainant’s residency in
Abgao. Complainant described what transpired after the meeting thus:

20. xxx After the hearing, a police officer approached and informed me that the chief
of Police of Maasin City wanted to talk to me. As expected [of] every law-abiding
citizen, I went with them [to] the Police Station. Thereat, the Chief of Police
confronted me with a warrant of [a]rrest. The warrant and the supporting documents
show[ed] that I was charged with Robbery in relation to the wheel I removed [from
the jeep] and it was issued/signed by Judge Velasco. While still [in a] state of shock
because of this malicious prosecution, the police authorities placed me behind bars;

21. That upon further examination of the complaint docketed as Criminal Case No.
5485 of [the MTC Maasin] as well as the attached document thereto, it was found out
to the surprise of everyone that the complaint of Robbery filed by the Chief of Police
was supported by the sole affidavit dated September 29, 2000 of a witness in the
person of no other than Judge Ramon Velasco himself, xxx;

22. That I was locked up in jail for about six (6) hours before I was able to put up a
cash bond of P24,000.00 before the RTC, Br. 25, Maasin City. As I was about to be
released in the afternoon of the same day, a subpoena was served at me in the City Jail
which required me to file my counter-affidavit to the complaint [for Robbery] xxx;

23. That on October 16, 2000, I received another Order dated October 4, 2000 issued
by the respondent [J]udge directing me to submit [a] counter-affidavit in another case
[for] Malicious Mischief docketed as Crim. Case No. R-5486 of [MTC Maasin]. The
Complaint xxx was supported by the same and only affidavit of Judge Velasco
dated September 29, 2000 which he used in the aforecited criminal Complaint of
Robbery xxx;

24. That about the first week of November 2000, I received another subpoena
dated October 23, 2000 issued by Judge Velasco. This time a Criminal Case of
Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents was filed against
Dr. [D’Arcy], my principal. The Complaint docketed as Criminal Case No. 5493 of
[MTC Maasin], was supported by xxx yet [another] xxx affidavit of Judge Velasco
xxx dated October 18, 2000 xxx; [3]

Complainant sought to annul the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No.

5485 by filing a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”),
Branch 25, Maasin City. The RTC granted the petition and annulled the
warrant in its Order of 7 December 2000. [4]

Because of these events, complainant filed this complaint on 18 January

2001. Complainant prays that the Court discipline respondent Judge for using
his sala’s letterhead, for his failure to inhibit himself from his own criminal
complaints, and for his issuance of the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No.
5485.
In his Comment dated 18 April 2001, respondent Judge admitted doing the
acts complainant recounted about the Paler building, its tenants, and D’Arcy’s
jeep. Respondent Judge claimed, however, that he merely acted to protect his
maternal co-heirs’ interest in the Paler building and in the other properties
claimed by D’Arcy. Respondent Judge also stated the following qualifications:
(1) he changed the padlock of the grill door leading to the third floor as this
was already “worn-out”; (2) he had to open forcibly complainant’s room to
clean it as it was already “stinking”; (3) he temporarily transferred the jeep out
of the Paler building because the garage had to be cleaned; and (4) he sent
the demand letters to the Paler building’s tenants based on Rule 73 of the [5]

Rules of Court. Respondent Judge added that complainant illegally destroyed

the lock of the garage gate when he returned the jeep. [6]

On his filing and taking cognizance of his own complaints for Robbery,
Malicious Mischief, and Falsification and Use of Falsified Documents,
respondent Judge alleges:

P-LVIII

That construing the actuation of the complainant [in filing the complaints before the
Barangay Captain] to be deliberate in defiance of my order and utmost disrespect of
my person and my official capacity [sic] and to vindicate my name, honor and
reputation, and evident infractions of our penal laws, I filed the criminal complaint for
ROBBERY against the private complainant Jordan Oktubre and docketed as Crim.
Case No. 5485 and another criminal complaint for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
docketed as Crim. Case No. R-5486 xxx;

P-LIX

That the xxx institution of the criminal complaint for Robbery was not a malicious
suit as it was anchored on facts as conveyed and attested by [witnesses] and the
corpus delicti of the crime of Robbery and Malicious Mischief are established as
shown by the destroyed garage padlock and the fact of loss of the right wheel rim and
tire of the jeep;

P-LX

It is further qualified admitted [sic] that the institution of the suit against the private
complainant Jordan Oktubre was by way of protecting the interest of my co-heirs and
to enforce the law as my judicial mandate dictates;

P-LXI
That it is likewise admitted that another criminal case for FALSIFICATION OF
DOCUMENT BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND USE OF FALSIFIED
DOCUMENT was filed against the principal of Jordan P. Oktubre in the person of Dr.
Peggy D’Arcy Paler and docketed as Crim. Case No. R-5493 on the basis of the
unearthed evidently fraudulent and deliberate act of falsification by non-disclosure of
a material fact relative to her citizenship, she being an American citizen, on her
Affidavit of Sole Adjudication xxx;

P-LXII

That after proper evaluation of the Complaint for Robbery against complainant Jordan
P. Oktubre and referral to jurisprudence on this matter, particularly the cited cases of
PP. vs. Abapo, 239 SCRA 373, Webb vs. De Leon, et al., GR 121234, 63 SCAD 196,
in utmost good faith, with the end in view of dispensation of justice expeditiously
[sic] and not to frustrate the ends of justice and finding probable cause thereof for the
issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, [I] verily issued the Warrant of Arrest against
complainant Jordan Oktubre;

P-LXIII

That it is further admitted that the Court [in the complaint for Robbery] issued a subpoena to the
complainant to submit his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences pursuant to Rule
112, Sec. 3, Rules of Court xxx;[7]

Respondent Judge inhibited himself from the three criminal cases in his
Orders of 4, 6, and 25 October 2000.
In its Report (“Report”) dated 13 March 2002, the Office of the Court
Administrator (“OCA”) recommends that respondent Judge be fined P10,000
for Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of
Authority. The Report reads:

The records of this case show that complainant Mr. Jordan Oktubre was arrested and
detained pursuant to a Warrant of Arrest xxx and a Commitment Order xxx issued by
the respondent [J]udge, the basis for which is a Criminal Complaint for Robbery
supported by an affidavit executed by the respondent Judge Ramon Velasco. Also, in
Criminal Case No. 5486 for “Malicious Mischief”, records show that the complaint is
supported by [the] lone affidavit of Judge Ramon Velasco xxx and in an Order
marked Annex “I”, accused Jordan Oktubre was directed to submit his counter-
affidavit by the respondent.

Aggrieved by the issuance of respondent [J]udge [of the warrant of arres], herein
complainant elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Maasin, Southern Leyte via “Certiorari and/or Prohibition with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction”. The RTC in its
Order dated December 7, 2000 xxx ruled that “respondent [J]udge in issuing a warrant
of arrest violative of [Rule 112, Sec. 6, par. 2 of the Rules of Court] may not only be
committing grave abuse of discretion but gross ignorance of the law
xxx”. Consequently, the warrant of arrest was declared null and void.

Considering that respondent [J]udge is the complainant o[f] the cases, his issuance of
the warrant of arrest is in violation of Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Sec.
37 of the Judiciary Act of 1980. Having resorted to such act, he acted as the private
complainant, xxx judge and executioner.

It was also noted that in [the] letters xxx sent to the tenants of the Paler Building and
to Dr. [D’Arcy], respondent [Judge] used the letter head of his Office “Municipal
Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte” and signed the same as its Presiding
Judge. This to our mind, constitutes undue influence. [8]

The OCA’s recommendation finding respondent Judge guilty of Grave

Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority is well-
taken. However, the Court finds the recommended penalty disproportionate to
respondent Judge’s offenses and instead imposes on him the penalty of
dismissal from service.

Respondent Judge is Liable for Grave

Misconduct and Grave Abuse of Authority

Canon 2, Rule 2.03 (“Rule 2.03”) of the Code of Judicial Conduct (“Code”)
provides:

A judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Rule 3.12 of the Code (“Rule 3.12”), which is substantially similar to Rule
137, Section 1 (“Rule 137, Section 1”) of the 1964 Rules of Court, mandates [9]

that—

A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:

(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;

(b) the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the
case or matters in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel
during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;

(c) the judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;

(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the
sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;

(e) the judge knows that the judge’s spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir,
legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding.
In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition. (Emphasis
added)

For inappropriately using his Office’s letterhead and for acting on his own
criminal complaints against complainant and D’Arcy, respondent Judge
violated these rules. Thus, he is liable for grave misconduct and grave [10]

abuse of authority.

On Respondent Judge’s Use of

His Office’s Letterhead

Respondent Judge does not deny sending several letters bearing his
sala’s letterhead on matters involving an apparent dispute in the
administration of the estates of two relatives. His excuse for doing so is that
he wanted to protect the interest of his maternal co-heirs in the Paler building
and other disputed properties. This explanation is flimsy. Even if he is the
“administrator” of the estates of Abraham and Gaspar Paler (“Gaspar”),
Abraham’s father, and representative of his maternal co-heirs, respondent[11]

Judge has no business using his sala’s letterhead for private matters.
Respondent Judge should know that a court’s letterhead should be used only
for official correspondence. Respondent Judge aggravates his liability when,
in his letters to the tenants, he further required them to pay their rent at the
MTC Maasin, although he was then staying at the Paler building. By these
calculated steps, respondent Judge in the words of Rule 2.03, clearly intended
to “use the prestige of his judicial office” to advance the interest of his
maternal co-heirs.

On Respondent Judge’s Failure

To Recuse Himself from His
Criminal Complaints

As we noted in Perez v. Suller, the rule on disqualification of judges

[12]

under Rule 3.12 and Rule 137, Section 1 —

[S]tems from the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not
wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A Judge should not handle a
case in which he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule
is intended to preserve the people’s faith and confidence in the courts of justice.

True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently

construe and enforce the law. However, it is more important that he should act
and behave in such a manner that the parties before him have confidence in
his impartiality. Indeed, even conduct that gives rise to the mere appearance
[13]

of partiality is proscribed.[14]

Here, although he is the complainant in the three criminal complaints,

respondent Judge did not disqualify himself from the cases. Worse, he even
issued a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485, resulting in the arrest
and detention of complainant. By doing so, respondent Judge violated Rule
3.12 and, by implication Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary
stages of criminal prosecution. To be sure, the situation in this case does not
fall under any of the instances enumerated in Rule 3.12. Nevertheless, as the
provision itself states, such enumeration is not exclusive. More importantly,
paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from sitting in a case where he is related to a
party or to counsel within the sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, respectively. Thus, there is more reason to prohibit a judge from
doing so in cases where he is a party. Indeed, the idea that a judge can
preside over his own case is anathema to the notion of impartiality that such
was no longer included in the enumeration in Rule 3.12 nor covered by
Section 1 of Rule 137.
Respondent Judge’s subsequent inhibition from the three cases does not
detract from his culpability for he should not have taken cognizance of the
cases in the first place. The evil that the rule on disqualification seeks to
prevent is the denial of a party of his right to due process. This became fait
accompli when respondent Judge refused to abide by such rule. Equally
damaging was the effect of respondent Judge’s conduct on the image of the
judiciary, which without a doubt, immeasurably suffered from it. It is well to
remind respondent Judge —

As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the visible
representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. From them, the people
draw their will and awareness to obey the law xxx. If judges, who swore to obey and
uphold the constitution, would conduct themselves xxx in wanton disregard and
violation of the rights of complainant, then the people, especially those with whom
they come in direct contact, would lose all their respect and high regard for the
institution of the judiciary itself, not to mention, cause the breakdown of the moral
fiber on which the judiciary is founded. [15]

Respondent Judge is
Liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law

Respondent Judge does not deny that he did not conduct a preliminary
investigation on the complaint for Robbery in Criminal Case No. 5485 where
he issued the warrant of arrest against complainant. As justification, he claims
that he acted in good faith based on pertinent jurisprudence. This explanation
deserves scant consideration. Section 3 of Rule 112 sets out in detail the
procedure for conducting preliminary investigation, thus:

Procedure. — Except as provided for in Sec. 7 hereof, no complaint or information

for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other
supporting documents in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2)
copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before
any fiscal or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, before a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined
the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer
shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue
a subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and
other supporting documents.

(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the

respondent shall also be sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof
and copies thereof shall be furnished by him to the complainant. Within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, the respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents. He shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted
by the complainant.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit

counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base
his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.

(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may
set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses,
during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the
right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions
to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses
concerned.

(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating
officer shall resolve the case within the (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus
adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient
ground to hold the respondent for trial. [16]

Criminal Case No. 5485 involves Robbery punishable either with prision
mayor (six years and one day to 12 years) or prision mayor in its minimum
period (six years and one day to eight years), depending on the value of the
property taken. In either case, the offense falls under the jurisdiction of the
[17]

Regional Trial Courts for which Section 1 of Rule 112 mandates the conduct
of a preliminary investigation. As one of the officers authorized to conduct
[18]

preliminary investigation under Section 2 of Rule 112, respondent Judge is

[19]

duty-bound to know and strictly follow the procedure and requirements in Rule
112.
Respondent Judge aggravated his liability when he proceeded to issue the
warrant of arrest. Section 6 of Rule 112 provides:

When warrant of arrest may issue. — x x x (b) By the Municipal Trial Court. — If the
municipal trial court judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after
an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is
a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. (Emphasis supplied)
[20]
This is the same procedure prescribed in Section 2, Article III of the[21]

Constitution and in Section 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

[22]

Procedure. A judge who issues a warrant of arrest without first complying with
such mandatory procedure is liable for gross ignorance of the
[23]

law. In Cabilao v. Judge Sardido, we ruled:

[24] [25]

We have held, in a number of cases before this Court, that the procedure described in
Section 6 of Rule 112 is mandatory because failure to follow the same would amount
to a denial of due process. With respect to the issuance by inferior courts of warrants
of arrest, it is necessary that the judge be satisfied that probable cause exists: 1)
through an examination under oath and in writing of the complainant and his
witnesses, which examination should be 2) in the form of searching questions and
answers. This rule is not merely a procedural but a substantive rule because it gives
flesh to two of the most sacrosanct guarantees found in the fundamental law: the
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and the due process
requirement. (Emphasis supplied)

The only instance where the judge may dispense with such procedure is
when the application for the warrant of arrest is filed before a Regional Trial
Court judge. In such a case, the RTC judge can rely on the report of the
prosecutor on the finding of probable cause. Criminal Case No. 5485 does
[26]

not fall under such exception.

The Penalty Appropriate to the Case

The OCA recommends the imposition of P10,000 fine on respondent

Judge. As earlier stated, the Court finds this penalty disproportionate to the
gravity of respondent Judge’s offenses. In several cases, we have imposed
[27]

the penalty of dismissal against judges for grave misconduct alone. In OCA
v. Judge Bara-acal, we dismissed a lower court judge for grave misconduct.
[28]

Considering that respondent Judge’s grave misconduct is compounded by his

other offenses of grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, his
dismissal from service is more than justified. [29]

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Ramon P. Velasco, Presiding Judge of

the Municipal Trial Court, Maasin City, Southern Leyte, GUILTY of Grave
Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and Grave Abuse of Authority for
violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is
DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with
prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities, including government owned or controlled
corporations. However, he shall receive any accrued leaves due him as of
this date.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
 HIRD DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1411. April 11, 2002]

JOCELYN T. BRIONES, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO A. ANTE,

JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on

September 17, 1996, Jocelyn T. Briones, a Clerk II of the Municipal Trial Court of
Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur, charged Judge Francisco A. Ante, Jr., the Municipal Trial
Court of Sto. Domingo, with grave misconduct, acts unbecoming of a judge,
oppression, and abuse of authority. The complaint docketed as OCA IPI No. 96-208-
MTJ.
In her letter, complainant alleged that on September 3, 1996, she was instructed
by clerk of Court Apolonio T. Tagelo to docket the order archiving a particular
case. Not finding the docket book in its place, complainant searched for it and saw it
in the possession of Court Interpreter Marcela Rabanal who was in the
courtroom. Complainant asked for and got the docket book from Rabanal. She then
went back to the staff room and placed the docket book on top of a filing cabinet but it
fell on the floor, causing a loud sound. She was about to pick it up when respondent
judge appeared and shouted at her “Why did you throw the docket book?” Respondent
also added, “You get out of here, punyeta, we don’t need you.” Worse, respondent got
a monobloc chair and threw it at complainant, hitting her on the forehead and right
arm. Immediately thereafter, Heraclea Soliven, the court stenographer, brought
complainant outside the staff room. The other court employees restrained respondent.
On October 11, 1996, complainant filed another complaint against respondent
judge, this time for sexual harassment, docketed as OCA IPI No. 96-229-
MTJ. Complainant claimed that on March 13, 1996, while the whole staff of the court
were having snacks on the occasion of their janitor’s birthday, respondent told her that
somebody was interested in her position. Respondent then added, “I cannot give your
job to that somebody because I plan to have you as my girlfriend first.” Complainant
was not able to say a word. She just turned away, went to the staff room and
cried. Since that time, complainant claimed that respondent was always mad at her,
which eventually culminated in the incident that occurred on September 3, 1996.
In his Comment dated February 18, 1997, respondent judge denied hitting
complainant with a chair on September 3, 1996. He, likewise, maintained that the
charge of sexual harassment against him was just a figment of complainant’s
imagination. Moreover, he asserted that these two complaints against him were purely
for harassment purposes as complainant knew that he was about to file a complaint
against her for falsifying her Daily Time Record.
 The aforementioned administrative complaints were consolidated and assigned to
Executive Judge Alipio V. Flores of the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
In his Report dated February 5, 2001, Executive Judge Flores absolved respondent
from the charge of sexual harassment, finding that the remarks allegedly uttered by
respondent - the basis of the complaint - was actually made as a joke. However, with
regard to the charges of grave misconduct, acts unbecoming of a judge, and abuse of
authority, the Investigating Judge recommended that respondent be suspended for one
(1) month without pay. Said report and recommendation was thereafter referred to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
In its Memorandum dated December 12, 2001, the OCA adopted the findings and
recommendation of Executive Judge Flores for being adequately supported by the
evidence presented during the course of the investigation.
On January 30, 2002, Administrative Matter IPI 96-229-MTJ was dismissed, the
Court approving the recommendation of the Court Administrator. Thus, this
resolution shall deal only with the first complaint.
We have carefully evaluated the record of this case and we come to the conclusion
that respondent is indeed guilty of grave misconduct, acts unbecoming of a judge and
abuse of authority. To prove that respondent did throw a chair at complainant,
complainant presented herself, two stenographers, and the clerk of court as witnesses
to the incident. The Investigating Judge himself stated that the testimony of
complainant and her witnesses were categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and
frank. On the other hand, to refute the incident, respondent could only present himself
and the testimony of the court interpreter. It should be noted that the court interpreter
was then respondent’s girlfriend, and later his wife.
The evidence positively shows that respondent judge shouted invectives and threw
a chair at the complainant on September 3, 1996, as a result of which, complainant, as
proven by a medical certificate, sustained wrist and other injuries. Clearly, this
behavior of respondent judge cannot be sanctioned. Respondent’s act, coupled with
his being a public official, holding a position in the judiciary and specifically
entrusted with the sacred duty of administering justice, violates Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandate,
respectively, that “a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities,” and that “a judge’s official conduct should be free from
the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and
in the performance of official duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach.” These most exacting standards of decorum are expected of magistrates if
only to promote public confidence in the judiciary.
Adding credibility to the complaint, there is no evidence on record indicating that
complainant was motivated by ill-will, contrary to what respondent would like this
Court to believe. Respondent’s act of hitting complainant with a chair showed
contempt for complainant and possibly was made to ridicule and embarrass her in the
presence of her co-workers. Worse, respondent judge displayed a predisposition to
use physical violence and intemperate language which reveals a marked lack of
judicial temperament and self- restraint - traits which, aside from the basic equipment
of learning in the law - are indispensable qualities of every judge.
 Verily, no position is more demanding as regards uprightness of any individual
than a seat on the Bench. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the
administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon
him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his
conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that
looks up to him as an epitome of integrity and justice (Vendaña vs. Valencia, 295
SCRA 1 [1998]).
While we concur with the findings made by the Investigating Judge and the OCA,
we are, however, unable to adopt the recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed,
which we find too light in view of the nature and import of the offense to complainant
and the judiciary. Section 2 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies
administrative charges filed against judges as serious, less serious, or light. Section 3
of Rule 140 considers violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct to be serious
charges. For a serious charge, the respondent found culpable therefor may be
imposed the sanction of either: (1) dismissal from the service and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office; (2) suspension for three
months without salary or benefits; or (3) a fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not
more than P40,000.00.
In Lim vs. Sequiban (158 SCRA 532 [1988]), we dismissed a judge for slapping
his clerk of court in public, without sufficient provocation or justifiable
cause. In Ferrer vs. Maramba (A.M. No. MTJ-93-795, 290 SCRA 44 [1998]), the
Court suspended a judge for six months for slapping and hitting complainant with a
logbook. In Alumbres vs. Caoibes (A.C. No. RTJ-99-1431, January 23, 2002), the
Court fined a judge only P20,000.00, for fighting within the court premises, only
because the respondent had been provoked. Consequently, we find it proper that
respondent judge, for having acted in an improper and violent manner, should be
suspended for three (3) months without pay.
WHEREFORE, Judge Francisco Ante, Jr. is hereby found guilty of grave
misconduct, acts unbecoming of a judge and abuse of authority and is SUSPENDED
from office for a period of three (3) months without pay effective immediately, with
the warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.