LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 1
CANON 9: UNATHOURIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW
[G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA,
Presiding Judge of Branch 12, Regional Trial
Court of Antique, and AVELINO T.
JAVELLANA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples
motion seeking reconsideration of our August
13, 1990 decision in these cases. In said
resolution, we held that respondent Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the order of
August 8, 1989 giving custody over private
respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12,
San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del
Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases
Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason
was shown why private respondent Javellana
should not be detained at the Antique Provincial
Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided
for private respondents detention at the
residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private
respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam
around but was to be held as detention prisoner
in said residence.
This order of the trial court was not strictly
complied with because private respondent was
not detained in the residence of Atty. Del
Rosario. He went about his normal activities as
if he were a free man, including engaging in the
practice of law. Despite our resolution of July 30,
1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear
as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262,[1] the
latter accepted cases and continued practicing
law.
On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor
Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme
Court a motion seeking clarification on the
following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of
this Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990,
prohibiting Atty. Javellana from appearing as
counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262?
(2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario
still the custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3)
Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del
Rosario never really held and detained Atty.
Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not
Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a
fugitive of justice for which warrant for his arrest
should forthwith be issued?"[2] Mis spped
In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted"
the above motion.
After we denied the motion for reconsideration
on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed
hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355.
Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San
Jose, Antique, a motion seeking the revocation
of the trial courts custody order and the
imprisonment of private respondent Javellana in
the provincial jail.
On November 15, 1999, private respondent
Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an
urgent motion seeking to clarify whether the
June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or
resolved the motion for clarification filed by the
State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested
based on the filing of criminal cases against him.
By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the
custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty.
Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private
respondent Javellana with the obligation "to
hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosarios
residence in his official capacity as the clerk of
court of the regional trial court. Hence, when
Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he
ceased to be the personal custodian of accused
Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court
must be deemed the custodian under the same
undertaking.
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 2

In our mind, the perceived threats to private WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the
respondent Javelanas life no longer exist. Thus, trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in
the trial courts order dated August 8, 1989 Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including
giving custody over him to the clerk of court Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador
must be recalled, and he shall be detained at the are ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of
Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique. Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective
immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a
of the jail for any reason or guise, except upon
detention prisoner private respondent Javellana
prior written permission of the trial court for a
is not allowed to practice his profession as a
lawful purpose.
necessary consequence of his status as a
detention prisoner. The trial courts order was Let copies of this resolution be given to the
clear that private respondent "is not to be Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial
allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held Police Office, San Jose, Antique and to the
as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of
practice law referred not only to Criminal Case Antique, San Jose, Antique.
No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except
SO ORDERED.
in cases where private respondent would
appear in court to defend himself. Spped
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for
an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed
under the custody of the law. He is placed in
actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of the
offense.[3] He must be detained in jail during the
pendency of the case against him, unless he is
authorized by the court to be released on bail or
on recognizance.[4] Let it be stressed that all
prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence can not practice their
profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention.
Consequently, all the accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the
Provincial Jail of Antique.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more
than ten (10) years, the presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose,
Antique, is ordered to continue with the trial of
said criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch
and to avoid further delay.

A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978
JULIO ZETA, complainant,
vs.
FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint against Felicisimo
Malinao court interpreter of the Court of First
Instance of Catbalogan, Samar charging as
follows:
l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. —
MR. Malinao has been appearing in the
municipal court of this town for parties like
attorney when he is not an attorney. Reliable
information also says he has been appearing in
the municipal courts of Daram, Zumarraga,
Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not
authorized to do so we believe. He makes it his
means of livelihood as he collects fees from his
clients. He competes with attorneys but does
not pay anything. We believe that his doing so
should be stopped for a good government.
These facts can be checked with records of
those municipal courts.
2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. —
Being employed in the Court of First Instance he
would instigate persons, especially in his barrio
to grab land rob or coerce. In fact he has cases
in the municipal court in this town involving
himself and his men. He incite them telling them
not to be afraid as he is a court employee and
has influence over the judges. Those persons
being ignorant would believe him and so would
commit crimes. This act of Mr. Malinao is
contrary to good order and peace as he is using
his supposed influences to urge persons to
commit crimes.
3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. —
Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing his
time record in the CFI. Even he has been out
practicing in the municipal courts sometimes he
would fill his time record as present. He receives
salary for those absent days. This can be
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 3
checked with time record he has submitted and
if he has any application for leave. He may try to
cure it by submitting application for leave but
this should not be allowed as he has already
committed crime.
4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND
CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable
information it is prohibited for a civil service
employee to engage in private practice any
profession or business without permission from
the Department Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure
has not secured that permission because he
should not be allowed to practice as he is not an
attorney. If that were so, he violated that
Executive Order and Civil Service Law and we
are urgently and earnestly requesting the
Commissioner of Civil Service to investigate him
on this. If warranted he should be given the
corresponding penalty as dismissal because we
believe he deserve it. (Page 2, Record.)
After respondent filed the following 3rd
indorsement relative to the above complaint:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the
Secretary of Justice, Manila, thru the Honorable
District Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch I,
Catbalogan, Samar, and thru the Honorable
Judicial Superintendent, Department of Justice,
Manila, the undersigned's reply to the preceding
endorsements, to wit: That the alleged letter-
complaint of one Julio Zeta is not inclosed in the
first indorsement, which absence has also been
noticed and noted on the right hand corner of
the said first indorsement by the Clerk of Court,
of this Court; that despite this absence, and
without waiving, however, his right to any
pertinent provision of law, but for respect and
courtesy to a Superior, he hereby states that he
has not violated any rule or law, much less Sec.
12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules; that his
participation for defendants' cause was
gratuitous as they could not engage the services
of counsel by reason of poverty and the
absence of one in the locality, said assistance
has also checked the miscarriage of justice by

the Presiding Municipal Judge, now resigned;
that he is attaching herewith a carbon-original of
a pleading submitted by Atty. Simeon Quiachon
the attorney of record for the defendants in Civil
Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose Kiskisan versus
Fidel Pacate, et al. for Forcible Entry, in the
Municipal Court of Talalora, Samar, which is a
'Motion To Withdraw Exhibits', as Annex 'A', as
part of this reply. (Page 5, Rec.)
the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction
over the matter then, referred the said complaint
and answer to District Judge Segundo Zosa,
Court of First Instance, Catbalogan, Western
Samar, for investigation, report and
recommendation, and after due hearing, Judge
Zosa submitted his report pertinent parts of
which read thus:
Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to
subpoena the complainant, Julio Zeta, who is
said to be a resident of Zumarraga, Samar the
same had failed because the said Julio Zeta
appears to be a fictitious person
Inspite of the failure of the complainant to
appear in the investigation in connection with his
complaint against Felicisimo Malinao, the Court
nevertheless proceeded to investigate the case
against him by calling Judge Restituto Duran of
Sta. Rita, Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of
Zumarraga, Samar and Judge Miguel Avestruz
of Daram, Samar.
Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar,
declared that according to his docket books the
respondent appeared as counsel for Vicente
Baculanlan in criminal case No. 1247 in the
Municipal Court of Sta. Rita, Samar, for grave
threats and in criminal case No. 1249 for the
same accused and Romulo Villagracia for illegal
possession of firearm on August 5, 1960 and on
September 17, 1970.
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar,
declared that the respondent appeared as
counsel in civil case No. 39 in the Municipal
Court of Daram, Samar, entitled Felix Versoza
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 4
versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry on
December 15, 1962, January 26, 1963,
February 18, 1963 and on March 1, 1963.
Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March
27, 1969, the respondent appeared as counsel
for the defendant in civil case No. 318 of the
Municipal Court of Zumarraga entitled Restituto
Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry
and again on June 17, 1970 in the same case.
From the certification of the Clerk of this Court,
it appears that the respondent had the following
entries in his daily time record:
1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960
and September 17, 1960;
2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;
3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963,
and present also on February 18, 1963 but
undertime by 1 hour;
4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;
5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969;
and
6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but
undertime by 5 hours.
Comparing the dates when the respondent
appeared before the aforementioned Municipal
Courts with his daily time records, he made it
appear that on December 15, 1962 and
February 18, 1963 he was present in his office
although according to the testimony of Judge
Miguel Avestruz he was before his Court on
December 15, 1962 as well as on February 18,
1963. Again according to Judge Juanito Reyes
the respondent appeared in his Court on June
17, 1970. The respondent again made it appear
in his daily time record that he was present with
an undertime of five hours. The respondent did
not offer any plausible explanation for this
irregularity.
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 5

With respect to the crime of falsification of his true, carry the day for him, considering that in
daily time record as shown by the evidence, he appearing as counsel in court, he did so without
had made it appear that he was present in his permission from his superiors and, worse, he
office on December 15, 1962, February 18, falsified his time record of service to conceal his
1963 and June 17, 1970 when as a matter of absence from his office on the dates in question.
fact he was in the Municipal Court of Daram Indeed, the number of times that respondent
attending to a case entitled Felix Versoza acted as counsel under the above
versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry as circumstances would indicate that he was doing
well as in the Municipal Court of Zumarraga it as a regular practice obviously for
attending to Civil Case No. 318 entitled considerations other than pure love of justice.
Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the
forcible entry. The Inquest Judge respectfully
offense committed by respondent is grave,
recommends that he be given stern warning and
hence it warrants a more drastic sanction than
severe reprimand for this irregularity.
that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa.
With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of We find no alternative than to separate him from
Section 12, Rule XVIII, Republic Act 2260, as the service, with the admonition that he desist
amended, again the evidence shows that from appearing in any court or investigative
respondent had been appearing as counsel in body wherein Only members of the bar are
the municipal courts of Sta. Rita, Daram and allowed to practice.
Zumarraga in violation of the rules of the Civil
WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao
Service Law. (Pp. 28-31, Record.)
is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as
We have carefully reviewed the record, and We interpreter in the Court of First Instance, CFI,
find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to
be amply supported by the evidence, reemployment in the judicial branch of the
particularly the documents consisting of public government.
records and the declarations of the judges
before whom respondent had appeared. It is
clear to Us that respondent, apart from
appearing as counsel in various municipal
courts without prior permission of his superiors
in violation of civil service rules and regulations,
falsified his time record of service by making it
appear therein that he was present in his office
on occasions when in fact he was in the
municipal courts appearing as counsel, without
being a member of the bar, which, furthermore,
constitutes illegal practice of law. We, therefore,
adopt the above findings of fact of the
Investigator.
The defense of respondent that "his
participation (sic) for defendants' cause was
gratuitous as they could not engage the services
of counsel by reason of poverty and the
absence of one in the locality" cannot, even if

ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN G.R. No.
169517 and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN,
Petitioners, - versus – BENEDICTO M.
BALAJADIA, Respondent
March 14, 2006
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is an original petition [1] for contempt
filed by petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and
Maliyawao Pagayokan against respondent
Benedicto Balajadia.
Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005,
respondent filed a criminal case against them
with the Office of the City of Prosecutor of
Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave
coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due
to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by
petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of
the complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted
that he is a practicing lawyer based in Baguio
City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F
Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City.[2]
However, certifications issued by the Office of
the Bar Confidant[3] and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines[4] showed that respondent has
never been admitted to the Philippine Bar.
Hence, petitioners claim that respondent is
liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting
himself as a lawyer.
In his Comment,[5] respondent avers that the
allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-
affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer was an
honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of
Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject
complaint-affidavit which was patterned after
Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit.[6] It appears
that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a
complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving
the same subject matter.
Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits
were drafted by the same secretary; one for the
May 5, 2005 parking incident at 10:00 oclock in
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 6
the morning and another for the parking incident
on the same date but which occurred at 1:00
oclock in the afternoon. Respondent insists that
the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00 oclock
parking incident correctly alleged that he is a
businessman with office address at Room B-
204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio
City.[7] However, the complaint-affidavit
regarding the 10:00 oclock parking incident,
which is the subject of the instant petition,
erroneously referred to him as a practicing
lawyer because Atty. Aquinos secretary copied
verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquinos
complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently
alleged that respondent is a practicing lawyer
based in Baguio City with office address at
Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session
Road, Baguio City, which statement referred to
the person of Atty. Aquino and his law office
address.
Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquinos secretary,
executed an affidavit[8] admitting the mistake in
the preparation of the complaint-affidavit.
Respondent alleged that he did not read the
complaint-affidavit because he assumed that
the two complaint-affidavits contained the same
allegations with respect to his occupation and
office address. Respondent claims that he had
no intention of misrepresenting himself as a
practicing lawyer.
In their Reply,[9] petitioners reiterate that
respondent should be made liable for indirect
contempt for having made untruthful statements
in the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift
the blame to Atty. Aquinos secretary.
The sole issue for resolution is whether
respondent is liable for indirect contempt.
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished
after charge and hearing. After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given
to the respondent to comment thereon within
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 7

such period as may be fixed by the court and to attorney;[13] manifesting before the court that
be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty he will practice law despite being previously
of any of the following acts may be punished for denied admission to the bar;[14] or deliberately
indirect contempt: attempting to practice law and holding out
himself as an attorney through circulars with full
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a
knowledge that he is not licensed to do so.
court, and acting as such without authority;
In the case at bar, no evidence was presented
In several cases,[10] we have ruled that the
to show that respondent acted as an attorney or
unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be
that he intended to practice law. Consequently,
an attorney and acting as such without authority
he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt
constitutes indirect contempt which is
considering his lack of intent to illegally practice
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The
law.
liability for the unauthorized practice of law
under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of However, while the evidence on record failed to
Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and prove respondents deliberate intent to
the acts are punished because they are an misrepresent himself as an attorney and act as
affront to the dignity and authority of the court, such without authority, he is hereby warned to
and obstruct the orderly administration of be more careful and circumspect in his future
justice. In determining liability for criminal actions.
contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
necessary element, and no one can be
Respondent is WARNED to be more careful and
punished unless the evidence makes it clear
circumspect in his future actions.
that he intended to commit it.[11]
SO ORDERED.
In the case at bar, a review of the records
supports respondents claim that he never
intended to project himself as a lawyer to the
public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of
the secretary of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza
Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that
gave rise to the mistake in the drafting of the
complaint-affidavit conforms to the
documentary evidence on record. Taken
together, these circumstances show that the
allegation in paragraph 5 of respondents
complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the result of
inadvertence.
Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the
allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the
result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself,
establish intent as to make him liable for indirect
contempt. In the cases where we found a party
liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the
party was guilty of some overt act like signing
court pleadings on behalf of his client;[12]
appearing before court hearings as an

[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant,
vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he
must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession
of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law
is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A
bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot
practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was
among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled
mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees
as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to
the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,
violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath
as a member of the Bar during the scheduled
oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the
Court ruled that respondent could not sign the
Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the
charge against him. Thus, respondent took the
lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not
signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for
unauthorized practice of law and grave
misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as
counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 8
elections before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent
filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May
2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion
in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts
for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading,
respondent represented himself as counsel for
and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan, and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant
claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as
counsel for a client in any court or administrative
body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and
misrepresentation, complainant accuses
respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan)
without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent
filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty
candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution
allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of
Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges
against him. In the same resolution, the Court
required respondent to comment on the
complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan
sought his specific assistance to represent him
before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a
lawyer but as a person who knows the law.
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001
pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain
votes in the canvassing. He explains, however,
that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or

represented himself as an attorney in the
pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he
submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which
was allegedly accepted on the same date. He
submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt
of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001
signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox.
Respondent further claims that the complaint is
politically motivated considering that
complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre,
the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint
be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be
allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to
respondents Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the
MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to
Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May
2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a
petition for proclamation as the winning
candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When
respondent appeared as counsel before the
MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance
on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken
his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to
Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim
that the instant administrative case is motivated
mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed
appeared before the MBEC as counsel for
Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes
of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent
actively participated in the proceedings. The
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 9
OBC likewise found that respondent appeared
in the MBEC proceedings even before he took
the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC
believes that respondents misconduct casts a
serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondents unauthorized practice of law is a
ground to deny his admission to the practice of
law. The OBC therefore recommends that
respondent be denied admission to the
Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that
complainant failed to cite a law which
respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a
government employee. Respondent resigned
as secretary and his resignation was accepted.
Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan
to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of
the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not
deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May
2001. However, the records show that
respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan
prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took
the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed
as counsel for George Bunan. In the first
paragraph of the same pleading respondent
stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel
for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the
MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized
Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent
him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily
Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her
counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly

D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L.
Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-
PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the
candidate of the said party. Respondent himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his appearance as counsel for
Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and
for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao
in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for
the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the
winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent
took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent
engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1]
the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that
practice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law,
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 10
legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is
to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to
practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or
skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice
of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings,
without license to do so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of
law. Respondent called himself counsel
knowing fully well that he was not a member of
the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel
knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited
to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust[4]
since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice
law simply by passing the bar examinations.
The practice of law is a privilege that can be
withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission
had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is
unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6]
a candidate passed the bar examinations but
had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the
Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations and took the lawyers oath.
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 11

However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys

that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The
fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is
not the only qualification to become an attorney-
at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still
had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath
to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant
contends that the law does not allow respondent
to act as counsel for a private client in any court
or administrative body since respondent is the
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the
acts complained of as constituting unauthorized
practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001
addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent stated that he was resigning
effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor
Relox accepted respondents resignation
effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence
does not support the charge that respondent
acted as counsel for a client while serving as
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and
misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan
indeed authorized respondent to represent him
as his counsel before the MBEC and similar
bodies. While there was no misrepresentation,
respondent nonetheless had no authority to
practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is
DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

RUL2 9.02 NOT TO DIVIDE LEGAL FEES
A.C. No. 6317 August 31, 2006
LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 13, 2004, an administrative
complaint1 was filed by complainant Luzviminda
C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P.
Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and
conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court
when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to
him despite receipt of payment representing
attorney’s fees.
According to the complainant, she engaged the
services of respondent sometime in January
2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her
deposit with Planters Development Bank,
Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of
P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed
house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The
property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and
registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of
said bank is the subject of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession then pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Binan,
Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No.
B-2610.
Complainant alleged that respondent failed to
appear before the trial court in the hearing for
the issuance of the Writ of Possession and did
not protect her interests in the Compromise
Agreement which she subsequently entered into
to end LRC Case No. B-2610.2
Respondent denied the accusations against
him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he
received from complainant was payment for
legal services for the recovery of the deposit
with Planters Development Bank and did not
include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 12
The complaint was referred3 to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. On September 21,
2005, the Investigating Commissioner
submitted his report finding respondent guilty of
violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provide:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate
to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with
a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s
death, money shall be paid over a reasonable
period of time to his estate or to the persons
specified in the agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete
unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer;
or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-
lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if
the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-
sharing arrangement.
In finding the respondent guilty of violating
Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner
opined that:
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant. To be made the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the
charge against him must be established by
convincing proof. The record must disclose as
free from doubt a case which compels the
exercise by the Supreme Court of its disciplinary
powers. The dubious character of the act done
as well as of the motivation thereof must be
clearly demonstrated. x x x.

In the instant scenario, despite the strong
protestation of respondent that the
Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and solely for
the recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings
account of complainant subsequent acts and
events say otherwise, to wit:
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery
of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainant’s
lawyer to effectuate the compromise
agreement.
By openly admitting he divided the
Php70,000.00 to other individuals as
commission/referral fees respondent violated
Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall
not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice
law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate
in a compromise agreement with a false and
misleading assurance that complainant can still
recover after Three (3) years her foreclosed
property respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which says a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.4
The Investigating Commissioner thus
recommended:
WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible
for aforestated violations to protect the public
and the legal profession from his kind, it is
recommended that he be suspended for Six (6)
months with a stern warning that similar acts in
the future will be severely dealt with.5
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the
recommendation of the investigating
commissioner.6
We agree with the findings of the IBP.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on
those who show that they possessed and
continue to possess the legal qualifications for
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 13
it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at
all times a high standard of legal proficiency and
morality, including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility.7
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct8 and are mandated to serve their
clients with competence and diligence.9 They
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
them, and this negligence in connection
therewith shall render them liable.10
Respondent’s claim that the attorney’s fee
pertains only to the recovery of complainant’s
savings deposit from Planter’s Development
Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that
he acted as complainant’s counsel in the
drafting of the compromise agreement between
the latter and the bank relative to LRC Case No.
B-2610. Respondent admitted that he explained
the contents of the agreement to complainant
before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover,
the Investigating Commissioner observed that
the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the
recovery of the deposit amounting to
P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall
charge only fair and reasonable fees.11
Respondent’s disregard for his client’s interests
is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in the
compromise agreement where the complainant
conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her
property; that the redemption period has already
expired thus consolidating ownership in the
bank, and that she releases her claims against
it.12 As found by the Investigating
Commissioner, complainant agreed to these
concessions because respondent misled her to
believe that she could still redeem the property
after three years from the foreclosure. The duty
of a lawyer to safeguard his client’s interests
commences from his retainer until his discharge
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 14

from the case or the final disposition of the the legal matter; he must also give adequate
subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of attention to his legal work. Utmost fidelity is
money from a client establishes an attorney- demanded once counsel agrees to take the
client relationship and gives rise to the duty of cudgels for his client’s cause.18
fidelity to the client’s cause. The canons of the
In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension
legal profession require that once an attorney
from the practice of law for six months is
agrees to handle a case, he should undertake
warranted. In addition, he is directed to return to
the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.13
complainant the amount he received by way of
Respondent’s admission14 that he divided the legal fees pursuant to existing jurisprudence.19
legal fees with two other people as a referral fee
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is
does not release him from liability. A lawyer
found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02,
shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for
18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of Professional
legal services with persons not licensed to
Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice law, except in certain cases.15
practice of law for six (6) months effective from
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any
Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or similar infraction will be dealt with more
suspended on the following grounds: 1) deceit; severely. He is further ordered to RETURN,
2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of
office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C.
of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of his
of the lawyer’s oath; 6) willful disobedience to compliance within three (3) days therefrom.
any lawful order of a superior court; and 7)
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
record of respondent and served on the IBP, as
without authority.
well as on the Court Administrator who shall
In Santos v. Lazaro16 and Dalisay v. Mauricio, circulate it to all courts for their information and
Jr.,17 we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of guidance.
Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate
SO ORDERED.
in legal ethics. When a lawyer takes a client’s
cause, he covenants that he will exercise due
diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to
exercise that degree of vigilance and attention
makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust
reposed in him by his client and makes him
answerable not just to his client but also to the
legal profession, the courts and society.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care
and time to his client’s case. Once he agrees to
handle a case, he should undertake the task
with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty,
he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a
lawyer should accept only as much cases as he
can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently
protect his clients’ interests. It is not enough that
a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle

A.C. No. 7056 September 13, 2006
PLUS BUILDERS, INC. and EDGARDO C.
GARCIA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA,
JR., respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
By their oath and under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, lawyers must
uphold truth and justice above everything else,
even above their own and their client's interests.
They must be willing and able to stand for their
convictions against all odds; to carry on in spite
of seemingly insurmountable opposition; and to
be beacons for the weak, the oppressed and the
marginalized. For failing miserably to live by this
oath and Code, respondent must be sanctioned.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case originated from a
Verified Petition for Disbarment1 filed by Plus
Builders Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Complainants charged Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla, Jr. with committing a willful and
intentional falsehood before the court; misusing
court procedure and processes to delay the
execution of a judgment; and collaborating with
non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.
The material averments of the Complaint are as
follows:
"On April 7, 1999, Plus Builders Inc. filed before
the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) of
DAR, DARAB CASE NOS. R-402-027-99 up to
R-402-031-99, inclusive, against Leopoldo De
Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido De Guzman,
Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez Siongco, Heirs
of Faustino Siongco; Serafin Santarin, Benigno
Alvarez and Maria Esguerra, et al; hereinafter
called [tenants/farmers] x x x.
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 15
"On November 15, 1999, the Provincial
Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a
consolidated Decision in favor of
petitioner/complainant [Plus Builders, Inc.], and
against [tenants/farmers]. x x x.
"[Tenants/farmers] filed several verified
pleadings as part of the records of DARAB
cases above-mentioned alleging under oath
that they were 'MAGSASAKANG
NAMUMUWISAN' or mere tenants of subject
properties, acknowledging the rights of the
registered owners at that time, even before the
ownership and title were transferred to
Petitioner/ Complainant Plus Builders, Inc. x x x.
"On Dec[ember] 17, 1999, counsel for
TENANTS/FARMERS who at that time was
Atty. Damian S. J. Vellaseca, filed a pro-forma
Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation x
x x. As a result, PARAD did not give due course
to the same x x x.
"On March 27, 2000, another counsel for
TENANTS/FARMERS, by the name of Atty.
Willy G. Roxas, who represented himself as
counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, filed a
manifestation stating that he is representing
TENANTS/FARMERS and alleged that they
were 'bona fide' members of the [Kalayaan
Development Cooperative] (KDC). Thereafter,
he filed a Notice of Appeal on March 27, 2000
stating that they received the Decision on March
14, 2000 and alleged that the Decision is
against the law and jurisprudence x x x.
"On May 31, 2001, Respondent Anastacio
Revilla Jr., knowing that there was a monetary
judgment by way of Disturbance Compensation
granted to Tenants/Farmers, x x x filed a 'Motion
for Leave of Court to Allow Correction of Caption
and Amendment of Judgment' (referring to the
Decision of PARAD of Cavite dated November
15, 1999 x x x) with a prayer 'x x x to include the
name of the KALAYAAN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION representing the following
respondents herein above stated in the caption
of [the] pleading.' Also, a Contract of

Retainership dated April 4, 2001 was attached
to the Motion x x x to make x x x KDC
represented by Respondent, [the] retained x x x
'counsel on record' x x x.
"After realizing that his motion failed to give him
beneficial monetary gain from the PARAD
judgment, a Petition for Preliminary Injunction
with prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and to Quash Alias Writ of
Execution with Demolition plus Damages dated
July 18, 2001 was filed by Respondent x x x
before the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City,
notwithstanding the fact that this instant case
was appealed by another lawyer (Atty. Willy
Roxas). x x x.
"On the basis of this Petition, a Temporary
Restraining Order by the DARAB Central Office,
Quezon City, was issued on July 25, 2001 and
an extension of or another Temporary
Restraining Order was issued dated August 24,
2001, as a result of the active participation of
Respondent x x x.
"Emboldened by the two (2) TRO's coming from
DARAB Central Office, Respondent x x x filed
an Indirect Contempt case dated August 28,
2001 against Plus Builders Inc. and their Board
of Directors, Edgardo Garcia and [its] counsel
Atty. Leopoldo S. Gonzalez before the same
Office. x x x.
"Sensing a series of orders against herein
Petitioners and considering, further, that the
DARAB Central Office refused to hear
arguments from Petitioners on the two (2)
questionable TRO's, Petitioners decided to
elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals by
way of a Petition for Certiorari. A Decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals on
[December] 20, 2001 stating that:
'WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed orders issued by the DARAB are
hereby declared NULL AND VOID for having
been issued without jurisdiction. Consequently,
this Court sees no impediment for the
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 16
IMPLEMENTATION of the 15 November 1999
Decision of the provincial adjudicator.
'SO ORDERED.'
"This incident was further elevated to the
Supreme Court by Respondent x x x through a
Petition, but said Petition was dismissed with
finality x x x.
"Enraged by his defeat, Respondent x x x filed
a verified "Action to Quiet Title" before the
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite praying for
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), among
others, to deliberately and maliciously stop the
enforcement of the Decisions of the higher
courts to implement the PARAD Decision dated
November 15, 1999. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"Respondent signed his pleading under a group
of non-lawyers joining him in the practice of law
as [KDC] LEGAL SERVICES, LAW OFFICERS
AND ASSOCIATES which included KDC as law
partners in violation of the Rules on the practice
of law with non-lawyers. As a matter of fact,
under the Retainership Contract submitted by
Respondent before the PARAD of Cavite, it was
specifically mentioned that legal fees were to be
collected as counsel on record for the
cooperative and respondent. Therefore, this
contract was effectively used [for] unlawful
solicitation of clients in the practice of law with
non-lawyers, being the cooperative (KDC) to
become "counsel on record [sic] x x x.
"On March 6, 2003, the Regional Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite quashed the earlier issued TRO
and dismissed the case on the ground of 'res
judicata' because the Court of Appeals ruled
that, 'x x x the Decision of the Provincial
Adjudicator of DAR dated November 15, 1999
has already become final x x x' and that,
prescription does not run against registered
land. x x x."2
In his Answer3 dated March 29, 2004,
respondent denied the charges against him. He

averred that by filing the action to quiet title in
Civil Case No. 2763-03, he had merely wanted
to protect the rights and interests of his clients.
According to him, they sincerely and honestly
believed that their possession of the litigated
land had already ripened into ownership. He
explained thus:
"Notwithstanding the claim of said farmers of
tenancy relationship with [the] previous owner in
the decisions of PARA[D], Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court in the DISTURBANCE
COMPENSATION CASES, (DARAB CASE NO.
R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99; R-402-027-99;
R-402-028-99; R-402-029-99; R-402-030-99;
R-402-031-99) the said farmers, are not
precluded, by any law or jurisprudence, from
entertaining in good faith an opinion or belief
that they could legally be considered as owners
of the subject-property precisely because of the
undisputed fact that they have been in
possession thereof in an open, continuous,
public, uninterrupted possession for more than
fifty (50) years. x x x.
"It was on the basis of [a] sincere and honest
belief and opinion o[f] acquiring ownership of the
land through prescription that the said farmers
had decided to pursue and file the Action to
Quiet Title in Civil Case No. 2763-03, before the
RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"It should be stressed that the decisions of the
PARA[D], Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court in DARAB CASE No. R-402-025-99; R-
402-026-99; R-402-027-99; R-402-028-99; R-
402-029-99; R-402-030-99; R-402-031-99,
[i]ndisputably refer only to the fixing of
disturbance compensations. They did not in any
way, involve [the] question of ownership of the
subject property, which is the subject matter of
Civil Case No. 2763-03, (Action to Quiet Title),
filed before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20.
xxx xxx xxx
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 17
"As new counsel of the said farmers x x x,
respondent has the complete discretion [of]
what legal strategy or cause of action to
undertake on their behalf and the complainant
and their counsel have no business or right to
interfere with or dictate [upon] the respondent
on how to protect the rights and interests of said
farmers under the applicable law and
jurisprudence.
xxx xxx xxx
"Respondent respectfully submits that he has
not committed any illegal, unlawful, unjust,
wrongful or immoral acts towards the
complainant. Respondent, in good faith filed the
aforesaid cases (Action to Quiet Title, RTC,
Imus, Cavite, Branch 20; and Petition for
Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and TRO,
and Complaint before the Ombudsman), as a
lawyer sworn to uphold justice and the law who
was the bounden duty to exert utmost efforts to
defend his client and protect his right, no matter
how guilty or evil he appears to be, especially if
they are poor and uneducated like the said
farmers."4
In a Reply5 dated April 12, 2004, complainants
emphasized that the nature of the possession of
the subject land by respondent's clients had
already been settled in the case for disturbance
compensation. Complainants maintained that
the PARAD Decision, which was sustained by
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
clearly stated that these clients were mere
tenants of the land. Thus, adverse possession
could not be claimed by respondent in good
faith, especially when he had previously
acknowledged the rights of complainants as
landowners.
On August 4, 2004, both parties appeared at a
hearing scheduled by Edmund T. Espina,
commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD). During the hearing, the parties were
directed to submit their respective Memoranda.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP-
CBD
In his April 30, 2005 Report,6 Investigating
Commissioner Espina found respondent guilty
of violating the attorney's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.7 Allegedly,
respondent had "maliciously concealed the
defeat of his clients in the case before the
PARAD of Cavite and the higher courts,"8 in
order to secure a temporary restraining order
from the RTC of Imus, Cavite. As a result, he
was able to delay the execution of the provincial
adjudicator's Decision dated November 15,
1999.
Moreover, Commissioner Espina opined that
the charge that respondent had been engaged
in the unlawful practice of law was neither
satisfactorily explained nor specifically denied
by the latter. The failure of respondent to do so
led to the presumption that the allegation was
true.
Thus, his suspension from the practice of law for
two years was recommended by the
investigating commissioner. In Resolution No.
XVII-2005-172,9 the board of governors of the
IBP adopted the findings and recommendation
of IBP Commissioner Espina.
The Resolution, together with the records of the
case, was transmitted to this Court for final
action,10 pursuant to Rule 139-B Section 12(b).
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP board of governors.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to
assist in the administration of justice. They act
as vanguards of our legal system,11 protecting
and upholding truth and the rule of law.12 They
are expected to act with honesty in all their
dealings, especially with the courts. Verily, the
Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins
lawyers from committing or consenting to any
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 18
falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to
be misled by any artifice.13Moreover, they are
obliged to observe the rules of procedure and
not to misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.14
Good faith, fairness and candor constitute the
essence of membership in the legal
profession.15 Thus, while lawyers owe fidelity to
the cause of their client, they must never abuse
their right of recourse to the courts by arguing a
case that has repeatedly been rejected. Neither
should they use their knowledge of the law as
an instrument to harass a party or to misuse
judicial processes. These acts constitute
serious transgression of their professional
oath.16
In the present case, respondent claims good
faith in pursuing the cause of his clients. The
records show, however, that his course of legal
action was obviously a stratagem. It was meant
to delay unduly the execution of the provincial
adjudicator's Decision dated November 15,
1999.
It must be noted that when the Court of Appeals
and this Court upheld that Decision, respondent
resorted to a different forum to pursue his
clients' lost cause. In the disturbance
compensation case, he represented his clients
as tenants and acknowledged that
complainants were the owners of the subject
land. In the action to quiet title, however, he
conveniently repudiated his previous admission
by falsely alleging that his clients were adverse
possessors claiming bona fide ownership.
Consequently, he was able to obtain a
temporary restraining order preventing the
execution of the provincial adjudicator's
Decision.
Clearly, he was shielding his clients from the
Order of execution. Contrary to his later claim of
ownership of the land, he cannot feign
ignorance of his previous admission of a
tenancy relationship existing between his clients

and complainants, as correctly observed by IBP
Commissioner Espina.
The propensity of respondent for doublespeak
was also revealed in his declaration that his
clients were pauper litigants. His prayer for an
exemption to pay court fees, on the ground that
they did not have sufficient income,17was
granted by the trial court. Earlier, however, he
admitted that they had engaged the services of
his legal office for a fee of P20,000, in addition
to P2,500 per appearance in court. Also, in the
action to quiet title, he even alleged that they
were willing to post a bond to answer for
damages, in the event that the court ruled in
favor of the defendants. These facts contravene
his claim that his clients could not afford to pay
the appropriate court fees.
In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers
have the duty to present every remedy or
defense within the authority of the law. This
obligation, however, must never be at the
expense of truth and justice,18 as explained
in Choa v. Chiongson:19
"While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the
cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability, he must do so
only within the bounds of the law. He must give
a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of his client's case with the end
in view of promoting respect for the law and
legal processes, and counsel or maintain such
actions or proceedings only as appear to him to
be just, and such defenses only as he believes
to be honestly debatable under the law. He must
always remind himself of the oath he took upon
admission to the Bar that he 'will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the
same'; and that he 'will conduct [himself] as a
lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to [his] clients.' Needless to state, the
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 19
lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued
at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice, and it must be done within the bounds of
reason and common sense. A lawyer's
responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client does not warrant a course
of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions against the other party."20
Moreover, we agree with the finding of IBP
Commissioner Espina that the silence or failure
of respondent to challenge the allegation that he
allowed non-lawyers to engage in the
unauthorized practice of law may be deemed an
admission of the truth of the accusation. We
note that complainants successfully
substantiated their claim that respondent, who
held himself out as a law partner of the "KDC
Legal Services, Law Offices and Associates,"
was rendering legal services together with
persons not licensed to practice law. His silence
on this accusation is deemed an admission,
especially because he had every chance to
deny it.21
Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provide thus:
"Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or
indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.
'Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.'"
The significance of this professional norm was
emphasized in Cambaliza v. Cristal-
22
Tenorio, which we quote:
"The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least
not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law
is founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited
to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 20

to maintain proper standards of moral and

professional conduct. The purpose is to protect
the public, the court, the client, and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves
upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is
attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the
profession enjoin him not to permit his
professional services or his name to be used in
aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized
practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior
on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid
a layman in the unauthorized practice of law."23
Respondent failed to live up to the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of law
and justice. In line with jurisprudence, he is held
liable for gross misconduct and is suspended
from the practice of law. 24
WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is
hereby found guilty of gross misconduct and
is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice
of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the
record of respondent as attorney and served on
the IBP, as well as on the court administrator
who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

DISBARMENT – DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS
[A.C. No. 5916. July 1, 2003]
SELWYN F. LAO, complainant, vs. ATTY.
ROBERT W. MEDEL, respondent.
DECISION
The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the
issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with one-year suspension from the
practice of law.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a
Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Selwyn F. Lao. Atty.
Robert W. Medel was charged therein with
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
unbecoming an attorney.
The material averments of the Complaint are
summarized by the IBP-CBD in this wise:
The Complaint arose from the [respondents]
persistent refusal to make good on four (4)
RCBC checks totaling [t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand
(P22,000.00) [p]esos. These dishonored checks
were issued by defendant in replacement for
previous checks issued to the complainant.
Based on the exchange of letters between the
parties, it appears that [respondent], in a letter
dated June 19, 2001, had committed to forthwith
effect immediate settlement of my outstanding
obligation of P22,000.00 with Engr. Lao, at the
earliest possible time, preferably, on or before
the end of June 2000. Again, in a letter dated
July 3, 2000, the [respondent] made a request
for a final extension of only ten (10) days from
June 30, 2000 (or not later than July 10, 2000),
within which to effect payment of P22,000.00 to
Engr. Lao. Needless to say, the initiation of this
present complaint proves that contrary to his
written promises, Atty. Medel never made good
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 21
on his dishonored checks. Neither has he paid
his indebtedness.[2]
In his Answer[3] dated July 30, 2001, Atty.
Medel reasons that because all of his proposals
to settle his obligation were rejected, he was
unable to comply with his promise to pay
complainant. Respondent maintains that the
Complaint did not constitute a valid ground for
disciplinary action because of the following:
(a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a
member of the Bar, may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wil[l]ful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wil[l]fully appearing as
an attorney for a party to case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice;
(a.1). Applying the afore-cited legal provision to
the facts obtaining in the present case, it is clear
that the offense with which the respondent is
being charged by the complainant, is merely a
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22,
for brevity), which is a special law, and is not
punishable under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC, for brevity). It is self-evident therefore,
that the offense is not in the same category as a
violation of Article 315, paragraph 2, (d), RPC,
which is issuing a post-dated check or a check
in payment of an obligation, with insufficient
funds in the drawee bank, through false
pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, which is a crime involving moral turpitude;

(b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by the
Supreme Court, under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules, for the issuance of a worthless check, in
violation of B.P. 22, for payment of a pre-
existing obligation to the complainant, then,
verily, the said Rule 138, Sec. 27, would be a
cruel and an unjust law, which the Honorable
Supreme Court would not countenance;
(c). A careful examination of the specific
grounds enumerated, for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, under Sec.
27 of Rule 138 of the Rules, clearly shows
beyond a shadow of doubt that the alleged
issuance of a worthless check, in violation of
B.P. 22, is NOT one of the grounds for
disciplinary action against a member of the Bar,
to warrant his disbarment or suspension from
his office as attorney, by the Supreme Court;
and
(d). The issuance of a worthless check by a
member of the Bar, in violation of B.P. 22, does
NOT constitute dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct, under Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. This is
because, the door to the law profession swings
on reluctant hinges. Stated otherwise, unless
there is a clear, palpable and unmitigated
immoral or deceitful conduct, of a member of the
Bar, in violation of his oath as an attorney, by
the mere issuance of a worthless check, in
violation of B.P. 22, the Supreme Court is
inclined to give the said attorney, the benefit of
the doubt.[4]
On August 22, 2001, complainant submitted his
Reply.[5] Thereafter, IBP-CBD Commissioner
Renato G. Cunanan, to whom the case was
assigned by the IBP for investigation and report,
scheduled the case for hearing on October 4,
2001. After several cancellations, the parties
finally met on May 29, 2002. In that hearing,
respondent acknowledged his obligation and
committed himself to pay a total of P42,000
(P22,000 for his principal debt and P20,000 for
attorneys fees). Complainant agreed to give him
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 22
until July 4, 2002 to settle the principal debt and
to discuss the plan of payment for attorneys fees
in the next hearing.
On July 4, 2002, both parties appeared before
the IBP-CBD for their scheduled hearing. But,
while waiting for the case to be called,
respondent suddenly insisted on leaving,
supposedly to attend to a family emergency.
Complainants counsel objected and
Commissioner Cunanan, who was still
conducting a hearing in another case, ordered
him to wait. He, however, retorted in a loud
voice, Its up to you, this is only disbarment, my
family is more important.[6] And, despite the
objection and the warning, he arrogantly left. He
made no effort to comply with his undertaking to
settle his indebtedness before leaving.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In his September 19, 2002 Report,[7]
Commissioner Cunanan found respondent
guilty of violating the attorneys oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The former
explained that, contrary to the latters claim,
violation of BP 22 was a crime that involved
moral turpitude. Further, he observed that
[w]hile no criminal case may have been
instituted against [respondent], it is beyond cavil
that indeed, [the latter] committed not one (1)
but four counts of violation of BP 22.[8] The
refusal [by respondent] to pay his indebtedness,
his broken promises, his arrogant attitude
towards complainants counsel and the
[commission sufficiently] warrant the imposition
of sanctions against him.[9] Thus, the
investigating commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of
law.
In Resolution No. XV-2002-598,[10] the Board
of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan
and resolved to suspend respondent from the
practice of law for two years. The Resolution,
together with the records of the case, was

transmitted to this Court for final action,
pursuant to Rule 139-B Sec. 12(b).
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors,
but reduce the period of suspension to one year.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
Lawyers are instruments for the administration
of justice. As vanguards of our legal system,
they are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[11] In so
doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured.
In the present case, respondent has been
brought to this Court for failure to pay his debts
and for issuing worthless checks as payment for
his loan from complainant. While acknowledging
the fact that he issued several worthless checks,
he contends that such act constitutes neither a
violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; nor dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
The defense proffered by respondent is
untenable. It is evident from the records that he
made several promises to pay his debt
promptly. However, he reneged on his
obligation despite sufficient time afforded him.
Worse, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing
and transferred the blame to complainant, on
the contorted reasoning that the latter had
refused to accept the formers plan of payment.
It must be pointed out that complainant had no
obligation to accept it, considering respondents
previous failure to comply with earlier payment
plans for the same debt.
Moreover, before the IBP-CBD, respondent had
voluntarily committed himself to the payment of
his debts, yet failed again to fulfill his promise.
That he had no real intention to settle them is
evident from his unremitting failed
commitments. His cavalier attitude in incurring
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 23
debts without any intention of paying for them
puts his moral character in serious doubt.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to their clients. As part of those
duties, they must promptly pay their financial
obligations. Their conduct must always reflect
the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On these considerations, the
Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any
professional or private misconduct showing
them to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy
to continue as officers of the Court.[12]
It is equally disturbing that respondent
remorselessly issued a series of worthless
checks, unmindful of the deleterious effects of
such act to public interest and public order.[13]
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates all members of the bar
to obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically
provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. In Co v. Bernardino,[14] the Court
considered the issuance of worthless checks as
a violation of this Rule and an act constituting
gross misconduct. It explained thus:
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be
suspended or disbarred, and the court may not
ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him
for misconduct in his non-professional or private
capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]).
Where, however, the misconduct outside of the
lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a
character as to show him morally unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privilege which his
licenses and the law confer on him, the court
may be justified in suspending or removing him
from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil.
569 [1923]).

The evidence on record clearly shows
respondent's propensity to issue bad checks.
This gross misconduct on his part, though not
related to his professional duties as a member
of the bar, puts his moral character in serious
doubt. The Commission, however, does not find
him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that
he eventually paid his obligation to the
complainant, albeit very much delayed.
While it is true that there was no attorney-client
relationship between complainant and
respondent as the transaction between them did
not require the professional legal services of
respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject
conduct merits condemnation from this Court.
As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down
in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)] the
principle that it can exercise its power to
discipline lawyers for causes which do not
involve the relationship of an attorney and client
x x x In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice
Malcolm said: x x x As a general rule, a court will
not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its
officers for misconduct alleged to have been
committed in his private capacity. But this is a
general rule with many exceptions x x x. The
nature of the office, the trust relation which
exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory
rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
uniformly require that an attorney shall be a
person of good moral character. If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license
or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law,
it would seem to be equally essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of
the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be
removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional
duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer upon him x x x.
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 24
Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo where the
erring lawyer was suspended for one year from
the practice of law for attempting to engage in
an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated that
an attorney may be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession,
but also for gross misconduct not related to his
professional duties which show him to be an
unfit and unworthy lawyer. The courts are not
curators of the morals of the bar. At the same
time the profession is not compelled to harbor
all persons whatever their character, who are
fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good
character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the
attorney's character is bad in such respects as
to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be
entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the
courts retain the power to discipline him x x x Of
all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the law x x x and to
that doctrine we give our unqualified support."
We likewise take notice of the high-handed
manner in which respondent dealt with
Commissioner Cunanan during the July 4, 2002
hearing, when the former was expected to settle
his obligation with complainant. We cannot
countenance the discourtesy of respondent. He
should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary
authority over him by virtue of his membership
therein.[15]
Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the
authority of the officer assigned to investigate
his case. Assuming that he had a very important
personal matter to attend to, he could have
politely explained his predicament to the
investigating commissioner and asked
permission to leave immediately. Unfortunately,
the former showed dismal behavior by raising
his voice and leaving without the consent of
complainant and the investigating
commissioner.
We stress that membership in the legal
profession is a privilege.[16] It demands a high
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 25

degree of good moral character, not only as a

condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of
law.[17] In this case, respondent fell short of the
exacting standards expected of him as a
guardian of law and justice.[18]
Accordingly, administrative sanction is
warranted by his gross misconduct. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for two
years. However, in line with Co v.
Bernardino,[19] Ducat Jr. v. Villalon Jr.[20] and
Saburnido v. Madroo[21] -- which also involved
gross misconduct of lawyers -- we find the
suspension of one year sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found
guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby
SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of
law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
He is warned that a repetition of the same or a
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the
record of respondent and served on the IBP, as
well as on the court administrator who shall
circulate it to all courts for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.

PURPOSE OF DISBARMENT/SUSPENSION
[A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003]
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant, vs.
ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment
filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre against Atty.
Alfredo Castillo on the ground of Gross Immoral
Conduct.
The facts as borne by the records are as follows:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in
1996 when the two became officemates at the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).[1]
Respondent courted complainant and promised
to marry her while representing himself to be
single.[2] Soon they had an intimate relationship
that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until
1997.[3] During their affair, respondent was
preparing for the bar examinations which he
passed. On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as
a member of the Philippine Bar.[4] It was only
around the first week of May 1997 that
complainant first learned that respondent was
already married when his wife went to her office
and confronted her about her relationship with
respondent.[5] On September 10, 1997,
respondent, who by now is a lawyer, executed
an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the
complainant and recognizing the unborn child
she was carrying as his.[6] On December 09,
1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl,
Aletha Jessa.[7] By this time however,
respondent had started to refuse recognizing
the child and giving her any form of support.[8]
Respondent claims that: he never courted the
complainant; what transpired between them
was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never
represented himself as single since it was
known in the NBI that he was already married
and with children;[9] complainant is almost 10
years older than him and knew beforehand that
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 26
he is already married;[10] the child borne by
complainant is not his, because the complainant
was seeing other men at the time they were
having an affair.[11] He admits that he signed
the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but
explains that he only did so to save complainant
from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at
the time that complainant was seeing other
men.[12]
After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline found Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of
gross immoral conduct and recommends that he
be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension
from the practice of law.
The Court agrees with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP.
The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Immoral conduct has been defined as:
xxx that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Furthermore, such conduct must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That
is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense
of decency.[13]

In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly
acknowledged before a notary public, he
declared explicitly:
1. That I had a relationship with one Carmelita
Zaguirre, my officemate;
2. That as a result of that relationship, she is
presently pregnant with my child;
3. That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child
now under (sic) her womb to be my own;
4. That I am willing to support the said child
henceforth, including his/her personal and
medical needs, education, housing, food,
clothing and other necessities for living, which I
will give through his/her mother, Carmelita
Zaguirre, until he/she becomes of legal age and
capable to live on his/her own;
5. That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as
an additional proof that he/she is my child;
however, my failure to sign does not negate the
recognition and acknowledgement already done
herein;
6. That I am executing this affidavit without
compulsion on my part and being a lawyer, I
have full knowledge of the consequence of such
acknowledgment and recognition.[14]
More incriminating is his handwritten letter
dated March 12, 1998 which states in part:
Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa.
All your officemates, e.g., Ate Ging, Glo, Guy
and others (say) that I am the look like(sic) of
your daughter.
Heres my bargain. I will help you in supporting
your daughter, but I cannot promise fix amount
for monthly support of your daughter. However
it shall not be less than P500 but not more than
P1,000.[15]
In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano,
Jr., the Court in castigating a judge stated that:
...even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to
conform to the strict standard of conduct
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 27
demanded of members of the profession.
Certainly, fathering children by a woman other
than his lawful wife fails to meet these
standards.[16]
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife
is a conduct way below the standards of morality
required of every lawyer.[17]
Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege
on his notarized statement recognizing and
undertaking to support his child by Carmelita
demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on
his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming
a member of a noble profession, tantamount to
self-stultification.[18]
This Court has repeatedly held:
as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically,
a member of the Bar and officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or the keeping of mistresses but
must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral standards.[19]
While respondent does not deny having an
extra-marital affair with complainant he seeks
understanding from the Court, pointing out that
men by nature are polygamous,[20] and that
what happened between them was nothing but
mutual lust and desire.[21] The Court is not
convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the
reprehensible, amoral attitude of the
respondent.
Respondent claims that he did not use any
deception to win her affection. Granting
arguendo that complainant entered into a
relationship with him knowing full well his marital
status, still it does not absolve him of gross
immorality for what is in question in a case like
this is respondents fitness to be a member of the
legal profession. It is not dependent whether or

not the other party knowingly engaged in an
immoral relationship with him.
We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari
delicto is not feasible. The Court held in Mortel
vs. Aspiras:
In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that
the complainant is in pari delicto because this is
not a proceeding to grant relief to the
complainant, but one to purge the law
profession of unworthy members, to protect the
public and the courts.[22]
The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place
while respondent was preparing to take the bar
examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is
unknown to him that an applicant for admission
to membership in the bar must show that he is
possessed of good moral character, a
requirement which is not dispensed with upon
admission to membership of the bar.[23] This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession, but its
continued possession is essential to maintain
ones good standing in the profession;[24] it is a
continuing requirement to the practice of law[25]
and therefore admission to the bar does not
preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon
proper complaint, into any question concerning
his mental or moral fitness before he became a
lawyer. This is because his admission to
practice merely creates a rebuttable
presumption that he has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer.
The Court held:
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment
of such privilege. We must stress that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to
practice law only during good behavior. He can
be deprived of his license for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 28
court after giving him the opportunity to be
heard.[26]
and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality and faithful compliance with
the rules of the legal profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of
good standing of the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law.[27]
Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual
congress with a woman not his wife and now
refuses to recognize and support a child whom
he previously recognized and promised to
support. Clearly therefore, respondent violated
the standards of morality required of the legal
profession and should be disciplined
accordingly.
As consistently held by this Court, disbarment
shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment
could be given.[28] Records show that from the
time he took his oath in 1997, he has severed
his ties with complainant and now lives with his
wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the
Court does not perceive this fact as an
indication of respondents effort to mend his
ways or that he recognizes the impact of his
offense on the noble profession of law.
Nevertheless, the Court deems it more
appropriate under the circumstances that
indefinite suspension should be meted out than
disbarment. The suspension shall last until such
time that respondent is able to show, to the full
satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in
himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral
integrity and uprightness required of every
member of the profession.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for any misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long
as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.[29]
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 29

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the

Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross
Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer
INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of
law.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty.
Castillos personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the
IBP and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5499. August 16, 2005]
WILSON PO CHAM, complainant, vs. ATTY.
EDILBERTO D. PIZARRO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint
for disbarment filed by Wilson Po Cham
(complainant) against Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro
(respondent) for commission of falsehood and
misrepresentations in violation of a lawyers
oath.
Complainant gives the following account of the
facts that spawned the filing of the present
administrative complaint.
Sometime in July 1995, Emelita Caete (Caete),
Elenita Alipio (Alipio), and now deceased Mario
Navarro (Navarro) who was then the Municipal
Assessor of Morong, Bataan, offered for sale to
him a parcel of land with an area of
approximately forty (40) hectares, identified as
Lot 1683 of Cad. Case No. 262, situated at Sitio
Gatao, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan (the
property).
He having expressed interest in the offer, Caete
and Navarro arranged a meeting between him
and respondent at the latters residence in
Balanga, Bataan[1] where respondent
categorically represented to him that the
property being offered for sale was alienable
and disposable.[2] Respondent in fact
presented to him 1) Real Property Tax Order of
Payment[3] dated July 10, 1995 covering the
property signed by Edna P. Pizarro as Municipal
Treasurer and Navarro as Municipal Assessor;
2) a Deed of Absolute Sale[4] dated July 25,
1995 purportedly executed by the alleged
previous actual occupant of the property, one
Jose R. Monzon (Monzon), transferring all his
rights, interest and possession thereover in
favor of Virgilio Banzon (Banzon), Rolando B.
Zabala (Zabala) and respondent for an agreed
consideration of P500,000.00; and 3) Special
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 30
Power of Attorney[5] dated July 25, 1995
executed by Banzon and Zabala authorizing him
(respondent) to:
1. x x x offer to sell [their] rights over a certain
parcel of land, which is more particularly
described as follows:
AREA: 40 has. more or less
situated at Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong,
Morong, Bataan covered by Tax Declaration No.
6066 PIN #108-08-044-05-126
2. x x x negotiate and enter into a contract for
the consumation (sic) of sale of the subject
property; and to sign the same.
3. x x x receive proceeds thereof with obligation
to distribute the corresponding share of each co-
owner;
x x x[6] (Underscoring supplied)
On July 25, 1995, he as buyer and respondent
as seller executed an Option to Buy,[7] the
pertinent portions of which provide:
WHEREAS, the SELLER is the owner and
Attorney-In-Fact of his co-owners of rights with
planted trees (improvements) containing an
area of FORTY THREE (43) hectares, situated
in Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong,
Bataan; (Portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong
Cadastre), covered by Tax Declaration 6066.
WHEREAS, the BUYER is interested to buy the
same for a total price of THREE MILLION AND
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P3,700,000.00) payable in two (2) gives (sic),
as follows:
a) Earnest money of P10,000.00 upon signing
of this contract and the balance of full payment
within three (3) weeks from date hereof which
offer the SELLER accepts;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of
the foregoing premises and the terms and
conditions hereunder specified the parties have
agreed on the following:

1) That the Buyer shall give an option money
and earnest (sic) of P10,000.00 upon signing of
this contract, which shall form part of the
contract price if and when the buyer comply (sic)
with his obligation to pay in full within three (3)
weeks from date hereof, otherwise should the
BUYER fails (sic) to comply with his obligation
to pay in full on the scheduled period the
P10,000.00 earnest money shall be forfeited in
favor of the SELLER and the Option to Buy is
automatically cancelled.
2) That the SELLER upon full payment of the
price shall execute a final Deed of Sale and shall
surrender all documents, plans and paper
relative to the properties subject of sale;
3) That the SELLER shall warrants (sic) their
rights and claims over the above stated
properties including the trees planted on it as
against the rights of third party except that of the
government.[8] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In accordance with the terms of the Option to
Buy, he paid respondent the amount of
P10,000.00 for which respondent issued the
corresponding Receipt[9] reading:
Received the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) from MR. WILSON CHAM,
representing earnest/option money for Lot 1683
of Cad. Case No. 262 situated at Boundaries:
NORTH : Right of Catalino Agujo
SOUTH : National Road-Bagac-Morong
WEST : Right of Nicasio Canta
EAST : Sapang Batang Panao
including the trees and improvement situated
thereon.
Full payment shall be paid within three (3)
weeks from date hereof.[10] (Underscoring
supplied)
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 31
On August 21, 1995, respondent executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale[11] over the property in
his favor, the pertinent portions of which read as
follows:
For and in consideration of the sum of THREE
MILLION THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
(P3,372,533.00), Philippine Currency, the
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged from
the BUYER to the entire satisfaction of the
SELLERS, the said SELLERS do by these
presents SELL, TRANSFER and CONVEY, in
manner absolute and irrevocable, in favor of the
said BUYER, his heirs and assigns, all their
rights, interest and participation over that certain
real estate destined for, and in actual use as fruit
land, situated at Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong,
Morong, Bataan and more particularly described
as follows:
Location : Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong,
Morong, Bataan
Area : That portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262,
Morong Cadastre, containing an area of
392,155 square meters more or less.
Boundaries : North : Right of Catalino Agujo
South : National Road, Bagac-Morong
West : Right of Nicasio Canta
East : Sapang Batang Panao
The SELLERS do hereby declare that the
boundaries of the foregoing land are visible by
means of monuments, creeks and trees; that the
land including the permanent improvements
existing thereon consist of fruit-bearing trees
assessed for the current year at TWO
HUNDRED SIXTY TWO THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED P262,400.00 as per Tax Declaration
No. 5010; and that the property is presently in
the possession of the SELLERS.
The SELLERS hereby agree with the BUYER
that they are the absolute owners of the rights
over the said property; that they have the perfect
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 32

right to convey the same; that they acquired (CENR) in Bagac, Bataan of the Department of
their rights over the said property by absolute Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
deed of sale from Jose R. Monzon who acquired dated July 2, 1998, signed by CENR Officer
his rights over the property from Marianito Laurino D. Macadangdang, reading:
Holgado; that Marianito Holgado acquired his
This pertains to your request for a certification
right from Pedro de Leon who, in turn, acquired
as to the status of land claimed by spouses
his right from Julian Agujo who was the original
Perfecto and Purificacion, Jose Monson, et. al,
owner who cleared the land and who was in
Virgilio Banzon and Edilberto Pizarro, all located
possession of the same immediately after the
at Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan.
Second World War.
Please be informed that per verification
The SELLERS warrant their rights and claims
conducted by the personnel of this Office, said
over the aforedescribed real estate including the
lands fall within the Bataan Natural Park per
trees planted thereon and they undertake to
L.C. Map/N.P. Map No. 34 as certified on
defend the same unto said Vendee, his heirs
December 1, 1945. Under the Public Land Law,
and assigns against the claims of any third
lands within this category are not subject for
person whomsoever.[12] (Emphasis and
disposition.[19] (Underscoring supplied)
underscoring supplied)
He also obtained a Letter-directive[20] dated
Respondent thereafter furnished him with a
August 31, 1995 issued by Officer-in-Charge
copy of Tax Declaration No. 5010[13] with
Ricardo R. Alarcon of the Provincial
Property Index No. 018-08-004-05-126 issued
Environment and Natural Resources Office
in his (respondents) name and his alleged co-
(PENR) of Balanga, Bataan to the Municipal
owners, and Real Property Tax Receipt No.
Assessor, the pertinent portions of which read:
025201[14] dated August 17, 1995 issued in his
(respondents) name. Please be informed that it comes to our attention
that there are some forest occupants that are
He thus gave respondent two checks dated
securing land tax declarations from your office
August 21, 1995 representing the purchase
in (sic) the pretext that the area they occupied
price of the rights over the property, Asian Bank
(sic) were (sic) within alienable and disposable
Corporation Check No. GA063210[15] in the
lands. Presently, this tax declaration is being
amount of P168,627.00 payable to respondent,
used in the illegal selling of right [of] possession
and Asian Bank Managers Check No.
within the Bataan Natural Park which is
004639GA[16] in the amount of P3,193,906.00
prohibited under our laws.
payable to respondent, Banzon and Zabala.
xxx
He subsequently took possession of the
property and installed a barbed wire fence at its In this regard, I would like to request for your
front portion. Soon after, however, a forest assistance by way of informing us and in
guard approached him and informed him that controlling this land rush and massive selling
the property could not be fenced as it was part and buying of rights of possession within
of the Bataan National Park.[17] prohibited areas as stated above.[21]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon investigation, he discovered that the
property is not an alienable or disposable land Upon his request, the PENR issued a
susceptible of private ownership. He thus Certification[22] dated March 14, 1996 stating
secured a Certification[18] from the Community that those named by respondent as prior owners
Environment and Natural Resources Office of rights over the property from whom

respondent and his alleged co-owners acquired
their alleged rights were not among those
inventoried as occupants per the PENRs 1978
to 1994 Forest Occupancy Census (IFO)
Survey.
Despite repeated demands, respondent refused
to return the purchase price of the rights over
the property.[23]
In his present complaint[24] dated September
10, 2001, complainant charges respondent to
have violated his oath as a member of the Bar
in committing manifest falsehood and evident
misrepresentation by employing fraudulent
means to lure him into buying rights over the
property which property he represented to be
disposable and alienable.[25]
In his Comment[26] dated January 12, 2002,
respondent denied having employed deceit or
having pretended to co-own rights over the
property or having represented that it was
alienable and disposable. He claimed that
complainant, being engaged in speculation in
the purchase of property, knew exactly the
character and nature of the object of his
purchase;[27] and that despite complainants
awareness that he was merely buying rights to
forest land, he just the same voluntarily entered
into the transaction because of the propertys
proximity to the Subic Bay Economic Zone.
Respondent surmised that complainant bought
the rights over the property in the hope that
lands belonging to the public domain in Morong
would be eventually declared alienable and
disposable to meet the rising demand for
economic zones.[28]
By Resolution[29] of February 6, 2002, this
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation or decision within ninety
(90) days from notice.
On May 6, 2002, complainant filed before the
IBP his Reply[30] to respondents Comment,
maintaining that the sale of rights over the
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 33
property was attended with deceit as
respondent deliberately did not disclose that the
property was within the confines of the Bataan
National Park.[31] And he denied being
engaged in speculation, he claiming that with his
purchase of the property, he would venture into
low-cost housing for the employees of the
nearby Subic Bay area.[32]
To complainants Reply, respondent filed his
Rejoinder on June 21, 2002.[33]
Complainant later filed his Affidavit[34] and
Position Paper[35] on June 21, 2002 and
September 17, 2001, respectively, reiterating
his assertions in his previous pleadings.
The record shows that complainant filed a
criminal complaint for estafa against
respondent, Banzon, Zabala, Caete, Alipio and
Navarro in 1999[36] arising from the questioned
sale of rights. The complaint was twice
dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City. On petition for review, however, the
Department of Justice, through then Secretary
Hernando B. Perez, by Resolution[37] of March
6, 2002, reversed the dismissal of the complaint
as it found probable cause to indict respondent
et al. in court. An information for estafa was
thereupon filed against respondent et al. before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-00-94232.
By Report and Recommendation of April 20,
2004, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), through Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro, finding respondent to have violated his
oath as a member of the Bar to do no falsehood
and misrepresentations, recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for three (3)
months, subject to the approval of the members
of the Board of Governors. Pertinent portions of
the Report and Recommendation read:
. . . [I]t is evident that as early as of (sic) 1992,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
NIPAS ACT[38] prohibited the illegal selling of
rights or possession of the areas occupied

within the Bataan Natural Park, the subject
property not excluded as per letter of OIC
CENRO Laurino D. Mapadanig [illegible],
Bagac, Bataan per L.C. map/N.P. Map No. 34 to
the Municipal Assessor therein and certified on
December 1, 1945 that subject property which
is within this category was not subject for
disposition; a fact supposed to be known by the
respondent being a resident of Balanga, Bataan
and was in the practice of his profession also in
said area.
Aside from the fact that the alleged original
owner Monzon was not among those
inventoried occupants as per Forest Occupancy
(IFO) Survey since 1978 up to the latest census
in 1994 from whom respondent allegedly bought
the subject property; the Absolute Deed of Sale
executed between the complainant Wilson Po
Cham and the respondent relative to the same
subject property was not notarized which
partook the nature of a private and not official
document.
Although respondent furnished complainant the
foregoing documents to prove their rights,
interest and possession to the subject property,
respondent and his co-owners failed to show a
permit from the government conferring upon
them rights or concessions over the subject
property, which formed part of the Bataan
Natural Park classified as public and not subject
to disposition, therefore respondent and his co-
owners have no rights and interests whatsoever
over the subject property and their
representations to complainant were simply not
true but a falsehood.
Respondent being extensively conversant and
knowledgeable about the law took advantage of
his versatility in the practice of law and
committed misrepresentations that he and his
co-owners have irrevocable rights, interests and
possession over the subject property which
convinced complainant into purchasing subject
property unmindful that the same is not
alienable or disposable being a portion of the
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 34
public domain; whereby respondent violated his
solemn oath as member of the Philippine Bar for
having committed such falsehood and
misrepresentations to the complainant.[39]
(Underscoring supplied).
By CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-407 of
October 7, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the April 20, 2004
Committee Report and Recommendation.
The case was forwarded to this Court for final
action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.[40]
The IBP findings are well-taken.
The Bar is enjoined to maintain a high standard
of not only legal proficiency but of honesty and
fair dealing.[41] Thus, a member should refrain
from doing any act which might lessen in any
degree the confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
legal profession.[42]
The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor to thus render him
unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned
with disbarment or suspension.[43]
Thus, under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney on the following grounds: 1) deceit;
2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation
of the lawyers oath; 6) willful disobedience to
any lawful order of a superior court; and 7)
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority.
And he may be faulted under Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates a member of the Bar to obey the laws

of the land and promote respect for the law. Rule
1.01 of the Code specifically enjoins him not to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Conduct, as used in this rule,
is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection
with the performance of professional duties.[44]
In the case at bar, as reflected above,
complainant presented certifications from the
DENR that the property is part of the public
domain and not disposable as it is within the
Bataan National Park. Indeed, by virtue of
Proclamation No. 24[45] issued on December 1,
1945, all properties of the public domain therein
designated as part of the Bataan National Park
were withdrawn from sale, settlement or other
disposition, subject to private rights.
On the other hand, respondent has utterly failed
to substantiate his documented claim of having
irrevocable rights and interests over the
property which he could have conveyed to
complainant. E.g., he could have presented any
document issued by the government conferring
upon him and his alleged co-owners, or even
upon his alleged predecessors-in-interest, with
any such right or interest, but he presented
none. He merely presented a Deed of Absolute
Sale purportedly executed by a certain Jose R.
Monzon in his, Banzons and Zabalas favor on
July 25, 1995, a month shy of the execution on
August 21, 1995 of the Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of complainant.
The tax declaration and receipt which
respondent presented do not help his cause any
as neither tax receipts nor realty tax
declarations are sufficient evidence of the right
of possession over realty unless supported by
other effective proof.[46] The presentation of a
tax declaration must indeed have been a
pretext, as observed by the PENR in its earlier-
quoted portion of its letter-directive to the
Balanga Municipal Assessor that the area
occupied . . . [is] within alienable and disposable
land.
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 35
Respondent must thus be faulted for
fraudulently inducing complainant to purchase,
for P3,372,533.00, non-existent irrevocable
rights, interest and participation over an
inalienable property.
In Lizaso v. Amante[47] where therein
respondent lawyer enticed the therein
complainant to invest in the casino business
with the proposition that her investment would
yield her substantial profit, but therein
respondent not only failed to deliver the
promised return on the investment but also the
principal thereof, this Court took occasion to
expound on sanctioning lawyers for committing
fraud, deceit or falsehood in their private
dealings:
It is true, of course, that there was no attorney-
client relationship between respondent Amante
and complainant Cuyugan-Lizaso. The
transaction that complainant entered into with
respondent did not require respondent to
perform professional legal services for
complainant nor did that transaction relate to the
rendition of professional services by respondent
to any other person.
As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down
in In Re Vicente Pelaez the principle that it can
exercise its power to discipline lawyers for
causes which do not involve the relationship of
an attorney and client. x x x
x x x [A]s a general rule, a court will not assume
jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to have been committed in
his private capacity. But this is a general rule
with many exceptions. The courts sometimes
stress the point that the attorney has shown,
through misconduct outside of his professional
dealings, a want of such professional honesty
as render him unworthy of public confidence,
and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the
legal business of others. The reason why such
a distinction can be drawn is because it is the

court which admits an attorney to the bar, and
the court requires for such admission the
possession of a good moral character.
The rationale of the rule that misconduct,
indicative of moral unfitness, whether relating to
professional or non-professional matters,
justifies suspension or disbarment, was
expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Prentice in In Re
Disbarment of Peck, with eloquence and
restraint:
As important as it is that an attorney be
competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate
matters which may be intrusted to him, it is
infinitely more so that he be upright and
trustworthy. Unfortunately, it is not easy to limit
membership in the profession to those who
satisfy the standard of test of fitness. But scant
progress in that direction can be hoped for if, in
the determination of the qualification of
professional fitness, non-professional dishonor
and dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to
be ignored. Professional honesty and honor are
not to be expected as the accompaniment of
dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. x x x
misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness for the
profession, whether it be professional or non-
professional, justifies dismission as well as
exclusion from the bar.
The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr.
Justice Malcolm in Piatt v. Abordo x xx:
The courts are not curators of the morals of the
bar. At the same time the profession is not
compelled to harbor all persons whatever their
character, who are fortunate enough to keep out
of prison. As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attorneys character is bad in
such respects as to show that he is unsafe and
unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an
attorney, the courts retain the power to
discipline him.[48] (Italics in the original)
This Lizaso ruling was reiterated in Co v.
Bernardino[49] and Lao v. Medel.[50]
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 36
To be sure, complainant is not entirely
blameless. Had he exhibited a modicum of
prudence before entering into the transaction
with respondent, he would have spared himself
from respondents sham.
It is jurisprudentially established though that in a
disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the
complainant is not blameless or is in pari delicto
as this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the
complainant, but one to purge the law
profession of unworthy members to protect the
public and the courts.[51]
The record does not disclose the status of the
estafa case against respondent. His conviction
or acquittal is not, however, essential insofar as
the present administrative case against him is
concerned.[52]
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to
a class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of x x x
criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases
differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or
suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all
that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will
not constitute a prejudicial question even if the
same facts and circumstances are attendant in
the administrative proceedings.
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in
the criminal case will not necessarily result in a
finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, respondents acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively.[53]
(Emphasis supplied)
It is not thus sound judicial policy to await the
final resolution of a criminal case before a
complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon;
otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless
from vigorously applying the rules on admission
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 37

to and continuing membership in the legal

profession during the whole period that the
criminal case is pending final disposition when
the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly
disparate.[54]

While the facts and circumstances of the case

do not warrant the imposition of so severe a
penalty as disbarment, the inherent power of
this Court to discipline an errant member of the
Bar must, nonetheless, be exercised as it
cannot be denied that respondent violated his
solemn oath as a lawyer not to engage in
unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct.[55]
The penalty of suspension for three (3) months
recommended by the IBP is not, however,
commensurate to the gravity of the wrong
committed by respondent. This Court finds that
respondents suspension from the practice of
law for One (1) Year is warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Edilberto D.
Pizarro, is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for One (1) Year and STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will merit a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the
personal record of respondent as a member of
the Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.

EFFECT OF AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
A.C. No. 6963 February 9, 2006
VICTORINA BAUTISTA, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a Complaint1 filed before the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on November 16, 2004,
complainant Victorina Bautista2 prays for the
suspension or disbarment of respondent Atty.
Sergio E. Bernabe for malpractice and unethical
conduct in the performance of his duties as a
notary public and a lawyer.
Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998,
respondent prepared and notarized a
Magkasanib na Salaysay3 purportedly
executed by Donato Salonga and complainant’s
mother, Basilia de la Cruz.4 Both affiants
declared that a certain parcel of land in Bigte,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being occupied by
Rodolfo Lucas and his family for more than 30
years. Complainant claimed that her mother
could not have executed the joint affidavit on
January 3, 1998 because she has been dead
since January 28, 1961.5
In his Answer,6 respondent denied that he
falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay. He
disclaimed any knowledge about Basilia’s
death. He alleged that before he notarized the
document, he requested for Basilia’s presence
and in her absence, he allowed a certain
Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of Basilia, to
sign above the name of the latter as shown by
the word "by" on top of the name of Basilia.
Respondent maintained that there was no
forgery since the signature appearing on top of
Basilia’s name was the signature of Pronebo.
On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a
manifestation7 attaching thereto the affidavit of
desistance8 of complainant which reads in part:
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 38
Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, x x x
matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas
ay malaya at kusang loob na nagpapahayag ng
mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo
laban kay Abogado, SERGIO EXQUIVEL
BERNABE, sa isang kaso sa Tanggapan ng
Integrated Bar of the Philippines na may Blg.
CBD CASE NO. 04-1371;
2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko
kagustuhan sapagkat iyon ay pinapirmahan
lamang sa akin ni ELISEO OLOROSO at ng
kanyang Abogado na si Atty. MARCIAL MORFE
MAGSINO at sa katunayan hindi ako nakaharap
sa Notaryo Publiko na si Abogado CARLITOS
C. VILLARIN;
3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin ay isang
panlilinlang at ako ay ginawang kasangkapan
para sirain ang magandang pangalan nitong si
Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE;
4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking
hinihiling sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) na ang reklamo ko laban sa
nasabing Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL
BERNABE ay mapawa[la]ng bisa.
In the report dated August 29, 2005, the
Investigating Commissioner9 recommended
that:
1. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended
from the practice of the legal profession for one
(1) month;
2. Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio
Esquibel Bernabe as notary public, be revoked;
and
3. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from
being granted a notarial commission for a period
of one (1) year.10
In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the
Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
approved the recommendation of the

Investigating Commissioner with modification
that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for one year and his notarial commission
be revoked and that he be disqualified for
reappointment as notary public for two years.
We agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP.
The records sufficiently established that Basilia
was already dead when the joint affidavit was
prepared on January 3, 1998. Respondent’s
alleged lack of knowledge of Basilia’s death
does not excuse him. It was his duty to require
the personal appearance of the affiant before
affixing his notarial seal and signature on the
instrument.
A notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein.
The presence of the parties to the deed will
enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the affiant.11
Respondent’s act of notarizing the Magkasanib
na Salaysay in the absence of one of the affiants
is in violation of Rule 1.01,12 Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Notarial Law.13 By affixing his signature and
notarial seal on the instrument, he led us to
believe that Basilia personally appeared before
him and attested to the truth and veracity of the
contents of the affidavit when in fact it was a
certain Pronebo who signed the document.
Respondent’s conduct is fraught with dangerous
possibilities considering the conclusiveness on
the due execution of a document that our courts
and the public accord on notarized documents.
Respondent has clearly failed to exercise
utmost diligence in the performance of his
function as a notary public and to comply with
the mandates of the law.14
Respondent was also remiss in his duty when
he allowed Pronebo to sign in behalf of Basilia.
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 39
A member of the bar who performs an act as a
notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him. The acts of the
affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what
are stated therein are facts of which they have
personal knowledge. They should swear to the
document personally and not through any
representative. Otherwise, their
representative’s name should appear in the said
documents as the one who executed the same.
That is the only time the representative can affix
his signature and personally appear before the
notary public for notarization of the said
document. Simply put, the party or parties who
executed the instrument must be the ones to
personally appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the document.15
Complainant’s desistance or withdrawal of the
complaint does not exonerate respondent or put
an end to the administrative proceedings. A
case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
has been proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding
for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.
The attorney is called to answer to the court for
his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as
all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.16
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 40

of the Philippines, and all courts all over the

country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be
We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to
attached to the personal records of the
be in full accord with recent jurisprudence. In
respondent.
Gonzales v. Ramos,17 respondent lawyer was
found guilty of notarizing the document despite SO ORDERED.
the non-appearance of one of the signatories.
As a result, his notarial commission was
revoked and he was disqualified from
reappointment for a period of two years. In
addition, he was suspended from the practice of
law for one year.
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that in
paragraph 218 of complainant’s affidavit of
desistance, she alluded that Atty. Carlitos C.
Villarin notarized her Sinumpaang Salaysay19
dated November 12, 2004 which was attached
to the complaint filed with the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the IBP, without requiring her
to personally appear before him in violation of
the Notarial Law. This allegation must likewise
be investigated.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law
and Code of Professional Responsibility, the
notarial commission of respondent Atty. Sergio
E. Bernabe, is REVOKED. He is
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary
Public for a period of two years. He is also
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one year, effective immediately. He is
further WARNED that a repetition of the same
or of similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of
receipt of this Decision in order to determine
when his suspension shall take effect.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED
to investigate the allegation that Atty. Carlitos C.
Villarin notarized the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Victorina Bautista dated November 12, 2004
without requiring the latter’s personal
appearance.lavvph!1.net
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar

ADM. CASE No. 5134 December 14, 2005
TIRSO UYTENGSU III, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSEPH M. BADUEL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Tinga, J.:
A sworn letter-complaint1 dated 1 July
19992 was filed by Tirso Uytengsu III
(complainant) against Atty. Joseph M. Baduel
(respondent) for violation of Rule 1.013 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant is one of the heirs of Tirso
Uytengsu, Jr. He and his co-heirs had a pending
patent application. He alleges that sometime in
December 1998 respondent requested him to
sign a special power of attorney (SPA)
authorizing Luis Wee (Wee) and/or Thomas
Jacobo (Jacobo) to claim, demand,
acknowledge and receive on his behalf the
certificates of title from the Register of Deeds,
General Santos City, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and from
any government office or agency due to
complainant and his co-heirs by reason of their
application for Homestead Patent II.A. No. 37
142 (E 37 124) over Lot 924-A Cad. II-013120-
D with an area of 5.3876 hectares and II.A. No.
116303 over Lot No. 924-B Cad. II-013120-D
with an area of 5,1526 hectares, both situated in
Lagao, General Santos City.
Complainant refused to sign the SPA as he
wanted to obtain the documents personally.
Subsequently though, before he could get the
title and other documents, complainant learned
that respondent caused to have the SPA signed
by Connie U. Kokseng (Kokseng), the former
guardian of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr.
Complainant maintains that the document
signed by Kokseng was the same SPA which
was presented to him for signature by
respondent in December 1998. As a result, the
titles and other documents were received and
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 41
taken by other persons without his or his co-
heirs’ knowledge and consent.
Complainant contends that the said SPA was
prepared and notarized by the law office of
respondent and the latter stood as a witness to
the public instrument. Complainant further avers
that respondent used to do some legal work for
him and knew fully well that Kokseng has
already ceased to be his and his co-heirs’
guardian when the Regional Trial Court, Branch
19 of Cebu City terminated the letters of
guardianship over her youngest sibling on 30
August 1985 in the case entitled "In the Matter
of Guardianship of Tirso M. Uytengsu III,
Kathleen Anne M. Uytengsu, and Barbara Anne
M. Uytengsu," docketed as SP Proc. No. 3039-
R.
In essence, complainant asserts that
respondent caused Kokseng to execute an SPA
in favor of Wee and/or Jacobo to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr.
even if he knew that Kokseng had no authority
to do so.
Respondent in his comment,4 argues that the
allegations of complainant are purely hearsay.
He stresses that complaint was instituted to
harass him because he was the counsel of an
opposing litigant against complainant’s
corporation in an ejectment case entitled
"General Milling Corporation v. Cebu Autometic
Motors, Inc. and Tirso Uytengsu III."
On 9 August 2000, this Court referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.5
Notices of hearing were sent to both parties
between 11 January 2001 and 8 May 2001.
However, no actual hearings were conducted
then due to the unavailability of either or both
parties. Finally, on 26 June 2001, both parties
appeared before the investigating
commissioner. They were then directed to file
their position papers and their respective replies
thereto.

Investigating Commissioner Tyrone Cimafranca
submitted his Report and Recommendation
dated 2 April 2002, recommending the dismissal
of the case. The Commissioner characterized
the evidence against respondent as hearsay.
Moreover, the Commissioner concluded that
Kokseng had legal basis to execute the SPA in
favor of a substitute, the records showing that
complainant and his co-heirs have constituted
Kokseng as their attorney-in-fact for the purpose
of filing the homestead application.6
Thereafter, the IBP submitted their resolution
dated 29 June 2002 approving and adopting the
report and recommendation of the investigating
commissioner, dismissing the complaint against
respondent.7 Complainant filed his motion for
reconsideration8 but was denied by the IBP in its
resolution dated 19 October 2002 on the ground
that the IBP no longer had jurisdiction to
consider and resolve a matter already endorsed
to this Court.9 This notwithstanding, the Court
remanded10 the administrative case for
immediate resolution of the motion for
reconsideration on the merits to the IBP in the
Court’s resolution dated 20 January 2003.11
On 27 February 2004, the IBP filed its resolution
adopting and approving the investigating
commissioner’s report and recommendation
denying complainant’s motion for
reconsideration. 12
Subsequently, on 1 July 2004,13 complainant
filed a petition for review on certiorari14 assailing
the resolution of the IBP dated 27 February
2004.
In his petition for review, complainant questions
the findings of the IBP that complainant’s
allegations were based on hearsay and in
finding that Kokseng had the authority to
execute the special power of attorney in favor of
Wee and/or Jacobo.
We dismiss the complaint.
At the outset, the Court finds that herein
respondent was in fact the counsel in the
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 42
homestead patent application of the heirs of
Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. This can be deduced from
the letters15 dated 9 October 1991 and 15
January 1993, addressed to respondent by
Victoria Villasor-Inong (Villasor-Inong),
Accounts Liquidation Officer III of the Board of
Liquidators of General Santos City.
In said letters, Villasor-Inong communicated to
respondent the requirements for the grant of the
homestead patent to herein complainant and his
co-heirs. From the tenor of the letters, it would
seem that respondent actively participated in
representing complainant and his co-heirs in
their patent application for the subject land.
Apparently, he stood as counsel for the heirs of
Tirso Uytengsu, Jr.
With that ostensible representation and without
any evidence to show that complainant or his
co-heirs withdrew such authority from
respondent, the latter himself can even claim
the certificates of titles and other documents
with regard to the homestead patents.
It should be remembered that the first letter of
Villasor-Inong addressed to respondent was on
9 October 1991.16The addressees of the said
letter were "The Heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr.,
Rep. by Connie Uytengsu Kokseng, c/o Atty.
Joseph Baduel."
Complainant also presented a letter17 dated 23
September 1992 addressed to Villasor-Inong by
the general manager of the Board of
Liquidators, directing the former to personally
contact the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. to
ascertain who among the persons giving
conflicting directives as to the course of the
patent application is the true authorized
representative of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr.
After four (4) months, respondent received from
Villasor Inong another letter,18 dated 15 January
1993, also attached to complainant’s position
paper and petition for review, furnishing
respondent the requirements needed for the

homestead patent application of complainant
and his co-heirs.
Complainant himself submitted all the
aforementioned letters clearly showing that
respondent was indeed the counsel or
representative of complainant in the application
for patent.
The relation of attorney and client is in many
respects one of agency and the general rules of
ordinary agency apply to such relation.19 The
extent of authority of a lawyer, when acting on
behalf of his client outside of court, is measured
by the same test as that which is applied to an
ordinary agent.20
Such being the case, even respondent himself
can acquire the certificates of title and other
documents without need of an SPA from
complainant and his co-heirs.
In addition, the Court agrees with the
investigating commissioner that the allegations
of complainant constitutes mere hearsay
evidence and may not be admissible in any
proceeding.
In Marcelo v. Javier,21 it was held that:
In all cases the determination whether an
attorney should be disbarred or merely
suspended for a period involves the exercise of
a sound judicial discretion, mindful always of the
fact that disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary action and should be resorted to
only in cases where the lawyer demonstrates an
attitude or course of conduct wholly inconsistent
with approved professional standards. In cases
of lighter offenses or of first delinquency, an
order of suspension, which is correctional in
nature, should be inflicted. In view of the nature
and consequences of a disciplinary
proceedings, observance of due process, as in
other judicial determination, is imperative along
with presumption of innocence in favor of the
lawyer. Consequently, the burden of proof is on
the complainant to overcome such presumption
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 43
and establish his charges by clear
preponderance of evidence.22
Procedural due process demands that
respondent lawyer should be given an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against him. He enjoys the legal presumption
that he is innocent of the charges against him
until the contrary is proved. The case must be
established by clear, convincing and
23
satisfactory proof.
In the case at bar, other than the bare assertions
of complainant, the evidence presented by the
latter does not suffice to tip the scale of justice
to his side.
It should be stressed that in administrative
proceedings, complainant has the burden of
proving the allegations in the complaint. We
cannot depend on mere conjectures and
speculations. There must be substantial
evidence to support respondent’s guilt.24
Complainant averred that: (1) the SPA which the
respondent asked him to sign was the same
document that Kokseng executed; (2) the
document was notarized by a notary public from
the office of the respondent; and (3) the
respondent was a witness in the SPA.
As correctly observed by the investigating
commissioner, all the aforementioned charges
are not based on his personal knowledge of the
acts complained of but acquired from other
sources.
Complainant charges that respondent
committed an act meriting disbarment when the
latter caused to have a special power of
attorney, which the former reused to sign earlier,
executed by Mrs. Connie Kokseng, former
guardian of complainant and his co-heirs,
authorizing certain individuals to secure the
release from the Register of Deeds and other
government offices in General Santos City, titles
and other documents pertaining to
complainant’s and his co-heirs’ homestead
application. However, this charge is not based

on his own personal knowledge of the acts
complained of but acquired from another
source. In other words, what he offered in
evidence to prove his charge is a second-hand
version. Complainant identified his source but
failed to present any sworn statement or
affidavit of said witness. In other words, what he
presented in evidence to prove his charge is
hearsay.25
The hearsay rule provides that no assertion
offered as testimony can be received unless it is
or has been open to test by cross-examination
or an opportunity for cross-examination, except
as provided otherwise by the rules on evidence,
by rules of court, or by statute. The chief
reasons for the rule are that out-of-court
statements amounting to hearsay are not made
under oath and are not subject to cross-
examination.26
He did not submit to this Court or to the IBP any
witness or documentary evidence to support his
claim that respondent has indeed caused the
execution of the disputed special power of
attorney. Furthermore, complainant in his
reply27 to respondent’s comment stated that he
has a credible witness in the person of Edward
U. Kokseng, son of Kokseng, who has first hand
knowledge of Kokseng’s signing of the SPA.
However, he failed to present his witness before
the IBP or submitted an affidavit of his witness
to affirm his allegations. Neither did he present
any witness, whether expert nor otherwise, to
attest to the genuiness of the signature of
respondent which was allegedly found in the
SPA, if that was his objective.
This is not to say that complainant was not given
any advice by the Court to make the proper
attachment to pleadings. As early as 21 July
1999, Atty. Erlinda C. Versoza, the then Deputy
Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, sent word to
complainant through a letter that
complainant’s letter-complaint must be verified
and the supporting documents duly
authenticated. 28
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 44
As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof
lies on the party who makes the allegations—ei
incumbit probatio, qui decit, non qui negat; cum
per rerum naturam factum negantis probatio
nulla sit.29
It is also worth noting that complainant’s claim
that he suffered damage and prejudice due to
the alleged unauthorized procurement of the
certificates of titles and other documents was
not substantiated by independent evidence.
Complainant’s silence as to the extent of the
alleged damage and the lack of material
evidence to show that his rights were impaired
by the acts of respondent would lead this Court
to believe that complainant has suffered no or
minimal injury, should there be any.
As held in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v.
Tan,30 "no right of action is given where no injury
is sustained. A wrongful violation of a legal right
is not a sufficient element of a cause of action
unless it has resulted in an injury causing loss
or damage. There must be therefore, both
wrongful violation and damages. The one
without the other is not sufficient."31
Complainant made no statement on whether or
not, at present, other persons who procured the
certificates of title and other documents are still
in possession of the same. He also has not
stated the direct injury that was produced by the
acts of respondent.
With all the foregoing, the Court finds that
complainant did not overcome the presumption
of innocence of respondent.
We need not dwell on the other factual issues of
the case as it involves the presentation of
concrete evidence that, sadly, complainant was
not able to offer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant case against respondent is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6656 May 4, 2006
[Formerly CBD-98-591]
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARMELITA S. BAUTISTA-LOZADA,*
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada
seeks reconsideration of our December 13,
2005 resolution finding her guilty of violating
Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of willfully
disobeying a final and executory decision of the
Court of Appeals and suspending her from the
practice of law for two years.
Respondent contends that, pursuant to Rule VIII
of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), the complaint against her was
already barred by prescription. She also asserts
that her December 7, 1990 loan agreement with
complainant complied with Rule 16.04 because
the interest of complainant was fully protected.
Respondent’s contentions have no merit.
Respondent anchors her defense of prescription
on Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure
of the CBD-IBP which provides:
SECTION 1. Prescription. A complaint for
disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the
date of the professional misconduct.
However, as early as 1967, we have held that
the defense of prescription does not lie in
administrative proceedings against lawyers.1
And in the 2004 case of Heck v. Santos,2 we
declared that an administrative complaint
against a member of the bar does not prescribe.
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 45
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar
would be emboldened to disregard the very oath
they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact
that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance
of being completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for.
It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity
of the practice of law as well as the
administration of justice. No matter how much
time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the
time of the institution of the complaint, erring
members of the bench and bar cannot escape
the disciplining arm of the Court. This
categorical pronouncement is aimed at
unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to
deter them from committing acts which violate
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath.
xxx
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from
the commission of the offending act to the
institution of the administrative complaint will not
erase the administrative culpability of a
lawyer….3 (emphasis supplied)
The CBD-IBP derives its authority to take
cognizance of administrative complaints against
lawyers from this Court which has the inherent
power to regulate, supervise and control the
practice of law in the Philippines. Hence, in the
exercise of its delegated power to entertain
administrative complaints against lawyers, the
CBD-IBP should be guided by the doctrines and
principles laid down by this Court.
Regrettably, Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of
Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides for a
prescriptive period for the filing of administrative
complaints against lawyers runs afoul of the
settled ruling of this Court. It should therefore be
struck down as void and of no legal effect for
being ultra vires.
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 46

Moreover, assuming that prescription is a valid

defense, respondent raised it only at this late
stage. We presume she was familiar with that
rule yet she failed to invoke it at the earliest
opportunity. Instead she opted to insist on her
innocence.
On the other ground raised by respondent, we
have sufficiently discussed the implications of
her loan agreement with complainant in relation
to Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in our December 13, 2005
resolution. Considering the fiduciary character
of respondent’s relationship with complainant,
the nature of their agreement and complainant’s
lack of independent advice when she entered
into it, there is neither sufficient ground nor
compelling reason to reconsider our earlier
resolution.
WHEREFORE, respondent’s motion for
reconsideration is hereby DENIED WITH
FINALITY.
Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is hereby
declared null and void.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Bar Confidant for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.

WILLFULLY APPEARING AS ATTORNEY
FOR ANY PARTY W/O AUTHORITY
A.C. No. 5499. August 16, 2005
WILSON PO CHAM, Complainant, vs. ATTY.
EDILBERTO D. PIZARRO, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 81093. October 15, 1991.]
PORAC TRUCKING, INC., Petitioner, v.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
(FIFTEENTH DIVISION), and EMERENCIANA
GUEVARRA, Respondents.
Ernesto L. Pineda for Petitioner.
Atlee T. Viray for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; DUTY
OF LAWYER NOT TO DO FALSEHOOD NOR
MISLED THE COURT. — Res ipsa loquitur.
Atty. Rodolfo Macalino is not only guilty of
falsehood but had misled the trial court as well
when her represented himself as "counsel" of
Porac Trucking, Inc. when in fact there was no
such client-lawyer relationship in the first place.
And he transgressed his oath as an attorney.
For Canon 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is clear. CANON 10 — A
LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 —
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
The Court motu proprio initiated the
administrative investigation of Atty. Rodolfo
Macalino for the "unsolicited appearance" in
Civil Case No. 84-0039-M, RTC, Br. 55, San
Fernando, Pampanga which reached this Court,
docketed and entitled as Porac Trucking, Inc.,
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 47
Petitioner, v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,
Et Al., Respondents, G.R. No. 81093, Second
Division. In its decision promulgated on March
6, 1990, the Court made the following
disquisition:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[In any case], the unsolicited appearance of
Atty. Rodolfo Macalino, in the absence of a
client-lawyer relationship with the petitioner
corporation, is unbecoming of a member of the
bar, to say the least . . . The presiding judge of
the court a quo is hereby ordered to undertake
this investigation and report to the Court his
findings and recommendation within thirty days
from receipt hereof.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The Report and Recommendation dated June
11, 1991 of the Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 55,
San Fernando, Pampanga, Hon. Reynaldo V.
Roura, was received by the Court on July 4,
1991. The pertinent portions are hereunder
quoted:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Maria Adelaida C. Dizon, Vice-President of
defendant Porac Trucking, Inc., testified on
December 28, 1990 that Porac Trucking Inc.
never retained the services of Atty. Rodolfo
Macalino to represent it in Civil Case No. 84-
0039-M. Despite the absence of evidence
showing malice on the part of Atty. Macalino, the
resulting injury to the interest of the parties in
this case, not to mention the adverse effect in
the administration of justice caused by the false
representation of Atty. Rodolfo Macalino in said
Civil Case can not be ignored. He should be
held responsible for the consequences of his
acts. When Atty. Macalino stated in his Motion
for Reconsideration dated November 19, 1984
that the defendant did not bother anymore to
appear during the pre-trial conference in as
much as they have already executed their
respective Special Powers of Attorney in favor
of their counsel authorizing him to represent
them in the said pre-trial conference when in
fact they did not, he tried to mislead the Court
and committed falsehood in violation of his oath
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 48

in the pursuit of his falsely representing the SO ORDERED.

defendants as his clients which clearly
constitutes wilful appearance as an attorney for
the defendants in the case without proper
authority. Indeed, such actuation of Atty.
Macalino as the Hon. Supreme Court stated in
its decision, is "unbecoming of a member of the
bar," and considered grounds for his removal or
suspension by the Honorable Supreme Court as
provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
The investigating judge submitted the following
recommendation:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
IN VIEW OF ALL FOREGOING, there is no
doubt that Atty. Rodolfo Macalino is guilty of
falsehood in violation of his oath, and of wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do, and accordingly, it is
respectfully recommended that he be
suspended for the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Res ipsa loquitur. Atty. Rodolfo Macalino is not
only guilty of falsehood but had misled the trial
court as well when he represented himself as
"counsel" of Porac Trucking, Inc. when in fact
there was no such client-lawyer relationship in
the first place. And he transgressed his oath as
an attorney. For Canon 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is clear.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.
ACCORDINGLY, Atty. Rodolfo Macalino is
suspended from the practice of law for a period
of six months. Let a copy of this Resolution be
spread in his personal file and distributed to the
all courts of the land. This Resolution is
immediately executory.cralawnad

A.M. No. L-840 June 30, 1969
JOAQUIN G. GARRIDO, CARLOS UY, JR.,
and, FRANCISCO R.
ACHACOSO, petitioners,
vs.
NORBERTO QUISUMBING, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioners Joaquin G. Garrido, Carlos Uy, Jr.
and Francisco R. Achacoso seek either the
disbarment or the suspension of respondent
Attorney Norberto Quisumbing, upon the ground
that he filed Civil Case No. 73668 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, as counsel for the
plaintiffs therein, including among them one L.
Garcia Pastor, who had not, in fact, authorized
respondent to institute said action on his (Garcia
Pastor's) behalf. Copy of an alleged affidavit of
Garcia Pastor to this effect was annexed to the
complaint of petitioners herein, which was filed
on September 30, 1968.
In his answer thereto, respondent alleged that
he filed the complaint in said case No. 73668 at
the request of one of the plaintiffs therein,
namely, Julio Muñoz, who claimed to have
authority to act on behalf of L. Garcia Pastor in
connection therewith. In support of this
allegation, respondent submitted a photostatic
copy of an affidavit of said Muñoz, dated July
12, 1968, which had allegedly been submitted in
Civil Case No. 73091 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. Subsequently, or on
December 4, 1968, respondent filed a
"manifestation" annexing thereto another
affidavit of Muñoz, made in Barcelona, Spain,
on November 11, 1968, in further support of said
allegation. Thereafter, petitioners filed their
reply, which was the object of a rejoinder on the
part of respondent. The aforementioned
pleadings and the annexes thereto sufficiently
establish the facts necessary for the
determination of this administrative case.
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 49
It is the contention of Muñoz, a Spanish citizen,
residing in Barcelona, Spain, that he is the
controlling shareholder or the representative of
the controlling shareholder of Carmun Trading
(N.Y.), Inc., Carmun Trading (Philippines), Inc.,
Safintex, S.A. and Sociedad Europea de
Financiacion, S.A. — hereafter referred to,
respectively, as Carmun (N.Y.), Carmun (Phil.),
Safintex and SEF; that Carmun (N.Y.) gave
Antonio V. Rocha, a businessman in the
Philippines, the sum of $400,000, with which, in
1949, he constituted and funded the Capital
Insurance and Surety Co., Inc., hereafter
referred to as Capital; that in 1958, Rocha, who
successfully managed the Capital, as its
president, and held the shares therein in trust for
Carmun (N.Y.), transferred said shares to
Carmun (Phil.); that thereafter Rocha was
replaced, as president of Capital, by petitioner
Garrido, who had only 16 out of the 10,000
shares of Capital; that L. Garcia Pastor and
Jaime Amat, both Spanish citizens and
residents, the former of Madrid, Spain, and the
latter of Pasay City, Philippines, hold 10 shares
each of Capital, which Muñoz caused to be
assigned to them to qualify them as members of
the Board of Directors of Capital, of which he
(Muñoz) is the Chairman; that Carmun (Phil.)
transferred its shares in Capital to Safintex,
which, in turn, transferred the shares to SEF;
that between 1964 and 1966, there had been an
impairment in the financial condition of Capital
owing to alleged mismanagement by petitioner
Garrido, involving the juggling of accounts, the
falsification of records and other irregularities,
committed in connivance or with the cooperation
of herein petitioners Achacoso and Uy, Vice-
President and Accountant General,
respectively, of Capital; that, as a consequence,
substantial assets of Capital were fraudulently
transferred by the petitioners to the Property
and Liability Insurance Corporation, which was
organized and is owned by petitioners Garrido
and Achacoso; and that, accordingly, he
(Muñoz) asked respondent herein to file, on his
behalf and that of Capital, SEF, Garcia Pastor
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 50

and Amat, said Civil Case No. 73668 against

petitioners herein, to oust them as president,
vice-president and accountant, respectively, of
Capital, and to recover damages.
Although Garcia Pastor had not personally
authorized respondent herein to file said case
on his (Garcia Pastor's) behalf, as one of the
plaintiffs therein, respondent had no reason to
doubt the veracity of the information furnished
by Muñoz regarding his power to grant such
authority, in representation of Garcia Pastor.
Indeed, the latter seemingly claims to have
returned his shares in Capital to Muñoz, thus
impliedly admitting that he (Garcia Pastor) held
the shares on behalf of Muñoz. At any rate,
Muñoz knew nothing about said alleged return,
he being in Japan, at the time of the filing of
Case No. 73668, whereas Garcia Pastor was
then in Barcelona. Moreover, the records of
Capital were in the possession of petitioners
herein, and respondent felt that the Complaint in
Case No. 73668 should be filed without delay,
owing to the urgency of the relief prayed for.
In other words, when respondent's services
were engaged in connection with said case,
Muñoz informed him that he (Muñoz) was the
controlling stockholder of Capital and that
Garcia Pastor was his alter ego in its board of
directors. Accordingly, Muñoz authorized
respondent to file the action, not only in his
(Muñoz) name, but, also, in that of Garcia
Pastor. Under the circumstances, it is clear that
respondent has not committed any act of
malpractice. In fact, Garcia Pastor has not
complained against respondent for having acted
as he did. The present administrative
proceeding has been instituted, not by Garcia
Pastor, but by the defendants in the
aforementioned civil case.1awphil.nêt
WHEREFORE, the complaint herein is hereby
dismissed. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-35830 July 24, 1990
FORTUNATA MERCADO, BASILIA CUEVAS
MERCADO, SOTERA MERCADO and
TRINIDAD MERCADO, petitioners,
vs.
Hon. ALBERTO Q. UBAY as Presiding Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXXII, LUCINA SAMONTE and TRINIDAD M.
SAMONTE, respondents.
Gregorio M. Familiar for petitioners.
Alfredo I. Molo for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioners seek to enjoin
and restrain respondent judge from further
proceeding with Civil Case No.
C-2442 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(now Regional Trial Court) on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction to annul a final and executory
judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Cavite (now Regional Trial Court) in
Civil Case No. TM-223.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 18, 1966, petitioners filed an action for
partition with the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, Branch I, docketed as Civil Case No.
TM-223, against Antonio, Ely and respondents
Lucina and Trinidad, all surnamed Samonte and
who are brothers and sisters.
On June 27, 1966, the defendants were served
with a copy of the complaint and summons thru
their co-defendant Antonio Samonte who
acknowledged receipt thereof.
On July 11, 1966, all the defendants in the
above-numbered case, thru counsel, Atty.
Danilo Pine, filed their answer to the complaint.
Later, on January 4,1967, the said defendants,
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 51
thru the same counsel, filed their amended
answer.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of
Cavite (now RTC) rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioners and against all the defendants in
the civil case, including private respondents.
Since no appeal was made by any of the
defendants from the decision of the trial court,
the same became final and executory and the
court issued the corresponding writ of
execution.
However, before the writ could be carried out by
the provincial sheriff, all the defendants, thru the
same counsel, Atty. Danilo Pine, filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of
Appeals seeking to annul the writ of execution
issued by the trial court in Cavite in Case No.
TM-223. On July 9, 1971, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
On May 27, 1972, respondent Lucina Samonte
and Trinidad Samonte brought an action before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC)
docketed as Case No.
C-2442, for the annulment of the final judgment
rendered by the trial court in Cavite in Case No.
TM-223, alleging the following matters: that they
did not authorize anyone including Atty. Danilo
Pine to file an answer in their behalf as
defendants in Case No. TM 223, and that the
filing of the petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals to annul the writ of execution in the
same case was without their knowledge and
participation.
Petitioners' motion to dismiss the action was
denied by the CFI of Rizal. Thus, the instant
petition was filed.
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether
or not the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now
RTC) committed grave abuse of discretion or
acted without jurisdiction in denying the
petitioners' motion to dismiss the action for
annulment of the final and executory judgment
rendered by the CFI of Cavite.

The applicable law is Republic Act No. 296, as
amended, otherwise known as "The Judiciary
Act of 1948," which was the law in force when
the disputed action for annulment was filed on
May 27, 1972 in the CFI of Rizal. This is based
on the principle that the facts alleged in the
complaint and the law in force at the time of
commencement of action determine the
jurisdiction of a court (Lum Bing v. Ibanez 92
Phil. 799; Rodriguez v. Pecson, 92 Phil. 172;
Salao v. Crisostomo, No. L-29146, August 5,
1985, 138 SCRA 17; Tolentino v. Social
Security Commission No. L-28870, September
6, 1985, 138 SCRA 428; Philippine Overseas
Drilling, etc. v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No.
55703, November 27, 1986, 146 SCRA 79).
Section 44(a) of the Revised Judiciary Act of
1948 then vested original jurisdiction in the
Courts of First Instance over all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is not capable
of pecuniary estimation and an action for the
annulment of a judgment and an order of a court
of justice belongs to this category (Vda. de
Ursua v. Pelayo, 107 Phil. 622). A court of first
instance or a branch thereof has the authority
and the jurisdiction as provided for by law to
annul a final and executory judgment rendered
by another court of first instance or by another
branch of the same court. This was the ruling
laid down in the cases of (Dulap v. Court of
Appeals, No. L-28306, December 18, 1971, 42
SCRA 537; Gianan v. Imperial, No. L-37963,
February 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 755 and Francisco
v. Aquino, Nos. L-33235-36, July 29, 1976, 72
SCRA 149 which overturned the contrary rulings
in Mas v. Dumara-og No. L-16252, September
29,1964,12 SCRA 34; J.M. Tuason & Co. v.
Torres, et al., No. L-24717, December 4, 1967,
21 SCRA 1169; and Sterling Investment
Corporation, et al. v. Ruiz, etc. et al., No. L-
30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318). Thus,
in an action to annul a final judgment or order,
the choice of which court the action should be
filed is not left to the parties; by legal mandate
the action should be filed with the Court of First
Instance. The question is in what place (with
LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 52
what particular court of first instance) the action
should be commenced and tried (Dulap, supra).
The issue therefore to be resolved in the instant
case is not one of jurisdiction but of venue-
whether it was properly laid in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal for the annulment of the
judgment rendered by the CFI of Cavite.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Court fixes
he venue in Courts of First Instance, as follows:
SEC. 2. Venue in Court of First Instance — (a)
Real actions. — Actions affecting title to, or for
recovery of possession, or for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on,
real property, shall be commenced and tried in
the province where the property or any part
thereof lies.
(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the defendant or
any of the defendants besides or may be found,
or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
xxx xxx xxx
The complaint filed by respondent with the CFI
of Rizal for the annulment of judgment states
that they reside at Caloocan City and that
petitioners, as defendants, reside at Cavite (p.
48, Rollo). Since the action for annulment of
judgment is a personal one, the venue of the
action in this case should be either CFI of
Caloocan or CFI of Cavite at the election of the
plaintiff. Clearly, venue was improperly laid in
the CFI of Rizal and respondent judge should
have dismissed the action for annulment of
judgment on the ground of improper venue.
It is significant to state at this point that although
the prevailing rule before B. P. 129 was that
courts of first instance and their branches have
jurisdiction to annul each other's final judgments
and orders as ruled in Dulap and subsequent
cases, fundamental principles still dictate that
the better policy, as a matter of comity or
courteous interaction between courts of first
instance and the branches thereof, is for the
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 53

annulment cases to be tried by the same court process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by
or branch which heard the main action sought to fraud (Santiago v. Ceniza, No. L-17322, June
be annulled (Gianan v. Imperial, supra).i•t•c- 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 494).
aüsl Moreover, despite the re-examination by
None of the aforementioned grounds was
this Court of the old ruling in Mas v. Dumara-og,
shown to exist to support the annulment action.
supra, recent decisions still uphold its rationale
The contention of private respondents that they
that pursuant to judicial stability, the doctrine of
were not served with summons in Case No. TM-
non-interference should be regarded as highly
223 in the Cavite court is untenable. In their
important in the administration of justice
memorandum filed with this Court, they admit
whereby the judgment of a court of competent
that they were served with summons thru their
jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or
co-defendant Antonio Samonte who
vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction
acknowledged receipt thereof. The receipt of
(Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, No. L-45825, June 30,
summons is shown by the return submitted by
1988, 163 SCRA 237; Republic v. Reyes, Nos.
the sheriff to the Court of First Instance of
L-30263-65, October 30, 1987; Parco v. Court Cavite. Apart from the presumption that the
of Appeals, No. L-33152, January 30, 1982, 111 sheriff had regularly performed his functions,
SCRA 262). records amply show that all the defendants,
including private respondents had filed their
While the foregoing discussion may no longer
answer in Case No. TM-223 thru counsel, Atty.
find any application at this time with the
Danilo Pine. And when final judgment had been
effectivity of Batas Pambansa, Blg. 129,
rendered by the CFI of Cavite against
enacted on August 10, 1981, which transferred
respondents and a writ of execution issued by
the jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
the trial court, the private respondents, thru the
judgment to the Court of Appeals, it was
same counsel, Atty. Pine even instituted a
deemed necessary if only to bring light and
petition for certiorari and mandamus to enjoin
settle the existing confusion and chaos among
the execution of the judgment of the Cavite
judges of the different courts of first instance
court. Respondents now allege that they have
and their branches concerning the application of
not authorized Atty. Danilo Pine to appear in
the old laws on jurisdiction and venue over this
their behalf as defendants in Case No. TM-223
kind of action. Probably, this confusion was the
or to file the petition for certiorari with the
underlying reason of the Legislature behind the
appellate court. Such allegation is devoid of
transfer of jurisdiction over annulment of
merit.
judgments from the trial courts to the Court of
Appeals under B.P. 129. An attorney is presumed to be properly
authorized to represent any cause in which he
Even if We were to disregard, for the sake of
appears, and no written power of attorney is
argument, the issue on jurisdiction of and venue
required to authorize him to appear in court for
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal in the
his client (Sec. 21, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
annulment suit, We found, upon perusal of the
The fact that private respondents had not
records, that no sufficient grounds exist to justify
personally appeared in the hearings of Case
the annulment of the final judgment of the Cavite
TM-223 in the trial court is immaterial. The filing
court. Certain requisites must be established
of the answer by and appearance of Atty. Danilo
before a judgment can be the subject of an
Pine in their behalf are sufficient to give private
action for annulment. A judgment can be
respondents standing in court. It is hard to
annulled only on two grounds: (a) the judgment
believe that a counsel who has no personal
is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due
interest in the case would fight for and defend a
 LEGAL ETHICS ACJUCO 54

case with persistence and vigor if he had not

been authorized or employed by the party
concerned. It is obvious that since the appellate
court had decided adversely against private
respondents in their petition for certiorari, the
latter filed the annulment suit for a second
chance at preventing petitioners from enforcing
the decision rendered by the Cavite court in
favor of the latter.
It is an important fundamental principle in Our
judicial system that every litigation must come to
an end. Access to the courts is guaranteed. But
there must be a limit thereto. Once a litigant's
rights have been adjudicated in a valid final
judgment of a competent court, he should not be
granted an unbridled license to come back for
another try. The prevailing party should not be
harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless
litigations were to be encouraged, unscrupulous
litigants will multiply in number to the detriment
of the administration of justice (Ngo Bun Tiong
v. Sayo, supra; Pacquing v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. 52498, July 19, 1982, 115 SCRA 117).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and
the respondent judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (now Regional Trial Court) is
ORDERED to dismiss Civil Case No. C-2442.
The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.