FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129594. March 7, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUNNIFER

LAURENTE y ACEBEDO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Accused-appellant Junnifer Laurente was charged with the crime of rape in an information
which reads:

That on or about February 22, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused by means of force,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
(sic) the complainant, Anna Liza Villamor, who is 21 years of age, against her will.

Contrary to law.[1]

The prosecutions version of the incident is as follows:

Complainant Anna Liza Villamor was the househelp of spouses Jerwin and Jane Carabio,
residents of Emilia Homes, Cabantian, Davao. Accused-appellant, who is the elder brother of
Jane Carabio, was living with the spouses in their house. The house had two rooms, one
occupied by the spouses and their two children, and the other room by complainant. Accused-
appellant sleeps in the living room.
At about 2:00 oclock in the early morning of February 22, 1996, complainant was allegedly
awakened by the knocking on the door by accused-appellant who wanted to get something from
the room. When she opened the door, accused-appellant went inside and locked the
door. Accused-appellant allegedly embraced complainant from behind with his left hand on
complainants belly and his right hand covering her mouth. In the struggle to free herself from
accused-appellants embrace, she allegedly fell on the floor on her back with her face up. While
she was in that position, accused-appellant went on top of her. Complainant alleged that she tried
to resist to free herself but was unsuccessful. She could not shout for help as accused-appellant
was covering her mouth. Thereafter, accused-appellant removed complainants shorts and panties,
and proceeded to undress himself. He then succeeded in inserting his penis into complainants
vagina. She cried because of the pain but she could not shout as accused-appellant continued to
cover her mouth. Complainant could not remember how long accused-appellants penis stayed
inside her vagina. Thereafter, accused-appellant left the room without uttering a single word.
 After the incident, she could not sleep anymore and just cried. That same morning, at around
7:00 oclock, she performed her usual household chores. Her employers left for work at 8:00
oclock in the morning.Complainant was left in the house with the children.
At 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, complainant went to her mothers house in San Nicolas,
Buhangin, Davao, bringing with her the two children, and narrated to her mother what accused-
appellant did to her. Together, they went to the police station to report the incident. She and the
children went home at 6:00 oclock in the evening. Her employers were not yet there.
Accused-appellant arrived together with the Carabio spouses at about 10:00 oclock in the
evening. He was immediately arrested and brought to the police station. The following day,
complainant subjected herself to a medical examination by Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma who,
thereafter, issued a medical certificate[2] with the following findings:

GENITAL EXAMINATION:

Pubic hair, fully grown, abundant. Labia majora and minora, gaping. Fourchette, lax,
with an abrasion, 0.3x0.3 cm. Vestibule, pinkish, smooth. Hymen, thick, tall with
healing, complete lacerations at 5 and 9 oclock positions corresponding to the face of
a watch, with edematous, non-coaptable edges which bled on slight
manipulation. Hymenal orifice, originally annular, admits a tube 2.5 cms. in
diameter. Vaginal walls, tight. Rugosities, prominent.

CONCLUSIONS:

1.) No evident signs of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject
at the time of examination.

2.) Healing hymenal lacerations, present.

REMARKS: Semenology: Negative for spermatozoa.

Dr. Ledesma suggested that the abrasion and the lax fourchette of complainant may be
caused not only when the sexual act was performed forcibly but also when the same was
mutually done by the two parties.
On the other hand, accused-appellant claimed that he has known complainant since 1981,
when the latter became his neighbor. He started staying with the Carabio spouses in their house
in Emilia Homes in December 1995. The house had only two bedrooms, one occupied by the
Carabio family and the other occupied by complainant. Usually, accused-appellant sleeps in the
living room while complainant occupies the bedroom, but sometimes, he sleeps inside the room
while complainant sleeps in the living room. After some time, he became uncomfortable sleeping
in the living room and began to spend the night in the same bedroom as complainant. He
occupied the upper bunk of the double-deck bed while complainant stayed on the lower bunk. He
became close to complainant to the extent that they often talked about personal
matters. Complainant even volunteered to wash his clothes.
 Accused-appellant further testified that sometime in the early part of February 1996, the
stocks for his business arrived and, since there was no other room to keep them, he placed the
goods on the upper bunk of the double-deck bed. Thus, he asked complainant if he can sleep
beside her on the lower bunk and the latter agreed. On February 14, 1996, he greeted
complainant Happy Valentines Day and jokingly asked for a kiss, but she told him to kiss his
sweetheart. That evening, accused-appellant and complainant again shared the lower bunk of the
double-deck bed and, while they were lying side by side, complainant allegedly rested her head
on his arm. He placed his leg on top of complainant, and she did not object. Instead, she
embraced him. He touched her breast, and they both went to sleep.
On February 16, 1996, they again slept on the same bed. Complainant again rested her head
on accused-appellants arm. He felt warm and embraced her. She turned around to face him. He
continued embracing and caressing her, which tickled complainant. She also embraced and
caressed him. When he touched her breast, he felt that her nipples were hard. He then placed his
hand on top of her vagina, which caused her to spread her legs. He felt that her vagina was
wet. Complainant then touched his penis. After that, they both went to sleep.
Accused-appellant and complainant repeated the same things --- kissing, embracing and
touching --- on the subsequent nights that they slept together. On February 20, 1996,
complainant masturbated him. The following night, February 21, 1996, accused-appellant raised
her dress and found that she was not wearing a bra. They started to kiss, and complainant took
off her shorts. Accused-appellant touched her vagina. He pulled down her panties up to her knee,
and she removed it. He also removed his shorts and placed himself on top of her. She then spread
her legs and he tried to insert his penis into her vagina. She made no objection. She told accused-
appellant to do it slowly because it was painful. Thereafter, both of them put on their clothes and
went to sleep.
In the evening of February 22, 1996, while accused-appellant was detained at the police
station, he was able to talk with complainant. She told him that she wants him to marry her.
The trial court gave more credence to complainants version. It noted that the defense did not
impute malice on the part of complainant and failed to prove that she filed this case for
harassment. Moreover, it found the testimonies of accused-appellants witnesses to be tainted
with bias. Finally, the trial court applied the rule that rape can be committed inside a house even
while there are other people asleep. Thus, on January 3, 1997, it rendered judgment convicting
accused-appellant of rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, Junnifer Laurente is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify Ana (sic) Liza Villamor Fifty Thousand Pesos.[3]

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before this Court, raising the following assignment
of errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE FALSE AND
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT AND OTHER WITNESSES FOR
THE PROSECUTION.
 II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDING OF FACTS NOT SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE AND IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS BASED ON SURMISES,
CONJECTURES AND SPECULATIONS.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED THROUGH THE
USE OF FORCE HAD CARNAL KNOWLEDGE WITH PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED HAD CARNAL
KNOWLEDGE AGAINST THE WILL OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF RAPE INSTEAD OF UPHOLDING HIS INNOCENCE BASED ON THE
EVIDENCE AND LAW.[4]
The only issue before this Court is whether the guilt of accused-appellant was proved by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellees Brief asking for
the reversal of the trial courts decision and the acquittal of accused-appellant. He pointed out that
complainants testimony failed to meet the exacting degree of credibility sufficient to inspire
belief beyond reasonable doubt due to inconsistencies in her answers in the direct and cross-
examinations, and between her oral testimony and her sworn statement.
In the resolution of rape cases, the trial court is guided by the following principles: (1) to
accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove it is difficult though the accused may be innocent;
(2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of
rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and not be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[5]
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment by R.A. 8353 (the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997), provides:

When and how rape is committed. -- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. . .

Accused-appellant does not deny that he tried to have sexual intercourse with
complainant. The question, therefore, is whether the element of force was present in the sexual
intercourse between accused-appellant and complainant as charged in the Information.
This Court has ruled that the test of sufficiency of force or intimidation in rape is whether it
produces a reasonable fear in the victim that if she resists or does not give in to the sexual
demands of the accused, the threat would be carried out.[6]
 We do not find the presence of force in this case. There was no testimony that complainant
was ever threatened by accused-appellant. In fact, in her direct testimony, complainant testified
that after the supposed rape, accused-appellant simply left the room without uttering any word to
her.[7] She affirmed her testimony in the cross-examination, thus:
Atty. Ilagan:
xxxxxxxxx
Q. By the way after the accused removed his penis from your vagina, he immediately left the room?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he not say anything that time when he made the push and pull movement?
A. None, sir.
Q. So you mean to say that from the time you fell down on the floor after accused grabbed you up to
the time he left the room he did not say anything?
A. None, sir.
Q. When he left the room you did not shout?
A. No, sir, because I was weak.
Q. Did the accused box you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did the accused kick you?
A. No, sir.
Q. He was just only holding your hands?
A. Yes, sir.[8]
Significantly, complainant also admitted that accused-appellant was not even armed at the
time of the alleged assault. In her cross-examination, she testified:
Atty. Ilagan:
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Was the accused armed during that time?
A. No, sir.
Q. He was not bring (sic) anything like knife (sic)?
Court: The court is satisfied.[9]
In view of the absence of threat or force, it is difficult to believe complainants assertion that
when accused-appellant embraced her, forcibly removed her shorts and panties and forcibly
entered her vagina, she resisted and tried to free herself.[10] In prosecutions for rape, the testimony
of the victim is generally scrutinized with great caution, for the crime is usually known only to
her and the accused. Indeed, it is well-settled that conviction always rests on the strength of the
evidence of the state, never on the weakness of the defense.[11]
 Moreover, complainants assertion that she resisted and accused-appellant used force is
doubtful considering the lack of physical evidence to prove that she resisted his advances. The
medical examination conducted the following day shows that there were no evident signs of
extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination.[12]
Granting that complainant was forced to perform the sexual act on account of threats from
accused-appellant, the same became suspect because of her behavior after the alleged rape. In her
direct examination, she testified that after the incident, she performed her usual duties in the
kitchen.[13] In fact, she even went on an errand at Avon Cosmetics and dropped entries for the
Sarimanok Promo of ABS-CBN for her female employer.[14] Her actuation is not the normal
reaction of an outraged woman whose virginity had just been violated.
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that a womans conduct immediately after the
alleged assault is of critical value in gauging the truth of her accusations. It must coincide with
logic and experience.[15] True, she should not be expected to act in a particular manner, for after
all, people react differently to a given situation; still, this Court finds it hard to believe that she
would act normally so soon after a harrowing incident.
Moreover, prosecution witness Police Officer Rodolfo Clapis testified that complainant kept
quiet throughout the investigation.[16] She did not exhibit any outrage or manifest any emotion
when she came face to face with the person who allegedly violated her honor.
In People v. Docdoc,[17] it was stressed that:

It is our ruling case law that the testimony of the offended party in crimes against
chastity should not be received with precipitate credulity for the charge can be easily
concocted. We exercise the greatest degree of care and caution before giving full faith
and credit to the testimony of complainant. We have not hesitated to reverse
judgments of conviction when there are strong indications pointing to the possibility
that the rape charges are false.Nor have we sustained convictions when the
complainants conduct towards her alleged offender runs counter to human nature or
appears uncharacteristic of a victim of such an abominable act.

For the prosecution to succeed, it is imperative that the complainants testimony be not only
believable but must spring from the mouth of a credible witness which common experience can
probe under the circumstances.[18] In rape cases, an accused may be convicted solely on the
testimony of the complaining witness provided her testimony is credible, natural, convincing and
consistent with human nature. Hence, the complainants credibility becomes the single most
important issue.[19]
In this case, complainants narration of how she was raped falls short of the above-cited
criteria. As underscored by the Solicitor General, it was almost impossible for accused-appellant
to remove complainants shorts and panties with such ease using only his left hand because his
right hand was allegedly covering her mouth all the time, and considering also that she was
supposedly kicking and struggling at that time. Moreover, if it was true that accused-appellant
undressed her with his left hand and covered her mouth with his right hand, that would have left
complainants hands free, allowing her to ward off accused-appellants advances. Yet, she did
nothing, despite the absence of threats and the lack of a weapon on accused-appellants part, or of
any showing that she was paralyzed with fear.[20]
Similarly, in the recent case of People v. Docdoc,[21] we rejected private complainants claim
that accused-appellant was able to rape her while his hand was covering her mouth, thus:

xxx. Malou would now have this Court believe that during all this time, the appellant's
hand covered her mouth, preventing her from shouting for help. However, based on
Malou's account, it would take superb acrobatic skill for the appellant to have carried
out such an elaborate sexual act on an unwilling victim, without removing his hand
over her mouth. Malou's claim simply goes against human experience.[22]

For evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. The test to determine the value of the testimony of
a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of
mankind. Whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of
judicial cognizance.[23]
Complainants credibility is further eroded by inconsistencies between her sworn statement,
on the one hand, and her court testimony, on the other hand. In her sworn statement, she stated:
That Junnifer, once inside, reclosed and locked the door and windows and suddenly grabbed me
by the arm, covered my mouth with a piece of cloth and without a word begun touching my
private parts --- from my breast down to my sexual organ.[24] In her testimony during cross-
examination, however, complainant insisted that accused-appellant only locked the door but not
the window. She admitted that her affidavit does not state that particular event correctly.She
further admitted that accused-appellant did not touch her private parts but instead immediately
proceeded to remove her shorts and panty.[25] Also, she alleged in her sworn statement that it took
hours before she regained consciousness, after which she immediately went home to San Nicolas
and confided the incident to her my mother who, in turn, brought her to the police
precinct.[26] However, she refuted herself in open court when she declared that her statement in
her affidavit that she lost consciousness was not true.[27]
While the above inconsistencies do not directly touch on the whys and wherefores of the
alleged crime, it is difficult to nonchalantly dismiss them outright taking into consideration her
assertion in her oral testimony that what she stated to in her affidavit were actually not true. Her
declarations, taken together with her other inconsistent statements on direct and cross-
examination, as well as her actuations after the supposed rape, all betray her lack of
trustworthiness and credibility. Significantly, the prosecution did not attempt to offer any
plausible explanation to these conflicting statements made by complainant herself.
Moreover, it would have been unnatural for accused-appellant to go home that night if he
really did something wrong. The logical post-incident impulse of a criminal is to distance
himself from his victim as far as and as soon as practicable to avoid suspicion, discovery and
apprehension.[28]
 Finally, the observation of the prosecutor, as contained in his resolution[29] after conducting
the initial inquest proceedings, further reinforces the doubt of this Court as to the guilt of
accused-appellant, thus:

Complainant admitted during clarificatory, that after the reported incident, she did her
usual household chores in her employers house. That she even went downtown on
some personal business and also did an errand for her employer. But she denied the
allegation that respondent sleeps in the same room where she sleeps. However, during
the initial inquest proceedings, complainant actually admitted to the undersigned
Inquest Prosecutor that respondent used to sleep in the same room with her two (2)
months prior to the incident.

When complainant was presented during inquest, she was observed to be acting in a
carefree and jovial manner. Only her accompanying relatives were acting in a serious
manner. This behaviour of complainant is so inconsistent with one who had
undergone a supposed recent traumatic sex experience. Even her unusual behaviour of
doing her usual household chores after the supposed rape is quite puzzling. Equally
puzzling was her failure to shout for help, create some noise or commotion during the
supposed sexual assault, if only to attract the attention of the occupants of the other
room, so that help may come her way.

But while the foregoing observation may pose doubts on complainants credibility, its
degree cannot however overcome her positive statement that despite her attempts to
resist and struggle, respondent succeeded in forcibly inserting his sexual organ to hers,
an act constituting the crime of Rape. Whether she was in fact raped by respondent or
the event was induced by mutual attraction and desire as alleged by respondent,
should be left for the Court to decide.

Doctrinally, the trial court is deemed to be in a better position to decide the question of
credibility, because it heard the witnesses and observed their behavior and manner of
testifying. Hence, its factual findings are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal, unless, there is a clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of
the case.[30]
In this case, however, there is a clear showing that the trial court overlooked the absence of
the element of force, the inconsistent and conflicting declarations of complainant both in her oral
testimony and in her sworn statement, her actuations after the supposed rape, her actuation
towards her alleged rapist, the observation of the inquest prosecutor, and the lack of physical
evidence to support her claims of force and resistance. The combination of all the above is more
than sufficient to cast doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant.
There should be no mistake, however, that this Court, by its findings and opinion, totally
accepts accused-appellants version of the incident. If there is any truth to complainants
assertions, this Courts opinion should not be viewed as condoning what was done. It simply
means that the prosecution was not able to establish the immutable requisite of proof beyond
reasonable doubt in order to obtain conviction. Truly, this Court can guess and theorize on what
really happened on the day in question, or speculate on the motives why the charges have been
filed, but in the process, this Court will be treading on the realm of conjecture. This is simply not
allowed. In criminal prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is tangible,
verifiable and in harmony with the usual course of human experience and not by mere conjecture
or speculation. While guilt should not escape, innocence should not suffer.[31]
Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical;
sympathy for the victim and admiration for her for publicly seeking retribution for her
outrageous misfortune, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law
and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities and deal
with it with extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural
tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused and
demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and
humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in
mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.[32]
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt
must be established by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, then it is
not only the accuseds right to be freed; it is, even more, the courts constitutional duty to acquit
him.[33]
WHEREFORE, for failure to prove the guilt of accused-appellant Junnifer Laurente y
Acebedo beyond reasonable doubt, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Davao
City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, another one is rendered
ACQUITTING him of the crime of rape.
The Director of Prisons is directed to immediately RELEASE accused-appellant from
custody, unless he is being lawfully held for some other charge and to report to this Court the
action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

[1]
Records, p. 1.
[2]
Ibid., p. 7.
[3]
Decision penned by Judge Jesus V. Quitain, Rollo, p. 23.
[4]
Brief for Appellant, Rollo, pp. 55-56.
[5]
People v. Hofilena, G.R. No. 134772, June 22, 2000.
[6]
People v. San Diego, G.R. No. 129297, March 17, 2000.
[7]
TSN, August 26, 1996, p. 35.
[8]
Id., p. 53.
[9]
TSN, August 26, 1996, p. 50.
[10]
Id., pp. 34-35.
[11]
People v. Ibay, 312 SCRA 153 [1999].
[12]
Records, p. 7.
[13]
TSN, August, 26, 1996, p. 36.
[14]
Id., p. 53.
[15]
People v. Ablaneda, 314 SCRA 334 [1999].
[16]
TSN, July 17, 1996, p. 20.
[17]
G.R. No. 134679, August 8, 2000.
[18]
People v. Baldevieso, 314 SCRA 803 [1999].
[19]
People v. Docdoc, supra.
[20]
Rollo, p. 187.
[21]
Supra.
[22]
People v. Docdoc, supra.
[23]
People v. San Juan, G.R. No. 130969, February 29, 2000.
[24]
Records, p. 5.
[25]
TSN, August 26, 1996, pp. 48-49.
[26]
Records, p. 5.
[27]
TSN, August, 26, 1996, p. 51.
[28]
People v. San Juan, supra.
[29]
Records, p. 4.
[30]
People v. Ibay, supra.
[31]
People v. Baldevieso, supra.
[32]
People v. Ladrillo, 320 SCRA 61 [1999].
[33]
People v. San Juan, supra.

G.R. No. 175842

NILO MACAYAN, JR. y MALANA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari praying that the assailed Decision dated June 31, 2006 of the Court
1

of Appeals be reversed and set aside and that a new one be rendered acquitting petitioner Nilo Macayan, Jr.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification (by increasing the duration of the penalty)
the Decision dated November 15, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, which found Nilo Macayan, Jr.
2

(Macayan) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery.

In the Information dated February 20, 2001, Macayan was charged with robbery as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of February 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to gain and
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob / divest one ANNIE UY
JAO of the amount of P4,000.00 in cash in the manner as follows: on the date and in the place afore-mentioned, said
accused threatened complainant that he would destroy her and her entire family and that he will have her and
members of her family kidnapped unless she gives to him the amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency and
thereafter negotiated with said Annie Uy Jao at McDonald’s located at Quezon Avenue, this City, thus creating fear in
the mind of said complainant who was compelled to give as in fact she gave and delivered to the accused the amount
of P4,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Annie Uy Jao in the amount aforementioned.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01-98670 and raffled to Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City. 4

During trial, the prosecution presented as it witnesses: Annie Uy Jao, the private complainant; Rodrigo Mapoy, team
leader of the NBI operatives who conducted the supposed entrapment operation that led to Macayan’s arrest; and
Resurreccion R. Bajado, a forensic chemist. Macayan was the sole witness for the defense. 5

Annie Uy Jao (Jao) is the owner of Lanero Garments Ext (Lanero). In 1995, she hired Macayan as a sample cutter
and to undertake materials purchasing for her garments business. 6

In her testimony, Jao acknowledged that in 2000, when her business was doing poorly, she allowed her employees to
accept engagements elsewhere to augment their income, provided they prioritize their work at Lanero. It came to her
attention that Macayan and his wife (also an employee at Lanero) accepted work for a rival company. Thus, Jao
confronted Macayan to impress upon him the need to prioritize work at Lanero. Macayan still took his work at Lanero
for granted, so Jao confronted him again. In this confrontation, Macayan allegedly responded, "Kung gusto mo,
bayaran mo na lang ako at aalis ako." Macayan then stopped reporting for work. 7

Following this, Jao was surprised to find out that Macayan had filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against her
(docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-09-05057-00). Several conferences were set for this illegal dismissal case.
Immediately after the postponement of the conference on February 12, 2001, Macayan allegedly threatened Jao that
her family would be harmed and/or kidnapped if she did not give him 200,000.00. Marjorie Angel (Angel), Jao’s
secretary, was supposedly present when she was threatened. The following day, Macayan allegedly called Jao to
reiterate his threat and to specify the time and place — February 16, 2001, sometime between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. at
McDonald’s Banawe Branch — in which the 200,000.00 should be handed to him. Jao claimed that she was sure it
was Macayan speaking to her, as the person on the phone addressed her as "Madam," which was how he
customarily called her. 8

Fearing for her family’s safety, Jao sought assistance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). She asked that
an entrapment operation be set up. The NBI operatives asked her to prepare bills totalling 4,000.00 to be marked and
used in the operation. 9

On February 16, 2001, Jao, Angel, and the NBI operatives arrived at McDonald’s Banawe. They stayed there for
about 30 minutes before Macayan called Angel and told her that they were to meet at McDonald’s Quezon Avenue
instead. They arrived there at about 7:30 p.m. Macayan called Angel again and told her that he was moving the
venue to McDonald’s EDSA. They then proceeded to McDonald’s EDSA and waited for Macayan, while the NBI
operatives waited outside. Macayan arrived and proceeded to where Jao and Angel were seated. Jao handed him an
envelope containing the marked bills. Macayan pulled the bills halfway out of the envelope, and the NBI operatives
accosted him. 10

Prosecution witness Rodrigo Mapoy, team leader of the NBI operatives who arrested Macayan, testified to the
circumstances before and the conduct of the entrapment operation. The testimony of forensic chemist Resurreccion
R. Bajado regarding the marked bills handed to Macayan was subject of a joint stipulation by the prosecution and the
defense. 11

Macayan, testifying for himself, emphasized that he enjoyed a relatively trouble-free employment with Lanero.
However, sometime in 1999, after his wife gave birth to their first child, he discovered that Jao had not been remitting
required premiums to the Social Security System. 12

On August 18, 2000, as his child was confined in a hospital, Macayan inquired with Jao regarding his Medicare
benefits. This displeased Jao. The following day, she prevented him from performing his tasks at work. Construing
this as harassment, he stopped reporting for work. 13

Thereafter, Macayan filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Jao. In the course of the proceedings for this illegal
dismissal case, no less than 11 conferences/hearings were set. As evidenced by these conferences’ minutes or
constancias, at no instance did Jao ever attend, as it was either her legal counsel or Angel who did so. Macayan
recalled that in one of these conferences, he expressed to Angel his willingness to settle the case for 40,000.00. 14

On February 16, 2001, at about 9:00 a.m., Angel called Macayan. She told him that Jao was ready to settle the illegal
dismissal case. She added that Jao wanted to pay him already, as Jao was leaving for Hong Kong. Angel set a
rendezvous later in the day at McDonald’s Banawe. At about 11:00 a.m., Angel called him again, resetting the
rendezvous to McDonald’s EDSA. She even reasoned that this venue was more convenient for her since she was
going home to Zambales. 15

Macayan arrived at the agreed venue at about 9:00 p.m. He saw Angel standing outside McDonald’s. He approached
Angel, who then accompanied him inside and led him to a four-seat corner table. He was surprised to see Jao
present. Jao then brought out of her bag a piece of paper indicating that Macayan received the settlement amount for
the illegal dismissal case. Macayan signed this as he was of the understanding that this was necessary to the
settlement. Jao then pulled out a white envelope, handed it to Macayan, and told him to count its contents. While
counting the contents, a flash bulb went on somewhere to his right. Then, a man who claimed to be an NBI operative
struck a blow on the right side of Macayan’s face and told him, "Tatanga-tanga ka. Pupunta ka rito ng walang
kasama, ikaw ngayon ang me [sic] kaso." 16

Handcuffed, he was taken aboard a minivan and physically abused. He was taken to several police stations in the
hope that an inquest fiscal was available. It was only at 10:00 a.m. of the following day that an inquest fiscal,
Prosecutor Hilda Ibuyan, became available. 17

The Information charging him with robbery dated February 20, 2001 was then prepared, and the criminal case
(docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01-98670) was filed and raffled to Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City.

In the meantime, on October 31, 2001, the illegal dismissal case was decided in Macayan’s favor by Labor Arbiter
Daisy G. Cauton-Barcelona. A total of 186,632.00 was awarded to him. On appeal, the National Labor Relations
18

Commission would find that Macayan was entitled to unpaid benefits though he was legally dismissed. The Decision
of the National Labor Relations Commission was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals with modification as
to the applicable rate of interest.
19

After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City rendered the Decision convicting Macayan of robbery. The trial
20

court found the prosecution’s version of events "from the time of the telephone overtures of the Accused which is
consistent with the elements of intimidation and/or extortion, up to complainant Annie Uy Jao’s reporting the matter to
the NBI, to the time of the NBI entrapment" as "ring[ing] a loud bell of truth and consistency, not to say credibility." It
21

accorded the presumption of regularity to the entrapment operation and held that the forensic findings connecting the
marked money to Macayan militated against his defense. 22

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court, therefore, finds the Accused GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the
crime of robbery and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty (there being no mitigating/aggravating
circumstance) of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of ARRESTO MAYOR as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS,
TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as maximum.
Lastly the P4,000.00 marked money exhibit, which has been claimed to be owned by the private complainant, is
ORDERED RELEASED to her after the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

23

Macayan then appealed to the Court of Appeals. He filed his Appellant’s Brief on August 25, 2004.
24

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines at the appellate stage, did not file an
appellee’s brief. Instead, it filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee’s Brief recommending that Macayan
25

be acquitted. It asserted that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

Noting that Jao was never present in any of the conferences for the illegal dismissal case and that the sole witness
who could confirm if she was indeed threatened or intimidated on or immediately after such an occasion (i.e., Angel)
was never presented, the Office of the Solicitor General asserted that the fourth requisite of the offense of robbery
(i.e., violence against or intimidation of a person) could not have been made by Macayan on the occasion of a
conference for the illegal dismissal case. It added that the other occasion when Macayan was supposed to have
threatened Jao was equally dubious since Jao’s sole reason for claiming that it was Macayan speaking to her (i.e.,
her having been addressed as "Madam") was insufficient to ascertain that person’s identity. 26

On July 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division rendered the assailed Decision affirming Macayan’s
27

conviction and increasing the duration of the penalty imposed. It reasoned that Jao’s sole, uncorroborated testimony
was nevertheless positive and credible. As regards Jao’s having been threatened after the postponement of the
February 12, 2001 conference in the illegal dismissal case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that constancias are "not
the best evidence of attendance" and that, in any case, Jao was threatened after and not during the conference.
28

The dispositive portion of this Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, in Criminal
Case No. Q-01- 98670 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

29

On December 18, 2006, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division rendered the Resolution denying Macayan’s Motion for
30

Reconsideration. 31

Hence, this Petition was filed. 32

Asked by this court to file a Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General instead filed a Manifestation and Motion to
33

adopt as its Comment the same Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee’s Brief that it filed with the Court of
Appeals. Thus, the Office of the Solicitor General reiterated its position that Macayan’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
has not been established and that he must be acquitted.

On September 11, 2007, Macayan filed the Manifestation in Lieu of Reply in view of the Office of the Solicitor
34

General’s earlier Manifestation and Motion.

For resolution is the sole issue of whether Macayan’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt has been established.

We reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals and acquit petitioner Nilo Macayan, Jr. of the charge of robbery.

Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies the requisite quantum of evidence in criminal cases:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his
guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the strength of its
own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be
35

"presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that
36

lays such burden upon the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of
37

course, that an accused must be acquitted. As explained in Basilio v. People of the Philippines: 38

We ruled in People v. Ganguso:

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due
process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he
would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as,
excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible
for the offense charged.

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the weakness of the
defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence. (Citations omitted)
39

II

The determination of the guilt of an accused hinges on how a court appreciates evidentiary matters in relation to the
requisites of an offense. Determination of guilt is, thus, a fundamentally factual issue.

This court, however, is not a trier of facts. Consistent with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, "[a]s a rule, only questions of
law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45." More specifically, "in a
40

criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially
when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record." 41

Nevertheless, there are exceptions allowing this court to overturn the factual findings with which it is confronted.
Speaking specifically of criminal cases, this court stated in People of the Philippines v. Esteban that "in exceptional
42

circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters . . . this Court will re-calibrate
and evaluate the factual findings of the [lower courts]." Below are the recognized exceptions to the general rule
43

binding this court to the factual findings of lower courts:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
 (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record. (Emphasis supplied)
44

Here, Macayan asserts that the lower courts committed a serious misapprehension of facts, thereby wrongly
concluding that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. He argues that the evidence adduced by the prosecution falls
seriously short of the quantum of evidence required to convict him. He specifically draws attention to the following:

First, Jao’s claim that, immediately after the postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference in the illegal
dismissal case and in the presence of Angel, Macayan threatened to harm and/or kidnap the members of her family,
despite the records in the same case showing that Jao never attended any of the 11 conferences that were set or
conducted;

Second, the prosecution’s unjustified failure to present Angel as a witness and its sole reliance on Jao’s testimony,
considering that it was Angel who can confirm if, indeed, Macayan threatened Jao’s family immediately after the
postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference;

Third, Jao’s reliance on nothing more than how she was addressed as "Madam" by the person speaking to her on the
phone as basis for concluding that it must have been Macayan who was supposedly calling and threatening her and
her family;

Fourth, the inconsistency and absurdity of Jao’s conduct in considering Macayan’s threats of such serious nature that
she needed to report it to the National Bureau of Investigation for the prospective conduct of an entrapment
operation, and yet not telling her husband about the threats simply because he would easily get annoyed; and

Lastly, the inconsistent claims of Jao and prosecution witness Rodrigo Mapoy, the NBI operations team leader, as to
who Macayan called on the evening of February 16, 2001 to reset the rendezvous to McDonald’s EDSA. Jao claimed
that Macayan called Angel, while Rodrigo Mapoy claimed that Macayan called Jao herself.

Macayan’s position is buttressed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the public institution otherwise charged with
the task of pursuing the prosecution’s case on appeal. As the Office of the Solicitor General stated:

In the instant case, however, clues of untruthfulness in the testimony of Annie Uy Jao are abundant while incentives
for fabrication of a story [are] not wanting. The only way to eliminate any doubt in Annie Uy Jao’s assertions would
have been to find independent confirmation from the other sources, as by way of unambiguous testimony of a
competent and credible witness. Sadly, no such confirmation could be had as the prosecution’s evidence on the most
crucial elements of the crime was limited to that testified on by Annie Uy Jao.

It is respectfully submitted that had the trial court seen and understood these realities laid on clearly in the records of
this case, it would have concluded reasonable doubt as to acquit appellant. (Underscoring in the original)
45

The position taken by the Office of the Solicitor General has resulted in the peculiar situation where it is not the
prosecution but, effectively, the trial court and the Court of Appeals arguing for Macayan’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

With the backdrop of these assertions, we deem it proper to reevaluate the factual findings and the conclusions
reached by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

III
Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code provides for who are guilty of robbery:

ARTICLE 293. Who are Guilty of Robbery. — Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property
belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall
be guilty of robbery.

Accordingly, the following elements must be established to sustain a conviction for robbery:

1)there is a taking of personal property [i.e., unlawful taking]; 2) the personal property belongs to another; 3) the
taking is with animus lucrandi [i.e., intent to gain]; and 4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons
or with force upon things. 46

As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the "bone of contention" centers on the elements of unlawful
47

taking and of violence against or intimidation of persons. This is precisely Macayan’s contention: that he neither
intimidated nor threatened Jao, and that he could not have unlawfully taken money from her on account of any act of
intimidation and/or threats made by him.

Consistent with the rule on burden of proof, the requisite quantum of evidence in criminal cases, and in light of the
points highlighted by both Macayan and the Office of the Solicitor General, we find that the prosecution failed to
establish Macayan’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, a reversal of the rulings of the trial court and Court of
Appeals is in order. Macayan must be acquitted.

As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the resolution of this case hinges on whether Jao was
indeed threatened and/or intimidated by Macayan into giving him money, that is, whether he extorted money from
Jao. Per Jao’s own testimony, there were two (2) instances in which she was threatened and/or intimidated: first,
immediately after the postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference in the illegal dismissal case; and second,
when Macayan called her on February 13, 2001 and set a rendezvous for handing over the extorted money.

Contrary to the conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we find Jao’s testimony regarding these
occasions (and ultimately, the presence of the requisite of violence against or intimidation of a person) dubious and
unreliable.

Macayan and the Office of the Solicitor General are one in pointing out that the records of NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-
09-05057-00 are bereft of any indication that Jao was present in any of the 11 conferences held or set (only to be
postponed even if both parties were represented). The defense introduced as its Exhibits "2" to "12" the minutes
and/or constancias of these conferences. Exhibit "2" was the minutes/constancia of the February 12, 2001
conference. During his testimony, Macayan specifically referred to this document as proof that he never saw, met, or
spoke to Jao on the occasion of or immediately after the conference set on that date:

Q:Mr. Witness, you were present when complaining witness Annie Uy Jao told this Honorable Court that sometime on
February 12, 2001, during the hearing of the labor case in the NLRC, at Banawe, Quezon City, you threatened her
that you will kidnap her and her family if she will not give P200,000.00. What can you say about this?

A: That is not true, Sir.

Q: Why did you say there is no truth in it?

A: Because we did not meet on February 12.

Q: Do you mean to tell this Honorable Court that Annie Uy Jao was not present during the hearing of that case?

A: She was not there.

Q: Has she an [sic] representative?

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Who is that?

A: Marjorie Angel, the secretary.

Q: Do you have any proof that she was not present?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q:I am showing to you constancia, date of hearing 2/12/03. Will you please examine this document. Does it have
anything to do with what you said?

A: This is the Minutes of Hearing on February 12, 2001.

Atty. Oliva: We would like to request that this constancia be marked as Exhibit "2."

Court: Mark it. On its face, this is a form by the NLRC containing the caption, the name of the parties and the case
number, date of hearing and the time.

Atty. Oliva: Mr. Witness, there are signature [sic] below this constancia, complaining witness, there is a signature
above the complainant.

A:This is my signature and this is the signature of Marjorie Angel.

Q: How do you know that this is her signature[?]

A: Because I was with her for five (5) months. 48

Jao’s absence in the intended conference (though subsequently postponed despite both parties to the illegal
dismissal case being represented) places serious doubt on the occurrence of the supposed first instance of
intimidation on February 12, 2001.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that a constancia "would not be the best evidence of attendance in any of the
National Labor Relations Commission hearings." It added that, in any case, the act of intimidation happened after,
49

and not during, the conference. This is a strained consideration of the facts of this case.

First, consistent with the presumption "[t]hat official duty has been regularly performed" and "[t]hat a person takes
50

ordinary care of his concerns," both the personnel of the Labor Arbiter’s office who prepared the minutes of the
51

February 12, 2001 conference and the persons who signed it must be considered as having taken the necessary care
to make it a faithful and accurate record of what transpired and of who were present in the conference. Thus, the
minutes’ indication that only Angel was present should be taken as accurate and reliable absent any proof to the
contrary. If the principal, Jao, were present, there would not have been a need for Angel, her representative, to sign
in such capacity.

Second, much is made of how the threats were delivered after and not during the conference. To recall the
prosecution’s allegation, the intimidation took place immediately after the conference, outside the Labor Arbiter’s
office, along the corridor of the National Labor Relations Commission Building. As there was neither an appreciable
52

duration of time between the conference and the subsequent threatening exchange nor a significant distance
between where the conference was held and where the subsequent threatening exchange took place, it may be
deduced that whatever exchange, if any, that transpired must have been between those who were present at the
conference. Conversely, those who were absent from the conference must have been equally unavailable to engage
in an exchange with Macayan.

Apart from these, that the rest of the minutes of the illegal dismissal case shows that Jao never attended any
conference gives rise to the question of why she chose to be personally present in, of all conferences, the postponed
February 12 conference. If, indeed, she was present in this despite her absence in all others, some particular
significance must have characterized this conference, something that Jao has not accounted for. In any case, if there
was any particular significance to this February 12 conference, then, all the more, her presence or attendance should
have been indicated in the records.

Of course, many explanations — well within the realm of possibility — could be offered for why Jao’s attendance was
not indicated in the minutes. For instance, Jao could have simply chosen to wait outside the Labor Arbiter’s office, or
she could have declined from having her attendance specified in the minutes. What is crucial, however, this being a
criminal case, is for the prosecution to establish the guilt of an accused on the strength of its own evidence. Its case
must rise on its own merits. The prosecution carries the burden of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt; it
cannot merely rest on the relative likelihood of its claims. Any lacunae in its case gives rise to doubt as regards the
"fact[s] necessary to constitute the crime with which [an accused] is charged." 53

Here, there is serious doubt on whether Jao was actually threatened or intimidated at the time she specified. Thus,
there is serious doubt on the existence of the fourth requisite for robbery — violence against or intimidation of a
person — in relation to the alleged February 12, 2001 incident.

The prosecution could have addressed the deficiency in Jao’s allegation that she was threatened on February 12,
2001 by presenting as witness the other person who was supposedly present in the incident: Angel, Jao’s secretary.
However, she was never presented as a witness.

The Court of Appeals noted that corroborative testimony is dispensable; "the lack of it does not necessarily condemn
a lone witness’ recital of the crime for as long as that single witness’ testimony is credible."
54

People of the Philippines v. Cleopas, which the Court of Appeals cited, states that the testimony of a lone witness
55

"may suffice for conviction if found trustworthy and reliable."

56

Precisely, conviction resting on a singular testimony is warranted if this is, in the words of Cleopas, "trustworthy and
reliable," or, in the words of the Court of Appeals, "credible." This could not be said of Jao’s testimony. As
57 58

previously discussed, her very presence in the February 12, 2001 conference that she claimed to have been
immediately followed by Macayan’s threats, is in serious doubt. Nothing casts greater doubt on the reliability of Jao’s
claim than her having not been at the time and place of the supposed intimidation.

With the first alleged instance of intimidation being discredited, the prosecution is left to rely on the second supposed
instance of intimidation: the phone call made by Macayan to Jao on February 13, 2001, during which he not only
reiterated his threats but also set a rendezvous for the handover of the extorted money. Even this, however, is
doubtful.

The prosecution itself acknowledged that there is no basis for ascertaining the identity of Macayan as the caller other
than the caller’s use of "Madam" in addressing Jao. The following excerpt is taken from Jao’s direct examination:

Atty. Garena: Madam Witness, you said you received another call after February 12, 2001. Is that from the accused
or from another person?

A: From the accused.

Q: What was the call about?

A:He repeated the threat again that I have to give him P200,000.00 or else, he will harm y [sic] family; and he set a
place to give the money.

....

Court: The first word uttered by him. You narrated, more or less.

Did he introduce himself?

A: He never stated his name because he knew I know his name.

Court: That is your presumption, but what was the first word uttered by him and what was your reply, line by line[?]

A: He always calls me madam.

Court: You answer the question of the Court now. How did the conversation go?

A:He said, Madam, Kung hindi mo ibibigay sa akin ang P200,000.00, ipapakidnap ko ang pamilya mo. (Madam, if you
don’t give me that P200,000.00, I am going to ask somebody to kidnap you and your family.)

Court: That was the first line. Was that the end of the first line of the accused?

A:Those were the only words that he told me. I cannot say anything. I just put down the phone.

Court: After he said those lines, you put down the telephone?

A: After he said the date and time.

Court: The Court is asking you to narrate line by line. What he said. What you said.

A:If you will not give me P200,000.00, I will ask somebody to kidnap you, your child and your husband.

Court: That was the first line. Did you reply to him?

A:No, sir. I did not ask. The next line, he said he was going to wait for me at McDo Banawe at around 6:00 [to] 7:00 in
the evening.

Court: Did he state the date?

A: February 16.

Court: You are impressing to this Court that the accused had said two lines already without you uttering any word.
How did the accused knew [sic] that it is Annie Uy Jao on the other line?

A:Because the first word [sic] that I said, Hello, then he replied, Madam.

Court: You uttered the hello, that is why the accused recognized you on the line.

A:Yes, your Honor. Because he knew that only two persons are answering [sic] the phone, my secretary and
me. (Emphasis supplied)
59

The prosecution should have offered more convincing proof of the identity of the supposed caller. Even if it were true
that Macayan customarily addressed Jao as "Madam," merely being called this way by a caller does not ascertain
that he is the alleged caller. The prosecution never made an effort to establish how addressing Jao as "Madam" is a
unique trait of Macayan’s and Jao’s relationship. Other persons may be equally accustomed to calling her as such;
for instance, "Madam" may be Jao’s preferred manner of being addressed by her subordinates or employees.
Likewise, it was established that Macayan and Jao have known each other since 1995. Their relation was more than
that of employer and employee, as Jao was Macayan’s godmother in his wedding. 60

Certainly, Jao could have offered other, more reliable means of ascertaining that it was, indeed, Macayan with whom
she was conversing. The second alleged instance of intimidation is likewise cast in serious doubt. Left with no other
act of intimidation to rely on, the prosecution fails in establishing the fourth requisite of the crime of robbery.

Apart from these, another point underscores the unreliability of Jao’s allegations. As pointed out by Macayan and
acknowledged by the prosecution, Jao never saw it proper to warn her family, more specifically, her husband, of the
threat of being kidnapped. Nevertheless, she supposedly perceived Macayan’s alleged threat as being of such a
serious nature that she must not only report the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation, but also entreat its
officers to conduct an entrapment operation.

Jurisprudence has established the standard for appreciating the credibility of a witness’ claim:

[F]or evidence to be believed, however, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve under the circumstances.
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and
consistent with the experience of mankind. Whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies
outside of judicial cognizance.61

Jao’s inconsistent conduct, coupled with flimsy justifications for acting as she did, betrays the absurdity and
unreliability of her claims and ultimately, of her as a witness:

Court: You did not inform anybody about that call?

A: Only my secretary. She was beside me.

Court: What about your husband? At that time, where was he?

A: He was outside.

Court: Does he have a cellular phone at that time?

A: Only a pager.

Court: Did it not occur to you to inform your husband about the call?

A: No, your Honor.

Court: How about the words uttered to you in the Labor hearing, did you inform you [sic] husband?

A: No, your Honor.

Court: What was the reason?

A:I was afraid because he might accused (sic) me of what happened?

Court: This is a very private question. That date of hearing in the

NLRC, you slept together [with] your husband?

A: Yes, your Honor.

Court: That night, you did not inform him?

A: He knows about the labor case.

Court: You did not inform him about the extortion threat of the

Accused?

A: No, sir. 62
On cross examination, Jao explained:

Q: During the direct examination, the Honorable Court asked you whether you told this matter to your husband and
you said you did not?

A: I am not [the] type of person who don’t usually tell [sic] everything to my husband specially [sic] regarding things
like this because he is medyo makulit and I don’t want him asking same questions again and again (sic).

Q: Instead of telling your husband, you went to the NBI to report the matter?

A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied)

63

The Court of Appeals stated that "the subsequent and contemporaneous actions of the private complainant from the
time the threat was made bolsters the veracity of her story." This cannot be farther from the truth. On the contrary,
64

inconsistencies and absurdities in Jao’s actions cast serious doubt on the veracity of her claims.

Finally, the trial court made much of how Macayan is supposedly estopped by the joint stipulation that the prosecution
and the defense made as regards the "existence, authenticity, due execution and contents of [the] NBI Physics
Report on the powder dusting/ positive results." 65

The defense’s accession to these is inconsequential. These only prove that Macayan handled the bills used in the
alleged entrapment operation, a fact that he does not dispute. It remains, however, that they do not establish any
certainty as to the circumstances surrounding his handling of the bills, among these: whether there was, indeed,
unlawful taking by Macayan, and whether Jao did hand him the bills because he extorted them from her.

In sum, the prosecution failed to establish the elements of unlawful taking and of violence against or intimidation of a
person. Reasonable doubt persists. As is settled in jurisprudence, where the basis of conviction is flawed, this court
1âwphi 1

must acquit an accused:

In criminal cases, the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused. Ei incumbit probatio
non qui negat. He who asserts - not he who denies - must prove. The burden must be discharged by the prosecution
on the strength of its own evidence, not on the weakness of that for the defense. Hence, circumstantial evidence that
has not been adequately established, much less corroborated, cannot be the basis of conviction. Suspicion alone is
insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, "the sea of suspicion
has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass."

It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Where there is no moral
certainty as to their guilt, they must be acquitted even though their innocence may be questionable. The constitutional
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
66

With the prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of establishing Macayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
this court is constrained, as is its bounden duty when reasonable doubt persists, to acquit him.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 28380 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Nilo Macayan, Jr. y Malana is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If detained, he is ordered immediately RELEASED, unless he
is confined for any other lawful cause. Any amount paid by way of a bailbond is ordered RETURNED.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. *

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
Designated Acting Member per S.O. No. 1910 dated January 12, 2015.

1
Rollo, pp. 122-144. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. CR. No. 23830, was penned by Associate Justice
Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Estela M. Perlas-
Bernabe (now an Associate Justice of this court) of the Tenth Division, Court of Appeals Manila.

2
Id. at 66-76. The Decision, docketed as Crim. Case No. Q-01-98670, was penned by Judge Normandie B.
Pizarro.

3
Id. at 124.

4
Id. at 91.

5
Id.

6
Id. at 66 and 93.

7
Id. at 67 and 93–94.

8
Id. at 13, 67–68, and 94.

9
Id.

10
Id. at 13–14, 68–69, and 94–95.

11
Id. at 14–15 and 69–70.

12
Id. at 95.

13
Id. at 96.
14
Id. at 71 and 96–97.

15
Id. at 71 and 97.

16
Id. at 98–99.

17
Id. at 99.

18
Id. at 77–78.

Id. at 77–87. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72892 and dated October 28, 2003, was penned
19

by Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now an Associate Justice of this court) and concurred in by
Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz and Eliezer R. De Los Santos of the Ninth Division, Court of
Appeals Manila.

20
Id. at 66–76.

21
Id. at 75.

22
Id. at 74–75.

23
Id. at 75–76.

24
Id. at 41–65.

25
Id. at 89–120.

26
Id.

27
Id. at 122–144.

28
Id. at 139.

29
Id. at 144.

30
Id. at 155.

31
Id. at 145–150.

32
Id. at 10–37.

33
Id. at 157–159.

34
Id. at 162–164.

35
CONST, (1987), art. III, sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

36
CONST, (1987), art. III, sec. 14 (2): In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
37
People of the Philippines v. Solayao, 330 Phil. 811, 819 (1996) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].

38
591 Phil. 508 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].

39
Id. at 521–522.

40
Heirs of Deauna v. Fil-Star Maritime Corporation, G.R. No. 191563, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 284, 302
[Per J. Reyes, Second Division], citing Antiquina v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, 664 Phil. 88 (2011)
[Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]. People of the Philippines v. Esteban, G.R. No. 200290, June 9,
41

2014, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/june2014/200920.pdf> 6 [Per

J. Reyes, First Division].

42
Id.

43
Id.

Cirtek Employees Labor Union v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc., G.R. No. 190515, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 656,
44

660 [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division].

45
Rollo, pp. 118 and 147.

See Consulta v. People of the Philippines, 598 Phil. 464, 471 (2009) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Second
46

Division].

47
Rollo, p. 105.

48
Id. at 28–29, citing TSN, pp. 19-21, April 25, 2002.

49
Id. at 139.

50
REV. RULES ON EVID., Rule 131, sec. 3 (m).

51
REV. RULES ON EVID., Rule 131, sec. 3 (d).

52
Rollo, pp. 112 and 139.

53
Basilio v. People of the Philippines, 591 Phil. 508, 521–522 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].

54
Rollo, p. 135.

55
384 Phil. 286 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

56
Id. at 297.

57
Id.

58
Rollo, p. 136.

59
Id. at 21–23.

60
Id. at 106.

People of the Philippines v. Cantilla, 442 Phil. 641, 651 (2002) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division], citing
61

People of the Philippines v. Supnad, 414 Phil. 637 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
 62
Rollo, pp. 114–115.

63
Id. at 115–116.

64
Id. at 136.

65
Id. at 35.

66
People ofthe Philippines v. Asis, 439 Phil. 707. 7'27-728 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

G.R. No. 181843 July 14, 2014

MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Treachery as a qualifying circumstance must be deliberately sought to ensure the safety of the
accused from the defensive acts of the victim. Unexpectedness of the attack does not always equate
to treachery.

We are asked to decide on a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Court of Appeals' decision2 dated
November 20, 2007 and the Court of Appeals’ resolution3 dated February 18, 2008. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s decision4 dated July 2, 2004 that found petitioner guilty of
two (2) counts of frustrated murder and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to 17 years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporalas maximum for each count.5

This case arose out of two (2) informations for frustrated murder filed against petitioner:

Criminal Case No. Q-00-91821

That on or about the 20th day of April 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with
intent to kill, with evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attackand assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
GERARDO NAVAL by then and there stabbing the latter with a sharp bladed weapon hitting him at
the left back portion of his body, thereby inflicting upon said offended party physical injuries which
are necessarily fatal and mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, by the timely and able medical
attendance rendered to said GERARDO NAVAL which save his life, to the damage and prejudice of
the said offended party.6

Criminal Case No. Q-00-91842

That on or about the 20 th day of April 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with
intent to kill, with evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attackand assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
ROMEO AUSTRIA by then and there stabbing the latter with a sharp bladed weapon hitting him at
the left back portion of his body, thereby inflicting upon said offended party physical injuries which
are necessarily fatal and mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, by the timely and able medical
attendance rendered to said ROMEO AUSTRIA which save his life, to the damage and prejudice of
the said offended party.7

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleadednot guilty to the offenses charged against him.8

The prosecution presented private complainants Gerardo Naval and Romeo Austria as witnesses.9 It
also presented Dr. Raisa D. Francisco, Carlos Angeles, and Arnold Angeles as
witnesses.10 Petitioner testified for the defense.11

Facts according to the prosecution

Romeo Austria testified that at around 8:30 a.m. on April 20, 2000, he was playing a lucky nine
game ata wake on Araneta Avenue, Quezon City.12 Miguel arrived, asking money from Austria so he
could buy liquor.13 In response, Austria asked Miguel "to keep quiet."14 Gerardo Naval "arrived and
asked [Austria] to go home."15 There was an exchange of words between Naval and Miguel.16 Austria
"stood up [and] felt that he was stabbed."17 As he ran home, he noticedMiguel "armed with a
knife,"18 this time chasing Naval.19 Austria was "hospitalized . . . and was . . . confined for more than a
month."20 He spent around ₱110,000.00 for his hospitalization.21 On cross-examination, Austria
testified that he saw Miguel attempt to stab him again.22

Gerardo Naval testified that Miguel was irked when he asked Austria to go home.23 After he and
Miguel had an exchange of words, he "felt a hard blow on his back."24 Naval retaliated.25 However, he
ran away when he saw Miguel holding a knife.26 Miguel chased Naval who fell on the ground.27 When
Naval saw that Miguel was "about to stab him again, he hit [Miguel] with a bench"28 and left him lying
on the ground, unable to stand.29 According to Naval, "he did not see the [knife] land on his
back."30 Naval was also confined at the hospital but only for six (6) days.31

Dr. Carlos Angeles testified that "he treated [Austria] for [the] stab wound at [his] back."32 He
declared that Austria could have died without an emergency operation.33 According to him, "a long
and sharp instrument, probably a knife,"34 could have been used to stab the victim.35 Dr. Arnold
Angeles, Naval’s doctor, testified that "continuous blood loss"36 could have caused Naval’s death.37

Facts according to the defense

Miguel testified that he saw private complainants at a wake.38 Naval tapped his back and asked,
"Anong problema mo?" to which he answered, "Wala naman."39 Thereafter, Naval punched
Miguel.40 As he was about to stand up, he was hit by a hard objecton his head, causing him to lose
consciousness.41 He was brought to UERM Memorial Hospital where Naval identified him.42 He was
then brought to Station 11 in Galas, Quezon City.43 Miguel also testified that only Naval identified him
at the hospital.44

The parties stipulated that Dr. Renan Acosta, supposedly the second defense witness, conducted
Miguel’s examination.45 He issued a temporary medical certificate and a separate permanent medical
certificate.46

Regional Trial Court

In its decision, the Regional Trial Court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of frustrated murder.47 He was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum, to 17 years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporalas maximum for each count.48 Petitioner was ordered to indemnify Austria
₱25,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as actual damages; and Naval ₱25,000.00 asmoral
damages and ₱10,000.00 as temperate or moderate damages.49

Petitioner was also ordered to pay the costs of suit.50 The dispositive portion of the Regional

Trial Court decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Re: Criminal Case No. 00-91841-finding accused MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder hereby sentencing him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor
as MINIMUM to Seventeen (17)Years and Four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal as
MAXIMUM and to indemnify private complainant Gerardo Naval in the amount of Twenty
Five Thousand (₱25,000.00) Pesos as and by way of morals [sic] damages and in the
absence of evidence, the amount of Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) Pesos as and by way [of]
Temperate or moderate damages;

2. Re: Criminal Case NO. 00-91841-finding accused MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, hereby sentencing him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty [of] Six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as MINIMUM to
Seventeen (17)years and four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal as MAXIMUM and to
indemnify private complainant Romeo Austria in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand
(₱25,000.00) Pesos as and by way of moral damages and the amount of One Hundred
Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as actual damages.

3. To pay the cost of suit.51 (Emphasis in the original)

The Regional Trial Court found thatpetitioner caused the stab wounds of private
complainants.52 Naval and Austria were able to positively identify him and describe how they
obtained their injuries.53

Petitioner’s acts were not attended by evident premeditation as ruled by the trial court.54 However,
there was treachery on petitioner’s end, considering the length of time it took private complainants to
realize that they were stabbed.55 This, according to the Regional Trial Court, was a method or form
that tended to insure the execution of an act without risk from the offended party’s defense.56

Petitioner appealed57 the Regional Trial Court’s July 2, 2004 decision to the Court of Appeals, raising
as issue the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses and, hence, the correctness of his conviction.58

Court of Appeals

In a decision59 promulgated on November 20, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court.

The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by petitioner’s arguments pointing to alleged
inconsistencies inthe prosecution witnesses’ narratives. It found that the inconsistency between
Naval’s testimony and his sworn affidavit on the number of times petitioner was hit might be
attributed to the fact that "the statement was taken . . . while he was [still at] the hospital [unable] to
fully understand its contents".60 The Court of Appeals was not persuaded either by petitioner’s
argument that Austria and Naval failed to testify that they saw him stab them.61 The Court of Appeals
held that "no other person could have committed the crime"62 as "all the circumstances point to
[petitioner] as the author of the crime."63

The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the trial court that there was treachery in this case
because"the attack was so sudden and unexpected"64 that "self-defense was not possible."65

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the Court of Appeals’ resolution66 promulgated
on February 18, 2008.

Petitioner, in this case, raises the following issue:

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL

WHICH IN EFFECT, AFFIRMS THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION RENDERED BY THE TRIAL
COURT, DESPITE THE PATENT LACK OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THE PETITIONER AND FOR
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE PETITIONER’S GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.67

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the inconsistencies in Austria’s and
Naval’s statements.68 Austria’s statement that only Naval and petitioner were standing behind him
was inconsistent with Austria’s other statement that "petitioner was on his left side, while [Naval] was
on his right side."69

Petitioner also stresses that Austria’s claim that Naval and petitioner "were still having an altercation
when he suddenly felt a stab blow at his back"70 was inconsistent with Naval’s alleged failure to
mention "that he had an altercation with the petitioner before the stabbing incident."71 Petitioner
claims that it was not possible for him to have stabbed Austria without Naval noticing since he was
having a heatedexchange of words with Naval.72

Petitioner insists that the claim that "petitioner was armed with a knife"73 was not proven since "the
knife was not recovered."74 Petitioner was left immobile, yet "nobody bothered to retrieve the
knife"75 he supposedly used in committing the crimes charged against him.76 Petitioner also points out
that other players in the lucky nine game might have gotten mad at private complainants when Naval
allegedly asked Austria to go home for a drinking spree.77

Petitioner also argues that there was no treachery.78 Even assuming that an assault was sudden and
unexpected, there must be "evidence that [the] mode of assault was consciously and deliberately
adopted to [e]nsure the execution of the crime without risk to the [petitioner.]"79 Given "private
complainants’ superiority in number"80 and considering that petitioner "was left behind
unconscious,"81 private complainants were not left without "opportunity to retaliate."82

Respondent counters that the "trial court’s observations and conclusions deserve great respect and
are often accorded finality, unless there appears in the recordsome fact or circumstance of weight
which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which . . . would
alter the result of the case."83

Private complainants point out that the circumstances of the case show treachery since they were
attacked from behind.84 Further, they claim that there was no warning that they were in danger when
they were stabbed.85
The petition should be partly granted. Treachery did not exist and, hence, petitioner may only be
convicted of two counts of frustrated homicide.

Nonetheless, we affirm the findingthat the prosecution’s witnesses were credible.

Petitioner points to alleged inconsistencies that pertain only to collateral and inconsequential
matters. He directs this court’s attention to inconsistent statements regarding the positions of private
complainants at the time of the incident.86 He also points to the alleged impossibility of him
committing the offense without being noticed by Naval87and to the alleged failure to recover the knife
used in stabbing private complainants.88

These alleged inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, specially with respect to the "principal occurrence and positive identification"89 of
petitioner. Slight inconsistencies in the testimony even strengthen credibility as they show that the
"testimony [was] not rehearsed."90 What is important is that there is consistency as to the occurrence
and identity of the perpetrator.91

Further, the alleged failure to retrieve the knife supposed to have been used in perpetrating the
offense does not destroy the credibility of the testimonies.92 The crime is proved not by presenting
the object but by establishing the existence of the elements of the crime as written in law.93

II

Petitioner was charged and convicted by the trial court and the Court of Appeals with two counts of
frustrated murder.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that murder is committed by a person who kills,
under certain circumstances, another person that is not his or her father, mother, child, ascendant,
descendant, or spouse. It provides:

ARTICLE 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusión temporalin its maximum period
to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage ofsuperior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,

derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an

earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public
calamity. 5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
If these qualifying circumstances are not present or cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused may only be convicted with homicide, defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 249. Homicide. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another withoutthe attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article,
shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusión temporal.

In murder or homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill. If there is no intent to kill on the part
ofthe offender, he or she is liable only for physical injuries.94

"[I]ntent to kill . . . must beproved by clear and convincing evidence."95 "[It] should not be drawn inthe
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt."96

In Escamilla v. People,97 we said that "[t]he evidence to prove intent to kill may consist of, inter alia,
the means used; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and the
conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, orimmediately after the killing of the victim."98

The act of killing becomes frustrated when an offender "perform[s] all the acts of execution which
[c]ould produce the [crime]"99 but did not produce it for reasons independent of his or her will.

In convicting petitioner offrustrated murder, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
petitioner intentionally tried to kill private complainants. He was the author ofthe stab wounds
obtained by private complainants. However, for reasons independent of his will, he was unable to
fully execute the crime.

This court held that "findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left
to the trial court,"100 which is in the best position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor while being
examined in court.101 This court gives more weight tosuch findings if affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.102 The exception to the ruleis when the trial court misconstrued facts which if properly
appreciated could alter the outcome of the case.103

We find that there is nothing in the circumstances of this case that warrants the application of the
exception, with respect to the findings that: 1) there was intent to kill; 2) petitioner was the willful
author of the stab wounds, which almost killed private complainants; and that 3) petitioner’s failure to
kill private complainants was a result of circumstances independent of his will. Circumstantial
evidence was used to identify the perpetrator in this case.104

Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules ofCourt provides that a person may be convicted based on
circumstantial evidence if the requisites are present. It provides:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.— Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

This court iterated this rule in Trinidad v. People:105

The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the

circumstance es is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.106

In this case, the following facts were considered:

1) Petitioner was identified by private complainants to be at the scene of the crime;107

2) Private complainants were able todescribe how they obtained their injuries;108

3) Petitioner was seen holding the knife at the scene of the crime;109

4) Only three persons were involved in the incident — private complainants and petitioner;110

5) Petitioner "was standing very close to the private complainants";111

6) Petitioner was the only one who had an altercation with private complainants,112 and
petitioner was seen chasing and about to stab at least one of the private complainants;113

7) Private complainants sustained stab wounds;114

8) The stab wounds sustained by private complainants would have been fatal had it not been
given appropriate medical attention.115

The combination of these circumstances "constitute[s] an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the [petitioner], to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person."116

The version offered by petitioner that it was he who was punched and hit with a hard object117 is not
inconsistent with the facts as stated by private complainants. It may even be true. However, it does
not remove such reasonable conclusion that he was the author of the acts complained about in this
case.

Petitioner’s intent to kill is evident from his attempt to stab private complainants more than
once.118 Petitioner chased private complainants after they had tried to flee from him.119 The wounds
inflicted by petitioner were also shown to have been fatal if no medical attention had been given to
private complainants immediately after the incident.120

Petitioner’s acts did not result in private complainants’ deaths despite petitioner having already
performed all acts of execution of the crime. However, this was not due to his desistance but due to
the timely medical attention given to private complainants.121

Meanwhile, Dr. Carlos Angeles’ and Dr. Arnold Angeles’ testimonies that private complainants would
have died had no immediate medical attention been given to them,122 showed that petitioner’s failure
to kill private complainants was due toacts independent of his will.

Based on the foregoing, we do not find reason to disturb the trial court’s and the Court of Appeals’
findings.
 III

However, treachery, as a qualifying circumstance to sustain a conviction of frustrated murder rather

than frustrated homicide, was not proven by the prosecution.

Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery:

ARTICLE 14. Aggravating Circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances:

....

16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.123

The requisites of treachery are:

(1) [T]he employment of means,method, or manner of execution which will ensure the safety
of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity
being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate;124 and

(2) [D]eliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution.125

A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on "clear and convincing evidence."126 Such
evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself.127 Its existence "cannot be
presumed."128 As with the finding of guilt of the accused, "[a]ny doubt as to [its] existence . . . [should]
be resolved in favor of the accused."129

The unexpectedness of an attack cannotbe the sole basis of a finding of treachery130 even if the
attack was intended to kill another as long as the victim’s position was merely accidental.131 The
means adopted must have been a result of a determination to ensure success in committing the
crime.

In this case, no evidence was presented to show that petitioner consciously adopted or reflected on
the means, method, or form of attack to secure his unfair advantage.

The attack might "have been done on impulse [or] as a reaction to an actual or imagined provocation
offered by the victim."132 In this case, petitioner was not only dismissed by Austria when he
approached him for money. There was also an altercation between him and Naval. The provocation
might have been enough to entice petitioner to action and attack private complainants.

Therefore, the manner of attack might not have been motivated by a determination to ensure
success in committing the crime. What was more likely the case, based on private complainants’
1âwphi 1

testimonies, was that petitioner’s action was an impulsive reaction to being dismissed by Austria, his
altercation with Naval, and Naval’s attempt to summon Austria home.

Generally, this type of provocation negates the existence of treachery.133 This is the type of
provocation that does not lend itself to premeditation. The provocation in thiscase is of the kind
which triggers impulsive reactions left unchecked by the accused and caused him to commit the
crime. There was no evidence of a modicum ofpremeditation indicating the possibility of choice and
planning fundamental to achieve the elements of treachery.

The ability of the offended parties toretaliate and protect themselves may not by itself negate the
existence of treachery. The efforts of the accused to employ means and method to ensure his safety
and freedom from retaliation may not have succeeded. However, in this case, the ability of the
offended parties to have avoided greater harm by running away or by being able to subdue the
accused is a strongindicator that no treachery exists.

It is, therefore, an error for both the trial and appellate courts not to have considered the evidence
that the offended parties were able to flee and retaliate. Upon proof of evasion and retaliation, courts
must evaluate the evidence further to ensure whether there can be reasonable doubt for this
qualifying circumstance to exist. This is only in keeping with the presumption of innocence of the
accused.

Thus, in the absence of clear proof of the existence of treachery, the crime proven beyond
reasonable doubt isonly frustrated homicide and, correspondingly, the penalty should be reduced.134

IV

Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a penalty lower by one degree than that which
should be imposed for homicide may be imposed upon a person guilty of frustrated homicide.

The imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime shall be the penalty
next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated crimes. The penalty next
lower in degree is prision mayor.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed must have a maximum term
which canbe properly imposed under the rules considering the attending circumstances.135 Since
there is no attending circumstance in this case, the penalty of prision mayor in its medium term or
eight (8) years and one (1) day asmaximum should beimposed. The minimum sentence should be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.136 A penalty
of one (1) year and one (1) day as minimum, prision correccional should, therefore, be proper.

Furthermore, petitioner’s civil liabilitymust be modified. The award of actual damages to Romeo
Austria should be 88,028.77 since this is the only amount supported by receipts on record. This is in
line with Article 2199137 of the Civil Code, which limits the entitlement for pecuniary loss to such
amount duly proved.

We see no reason to modify the trial court’s award of moral damages, being in line with Article
2219138 and jurisprudence.139 The trial court’s award of temperate damages to Naval isalso justified in
recognition of the injuries he sustained, which from their very nature imply damages and do not need
to be proved inaccordance with Article 2216140 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals’ decision is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is found guilty of two (2)
counts of frustrated homicide. He is sentenced to a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of
prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as
maximum, for every count. Furthermore, he is ordered to indemnify a) Romeo Austria ₱25,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱88,028.77 as actual damages and b) Gerardo Naval ₱25,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱10,000.00 as temperate ormoderate damages.
Petitioner is also ordered to pay the c.osts of suit.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.** JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA***

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE****
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated as Additional Member per Special Order No. 1718 dated July 10, 2014.

** Designated as Acting Member in view of the vacancy in the Third Division per Special
Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014.

*** Designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 1721 dated July 10, 2014, in
view of the official trip of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta to New York, USA on July
14 to 18, 2014.
**** Designated as Acting Member per Special Order 1726 dated July 10, 2014, in view of
the official trip of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta to New York, USA on July 14 to 18,
2014.

1
Rollo, pp. 10-26.

2
Id. at 77-91.

3
Id. at 104.

4
Id. at 45–54.

5
Id. at 53–54.

6
Id. at 45.

7
Id. at 46.

8
Id.

9
Id.

10
Id.

11
Id.

12
Id. at 47.

13
Id.

14
Id.

15
Id.

16
Id.

17
Id.

18
Id.

19
Id.

20
Id.

21
Id.

22
Id.

23
Id.
24
Id.

25
Id.

26
Id.

27
Id.

28
Id.

29
Id.

30
Id. at 48.

31
Id. at 47.

32
Id. at 48.

33
Id.

34
Id.

35
Id.

36
Id. at 49.

37
Id.

38
Id.

39
Id.

40
Id.

41
Id.

42
Id.

43
Id.

44
Id.

45
Id.

46
Id.

47
Id. at 53–54.

48
Id.
49
Id.

50
Id. at 54.

51
Id. at 53–54.

52
Id. at 50.

53
Id.

54
Id. at 51.

55
Id. at 51–52.

56
Id. at 52.

57
Id. at 32–44.

58
Id. at 39–41.

Id. at 77–91, Eighth Division, penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with
59

Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal concurring.

60
Rollo,pp. 83–84.

61
Id. at 86–88.

62
Id. at 88.

63
Id. at 89.

64
Id. at 90, citing People v. Abatayo, G.R. No. 139456, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 562, 578
[Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

65
Rollo,p. 90.

66
Id. at 104.

67
Id. at 19.

68
Id. at 19–20.

69
Id. at 19.

70
Id. at 20.

71
Id.

72
Id.
73
Id. at 21.

74
Id.

75
Id.

76
Id.

77
Id. at 23.

78
Id.

79
Id.

80
Id.

81
Id.

82
Id.

83
Id. at 128.

84
Id. at 134, citing People v. Rellon,249 Phil. 73, 76 (1988) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].

85
Id. at 136.

86
Id. at 19.

87
Id. at 20.

88
Id. at 21.

89
People v. Cleopas, 384 Phil. 286, 298 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; See
also People v. Mamaruncas, G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 182, 194 [Per
J. Del Castillo, First Division].

90
Id.

91
People v. Mamaruncas, G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 182, 194–195 [Per
J. Del Castillo, First Division].

See also People v. Diu, G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 229, 246 [Per J.
92

Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].

93
Id.

94
Palaganas v. People, 533 Phil. 169, 193 (2006) [Per J.Chico-Nazario, First Division]; See
also People v. Pagador, 409 Phil. 338, 351–352 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].

95
Mondragon v. People, 123 Phil. 1328, 1333 (1966) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
 Id. at 1333–1334, citing People v. Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488, 491 (1928) [Per J. Street, En
96

Banc].

Escamilla v. People, G.R. No. 188551, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 203 [Per C.J.
97

Sereno, First Division].

Id. at 212, citing Mahawan v. People, 595 Phil. 397, 418 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario,
98

Third Division].

99
Palaganas v. People, 533 Phil. 169, 192 (2006) [Per J.Chico-Nazario, First Division]; See
also People v. Pagador, 409 Phil. 338, 350 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].

People v. Mamaruncas, G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 182, 186 [Per J.
100

Del Castillo, First Division].

People v. Diu, G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 229, 242–243 [Per J. Leonardo-
101

De Castro, First Division], citing People v. Maxion, 413 Phil. 740, 747–748 (2001) [Per J.
Pardo, First Division]; People v. Ayupan, 427 Phil. 200, 214 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division], citing People v. Milliam, 381 Phil. 163, 175 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second
Division].

See also People v. Mamaruncas, G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 182,
102

199 [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division], citing Chua v. People, 519 Phil. 151, 156–157 (2006)
[Per J. Corona, Second Division]; People v. Diu, G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA
229, 243 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division], citing People v. Algarme, 598 Phil. 423,
438–439 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

People v. Diu, G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 229, 243 [Per J. Leonardo-De
103

Castro, First Division], citing People v. Maxion, 413 Phil. 740, 747–748 (2001) [Per J. Pardo,
First Division].

104
Rollo, pp. 50, 52, 88, and 89.

Trinidad v. People, G.R. No. 192241, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 486 [Per J. Peralta, Third
105

Division].

106
Id. at 492, citingRULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 4; People v. Ragundiaz,389 Phil. 532,
540–541 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division], citing People v. De Guzman, 320
Phil. 158, 165–166 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division]; People v. Llaguno, 349 Phil. 39,
58 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; People v. Bato, 348 Phil. 246, 256 (1998) [Per
J. Panganiban, Third Division]; People v. Ferras, 351 Phil. 1020, 1031–1032 (1998) [Per J.
Kapunan, Third Division]; People v. Rivera, 356 Phil. 409, 421 (1998) [Per J. Mendoza,
Second Division].

107
Rollo, p. 50.

108
Id.

109
Id. at 89.

110
Id. at 87 and 89.
111
Id. at 89.

112
Id. Rollo, p. 89.

113
Id. at 87–88.

114
Id. at 52–53.

115
Id.

Trinidad v. People, G.R. No. 192241, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 486, 493 [Per J. Peralta,
116

Third Division].

117
Rollo, p. 15.

118
Id. at 47.

119
Id.

120
Id. at 48–49.

121
Id.

122
Id.

123
REVISED PENAL CODE, art. 14(16).

People v. Cleopas, 384 Phil. 286, 301 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division], citing
124

People v. Gatchalian, 360 Phil. 178, 196 (1998) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

People v. Cleopas, 384 Phil. 286, 301 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division], citing
125

People v. Gatchalian, 360 Phil. 178, 196–197 (1998) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

People v. Felix, 357 Phil. 684, 700 (1998) [Per J. Davide Jr., En Banc]; People v. Ayupan,
126

427 Phil. 200, 218 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division], citing People v. Orio, 386 Phil.
786, 799 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]; People v. Lubreo, G.R. No. 74146,
August 2, 1991, 200 SCRA 11, 28 [Per J. Davide Jr., Third Division].

127
Id.

People v. Felix, 357 Phil. 684, 700 (1998) [Per J. Davide Jr., En Banc]; People v. Lubreo,
128

G.R. No. 74146, August 2, 1991, 200 SCRA 11, 28 [Per J. Davide Jr., Third Division].

People v. Ayupan, 427 Phil. 200, 218 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division], citing
129

People v. Santos, 388 Phil. 183, 192 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].

130
See also People v. Sabanal,254 Phil. 433, 436 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].

131
See also People v. Ayupan, 427 Phil. 200, 219 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division],
citing People v. Templo, 400 Phil. 471, 493 (2000) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division].
 132
People v. Sabanal,254 Phil. 433, 436–437 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].

Id. at 437, citing People v. Manlapaz, 154 Phil. 556, 560–563 (1974) [Per J. Fernando,
133

Second Division].

134
REVISED PENAL CODE, art. 249. Homicide. – Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide
and be punished by reclusion temporal.

135
Indeterminate Sentence Law, sec. 1.

136
Indeterminate Sentence Law, sec. 1.

CIVIL CODE, art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
137

adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

CIVIL CODE, art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
138

cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

....

139
E.g. People v. Lanuza, G.R. No. 188562, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 293, 306 [Per J.
Leonardo-De Castro, First Division], citing People v. Domingo, 599 Phil. 589, 609 (2009) [Per
J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division] and Rugas v. People, 464 Phil. 493, 507 (2004) [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

140
CIVIL CODE, art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral,
nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment
of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to
the circumstances of each case.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 109920. August 31, 2000]

CEFERINO A. SORIANO, petitioner, vs. HON. ADORACION C.

ANGELES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Caloocan
City, Regional Trial Court, Branch CXXI, and RUEL
GARCIA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City, on March 15, 1993
in Criminal Case No. C-40740 which acquitted private respondent
Ruel Garcia of direct assault.

The prosecution’s evidence was as follows: Private respondent Ruel

Garcia and his uncle, Pedro Garcia, were members of the Caloocan
police. Shortly after midnight on November 7, 1991, they barged
into the barangay hall of Barangay 56, Zone 5 in Caloocan City,
looking for petitioner Ceferino A. Soriano, the barangay captain.
Private respondent gave petitioner fist blows on the face four times
with his left hand, while he poked a gun at him with his right hand,
at the same time cursing him, “Putang ina mo cabeza” (“You son of a
bitch chief”). Although there were four barangay tanods (Manuel
Montoya, Arturo del Rosario, Ramiro Samson, and Francisco Raton) in
the barangay hall, they could not come to the aid of petitioner
because they were held at bay by Pedro Garcia. The Garcias then
left with their companions who had been waiting outside the hall.
Petitioner was treated for his injuries in the hospital.

Private respondent denied petitioner’s allegations. He testified that

he went to the barangay hall in the evening of N ovember 6, 1991
because his younger brother had been reportedly arrested and
beaten up by petitioner. (It appears that the younger Garcia was
involved in a brawl with Dennis Mones and a certain Ocampo. They
were arrested and taken to the barangay hall. One of the boys, who
was apparently drunk, vomitted while their names were recorded.
Petitioner, therefore, ordered the three boys to be taken to the
Ospital ng Kalookan for a check-up.) As private respondent saw
petitioner near the door of the barangay hall, he asked for the
whereabouts of his brother and the reason for the latter’s arrest.
Apparently thinking that private respondent was trying to intervene
in the case he was investigating, petitioner angrily told private
respondent to lay off: “Walang pulis pulis dito” (“Your being a
policeman doesn’t pull strings here”). When private respondent
insisted on going inside the barangay hall, petitioner blocked him and
then pushed him on the chest. Private respondent also pushed
petitioner, causing him to fall on a pile of nightsticks and injure
himself. All the time, private respondent claimed he had his gun
tucked at his waist. Private respondent’s uncle, Pedro Garcia, then
arrived and took him home.

In acquitting private respondent, respondent Judge Adoracion C.

Angeles found it incredible that petitioner did not resist or even say
anything when private respondent allegedly assaulted him and that
none of the four barangay tanods who were near him came to his
aid. She thought that if petitioner had indeed been attacked, he
would have suffered more serious injuries than a contusion on the
forehead, erythema on the chest, and a lacerated wound on the lower
lip. Respondent judge also excluded from the evidence the
testimonies of petitioner and barangay tanod Manuel Montoya on the
ground that their testimonies had not been formally offered in
evidence as required by Rule 132, §§34 to 35 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.

Hence this petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleges that the decision
is void because it was not rendered by an impartial tribunal. He
contends that respondent judge was “hell-bent on saving the private
respondent from conviction and had pre-judged the case” as shown
by the fact that (1) on August 26, 1992, before private respondent’s
arraignment, she called the parties and their counsels to her
chambers and urged them to settle the case, and, when petitioner
refused, she did not set the case for hearing until after three weeks
allegedly to provide a “cooling off” period; (2) that at the initial trial
on September 15 and 16, 1992, respondent judge again called on the
parties to settle the case. Petitioner alleges that, while respondent
judge stated in her order of September 15, 1992 cancelling the
hearing on that date that this was do ne to enable Atty. Maria Lelibet
Sampaga to study the case as she had been appointed as private
respondent’s counsel only on that day, the same was actually a
pretext, the real reason being to give private respondent another
opportunity to persuade petitioner to settle the case. The records in
fact show that Atty. Sampaga had been private respondent’s counsel
at the arraignment on August 26, 1992; (3) that respondent judge
excluded the testimonies of petitioner and his witness, Manuel
Montoya, for failure of the prosecution to offer formally the same
when the transcript of stenographic notes shows this was not so and
that, at any rate, the defense waived the objection based on this
ground by cross-examining petitioner and Montoya; and (4) that
respondent judge failed to find private respondent guilty despite the
testimonies of three eyewitnesses (barangay tanodsMontoya, del
Rosario, and Samson). Petitioner therefore prays that a mistrial be
declared and that the case be ordered retried before another judge.

On the other hand, private respondent Ruel Garcia contends that, if

at the outset, petitioner doubted respondent judge’s impartiality, he
should have sought her inhibition right then and there; that it was
not true respondent judge called the parties to her chambers on
August 26, 1992 as only the arraignment took place on that day; that
at said arraignment, his counsel, Atty. Emilio Bermas, was absent for
which reason respondent judge designated Atty. Maria Lelibet S.
Sampaga to assist him; that the schedule of the trial (September 15,
16, and 21, 1992) was not fixed by respondent judge but by the clerk
in charge of the matter, taking into account the schedule of the other
cases assigned to the court; that it was only on the first day of trial
on September 15, 1992 that respondent judge first talked to the
parties, and, upon learning that both were public officers, thought it
proper to ask them if they were not willing to settle their dispute,
and seeing the parties and their counsels to be receptive, she invi ted
them to her chambers; that as petitioner later appeared to have
second thoughts and, on the other hand, as Atty. Sampaga needed
time to prepare for trial, respondent judge postponed the trial to the
next day, September 16, 1992; that on September 16, 1 992,
respondent judge again called the parties to her chambers to see if
they had come to any agreement, but as she was told by petitioner
that “for him to withdraw his complaint against the private
respondent, he must have to transfer his residence first, ” thus
implying that he wished the case against private respondent to
continue, respondent judge proceeded with the trial that morning.

Private respondent contends that the instant petition does not have
the consent and conformity of the public prosecutor but was instead
filed by the private prosecutor who does not have the requisite legal
personality to question the decision acquitting him.

Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that this petition

should be dismissed:

A perusal of the judgment of the trial court showed that the parties
were heard conformably to the norms of due process, evidence was
presented by both parties and duly considered, their arguments were
studied, analyzed, and assessed, and judgment was rendered in
which findings of facts and conclusions of law were set forth. These
conclusions of fact or law cannot in any sense be characterized as
outrageously wrong or manifestly mistaken or whimsically or
capriciously arrived at. The worst that may perhaps be said of them
is that they are fairly debatable and may even be possibly
erroneous. But they cannot be declared to have been made with
grave abuse of discretion (Bustamante vs. NLRC, 195 SCRA 1991 ).
Clearly, there was no mistrial in this case which would warrant the
nullity of the assailed judgment.[1]
The preliminary issue in this case is whether the petition should be
dismissed outright because it was filed without the intervention of
the OSG as counsel for the prosecution.

This question is not a novel one. In the case of People v.

Santiago,[2] this Court held:

The question as to whether or not U.P., as the private offended

party, can file this special civil action for certiorari questioning the
validity of said decision of the trial court should be answered in the
affirmative.

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is

the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private
offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role i s limited to that of
a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended
party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal
of the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of

the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on
other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be
filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties
are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may
file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant
should not bring the action in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said
complainant.[3]

The above ruling has been reiterated in De la Rosa v. Court of

Appeals[4] and Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.,[5] in which the
legal personality of private complainant to file a special civil action
of certiorari questioning the dismissal by the trial cou rt of a criminal
case has been upheld subject to the limitation that the accused’s
right to double jeopardy is not violated.[6] As explained by the Court
in People v. Court of Appeals:[7] 7

A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due

process is void, does not exist in legal contemplation, and, thus,
cannot be the source of an acquittal. However, where the petition
demonstrates mere errors in judgment not amounting to grave abuse
of discretion or deprivation of due process, the writ
of certiorari cannot issue. A review of the alleged errors of judgment
cannot be made without trampling upon the right of the accused
against double jeopardy.[8]

In short, petitioner must establish that the judgment of acquittal

resulted from a mistrial so as not to place private respondent, as
accused, in double jeopardy.

In only one case has the Court categorically declared a mistrial, and
that is the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan.[9] Petitioner would
have the Court draw parallelisms between this case
and Galman where the Court nullified the judgment of acquittal of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled
“People of the Philippines v. General Luther Custodio, et al.”

This cases is, however, a far cry from Galman. There, it was shown
that evidence was suppressed in order to justify the acquittal of the
accused. This Court held that “the secret Malacañang conference at
which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan [Manuel Pamaran] and T anodbayan
[Bernardo] Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by
Deputy Tanodbayan [Manuel] Herrera and told them how to handle
and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire
proceedings to assure the pre-determined ignominious final outcome
are without parallel and precedent in our annals and
jurisprudence.”[10]

In contrast, petitioner does not allege any such irregularity in the

trial of private respondent. He simply claims that respondent judge’s
bias and partiality denied the prosecution a fair and impartial trial.
Why respondent judge was biased for the defense petitioner does not
say. It is noteworthy that petitioner does not even dispute private
respondent’s allegation that respondent judge was not personally
acquainted with him until she heard the criminal case against him.
It is pertinent at this point to cite certain principles laid down by the
Court regarding the disqualification of a judge for lack of the
objectivity that due process requires. It is settled that mere
suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is not enough;
there should be evidence to prove the charge.[11] Bias and prejudice
cannot be presumed, especially weighed against a judge’s sacred
allegation under oath of office to administer ju stice without respect
to any person and do equal right to the poor and the rich.[12] There
must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an
extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some
basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the
case.[13]

The arguments which petitioner advances by way of proof of

respondent’s judge’s alleged bias are not persuasive.

Respondent judge’s efforts to have the parties arrive at an amicable

settlement is not evidence of partiality for private respondent. She
could have been motivated by factors other than a desire to clear
private respondent of criminal liability,i.e., the clearing of her court
docket or, as pointed out by the OSG in its comment,[14] in setting a
good example considering that petitioner and private respondent
were neighbors occupying public offices charged with the
maintenance of peace and order in the community.

As for the allegation that the trial was not held until after three
weeks to give private respondent more time to persuade petitioner to
amicably settle the case, it has been shown that it was not
respondent judge but court personnel in charge of scheduling cases
who assigned the dates of trial taking into account the court
calendar. The cancellation of the September 15, 1992 hearing, on
the other hand, was made to give private respondent’s counsel, Atty.
Maria Lelibet Sampaga, time to study the case and prepare for trial.
Although Atty. Sampaga had once appeared in behalf of private
respondent, it was for the purpose of assisting the latter at the
arraignment because the regular counsel was absent. As new
counsel, Atty. Sampaga needed to study the case. A postponement
to the next day, September 16, 1992, was not an unreasonable
request. Indeed, this did not involve resetting the case since
September 16, 1992 had been originally designated as one of the
initial trial dates.

Nor is there any showing that respondent judge decided the criminal
case on grounds other than its merits. A reading of her decision
acquitting private respondent shows that the same was made on the
basis of her evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and of the
defense. Because of the conflicting versions of the parties as to what
really happened, her decision was necessar ily based on her
appreciation of the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution
and the defense.

True, petitioner is correct in his argument that respondent judge

mistakenly excluded from the evidence his testimony as well as that
of prosecution witness Manuel Montoya on the ground that the same
had not been formally offered at the time they were called to the
witness stand. For the fact was that petitioner and Montoya had
been cross-examined at length by the defense and, therefore, the
latter had waived objection to the failure of the prosecution to make
an offer of the evidence.[15] It has been held in Go v. Court of
Appeals,[16] however, that divergence of opinion between the trial
judge and a party’s counsel as to the admissibility of evidence is not
proof of bias or partiality. Besides, though respondent judge stated
in her decision that the testimonies of petitioner and Montoya
“cannot be considered by this Court as constituting part of the
evidence for the prosecution,” her decision shows that s he actually
considered the testimonies in piecing together the prosecution’s
version of the events and in evaluating the evidence in the case. The
testimonies of petitioner and Montoya were after all referred to by
the other witnesses for the prosecution, namely, del Rosario and
Samson. Thus respondent judge’s decision reads in pertinent part:

The allegation of the private complainant that he neither resisted the

punches of the accused nor said anything to the latter is quite hard
to believe. No rational man would allow another to hurt him without
offering any form of resistance, for he is instinctively concerned
[with] his self-preservation. It is more in consonance with human
nature that when one is hurt, especially if the feeling of innocence is
within him, to immediately retaliate to an unjust act.

Another equally unbelievable allegation is that the four barangay

tanods just stood and watched their barangay captain while he was
being mauled. There were four of them inside the hall yet no one
even dared to defend herein private complainant or stop herein
accused. If they could not do it for their barangay captain and inside
their hall, how can they be expected to protect the residents of their
barangay outside their hall?
Furthermore, if herein private complainant was indeed mauled, he
should have suffered a lot more serious injuries than he alleged[ly]
incurred. Considering their allegation that the barangay tanods were
guarded at the point of a gun by Pedro Garcia, herein accused thus
had all the time and opportunity to inflict on the private complainant
as many serious injuries as he could. But the results of the medical
examination belie this point.

Well-settled is the rule that the prosecution must rely on the

strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense
(People vs. Dennis Mendoza, 203 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 85176, October
21, 1991). After a thorough examination of the pieces of evidence
presented by the prosecution, the latter failed to fulfill the test of
moral certainty and establish such degree of proof necessary to
support conviction. “If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of one or more explanations, one of which is consistent with
innocence and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction. The constitutional presumption of innocence
stands until overthrown by strong and convincing evidence, one of
which will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt” (People vs. Gina
Sahagun, 182 SCRA 91, G.R. No. 62024, February 12, 1990).

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are merely unfounded

accusations insufficient to gain conviction. In the case ofPeople vs.
Guinto, 184 SCRA 287, G.R. 88400, April 6, 1990, the Supreme Court
held: “Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is
protected by the constitutional presumption of innocence which the
prosecution must overcome with contrary proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Even if the defense is weak, the case against the accused
must fail if the prosecution is even weaker. . . . If the prosecution
has not sufficiently established the guilt of the accused, he has a
right to be acquitted and released even if he presents naught a shred
of evidence.”[17]

That respondent judge believed the evidence of the defense more

than that of the prosecution does not indicate that she was biased.
She must have simply found the defense witnesses to be more
credible.[18]

Indeed, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court

simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence.
A writ of certiorari cannot be used to correct a lower tribunal’s
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Thus, in People v.
Court of Appeals,[19] the Court dismissed a petition
for certiorari filed by the prosecution from a decision of the Court of
Appeals reversing that of the trial court and acquitting the accused of
homicide and serious physical injuries on the ground that he acted in
self-defense. The Court held:

To show grave abuse of discretion, herein petitioner contends that

Respondent Court of Appeals committed manifest bias and partiality
in rendering the assailed Decision. It claims that Respondent Court
ignored and discarded “uncontroverted physical evidenc e” which the
trial judge had relied upon. Furthermore, it allegedly erred in finding
that he had “base[d] his decision on the testimony of witnesses
whose demeanor he did not personally witness.” In addition, it
supposedly harped on insignificant inconsi stencies in the testimonies
of some prosecution witnesses, while unquestioningly accepting the
private respondent’s claim of self-defense.

Finally, the solicitor general maintains that the assailed Decision (1)
failed to discuss the effect of Maquiling’s e scape from confinement
during the pendency of the case; (2) shifted the burden of proof on
the prosecution to prove Maquiling’s guilt, although he admitted
killing the victim in self-defense; (3) ignored the physical evidence ¾
particularly the downward trajectory of the bullets that had hit the
two victims, thereby showing that private respondent was still
standing when he shot them; and the shotgun wound sustained by
private respondent, which disabled him and rendered him incapable
of shooting the victims.

It is quite obvious from the foregoing allegations that petitioner

imputed grave abuse of discretion to Respondent Court because of
the latter’s supposed misappreciation and wrongful assessment
of factual evidence. However, as earlier stressed, the present
recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is a
fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is
not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari; which
is extra ordinem ¾ beyond the ambit of appeal. Stated elsewise,
factual matters cannot normally be inquired into by the Supreme
Court in a certiorari proceeding. This Court cannot be tasked to go
over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and
weigh them again, in order to ascertain if the tri al and the appellate
courts were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece
of evidence of one party or the other.
The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a case does not
necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction. Thus, assumingarguendo that a
court commits a mistake in its judgment, the error does not vitiate
the decision, considering that it has jurisdiction over the case.

An examination of the 65-page Decision rendered by the Court of

Appeals shows no patent and gross error amounting to grave abuse
of discretion. Neither does it show an arbitrary or despotic exercise
of power arising from passion or hostility. . . .[20]

Finally, petitioner’s claim that respondent judge was biased is belied

by his failure to move for respondent judge’s inhibition. Petitioner’s
claim that he did not do so because of his “belief and desire for said
respondent judge to finally return to her normal sense of fairness” is
a feeble excuse. His failure to file such motion stands as one more
stark difference between this case and Galman since the private
prosecutors in the latter case lost no time in seeking the
disqualification of the members of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of
manifest bias and partiality for the defense.[21]

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of

merit.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,

concur.

[1] OSG’s Comment, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 112-113.

[2] 174 SCRA 143 (1989).

[3] Id., pp. 152-153.

[4] 253 SCRA 499 (1996).

[5] G.R. No. 126210, Mar. 9, 2000.

[6] Const., Art. III, §21 provides:

“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act.”

[7] 308 SCRA 687 (1999).

[8] Id., p. 690.

[9] 144 SCRA 43 (1986).

[10] Id, pp. 82-83.

[11] Geneblazo v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 124, 134 (1989).

[12] Pimentel v. Salanga, 21 SCRA 161, 167 (1967).

[13] Webb v. People, 276 SCRA 243, 253 (1997).

[14] OSG’s Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 112.

[15] People v. Java, 227 SCRA 669, 680 (1992).

[16] 221 SCRA 397, 413 (1993).

[17] Petition, Annex A, pp. 10-11; Rollo, pp. 22-23.

[18] See People v. Tabarno, 242 SCRA 456, 460 (1995).

[19] 308 SCRA 687 (1999).

[20] Id., pp. 700-701.

[21] The Court in fact viewed in a negative light the Sandiganbayan’s

rush to judgment notwithstanding the pendency of the motion for
inhibition.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
GIOVANI SERRANO y G.R. No. 175023
CERVANTES,
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,

ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent.
July 5, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari[1] the decision[2] dated July 20,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29090, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Giovani Serrano y Cervantes. The CA modified the decision
dated October 25, 2004[3] of the Regional Trial Court[4] (RTC), Branch 83, Quezon
City, and found petitioner Giovani Serrano y Cervantes (petitioner) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, instead of frustrated homicide.

THE FACTS

The case stemmed from a brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two (2) rival
groups that occurred at the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City
(UP) on the evening of March 8, 1999. The incident resulted in the stabbing of
Anthony Galang (victim). Pinpointed as the victims assailant, the petitioner was
charged on March 11, 1999,[5] with frustrated homicide in an Information that
reads:
That on or about the 8th day of March 1999, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
ANTHONY GALANG Y LAGUNSAD, by then and there stabbing him on the
 stomach with a bladed weapon, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of homicide, as a consequence but which
nevertheless did not produce it, by reason of some causes independent of the will
of the accused; that is the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said
ANTHONY GALANG Y LAGUNSAD which prevented his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

On March 20, 2000, the petitioner pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial,
the prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with the testimonies of SPO2
Isagani dela Paz and the records custodian of East Avenue Medical Center on the
basis of the following stipulations: (1) SPO2 dela Paz was the one who conducted
the investigation; (2) SPO2 dela Paz took the statement of the victim at the East
Avenue Medical Center; (3) the victim was able to narrate the story of the incident
to SPO2 dela Paz before he underwent surgery; (4) SPO2 dela Paz prepared a
referral-letter to the city prosecutor; (5) SPO2 dela Paz had no personal knowledge
of the incident; and (6) the victim was confined for treatment at the East Avenue
Medical Center from March 8, 1999, and the documents referring to his
confinement and treatment were duly executed and authenticated.[7] After these
stipulations, trial on the merits immediately followed.

The Prosecutions Evidence

The prosecution presented the victim, Arlo Angelo Arceo, Sgt. Rolando Zoleto,
and SPO2 Roderick Dalit.

These witnesses testified that, at around 9:30 p.m. of March 8, 1999, the victim and
his two friends, Arceo and Richard Tan, were on their way to Fatima II in Pook
Dagohoy, UP Campus when they came across Gener Serrano, the petitioners
brother, who was with his group of friends. The victim, Arceo and Tan approached
Gener and his friends to settle a previous quarrel between Gener and Roberto
Comia. While the victim and Gener were talking, Comia suddenly appeared and
hurled invectives at Gener. Irked, Gener challenged Comia to a fistfight to settle
their quarrel once and for all; Comia rose to the challenge.
 It was at this point that the petitioner appeared with other members of his
group. He was a guest at a party nearby, and was informed that a fight was about to
take place between his brother and Comia. Members of the victims group also
started to show up.

The petitioner watched Gener fight Comia. When Gener lost the fight, the
petitioner sought to get back at the victim and his friends. Thus, the one-on-one
escalated into a rumble between the members of the two groups. During the
rumble, and with the aid of the light emanating from two Meralco posts, the victim
and Arceo saw that the petitioner had a knife and used it to chase away the
members of their group. The petitioner also chased Arceo away, leaving the victim
alone; the petitioners group ganged up on him.

The petitioner went to where the victim was being beaten by Gener and
one Obet Orieta. It was then that the victim was stabbed. The petitioner stabbed the
left side of his stomach while he was standing, with Gener and Orieta holding his
arms. The petitioner, Gener and Orieta thereafter continued to beat and stone the
victim until he fell into a nearby creek. The petitioner and his group left him there.

From his fallen position, the victim inspected his stab wound and saw that a
portion of his intestines showed. On foot, he went to find help. The victim was
initially taken to the UP Infirmary, but was referred to
the East Avenue Medical Center where he underwent surgery. The victim stayed at
the hospital for a week, and thereafter stayed home for one month to recuperate.

In the investigation that immediately followed, the victim identified the

petitioner as the person who stabbed him. In court, the victim likewise positively
identified the petitioner as his assailant.
The Defenses Evidence

The defense presented the testimonies of the petitioner, Gener, and George
Hipolito.

The petitioner denied that he stabbed the victim. While he admitted that he
was present during the fistfight between Gener and Comia, he claimed that he and
Gener left as soon as the rumble started. The petitioner testified that as he and
Gener were running away from the scene (to get back to the party), bottles and
stones were being thrown at them.

Hipolito, a participant in the rumble and a member of the petitioners group,

narrated that the rumble happened fast and he was too busy defending himself to
take note of everything that happened. He testified that he did not see the petitioner
and Gener during the fight. He also testified that the place where the rumble took
place was near a steel manufacturing shop which provided some light to the area.
He further testified that the victim was left alone at the scene and he alone faced
the rival group.

THE RTC RULING

After considering the evidence, the trial court found the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide. It held, thus:

The bare statement of Giovani Serrano that he did not stab Anthony and he really
does not know who might have stabbed Anthony is outweighed by the positive
identification by Anthony that Giovani stabbed him frontally while they faced
each other and also the circumstantial evidence pointing to him as the wielder of
the knife. Naturally, Giovani Serrano would feign ignorance as to who stabbed
Anthony but there is no way that he can avoid said direct and circumstantial
evidences.[8]
Accordingly, the RTC decision disposed:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of accused
GIOVANI SERRANO Y CERVANTES of the offense of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY thereof and
hereby sentences him to undergo imprisonment of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor as maximum.

Accused Giovani Serrano is hereby ordered to reimburse to complainant

Anthony Galang the medical expenses incurred by the latter in his hospitalization
and treatment of his injuries in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P15,000.00) and loss of income for one (1) month in the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) or the total amount of NINETEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P19,000.00).

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.[9]
 The petitioner appealed to the CA. He claimed that the inconsistencies in the
victims testimony rendered it incredible, but the RTC disregarded the claim. The
RTC also disregarded the evidence that the dimness of the light in the crime scene
made it impossible for the victim to identify his assailant.

THE CA RULING

In its decision, the CA agreed with the RTC that the petitioner had been
positively identified as the victims assailant. The CA, however, ruled that the crime
committed was attempted homicide, not frustrated homicide. The CA ruled that the
prosecution evidence failed to conclusively show that the victims single stab
wound was sufficient to cause death without timely medical intervention. In
support of its conclusion, the CA said that:
Thus, in Paddayuman v. People (G.R. No. 120344, 23 January 2002), appellants
conviction for attempted homicide was upheld because there was no evidence
that the wounds suffered by the victim were fatal enough as to cause her
demise. Thus:

x x x petitioner stabbed the victim twice on the chest, which is

indicative of an intent to kill. x x x This can be gleaned from the
testimony of Dr. Pintucan who did not categorically state whether
or not the wounds were fatal. x x x (I)n People v. Pilones, this
Court held that even if the victim was wounded but the injury was
not fatal and could not cause his death, the crime would only be
attempted.

Similarly, in the case of People v. Costales (G.R. No. 141154, 15 January 2002),
where the offense charged was frustrated murder, the trial court rendered a verdict
of guilty for attempted murder because the prosecution failed to present a
medical certificate or competent testimonial evidence which will prove that the
victim would have died from her wound without medical intervention.
Citing People v. De La Cruz, the Supreme Court sustained the trial court and
stressed that:

x x x the crime committed for the shooting of the victim

was attempted murder and not frustrated murder for the reason
that his injuries, though no doubt serious, were not proved
fatal such that without timely medical intervention, they would
have caused his death.[10]
 Thus, the CA modified the RTC decision. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that:

1) Appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime

of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of SIX (6) MONTHSof arresto mayor as minimum
to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision
correccional, as maximum;

2) The actual damages is REDUCED to P3,858.50; and

3) The award of loss earnings is DELETED,

The appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.[11]
Undaunted, the petitioner filed this present petition.

THE ISSUES

The petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH

AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE

TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE
PROSECUTION, WHICH WERE BASED ON MERE
SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE.

C
 THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THE STABBING
INCIDENT OCCURRED IN THE MIDDLE OF A STREET
BRAWL, WHERE ANYBODY OF THE NUMEROUS
PARTICIPANTS COULD HAVE BEEN THE ASSAILANT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[12]

The petitioner claims that the lower courts decisions were erroneous based on two-
pronged arguments first, he cannot be convicted because he was not positively
identified by a credible testimony; and second, if he is criminally culpable, he can
only be convicted of serious physical injuries as the intent to kill the victim was not
sufficiently proven.

THE COURT RULING

We do not find merit in the petitioners arguments, and accordingly hold that
the petition is devoid of merit.

At the outset, we clarify that we shall no longer deal with the correctness of the
RTC and the CAs appreciation of the victims identification of the petitioner as his
assailant. This is a question of fact that we cannot entertain in a Rule 45 review,
save for exceptional reasons[13] that must be clearly and convincingly shown. As a
rule, we accord the greatest respect for the findings of the lower courts, especially
the evaluation by the trial judge who had the distinct opportunity to directly hear
and observe the witnesses and their testimonies. As we explained in People v.
Lucena[14]

[It] has been consistently held by this Court that the matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by
the trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and
to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected in the
record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact
and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the
angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty
 blanch these can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his
teeth.[15]

In this regard, the petitioner cites an exception the lower courts

misappreciation of the testimonial evidence. Due consideration of the records,
however, does not support the petitioners position. We find that the RTC and the
CA did not err in their appreciation of the evidence.

The petitioner was positively identified

The RTCs and CAs conclusions on the petitioners positive identification are
supported by ample evidence. We consider in this regard the following pieces of
evidence of the prosecution: (1) the manner of attack which was done frontally and
at close range, thus allowing the victim to see his assailant; (2) the lighting
conditions at the scene of the stabbing, provided by two Meralco posts; [16] the
scene was also illuminated by white, fluorescent type light coming from a steel
manufacturing shop;[17] and (3) that the victim and the petitioner knew each other
also allowed the victim to readily identify the petitioner as his assailant.

The victims credibility is further strengthened by his lack of improper motive to

falsely accuse the petitioner of the crime. Human experience tells us that it is
unnatural for a victim to accuse someone other than his actual attacker; in the
normal course of things, the victim would have the earnest desire to bring the
guilty person to justice, and no other. We consider, too, that the victim consistently
and positively, in and out of court, identified the petitioner as his assailant. The
victim testified that the petitioner was a neighbor who lived just a few houses away
from his house.

We also take into account the evidence that the petitioner was the only one seen in
possession of a knife during the rumble. The victim testified that he saw the
petitioner holding a knife which he used to chase away others. [18] Prosecution
witness Arceo testified that he also saw the petitioner wielding a knife during the
rumble.

Based on these considerations, we find the victims identification of the

petitioner as his assailant to be positive and conclusive.
In contrast, we find the inconsistencies attributed to the victim to be minor and
insufficient to discredit his testimony. These inconsistencies refer to extraneous
matters that happened during the rumble, not directly bearing on the
stabbing. They do not likewise relate to the material elements of the crime.

We also cannot give any credit to the petitioners position that the victims
failure to identify the weapon used to stab him discredited his testimony. The
victims failure to identify the weapon is irrelevant under the circumstances,
considering that the identity of the weapon is not an element of the crime charged.

The intent to kill was sufficiently established

The petitioner posits that he can only be held liable for serious physical injuries
since the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as homicide,
was not sufficiently proven. The assailants intent to kill is the main element that
distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of homicide. The crime
can only be homicide if the intent to kill is proven.

Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through
external manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the
assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,[19] we considered the
following factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used
by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after
the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. We also consider motive and the
words uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as
additional determinative factors.[20]
In this case, the records show that the petitioner used a knife in his assault. The
petitioner stabbed the victim in the abdomen while the latter was held by Gener
and Orieta. Immediately after the stabbing, the petitioner, Gener and Orieta beat
and stoned the victim until he fell into a creek. It was only then that the petitioner,
Gener and Orieta left. We consider in this regard that the stabbing occurred at
around 9:30 p.m. with only the petitioner, Gener, Orieta, and the victim as the only
persons left in the area. The CA aptly observed that a reasonable inference can be
made that the victim was left for dead when he fell into the creek.
 Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the petitioner, in stabbing,
beating and stoning the victim, intended to kill him. Thus, the crime committed
cannot be merely serious physical injuries.

Frustrated homicide versus attempted homicide

Since the victim did not die, the issue posed to us is the stage of execution of the
crime. The lower courts differed in their legal conclusions.

On one hand, the RTC held that the crime committed reached the frustrated
stage since the victim was stabbed on the left side of his stomach and beaten until
he fell into a creek.[21] The RTC also took into account that the victim had to be
referred by the UP Infirmary to the East Avenue Medical Center for medical
treatment.[22]

On the other hand, the CA ruled that the crime committed only reached the
attempted stage as there was lack of evidence that the stab wound inflicted was
fatal to cause the victims death.[23] The CA observed that the attending physician
did not testify in court.[24] The CA also considered that the Medical Certificate and
the Discharge Summary issued by the East Avenue Medical Center fell short of
specifying the nature or gravity of the wound.[25]

Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended defines the stages of a

felony in the following manner:

ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated

felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its

execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a

felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
 should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. [Emphasis and italics supplied.]

In Palaganas v. People,[26] we made the following distinctions between

frustrated and attempted felony as follows:

1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the
offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and
does not perform all the acts of execution.

2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is
some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in
attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or
accident other than the offenders own spontaneous desistance.[27]

The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which
must be supported by independent proof showing that the wound inflicted
was sufficient to cause the victims death without timely medical intervention.

In discussing the importance of ascertaining the degree of injury sustained

by a victim and its importance in determining criminal liability, the Court
in People v. Matyaong, said:[28]

In considering the extent of injury done, account must be taken of the injury to the
function of the various organs, and also the danger to life. A division into mortal
and nonmortal wounds, if it could be made, would be very desirable; but the
unexpected complications and the various extraneous causes which give gravity to
the simplest cases, and, on the other hand, the favorable termination of some
injuries apparently the most dangerous, render any such classification
impracticable. The general classification into slight, severe, dangerous, and mortal
wounds may be used, but the possibility of the slight wound terminating with the
loss of the persons life, and the apparently mortal ending with only a slight
impairment of some function, must always be kept in mind. x x x

The danger to life of any wound is dependent upon a number of factors: the extent
of the injury, the form of the wound, the region of the body affected, the blood
vessels, nerves, or organs involved, the entrance of disease-producing bacteria or
other organisms into the wound, the age and constitution of the person injured,
and the opportunities for administering proper surgical treatment.
When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal without
medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt; under
this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved in favor
of the petitioner. Thus, the crime committed should be attempted,
not frustrated, homicide.[29]

Under these standards, we agree with the CAs conclusion. From all
accounts, although the stab wound could have been fatal since the victim testified
that he saw his intestines showed, no exact evidence exists to prove the gravity of
the wound; hence, we cannot consider the stab wound as sufficient to cause death.
As correctly observed by the CA, the victims attending physician did not testify on
the gravity of the wound inflicted on the victim. We consider, too, the CAs
observation that the medical certifications issued by
[30]
the East Avenue Medical Center merely stated the location of the wound. There
was also no proof that without timely medical intervention, the victim would have
died.[31] This paucity of proof must necessarily favor the petitioner.

The view from the frustrated stage of the crime gives the same results. The
elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained
fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance;
and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.[32] Since the prosecution failed to
prove the second element, we cannot hold the petitioner liable for frustrated
homicide.

THE PENALTY

Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that the

imposable penalty for an attempted crime shall be lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony.

Under Article 249, the crime of homicide is punished by reclusion temporal.

Applying Article 61 (Rules of graduating penalties) and Article 71 (Graduated
scales), two (2) degrees lower of reclusion temporal is prision correccional which
has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence shall be taken, in view of the attending circumstances that
could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.[33]Thus, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence shall be taken within the range of prision correccional,
depending on the modifying circumstances. In turn, the minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the penalty one degree
lower of prision correccional, that is arresto mayor with a duration of one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months.

In the absence of any modifying circumstance, the maximum term of the

indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision
correccional or two (2) years and four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years
and two (2) months.[34] The minimum term shall be taken within the range
of arresto mayor. Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA against the petitioner of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum term of the indeterminate penalty, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty, is correct.
THE CIVIL LIABILITY
We modify the CA decision with respect to the petitioners civil liability. The
CA ordered actual damages to be paid in the amount of P3,858.50. This is
erroneous and contrary to the prevailing jurisprudence.

In People v. Andres,[35] we held that if the actual damages, proven by

receipts during the trial, amount to less than P25,000.00, the victim shall be
entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, in lieu of actual
damages. The award of temperate damages is based on Article 2224 of the New
Civil Code which states that temperate or moderate damages may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot
be proven with certainty. In this case, the victim is entitled to the award
of P25,000.00 as temperate damages considering that the amount of actual
damages is only P3,858.50. The amount of actual damages shall be deleted.
 Lastly, we find that the victim is also entitled to moral damages in the
amount of P10,000.00 in accordance with settled jurisprudence.[36] Under Article
2219, paragraph 1 of the New Civil Code, the victim is entitled to moral damages
in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition. The decision, dated July 20,
2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29090, finding petitioner
Giovani Serrano y Cervantes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted
Homicide, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The petitioner
is ORDERED to PAY the victim, Anthony Galang, the following amounts:

(1) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and

(2) P10,000.00 as moral damages.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice


Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 27-42. Penned by CA Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, with Presiding CA Justice (now
retired Supreme Court Associate Justice) Ruben T. Reyes and CA Associate Justice (now retired) Monina
Arevalo-Zearosa concurring.
[3]
Criminal Case No. Q-99-81784; id. at 46-73.
[4]
Penned by Judge Estrella T. Estrada.
[5]
Rollo, p. 46.
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
Id. at 47.
[8]
Id. at 72.
[9]
Id. at 73.
[10]
Id. at 37-38.
[11]
Id. at 41-42.
[12]
Id. at 9-10.
[13]
They are: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on
which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence
on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and, (11) such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both parties; Pelonia v. People, G.R. No. 168997, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 207.
[14]
408 Phil. 172, 183 (2001).
[15]
Id. at 183.
[16]
Rollo, p. 33.
[17]
Id. at 34.
[18]
Id. at 48.
[19]
G.R. No. 166326, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 188, 197, citing People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003).
[20]
Epifanio v. People, G.R. No. 157057, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 552, 562.
[21]
Rollo, p. 68.
[22]
Id. at 69.
[23]
Id. at 32.
[24]
Ibid.
[25]
Ibid.
[26]
G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 533.
[27]
Id. at 535.
[28]
411 Phil. 938, 948 (2001), cited in Epifanio v. People, supra note 21, at 563.
[29]
Epifanio v. People, supra note 21, at 563-564; also see Paddayuman v. People, G.R. No. 120344. January 23,
2002, 374 SCRA 278, 288.
[30]
Rollo, p. 40.
[31]
Ingles v. CA, G.R. No. 117161, March 3, 1997, 269 SCRA 122, 130.
[32]
Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 737, 758.
[33]
Section 1.
[34]
Applying Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
[35]
G.R. Nos. 135697-98, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 141, 152.
[36]
People v. Flores, G.R. Nos. 143435-36, November 28, 2003, 416 SCRA 612.

G.R. No. 174461 September 11, 2013

LETICIA I. KUMMER, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
BRION, J.:

We decide the appeal tiled by petitioner Leticia I. Kummer assailing the April 28, 2006 decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27609. The CA decision affirmed the July 27, 2000 judgment 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, finding the petitioner and her co-accused Freiderich Johan I.
Kummer guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1130.

The Facts

The prosecution's evidence revealed that on June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Jesus Mallo, Jr.,
accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of the petitioner. Mallo knocked at the front door with a stone and
identified himself by saying, "Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo."

The petitioner opened the door and at this point, her son and co-accused, Johan, using his left hand, shot Mallo twice
using a gun about six (6) inches long.3 Malana, who was with Mallo and who witnessed the shooting, immediately ran
towards the west, followed by Mallo. When Malana turned his back, he saw the petitioner leveling and firing her long
gun at Mallo, hitting the latter’s back and causing him to fall flat on the ground. 4

Thereafter, the petitioner went inside the house and came out with a flashlight. Together with her co-accused, she
scoured the pathway up to the place where Mallo was lying flat. 5 At that point, the petitioner uttered,"Johan, patay
na," in a loud voice.6 The petitioner and her co-accused putdown the guns and the flashlight they were holding, held
Mallo’s feet and pulled him to about three (3) to four (4) meters away from the house. Thereafter, they returned to the
house and turned off all the lights.7

The following morning, policeman Danilo Pelovello went to the petitioner’s house and informed her that Mallo had
been found dead in front of her house. Pelovello conducted an investigation through inquiries among the neighbors,
including the petitioner, who all denied having any knowledge of the incident.

The prosecution filed an information8 for homicide on January 12,1989 against the petitioner and Johan, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 1130.Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. They waived the
pre-trial, and the trial on the merits accordingly followed.

The petitioner denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her children, Johan, Melanie and Erika,
were already asleep in the evening of June 19, 1988. She claimed that they were awakened by the sound of stones
being thrown at their house, a gun report, and the banging at their door.

Believing that the noise was caused by the members of the New People’s Army prevalent in their area, and sensing
the possible harm that might be inflicted on them, Johan got a .38 cal. gun from the drawer and fired it twice outside
to scare the people causing the disturbance. The noise continued, however, with a stone hitting the window and
breaking the glass; another stone hit Melanie who was then sick. This prompted Johan to get the shotgun placed
beside the door and to fire it. The noise thereafter stopped and they all went back to sleep.

In its judgment dated July 27, 2000, the RTC found the prosecution’s evidence persuasive based on the testimonies
of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and Malana who both testified that the petitioner shot Mallo. The
testimonial evidence, coupled by the positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan and on the
petitioner’s right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, led the RTC to find
both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Johan, still a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was released on the recognizance of his father,
Moises Kummer. Johan subsequently left the country without notifying the court; hence, only the petitioner appealed
the judgment of conviction with the CA.

She contended before the CA that the RTC committed reversible errors in its appreciation of the evidence, namely:
(1) in giving credence to the testimonial evidence of Cuntapay and of Malana despite the discrepancies between their
sworn statements and direct testimonies; (2) in not considering the failure of the prosecution to cite the petitioner’s
motive in killing the victim; (3) in failing to consider that the writer of the decision, Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino, was
not the judge who heard the testimonies; and (4) in considering the paraffin test results finding the petitioner positive
for gunpowder residue.
The CA rejected the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the RTC judgment, holding that the discrepancies between
the sworn statement and the direct testimony of the witnesses do not necessarily discredit them because the
contradictions are minimal and reconcilable. The CA also ruled that the inconsistencies are minor lapses and are
therefore not substantial. The petitioner’s positive identification by the eyewitnesses as one of the assailants
remained unrefuted. The CA, moreover, held that proof of motive is only necessary when a serious doubt arises on
the identity of the accused. That the writer of the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the
witnesses does not necessarily make the decision erroneous.

In sum, the CA found Malana and Cuntapay’s positive identification and the corroborative evidence presented by the
prosecution more than sufficient to convict the petitioner of the crime charged.

On further appeal to this Court, the petitioner submits the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in
affirming the RTC’s decision convicting her of the crime of homicide.

In essence, the case involves the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses and the sufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence.

Our Ruling

We find the petition devoid of merit.

The petitioner’s conviction is anchored on the positive and direct testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, which
testimonies the petitioner submits to be both inconsistent and illogical. The petitioner essentially impugns the
credibility of the witnesses on these grounds. The petitioner moreover claims that her conviction was based on
doctrinal precepts that should not apply to her case.

Variance between the eyewitnesses’

testimonies in open court and their
affidavits does not affect their
credibility

In her attempt to impugn the credibility of prosecution eyewitnesses Malana and Cuntapay, the petitioner pointed to
the following in consistencies: First, in paragraph 7 of Malana’s July 21, 1988 affidavit, he stated that after hearing
two gunshots, he dived to the ground for cover and heard another shot louder than the first two. This statement is
allegedly inconsistent with his declaration during the direct examination that he saw the petitioner and Johan fire their
guns at Mallo. Second, the July 22, 1988affidavit of Cuntapay likewise stated that he heard two burst of gun fire
coming from the direction of the petitioner’s house and heard another burst from the same direction, which statement
is allegedly inconsistent with his direct testimony where he claimed that he saw the petitioner shoot Mallo. Third, in
his affidavit, Malana declared that he ran away as he felt the door being opened and heard two shots, while in his
testimony in court, he stated that he ran away after Mallo was already hit. According to the petitioner, these and some
other trivial and minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the two witnesses effectively destroyed their credibility.

We find these claims far from convincing. The Court has consistently held that inconsistencies between the testimony
of a witness in open court, on one hand, and the statements in his sworn affidavit, on the other hand, referring only to
minor and collateral matters, do not affect his credibility and the veracity and weight of his testimony as they do not
touch upon the commission of the crime itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even serve to strengthen the credibility of
the witnesses, as these may be considered as badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to prove that
their testimonies have not been rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and evenimpro babilities, unusual, for no
person has perfect faculties of senses or recall.9

A close scrutiny of the records reveals that Malana and Cuntapay positively and firmly declared in open court that
they saw the petitioner and Johan shoot Mallo. The inconsistencies in their affidavit, they reasoned, were due to the
oversight of the administering official in typing the exact details of their narration.

It is oft repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes, an affidavit is incomplete,
resulting in its seeming contradiction with the declarant’s testimony in court. Generally, the affiant is asked standard
questions, coupled with ready suggestions intended to elicit answers, that later turn out not to be wholly descriptive of
the series of events as the affiant knows them. 10 Worse, the process of affidavit-taking may sometimes amount to
putting words into the affiant’s mouth, thus allowing the whole statement to be taken out of context.

The court is not unmindful of these on-the-ground realities. In fact, we have ruled that the discrepancies between the
statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him
since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete.11 As between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open
court, the latter prevails because affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony
given in court.12

In the present case, we find it undeniable that Malana and Cuntapay positively identified the petitioner as one of the
assailants. This is the critical point, not the inconsistencies that the petitioner repeatedly refers to, which carry no
direct bearing on the crucial issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Indeed, the inconsistencies refer only
to minor details that are not critical to the main outcome of the case. Moreover, the basic rule is that the Supreme
Court accords great respect and even finality to the findings of credibility of the trial court, more so if the same were
affirmed by the CA, as in this case.13 We find no reason to break this rule and thus find that both the RTC and the CA
were correct in giving credence to the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay.

It is not necessary for the validity of

the judgment that it be rendered by
the judge who heard the case

The petitioner contends that the CA, in affirming the judgment of the RTC, failed to recognize that the trial court that
heard the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay was not the same court that rendered the decision. 14

We do not share this view.

The rule is settled that the validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneous solely because the judge who heard the
case was not the same judge who rendered the decision. In fact, it is not necessary for the validity of a judgment that
the judge who penned the decision should actually hear the case in its entirety, for he can merely rely on the
transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis for his decision. 15

Thus, the contention - that since Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino was not the one who heard the evidence and thereby
did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses - must fail. It is sufficient that the judge, in
deciding the case, must base her ruling completely on the records before her, in the way that appellate courts do
when they review the evidence of the case raised on appeal. 16 Thus, a judgment of conviction penned by a different
trial judge is not erroneous if she relied on the records available to her.

Motive is irrelevant when the

accused has been positively identified

by an eyewitness

We agree with the CA’s ruling that motive gains importance only when the identity of the assailant is in doubt. As held
in a long line of cases, the prosecution does not need to prove the motive of the accused when the latter has been
identified as the author of the crime.17

Once again, we point out that the petitioner was positively identified by Malana and Cuntapay. Thus, the prosecution
did not have to identify and prove the motive for the killing. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been
killed for no apparent reason at all, and that friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a
crime.18

The petitioner attempts to offer the justification that the witnesses did not really witness the shooting as their affidavits
merely attested that they heard the shooting of Mallo (and did not state that they actually witnessed it). We find this to
be a lame argument whose merit we cannot recognize.
That Malana and Cuntapay have been eyewitnesses to the crime remains unrefuted. They both confirmed in their
direct testimony before the RTC that they saw the petitioner fire a gun at Mallo. This was again re-affirmed by the
witnesses during their cross examination. The fact that their respective affidavits merely stated that they heard the
gunshots does not automatically foreclose the possibility that they also saw the actual shoot in gas this was in fact
what the witnesses claimed truly happened. Besides, it has been held that the claim that "whenever a witness
discloses in his testimony in court facts which he failed to state in his affidavit taken ante litem motam, then an
inconsistency exists between the testimony and the affidavit" is erroneous. If what were stated in open court are but
details or additional facts that serve to supplement the declarations made in the affidavit, these statements cannot be
ruled out as inconsistent and may be considered by the court.

Thus, in light of the direct and positive identification of the petitioner as one of the perpetrators of the crime by not one
but two prosecution eye witnesses, the failure to cite the motive of the petitioner is of no moment.

At any rate, we find it noteworthy that the lack or absence of motive for committing the crime does not preclude
conviction where there are reliable witnesses who fully and satisfactorily identified the petitioner as the perpetrator of
the felony, such as in this case.

There is no absolute uniformity

nor a fixed standard form of human
behavior

The petitioner imputes error to the CA in giving credence to the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay on the claim that
these are riddled not only by inconsistencies and contradictions, but also by improbabilities and illogical claims. She
laboriously pointed out the numerous improbabilities that, taken as a whole, allegedly cast serious doubt on their
reliability and credibility.

She alleged, among others: (1) that it was abnormal and contrary to the ways of the farmers in the rural areas for
Cuntapay to go home from his corral at about 9:00 p.m., while everybody else goes home from his farm much earlier,
as working late in the farm (that is, before and after sunset) is taboo to farming; (2) that the act of the petitioner of
putting down her gun in order to pull the victim away does not make any sense because a criminal would not simply
part with his weapon in this manner; (3) that it is highly incredible that Malana, who accompanied Mallo, was left
unharmed and was allowed to escape if indeed he was just beside the victim; (4) that it is unbelievable that when
Malana heard the cocking of guns and the opening of the door, he did not become scared at all; (5) that Malana and
Cuntapay did not immediately report the incident to the authorities; (6) that it was highly improbable for Malana to turn
his head while running; and (7) that it was unusual that Cuntapay did not run away when he saw the shooting.

We rule, without descending to particulars and going over each and every one of these claims, that without more and
stronger indicators, we cannot accord them credit. Human nature suggests that people may react differently when
confronted with a given situation. Witnesses to a crime cannot be expected to demonstrate an absolute uniformity
and conformity inaction and reaction. People may act contrary to the accepted norm, react differently and act contrary
to the expectation of mankind. There is no standard human behavioral response when one is confronted with an
unusual, strange, startling or frightful experience. 19

We thus hold that the CA was correct in brushing aside the improbabilities alleged by the petitioner who, in her
present plight, can be overcritical in her attempt to seize every detail that can favor her case. Unfortunately, if at all,
her claims refer only to minor and even inconsequential details that do not touch on the core of the crime itself.

Public documents are admissible in

court without further proof of their
due execution and authenticity

A public document is defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as follows:

SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private.

Public documents are:

 (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, or private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private. [emphasis and underscore ours]

The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document. As a public document, the
rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and
genuineness; the person who made the report need not be presented in court to identify, describe and testify how the
report was conducted. Moreover, documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.20

In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin Rubio who was presented in court to
identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist who actually conducted the paraffin test on the petitioner,
the report may still be admitted because the requirement for authentication does not apply to public documents. In
other words, the forensic chemist does not need to be presented as witness to identify and authenticate the chemistry
report. Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report are prima facie evidence of the facts they state, that is, of the
presence of gunpowder residue on the left hand of Johan and on the right hand of the petitioner. As a matter of fact,
the petitioner herself admitted the presence of gunpowder nitrates on her fingers, albeit ascribing their presence from
a match she allegedly lighted.21 Accordingly, we hold that the chemistry report is admissible as evidence.

On the issue of the normal process versus the actual process conducted during the test raised by the petitioner,
suffice it to say that in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the forensic chemist who conducted
the report observed the regular procedure. Stated otherwise, the courts will not presume irregularity or negligence in
the performance of one’s duties unless facts are shown dictating a contrary conclusion. The presumption of regularity
in favor of the forensic chemist compels us to reject the petitioner’s contention that an explanation has to be given on
how the actual process was conducted. Since the petitioner presented no evidence of fabrication or irregularity, we
presume that the standard operating procedure has been observed.

We note at this point that while the positive finding of gunpowder residue does not conclusively show that the
petitioner indeed fired a gun, the finding nevertheless serves to corroborate the prosecution eyewitnesses’ testimony
that the petitioner shot the victim. Furthermore, while it is true that cigarettes, fertilizers, urine or even a match may
leave traces of nitrates, experts confirm that these traces are minimal and may be washed off with tap water, unlike
the evidence nitrates left behind by gunpowder.

Change in the date of the

commission of the crime, where the
disparity is not great, is merely a
formal amendment, thus, no
arraignment is required

The petitioner claims that she was not arraigned on the amended information for which she was convicted. The
petitioner’s argument is founded on the flawed understanding of the rules on amendment and misconception on the
necessity of arraignment in every case. Thus, we do not see any merit in this claim.

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the plea but only if
it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
Section 14 provides:

Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any
accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order
shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance
with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. [emphasis and underscore ours]

A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more formal than
substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendment would
not alter the nature of the offense.

The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when
a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment
is made, when any evidence the accused might have would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and
when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as amended. 22

In People, et al. v. Borromeo, et al.,23 we ruled that the change of the date of the commission of the crime from June
24, 1981 to August 28, 1981 is a formal amendment and would not prejudice the rights of the accused because the
nature of the offense of grave coercion would not be altered. In that case, the difference in the date was only about
two months and five days, which difference, we ruled, would neither cause substantial prejudice nor cause surprise
on the part of the accused.

It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed
except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. 24 The act may be alleged to have been committed at any
time as near as to the actual date at which date the offense was committed, as the information will permit. Under the
circumstances, the precise time is not an essential ingredient of the crime of homicide.

Having established that a change of date of the commission of a crime is a formal amendment, we proceed to the
next question of whether an arraignment is necessary.

Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the nature and cause of the
accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed.25 Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed of the reason
for his indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could be possibly
meted against him. It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time, is given the opportunity to know the precise
charge that confronts him. It is only imperative that he is thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even
of his life, depending on the nature of the imputed crime. 26

The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This however, we hastily
clarify, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not
charge an offense different from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the
prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect the substantial
rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.

We further stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules, does not call
for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the
accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was
arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the accused
simply because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.

Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show that the amendment
in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent
with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the change in the date of the commission of the
crime of homicide is a formal amendment - it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of
the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the
accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the
same line of defenses used by the petitioner. This is also true with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the
petitioner. The effected amendment was of this nature and did not need a second plea.
To sum up, we are satisfied after a review of the records of the case that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence has been successfully overcome.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated April 28, 2006, convicting the petitioner of the
crime of homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Leticia I. Kummer.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* In lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo per Raffle dated September 4, 2013.

1Rollo, pp. 11-28; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. F. Veloso, and concurred in by Associate Justice
Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino.

2
Id. at 85-94; penned by Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino.

3
TSN, November 21, 1989, p. 6.
 4
Id. at 11.

5 Id. at 12.

6 Id. at 13.

7 Ibid.

8
Rollo, p. 82.

9 People v. Perreras, 414 Phil. 480, 488 (2001).

10
People v. Quiming, G.R. No. 92847, May 21, 1993, 222 SCRA 371, 376.

11 People v. Dumpe, G.R. Nos. 80110-11, March 22, 1990, 183 SCRA 547, 552.

12 People v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 105005, June 2, 1993, 223 SCRA 24, 36.

13 People v. Lucero, G.R. No. 179044, December 6, 2010, 636 SCRA 533, 540.

14 Rollo, p. 351.

15
People v. Cadley, 469 Phil. 515, 524 (2004).

16 Villanueva v. Judge Estenzo, 159-A Phil. 674, 681 (1975).

17 People v. Canceran, G.R. No. 104866, January 31, 1994, 229 SCRA 581, 587.

18
People v. Paragua, 326 Phil. 923, 929 (1996).

19 People v. Roncal, 338 Phil. 749, 755 (1997).

20 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Section 23.

21 Rollo, p. 50.

22 People v. Casey, No. L-30146, February 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 21, 31-32.

23 208 Phil. 234, 237-238 (1983).

24 RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, Section 11.

25
Id., Rule 115, Section 1(b).

26 Borja v. Judge Mendoza, 168 Phil. 83, 87 (1977).

A.M. No. RTJ-91-657 June 21, 1993

LOURDES PRESADO, complainant,

vs.

HON. JUDGE MANUEL C. GENOVA, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-91-704 June 21, 1993

DOMINADOR SIA, complainant,

vs.

HON. JUDGE MANUEL C. GENOVA, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-91-721 June 21, 1993

JOSE DE JESUS, complainant,

vs.

HON. JUDGE MANUEL C. GENOVA, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-91-746 June 21, 1993

MANUEL O. ZURBITO, complainant,

vs.

HON. JUDGE MANUEL C. GENOVA, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-91-767 June 21, 1993

DELFIN RICARTE, complainant,

vs.

HON. JUDGE MANUEL C. GENOVA, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-92-816 June 21, 1993

DEBORAH PERINO, complainant,

vs.

HON. JUDGE MANUEL C. GENOVA, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-92-823 June 21, 1993

RIZALINA Q. VALENCIA, complainant,

vs.

HON. JUDGE MANUEL C. GENOVA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
Seven (7) administrative complaints against respondent Judge Manuel C. Genova ("respondent
Judge"), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Masbate, Masbate, were filed with
this Court and subsequently consolidated and referred to Associate Justice Gloria C. Paras of the
Court of Appeals for investigation of, and report and recommendation on, the charges therein. 1

On 29 July 1992, Associate Justice Gloria C. Paras ("Investigating Justice") commenced formal
investigation proceedings, giving notice to all the complainants and to respondent Judge, and
issuing the necessary subpoenaeto the persons who could have information relevant to the charges
filed against respondent Judge. To facilitate the investigation proceedings, depositions were taken,
by authority of this Court, at Masbate, Masbate, before Judge Florente A. Cirpres, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 46.

On 29 January 1993, the Investigating Justice, after holding multiple hearings where the several
parties concerned were present, submitted to the Court a Report and Recommendation of five (5) of
the seven (7) consolidated administrative cases against respondent judge, namely, A.M. No. RTJ-
91-657; A.M. No. RTJ-91-721; A.M. No. RTJ-91-746; A.M. No. RTJ-91-767; and A.M. No. RTJ-92-
816. 2 The Report and Recommendation on the two (2) remaining administrative cases against
respondent Judge, namely A.M. No. RTJ-91-704 and A.M. No. RTJ-92-823, were submitted to the
Court on 8 February 1993. 3

Re: A.M. No. RTJ-91-657 (Lourdes Presado v. Judge Manuel C. Genova) for "Violation of Sec. 3 [b]
R.A. No. 3019 [Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act])."

Lourdes Presado, in her verified complaint dated 26 March 1991, averred that: 4

a) Sometime in 1990, after a petition for adoption of Norlin Mondoniedo was filed by
one Phoebe Dizon before the respondent Judge's sala, respondent's wife
Emerenciana Genova allegedly demanded and received from the adopting parents
the aggregate amount of P15,000.00 through one Mrs. Celeste Asilum;

b) Sometime in 1990, respondent Judge, through his wife Emerenciana, received an

undetermined amount from one Adela Du, who also had a pending case with
respondent;

c) On another occasion, respondent Judge allowed his wife to receive the amount of
P20,000.00 from one Aida Valencia, who then had a pending case before his sala;

d) Sometime in December 1989, a certain Emma Diaz Hao, who was a party to a
case pending before respondent judge, at the instance of respondent's wife
Emerenciana, treated both respondent Judge and wife to a very sumptuous meal,
after which the unconsumed food was wrapped up and given to respondent and wife,
at the prodding of the latter;

e) Respondent Judge is permitting his employee Amy Gaballo to front for his wife's
usurious loan transactions, to the direct or indirect benefit of respondent Judge.

Respondent judge filed an answer alleging: 5

 a) that neither he nor his wife could have made any demands, financial or otherwise,
in the petition for adoption of Norlin Mondoniedo considering that the petition was
resolved without any opposition. Attached to the Answer were the affidavit adopting
parents denying the allegation of having paid respondent judge or his wife, and of
Celeste Asilum denying any participation with the said adoption proceedings;

b) that neither he nor his wife demanded or received any monies from one Adela Du.
Attached to the Answer is the affidavit of Adela Du stating that she "never paid any
amount to" respondent judge nor his wife;

c) that he never allowed nor had his wife ever received from Aida Valencia, a party-
litigant in Civil Case No. 2999 an action for partition, the amount of P20,000.00. That
Civil Case No. 2999 was affirmed by the court of Appeals only shows that the
decision was decided on the merits. The affidavit of Aida Valencia in support of
respondent Judge's denial was attached to the Answer;

d) that the alleged "sumptuous meal" was not arranged by one Emma Diaz Hao" for
respondent Judge and his wife Emerenciana, but was in fact an ordinary meal hosted
by Presiding Judge Silvestre Aguirre of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mandaon-
Balid on the occasion of the judicial visit if the then Presiding Judges of Masbate,
including respondent Judge;

e) that the allegation that his wife Emerenciana has been engaged in usurious loan
transactions is false. That while his wife may have lent money to his employees, the
same was interest free, and in fact, complainant herself and her relatives have
benefited from such "loans" which to date have remained unpaid.

At the investigation proceedings, complainant Presado filed two (2) Manifestations, dated 10 August
1992 6 and 9 September 1992, 7stating that she had lost interest in prosecuting the present complaint
and other administrative complaints against respondent Judge due to financial constraints, filial
obligations, 8and "change of heart." In her second Manifestation, complainant stated that she had
become associated with certain charismatic organizations of the Catholic Church prompting her to
"condone all those who wronged her", including respondent Judge and his wife.

In the meantime, evidence for respondent Judge consisting of testimony from persons mentioned in
the present complaint, was presented before the Investigating Justice.

The Investigating Justice submitted the following recommendation in respect of Presado's

complaint: 9

Considering that in the instant administrative case, there is no evidence to prove the
charges alleged therein in view of the lack of interest of the complainant to prosecute
her complaint, and [that] the persons who allegedly paid or gave money or served
[the] sumptuous meal to the respondent or his wife, in consideration of a judgment by
the respondent judge in their favor in their respective cases,were presented before
the undersigned Investigator, and had affirmed the statements in their respective
affidavits that no such money was ever paid nor a sumptuous meal served to the
respondent judge or his wife [in effect, testifying to the falsity of the charges alleged
by the complainant] THE UNDERSIGNED RECOMMENDS THAT THE COMPLAINT
IN THIS ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. RTJ-[91-] 657 BE DISMISSED. (Emphasis
supplied)
As a rule, the Court does not, as a matter of course, dismiss administrative complaints (especially
those charging offenses as serious as those here charged) against members of the Bench on
account of withdrawal of the charges or desistance of the complainant from prosecuting the
complaint. The Court, however, in the complaint at bar, has very little choice save to adopt the
recommendation of the Investigating Justice to dismiss A.M. No. RTJ-91-657; the desistance of the
complainant, for reasons satisfactory to herself, 10left the charges against respondent judge
unsubstantiated. 11

II

Re: A.M. No. RTJ-91-704 (Dominador Sia v. Hon. Judge Manuel C. Genova) for "Serious
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service."

Dominador Sia, in his verified complaint dated 25 July 1991, charged respondent Judge with
"Serious Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service"
committed as follows: 12

That in 1989, prior thereto and subsequent thereafter, Judge Manuel C. Genova of
Regional Trial Court of the province of Masbate, Masbate, motivated by bias and
moved by personal gain,repeatedly refused to allow herein complainant to present
his documentary evidence, consisting of: [a] the decision of the Honorable Court of
Appeals and that of the Honorable Supreme Court in Civil Case No. 163, in favor of
herein complainant and for which reason, Civil Case No. 321, involving the same
property, subject of Civil Case No. 163 was decided upon by respondent in favor of
intervenors Heirs of Marcelino Aguirre, represented by Judge Silvestre Aguirre,
brother-in-law, Mrs. Emma Diaz Hao, cousin and town-mate of respondent judge
who hails from Magallanes, Sorsogon, [b] that Mrs. Emerenciana Genova, acting as
conduit for her husband [respondent herein,] solicited gifts and goods in kind from
Mrs. Emma Hao in exchange/consideration for a favorable decision in said Civil Case
No. 321. That it is only now that this complaint is filed before this Honorable Court, in
view of he sworn statement of Miss Lourdes Presado [complainant in AM No. RTJ-
91-657] who was privy to all these facts, she being a relative of respondent judge
and the latter having stayed in the house of the former for quite sometime during
which all these unbecoming acts of serious misconduct and dishonesty took place.
(Emphasis supplied)

The Court required respondent Judge to file a Comment, and he did. In his Comment, dated 17
January 1992, respondent Judge averred 13that the orders assailed by the complainant, in
connection with Civil Case No. 321,i.e. (i) Motion to Submit their Formal Offer of Evidence; (ii) Notice
of Appeal; and (iii) Motions for Reconsideration, were denied because they were either filed out of
time or lacked any merit. Respondent Judge explained that he had denied complainant's Formal
Offer of Evidence because it was filed beyond the period granted by the court a quo; the notice of
Appeal was likewise denied because the decision had in the meantime attained finality; that the first
Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, and the second was rejected pursuant to
the prohibition against second motions for reconsideration in B.P. Blg. 129. Respondent Judge
called the Court's attention to the fact that in CA-G.R. SP No. 16299, his decision in Civil Case No.
321 was affirmed en toto by the Court of Appeals.

The Investigating Justice summarized the proceedings relevant to Civil Case No. 321 as follows: 14

[I]n the hearing of November 21, 1986 (in Civil Case No. 321). defendant Dominador
Sia [complainant herein] identified a number of documentary exhibits marked as
Exhibits 1 to 12, after which his counsel was granted by respondent judge five (5)
days within which to formally submit documentary exhibits in writing which,
however, the latter failed to do so for the alleged reason that the defendant brought
along with him the exhibits when he went to Manila to follow up the pending case
before the Court of Appeals.

On January 30, 1987, after the conclusion of the testimony of rebuttal witness in Civil
Case No. 321, the respondent judge issued an Order directing the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.

It was only on August 28, 1987 that counsel for the defendants filed a Motion to
Admit Exhibits which motion was opposed by the plaintiff and the plaintiff-intervenor.
The respondent judge denied said motion in his Order of September 17, 1987 as he
found the delay in filing the same inexcusable.

On November 18, 1987, respondent judge rendered his Decision in Civil Case No.
321 (Exh. "H", Sia) declaring plaintiff and the Intervenor owners of the property in
question. The decretal part of the decision (Exh. "H-1" to "H-3", Sia) reads:

xxx xxx xxx

For failure of the defendants to make a timely appeal, the foregoing decision became
final and executory. Upon motion of the plaintiff and the plaintiff-intervenor, the
respondent judge issued the corresponding writ of execution, and denied the
defendants' motion for reconsideration of his order granting such issuance of the said
writ.

Thus, the defendants [complainants herein] in a petition for certiorari and prohibition
and preliminary injunction (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 16299) sought before the
Court of Appeals the setting asideof the (1) Order of September 17, 1987 denying
their motion to admit documentary exhibits; (2)decision of November 18, 1987; and
(3) orders granting execution and denying the defendants' motion for
reconsideration.

The then Eighth Division of this Court [of Appeals] in its decision dated September
14, 1989 in said CA-G.R. SP No. 16299 found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent judge in issuing the questioned orders and decision, and
dismissed the petition for lack of merit as It Ruled:

1) Re: The Order Refusing Admission of Petitioners' Belated Formal

Offer of Documentary Exhibits:

The refusal to admit petitioner's formal offer of exhibits being one

which was essential to the rendition of the judgment is deemed to
have been finally settled with the finality of the judgment that was
rendered in relation thereto.

2) Re: Decision in Favor of the Petitioners in Civil Case No. 163-II:

xxx xxx xxx

 As regards the petitioners [complainant and privies], they never
invoked the proceedings in Civil Case No. 163 as a defense in Civil
Case No. 321 against the intervenor despite the judgment in their
(petitioners) favor as early as October 2, 1972. On the contrary, it
was the other way around. Civil Case No. 321 was pleaded by the
petitioners in abatement of Civil Case No. 163. When judgment was
rendered in favor of the petitioners in Civil Case No. 163 on October
2, 1972, they did not amend their answer to the complaint in
intervention in Civil Case No. 321, which was then pending to invoke
the judgment in their favor in Civil Case No. 163, but instead went on
full steam ahead in Civil Case No. 321. Significantly, the Formal Offer
of Exhibits by petitioners in Civil Case No. 321 does not include the
judgment in Civil Case No. 163 or even made any reference thereto.
Pronouncement of a judgment in a former
case would not necessarily preclude relitigation of the issues in a
second case if res judicata is not invoked, since res judicata is a
matter of defense and does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to
act on a second suit between the parties on the same subject
matter (Kidpalos vs. Baguio Gold Mining Company, 104 SCRA 913,
917) Defenses and objections not raised in an answer or a motion to
dismiss [are] deemed waived (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) This
is what happened in the present case.

When the petitioners as defendants submitted the merits of their

claim to the land in question in Civil Case No. 321 and evidence in
support thereof was adduced, they may be deemed to have waived
the benefits of the judgment in Civil Case No. 163 and agreed instead
to relitigate in Civil Case No. 321 the merits of their claim to the land
in question. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered
against them in Civil Case No. 321 and after the judgment had
became final, that petitioners invoked for the first time the judgment in
Civil Case No. 163. The rule is settled that if the doctrine of res
judicata is not set up as a defense or ground of objection seasonably,
it is deemed waived and cannot be asserted for the first time on
appeal (Alvarez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 401).

3) Re: Orders Relating to the Execution of the Judgment in Civil Case

No. 321.

Since the judgment in said Civil Case No. 321 has become final and
executory, the issuance of the writ of execution became a ministerial
duty compelled by mandamus(Aguilar vs. Blanco, G.R. No. 32392,
August 31, 1988)

On October 6, 1989, the aforesaid Court of Appeals decision became final and
executory. (Emphasis supplied)

Evaluating the allegations and counter-allegations of complainant and respondent Judge, as well as
the available evidence on record, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the Investigating
Justice to exonerate respondent judge from any liability arising from his Order denying complainants'
Formal Offer of Evidence in Civil Case No. 321 in view of complainant's tardiness in filing the Formal
Offer of Evidence and of complainant's failure to raise as a matter of defense, in a seasonable
manner, the decision in Civil Case No.
163-II.

On the second charge, respondent Judge avers that his wife neither intervened in any case nor
received gifts from any litigants before Branch 44, of which he is the Presiding Judge. He does not
remember having attended any "victory" party in reference to Civil Case No. 321; but recalls
attending a luncheon gathering hosted by Municipal Trial Circuit Court Presiding Judge Aguirre on
the occasion of a judicial visit to Mandaon in 1990 by several Regional Trial Court Judges, including
himself. It was apparently at this occasion when Judge Aguirre introduced to respondent Judge a
certain Ms. Emma Diaz-Hao as his town-mate and schoolmate; but respondent Judge denies ever
having confirmed any blood relation with said Ms. Emma Diaz-Hao.

Considering that the complainant herein had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting
the second charge of his complaint, and presented no competent evidence thereof, 15the
Court is left without any alternative but to accept the recommendation of the Investigating
Justice to dismiss administrative complaint A.M. No. RTJ-91-704 for lack of evidence.

III

Re: A.M. No. RTJ-91-721 (Jose de Jesus, Jr. v. Judge Manuel C. Genova) for
"Serious Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Conduct Unbecoming and Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service."

In a verified complaint dated 1 August 1991, Jose de Jesus charged respondent Judge with "Serious
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Conduct Unbecoming and Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service" committed in the following manner: 16

That on May 1991 and subsequent thereafter, Judge Manuel C. Genova of Regional
Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44, moved by personal gain without
justifiable reason in scandalous manner and in an act debasing the dignity of the
exalted position of an RTC Judge, did then and there, together with his wife,
Emerenciana Genova, stayed and resided at his chambers, second floor of the
Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Masbate, Masbate, utilizing the same as his and his wife's
living and residential quarters, with the provincial government paying their electric
bills thereby inviting public criticisms and as a matter of fact, such actuation of the
respondent and his wife were seriously criticized in a local tabloid "Panahon", copy of
which is hereto attached, marked as Annex "A" anddenounced in a rally held in front
of the Hall of Justice on July 22, 1991 as evidenced by pictures, hereto attached,
marked as Annexes "B", "C", "D", and "E", (Emphasis supplied)

In his affidavit attached to his complaint, Jose de Jesus stated, among other things, that he knew for
a fact that respondent Judge and his wife were using his chambers as living and residential quarters
since May 1991 and up to the time of execution of said affidavit on 25 July 1991. While respondent
Judge denied this charge, he presented during the hearing before the Investigating Justice a written
permit from the Governor of Masbate allowing respondent Judge to stay overnight at the Bulwagan
ng Katarungan "while he is working and as long as he remains the presiding judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 44, Masbate, Masbate." 17The Investigating Justice found that they had
"permanently stayed" in the Bulwagan, quoting from the testimony of respondent Judge himself:

Court:

xxx xxx xxx

 What can you say about this charge of de Jesus that you were living
at the Bulwagan ng Katarungan?

Witness (of respondent Judge):

You know, your Honor, with the peace and order

condition in Masbate that it is very fearsome to be
walking at night, it is a little bit alright now but
previously you cannot even find a tricycle or a
trimobile at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, that you have
to walk and expose to the elements and so I tried to
request the Governor of Masbate who is the caretaker
of the Bulwagan sometimes in the month of March,
1991, requesting that I be allowed to stay overnight if I
am writing my decisions, thinking that if I have to go
home and walk alone without bodyguards, just like
what other judges in Masbate do, and the good
Governor issued to me a permit to stay at the
Bulwagan but previous to this although I would not
like to place it on the record, with the permission of
the Justice, when Justice Bellosillo was the Court
Administrator, I asked permission.

COURT:

You also asked permission.

Witness (of respondent Judge):

Yes, he permitted me, verbally.

Court:

Verbally.

Witness (of respondent Judge):

Verbally together with Justice Fernan. But when this

case was filed, these 2 people (Justices) called for me
and told me not to stay at the Bulwagan . . . .So, from
the time on I was not permanently staying . . . (tsn,
pp. 28, 29, Sept. 21, 1992)" 18 (Emphasis supplied)

The Investigating Justice concluded:

It need not be stated that government property is for official use only and not for the
personal use of the official. The permit issued by the Provincial Governor of Masbate
did not confer on the respondent judge the right to utilize his chambers as his living
and residential quarters. The permit was only for those occasions where the
respondent judge had to work overnight in connection with his official
work. 19(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Judge did not try to prove his assertion that he had been given oral permission to use
his chambers as his family and residential quarters.

The Court agrees with the above conclusion reached by the Investigating Justice and finds the
respondent judge guilty of serious misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.

IV

Re: A.M. No. RTJ-91-746 (Marthie O. Zurbito v. Regional Trial Court Judge Manuel
C. Genova) for "Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Discretion and
Dishonesty."

In her verified complaint, complainant Marthie Zurbito charged respondent Judge as follows:

That on August 20, 1991, in the Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate,

Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the respondent, being the Presiding
Judge of Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Fifth Judicial Region,
and knowing fully well that the accused Adonis Francisco, in Criminal Case No. 6184
for the Murder of Manuel Zurbito, complainant's husband, had pleaded guilty to the
offense charged but had invoked only the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and, therefore, under the law and in a long line of Supreme Court
decisions, should have been convicted, instead, in gross ignorance of the law with
deliberate abuse of discretion and dishonesty for making up or manufacturing "facts"
which were not found in the records, knowingly, willfully and feloniously rendered a
decision of acquittal, thereby inflicting irreparable injustice to herein complainant and
her family. 20(Emphasis supplied)

In its Resolution of 30 January 1992, the Court required respondent Judge to comment on the above
complaint. In his Comment, 21he contended:

(i) that at the arraignment of the accused Adonis Francisco on 23 January 1991 in
Criminal Case No. 6184 entitled People vs. Francisco, defense counsel moved to
enter a plea of "guilty" for the accused, but the latter, with "tears" in his eyes, uttered
"I killed him because he boxed me". Arraignment was thence postponed for 29
January 1991;

(ii) that at the rescheduled arraignment on 29 January 1991, a new defense counsel
entered a plea of "guilty". When asked by the trial court, accused admitted having
killed the victim, but reasoned that the victim repeatedly boxed him. A plea of "guilty"
was nonetheless entered in the Minutes of the arraignment proceedings and
Certificate of Arraignment;

(iii) that prosecution merely presented circumstantial evidence which, unfortunately,

was not sufficient to support the conviction of the accused;

(iv) that the defense, without any objection from the prosecution, presented evidence
to support the statement of the accused that he killed the victim in self-defense;
 (v) that weighing the evidence of the prosecution and of the defense, he gave
credence to the self-defense proposition of the accused and ordered, on 5 August
1991, the acquittal of the latter of the charge in Criminal Case No. 6184.

(vi) that he is invoking the principle of judicial immunity, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of his judicial functions, and that the error, assuming one was
made, was one of judgment made in good faith.

Basically, complainant Marthie O. Zurbito charges that although the accused Adonis Francisco in
Criminal Case No. 6184 for the murder of Manuel Zurbito, complainant's husband, had pleaded
guilty to the charge of murder, respondent Judge nonetheless acquitted the accused.

As a general rule, a plea of guilty is sufficient to sustain a conviction without need of introduction of
any further evidence, save such evidence as may be necessary to enable the court to fix the proper
penalty. 22Where the offense charged is a capital offense, the Rules of Court (Rule 116, Section 3)
require the trial court to conduct "a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree
of culpability."

The decision rendered by respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 6184 was examined in detail by
Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad who found the charges of Marthie O. Zurbito against
respondent Judge to be meritorious. The Investigating Justice declared herself in agreement with the
following findings of Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad:

xxx xxx xxx

Three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense
and this rule is mandatory (PP vs. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637). Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to a capital offense, reception of evidence. —

When the accused pleaded guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequence of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.

Admittedly, respondent judge failed to observe the first requisite although he

complied with the second and third. Trial courts must exercise meticulous care in
accepting a plea of guilty in a capital offense (PP v. Gonzaga, 127 SCRA 158).

Complainant refutes respondent's allegations in his assailed Decision that Atty.

Amador gave the information that the accused surrendered to the police and that the
doctor testified that the victim was bigger than the accused. As to the first allegation,
respondent's stand is tenable that he did not state that Atty. Amador testified in court.
As regard the second, nowhere does it appear on record that the doctor testified to
that effect. Prudence dictates that respondent should have ascertained the veracity
of his factual findings in his decision, especially in the questioned criminal case
involving as it does a judgment of acquittal in a murder case.

What is more deplorable is that in the said decision, respondent acquitted the
accused for the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
 reasonable doubt despite his plea of guilt, corroborated by the testimony of
prosecution witness Jasmin Quintal. He even appreciated complete self-defense in
favor of the accused although the facts of the case do not establish such a justifying
circumstance. The two (2) essential requisites thereof, namely unlawful aggression
and reasonableness of the means employed to repel it are not present. When an
accused claims self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He must rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for
even if the latter's evidence is weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused
himself admitted the killing (PP v. Rey, 172 SCRA 149). Besides, even if it was
established that the accused stabbed the victim thrice at the back, he [respondent
Judge] still asserts that the former had no intent to kill the latter.

Respondent's judge's defenses of judicial immunity and error of judgment made in

good faith are unavailing. His unsubstantiated factual findings, non-observance of
Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, and misapplication of the
theory of self-defense which is elementary in criminal law are far too glaring to
ignore.

Judges may be excused only for occasional mistakes or errors of judgment,

particularly when incurred on complex points of law or mitigated by hourly difficulties
of increasing appellate decisions. Judges are expected to show more than a cursory
acquaintance with elementary rules covering procedure and preliminary
investigations and well-settled authoritative doctrines (Daplas vs. Judge Arquiza, 99
SCRA 141). 23

The Court has examined the decision rendered by respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 6184
dated 5 August 1991. The pertinent portion of respondent Judge's decision reads as follows:

During the presentation of the defense evidence, the accused and his wife testified.
According to the accused, that morning he was going to the Magallanes Gate
wherein he remembered that there was an Anonang Tree. He was going to get a
bark of that tree which he will use as a medicine for his wife who has just given birth.
That while walking towards the place and passing by the public market he saw [the
victim] Manuel Zurbito. Remembering that the latter was his manager at the Masbate
Water Works District, he approached him for a loan of P100.00 which he will use to
buy the medicines for his wife. That instead of giving him what he was requesting,
Manuel Zurbito got angry and boxed him. He was hit on the face. At that time, he
was bringing a knife in order to get the anonang bark and pulled it out. Seeing that
the knife was pulled out, Manuel Zurbito [i.e. the victim] tried to run away but he was
overtaken by the accused. With the stroke of the knife, he hit him in the spinal
column causing [Zurbito's] death. According to him, he made three (3) stabs and then
the victim fell down. Later on, he heard somebody shouting and this made him
recover his senses that's why he started to run.

xxx xxx xxx

During the cross-examination, the prosecution made the accused reveal that he was
a plumber of the Masbate Water Works District. That he was employed there for his
father was relieved because of his illness [sic]. He was made to continue his father's
work as a plumber. That while working, his services was terminated and it was
through the order of Manuel Zurbito that he was terminated. According to the
accused, he did not actually receive the memorandum. In fact, what he received was
 a notice of suspension. He denied that he harbored any bad feelings against Manuel
Zurbito. In fact during that morning, he tried to make a loan and it was only that the
deceased got angry so he tried to stab him.

xxx xxx xxx

Was the accused justified in stabbing Manuel Zurbito? The weapon used and
submitted as an exhibit has a blade of around four inches in length and it is not a
weapon which is used purposely to commit crime. It appears that it has been used
for a long time in the service of the kitchen. It is eroded on its blade and not even
sharp. The edge of the weapon shows that it has been used for quite sometime. It is
stained with dirt, showing that it is not only dirty but it is almost black. This only
shows that the accused did not purposely bring the knife in order to attack
somebody.

xxx xxx xxx

Analyzing the foregoing, it shows that the accused did not actually mean to kill
Manuel Zurbito. If his purpose was to kill him, he should have been stabbed in
another part of the body. The testimony of the doctor was very clear that the knife
was not really fully embedded. It had only a depth of two inches. The wound at the
back explains that the victim was running away.

xxx xxx xxx

From this presentation, nobody saw that really happened except what the accused
says. The Court believes that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond
reasonable doubt and for insufficiency of evidence, the case against the accused
should be dismissed. The accused prove exculpatory evidence which must result to
his acquittal even if he pleaded guilty. 24(Emphasis supplied)

After examination of the decision rendered by respondent Judge and the record of Criminal Case
No. 6184, this Court, like Deputy Court Administrator Bernad and the Investigating Justice, is
convinced that the prosecution's evidence against the accused Adonis Francisco constituted proof
beyond reasonable doubt, that the acquittal of the accused by respondent Judge was rendered in
gross ignorance of the law and tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

A claim of self-defense is, in principle, an admission that he had inflicted a fatal blow on the person
of the victim, but that the injuries so inflicted were justified under the circumstances. It is incumbent,
therefore, upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the unlawful unaggression
on the part of the victim; the reasonableness of the necessary means he employed to prevent or
repel the initial aggression of the victim; and the absence of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused that could have precipitated the aggression by the victim. Even if the evidence of
prosecution be "weak," the accused cannot escape criminal liability on that ground alone since he
has the burden of justifying by clear and convincing evidence what would otherwise be a felonious
act on his part. 25

After a thorough review of the facts obtaining in Criminal Case No. 6184, the Court is unable to see
how respondent Judge could have reasonably ruled that the accused Adonis Francisco, in killing the
victim, acted in self-defense. The bare allegation of the accused that it was the victim, and not
himself, who had provided provocation, was obviously self-serving. The only corroboration of that
allegation was provided by the wife of the accused who could not be expected to be unbiased
witness and whose evidence was clearly hearsay in character since she did not see the incident
herself but merely testified on what the accused had told her after the killing. Moreover, the
testimony of the wife was offered merely to prove voluntary surrender on the part of the accused.

Moreover, even if the respondent Judge had found that the victim Zurbito had "boxed" the accused
Adonis Francisco, the response of the accused against the victim was obviously excessive and
unnecessary, considering that the victim fled from the accused who nonetheless chased him and
inflicted three (3) stab wounds on the victim, the last one penetrating the back and the spine of the
victim two (2) inches deep. The Forensic Examiner Dr. Artemio Capelan testified that he had
difficulty extracting the knife from the body of the victim because it had been embedded through the
vertebral column deep enough to have penetrated the back lateral and lower portion of the heart of
the victim. 26he accused must have delivered the stabbing blow with great force. There is here an
obvious and total misapplication of the law on self-defense. The rule on self-defense is an
elementary norm of law of which respondent Judge seemed totally unaware.

For the acts of respondent Judge in this case, the Investigating Justice recommended that he be
suspended from office without pay for one (1) month.

Re: A.M. No. RTJ-91-767 (Delfin Ricarte v. Hon. Judge Manuel C. Genova) for
"Incompetence, Grave Abuse of Discretion and Gross Ignorance of the Law"

In his verified complaint, Delfin Ricarte stated that he was the father of Edgar Ricarte, the murder
victim in Criminal Case No. 5739 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Sonny Baruelo;" that the
accused Sonny Baruelo was acquitted by respondent Judge for alleged failure of the prosecution to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; that in rendering that acquittal, respondent Judge was partial
to the accused, considering that the defense had failed to discredit Bernito Alvarez, the prosecution
eye-witness; that respondent Judge had discredited the prosecution eye-witness Alvarez by making
assumptions in favor of the accused for which no factual basis had been established during the trial;
that respondent Judge relied solely on his personal notes in deciding the case, disregarding
completely the transcript of stenographic notes taken; that if respondent Judge had referred to the
transcript, he would have found out that the defense witnesses had contradicted each other in their
testimony in material respects; that the testimony of defense witness Ben Betonio contradicted that
of the accused and his wife, but partly confirmed the testimony of prosecution eye-witness Alvarez
that the victim had been killed outside of the house after having been overtaken by accused.

The Court required respondent Judge to file a Comment and there he stated that Criminal Case No.
5739 was a simple case where the accused had proved self-defense; that the victim who lived for
sixteen (16) days after he was stabbed did not execute any affidavit; that the fact that defense
counsel was his former Clerk of Court was not sufficient reason for respondent Judge to inhibit
himself from deciding the case.

The Investigating Justice examined in detail the decision rendered by respondent Judge in
the Baruelo case and the evidence submitted to the trial court. After such examination, the
Investigating reached certain conclusions which may be summarized in the following terms:

(1) There are statements in the assailed decision of respondent Judge that "are not
in accordance with the evidence adduced during the trial." 27

(2) There were inconsistencies on "very substantial matters" between the testimony
of defense witness Betonio on direct examination and his testimony on cross-
 examination; consequently, the credibility of his testimony was "questionable; 28and
that the testimony of that defense witness had at least partially corroborated the
testimony of prosecution eye-witness Alvarez that he saw the accused come from
inside the house and stab the victim Edgar Ricarte who was walking in front of the
accused's house.

(3) The claim of the accused of self-defense had not been convincingly proved:

The number of stab wounds, 5 at that, inflicted on the victim by the

accused [Sonny Baruelo] as well as the location of the same shows
that it was more than mere repelling the alleged attack on the person
of the accused Sonny Baruelo that caused him to stab the victim 5
times. Also, there was no physical proof of the alleged blows by
Edgar Ricarte on the face, forearm and stomach of the accused;

The knife which the victim allegedly tried to stab the accused, with,
was not producedbefore the court. It may be said that except for
the self- serving testimony of the accused himself which
was corroborated only by his wife, there is no clear and convincing
evidence of the claim of self-defense. 29

The basic conclusion reached by the Investigating Justice was that:

While malice does not appear to have attended the inaccuracies found in the
questioned decision, there certainly was misappreciation of the evidence and non-
application of the settled rules on the matter by the respondent judge. There is no
dispute that the respondent judge failed to draw up his decision with care and failed
to make certain that the contents of his decision truly and accurately reflect what is
on record. Thus, the respondent judge may be said to be grossly negligent
which amounts to ignorance of the law in the rendition of the questioned
decision. 30(Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the Investigating Justice found respondent Judge guilty of gross negligence "which
amounts to ignorance of the law," for which she recommended the penalty of suspension without
pay for one (1) month.

After careful examination of the decision of respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 5739 as well as
the underlying records of that case, the Court agrees with the findings of fact of the Investigating
Justice. There is in this case the same gross ignorance on the part of respondent Judge of the very
basic substantive rules of self-defense that were obvious in A.M. No. RTJ-91-746 (Zurbito v.
Genova) which law students in their first year in law school. There is also failure on the part of
respondent Judge to take account of the facts as shown by the evidence made of record during the
trial, such that some of the conclusions reached by the respondent Judge found no basis in the
evidence of record.

VI

Re: A.M. No. RTJ-91-816 (Deborah Perino v. Judge Manuel C. Genova, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 44, Masbate, Masbate) for "Ignorance of the Law."

The sworn complaint here relates, once again, to a decision rendered by respondent Judge in a
criminal case for murder — Criminal Case No. 442 — where, in a decision dated 17 December
1991, two (2) of the accused, Nicomedes Estorum and Joel Estorum, were acquitted of the charge of
murder and that acquittal was rendered, according to complainant Perino, notwithstanding the strong
evidence against both accused and notwithstanding the fact that one of them, Joel Estorum, had not
even been subjected to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Respondent Judge was required by the Court to file a comment on the complaint, and in that
comment, he maintained that his decision in Criminal Case No. 442 was based on the merits; that
while it was true that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Joel Estorum, Joel
was acquitted because of insufficiency of evidence and because, "in the interest of justice," the case
against Joel Estorum "who [was] wrongly accused [should] be terminated," instead of being archived
and serving as a sword of Damocles over the head of Joel Estorum. 31In his memorandum,
respondent Judge invokes the decision of the Supreme Court in People v. Fernandez, 32where the
Court held that when "the crime is not successfully proven, the judgment of acquittal affects the co-
accused who jumped bail."

In Criminal Case No. 442, the evidence of the prosecution tended to establish the following as facts:
that about 3:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 August 1989 at Barrio San Marco, Placer, Masbate, prosecution
witness Marcos Perino and his son Elpidio Perino (victim in Criminal Case No. 442) where at the
store of Sitas Estorum; that the victim Elpidio was invited by the accused Nicasio Estorum to join
their group consisting of two (2) other Estorums and another person; that when the victim went along
with Nicasio, the latter stabbed the victim at the back, while Joel Estorum stabbed the victim above
the right waistline; that almost simultaneously, Nicomedes Estorum shot the victim on the right
abdomen; that all three (3) accused Estorums fled after the slaying of Elpidio Perino; that only
Nicomedes and Nicasio were arrested and later arraigned on 8 October 1990 and 14 August 1991,
respectively; that co-accused Joel Estorum was never arrested and has remained since then a
fugitive from the law.

The story presented by the defense in Criminal Case No. 442 was the following: that in the mid-
afternoon of 24 August 1989, the victim was at the store of Sitas Estorum where the accused
Nicomedes' wife Florita was selling "tuba"; that the victim Elpidio Perino, appearing to be drunk,
wanted to purchase some "tuba" on credit; that Florita refused to sell any to him on credit until the
victim Elpidio shall have paid his previous debt of P80.00; that the victim Elpidio then pulled the hair
of Florita; that Nicomedes, coming from behind the store, confronted the victim and demanded that
he release his wife; that Elpidio then pulled out a gun and pointed it at Nicomedes; that accused
Nicomedes then tried to wrest the gun from the victim; that co-accused Nicasio, seeing the
commotion between his brother Nicomedes and the victim, and attempting to help his brother
Nicomedes, pulled out a bolo;which the victim had on a scabbard on his side and thereupon stabbed
the victim with the bolo; that almost simultaneously, while Nicomedes and the victim Elpidio were
wrestling for the possession of the latter's gun, the gun went off the bullet hitting Elpidio; that both
Nicomedes and Nicasio subsequently escaped from the scene of the crime.

After trial, respondent Judge found Nicasio guilty of homicide with the mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense of his brother (co-accused) Nicomedes. Nicomedes was acquitted upon the
ground of defense of relative (his wife) and the ground that gunshot wound was inflicted accidentally.
Accused Joel Estorum, although never arraigned before the trial court, was acquitted because of
lack of evidence against him.

In her Report, the Investigating Justice made the following observations:

In the criminal case a quo, evidence is clear that the victim suffered two stab
wounds. Logic dictates that since accused Nicasio testified that he stabbed the victim
only once (tsn., p. 9; p. 12, October 8, 1991) someone else must have inflicted the
 second stab wound. There is therefore [a] need of determining how the second stab
wound came about. The case as against accused Joel Estorum should thus not have
been dismissed under the circumstances.

Witness for the prosecution, Marcos Perino, testified that after Nicasio Estorum
stabbed the victim, the latter was also stabbed by Joel Estorum (tsn., p. 4, Nov. 7,
1990) and the Municipal Health Officer Pio V. Corpus of Masbate testified that the
victim suffered two stab wounds and 1 gunshot wound (tsn., p. 3, Jan. 14, 1991).

In the light of the foregoing, the respondent judge may be said to have been too
precipitate to relieve accused Joel Estorum of any criminal liability.

xxx xxx xxx

The version recited by accused Nicomedes Estorum and Zaldy Francisco in their
testimonies and which version was believed by the respondent judge is completely
different from that appearing in their affidavits.

Such grave inconsistency and very substantial at that, between the statements of
accused Nicomedes and the defense witness Zaldy Francisco in their respective
affidavits (which are part of the record)and their testimonies at the witness stand,
should have cautioned the respondent judge in lending credence to the testimonies
of the said witnesses. A judge should exercise due care in analyzing conflicting
statements on record but also to reassure the litigants of his being fair and just.

For the aforesaid gross negligence which amounts to ignorance of the law committed
by the respondent judge, the undersigned Investigator recommends the . . . .
" 33(Emphasis supplied)

We think that once again, in Criminal Case No. 442, respondent Judge showed
unusual ignorance of the law concerning self-defense and defense of relatives as
well as failure to examine the evidence presented during the trial with sufficient care.

Respondent Judge's invocation of People v. Fernandez > 34as basis for his acquittal of Joel Estorum,
appears plainly unjustified. Even cursory examination of the decision of the Court
in Fernandez shows that the co-accusedJosefino Fernandez after having been admitted to
bail, jumped bail, such that the trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over Fernandez's person
when it convicted him and when the Supreme Court found the evidence against both accused
insufficient and accordingly acquitted both. In the present complaint, Joel Estorum was never
arrested nor arraigned, so that, as admitted by respondent judge, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction of his person. Moreover, the evidence against Joel Estorum, as shown by the
Investigating Justice, was very substantial and should have been more than sufficient to restrain
respondent Judge's eagerness to acquit Joel Estorum.

The Investigating Justice found respondent Judge guilty of "gross negligence which amounts to
ignorance of the law" and recommended the penalty of suspension from office without pay for one
(1) month.

VII
 Re: A.M. No. RTJ-92-823 (Rizalina Q. Valencia v. Judge Manuel C. Genova,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Masbate, Masbate) for "Accepting Bribe Money."

In her sworn statement, complainant Rizalina Q. Valencia stated that she is the legal spouse of
Melchor Valencia, one of the defendants in a case entitled "Pedro Valencia et al. v. Melchor
Valencia, et al.", Civil Case No. 2999, Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44, presided
over by respondent Judge; that said case was a complaint for judicial partition; that a decision dated
2 June 1989 was rendered by respondent Judge in favor of plaintiffs Pedro Valencia, et al. which,
among other things, allowed the heirs of the late Marcelo Valencia to share in the estate of the late
Severino Valencia, and included certain heads of large cattle in the estate of Severino Valencia
although the same was separate conjugal property of some of the defendants, and declared
defendants non-suited; that decision was tainted with "bias and irregularity;" that after the said
decision was rendered, complainant Rizalina discovered that respondent Judge received from Aida
Valencia, one of the children of Marcelo Valencia — one of the plaintiffs — the following amounts:
(1) P2,000.00 — on 13 February 1989; and (2) P5,000.00 on 27 July 1989. Complainant attached
xerox copies of two (2) vouchers of AVECO Company.

The xerox copies were described by the Investigating Justice 35in the following manner:

Exh. "F" is a xerox copy of a voucher entitled in bold prints "GENERAL VOUCHER."
All in handwriting are (1) "Feb. 13, (19)89" (date); (2) "Payment for
Judge (EXPLANATION OF TRANSACTION); (3) P2,000 (AMOUNT); (4) "Aida
Valencia" (signature); (5) Cash Feb. 13 (19)89 (Check No.)"; (6) Aveco (Received
from); and (7) TWO THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (the sum of).

Exh. "G" is a xerox copy of a voucher also entitled in bold prints "GENERAL
VOUCHER." All in handwriting are (1) "July 27, 1989" (date); (2) "Judge Manuel
Genova" (appearing on the uppermost left hand corner of the voucher); (3) "Payment
for legal fees for the case" (EXPLANATION OF TRANSACTION); (4) P5,000
(AMOUNT); (5) "Aida Valencia" (signature); (6) "Professional Fee" (ACCOUNT); (7)
"Petty Cash fund" (CREDITS); (8) "Cash" — 7-27 (19)89 (CHECK NO.); (9) "Aveco
Company" (Received from); and (10) "Five Thousand Pesos Only" (the sum of). 36

In his comment on the complaint, respondent Judge denied receiving the amount of P7,000.00 from
Aida Valencia. He also stated that the decision he rendered in civil Case No. 2999 had been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a decision rendered on 29 September 1991 which was brought
to the Supreme Court on petition for review; that the petition for review was dismissed by the
Supreme Court for lack of merit. Respondent Judge also stated that the vouchers attached to the
complaint were fake and not the genuine vouchers of AVECO Company.

In respect of the vouchers showing the total amount of P7,000.00, the complainant testified before
the Investigating Justice that she was given those vouchers by Evelyn Posadas, an accountant of
Aida Valencia who had asked Evelyn to prepare the vouchers for respondent Judge. 37

Evelyn Posadas, after initial failure to attend the hearings, did appear before the Investigating
Justice and stated that her failure to attend the earlier hearings was due to "the respondent Judge
threaten[ing] to file a case against her before the Professional Regulatory Commission." 38The
testimony of Evelyn Posadas was summarized by the Investigating Justice in the following manner:

[Evelyn Posadas] testified that since July 29, 1992, in the residence of Aida Valencia,
in Palmera Heights Subd., the respondent judge had threatened to file such
administrative charge against her if she appears before the Investigator; that during
 the proceedings of this administrative case, the respondent judge told her to hide in
the house of Aida Valencia in order that the process server could not serve on her
subpoena for the said hearings; that Aida Valencia told her that if ever she would
testify, it would only cost Aida Valencia P100,000.00 — P50,000.00 for the judge and
P50,000.00 for the police; that she (Evelyn Posadas) got the original copies of the
said vouchers from the files of Aveco Export Co., had them photocopied and
returned the original copies; that when she saw the said vouchers and asked Aida
Valencia about them, the latter said that she used them "sa paggapang sa Kaso ko
sa lupa"; that the signatures in the said xerox vouchers are the genuine signatures of
Aida Valencia for Evelyn Posadas is familiar with the same as Aida always sign in
her presence; that sometimes, Evelyn prepared the checks for the professional fees
and Aida Valencia signed them; that Aida Valencia gave her mother, Flora Guadayo,
a Rolex wrist watch for the latter to appear in this administrative case in favor of the
respondent judge and she (Evelyn Posadas) was a given a Rolex wrist watch in
order not to appear as the complainant's witness in the present administrative case;
that her mother failed to attend the September 21, 1992 hearing because she went to
Masbate for the hearing of a land entitled "Valenzuela, et al v. Guadayo" before the
sala of Judge Genova; that she appeared in this administrative case because she
was already sick and tired of the grave threats against her by Aida Valencia and for
public interest; that Aida Valencia made her sign a prepared affidavit in September
1992 right after the publication in the "Panahon" of the bribery case involving the
respondent judge; that when she stayed in the house of Aida Valencia with the
respondent judge and his wife, he would ask money from Aida Valencia for
transportation and other ordinary expenses, and the latter would put in his pocket, a
P1,000.00 denomination bill; and that she filed administrative cases for bribery
against the judge and the Justices who rendered the decisions against her in civil
cases she filed before their respective courts (tsn, pp. 3-38, October 7, 1992, 1:30
p.m.).39(Emphasis supplied)

Respondent judge contended that the testimony of Evelyn Posadas should not be believed
considering that she was mentally ill, being a schizophrenic and being in and out of the mental
hospital several times. In support of this assertion, Dr. Cecilia Alvaran of the National Center for
Mental Health was presented and testified that Evelyn Posadas had been confined a number of
times in that hospital with the diagnosis of "schizophrenia paranoid-type." and "schizophrenia
undifferentiated-type." The Investigating Justice, however, noted that a court report dated 20
October 1992 by the National Center for Mental Health prepared by Carmelito Erespe and approved
by Dr. Cecilia Alvaran contained the following recommendation:

At present she (Evelyn Posadas) is deemed to be free of psychotic symptoms and is

deemed fit to stand witness in court. 40

Aida Valencia appeared as a defense witness at the investigation and there said that she never gave
any money to respondent Judge nor prepared any vouchers for him; that the signatures on the xerox
copies of the vouchers were not her signatures; that she would not pay respondent Judge legal fees
because she had a lawyer, one Atty. Apaya; that she had indeed employed Evelyn Posadas as
auditor of the company (AVECO) from 1990-1991 until Evelyn Posadas became a "mental case."

In the portion of her "Second Report dealing with this complaint, the Investigating Justice stated that
she was not convinced "that bribery took place between Aida Valencia as the giver and the
respondent judge as the receiver.41The Investigating Justice submitted two (2) reasons for this
conclusion: firstly, the Investigating Justice believes that Evelyn Posadas had a "fixation" that "every
court victory has been attended by a bribe received by a judge from the winning litigant;" 42and
secondly, the Investigating Justice felt that the xerox copies of the vouchers did not constitute
sufficient evidence of a bribe. She said:

The xerox copies for the two vouchers in question likewise are not sufficiently
convincing of the bribe alleged in this administrative case. In the first place, they are
mere xerox copies and as such could easily be subject to insertions, additions or
changes of matters not found in the original. Secondly, the data contained therein do
not support the dishonest act involved. In Exhibit F, while there is the phrase
"payment for judge" the name of the judge is not indicated. It does not necessarily
follow that because Aida Valencia is an heir of one of the plaintiffs in a case before
the respondent judge, such payment was made to him.

In Exhibit G, the data contained therein regarding explanation of transactions and

account are contradictory. While at the top, there are the words "Judge Manuel
Genova", in the box for "Explanation of Transaction" is written "payment for legal
fees for the case" and in the box for account is written "Professional fee." Certainly, if
the explanation of the transaction is payment for legal fees, then such payment is
legitimate." 43

While apparently dismissing the complaint of Rizalina Q. Valencia for lack of sufficient evidence, the
Investigating Justice took respondent Judge to task for certain improprieties:

An observation of the Investigator is that the respondent judge has utilized Flora
Guadayo, a litigant in a civil case before his sala, as his witness in this administrative
case, and that despite the fact that she has already testified for him, he has not
inhibited himself from presiding over her case as of the date of the last hearing of this
administrative case on November 11, 1992.

The Investigator is of the view that under the circumstances, the respondent judge
has displayed lack of sound discretion for he has placed himself in a situation where
the so-called cold neutrality of a judge can no longer be said of him for the litigant,
Flora Guadayo, has done him a favor.

Also, on one occasion when the respondent judge went to the office of the
stenographers in these administrative cases in order to have a copy of the transcript,
it was Aida Valencia who paid for the transcript, although according to him, he paid
her after. Such payment by Aida Valencia (although paid later by the respondent
judge) is an act of impropriety considering that she won a case in his sala. If may be
mentioned that a copy of the transcript could be send to him even if there was no
prior payment as was done with the transcript of the proceedings on October 7,
1992.

Furthermore, the respondent judge, as shown in the earlier part of the proceedings,
was trying to make it appear to the Investigator that Evelyn Posadas could not be a
witness in this administrative case as she was allegedly so mentally sick and
confined at the mental hospital (tsn. p. 65, Aug. 18, 1992, a.m.) when in fact, on the
day she was supposed to appear, he knew that she would not appear as instructed
by Aida Valencia. 44

Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the evidence submitted against respondent
Judge on this bribery charge is not insubstantial. The testimony of Evelyn Posadas cannot be
disregarded as the meaningless babble of a mad woman, considering the certification issued by the
National Center for Mental Health, and considering the clear and coherent manner in which she
testified. Aida Valencia contradicted the testimony of Evelyn Posadas; that was, of course, to be
expected. Considering all the testimony and other evidence submitted in this case, the balance of
evidence appears to the Court to be just about at equipoise. The vouchers submitted by the
complainant were photocopies only. The record does not show that efforts were made by
complainant to secure production of the original vouchers by subpoena duces tecum.
Photocopies could be faithful reproductions of the originals. Respondent Judge sought to suggest
that the amounts indicated in the photocopies of the vouchers may have been amounts paid to the
commissioners appointed in the partition case. This effort was not convincing. At the same time,
however, the photocopied vouchers do not unequivocally state that the sums there set out were
given to respondent Judge. Upon the other hand, if those sums had indeed been given to and
received by respondent Judge, he would not, in realistic expectation, have given a receipt for them;
to require submission of such a receipt in order to hold respondent guilty would be unreal and
unreasonable. Finally, we note that if, in fact, one of the vouchers (Exhibit "G") was "payment for
legal fees," such payment would not have been legitimate if made to respondent Judge; for he, an
incumbent judge, obviously could not have legally practiced law and charged legal fees for legal
services.

We hold that, on balance, and not without hesitation, the evidence submitted against respondent
Judge in this seventh administrative case is not sufficient basis for finding him guilty of bribery.

Taking now a global view of all the seven (7) cases against respondent Judge, and considering more
particularly the conclusions we reached in respect of the fourth, fifth and sixth cases (A.M. No. RTJ-
91-746; A.M. No. RTJ-91-767; and A.M. No. RTJ-91-816) above, in conjunction with our conclusion
in the third case (A.M. No. RTJ-91-721), the Court concludes that respondent Judge has been
shown to be unfit to remain in the Judiciary and must accordingly, in the interest of the service, be
removed from the service. In the fourth, fifth and sixth cases above, respondent Judge exhibited
ignorance about basic principles of criminal law so gross and appalling as to compel the conclusions
that he could not have been acting in good faith; that he is grossly incompetent as a judge; and that
to allow him to remain a judge is to impose an intolerable risk of letting loose on our hapless society
more persons who have committed crimes as serious as murder and who should be behind prison
bars. In the third case, respondent Judge demonstrated that he is capable and willing to devote
government property to private and family purposes, a demonstration which reinforces the Court's
conviction concerning respondent Judge's unfitness to remain in the Judiciary.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the respondent Judge for gross ignorance of the law
amounting to gross incompetence and misconduct in office, and in the best interest of the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and benefits he might otherwise be entitled
to, except accrued earned leave privileges or the money value thereof. This Resolution is
immediately executory and respondent Judge shall vacate his position forthwith.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo
and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., is on leave.

Bellosillo, J., took no part.

# Footnotes
1 Resolution dated 14 May 1992, and again in the Respondent dated 13 August
1992.

2 Hereafter, "First Report."

3 Hereafter, "Second Report."

4 Rollo of A.M. No. RTJ-91-675, pp. 1-2.

5 Id., pp. 27-45.

6 Id., p. 71.

7 Id., p. 92.

8 Complainant Presado stated that even if she had the financial resources to
prosecute her complaint against respondent Judge, she would not be able to find any
one to whom she could entrust her two (2) minor children during her trips to Manila in
connection with the investigation of respondent Judge.

9 First Report, p. 6.

10 It appears that Lourdes Presado is a relative of respondent Judge and that the
latter had stayed in her house for sometime; see below, footnote 12.

11 Banawa v. De Jesus, 144 SCRA 505 (1982). See generally Beltran v. Magsarili,
79 SCRA 655 (1977); de la Rama v. Dizon, 72 SCRA 129 (1976).

12 Rollo of A.M. No. RTJ-91-704, p. 1.

13 Id., pp. 11-15.

14 Second Report, pp. 6-8.

15 Complainant Sia pointed to Lourdes Presado (complainant in A.M. No. RTJ-91-

657) as his witness. As noted earlier, however, Presado suddenly "acquired religion"
and withdrew her own complaint and the affidavit she had executed in Sia's case
against respondent Judge.

16 Rollo of A.M. No. RTJ-91-721, p. 1.

17 First Report, p. 8.

18 Id., pp. 8-9.

19 Id., p. 9.

20 Id., p. 15.

21 Rollo of A.M. No. RTJ-91-746, pp. 49-57.

22 Section 4, Rule 116, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. See also Demsey v.
Regional Trial Court, 164 SCRA 319 (1988).

23 First Report, p. 17-18.

24 Record of Criminal Case No. 6184, pp. 43-49.

25 People v. Arroyo, 201 SCRA 616 (1991); Guevarra v. Court of Appeals, 187
SCRA 490 (1990); People v. Rey, 172 SCRA 149 (1989); People v. Llamera, 51
SCRA 48 (1973).

26 TSN, Criminal Case No. 6184, dated 19 January 1991, pp. 12-13.

27 First Report, p. 12.

28 Id., p. 13.

29 Id., p. 14.

30 Id.

31 Rollo of A.M. No. RTJ-92-816, pp. 12-13.

32 186 SCRA 830 (1990).

33 First Report, pp. 21-22.

34 186 SCRA 830 (1990).

35 Second Report, p. 14.

36 Id.

37 Id., p. 13.

38 Id., p. 16.

39 Id.

40 Id., p. 17.

41 Id., p. 20.

42 Id.

43 Id., p. 23.

44 Id., pp. 23-24.

G.R. No. 190178 February 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA, Accused-Apellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The peculiar nature of rape is that conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely upon the word of
the private complainant because it is essentially committed in relative isolation or even in secrecy,
and it is usually only the victim who can testify of the unconsented coitus. Thus, the long standing
rule is that when an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed. Since the participants are usually the only
witnesses in crimes of this nature and the accused's conviction or acquittal virtually depends on the
private complainant's testimony, it must be received with utmost caution. It is then incumbent upon
the trial court to be very scrupulous in ascertaining the credibility of the victim's testimony. Judges
must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman claiming to have
been sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant
of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should
equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice according to law.1

Before Us is an appeal from the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Forcible Abduction with Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The present case involves eight (8) sets of Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape filed by
private complainant ("AAA") against appellant, Felimon Patentes.

The Prosecution’s Case

On 5 December 1998, at about 11:00 a.m., AAA boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City, to visit
and bring medicines to her sick grandmother. While seated at the rear portion of the bus, appellant
suddenly sat next to her. It was the second time AAA met appellant; the first time was on 4
December 1998, when appellant persistently courted her. She only knew appellant as he was a
friend of her brother.

After a brief conversation, appellant suddenly showed her his bolo, covered by a red scabbard
tucked in his right side while he held a red steel pipe with Arabic markings, which he used to
threaten to kill AAA should AAA disobey him. Appellant then accompanied AAA to her
grandmother’s place and returned to Davao City proper by bus. As they walked around, appellant
placed his right hand on AAA’s shoulder. Appellant also held AAA’s right hand, which covers her
mouth with a handkerchief.

Upon reaching Davao City, they rode a jeepney to Sasa and alighted at a nearby convenience store.
Upon arrival, a man gave something to appellant, which he immediately placed inside his pocket.
Appellant then brought AAA to his house in Hacienda Heights, Davao City, where his parents, sister,
brother-in-law, nephews and nieces live.
Upon entering the house, appellant dragged AAA to a room upstairs and tied her to a sewing
machine. Appellant then started to smoke something, which he also forced AAA to inhale, causing
AAA to feel light, weak and dizzy. This prevented AAA from fighting back as appellant removed
AAA’s clothes. Doffed of his own clothes, appellant mounted her and inserted his penis into her
vagina.

The following day, 6 December 1998, appellant again forced AAA to inhale the smoke from his
cigarette, causing her to feel weak and dizzy as appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA.

On 7 December 1998, appellant again had carnal knowledge of AAA using threats, force and
intimidation, causing bruises on AAA’s arms.

On 8 December 1998, while appellant was sleeping beside AAA, AAA slowly got up to escape.
However, AAA’s attempt, while feeble, woke up appellant. Appellant then punched her in the
stomach, causing AAA to lose consciousness. When AAA gained a little strength, appellant again
mauled her and raped her again.

On 9 December 1998, after AAA took a bath, appellant raped AAA while pointing a bolo to her neck.

On 10, 11 and 12 December 1998, appellant raped AAA while threatening her with bodily harm. He
also threatened to kill her family, in case she tells anyone of her ordeal.

On 13 December 1998, to free herself from her predicament, AAA convinced appellant that she will
marry him. Appellant agreed. Appellant’s mother accompanied AAA to the latter’s house to discuss
the marital plans with AAA’s family. Surprised by the marital plans, AAA’s mother asked for a private
moment with AAA. In their conversation, AAA confessed how appellant forcibly took her to his house
on 5 December 1998 and raped her for more than a week. AAA’s mother then accompanied AAA to
report her ordeal to the police, where AAA was examined by a doctor, Dr. Samuel Cruz, the City
Health Officer of Davao City.

Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he noted the following observations about
AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen was intact and can readily admit
a normal-sized erect male penis without sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal canal was negative for
spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell whether it was AAA’s first sexual intercourse
as the vagina was not injured but had healed lacerations.

The Accused-Appellant’s Defense

On 5 December 1998, pursuant to their previous agreement, appellant accompanied AAA to

Bansalan to visit and bring medicines to AAA’s grandmother. After going around Davao City, they
went to his house at about 7:00 p.m. Appellant then offered to bring AAA to her house but the latter
refused, insisting that she wanted to live with appellant because she was fed up with her mother,
who often called her "buntog" or prostitute.

AAA stayed in appellant’s house together with the latter’s parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews
and nieces. AAA slept in the same room with appellant and had consented sexual intercourse.
Throughout AAA’s stay, she was free to roam around the house and even helped in the household
chores. Pursuant to their marital plans, AAA’s grandfather went to appellant’s house on 7 December
1998. As a result, they agreed to set the wedding date on 27 May 1999. Appellant’s mother also
went to AAA’s house to discuss the marital plans on 14 December 1998. However, AAA’s mother
rejected the marriage proposal because of appellant’s social standing.
Leonora Gerondio (Gerondio), appellant’s neighbor, testified that she first met AAA in appellant’s
house on 5 December 1998. The following day, Gerondio again saw AAA when she went to
appellant’s house. Appellant told her that he will marry AAA. Since then, Gerondio saw AAA
everyday from 7 to 11 December 1998, cleaning the surroundings, doing the laundry, and walking
around the vicinity. AAA even visited her house and talked about AAA and appellant’s marital plans.
In her observation, AAA and appellant acted like a couple. Gerondio also accompanied appellant’s
mother to AAA’s house to discuss AAA and appellant’s marital plans. However, AAA’s mother
rejected the marriage proposal.

Wilma Enriquez (Enriquez), a common friend of AAA and appellant, testified that between 5 to 12
December 1998, she went twice to appellant’s house upon AAA’s invitation to talk about the couple’s
marital plans.

During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) AAA, private complainant herself;
(2) Dr. Samuel Cruz; (3) PO1 Lennie Ronquillo; (4) private complainant’s mother; and (5) Julie
Dayaday.

On the other hand, the defense presented: (1) Felimon Patentes, accused-appellant himself; (2)
Leonora Gerondio; (3) Wilma Enriquez; and (4) Francisca Patentes.

After trial, the lower court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of
Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
Felimon Patentes a.k.a. Arnold Patentes is hereby sentenced as follows:

1. Criminal Case No. 42,786-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

2. Criminal Case No. 42,787-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

3. Criminal Case No. 42,788-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

4. Criminal Case No. 42,789-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

5. Criminal Case No. 42,790-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

6. Criminal Case No. 42,791-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

7. Criminal Case No. 42,792-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

8. Criminal Case No. 42,793-99 - Reclusion Perpetua

The accused shall indemnify AAA Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) in each of the eight cases
for a total of Two Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (₱240,000.00).

SO ORDERED.4

Aggrieved, appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court with modification. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED as to the conviction of appellant FELIMON
PATENTES for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of eight (8)
counts of Rape and as to the imposition upon him of the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the
eight (8) offenses. His civil liability, however, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

Appellant FELIMON PATENTES is hereby directed to pay the following amounts:

1. ₱50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and
seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of ₱400,000.00;

2. ₱75,000.00 each as moral damages for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and
seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of ₱600,000.00; and

3. ₱25,000.00 each as temperate damages for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with
Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of ₱200,000.00.

SO ORDERED.5

The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses
for the prosecution. According to the appellate court, "AAA’s account of her ordeal in the hands of
appellant was straightforward, firm, candid and consistent. Notwithstanding the rigid, lengthy and
rigorous cross-examination by the defense, AAA remained steadfast in her narration of the details of
her harrowing experience. A thorough reading of the transcript shows that AAA’s testimony bears
the earmarks of truth and credibility."6

Hence, this appeal.

The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge
of the victim; and (2) said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b)
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12
years of age or is demented.7 In the case at bar, appellant never denied having carnal knowledge of
AAA. The only matter, thus, to be resolved by this Court is whether appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation, or that AAA was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or was under 12 years of age or is demented.

Appellant argues that if AAA really was raped for more than an entire week, it is perplexing why she
did not escape, or even seek the help of the neighbors despite several opportunities to do
so.8 Appellant further alleges that AAA’s failure to escape and her helping in the household chores in
appellant’s house prove that she was not raped and that they had consensual sexual intercourse.9

About this position, the appellate court noted and reasoned that, "appellant threatened AAA with
harm in the event that she told anyone of what happened between them. The lingering fear instilled
upon AAA is understandable considering that appellant was always armed with a bolo and was
constantly showing it to AAA. The possibility of him making good his threat was not at all remote and
the fear for her life remained palpable."10

Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. There is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident as the workings of the
human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable.11 Nevertheless, the Court must
be guided by established principles.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape
is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2)
inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.12 So long as the private complainant’s testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.13

Following these legal precepts, AAA’s testimony, placed side by side with the prosecution’s
evidence, must stand the test of credibility.

1. Absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of rape since proof
of injuries is not an essential element of the crime.14 And, it is also a precept that physical evidence is
of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together.15 In the case at bar,
the prosecution failed to present any scintilla of proof to support its claim. In fact, contrary to the
prosecution’s claim that AAA was dragged, tied, mauled, slapped and boxed, the medical certificate
revealed no telltale sign of the prosecution’s allegations. It has to be noted that the medical
examination was conducted the day after AAA’s supposed escape from appellant. As shown by the
medical certificate, AAA had no external signs of physical injuries, save for a kiss mark, to wit:16

EXTRAGENITAL PHYSICAL INJURY:

Contusion, reddish purple, breast, right side, lower-inner quadrant, 2.0x1.0 cm. xxx

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The above physical injury was noted on the body of the subject, age of which is consistent
with the alleged date of infliction.

2. That under normal conditions without subsequent complications and unless a deeper
involvement might be present but which is not clinically apparent at the time of examination,
said injury will require medical attendance of not more than seven (7) days from date of
infliction.

3. Hymen intact and its orifice, wide as to allow complete penetration by an average-sized
male organ in erection without causing hymenal injury.17

2. The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility
with human knowledge, observation and common experience of man.18 Thus, whatever is repugnant
to the standards of human knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie
outside judicial cognizance.19

As culled from the records, AAA lived with appellant’s family for eight (8) days – in the same house
where appellant’s parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces also lived. AAA even called
appellant’s mother, "mama." As argued by the defense, "the members of the appellant’s family could
have noticed that she was being forced and raped by the accused if the accusations were really
true."20 Indeed, it is incompatible with human experience to keep a sex slave for eight (8) days in a
house where the abuser’s entire family, including the abuser’s minor nephews and nieces live.

When appellant and AAA arrived in the former’s house, they were greeted by appellant’s father. If
AAA’s account were true that appellant dragged her to a room upstairs and then tied her to a sewing
machine, appellant’s father could have noticed and reacted to the obvious violence. To say the least,
he would have talked to the appellant about the deed. Instead, and incredibly, appellant’s mother
went to AAA’s house to propose marriage – contrary to the common experience.

Contrary to the prosecution’s claim that AAA only saw appellant on 4 December 1998, a day before
the alleged commission of the crime, it was stipulated that AAA knew appellant as appellant was a
neighbor and friend of AAA’s brother.21 Furthermore, appellant’s mother was the midwife who
assisted AAA’s housemaid in giving birth.22Lastly, AAA and appellant have a common friend,
Enriquez, who testified that she saw the two in appellant’s house, through AAA’s invitation.23 The
TSN reflects the inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony:24

Q: Do you know that his mother is a midwife?

A: No, Sir. Because she helped in the delivery of our housemaid.

Q: When did your housemaid give birth?

A: When I went to Bansalan on December 5 I passed by the house she was about to deliver and I
saw the mother of the accused that’s the time I came to know his mother.

Q: Is it not that your stepfather even went to the house where you stayed?

A: No, sir.

Q: You will deny that?

A: I did not see him.

xxxx

Q: Is it not you said you were being locked?

A: I was locked at the door when my father arrived. I do not know because he locked me at the
room. [Emphasis supplied]

For several days that AAA had been missing, which would have caused worry and anxiety among
AAA’s family members, AAA’s father, instead of reporting the matter to police authorities, went to
appellant’s house to discuss AAA and appellant’s marital plans on 7 December 1998.25 Clearly, this
is contrary to human logic and experience, and inconsistent with the prosecution’s claim.

3. The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance
in establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape.26 In the case at bar, the actuations of AAA
after the alleged rape is totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. It is contrary to normal
human behavior for AAA to willingly go with her abuser’s mother, and worse, to live with her abuser’s
entire family in one roof for eight (8) days sans any attempt to escape.

It goes against the grain of human experience for a woman who has been robbed of her honor and
chastity not to seize an opportunity to escape from the clutches of her malefactor.27 Instead of
escaping from her abuser, AAA visited appellant’s neighbor.28 Even if AAA had several opportunities
to share her ordeal to be rescued by her friend, Wilma, AAA inexplicably failed and instead
described the details of her marital plans. What is truly exceptional, however, is the testimony of
AAA that she visited her grandmother during the period of her alleged abduction. Despite
inconsistencies in her testimony as shown in the TSN, AAA admitted the visit to her grandmother:29

Q: So you did not proceed to your grandmother’s house, where is the house of your grandmother?

A: Km. 81.

Q: Near the Dulo?

A: A bit farther of Dulo.

Q: You rode in a jeep and the driver is your cousin?

A: No sir we rode (sic) pedicab going to my grandmother’s place.

Q: There were no people?

A: We are used to ride (sic) pedicab.

Q: So you rode a pedicab at that time?

A: No, Sir. [Emphasis supplied]

We are mindful that appellant’s bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone stand. It must
be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes,
photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.30 There is such
corroboration in this case. To support its sweetheart theory, the defense presented appellant and
AAA’s common friend, Enriquez, who attested to the veracity of appellant’s claim:31

Q: When you arrived at their house did you see the complainant AAA?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were you able to talk to her?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell the court what was the subject of your conversation?

A: She told me that she and Felimon Patentes are getting married, saying where they will live and
that they will go into the buy and sell business.

Q: Did you notice AAA to be happy with Felimon Patentes?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And the second time you went to their place do you remember what was the subject of your
conversation?

A: Regarding their plan of getting married. [Emphasis supplied]

Appellant’s neighbor, Gerondio, corroborated the testimony:32

Q: Do you remember seeing the accused sometime on December 5, 1998?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where did you see him?

A: In their house, he just arrived.

Q: Was he alone?

A: He is with AAA.

xxxx

Q: On the following day did you see again AAA?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where did you see her?

A: Inside their house, she was walking.

xxxx

Q: When was that when you saw her?

A: The next day, December 6, 1998.

xxxx

Q: On the succeeding days, from December 7 to 11 were you able to see AAA in the house of
Felimon?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where did you see her?

A: In the house of the accused, Felimon.

Q: What was she doing?

A: She was cleaning the surroundings of the house and did the laundry, and she was also going
around.

Q: When you said going around or "suroy-suroy" where did she go around?

A: She also went to our house.

Q: Were you able to talk to her personally?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: What did you observe from them?

A: As if they are married.

Q: What were the actions that you saw in them?

A: They were loving with each other.

Q: What do you mean by loving?

A: They are close to each other, they joke, and Felimon would place his arm on the shoulder of AAA.
[Emphasis supplied]

A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means
a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution.33 In the
case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the
truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats,
force or intimidation.

The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with precipitate
credulity for the charge can easily be concocted.34 Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility
to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose charge is
not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting
interpretations.35 While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim
undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render
justice based on the law.36

The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created reasonable
doubt in Our mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in favor of
1âwphi 1

appellant must be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the
quantum of proof to support a conviction.37

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, finding appellant
FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Forcible Abduction with Rape,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA is ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt. His immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless he is being
detained for some other charge.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
People v. Macapanpan, 449 Phil. 87-89 (2003) citing People v. Alitagtag, 368 Phil. 637, 647
(1999); People v. Baltazar, 385 Phil. 1023, 1031 (2000); People v. Dumaguing, 394 Phil. 93,
103 (2000); People v. Gallo, 348 Phil. 640, 665 (1998); People v. Babera, 388 Phil. 44, 53
(2000); People v. Alvario, 341 Phil. 526, 538-539 (1997).

2
Penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justices Jane Aurora C.
Lantion and Edgardo T. Lloren concurring, Court of Appeals, Twenty First Division, Cagayan
de Oro, CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00062; CA rollo, p.159-187.

3
Penned by Presiding Judge Jesus V. Quitain, promulgated on 7 March 2005, People v.
Felimon Patentes, Crim. Case No. 42,786-793-99, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Davao
City. Records, pp. 129-144.

4
Id. at 144.

5
CA rollo, p. 186.

6
Id. at 179.
7
People v. Bongat, G. R. No. 184170, 2 February 2011, 641 SCRA 496, 505.

8
CA rollo, p. 101.

9
Id. at 93.

10
Id. at 181.

11
People v. Mariano, G.R. No. 168693, 19 June 2009, 590 SCRA 74, 90.

12
People v. Marquez, GR Nos. 137408-10, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 510, 517.

13
Id.

14
People v. Freta, 406 Phil. 853, 862 (2001).

15
People v. Bardaje, 187 Phil. 735, 744 (1980).

16
Exhibit "B," records, p. 7.

17
Id.

18
People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 192250, 11 July 2012, 676 SCRA 347, 360.

19
Id.

20
CA rollo, p. 103.

21
Records, p. 13.

22
TSN, 8 February 2000, p. 46.

23
TSN, 9 December 2002, p. 3.

24
TSN, 8 February 2000, pp. 46-47.

25
TSN, 8 February 2000, pp. 46-47.

26
People v. Sapinoso, 385 Phil. 374, 387 (2000); People v. Moreno, 378 Phil. 951, 969
(1999).

27
People v. Macapanpan, supra note 1, at 106; citing People v. Malbog, 396 Phil. 784
(2000).

28
TSN, 20 June 2001, p. 4.

29
TSN, 8 February 2000, p. 37

30
People v. Jimenez, 362 Phil. 222, 233 (1999).
 31
TSN, 9 December 2002, pp. 3-4.

32
TSN, 20 June 2001, pp. 2-4.

33
Section 2, Rule 133, Revised Rules on Evidence; People v. Palma Gil, 348 Phil. 608, 626
(1998).

34
People v. Gilbero, 425 Phil. 241, 249 (2002).

35
People v. Medel, 350 Phil. 208, 226 (1998).

36
People v. Alvario, 341 Phil. 526, 538-539 (1997).

37
People v. Villajlores, 422 Phil. 776, 792 (2001), citing People v. Bravo, 376 Phil. 931, 944
(1999).

ROLITO RABANAL, G. R. No. 160858

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Promulgated:

and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
February 28, 2006
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed
by Rolito Rabanal (petitioner) impugning the (1) Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals dated 31 March 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 14772, affirming the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 97
convicting petitioner of homicide and (2) its Resolution[3] dated 11 November
2003 denying his motion for reconsideration.

In Criminal Case No. Q-48913, petitioner, along with Salvador Impistan alias
Ador and Eloy Labatique (Eloy) were charged with homicide in an
Information which reads:

That on or about the 16th day of November, [sic] 1986, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused conspiring together, confederating with [and] mutually
helping each other, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and
treachery, and without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of FELIPE SALES Y NACHOR by then and there
stab[b]ing him with a bladed weapon hitting the victim on different parts
of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wou[n]ds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the [heirs] of the said FELIPE SALES Y NACHOR in such
amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Eloy remained at large. On arraignment, Ador and petitioner pleaded

not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.

As culled from the testimony of the lone eyewitness Dionisio Javier (Javier)
and the medico-legal report, the evidence of the prosecution established the
following facts:

In the evening of 16 November 1986, Javier was watching a card game

of pusoy inside the chapel in Seminary Road, Sitio Maligaya, Quezon
City when Ador and Eloy arrived. Ador reportedly uttered, Kung sino ang
matapang dito, ako lang ang harapin, kung sino ang manggugulo, ako lang
ang harapin. Thereafter, the duo left.Johnny Sibayan (Mang Johnny), the
Barangay Tanod, came and asked the children to leave, after which he
followed suit.
Ador and Eloy returned to the chapel. Ador suddenly boxed Javier on the
right side of his head, causing the latter to move backward. When Javier
asked Bakit? Eloy collared him and dragged him to a corner of the chapels
room. Eloy punched him again on the head and at the back while Javier was
cowering to cover his face. At that instance, Mang Johnny came back and
tried to pacify the assailant by saying, Tama na yan, tama na yan. Mang
Johnny subsequently ordered Javier to leave.

Instead of leaving, Javier went out to look for a stone to hurl back at
Ador. However, Javier failed to find one; he instead stood beside the
door. Peeping through a window, Javier saw the victim Felipe Sales putting
his right foot over a chair while holding on to iron railings.

Suddenly, Javier saw petitioner appear from the back of the chapel. Petitioner
leaned against the wall and pulled out a knife measuring seven (7) inches in
length. He stabbed the victim with an upward thrust at his right armpit. Javier
also saw Ador stab the victim near the chest, after which the latter
groaned, Aray. The victim retaliated with a blow to Ador, who
simultaneously stabbed him at the front side of his body near the chest. Eloy
entered the scene and likewise stabbed the victim.Javier saw Ador stab the
victim several times until he fell down. Ador continued stabbing the victim
several times at the back while he was lying flat on the floor.

At this moment, Javier ran away. On his way home, he met one of his friends
and told him about the incident.

Dr. Florante Mendoza was on duty at the Quezon City

General Hospital on 16 November 1986. He examined a patient named Felipe
Sales who was declared dead on arrival. He testified that the victim suffered
several stab wounds on the left upper arm, in the forearm, and at the back,
which possibly caused his death.[5]

Dr. Desiderio Moraleda, on the other hand, testified that as per autopsy result,
the cause of the victims death was cardio arrest due to respiratory shock and
hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds. The wounds totaled twenty-
six (26), twenty-three (23) of which were located in the dorsal side, chest,
forearm and back. He said that there was no wound at the right armpit. Based
on his examination of the wounds, he opined that the assailants had been in
motion, although he also said that it was possible that there could have been
only one assailant.[6]

The evidence for the defense consists of the testimonies of Raymundo

Buenaventura (Raymundo) and petitioner himself.

Raymundo was inside the chapel when he saw Ador and Eloy stab the victim
several times. After the assailants left, the victim was brought to the hospital
in a tricycle.He belied the testimony of witness Javier that petitioner was the
first to stab the victim. According to Raymundo, petitioner was not present at
the scene of the crime.

Petitioner testified on his behalf. He claimed that he was then working at

the Quezon City General Hospital on 16 November 1986 from 7:00
a.m. to 4:00 p.m. He went to the wake in the chapel after work. After being
informed by Mang Johnny and Raymundo of the stabbing incident, he went
home to avoid trouble. He denied stabbing the victim and further denied
having known the victim prior to 16 November 1986.

The case against Ador was dismissed on demurrer to

evidence. However, petitioner was eventually convicted of homicide in a
Decision[7] dated 12 January 1993.

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution

witness, despite some apparent inconsistencies on his part. The RTC opined
that the prosecution was able to overcome the presumption of innocence of
petitioner. The trial court sentenced petitioner to a penalty of imprisonment
with a minimum term of ten (10) years and four (4) months and one (1) day
to fifteen (15) years and ordered him to indemnity the heirs of the victim in
the amount of P30,000.00.[8]
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. In his Brief, he
capitalized on the inconsistency of Javiers testimony relative to the physical
evidence as shown by the medical and autopsy findings to exculpate himself
from criminal liability. Petitioner claimed that he could not be faulted for the
death of the victim in the absence of credible proof of injury he caused to the
victim.[9]
The appellate court dismissed petitioners contention by holding that [t]he
location of the stab wounds at the cadaver is inconsequential in a homicidal
attack. As long as the intent to kill is present, the requirement of the law for
conviction is satisfied.[10] The Court of Appeals gave full faith to the positive
identification by the lone witness Javier of petitioner as the assailant in
sustaining the latters conviction.[11]

In a Decision dated 31 March 2003, the appellate court affirmed the

trial courts judgment of conviction with a clarification of the nomenclature of
the penalty pertaining to the minimum and maximum terms of the
indeterminate sentence, thus: ten (10) years and four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.[12]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied in a

Resolution dated 11 November 2003. The Court of Appeals remained
steadfast in its original action for conviction, thus:

Even assuming, ex argumenti, that the witness account of the location of the
stab wound is disputatious, it will not warrant a reversal of Our ruling in
light of the positive, categorical and consistent identification of appellant as
the assailant.[13]

Aggrieved, petitioner interposed the instant petition anchored on the

primordial issue of whether or not the guilt of petitioner was proven beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime charged.[14]

It is a well-entrenched rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and
its conclusions based on the said findings are accorded by this Court high
respect, if not conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court of having
been able to observe, at close range, the demeanor and behavior of the
witnesses as they testify.[15]
 Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is
limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the
appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. We are not
duty-bound to analyze and
weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings
below.However, such rule is not without
exceptions.[16] Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly
considered, would alter the result of the case.[17] Where, as in this case, the
weight and sufficiency of evidence is crucial to the question of innocence or
guilt of petitioner, a thorough reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for
conviction is imperative.

The prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of its lone eyewitness

to establish the participation of petitioner in the crime. Javier positively
identified petitioner as one of those who stabbed the victim inside the
chapel. In fact, the rulings of the lower courts rest primarily on his testimony
to warrant petitioners conviction. Thus, it becomes evident that Javiers
testimony is pivotal in the determination of the guilt of petitioner.

Although the well-entrenched rule is that the testimony of a single

witness is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction, it is
required that such testimony must be credible and reliable.[18]

We shall now examine Javiers version of the stabbing incident. In his

earlier statement made before the police taken on 17 November 1986, he
made the following declaration:

T: Isalaysay mo nga ang buong pangyayari?

S: Ganito po iyon, ng gabing [sic] ay nagpunta ako sa kapilya dahil

nga may na aburol [sic] na patay, inabutan ko doon sina FELIPE, DELFIN
at maraming tao na nanood din ng sugal. Habang magkakatabi [sic] kami
nina FELIPE at DIONISIO ay dumating si ADOR na kasama si BOY
BUWING at isa pa na hindi ko kilala. Bigla akong sinuntok ni ADOR sa
mukha tapos niyan ay hinila ako sa aking t-s[h]irt ng kasama nila at nilayo,
buti na lang at naawat ni JOHNNY kaya hindi na ako nasaktan.
Lalabas sana ako ng kapilya pero nakita ko na sinaksak ni BOY BUWING
si FELIPE, tapos niyon ay sinaksak din siya ni ADOR, hinawakan pa ni
ADOR si FELIPE sa damit at pinagsasaksak [sic] sa katawan. Ang ginawa
naman nina BOY BUWING at ng kasama nila ay pinagsasaksak din si
FELIPE. Tumakbong palabas ng kapilya si FELIPE pero sinundan nina
ADOR, BOY BUWING at ng kasama xxx nila. Nakahiga na sa lupa si
 FELIPE at sinusaksak [sic] pa nila. Nagtakbuhan na sina ADOR, BOY
BUWING at kasama niya, si FELIPE naman ay dinala na sa hospital.[19]

Javier made these statements while the events were still fresh on his
mind. It can thus be inferred that there were three people who allegedly
attacked the victim, namely, Boy Buwing (petitioner), Ador, and one other
person whose identity was not known to the witness at that time. Javier also
stated that the trio arrived together at the chapel.

On direct examination, or two months after the incident, Javier gave the
following answers to the questions propounded by the private prosecutor:

Q- Now do you recall of [sic] any unusual incident that happened on that
prcised [sic] date and time?
A- There was.

Q- And will you please relate to this Court what that incident was all about?
A- Yes sir.

Q- Kindly relate please?

A- Yes sir.

xxxx

A- Then, Ador and Roy Labatique arrived.

Q- And what happened after [sic] arrival of these two?

A- Ador told everyone present that if there is someone who will make
trouble.

xxxx

A- Sabi po nila, kung sino ang matapang dito ako lang ang harapin, kung
sino ang manggugulo, ako lang ang harapin.

xxxx
 Q- And after those words being uttered at by Ador, what happened next, if
you remember?
A- After they uttered those words, they left.

Q- And after having left the place if they left as you said, what happened
next?
A- The Barangay Tanod, Mang Johnny came.

xxxx
A- Mang Johnny told the children to get out.

xxxx

A- After he asked the children to leave, he also left.

xxxx

Q- After that, what happened?

A- Then, Ador and Elloy suddenly arrived.

Q- Where were you positioned at when these Ador and Elloy arrived at the
chapel?
A- I was inside the chapel near the place where we were playing pusoy.[20]

Based on the foregoing testimony, Javier clearly stated that Ador and Eloy
arrived together at the chapel and left abruptly after issuing a vague
threat. The Barangay Tanod came and asked the children to leave. When
Ador and Eloy came back, they chanced upon Javier.

Upon seeing Javier, Ador boxed him. Eloy, on the other hand, dragged
him to a corner of the chapel and continuously hit him at the back and
head. This mauling went on until he was pacified by the Barangay
Tanod. Standing by the door of the chapel, Javier witnessed the killing. He
positively declared that petitioner then stabbed victim once:

xxxx
 Q- You said that this Rolito Rabanal arrived, where did you see him when
he arrived?
A- He came from behind the chapel.

Q- Why do you know that he came from behind the chapel?

xxxx

A- It is because I saw him.

Q- And what happened next after you saw him came from behind the
chapel?
A- Dumikit siya sa pader at bumunot ng patalim. (witness demonstrating)

xxxx

Q- After having seen [sic] the petitioner with that knife, what happened
next?

A- Then he stabbed Felipe by an upward thrust while Felipe was holding

on to the grill.
(witness demonstrating the sudden upward thrust towards the left armpit)

Q- Left armpit of who?

A- While Felipe was holding on to the grill, Rolito Rabanal stabbed
him upwards near the right armpit. The thrust of the knife was
upwards. (witness demonstrating an upward thrust on his right
armpit under the armpit side of the right body just under the left
armpit)

Q- And where was the petitioner positioned at in relation to the deceased

Felipe Sales when Felipe Sales as you said was stabbed on the right
armpit?
A- Boy Buwing was on the right side of the Felipe Sales and the latter
did not know that he was there because he just came from behind the
chapel.[21]

According to Javier, the first stab wound was inflicted by petitioner, who came
from behind the chapel. While the victim was holding on to the grill and unaware
of the presence of petitioner, the latter allegedly stabbed him near his right armpit.

Then, Javier recounted the participation of Ador in the stabbing of Sales.

 xxxx

Q- Now after you said Felipe Sales was stabbed by the petitioner, what
happened next?
A- Then I looked at Felipe Sales, Ador hit him near the chest with a knife,
and then, after Felipe Sales was stabbed, he said, aray, after that, he
boxed Ador who was in front of him and then he simultaneously
Ador stabbed him also near the front side of his body near the
chest. I do not know the exact location.

Q- And this Ador you are referring to, would you be able to describe him?
A- He is a small man but he has a robust body.

xxxx

Q- Now after Ador whom you stated gave a thrust at the chest of the
victim, what happened next?
A- After a simultaneous boxing by Felipe Sales and Ador was also stabbing
him, then, this Ador stabbed him, when he was about to ran [sic] a
little backward, Ador held him by the collar (witness indicating with
his left hand the holding of the collar) and then stabbed him again,
and then, Ador held him [by] the collar of his neck. After Felipe
Sales boxed Ador, Ador stabbed him and when he moved a little
backward, Ador followed him and held him by the collar on his
neck, and then, Boy Buwing arrived and also stabbed Felipe Sales,
and then Felipe Sales fell down to the ground, and then
simultaneously, Elloy Labatique and Ador entered.[22]

Upon his cross-examination, however, Javier made a surprising

turnaround.
Q- How about Salvador Impistan, did he stab Felipe Sales?
A- After boxing me, a Barangay Tanod pacified us and I was sent out of the
chapel by the Barangay Tanod.

Q- So, in short, you did not see whether or not Salvador Impistan stab
Felipe Sales?
A- Because I was sent out by the Barangay Tanod.
 Q- I will repeat my question for the last time. Did you see Salvador
Impistan stab Felipe Sales?
A- No sir. I did not see. I only saw Rolito Rabanal.[23]

While Javier was very explicit in recounting Adors participation in the

crime in his sworn statement and during the direct examination, he retracted
during the cross-examination when he expressly denied seeing Ador stab the
victim. Presumably, the dismissal of the case against Ador on demurrer was
grounded on this inconsistent, yet categorical statement of Javier.

The trial court disregarded these apparent inconsistencies and upheld

the general credibility of the witness who appeared to be sincere. [24] We are
well aware of the rule that minor inconsistencies and contradictions do not
destroy the credibility of the witness. In fact, they even tend to strengthen
rather than weaken ones credibility by erasing any suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony.[25]

However, these inconsistencies and contradictions in Javiers testimony

cannot be characterized as minor or be dismissed as trivial. If at all, these
inconsistencies reflect his uncertainty as to the identity of the malefactors. He
was categorical in describing Adors participation in stabbing the victim
during the direct examination and even earlier in his sworn statement, only to
retract during the cross-examination and deny having seen Ador stab the
victim. This turnaround bears relevance to the identification of the assailants
so as to create a reasonable doubt as to their culpability.

It is a well-established principle that when the identification is doubtful,

inconclusive, or unreliable, an acquittal is called for. The doubtful
identification of petitioner herein, when taken with the absence of any other
evidence showing his guilt, justifies his acquittal.[26]

Corroborative evidence may be resorted to when there are reasons to

warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his
observations had been inaccurate.[27]
Javier had unequivocally testified that petitioner stabbed victim on the
right armpit.[28] This does not correspond with the autopsy report. Of the
twenty-six (26) stab wounds, not a single wound was found at the right
armpit.

Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth and

rates highly in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. It enjoys a far more
superior probative weight than corroborative testimonies.[29] In the instant
case, the autopsy report negates the lone witnesss account of the participation
of petitioner in the stabbing of the victim.

The inconsistency between the positive testimony of Javier and the

physical evidence, particularly the autopsy report, further diminishes the
credibility of the lone eyewitness.

The Court has ruled that when serious and inexplicable discrepancies in
important details are found in a witness's testimony, his/her testimony may be
disregarded. Also, when discrepancies pervade the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses such that the totality of the prosecution evidence fails to constitute
a coherent account, the conviction of petitioner cannot be justified. In this
case, where the testimony of the lone witness may be the sole basis for
conviction, the serious discrepancies in his testimony hardly lend credence to
his supposed positive testimony and cast a serious doubt as to the credibility
of his charge.[30]

There are other circumstances extant from the record that likewise
support reasonable doubt in favor of petitioner. His own witness, Raymundo,
asserted that petitioner was not present at all at the scene of the crime. The
medico-legal officer conceded that it was possible that only one person
inflicted all the stab wounds on the victim, thus it is also possible that any
one of the several people mentioned by Javier could have, on his own,
perpetrated the crime. The gaps and inconsistencies in Javiers tale give rise to
a plausible alternative version, supported by petitioners witness and
unrebutted by the physical evidence, that petitioner was not present at the
scene of the crime, or otherwise did not participate in the stabbing of the
victim. When confronted with variant though equally plausible version of
events, the version that is in accord with the acquittal or the least liability of
the accused should be favored.[31]
 Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before
any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in
the Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The
constitutional presumption of innocence requires courts to take "a more than
casual consideration" of every circumstance or doubt proving the innocence
of petitioner.[32]

The lower courts committed reversible error in ruling that the positive
identification of petitioner-appellant by the complainant as the lone
eyewitness presented by the prosecution established his guilt to a moral
certainty. In this case, the testimony of Javier is dubious; hence, stark of
probative weight.

A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond

reasonable doubt, which means a moral certainty that petitioner is
guilty.[33] The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the assailant
beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, we cannot sustain petitioners conviction.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR

No. 14772 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is on reasonable
doubt, and is ordered immediately released unless he is being held for some
other valid or lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform
this Court of the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA Associate

Justice
WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 18-30. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices
Elvi John S. Asuncion and Lucas P. Bersamin.
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 13-17. Penned by Judge Oscar L. Leviste.
[3]
Id. at 32-33.
[4]
Id. at 4.
[5]
Rollo, p. 21.
[6]
Id.
[7]
CA rollo, pp. 13-17.
[8]
Id. at 17.
[9]
Id. at 73.
[10]
Rollo, p. 23.
[11]
Id. at 24.
[12]
Id. at 27.
[13]
Id. at 32-33.
[14]
Id. at 10.
 [15]
Senoja v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 160341, 19 October 2004, 440 SCRA 695.
[16]
However, we have consistently enunciated that we may review the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals: (a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, is conflicting; (e) when the factual findings are
conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are
mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed
by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record. Tugade, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 407 SCRA 497, 507 (2003).
[17]
J. King & Sons Company v. Hontanosas, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-03-1802, 21 September 2004, 438 SCRA
525, citing People v. Parreno, G.R. No. 144343, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 591.
[18]
Francisco v. People , G.R. No. 146584, 12 July 2004, 434 SCRA 122, citing People v. Araneta, 335
SCRA 1 (2000); People v. Lotoc, 307 SCRA 471 (1999).
[19]
Records, p. 7.
[20]
TSN, 5 January 1987, pp. 4-6.
[21]
Id. at 10-11.
[22]
Id. at 11-13.
[23]
TSN, 14 April 1993, p. 3.
[24]
CA rollo, p. 17.
[25]
People v. Bulan, G.R. No. 143404, 8 June 2005, 459 SCRA 550, citing People v. Tamayo, G.R. No.
138608, 24 September 2002, 389 SCRA 540 and People v. Amazan, G.R. Nos. 136251, 138606 & 138607, 16
January 2001, 349 SCRA 218.
[26]
People v. Maguing, 352 Phil. 1026 (2003) citing People v. Saturno, 355 SCRA 578, March 28, 2001.
[27]
Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 138553, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA 350, citing People v. Manalad, G.R. No.
128593, 387 SCRA 263 (2002).
[28]
Supra note 20.
[29]
People v. Palijon, 397 Phil. 545 (2000); People v. Ubaldo, 419 Phil. 718 (2001); People v. Atadero, 435
Phil. 888 (2002).
[30]
People v. Surio. 435 Phil. 888 (2002), citing People v. Palma, 308 SCRA 466 (1999) and People v. Diaz,
308 SCRA 744 (1999).

[31]
Li v. People, G.R. No. 127962, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 217, 235.
[32]
People v. Ochate 434 Phil. 575 (2002), citing People v. Morada, 307 SCRA 362, 379-380; People v. San
Juan, 326 SCRA 786, 801; and People v. Ratunil, 334 SCRA 721, 737.
 [33]
Section 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court.

NOT GUILTY on two counts of domestic assault. Complainant’s evidence

highly unreliable, riddled with inconsistencies; accused testified and his
evidence was corroborated
May 19, 2014

Ontario Court of Justice

Between

Her Majesty the Queen, and

1. P. V. (a.k.a. M. V. P.)

[2014] O.J. No. 1412

2014 ONCJ 138

Halton Court File No. 1365/12

Ontario Court of Justice

L.M. Baldwin J.

Heard: March 27, May 24, June 13 and 25, 2013. Judgment: March 20, 2014.

(118 paras.)

[Summary by Quicklaw {Lexis Nexis}] Trial of accused for two counts of assault. The complainant gave a videotaped
K.G.B. statement under oath in which she told police she and the accused had been arguing about his son a lot, and
on this occasion the accused told her their relationship was over and she should leave. The complainant stated she
left but came back the next morning and resumed the argument. The complainant stated the accused was drinking
rum and coke and started pushing her, and then pushed her to the floor and strangled her until she hit him in the face
and ran. The complainant stated the accused found her car keys for her and she went outside, but was too upset to
drive, so called the police and called a friend. The complainant made several physical demonstrations of the alleged
assault and stated there was an earlier argument during which the accused punched her in the face and his brother
had to intervene. The officer noted some redness on the complainant’s collarbone, which she attributed to the
accused. In the 9-11 call, the complainant said the accused choked her, threw her to the ground and slapped her,
and had been drinking. The complainant told the dispatcher the fight was about the accused’s son and the accused
had punched her two weeks prior. When the officer arrived on the scene, the complainant was in the driveway crying
and had some redness on her chest and neck. The accused had some blood on his nose and the smell of alcohol on
his breath. The accused was arrested for assault. The complainant’s friend testified that, when she arrived, the
complainant was hysterical and was crying and asking why the accused was being arrested. The complainant gave
her statement at the police station. The complainant later recanted her statement and denied all allegations at trial.
The complainant testified she had been in two prior car accidents and was in poor health and memory and one at
least seven different medications. The complainant denied the veracity of her statements to 9-11 and claimed she
was forced to make the police statement. The complainant testified her chest and neck became red when she was
upset. The accused denied all allegations.

HELD: Accused acquitted. The complainant’s evidence was highly unreliable and riddled with inconsistencies, and
her evidence at trial compromised all guarantees of reliability of her K.G.B. statement. The complainant entered a
relationship with the accused knowing he had a son, yet continued to provoke arguments about it and was unable to
handle the reality. There was no independent evidence supporting the complainant’s statements to the police. The
accused’s evidence was corroborated by his tenant, who was a relatively unbiased witness. The complainant showed
herself to be an emotionally weak person who flailed and attacked when upset. It was clear this was the situation in
play when she called the police, as she had provoked another fight about the accused’s son and he had responded
by breaking up with her, which she could not accept. The complainant’s evidence she called the police because she
thought they would come counsel her and the accused was incredible, and her claim the police forced her to give a
statement was an outright fabrication.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 137, s. 139, s. 140

Counsel:

Tony MacKinnon: counsel for the Crown.

Graham Clark: counsel for the defendant M. V..

1 L.M. BALDWIN J.:– M. P. V. is charged with two counts of assaulting S.B. on April 25th and April 29th 2012 in
Oakville.

2 The Crown proceeded summarily.

3 Date, jurisdiction and identification were admitted at the outset of the trial.

KGB Statement dated April 29, 2012:

(Trial Exhibits – DVD and Transcript)

4 On Sunday April 29, 2012 between 12:03 p.m. and 12:40 p.m., S.B. was interviewed on video-tape by D/Cst.
Ropponen at 20 Division in Oakville.

5 After advising Ms. S.B. that the video equipment was turned on, and after ensuring that she had the spelling of
Ms. S.B.’s name correctly, D/Cst. Ropponen stated as follows:

“Okay, so as I explained, I’m just going to read this form over to you. If you have any questions let me know and I’ll try
my best to explain okay? So I’m conducting an electronic interview with you concerning your knowledge and
involvement in a domestic assault. Do you understand?
S.B.: Yes

D/Cst Ropponen: Okay. This statement will be taken under oath or solemn affirmation and will be electronically
recorded. You must understand that it is a criminal offence to mislead a police officer during an investigation. You
may be liable to prosecution under section 140 of the Criminal Code ofCanada if you mislead a police officer during
this investigation. And if convicted, you could be sentenced for up to 5 years in jail. You must also understand that it
is a criminal offence to attempt to obstruct justice during a police investigation. And if you do so, you could be
prosecuted under section 139 of the Criminal Code of Canada. And if convicted, you could be sentenced up to 10
years in jail. You must further understand that you may be a witness at a trial concerning the events you describe in
your statement. If at any time you change your statement or claim not to remember the events, the contents of the
statement you now give may be used as evidence at the trial. In such circumstances, you may be liable to
prosecution under section 137 of theCriminal Code of Canada. And if convicted, you could be sentenced for up to 14
years in jail. Do you understand the criminal consequences of making a false statement?

S.B.: Yes.

D/Cst. Ropponen: Okay. This part I’m going to read out loud to you. If you agree with it, we’ll both sign and date it,
okay?

S.B.: Okay.

D/Cst. Ropponen: So by signing this document — I will read it on your behalf — I acknowledge that I have received
the above warning. I also acknowledge that I understand that I am not obligated to give this statement. (I give this
statement) of my own free will, voluntarily, without threats or favours being held out to me. Do you understand and
agree with that?

S.B.: Yes.

D/Cst. Ropponen: Okay. I guess that means that you don’t have to give a statement. You’re doing it because it’s
something you want to do and I’m not pressuring you to provide this statement. Do you agree with that?

S.B.: Can I know his charges before I give a statement?

D/Cst. Ropponen: I don’t know what they are until I talk to you.

S.B.: Okay.

D/Cst. Ropponen: Okay? I’ll get you to sit right there and I’ll get the Commissioner. I’ll be right back, okay. Oh that
was good.” (pp. 3, 4 of video statement)

6 I observed Ms. B. to be calm, quiet and attentive during this part of the statement. There was no hesitancy in her
affirmative responses stating that she understood what the officer had read to her and that she was voluntarily giving
a statement to the officer.

7 At 12:07 the Commissioner of Oaths enters the room and S.B. swore on the bible to tell the truth in her
statement. I observed no hesitancy on Ms. B.’s part during this process.
8 The Commissioner of Oaths repeats that lying under oath is a serious criminal offence under the Criminal Code
of Canada. Ms. B. is asked again if she understands this. Ms. B. for a second time replied, “Yes”.

9 At the outset of the interview, Ms. B. describes how she met M.. They have been in a relationship for 7 months.
She lives in Woodbridge and he lives in Oakville.

10 She described the relationship as having its ups and downs and immediately stated that M. has a three-year-old
son with another woman and how she just can’t accept this and that this is the cause of their arguments.

“… it’s always our arguments. Like he doesn’t understand that I have questions and I have feelings towards this and
whenever I try to talk to him about it – – that’s it — he explodes. Whether it’s being like verbal or now it’s getting to
physical, it’s just his temper in some way comes out. So today was enough.” (p. 8)

11 M.’s son, A., lives with his mother and M. has access to his son for the weekend every second week.

12 A. was sitting on the couch and watched what happened today between them.

13 Ms. B. stated that over the last few months things have gotten worse. When they argue, M. would say “That’s it,
we’re over”. She also stated that M. has a temper which gets worse when he consumes alcohol.

14 When asked to describe what happened today, Ms. B. started by talking about yesterday and how she was not
physically feeling well — she’s been in two previous car accidents — her back was hurting — she has not been able
to sleep — she was PMSing. A. was there for the weekend and she told M. again that she was not okay with him
having a son. It was the same argument. He told her to leave and said that was the end of the relationship. She left.

15 The next morning she returned to M.’s Oakville residence. M. and A. were sitting on a couch in the family room.

16 She and M. went into the kitchen and started arguing over the issue of his having a son again.

17 She stated that M. was drinking rum and coke. It was just past 10:00 a.m.

18 He started pushing her and she said, “Don’t put your hand on me today because I will call the cops on you
today. Boom. Pushes me again to the floor of the kitchen (indicates) strangling me. As he’s doing that
I(indicates) can’t breathe. He’s like, ‘How does it feel? (Demonstrates). How does it
feel? (Demonstrates)(Demonstrates) I hit him in the face and (indicates) his nose started to
bleed (indicates) hence the blood on me, k? I got up and ran into his room …” (p. 14)

19 She was yelling for help but no one else in the house would help her. Two tenants live in the basement. No one
responded. “Someone is yelling for help and no one did anything”. (p. 14)

20 She could not find her car keys to leave.

21 She ran downstairs and started banging on the tenants’ doors. They did not come out. M. followed her down
with his son in his arms and she ran back upstairs.

22 She called her best friend (M.D. from Woodbridge) and asked her to come to the house because she was too
upset to drive and she could not find her keys.
23 M. came up to her and told her that he had been talking to his ex — his son’s mother. To hear him say that was
“once again emotionally just killing me”. (p. 14)

24 He told her to get out. She said she did not have her car keys. M. went into his room and got them for her. She
left the house, got into her car and “I called the cops”. (p. 15)

25 At first she called the non-emergency number to ask them what she should do. They put her through to the 911
dispatch.

26 M. and one of the tenants in the basement drove away.

27 “And then the ambulance came and the police came and as I was in the back of the ambulance
being(indicates) examined because he choked me, they came back.” (p. 15)

28 In providing more detail, Ms. B. stated that M. started slapping her in the family room in front of A..

29 She described and demonstrated four “really really hard” open-handed slaps. Then they went into the kitchen
where she was pushed and shoved to the floor and choked.

30 Ms. B. stated that she did not understand what was happening at the time. It was like “crazy” to her (p. 17). “I
feel like this is a dream and like I wanna wake up”. (p.17)

31 Ms. B. repeated that the argument was over her not being a hundred percent on his having a son. She stated
that she loves M..

32 During the remainder of this lengthy and detailed interview, Ms. B. makes over 50 physical demonstrations of
the alleged assaults.

33 Ms. B. stated that she could not breathe when she was pushed to the kitchen floor and choked for
approximately 10 seconds. (p. 23)

34 Ms. B. stated that after she ran out of the kitchen, she ran into M.’s bedroom. “Again, he
pushes(demonstrates) me down to the floor and once again starts choking me. And I’m like, ‘This is not okay —
that’s it. Like today, I’m gonna call the cops. I’m calling the police’.” (p. 26)

35 M. let go of her and she ran downstairs and banged on the tenants’ door for help. They did not respond — they
probably didn’t want to get involved — they’ve never helped. (p. 28)

36 Ms. B. described the earlier incident as happening last week (on Wednesday). (Count #2)

37 It was over conflicting social plans. “First he starts with the yelling and swearing and the pushing and
everything. He ended up basically throwing me down. (He) punched me in the nose. My nose is actually still ’til today
is really swollen. I had a black eye from it. Bleeding everywhere.” (p. 31)

38 When M. was on top of her “I think I scratched his neck.” (p. 36)
39 M.’s brother intervened and M. got off of her. She ended up leaving. A couple of days later they were back
together as a couple again. (p. 31)

40 Officer Ropponen noticed a little bit of redness on Ms. B.’s collarbone. Ms. B. indicated that it was caused by
the incident that day. The officer states that she will have some photographs taken. (Photographs were taken and
entered as Exhibits at trial)

41 Ms. B. states that she will provide the police with photographs she took after the Wednesday incident showing
redness. (Entered as Exhibits at trial)

42 The interview ended.

Call to Police and Statements to 911 Dispatcher:

43 On April 29, 2012, between 10:50:33 a.m. and 10:58:48 a.m. Ms. B. spoke to a 911 dispatcher with Halton
Regional Police: Exhibits #1(a) & (b).

44 Ms. B. requests that police attend at 357 Bronte Road in Oakville and states the problem as follows: “My
boyfriend just put his hands on me and I had to like defend myself so he has a cut on his nose. But I’m sitting outside
in the car … So I’m not able to drive”. (p. 3)

45 Ms. B. declines the need for an ambulance.

46 She states that M. choked her, threw her to the floor and slapped her really hard a few times on both sides of
her face.

47 Ms. B. stated that M. had been drinking.

48 The dispatcher asked her what had started the fight. Ms. B. stated that yesterday they had an argument
because she told M. that it’s hard for her to understand that he has a son by someone else. She ended up leaving his
place. (pp. 5, 6)

49 Today she returned to his house and the argument continued. He started pushing her and threw her to the floor
for no reason. He spat in her face.

50 “You know and as I’m pushing him off you know what I did hit him there like in the face as he’s on top of me.
But now it’s like oh you know oh I’m bleeding and whatever. Like two weeks ago as well he smashed me in the face
like I had a black eye from it. And I haven’t done anything but like this is just crazy to me now.” (p. 6)

Officer Conrad Bertasson:

51 This officer was dispatched to attend 357 Bronte Road at 10:53 a.m. He arrived on scene at 10:58 a.m.

52 He located Ms. B. standing in the driveway between two cars. She gave him some information about what had
happened.
53 The Officer observed her to be “very very emotional”. She was crying. She also had some redness on her neck
and chest area.

54 This Officer was present when M. returned back to the house with one of his tenants named Steve Arnold. The
Officer observed a bit of blood in M.’s nose and maybe some droplets on his shirt.

55 The Officer detected an odour of alcohol on M.’s breath.

56 After other officers arrived on scene, M. was arrested for assault and taken to 20 Division.

Officer Yvonne Jane Martin:

57 Officer Martin has been employed with HRPS for over 24 years.

58 She attended the scene at 10:58 a.m. and first observed Ms. B. standing in the driveway crying.

59 She and Officer Bertasson entered the residence and checked on the well-being of the three-year-old child. He
was in the house with the tenant named Ms. Evans.

60 Around this same time, M. returned to the residence. Officer Bertasson spoke with him.

61 Officer Martin spoke with Steven Arnold and then Ms. B. who was with ambulance personnel.

62 The Officer observed redness to Ms. B.’s neck and collar bone area. Ms. B. was visibly upset and crying.

63 Officer Martin spoke to Ms. B. and obtained grounds for the arrest of M. P..

M.D.:

64 M. has known Stephanie through work for 5 years. They were friends prior to the incident.

65 Ms. D. is a clinic manager for Physiotherapy rehab clinics in the GTA.

66 She first met M. in September of 2011. She was with Stephanie on a plane to Miami when they all first met.

67 Up until April of 2012, she had seen M. about a half dozen times in Stephanie’s company for social occasions.

68 Prior to the incident she was good friends with Stephanie and she would see her socially about once a week.

69 M. got a call from Stephanie on April 18, 2012 and then saw her the next day. She observed some swelling in
Stephanie’s nose and a little bit of bruising under her left eye.

70 On April 29, 2012, Stephanie called her at 10:30 a.m. and she was “hysterical”. She was crying, and could not
catch her breath or barely say anything. (Tr. p. 44)

71 Because of that call, M. left her home and drove to Stephanie’s location.
72 When she got to M.’s house the police were already on scene. Stephanie was still hysterical.

73 Stephanie was yelling and screaming “why are they arresting him?” An Officer approached and asked M. to
drive Stephanie to the station, which she did. Stephanie was hysterical the whole way to the station.

Summary of the Testimony of Det./Cst. Cassandra Ropponen:

74 Det./Cst. Ropponen has been an officer with the Halton Regional Police since December of 2002.

75 She was on duty on April 29, 2012 working in the Domestic Violence Unit. She was advised that Ms. B. was on
her way into the station.

76 She met Ms. B. at the front entrance of 20 Division at 11:58 a.m. At 12:02 p.m. she was in the interview room
with Ms. B.. At 12:03 p.m. the videotaping began.

77 In the four to five minutes before the video equipment was turned on, Ms. B. said she wanted to give a
statement and tell the truth about what happened.

78 Det./Cst. Ropponen testified that she always makes sure that a victim wants to give a statement before she
places them on the video camera. Before the video was started, Officer Ropponen was trying to explain to Ms. B.
how the interview was going to be conducted.

79 There was minimal conversation with the complainant before the video started. Ms. B. asked if M. was okay and
the Officer, who knew he was at 20 Division, responded that he was okay.

80 The Officer did not observe Ms. B. to be under the influence of drugs or otherwise unable to give a voluntary
statement.

81 Det./Cst. Ropponen testified that Ms. B.’s condition did not change during the 40 minute interview.

Summary of the Testimony of S.B.:

82 Ms. B. testified on the KGB, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740, Application and on the trial at large.

83 Her extensive evidence was heard on March 27, 2013, May 24, 2013 and June 13, 2013.

84 During the course of her evidence, Ms. B. testified that she has been in two serious car accidents prior to the
events in question. As a result she is in poor health, traumatized and has poor memory. She was on at least seven
medications at the time of the incidents in question: Replax, Celebrex, Elavil, Apo-Tizanidine, Lyrica, Novo-gesic
Forte, Ratio-Lenoltec #2. (Tr. pp. 94, 95) These medications are for issues relating to nervousness, anxiety, irritability,
restlessness and depression.

85 She adamantly denies the veracity of the statements she made to the 911 dispatcher and to police in her KGB
statement. She has written the Crown Attorney’s Office on two prior occasions, May 2, 2012 and July 4, 2012,
recanting all statements made to the police in this matter.
86 I conclude that her evidence is highly unreliable as it is riddled with inconsistencies, distorted realities and lacks
common sense.

87 I will provide a number of examples in support of my conclusion. There were others that emerged in her three
days on the witness stand.

The Unreasonable and Unresolvable Argument:

88 When she returned to M.’s residence on April 29th, 2012 she continued the argument with him that they were
having the night before. The argument was again about him having a son and how she was having trouble accepting
that. She was frustrated, furious, crying, yelling and calling names. M. was calm and was trying to diffuse the
situation.

89 “Q. What happened next?”

90 “A. I don’t remember.” (Tr. March 27/13 pp. 55, 56)

91 This is an example of how Ms. B. cannot accept the reality of M. having a child and being an active parent in his
son’s life. Ms. B. knew from day one of the relationship that M. had a son, yet she entered into and pursued a
relationship in circumstances that she claims she could not accept. This was a highly unstable position she put
herself, M. and M.’s son in. Because she refused to accept reality, she provoked arguments about a situation that
could not be changed.

Physical Contact with M. on April 29, 2012:

92 At one point M. just sat her down, not hurting her, to try to calm her down and have her relax. She was
emotional and having trouble breathing.

93 She kept yelling at him and saying mean things and “at one point I did actually smack him”. She testified she
probably smacked his face as M. was sitting on the couch next to his son.

94 She could recall no other physical contact between her and M. before she left the house. (Tr. March 27/13 pp.
59, 60, 61, 62)

Why She Called the Police:

95 When asked how this argument ended Ms. B. testified that she called the “non-emergency police line” when she
was inside her car parked in M.’s driveway. She was outside because M. had asked her to leave his residence. (Tr.
March 27/13 pp. 57, 58, 59, 60)

96 Ms. B. testified that she only wanted the police to come out and counsel them and to help them resolve the
argument.

What She Reported to the 911 Dispatcher:

97 When asked about her reports to the 911 dispatcher, Ms. B. testified that “I don’t recall it happening. I can’t
remember how it happens. I can’t remember any of that … I just won’t remember”. (Tr. March 27/13 pp. 64 & 70)
98 Ms. B. testified that she was an emotional “disaster” when she called the police. (Tr. p. 94)

What She Said in her Video-Taped Statement:

99 Ms. B. testified that what she said is not what happened. (Tr. p. 74) She did not tell the officer all the things that
she did. “… that I wouldn’t drop it, that I kept instigating it, that I kept throwing in comments, I threw in the jabs…I
want to be clear that M. didn’t just come up to me and get physical with me out of nowhere.” (Tr. pp. 74, 75)

100 When asked if viewing the video-taped statement refreshed her memory in any respect about what happened,
Ms. B. stated that it did not and she could not remember. (Tr. p. 76)

101 She does remember arriving at M.’s house on April 29th and “… being a total bitch. Like I would not listen to
him. I was just reacting off a lot of emotion and a lot of built up anger I have inside of me for other aspects of my life
and it got taken out on him. I know for a fact that if I had gone there that day calmly, or just listened when he was
trying to calm me down, none of this would have happened.” (Tr. p. 76)

102 Ms. B. testified that she felt she had no choice about giving a statement to the police on video-tape. She stated
that she was told that she had to give a statement because she had called the police. She has made a complaint
about how the police forced her to give a statement. Ms. B. stated that Det./Cst Ropponen told her before the video-
tape was turned on that she had to make a statement because she called 911. She stated that she did not call 911 –
– she called the non-emergency line and they put her through to 911. She wanted the police to come out and “diffuse
a disagreement”. (Tr. pp. 87, 88, 89, 90, 97). She also stated that Det./Cst. Ropponen threatened her into giving a
statement. (Tr. pp 99, 102)

Injuries Sustained by the Accused:

103 Ms. B. agreed that she scratched M.’s neck as depicted in a photograph trial Exhibit. She was not sure when
she inflicted those injuries. (Tr. pp. 91, 92)

Redness Observed on Ms. B.’s neck:

104 Ms. B. testified that her neck often gets red when she is nervous and upset. (Tr. May 24, 2013 p. 57)

Defence Evidence:

105 M. P. V. testified on his own behalf. He denied all the allegations.

106 His version of the events was supported by the downstairs tenant, Mr. Steven Andrew Ross Arnold, who was a
relatively unbiased witness in this case.

Conclusions – Value of the KGB Statement on the Ultimate Issues:

107 Ms. B.’s evidence at this trial has compromised all the guarantees of reliability in her statements to the police.
Accordingly, I cannot rely upon those statements for the truth of their contents.

108 There was little to no independent evidence to support the statements made to police with respect to the
events of April 25 and 29, 2012.
109 As noted above, Ms. B.’s trial evidence is concerning. She is clearly an emotionally weak person and she will
flail out at and attack others when she gets frustrated and upset. This reaction appears to have been at play in her
calling the police that day. M. had ended the relationship with her and asked her to leave his house. She could not
accept this.

110 I reject her evidence that she thought the police would come out and counsel them. That is not the job of the
police and as a 28-year-old employed woman I find her statements in this regard incredulous.

111 Ms. B. repeated this victim-like then attack-like mode when she accused Det./Cst. Ropponen of forcing her to
give a statement. This testimony is rejected as outright fabrication by Ms. B. who was once again demanding her way
or the highway. For unexplainable reasons, Ms. B. claims to have a clear memory of a four-minute unrecorded
conversation with this officer, yet she cannot remember anything else despite audio and video recordings.

112 The police conducted this investigation in a skilful and professional manner.

113 The KGB statement taken in this case is the Gold Standard with respect to cautions and warnings concerning
the legal necessity of telling the truth. No more could have been said or done to ensure that Ms. B. understood the
importance of this.

114 The Crown Attorney had a duty to pursue this prosecution given the seriousness of the allegations made
under oath to the police.

115 I find as a fact that Ms. B. and Mr. V. had a toxic relationship and I hope that it will not be resumed for the
welfare of both of them and in particular, for the welfare of a little boy named A..

116 For these reasons findings of not guilty are registered.

Sufficiency of Reasons for Judgment

117 This trial was originally scheduled to take one day. The matter proceeded over the course of 5 split-up days.
Judgment was originally reserved until December 6, 2013. Judgment could not be delivered that day due to the high
volume of reserved judgments in the OCJ trial Courts in Halton. During the course of this trial, all of the witnesses’
evidence, Exhibits filed, and submissions made, have been carefully reviewed and assessed. It is not necessary or
reasonable for me to review all of the evidence in any more detail than I have in these focused reasons for judgment.
It must be understood that busy trial court Judges must deliver both oral and written reasons in hundreds of trial
matters every year and we are required to do so in a timely fashion. Judgment writing time is not factored into trial
time estimates. The OCJ Judges do not get judgment writing weeks like the SCJ Judges have. In Halton, the fastest
growing Region in Canada, judgment time is being eroded by the increasing trial case load and the pile up of long,
split-up trial continuations.

118 This Court is aware of appellant authority governing the sufficiency of reasons by trial Courts and has been
guided accordingly. See R. v. Vuradin [2013] S.C.J. No. 38; R. v. S. (T.), 2012 ONCA 289 (OCA); R. v. H.
(J.M.),[2011] 3 S.C.R. 197; R. v. Drabinsky (2011), 107 O.R. (3d) 595 (OCA); Decision-makers under new scrutiny:
sufficiency of reasons and timely decision-making, David Stratas, Administrative Law Roundtable (C.I.A.J.) May
2010; R. v. Dinardo, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788; R. v. R.E.M. [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Walker, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 245; R. v.
Gagnon, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621; R. v. Braich, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 903; R. v. Sheppard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869.
 C

G.R. No. 182555: LENIDO LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS,

petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 185123: CESAR FORTUNA, petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 187745: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v.

SPO2 CESAR FORTUNA y ABUDO, RAMESES DE JESUS y CALMA,
LENIDO LUMANOG y LUISTRO, JOEL DE JESUS y VALDEZ and
AUGUSTO SANTOS y GALANG, accused, RAMESES DE JESUS y CALMA
and JOEL DE JESUS y VALDEZ, accused-appellants.

Promulgated:
September 7, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

An accused has the right to be presumed innocent unless proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. No less than the fundamental law guarantees such human
right. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution mandates that In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. Reinforcing this right, Section 2, Rule 134 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.

The presumption of innocence serves to emphasize that the prosecution has the
obligation to prove not only each element of the offense beyond reasonable
doubt[1] but also the identity of the accused as the perpetrator. The accused, on
the other hand, bears no burden of proof.[2] The prosecution evidence must stand or
fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.[3]
The present consolidated cases involve the ambush-killing of former Metropolitan
Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary Colonel
Rolando N. Abadilla (Abadilla) on 13 June 1996 by several men while he was
stuck in traffic along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City.

Accused of being the killers of Abadilla, Lenido Lumanog (Lumanog), Augusto

Santos (Santos), Cesar Fortuna (Fortuna), Rameses De Jesus (Rameses), Lorenzo
Delos Santos (Delos Santos), Joel De Jesus (Joel), and Arturo Napolitano
(Napolitano) were charged with murder, aggravated by treachery, evident
premeditation, and taking advantage of superior strength. The trial court convicted
Lumanog, Santos, Fortuna, Rameses, and Joel, while it acquitted Delos Santos and
Napolitano. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

The majority sees no reason to disturb the verdict. The majority discards the
extrajudicial confession extracted from the accused for being violative of the
accuseds constitutional rights. Nevertheless, the majority affirms the trial and
appellate courts finding of guilt, which was basically anchored on the alleged
positive identification of the accused as gunmen and lookouts by a lone
eyewitness, Freddie Alejo (Alejo). The majority gives credence to the prosecutions
eyewitness, and disbelieves the defenses eyewitness. For these reasons, the
majority finds that the prosecution has sufficiently overthrown the presumption of
innocence which the accused enjoy and has proved beyond reasonable doubt the
accuseds guilt for the crime of murder.

I dissent.

I. The photographic identification of Joel De Jesus is

tainted with impermissible suggestion,
violating the accuseds due process rights.

As the majority found, when appellants (accused) were arrested they were
already considered suspects: Joel was pinpointed by security guard Alejo who
went along with the PARAC squad to Fairview on June 19, 1996, x x x. In
other words, insofar as the police was concerned, Joel was already a suspect even
before Alejo went with them to identify Joel. In fact, before Alejo pinpointed
Joel as one of the suspects, the police showed Alejo a photograph of Joel,
supporting the fact that the police focused on Joel as a suspect in the Abadilla
killing. Alejo testified:
 ATTY. BAGATSING:

Q Prior to 3:00 oclock PM of June 19, 1996 on or about 2:00 oclock PM where
were you?
A Perhaps I was on my way I was fetched by the policeman from our agency in
Monumento, sir.

Q Who was that police officer who fetched you?

A I cant recall his name which was placed on his name plate, sir.

Q How many were they?

A They were four (4) of them, sir.

Q After you were fetched from your post or agency in Monumento, where did
you go?
A The police officers told me we were going to Fairview, sir.

Q While you were with these police officers on the way to Fairview, did you have
any conversation with them?
A This was what happened. On the 18th of June in the afternoon of June 18,
1996, they showed me a picture of a man wearing eyeglasses but I told
them I will not point a man in photographs I would like to see him in
person.[4] (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Teehankee,[5] the Court laid down the guidelines to determine the
admissibility and reliability of an out-of-court identification, thus:
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at the time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, in an out-of-court identification, among the factors to be considered is the

suggestiveness of the procedure. In this case, the police resorted to a photographic
identification of Joel, who was the first suspect to be apprehended and who
provided the identities of the other accused.

In People v. Pineda,[6] the Court explained the rules in proper photographic

identification procedure, to wit:
 Although showing mug shots of suspects is one of the established methods of
identifying criminals, the procedure used in this case is unacceptable. The first
rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that a series of
photographs must be shown, and not merely that of the suspect. The second
rule directs that when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their
arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures
pertains to the suspect. Thus:

[W] here a photograph has been identified as that of the guilty party, any
subsequent corporeal identification of that person may be based not upon
the witnesss recollection of the features of the guilty party, but upon his
recollection of the photograph. Thus, although a witness who is asked to
attempt a corporeal identification of a person whose photograph he
previously identified may say, "Thats the man that did it," what he may
actually mean is, "Thats the man whose photograph I identified."
xxx
A recognition of this psychological phenomenon leads logically to the
conclusion that where a witness has made a photographic identification of
a person, his subsequent corporeal identification of that same person is
somewhat impaired in value, and its accuracy must be evaluated in light of
the fact that he first saw a photograph. (Emphasis supplied)

In Pineda, the Court rejected the out-of-court identification of the accused, since
only the photographs of the two accused, Pineda and Sison, were shown to the
witnesses, contrary to the recognized rules in photographic identification. Finding
the identification of appellant therein tainted with impermissible suggestion, the
Court held the identification failed the totality of circumstances test, thus:

In the present case, there was impermissible suggestion because the photographs
were only of appellant and Sison, focusing attention on the two accused. The
police obviously suggested the identity of the accused by showing only appellant
and Sisons photographs to Ferrer and Ramos.
The testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos show that their identification of appellant
fails the totality of circumstances test. The out-of-court identification of appellant
casts doubt on the testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos in court.[7]

Similarly, in this case, Alejo was first shown a photograph of Joel before Alejo
pinpointed Joel as one of the suspects. The police showed only one
photograph, that of Joels, highlighting the fact that the police primed and
conditioned Alejo to identify Joel as one of the murderers of Abadilla. The
police focused on Joel as one of the suspects, prior to Alejos identification. The
police did not show Alejo any other photograph, only that of Joels. Assuming
Alejo refused to glance at Joels photograph, which is quited unbelievable, the fact
that he was shown only one photograph violates standard operating procedures in
criminal investigations. Clearly, the police, in showing Alejo only a photograph of
Joel, instead of a series of photographs arranged in an unsuspicious manner,
breached the recognized rules in photographic identification. Undoubtedly, this
procedure seriously corrupted the identification process with impermissible
suggestion.

In People v. Rodrigo,[8] the Court, speaking thru Justice Arturo Brion, acquitted the
accused for failure of the prosecution to identify the accused as the perpetrator of
the crime, which identification is extremely crucial to the prosecutions burden of
proof. Stressing the importance of a proper identification of the accused, most
especially when the identification is made by a sole witness and the judgment
in the case totally depends on the reliability of the identification, just like in
this case, the Court held:

The greatest care should be taken in considering the identification of the accused
especially, when this identification is made by a sole witness and the judgment in
the case totally depends on the reliability of the identification. This level of care
and circumspection applies with greater vigor when, as in the present case, the
issue goes beyond pure credibility into constitutional dimensions arising from the
due process rights of the accused.

xxxx

That a single photograph, not a series, was shown to Rosita is admitted by Rosita
herself in her testimony.

xxxx

We hold it highly likely, based on the above considerations, that Rositas

photographic identification was attended by an impermissible suggestion that
tainted her in-court identification of Rodrigo as one of the three robbers. We
rule too that based on the other indicators of unreliability we discussed
above, Rositas identification cannot be considered as proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the identity of Rodrigo as one of the perpetrators of the
crime.

A first significant point to us is that Rosita did not identify a person whom she had
known or seen in the past. The robbers were total strangers whom she saw very
 briefly. It is unfortunate that there is no direct evidence of how long the actual
robbery and the accompanying homicide lasted. But the crime, as described, could
not have taken long, certainly not more than a quarter of an hour at its longest.
This time element alone raises the question of whether Rosita had sufficiently
focused on Rodrigo to remember him, and whether there could have been a
reliable independent recall of Rodrigos identity.

We also find it significant that three robbers were involved, all three brandishing
guns, who immediately announced a holdup. This is an unusual event that
ordinarily would have left a person in the scene nervous, confused, or in common
parlance, "rattled." To this already uncommon event was added the shooting of
Rositas husband who charged the robbers with a "bangko" and was promptly shot,
not once but three times. These factors add up to our conclusion of the
unlikelihood of an independent and reliable identification. (Emphasis supplied)

The clear import of Rodrigo is that an out-of-court identification, made by the

lone witness, who was subjected to impermissible photographic suggestion,
fatally tainted the subsequent in-court identification made by the same
witness. Accordingly, the testimony of such witness on the identification of the
accused, by itself, cannot be considered as proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Without proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the identity of the perpetrator, the accused deserves an acquittal.

Inasmuch as the present case involves the alleged positive identification by a lone
eyewitness and the entire case depends on such identification, the Rodrigo case
squarely applies here. Moreover, similar to this case, the witness in Rodrigo was
initially shown a single photograph of the accused.

Applying Rodrigo to this case, the sole eyewitness Alejos out-of-court

identification which proceeded from impermissible suggestion tainted his in-court
identification of Joel as one of the perpetrators of the crime. As a result, Alejos
corrupted testimony on the identification of Joel cannot be considered as proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of Joel as one of the perpetrators. Without
such proof, Joel must be acquitted.

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, Justice Lucas P.

Bersamin distinguishes Rodrigo from the instant case. Indeed, Rodrigo involved a
robbery with homicide while this case is for murder. Notwithstanding the
dissimilarity in the factual milieus, Rodrigo similarly dealt with the admissibility
and reliability of the identification made by a sole witnessand the judgment in
the case totally depends on such identification. In this case, Alejo is the sole
eyewitness whose identification of the perpetrators is determinative of the
final outcome of this case.

Justice Bersamin errs in concluding that Alejos alleged act of categorically

declining to identify any suspect from mere looking at a photograph removes any
taint of impermissible suggestion from the out-of-court identification. This does
not detract from the fact that the police showed Alejo no other photograph, except
that of Joels. Moreover, to repeat the majoritys finding: when appellants
(accused) were arrested they were already considered suspects: Joel was
pinpointed by security guard Alejo who went along with the PARAC squad to
Fairview on June 19, 1996, x x x. Moreover, the fact remains that Joel testified
that the police showed me a picture of a man wearing eyeglasses.

Further, it must be emphasized that a highly suggestive identification results in a

denial of the accuseds right to due process since it effectively and necessarily
deprives the accused of a fair trial. In Rodrigo, the Court stated:

The initial photographic identification in this case carries serious constitutional

law implications in terms of the possible violation of the due process rights of the
accused as it may deny him his rights to a fair trial to the extent that his in-court
identification proceeded from and was influenced by impermissible suggestions
in the earlier photographic identification. In the context of this case, the
investigators might not have been fair to Rodrigo if they themselves, purposely or
unwittingly, fixed in the mind of Rosita, or at least actively prepared her mind to,
the thought that Rodrigo was one of the robbers. Effectively, this act is no
different from coercing a witness in identifying an accused, varying only with
respect to the means used. Either way, the police investigators are the real actors
in the identification of the accused; evidence of identification is effectively
created when none really exists.[9]

In Pineda, the Court pointed out the dangers a photographic identification

spawns: an impermissible suggestion and the risk that the eyewitness would
identify the person he saw in the photograph and not the person he saw
actually committing the crime. Citing Patrick M. Wall, the Court stated:
[W]here a photograph has been identified as that of the guilty party, any
subsequent corporeal identification of that person may be based not upon
the witness recollection of the features of the guilty party, but upon his
 recollection of the photograph. Thus, although a witness who is asked to
attempt a corporeal identification of a person whose photograph he
previously identified may say, "Thats the man that did it," what he may
actually mean is, "Thats the man whose photograph I identified."

xxxx

A recognition of this psychological phenomenon leads logically to the

conclusion that where a witness has made a photographic identification
of a person, his subsequent corporeal identification of that same person is
somewhat impaired in value, and its accuracy must be evaluated in light
of the fact that he first saw a photograph.[10]

Due process dictates that the photographic identification must be devoid of any
impermissible suggestions in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In People v.
Alcantara, the Court declared:

Due process demands that identification procedure of criminal suspects must be

free from impermissible suggestions. As appropriately held in US vs. Wade, the
influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witness probably accounts
for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor.[11] (Emphasis
supplied)

Therefore, the polices act of showing a single photograph to Alejo, prior to

identifying Joel as a suspect, corrupted the identification procedure with
impermissible suggestion.Through this illegal procedure, the police, purposely or
otherwise, suggested and implanted on Alejos mind that Joel was one of the
perpetrators, thereby violating Joels right as an accused to due process. Not only
did the police disregard recognized and accepted rules in photographic
identification, they likewise transgressed the clear mandate of the Constitution that
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
More particularly, the police violated Section 14(1) of the Constitution which
provides: No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.

II. The accused was not assisted by counsel

during the police line-up, violating the accuseds
right to counsel in a custodial investigation.

The second out-of-court identification of Joel was made by Alejo when Joel and
Delos Santos were presented in a police line-up conducted at the Criminal
Investigation Division in Camp Karingal on 21 June 1996, two days after the first
out-of-court identification of Joel. As stated above, Alejo was shown a picture of
Joel prior to the latters arrest on 19 June 1996. Similar to the first out-of-court
identification, the identification of Joel in a police line-up likewise proceeded from
impermissible suggestion. Alejo already saw Joels photograph and had seen Joel in
person when Alejo pinpointed Joel as a suspect. The necessity for the police line-
up was doubtful and the conduct thereof suspicious considering that Joel was
already identified by Alejo when the latter went with the police to Fairview to
pinpoint the suspect.

More importantly, the police denied Joel his right to counsel during the line-up,
contrary to Section 12(1) of the Constitution which provides:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
In People v. Escordial,[12] the Court pertinently ruled:
As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up
considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the
cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of
attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the
possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when
these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a
show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from
a group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial investigation,
these types of identification have been recognized as critical confrontations of
the accused by the prosecution which necessitate the presence of counsel for
the accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings might
well settle the accuseds fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.
We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made
in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the
custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. (Emphasis
supplied)

As stated in Escordial, generally, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of

counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of custodial
investigation. An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus
of police attention at the start of the investigation. The line-up in this case
squarely falls under this exception. It was established that Joel was already a
suspect prior to the police line-up. In fact, even before Joels apprehension, the
police had already zeroed in on Joel as one of Abadillas killers. As such, Joel was
entitled to counsel during the police line-up.

However, there is no question that Joel was not assisted by counsel, whether of his
own choice or provided by the police, during the line up. As Joels identification
was uncounseled, it cannot be admitted in evidence for grossly violating Joels right
to counsel under Section 12(1) of the Constitution.
Further, the Court held in Escordial that the testimony of the witness regarding the
inadmissible identification cannot be admitted as well, thus:

Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on

January 3, 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and
Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been
made when accused-appellant did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-
court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him. Consequently, the
testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should have
been held inadmissible for being the direct result of the illegal lineup come at
by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.[13]

III. The in-court identification of the accused

did not cure the flawed out-of-court identification.

Citing Patrick M. Wall,[14] the majority enumerated the danger signals which give
warning that the identification may be erroneous even though the method used is
proper. Contrary to the majority, some of these danger signals are present in this
case: (1) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness original
description and the actual description of the accused; (2) the limited opportunity on
the part of the witness to see the accused before the commission of the crime; (3) a
considerable time elapsed between the witness view of the criminal and his
identification of the accused; and (4) several persons committed the crime.

A. Discrepancy between original description and actual description

In his sworn statement, which was executed barely five hours after the commission
of the crime, Alejo was able to recall the features of only two suspects, those of
one of the gunmen and one of the lookouts. Significantly, Alejo failed to remember
the physical attributes of the rest of the suspects. Alejo described the two suspects
as follows:
20. T Kung makita mo bang muli ang mga suspect, makikilala mo ba sila?
S Maaari, sir.

21. T Ano ba ang itsura ng mga suspect?

S Iyong tumutok sa akin ay naka-asul na t-shirt, edad 30-35, 55
- 56 ang taas, maikli ang buhok, kayumanggi. xxx Iyong sumakal sa
biktima at nang-agaw ng clutch bag nito ay 25-30 ang edad, payat,
mahaba ang buhok na nakatali, maitim, may taas na 55-56, maiksi din
ang baril niya at nakaputing polo. xxx

22. T Ang sabi mo, pagbangon mo sa pagkadapa sa guardhouse ay wala na

ang mga suspect, may napansin ka bang sasakyan man sila sa pagtakas?
S Mabilis nga sir ang pangyayari. Wala din akong napansin kung may sasakyan
man sila sa pagtakas. (Emphasis supplied)

In his in-court identification of the suspects, two months after the crime, Alejo
identified Lumanog as Suspect No. 1, who allegedly took the clutch bag of the
victim, sinakal ang biktima, inilabas ng kotse at nang bagsak sa kalsada ay binaril
pa uli.

However, Lumanogs actual age and physical features are nowhere close to Alejos
description of the gunman in his sworn statement. In a newspaper article, it was
reported that the police sketch of killer bore no resemblance to any of the Abadilla
5 (referring to the five accused).[15] Lumanog is fair complexioned, definitely not
maitim; 40 years old, not 25 to 30 years of age; and sported a short, not long, hair.
The grave disparity between the description of the gunman in Alejos sworn
statement and in his testimony greatly undermines Alejos credibility in identifying
the perpetrators of the gruesome crime.

Yet, the majority brushed aside Alejos inconsistencies, justifying the same, thus:

Alejos description of Lumanog as dark-skinned was made two (2) months prior to
the dates of trial when he was again asked to identify him in court. When defense
counsel posed the question of the discrepancy in Alejos description of Lumanog
who was then presented as having fair complexion and 40 years old, the private
prosecutor manifested the possible effect of Lumanogs incarceration for such
length of time as to make his appearance different at the time of the trial.[16]
Notably, the majority failed to consider the disparity in the suspects estimated age
and Lumanogs actual age. Alejo described the gunman as between 25-30 years old,
while Lumanog was actually 40 years old. Certainly, a 40 year old man could not
be mistaken for a 25 or 30 year old male, unless the prosecution had shown that
Lumanog, despite his age, looked quite young, or that Lumanog underwent facial
surgery before he supposedly shot the victim to appear as a 25-30 year old male.

With respect to one of the lookouts, who pointed a gun at him, Alejo described him
in his sworn statement as edad 30-35, 55-56 ang taas, maikli ang buhok,
kayumanggi. It must be pointed out that Alejo was only able to give a prior
description of one of the lookouts who pointed a gun at him, despite his later
testimony that there were two lookouts who threatened his life and were walking to
and fro in front of his guardpost prior to the killing, suggesting Alejo had ample
time to see and familiarize himself with the faces of these two lookouts.

Considering that in open court, Alejo testified that there were two suspects who
each pointed a gun at him, whom he identified as Joel and Delos Santos, the
prosecution must sufficiently and clearly establish as to who between these two
accused would the description in Alejos sworn statement be used as basis for
identification. This the prosecution gravely failed to do.

With respect to Joel, Alejos prior description given before the police did not match
Joels physical features. Joel was only 22 years old then, leaving at least an 8-year
difference as to the age of the lookout who was described by Alejo as 30-35 years
old. The majority explained the difference in the age by stating, thus:

Though his estimate of Joels age was not precise, it is not far from his true age,
especially if we consider that being a tricycle driver who is exposed daily to
sunlight, Joels looks may give a first impression that he is older than his actual
age.[17]

The majoritys explanation is purely speculative. There was no evidence presented

to prove (1) that Joel plied his tricycle everyday during daytime; (2) the amount of
Joels exposure to sunlight; and (3) such exposure was excessive as to result to
premature aging of the facial skin.

Moreover, Joels height is 59 whereas the man whom Alejo described as lookout
was about 55-56 tall. There was no explanation offered as to the disparity in the
height.
To repeat, Alejo described only one lookout in his sworn statement, contrary to his
testimony that there were two lookouts. For such conflicting statements, the trial
court acquitted Delos Santos, thus:

The typewriter recording at 1:55 in the afternoon of SG Alejos salaysay is but the
culmination of a long process of oral interviews and conversation so that the
results thereof can be put in systematic order.Additionally, at that period in time,
SG Alejos recollection is still very recent and fresh and he appears to be solely in
touch with police investigators who came to know of the ambush that same
morning. His court testimony, therefore, given at a much later date (August 1996)
after the arrest of Lorenzo delos Santos wherein SG Alejo narrated that there were
two (2) men loitering about near his post and that one after the other those two
men barked at or ordered him is weakened by what he had earlier told police
investigators disclosing that only one (1) person shouted orders at him. In view of
this, the court finds the alibi of Lorenzo to have been correspondingly
strengthened as to put in doubt the prosecutions case against this particular
accused.

The trial court disbelieved Alejos testimony wherein he pinned Joel and Delos
Santos as the suspects who were walking to and fro and threatened him at his
guard post. Despite the fact that in terms of proximity to Alejo, these two suspects
were nearest him, and would most likely be recognized, if seen again, the trial
court doubted Alejos identification of Delos Santos. Alejos testimony is fatally
inconsistent with his earlier claim that there was only one lookout who twice
ordered him to lie down (baba).

Considering there was sufficient reason to doubt Delos Santos culpability based on
Alejos conflicting statements, there is more reason to doubt Joels participation in
the crime. The discrepancy between Alejos description given before the police and
the actual physical appearance of Joel, and the inconsistency in the number of
lookouts, severely weakened the credibility of Alejo in identifying the real culprits.

B. Limited opportunity for Alejo to see the criminals

There is no dispute that Alejo does not know the murderers. Neither does he know
the accused. Alejo saw the gunmen and lookouts for the first time during the
killing. In Rodrigo, the Court observed:
 This fact can make a lot of difference as human experience tells us: in the
recognition of faces, the mind is more certain when the faces relate to those
already in the minds memory bank; conversely, it is not easy to recall or identify
someone we have met only once or whose appearance we have not fixed in our
mind.[18]

Aside from the fact that Alejo did not know the killers, Alejo saw them very
briefly. In fact, in his own words, he admitted this to the police investigators when
he answered mabilis ang mga pangyayari, sir. Likewise, in his testimony, Alejo
stated:

ATTY. AZARCON

Q And how long a time when the first suspect poked the gun at you and the time
you faced the other suspect?
A I faced the man who poked a gun at me for about 5 seconds and then I looked
back towards the four suspects.

Q How long a time were you facing the four suspects?

A Less than a minute, sir.[19]

We agree with the accused that the swiftness by which the crime was committed
and the physical impossibility of memorizing the faces of all the perpetrators of the
crime whom the witness saw for the first time and only for a brief moment under
life-threatening and stressful circumstances incite disturbing doubts as to whether
the witness could accurately remember the identity of the perpetrators of the crime.

C. A considerable time elapsed between the witness view

of the criminal and his identification of the accused.

Except for Joel and Delos Santos, the rest of the accused were identified for the
first time in open court when Alejo testified during the trial. It must be stressed that
there was neither any prior identification nor prior description of Lumanog, Santos,
Rameses, and Fortuna as murder suspects in this case.

The crime took place on 13 June 1996, while Alejo testified in August 1996. Alejo
was never made to identify Lumanog, Santos, Rameses, and Fortuna prior to their
arrest until their in-court identification was made. Two months had elapsed
between Alejos view of the criminals and his identification of the accused in open
court. Alejos memory, just like any other humans, is frail. In fact, as noted by the
trial court, Alejos recollection at the time he gave his statement before the police
investigators was more recent and fresher than when Alejo testified in
court. Accordingly, the trial court gave more credence to Alejos sworn statement
than his testimony in acquitting Delos Santos.

Considering Alejos weak recollection of the incident, it is quite incredible that

Alejo, at the time he identified the accused in open court, had perfect memory as to
the identity of the five accused, who were complete strangers allegedly seen by
Alejo for the first time on 13 June 1996 in a very fleeting and extremely stressful
moment.

D. Several persons committed the crime.

According to Alejo, six men perpetrated the crime. He saw these six male adults,
all complete strangers, for the very first time in a matter of seconds. It is quite
unbelievable that Alejo, whose life was threatened by at least one of the suspects,
focused his attention on all six suspects, looked at them at the same time, and
memorized their faces and features in less than a minute. In fact, he did not witness
the entire incident as it unfolded. Alejo did not even see the suspects flee the crime
scene in a white Kia Pride car as he was ordered to lie down by one of the
lookouts. The physical impossibility of looking at the faces of six different men at
the same time points to the incredibility of Alejos testimony, certain details of
which clearly run counter to human nature and experience.

IV. Alejos in-court identification of the accused

proceeded from illegal police activities.

As discussed earlier, Alejos in-court identification of Joel proceeded from and was
influenced by impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic identification.
As a consequence, Alejos testimony based on such fatally defective identification
cannot be considered as proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the
perpetrators, warranting Joels acquittal.

As regards Lumanog, Fortuna, Santos and Rameses, it was Joel, through a coerced
confession, who supplied the police investigators with the identities of his
supposed cohorts and their whereabouts. The majority notes that Police officers
claimed that appellants were apprehended as a result of hot pursuit activities on the
days following the ambush-slay of Abadilla. There is no question, however, that
when appellants were arrested they were already considered suspects: Joel was
pinpointed by security guard Alejo who went along with the PARAC squad to
Fairview on June 19, 1996, while the rest of appellants were taken by the same
operatives in follow-up operations after Joel provided them with identities of
his conspirators and where they could be found.

The police did not posses any description or prior identification of these accused.
There was no leading information, or any piece of reliable information for that
matter, on the identity of the killers, except Joels illegally extracted extrajudicial
confession. Neither did the police have any evidence linking the other accused to
the crime. To repeat, Joel provided the police, through a coerced confession,
with the identities of his supposed co-conspirators and where they could be
found. Clearly, the police investigators are the real actors in the identification
of the accused; evidence of identification is effectively created when none
really exists.[20]

The majority strikes down the extrajudicial confession [which were] extracted in
violation of constitutional enshrined rights and declares it inadmissible in
evidence. Since Joels coerced extrajudicial confession is inadmissible, the contents
of which, specifically the identities of the supposed killers, are unreliable and
inadmissible as well.

In Escordial, the Court stated that the testimonies of the witnesses on the
identification of the accused should be held inadmissible for being the direct result
of the illegal lineup come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.[21] Here,
being a direct result of an illegal police activity, that is the coerced extraction of a
confession from Joel, the subsequent in-court identification by Alejo of Lumanog,
Rameses, Fortuna and Santos must be rejected. The testimony of Alejo on the
identification of the accused as perpetrators of the crime cannot be given any
weight. Alejos in-court identification of Lumanog, Rameses, Fortuna, and Santos
was fatally tainted because the identity of the suspects came from a coerced
confession of Joel, who himself was identified as a suspect through a fatally
defective impermissible suggestion to Alejo. In short, Alejos identification of
Joel was fatally defective; Alejos identification of Lumanog, Rameses, Fortuna
and Santos was also fatally defective. Both identification directly emanated
from illegal police activities impermissible suggestion and coerced confession.

Without any credible evidence of their identification as the perpetrators of the

crime, Lumanog, Rameses, Fortuna, Santos, and Joel must therefore be acquitted.
 V. Alejos familiarity with the faces of the accused,
due to media exposure of the identities of the accused
extracted from a coerced confession,
impaired his in-court identification.

After the police investigators had illegally extracted from Joel the identities and
locations of the other suspects, and after they had arrested Lumanog, Rameses,
Fortuna and Santos, the police proudly declared: crime solved and case closed.
With this remarkable development, the accused were presented before the media in
a press conference in Camp Crame on 24 June 1996 or 11 days after the killing.
The accused were photographed by mediamen and interviewed by members of the
press. During the press conference, the accused were made to squat on the floor,
their names written on boards dangling from their necks.[22]

Indisputably, the police extracted the identities of the accused from a coerced
confession of Joel. Then the police arrested the accused, and allowed the media to
take their pictures with their names written on boards around their necks. The
media promptly published these pictures in several newspapers. Thus, at that time,
the faces of the accused were regularly splashed all over the newspapers and on
television screens in news reports. Alejo could not have missed seeing the faces
of the accused before he identified them in court. To rule otherwise strains
credulity.

Alejo, as the star witness in this case, must naturally be interested to look, or even
stare, at the faces of the alleged killers to make sure he identifies them in
court. Assuming Alejo failed to personally see the faces of the accused in the
newspapers or television, which is highly improbable, if not totally impossible, his
family and friends, if not the police, would have provided him with photographs of
the accused from the newspapers for easier identification later in court. Surely,
Alejo had ample time to memorize and familiarize himself with the faces of the
accused before he testified in court and identified Lumanog, Santos, Rameses,
Joel, and Fortuna as the killers of Abadilla.

To give credence to Alejos in-court identification of the accused is to admit

and give probative value to the coerced confession of Joel. Clearly, the
publication of the pictures of the accused in the newspapers and television
came directly from the coerced confession of Joel. Alejo would not have been
able to identify the accused without the pictures of the accused that were
taken by media as a result of the coerced confession of Joel.
Inexplicably, the majority fails to consider this extensive media exposure of the
accused in ascertaining the reliability and admissibility of Alejos testimony on the
identities of the accused. The majority ignores the fact that Alejo had seen the
accused in print and on television, guaranteeing Alejos in-court identification of
the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. The media exposure of the accused
casts serious doubts on the integrity of Alejos testimony on the identification of
the murderers. Such doubts are sufficient to rule that Alejos in-court identification
of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime is neither positive nor credible. It is
not merely any identification which would suffice for conviction of the accused. It
must be positive identification made by a credible witness, in order to attain the
level of acceptability and credibility to sustain moral certainty concerning the
person of the offender.[23]

VI. The police investigation and apprehension

of the accused violated the accuseds rights
against warrantless arrest
and against any form of torture.

The police arrested Joel, without any warrant, on 19 June 1996 or six days after the
killing. Six days is definitely more than enough to secure an arrest warrant,
and yet the police opted to arrest Joel and the other accused, without any
warrant, claiming that it was conducted in hot pursuit. In law enforcement, hot
pursuit can refer to an immediate pursuit by the police such as a car
chase.[24] Certainly, the warrantless arrrest of Joel, made six days after the murder,
does not fall within the ambit of hot pursuit. The question now is whether the
successive warrantless arrests of the accused are legal. The pertinent provisions of
Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
 c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

None of the above instances is present in this case: (1) the accused were not
arrested in flagrante delicto; (2) the arrest was not based on personal knowledge of
the arresting officers that there is probable cause that the accused were the authors
of the crime which had just been committed; (3) the accused were not prisoners
who have escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while their case is pending. There is no question that all the accused were
apprehended several days after the crime while doing ordinary and unsuspicious
activities. There is also no question that the police had no personal knowledge of
probable cause that the accused were responsible for the crime which had been
committed. The third situation is inapplicable since the accused are not prison
escapees. Considering these facts, there is indeed no justification for the
warrantless arrests effected by the police in their so-called hot pursuit. Such
warrantless arrest, therefore, amounts to a violation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.

The police investigation work in this case, which led to the unlawful warrantless
arrest of the accused, is nothing but sloppy: (1) they chose to rely solely on
the sworn statement of one eyewitness (Alejo); (2) they failed to obtain any
description of the suspects from other eyewitnesses, including the owner of the
Kia Pride which was forcefully obtained by the suspects as a get-away car; (3)
they showed Alejo a picture of Joel to assist him in identifying the suspect;
and (4) they arrested the other accused based entirely on the illegally
extracted extrajudicial confession of Joel.

Worse than their illegal warrantless arrest, the accused reportedly underwent
unspeakable torture in the hands of the police. While the Commission on Human
Rights, in its Resolution dated July 16, 1996, did not make any categorical finding
of physical violence inflicted on the appellants by the police authorities, the CHR
found prima facie evidence that the police officers could have violated Republic
Act No. 7438, particularly on visitorial rights and the right to counsel, including
the law on arbitrary detention, x x x.

The majority also finds that P/Insp. Castillo admitted that the initial questioning of
Joel began in the morning of June 20, 1996, the first time said suspect was
presented to him at the CPDC station, even before he was brought to the IBP
Office for the taking of his formal statement. Thus, the possibility of appellant
Joel having been subjected to intimidation or violence in the hands of police
investigators as he claims cannot be discounted. During the trial, the police
miserably failed to explain Joels whereabouts from the time he was arrested on 19
June 1996 until he was interrogated the next day. Further, there were sufficient
evidence that Joel and the other accused suffered physical injuries consistent with
torture bruises.

The speedy resolution of a crime is never a license for the police to apprehend any
person and beat him to admit his participation in a gruesome crime. In this case,
without any credible evidence linking the accused to the murder, the police blindly
resorted to careless investigation and unlawful apprehension of innocent men.
Worse, the police apparently tortured the accused to answer for the brutal slaying
of Abadilla.

Indisputably, torturing the accused to extract incriminating confessions is

repugnant to the Constitution. Section 12(2), Article III of the Constitution
expressly provides [n]o torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against [an accused]. The blatant
and unacceptable transgression of the accuseds constitutional rights, for the sake of
delivering speedy, but false, justice to the aggrieved, can never be countenanced.
This Court can never tolerate official abuses and perpetuate the gross violation of
these rights. The presumption that a public officer had regularly performed his
official duty can at no instance prevail over the presumption of innocence.

VII. Conclusion

In reviewing criminal cases, the Court must carefully determine and establish first,
the identification of the accused as perpetrator of the crime, taking into account the
credibility of the prosecution witness who made the identification as well as the
prosecutions compliance with legal and constitutional standards; and second, all
the elements constituting the crime were duly proven by the prosecution to be
present.[25] The inexistence of any of these two factors compels us to acquit the
accused.[26]

In this case, the identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime was
not clearly and convincingly established raising reasonable doubt on the accuseds
guilt for the crime charged.

Apart from breaching established rules on photographic identification, the out-of-

court identification of the accused Joel De Jesus infringes upon his fundamental
Constitutional rights (1) to due process; and (2) to counsel. Specifically, the highly
suggestive photographic identification of Joel made by Alejo violated Joels due
process rights under Section 1, Article III and Section 14(1) of the Constitution.
Meanwhile, the failure of the police to provide Joel with the assistance of counsel
during the police line-up, regarded as a part of custodial investigation, violated
Section 12(1) of the Constitution.

On the other hand, the in-court identification of Joel and the rest of the accused did
not cure the flawed out-of-court identification. Contrary to the majoritys view,
various circumstances signal an erroneous identification: (1) a serious discrepancy
exists between the identifying witness original description and the actual
description of the accused; (2) the limited opportunity on the part of the witness to
see the accused before the commission of the crime; (3) a considerable time
elapsed between the witness view of the criminal and his identification of the
accused; and (4) several persons committed the crime.

Moreover, it was clearly established that Joel was tortured in admitting his
participation in the crime and in providing the identities of the his supposed
co-conspirators. Such despicable act violated the accuseds right under Section
12 (2) of the Constitution. The torture, aside from the failure of the police to
provide Joel with counsel, renders his extrajudicial confession
indamissible. Significantly, without such coerced confession, the police had
nothing to implicate the other accused to the murder.

Further, the police arrested the accused without warrant contrary to Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution. Also, none of the instances under Rule 113 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure exists to justify the accuseds warrantless arrest.

It devolves upon the police authorities, as law enforcers, to ensure the proper and
strict implementation of the laws, most specially, the fundamental law of the
land. Lamentably, the present case showcases the dark reality in our country,
where the police at times assumes the role of law offenders. The policemen,
boasting of solving a highly sensationalized crime, flagrantly disregarded the
accuseds constitutional rights. These men in uniform openly defiled the
Constitution, which they are bound to observe and respect, by infringing upon the
accuseds rights guaranteed under (1) Section 1, Article III; (2) Section 14(1);
(3) Section 12(1); (4) Section 12 (2); and (5) Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution. Such violations simply cannot be countenanced. Instead, they deserve
utmost condemnation. As the Court declared emphatically in Alcantara:

The records show that [the police] illegally arrested appellant, arbitrarily detained,
physically abused and coerced him to confess to a crime penalized by nothing less
than reclusion perpetua. Too often, ourlaw
enforcers, in their haste to solve crimes, strip people accused of serious
offenses of the sanctity of their constitutional rights. It is again time to pound on
these law enforcers with the crania of cavern men that the guarantees of the
rights of an accused in the Constitution are not mere saccharine statements
but the bedrock of our liberty. If we allow a meltdown of these guarantees,
our democracy will be a delusion. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the gross violations of the accuseds constitutional rights as well as the
seriously flawed identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime, there
is sufficient reason to doubt the accuseds guilt for the crime charged. To repeat, the
prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof, specifically to prove the
identity of the perpetrators of the crime beyond reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused prevails.
The accused need not even raise the defenses of denial and alibi as the burden of
proof never shifted to the defense. Any consideration of the merits of these
defenses is rendered moot and will serve no useful purpose. [27]Therefore, the
accused are entitled to an acquittal.

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the appeals and ACQUIT all the accused.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

[1]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presumption_of_innocence
[2]
Id.
[3]
People v. Ulpindo, G.R. No. 115983, 12 April 1996; People v. Subido, G.R. No. 115004, 5 February 1996; People
v. Payawal, G.R. No. 113995, 16 August 1995.
[4]
TSN, 3 September 1996, pp. 21-22.
[5]
G.R. Nos. 111206-08, 6 October 1995, 249 SCRA 54.
[6]
G.R. No. 141644, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 478, 497-498.
[7]
Id. at 498.
[8]
G.R. No. 176159, 11 September 2008, 564 SCRA 584, 597, 600, 609-610.
[9]
Id. at 598-599.
[10]
People v. Pineda, supra at 498.
[11]
G.R. No. 91283, 17 January 1995, 240 SCRA 122, 135.
[12]
G.R. Nos. 139834-35, 16 January 2002, 373 SCRA 585, 607.
[13]
Id. at 607-608.
[14]
A well-known authority in eyewitness identification (see People v. Pineda, supra).
[15]
http://news.google.com/newspapers? nid=2479&dat=20021210&id=Alk1AAAAIBAJ&sjid=iyUMAAAAIBAJ&
pg=3075,32965267
[16]
Decision, p. 68.
[17]
Decision, p. 68.
[18]
Supra at 604.
[19]
TSN, 4 September 1996, p. 28.
[20]
People v. Rodrigo, supra at 599.
[21]
People v. Escordial, supra at 608 citing Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-273, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967).
[22]
http://news.google.com/newspapers? nid=2479&dat=20021210&id=Alk1AAAAIBAJ&sjid=iyUMAAAAIBAJ&
pg=3075,32965267
[23]
People v. Gamer, 383 Phil. 557, 570 (2000).
[24]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hot_pursuit. See People v. Bati, G.R. No. 87429, 27 August 1990, where the two
accused were pursued and arrested a few minutes after consummating the sale of marijuana.
[25]
People v. Rodrigo, supra at 597.
[26]
Id.
[27]
People v. Rodrigo, supra at 611-612.

G.R. No. 189846 June 26, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,

vs.
RAMIL MORES, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Herein appellant Ramil Mores seeks the review of the Decision 1 dated August 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H. C. No. 01362, entitled People of the Philippines v. Ramil Mores, which affirmed with modification the
Decision2 dated September 24, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Oriental Mindoro, Branch 43 in Criminal
Case No. R-632. The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with
Multiple Attempted Murder.

The pertinent portion of the Amended Information3 charging appellant and his co-accused Delio Famor (Famor) with
the commission of the aforementioned felony reads:

That on or about the 24th day of January, 1994 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Multi-Purpose Gymnasium,
at Barangay Bagumbayan, Municipality of Roxas, Province of Or. Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously toss/hurl a live hand grenade at the
center of the dancing hall wherein townsfolks are having a Farewell Ball in connection with the town fiesta
celebration, inflicting upon Ramie Balasa mortal wounds causing his death and injuries to Delfa Ylanan, Harold
Fetalco, Noel Faminialagao, Haynee Lizza Morota, Johnelyn Sinel, Arcel Morillo, Ronald Manalo, Mutia De Leon,
Elizabeth Magpantay, Romeo Ibabao, Joy Gabayno, Manny Balasa, Marilyn Ibabao and Mayra Suarez, thus
performing all the acts of execution necessary to produce the felony directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes not the will of perpetrators.

That in the commission of the crime, the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and nocturnity
are attendant.

At their arraignment, appellant and Famor pleaded not guilty to the charge against them. 4 Thereafter, trial on the
merits commenced. While trial was on-going, appellant, who had previously been granted bail, failed to appear during
two hearing dates. Thus, the bail bond that he posted was forfeited, a bench warrant was issued against him and he
was tried in absentia. Only Famor was able to present evidence on his defense.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were summarized in the trial court’s assailed Decision dated September
24, 1998 in this manner:

The prosecution’s evidence tends to show the following: At about 6:00 p.m. of January 24, 1994, Daryl Famisaran
was chatting with his friends at the Madugo [B]ridge. While they were conversing, (appellant) passed by, stopped
before them and with a grenade in his hand, talked to them in this wise: "Gusto nyo pasabugin ko ito?" ("Do you want
me to explode this"). After (appellant) had left, they immediately dispersed. In the evening of the same date, at about
9:00 p.m., he (Daryl) was at Roxas Gymnasium where a ball was being held. He was then standing on the second
bench from the ground floor on the right side of the stadium near the entrance. To his right was Margie Labatete and
to the right of Labatete was Rey Raymundo (TSN, September 7, 1994, p. 12). There were many persons inside the
gym. From their place up to the edge of the dance floor going towards the inner portion of the gymnasium was a
distance of about twenty-five meters (25m) filled up with rows of chairs and tables. While the dancing was going on,
Daryl saw again (appellant) at a distance of about five (5) armslength on the same row or line from them. (Appellant)
was then with accused Delio Famor and they were whispering to each other. In between him and the two (2) accused
were persons sitting on the rows of chairs and spectators (TSN, September 7, 1994, p. 10). He could no longer tell
what Famor was wearing because his view of him was covered by (appellant). It was at this point that he saw
(appellant) pulled out a round object, which Daryl knew to be a grenade, from (appellant’s) left pocket, transferred it to
his right hand and then threw it on the floor as if rolling a ball (TSN, Ibid, [p]p. 6-7). Then, a commotion ensued and
he heard outcries. He looked for his companions and saw one Nonoy Acebuque and assisted him in going out of the
gymnasium.

The narrative of Daryl Famisaran regarding the 6:00 p.m. incident of January 24, 1994 at Madugo Bridge where
(appellant) while holding a handgrenade uttered "Gusto ninyo pasabugin ko ito" in their presence was corroborated
by Esteban Galaran, Jr. According to Esteban, he knew (appellant) and accused Famor because they were former
members of Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit (hereinafter called CAFGU for brevity). At about 6:00 p.m. of
January 24, 1994, he was at Madugo Bridge with Daryl Famisaran, Jomer Fabiletante and Francisco Depuno.

While they were [seated] on the railings of the bridge, (appellant) and Famor passed by. Then, (appellant) pulled out
an object from his pocket, raised it and uttered in the vernacular "Gusto ninyo pasabugin ko ito?" Thereafter,
(appellant) proceeded to the rice mill and they also left the place (TSN, September 8, 1994, pp. 3-4). In the evening of
the same date, Esteban stayed at his house which is about half a kilometer from the gymnasium. He came to know
later on from Rey Raymundo that a grenade exploded at the Roxas Gymnasium that evening.

Also present at the Roxas Gymnasium during the ball as of the time mentioned by Daryl Famisaran the explosion
occurred were witnesses Delfa Ylanan, Myra Suarez and Noel Faminialagao.

According to Delfa Ylanan, she was then with Ramy Balasa, Manny Balasa and Malyn Balasa at the gymnasium
witnessing the on-going ball. They were in front of a table and in front of them separated by the table was Orpha
Famisaran who was about two (2) meters from them. Then, she saw an object with the size of her fist rolled in front of
them towards the direction of Orpha. The latter peeped under the table and she kicked the object. At that instance,
Orpha’s back was in front of them while in front of Orpha was another table. She claimed that the object even hit the
leg of the table of Orpha (TSN, September 8, 1994, p. 11). After Orpha had kicked the object there was an explosion
and a commotion ensued. She felt her feet getting hot and so, she asked for assistance from her companion Ramy
(also spelled Ramie) Balasa. Ramy was not able to help her because he suddenly fell down such that she instead
assisted Ramy and they brought him to Dr. Comia’s clinic. Ramy Balasa was later on transferred to Roxas District
Hospital where he died.
Myra Suarez was on the dance floor with partner Louie Faina immediately before the explosion. They were dancing
at the right side of the stadium facing the stage when something exploded under the table at their back at a distance
of about two (2) armslength from them. She was wounded at the back for which she was treated at Roxas District
Hospital for a day and then she was transferred to UST Hospital where she was confined for four (4) days.

Noel Faminialagao was also dancing when the explosion occurred. They were then at the right side of the
gymnasium facing the stage at a distance of about ten (10) meters from the place of the explosion. He sustained
injury at the back of his right leg for which he was treated at Roxas District Hospital for two (2) days.

When he heard the explosion, SPO2 Walfredo Lafuente was at his house at Fabella Village which is about two
hundred (200) meters from the gymnasium. He immediately proceeded to the gymnasium arriving thereat
approximately twelve (12) to fifteen (15) minutes from the time he heard the explosion. While walking towards the
gymnasium, SPO2 Lafuente met accused Delio Famor near the store of Aling Norbing Faminialagao which is about
fifty (50) meters from the gymnasium. Famor was then with (appellant) and another unidentified person according to
Lafuente. He asked Famor what happened to which the latter replied that something exploded. In his estimate,
Lafuente met Famor about ten (10) minutes from the time he heard the explosion. He proceeded to the plaza and
immediately conducted investigation thereat with the other members of the Roxas PNP composed of Chief of Police
Arnulfo Sison, Diego Falseso and other members whom he could no longer recall. In the middle of the gym or what
he called plaza, they recovered metal fragments and lever of a grenade with Serial No. UM-204-A-2 which were
placed inside two (2) separate envelopes accordingly marked as Exhibits "I" and "J".

Dr. Efren Faustino who is then the OIC of Roxas District Hospital was at the said hospital in the evening of January
24, 1994 when according to him there was a steady stream of vehicles with several patients with multiple injuries
coming to the hospital and that they could hardly cope with the injured persons as they were only two (2) doctors at
the said hospital. These persons who came to the hospital informed him that there was a grenade blast in the
municipal plaza of Roxas. In his (Dr. Faustino’s) estimate, there were about forty (40) persons who were treated at
the hospital of shrapnel injuries but some of them, they were not able to record or document for lack of time to write
that night. In due course, he identified about twenty-four (24) medico-legal certificates issued by him which were
marked in evidence as Exhibits "E", "E-1" to "E-23" (Records, pp. 217-240). He likewise opined that all these injuries
or wounds treated by him which were the subject of the medical certificates he issued, were caused by blasting. He
also attended to one Ramie Balasa who sustained a wound on the chest and on the left leg. When they opened the
chest of Ramie Balasa they found a shrapnel embedded at the right anterior wall of the heart causing a blood
hemorrhage which caused his death. He likewise identified the necropsy report on the cadaver of Ramie Balasa
which was marked as Exhibit "F" and the death certificate of the victim issued by him which was accordingly marked
as Exhibit "G". According to him, the cause of death of Ramie Balasa is hypovolemic shock secondary to massive
blood loss secondary to shrapnel wound or in layman’s language massive loss of blood (TSN, October 1, 1996, p.
18).

The aforementioned incident was investigated by Roxas PNP Police Investigator Edgar Valencia and the
investigators of the CIS of Oriental Mindoro. According to Police Investigator Valencia, when he arrived at the
gymnasium, Police Officers Renato Cruz and Walfredo Lafuente were already there. They immediately secured the
area and told the people to step out of the gymnasium. They scoured the area and found out that the explosion
occurred at the right side of the gymnasium if one would enter it on the northern side and that the tables inside the
gymnasium were hit by the explosion. One of his companions likewise found a "pin" of a grenade pointing to the
safety lever marked as Exhibit "J". They were not able to determine the source of the grenade on the basis of the
metal fragments and the metal lever although they referred them to the CIS for that purpose. Neither did they refer
them to a crime laboratory for examination. To his recollection, several persons were wounded and one (1) died as a
result of the grenade explosion.5

On the other hand, the trial court summed the defense witnesses’ testimonies as follows:

Accused Delio Famor for his part interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that in the evening of
January 24, 1994 he slept early at his house with his wife and their two-year old child. His house was located at
Fabella Village just beside the house of a certain Boy Cruz and estimated to be one hundred (100) meters from the
gymnasium. At about 9:00 in the evening he was still asleep when his wife Concepcion Famor woke him up. She told
him that there was an explosion from the direction of Camp Gozar. At that time, he was a member of CAFGU
assigned at Camp Gozar. He stood up and waited if something untoward will happen because he initially thought that
there was an NPA raid. After a while, he put on a t-shirt and went out of the house with his wife. They were many
persons around and one of them told him that something exploded at the gymnasium. He proceeded to the Shell
station near Camp Gozar. On the way, he met Rey Raymundo. He even asked Rey where did the explosion come
from who answered that it was at the plaza. Near the station, he met Sgt. Paraoan, their First Sergeant at Camp
Gozar. He (Sgt. Paraoan) borrowed a vehicle from the Shell station and he joined Sgt. Paraoan looking for the latter’s
children who also attended the ball. They found them at the hospital because they brought there a cousin who was
wounded in the explosion. Thereafter, he returned to his house. He denied the testimony of Daryl Famisaran that
immediately before the explosion he was with (appellant) and about five (5) armslength from Daryl and that they were
whispering to each other when (appellant) pulled out a grenade from his pocket and then pitched it on the floor
towards the dancing area. He likewise denied the statement of Esteban Galaran, Jr. that at about 6:00 p.m. of
January 24, 1994 he was with (appellant) at Madugo Bridge when the latter holding a hand grenade uttered, "Gusto
ninyo pasabugin ko ito?"

Accused Delio Famor further claimed that as a member of CAFGU he was seriously wounded and even showed his
lengthy scars in his abdomen and forearm, in an encounter with NPA Unit at Barangay Batangan, Bongabong,
Oriental Mindoro and could have been an awardee in that year were it not for his involvement in this case. He further
testified that when he was invited by the CIS operatives, he was brought to Canlubang, Laguna where they subjected
him to electric shocks and water treatments, and he told them that even if they would kill him, he cannot tell them
anything because he knew nothing of the crime being imputed against him. After five (5) days he was brought to the
provincial jail at Roxas but he did not bother to file a case against his tormentors.

The version narrated by accused Famor was corroborated by his wife Concepcion and in part by Rey Raymundo.
According to Rey Raymundo, in the evening of January 24, 1994, he was at Roxas Gymnasium where there was an
on-going ball-dance. Initially, he was with his niece Hayneeliza Morota but later on he was joined by Daryl Famisaran
and Margie Labatete. They were then at the western side of the gymnasium (obviously right side) with the northern
entrance as a point of reference. Before the explosion there was crashing sound similar to that produced by a glass
or bottle hitting the floor near the table occupied by his cousin Elwood and a certain Mutya and Orpha. A few seconds
thereafter, there was an explosion. The lights at the stadium went off and in a few seconds the lights returned. The
table of Orpha was about two (2) meters from their place. He did not see (appellant) nor Delio Famor inside the
gymnasium. After the lights had returned, he saw Hayneeliza bloodied in the face and so he assisted her in going
outside the gymnasium. Thereafter, they saw a jeepney with familiar faces on board. He requested them to bring
Hayneeliza to the hospital while he ran towards his house. Along the way, he met Delio Famor who even asked him
where the explosion was. He claimed to have spent the sum of ₱16,000.00 in connection with the treatment of his
injured eye.6

At the conclusion of court proceedings, the trial court convicted appellant for the felony of Murder with Multiple
Attempted Murder. However, it acquitted co-accused Famor on the ground that there was a paucity of evidence to
establish that Famor was appellant’s co-conspirator in the commission of the criminal act of which both of them were
charged. The dispositive portion of the assailed September 24, 1998 Decision of the trial court reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) The court finds the accused Ramil Mores who was tried in absentia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
supreme penalty of DEATH to be executed in accordance with existing law. And as he is at large, let an
alias warrant of arrest be issued for his apprehension. But, in accordance with the principle laid down in the
case of People vs. Esparas, et al., G.R. No. 120034, August 30, 1996 that the automatic appeal of a death
sentence still applies to a death convict who escaped, the Clerk of Court of this Court, Atty. Mariano S.
Familara III is directed to transmit to the Honorable Supreme Court the complete records of the case for
review.

(2) Accused Ramil Mores is also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Ramie Balasa compensatory
damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and the sum of ₱6,000.00 to Myra Suarez as actual damages;

(3) For failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused Delio Famor beyond reasonable doubt,
the said accused is ACQUITTED of the charge of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. Being a detention
prisoner, the said accused is hereby ordered released from confinement unless he is being detained on
some other charge or charges or that there is an order from other court to the contrary, without
pronouncement as to costs.7
In view of the death penalty handed down by the trial court, appellant’s case was automatically elevated to this Court
for reexamination; however, in conformity with the rule we laid down in People v. Mateo, 8 the matter was remanded to
the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.

Thereafter, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming with modification the trial court’s ruling. The dispositive
portion of the assailed August 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 11,
2007 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as follows:

(1) Appellant Ramil Mores is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for
parole;

(2) Appellant Ramil Mores is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Ramie Balasa the following:

(a) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

(b) ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(c) ₱20,000.00 as temperate damages;

(3) Appellant Ramil Mores is hereby ordered to pay Myra Suarez ₱5,000.00 as temperate damages.9

Since Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines) was already in
force when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, the appellate court correctly modified the original penalty of
death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Hence, Mores filed this appeal wherein both prosecution and defense counsels merely adopted their briefs with the
appellate court. Appellant reiterated the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF

TREACHERY IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.

III

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.10

In connection with the first assigned error, appellant argues that the element of treachery, which qualified his felony to
Murder, is not present in this case. Appellant maintains that "there is no evidence showing that he consciously
adopted the method of attack (grenade throwing) directly and especially to facilitate the perpetration of the killing
without danger to himself."11 He insists that the act of throwing the grenade, as alleged by the prosecution, was made
at the spur of the moment and the short distance between the explosion and his alleged location negates any sense
of concern for his own well-being which serves to belie any treacherous intent on his part.

As for the second and third assigned errors which were discussed jointly, appellant contends that since his co-
accused Famor purportedly successfully proved his alibi, then it follows that appellant should also be acquitted.
Appellant argues that since the prosecution insists that both he and Famor were together when the grenade throwing
incident occurred then the acquittal of Famor on the basis that he was not present at the crime scene totally destroys
the prosecution’s theory of the case. Thus, appellant should be exonerated from any wrongdoing.

Appellant likewise claimed that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were fraught with inconsistencies and
should not have been given credit by the trial court.

Furthermore, appellant asserts that flight must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. Although it is
undisputed that, after his arraignment, appellant had stopped appearing in court and up to this day remains at large,
appellant points out that he never left the vicinity of the crime scene and was, in fact, seen by one of the prosecution
witnesses, to be near that area 10 minutes after the explosion occurred. If he was indeed the perpetrator of the grisly
crime charged, appellant argues that he could have just left town that very evening in order to insure non-
apprehension.12

We are not persuaded and, thus, sustain appellant’s conviction.

Article 14, Paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code states that "there is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make." It is long settled in jurisprudence that two elements must concur in order to establish treachery: (a) that at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means of attack employed.13 Thus, the essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning and in
a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape.14

We agree with the appellate court that the manner by which appellant deliberately rolled the grenade on the ground
towards the dance floor packed with unsuspecting revelers, leaving one dead and scores wounded in the aftermath of
the sudden blast was accompanied with treachery. Appellant’s unexpected action which was immediately followed by
the grenade’s lethal explosion left the victims with utterly no chance to escape the blast area nor to find protective
cover. Though appellant stood a short distance away, he knowingly positioned himself safely from the reach of the
grenade’s destructive force. From the foregoing, we can confidently conclude that treachery, as correctly pointed out
by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, was present in the commission of the crime charged.

With regard to appellant’s contention that the acquittal of the co-accused Famor merits a similar acquittal for himself,
we rule that appellant erred in his appreciation of the actual ground for Famor’s acquittal as well as the effect of such
exoneration on appellant’s own criminal culpability.

Appellant is grossly mistaken in his conclusion that Famor was acquitted because the trial court believed his alibi.
Nothing more could be farther from the truth. Even a cursory reading of the assailed September 24, 1998 Decision of
the trial court would reveal that Famor’s acquittal stemmed from the prosecution’s inability to prove that Famor was a
co-conspirator of appellant in the commission of the dastardly act which is the subject of this criminal case. In other
words, the trial court did not exonerate Famor because his alibi was confirmed. He was adjudged not guilty of the
crime charged because his proximity and whispered communications to appellant moments before the grenade
throwing incident occurred was deemed by the trial court as insufficient evidence to establish conspiracy between him
and appellant. Thus, appellant and Famor’s presence in the crime scene as testified to by witness Daryl Famisaran
(Famisaran) was never doubted by the trial court.

Furthermore, contrary to appellant’s protestation, we find no cogent reason to question the veracity of the testimony
of Famisaran as well as that of the other witnesses for the prosecution. We have reiterated in jurisprudence that when
the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings
are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate
court, since it is settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally binding upon this Court.15 In all, we concur with the trial court in setting aside the inconsequential
differences in the prosecution’s witnesses’ testimonies and in pointing out that their testimonies actually corroborated
each other as to rolling of a grenade onto the dance floor and their respective positions from the blast.

Finally, we cannot subscribe to appellant’s theory that his continued presence at the vicinity of the Municipality of
Roxas right after the grenade throwing incident negates his guilt of the crime charged and that his absence in court
proceedings subsequent to his arraignment should not be taken against him. We have elucidated on this point in one
recent case wherein we held that non-flight does not necessarily connote innocence, to wit:

Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits behave differently and even erratically in
externalizing and manifesting their guilt. Some may escape or flee – a circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt –
while others may remain in the same vicinity so as to create a semblance of regularity, thereby avoiding suspicion
from other members of the community.16 (Citation omitted.)

Moreover, our position on the effects of unexplained flight on the guilt or innocence of an accused remains
unchanged. In People v. Camat,17 we reiterated the jurisprudential doctrine that flight is indicative of guilt in this
1âwphi1

manner:

Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest
or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. In one case, this Court had stated that it is well-
established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the
innocent are as bold as a lion. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)

From the foregoing, we have no other recourse but to sustain appellant’s conviction for the complex crime of Murder
with Multiple Attempted Murder. As correctly explained by the Court of Appeals, the single act of pitching or rolling the
hand grenade on the floor of the gymnasium which resulted in the death of Ramie Balasa (Balasa) and injuries to
other victims constituted a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which states that when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for the most serious crime of Murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to DEATH. Thus, applying Article 48, the death penalty should be
imposed. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the proper sentence therefore is reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole.

Also in line with current jurisprudence,18 we increase the award of civil indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Balasa
on account of his murder by appellant from Fifty Thousand Pesos (!!50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00). We likewise increase the award of exemplary damages from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(!!25,000.00) to Thirty

Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00). Moreover, moral damages should also be awarded in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (!!50,000.00). With regard to the instances of Attempted Murder, appellant is ordered to pay Forty Thousand
Pesos (₱40,000.00) as moral damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages to each
victim. 19

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 01362 convicting appellant Ramil Mores for murder with multiple attempted murder for which he is to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that:

(1) Appellant Ramil Mores is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Ramie Balasa Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages
and Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages;

(2) Appellant Ramil Mores is ordered to pay each victim of ATTEMPTED MURDER, Forty Thousand Pesos
(₱40,000.00) as moral damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

(3) Appellant Ramil Mores is further ordered to pay the private offended parties or their heirs interest on all
damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 3-18; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-
Leagogo and Antonio L. Villamor, concurring.

2
CA rollo, pp. 25-42.

3
Records, p. 105.

4
Id. at 117.

5 CA rollo, pp. 28-31.

6 Id. at 31-32.

7
Id. at 42.

8 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

9
Rollo, p. 17.

10 CA rollo, p. 66.

11
Id. at 72.

12 Id. at 77-78.

13 People v. Angelio and Olaso, G.R. No. 197540, February 27, 2012, 667 SCRA 102, 110.

14 People v. Cabtalan and Cabrillas, G.R. No. 175980, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 174, 186-187.
 15
People v. Adallom, G.R. No. 182522, March 7, 2012, 667 SCRA 652, 670-671.

16 People v. Asilan, G.R. No. 188322, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 405, 419.

17 G.R. No. 188612, July 30, 2012, 677 SCRA 640, 667.

18 People v. Cabtalan and Cabrillas, supra note 14 at 196.

19 People v. Cam at, supra note 17 at 671.

EOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188322

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ,* JJ.

Promulgated:

JOSEPH ASILAN yTABORNAL,

Accused-Appellant. April 11, 2012
x---------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal filed by the accused-appellant Joseph Asilan y Tabornal

(Asilan) to challenge the February 25, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02686, which affirmed in toto his Murder conviction,
rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20 of the City of Manila on
January 8, 2007, inCriminal Case No. 06-243060.

On March 31, 2006, Asilan was charged with the complex crime of Direct
Assault with Murder in an Information,[2] the pertinent portion of which reads:
 That on or about March 27, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring, and confederating with another whose true name, real
identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the person of PO1 RANDY ADOVAS y PE-CAAT,
a member of the Philippine National Police assigned at Camp Bagong Diwa,
Bicutan, Taguig, MM, duly qualified, appointed, and acting as such, and therefore
an agent of a person in authority, which fact was known to the said accused,
while PO1 RANDY ADOVAS y PE-CAAT was in the performance of his
official duty, that is, while handcuffing the at-large co-conspirator for illegal
possession of deadly weapon, herein accused suddenly appeared and with intent
to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault, and use personal
violence upon said police officer by then and there repeatedly stabbing the
latter with a fan knife then grabbing his service firearm and shooting him,
thereby inflicting upon the said PO1 RANDY ADOVAS y PE-CAAT mortal
stab and gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.

Asilan pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment [3] on April 10, 2006. Pre-
Trial Conference followed on April 26, 2006, where the counsels agreed to
stipulate that Asilan, who was at that time present in the RTC, was the same Asilan
named in the Information, and that the victim, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Randy
Adovas y Pe-caat (Adovas), was a police officer in active duty at the time of his
death.[4] Trial on the merits ensued after the termination of the pre-trial
conference.

Below is the prosecutionÕs version, as succinctly summarized by the Office

of the Solicitor General (OSG) from the testimony of Joselito Binosa (Binosa)[5]:

In the evening of March 27, 2006, around 10:00 oÕclock, Joselito Binosa,
a jeepney barker/carwash boy while chatting with his friends at the El Ni–o
Bakery along Teresa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, heard a gunshot nearby. He then
went to the place where the sound came and from where he was standing which
was about three (3) to four (4) meters away, he saw a uniformed policeman, who
seemed to be arresting someone and ordering the latter to lay on the ground.

The police officer pushed the man to the wall, poked the gun on him and
was about to handcuff the latter when another man, herein appellant Asilan
arrived, drew something from his back and stabbed the police officer on his back
several times until the latter fell to the ground.

The man who was being arrested by the police officer held the latterÕs
hand while he was being stabbed repeatedly by [Asilan]. The man who was being
arrested then took the officerÕs gun and shot the latter with it.
 The fellow barker of Joselito Binosa then threw stones at the malefactors
who subsequently left the place.

Joselito Binosa secretly followed [Asilan] and his companion who walked
towards the railroad track taking Teresa St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. [Asilan] entered
an alley and thereafter returned to the place of the incident. The other man
walked on to the tracks.

At that moment, a policeman passed by and Binosa pointed [Asilan] to

him. [Asilan] was arrested and the knife which was used in the
stabbing was confiscated by the policeman.[6] (Citations omitted.)

The above narration of events was largely corroborated by Pol Justine San
Diego (San Diego), a student, who also witnessed the events that transpired on
March 27, 2006.[7]

The prosecution also submitted as evidence Medico Legal Report No. M-

219-06,[8] accomplished and testified to by Dr. Vladimir V. Villase–or. The
pertinent portion of the Medico Legal Report states:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Cadaver of Randy Pe-caat Adovas, 29 y/o male, married, a policeman, 167

cm in height and a resident of 19 West Bank Road, Floodway, Rosario Pasig City.

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the cause of death.

FINDINGS:
Body belongs to a fairly nourished, fairly developed male cadaver in rigor
mortis with postmortem lividity at the dependent portions of the
body. Conjunctivae, lips and nailbeds are pale. With exploratory laparotomy
incision at the anterior abdominal wall, measuring 29 cm long, along the anterior
midline.

Trunk & Upper Extremity:

1) Stab wound, right axillary region, measuring 6 x 4 cm, 16 cm from the
anterior midline.
 2) Stab wound, right hypochondriac region, measuring 2.3 x 0.7 cm, 2cm
right of the anterior midline, 9 cm deep, directed posteriorwards, downwards &
medialwards, lacerating the right lobe of the liver.

-over-

CONCLUSION:

Cause of death is MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS & GUNSHOT

WOUND OF THE TRUNK AND UPPER EXTREMITIES.

Meanwhile, Asilan, in his AppellantsÕ Brief,[9] summed up his defense as

follows:

On March 27, 2006, at around 10:00 oÕclock p.m. JOSEPH

ASILAN [Asilan] was on board a passenger jeepney on his way to
Mandaluyong. As he had to transfer to another jeepney, [Asilan] alighted at Old
Sta. Mesa and waited for a jeep bound for Pasig City. Suddenly, three (3)
motorcycles stopped in front of him, the passengers of which approached and
frisked him. He was thereafter brought to the police station and in a small room,
he was forced to admit to the stabbing of a police officer. Thereafter, he was
brought to a nearby hospital and was medically examined. Then he was again
taken to the police station where he was confronted with the knife which was
allegedly used in stabbing PO1 Adovas. He was mauled for refusing to confess to
the stabbing of the said policeman. Afterwards, he was presented to alleged
eyewitnesses. However, the supposed eyewitnesses were not the ones presented
by the prosecution in court.[10]

The RTC convicted Asilan of Murder in its Decision[11] dated January 8,

2007, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the Prosecution to

have failed to establish and prove beyond reasonable doubt the offense of direct
assault. Where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the
charge as to one of the component, the accused can be convicted of the other
(People v. Roma, 374 SCRA 457).

WHEREFORE, his guilt having been proven beyond reasonable doubt

for the crime of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, judgment
is hereby rendered finding accused Joseph Asilan y Tabornal GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and is hereby imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of PO1 Randy Adovas y
 Pe-Caat the sum of ₱84,224.00 as actual damages, ₱25,000.00 for moral damages
and ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity.[12]

The RTC, in acquitting Asilan of Direct Assault, held that while it was
confirmed that Adovas was in his police uniform at the time of his death, the
prosecution failed to establish convincingly that he was in the performance of his
duty when he was assaulted by Asilan. The RTC explained that there was no
evidence to show that Adovas was arresting somebody at the time Asilan stabbed
him.[13] The RTC added:

What the framers of the law wanted was to know the reason of the assault
upon a person in authority or his agents. The prosecution failed to show why the
victim was pushing the man on the wall or why he poked his gun at the
latter. That the victim was assaulted while in the performance of his duty or by
reason thereof was not conclusively proven.[14]

In convicting Asilan of Murder, the RTC held that his defense of denial
could not be Òaccorded more weight than the categorical assertions of the
witnesses who positively identified him as the man who suddenly appeared from
behind [Adovas] and stabbed the latter repeatedly.Ó[15] Moreover, Asilan admitted
that he was at the scene of the crime when he was arrested, that he could not give
any reason for the witnesses to falsely testify against him, and that he did not know
them.

Anent the aggravating circumstances, the RTC found that the killing of
Adovas was proven to be attended with treachery since Adovas was attacked from
behind, depriving him of the opportunity to defend himself.[16] However, the RTC
declared that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation Òcould not be
appreciated x x x absent evidence that [Asilan] planned or prepared to kill
[Adovas] or of the time when the plot was conceived.Ó[17]

As to the damages, the RTC found the prosecutionÕs evidence, which

consisted of AdovasÕs wifeÕs testimony, and the receipts of the expenses she
incurred in AdovasÕs hospitalization, wake, and burial, sufficient to award moral
and actual damages.

On January 19, 2007, Asilan appealed[18] his conviction to the Court of

Appeals, mainly on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He subsequently filed a Motion to Litigate as a
Pauper, [19] which on February 28, 2007, was granted in an Order[20] by the RTC.

On February 25, 2009, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision,

affirming in toto the RTCÕs ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 08

January 2007 of the Court a quo in Criminal Case No. 06-243060, finding
Accused-Appellant JOSEPH ASILAN Y TABORNAL guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[21]

The Court of Appeals rejected AsilanÕs arguments and averred that his
denial and bare attempt at exculpation by trying to destroy the credibility of the
candid, categorical, and trustworthy testimonies of the witnesses must fail.

Aggrieved, Asilan is now appealing[22] his case to this Court, with the same
assignment of errors he posited before the Court of Appeals:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED BY RELYING ON THE INCONSISTENT AND UNNATURAL
TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESS.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.[23]

Discussion
 Asilan was convicted of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code:

Art. 248. Murder. Ñ Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of

armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity;

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding

of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by
means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving
great waste and ruin;

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding

paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive
cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity;

5. With evident premeditation;

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering

of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

Asilan claims that the testimonies of the witnesses were not only filled with
inconsistencies, they were also incredible for being contrary to the common
experience and observation that mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstance.[24]

Asilan insists that the testimony of Binosa should not be given credence as
he was selective in his recollection of the events. Asilan claimed that Binosa
seemed to have recalled more details on cross-examination, thus ÒimprovingÓ on
the version he gave during his direct examination. Asilan further claims that
BinosaÕs suggestion that Asilan returned to the scene of the crime after he
committed the alleged crime is very unlikely. Asilan avers that San DiegoÕs
testimony was likewise not credible as it was clearly only a more refined version of
BinosaÕs account of the events. Moreover, Asilan says that San DiegoÕs
testimony is too good to be true as he is unlikely to have a detailed recollection of
an event, which according to him happened within a span of two minutes.[25]

Credibility of Witnesses

It is a well-settled rule that the assessment of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses will generally not be disturbed on appeal. The rationale for
this doctrine is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the issue, as it
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.[26] The only exceptions to this rule are the following:

1. When patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by

the trial court; or

2. When the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the

evidence.[27]

This Court sees no reason to apply the above exceptions and disturb the
findings of the RTC, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Our perusal of the records showed that the RTC was vigilant in its duty to
ascertain the truth. The RTC itself propounded clarificatory questions to Binosa
and San Diego while they were testifying. At the end of the trial, the RTC found
these witnesses credible, and believed their eyewitness accounts because they were
categorical in their identification of Asilan as one of AdovasÕs assailants. The
RTC also pointed out that it could not find any dubious reason for Binosa and San
Diego to falsely implicate Asilan in a heinous crime.[28]

Alleged Inconsistencies

The alleged inconsistency in BinosaÕs testimony does not render his

testimony fictitious. The fact that he was able to provide more details of the events
only during cross-examination is not unusual, and on the contrary tends to buttress,
rather than weaken, his credibility, since it shows that he was neither coached nor
were his answers contrived.[29] After all, Ò[w]itnesses are not expected to
remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall.Ó[30]

As for San DiegoÕs testimony, it is not unnatural for him to have a detailed
recollection of the incident. ÒDifferent persons have different reactions to similar
situations. There is no typical reaction to a sudden occurrence.Ó[31] It is worthy to
note that San Diego was only sixteen years old when he witnessed the stabbing of
Adovas. It was his first time to witness a person being stabbed right before his
very eyes. He testified that three months after that night, the events were still
vividly imprinted in his mind.[32] It is thus not improbable that he could, with
certainty, identify Asilan as the man who stabbed Adovas that fateful night.

Likewise, our scrutiny of the so-called inconsistencies relied upon by Asilan

showed that they only referred to minor details, which did not affect the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses.[33] In People v. Albarido,[34] this Court said:

It is elementary in the rule of evidence that inconsistencies in the testimonies of

prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not
affect the substance of their declaration nor the veracity or weight of their
testimony. In fact, these minor inconsistencies enhance the credibility of the
witnesses, for they remove any suspicion that their testimonies were contrived or
rehearsed. In People vs. Maglente, this Court ruled that inconsistencies in details
which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal. x x
x.[35]

Credibility of the evidence

Asilan further asseverates that it is perplexing how none of the witnesses,

who were present during the incident, warned Adovas of the impending danger to
his life. He contends that Òfor evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstance.Ó[36]

This Court would like to reiterate that no standard form of behavior is

expected of an individual who witnesses something shocking or gruesome like
murder. This is especially true when the assailant is near. It is not unusual that
some people would feel reluctant in getting involved in a criminal incident.[37]

In the same manner, it is also not surprising that Asilan returned to the scene
of the crime after stabbing Adovas. His Òfailure to flee and the apparent normalcy
of his behavior subsequent to the commission of the crime do not imply his
innocence.Ó[38] This Court, elucidating on this point, declared:

Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits
behave differently and even erratically in externalizing and manifesting their
guilt. Some may escape or flee -- a circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt --
 while others may remain in the same vicinity so as to create a semblance of
regularity, thereby avoiding suspicion from other members of the community.[39]

Defense of Denial

Unfortunately, AsilanÕs bare denial, when juxtaposed with the prosecution

witnessesÕ positive declarations, is not worthy of credence. Denial, which is the
usual refuge of offenders, is an inherently weak defense, and must be buttressed by
other persuasive evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. The defense of
denial fails even more when the assailant, as in this case, was positively identified
by credible witnesses, against whom no ulterior motive could be ascribed.[40]

Asilan not only admitted that he was at the scene of the crime when he was
arrested by the police authorities, he also admitted that he did not know any of the
prosecution witnesses prior to his trial. Moreover, he had filed no case against the
police officers whom he accused of mauling him to make him admit to the
stabbing of Adovas. AsilanÕs Òself-serving statements deserve no weight in law
and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of the witnesses
who testified on positive points.Ó[41]

Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery

Asilan pleads that treachery cannot be appreciated in the present case as the
prosecution failed to establish that he had consciously or deliberately adopted or
chosen the mode of attack employed upon Adovas to deprive him of an
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. Asilan argues that mere suddenness of
the attack is not enough to constitute treachery. He further posits that while it may
be true that he allegedly came from behind, the Òmode of attack could have
occurred in a spur of the moment.Ó[42]

The RTC correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery in

the killing of Adovas.

The prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the attendance of treachery

in the case at bar. ÒIt is basic in our penal law that treachery is present when the
offender employs means, methods or forms which tend directly and especially to
insure the execution of the crime, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.Ó[43] In People v. Tan,[44] this Court
expounded on the concept of treachery as follows:
 The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. Treachery is present
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and especially to
insure its execution, without risk arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. In the case at bar, the attack on Magdalino Olos was
treacherous, because he was caught off guard and was therefore unable to defend
himself, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses and as indicated by the
wounds inflicted on him.[45]

Both eyewitnesses testified on how Asilan attacked Adovas from

behind. Adovas could not have defended himself because Asilan stabbed him at
his back repeatedly sansprovocation or warning. The deciding factor is that
AsilanÕs execution of his attack made it impossible for Adovas to defend himself
or retaliate.[46]

Sufficiency of the Information

Asilan also claims that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him was infringed when he was convicted for
Murder, since the manner by which he carried out the killing with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was not alleged in the Information against him. Thus, he
asserts, he was effectively only charged with Homicide.[47]

This Court does not find merit in AsilanÕs contention that he cannot be
convicted of murder because his acts of treachery were not alleged with specificity
in the Information. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. Ð A complaint or

information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission
of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed.

When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall
be included in the complaint or information.

This Court held that Ò[u]nder Section 6, the Information is sufficient if it

contains the full name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the
statute, the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended
party, the approximate date, and the place of the offense.Ó[48] The Information
herein complied with these conditions. Contrary to AsilanÕs contention, the
qualifying circumstance of ÒtreacheryÓ was specifically alleged in the
Information. ÒThe rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded
in the Information in order not to violate the accusedÕs constitutional right to be
properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.Ó[49] Asilan never claimed that he was deprived of his right to be fully
apprised of the nature of the charges against him due to the insufficiency of the
Information.

This Court completely agrees with the Court of AppealsÕ pronouncement

that Òsince treachery was correctly alleged in the Information and duly established
by the prosecution, x x x [Asilan]Õs conviction for the crime of murder is
proper.Ó[50]

In any case, it is now too late for Asilan to assail the sufficiency of the
Information on the ground that there was failure to specifically allege therein how
treachery was carried out. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.- The

failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads
to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash
or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b),
(g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.

Moreover, in People v. Candaza,[51] this Court held that Ò[a]n Information

which lacks essential allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accused
fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured by
competent evidence presented therein.Ó[52] In this case, Asilan not only failed to
question the sufficiency of the Information at any time during the pendency of his
case before the RTC, he also allowed the prosecution to present evidence, proving
the elements of treachery in the commission of the offense. Asilan is thus deemed
to have waived any objections against the sufficiency of the Information.[53]

Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,[54] this Court is increasing the award of

civil indemnity from Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) to Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00), and the moral damages from Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00). Moreover, in
view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, an additional
award of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00), as exemplary damages, in
accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code,[55]should be awarded to the heirs
of Adovas.[56]

As to actual damages, AdovasÕs widow, Irene Adovas, presented the

receipts showing that she paid ₱25,224.00 to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital, Inc.,
as hospital expenses,[57] ₱35,000.00 to Marulas Memorial Homes,[58] and
₱20,000.00 to Funeraria Saranay as funeral expenses,[59] or a total of ₱80,224.00.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider that under Article
2206 of the Civil Code, Asilan is also liable for the loss of the earning capacity of
Adovas, and such indemnity should be paid to his heirs[60]:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-
delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity
shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death;

Irene Adovas testified[61] on the amount her husband received as police

officer and presented documentary evidence to show that Adovas, who was only
29 years old when he died, [62] earned ₱8,605.00 a month[63] at the time of his
death.

The following are the factors in computing the amount of damages

recoverable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased:

1) The number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be

computed. This is based on the formula (2/3 x 80 Ð age of the deceased at the time
of his death = life expectancy), which is adopted from the American Expectancy
Table of Mortality; and

2) The rate at which the losses sustained by the heirs of the deceased should
be fixed.[64]
 Net income is arrived at by deducting the amount of the victimÕs living
expenses from the amount of his gross income.[65] The loss of earning capacity of
Asilan is thus computed as follows:

Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income Ð living

expenses][66]
= 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income Ð
50% of gross annual income]
= 2/3 [80-29] x [₱103,260.00 Ð ₱51,630.00]
= 34 x ₱51,630.00
= ₱1,755,420.00

WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 25, 2009 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02686 is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as it
found accused-appellant Joseph Asilan y Tabornal guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of MURDER and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with MODIFICATION as to the damages. Asilan is hereby ordered to indemnify
the heirs of Randy Adovas y Pe-caat the following: (a) ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; (d) ₱80,224.00 as actual damages; (e) ₱1,755,420.00 as loss of earning
capacity; and (f) interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

*
Per Raffle dated April 11, 2012.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-25; penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal with Associate Justices Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente concurring.
[2]
Records, p. 1.
[3]
Id. at 4.
[4]
Id. at 13.
[5]
TSN, May 31, 2006, pp. 1-30.
[6]
CA rollo, pp. 155-156.
[7]
TSN, June 14, 2006, pp. 1-10.
[8]
Folder of Exhibits, p. 25.
[9]
CA rollo, pp. 92-112.
[10]
Id. at 97-98.
[11]
Records, pp. 76-95.
[12]
Id. at 94-95.
[13]
Id. at 91.
[14]
Id. at 92.
[15]
Id. at 93.
[16]
Id. at 92.
[17]
Id. at 93.
[18]
Id. at 98
[19]
Id. at 99-101
[20]
Id. at 105.
[21]
Rollo, p. 24.
[22]
Id. at 26-27.
[23]
CA rollo, p. 94.
[24]
Id. at 98-105.
[25]
Id. at 104-105.
[26]
People v. Obosa, 429 Phil. 522, 532-533 (2002).
[27]
Id. at 533.
[28]
Records, p. 94.
[29]
People v. Orio, 386 Phil. 786 (2000).
[30]
Id. at 796.
[31]
People v. Letigio, 335 Phil. 693, 705 (1997).
[32]
TSN, June 14, 2006, pp. 1-10.
[33]
People v. Albarido, 420 Phil. 235, 244 (2001).
[34]
Id.
[35]
Id. at 244-245.
[36]
CA rollo, p. 105.
[37]
People v. Aliben, 446 Phil. 349, 373 (2003).
[38]
People v. Agunias, 344 Phil. 467, 481 (1997).
[39]
Id. at 481-482.
[40]
People v. Barona, 380 Phil. 204 (2000).
[41]
Id. at 212-213.
[42]
CA rollo, p. 107.
[43]
People v. Isleta, 332 Phil. 410, 420 (1996).
[44]
373 Phil. 990 (1999).
[45]
Id. at 1010.
[46]
People v. Pidoy, 453 Phil. 221, 230 (2003).
[47]
CA rollo, p. 108.
[48]
People v. Lab-Eo, 424 Phil. 482, 497 (2002).
[49]
Id.
[50]
Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[51]
G.R. No. 170474, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 280.
[52]
Id. at 289.
[53]
Id.
[54]
People v. Asis, G.R. No. 177573, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 509, 530.
[55]
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
[56]
People v. Asis, supra note 54 at 531.
[57]
Folder of Exhibits, p. 31.
[58]
Id. at 32.
[59]
Id. at 33.
[60]
People v. Lagat, G.R. No. 187044, September 14, 2011.
[61]
TSN, July 10, 2006, p. 17.
[62]
Folder of Exhibits, p. 20.
[63]
Id. at 28.
[64]
People v. Lagat, G.R. No. 187044, September 14, 2011.
[65]
Id.
[66]
People v. Verde, 362 Phil. 305, 321 (1999).

G.R. No. 150917 September 27, 2006

ARTEMIO YADAO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For Review1 is the 18 April 2001 Decision2 and 13 November 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 19818, affirming in toto the 28 March 1996 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch
33, in Criminal Case No. 1042-BG.

Petitioner Artemio Yadao (Yadao) prays for the reversal of the decision finding him "guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide as charged in the information x x x," 5 defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code for the death of Deogracias Gundran (Gundran), and sentencing him to suffer the "indeterminate penalty
of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its maximum period, as
Minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor in its minimum period, as Maximum, x x x."6

On 21 April 1989, petitioner Yadao was charged with the crime of homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, for allegedly mauling one Deogracias Gundran, in an Information, 7 the accusatory
portion of which states:

That on or about the 1st day of October, (sic) 1989, in the Municipality of Bauang, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul one DEOGRACIAS
GUNDRAN, thereby inflicting upon said victim several injuries on the different parts of his body which
directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victims.

CONTRARY TO ART. 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1042-BG.

Upon arraignment, petitioner Yadao with assistance of a counsel de parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged.
Thus, trial ensued, with the prosecution presenting four witnesses, namely 1) Carmelita Limon,8 2) Teofilo
Gundran,9 3) Napoleon Estigoy10 and 4) Dr. Arturo Llavore,11 to establish petitioner Yadao's culpability beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

To counter the evidence abovementioned, the defense offered the testimonies of the following defense witnesses: 1)
petitioner Artemio Yadao, 2) Reynaldo Feratero,12 3) Dr. Magdalena Alambra,13 4) Calixto Chan14 and 5) Evelyn Uy,
as well as documentary evidence, i.e., the Autopsy Report of Dr. Alambra.

From a review of the record of the case, we cull the following established facts:

It was petitioner Yadao's birthday on 1 October 1988. As such, he had a few guests over at his house to help him
celebrate it. The guests included defense witnesses Reynaldo Feratero, Calixto Chan and Evelyn Uy. At around 9:00
a.m., petitioner Yadao noticed the victim, Gundran,15 albeit not invited, to be milling around with the guests and was
already drinking gin. At around 3:45 p.m. of the said day, while petitioner Yadao was sitting on one end of a bench,
the victim, who happened to be lying down on the other end of the same bench, suddenly stood up. Because no one
else was sitting on the middle, said bench tilted due to the weight of petitioner Yadao, thus, causing him to fall to the
ground. Upon seeing him fall to the ground, the victim went over to petitioner Yadao and began boxing him on the
stomach. Petitioner Yadao's wife tried to pacify her nephew but this merely enraged the latter who then got a can
opener and tried to stab petitioner Yadao with it. The latter deflected said attempt and delivered a slap on the face of
the victim in order to "knock some sense" into him. But because he was already intoxicated, as he had been drinking
since early that morning, the victim lost his balance, hit his head on the edge of a table and fell to the ground landing
on his behind. The other guest helped the victim to stand up and proceeded to show him to the door.

The victim, Gundran, left the house of petitioner Yadao, between 4:00 to 5:00 p.m., and proceeded to the house of
Carmelita Limon who was the sister of one of his friends. At that time, Limon was inside her house doing the laundry.
Upon seeing him, Limon noticed a one-inch in diameter lump on the victim's forehead. The victim told her that he
came from the birthday party of petitioner Yadao and that the latter "mauled" him. While she treated the "wound" with
"kutsay," an herb, the victim complained of pain on his breast/stomach area, the area where he claimed to have been
hit by petitioner Yadao.

Two days later, or on 3 October 1988, Teofilo Gundran, the father of the victim was informed by his granddaughter
that his son, the victim, was having difficulty breathing. Teofilo Gundran then proceeded to where the victim was,
which happened to be in his (the victim's) sister's house, a short distance away from Limon's house. When he got to
the house, Teofilo Gundran saw the victim sitting on an "arinola" gasping for breath. He then held the victim's two
hands until the latter expired.

On the same day that he died, the body of the victim was autopsied by Dr. Magdalena Alambra, Medical Specialist II
of the Rural Health Unit of Bauang, La Union. In her Autopsy Report, she made the following findings:

PERTINENT PHYSICAL FINDINGS:

1. Hematoma suboponeurotic layer of the scalp rt. Fronto parietal area 10 cm. in length and 9 cm. in width.

2. Fibrocaseous necrosis of the right lung with loss of lung parenchymal tissue and pleural adhesion of the
rt. Lateral wall of the chest.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardio respiratory arrest due to pulmonary tuberculosis. Far advanced with massive
pleural adhesion rt. side.16

During the trial of the case, Dr. Alambra testified for the defense. She stated under oath that immediately after the
death of the victim, she conducted the autopsy of the body of said victim; that during the procedure, she made an
internal, as well as external, examination of the body of the victim; that fibrocaseous meant that half of the victim's
lungs, the right one in particular, was already gone; that she was only told that the victim had been mauled and that
the latter became weak thereafter; that although a hematoma17 was present on the victim's forehead, she did not
consider it as the cause of death as hematoma alone will not cause the death of a person especially seven to eight
days later; and, that when she opened the skull of the victim to study the latter's brain, she did not see anything
unusual. Dr. Alambra then confirmed that the cause of death of the victim was cardio-respiratory arrest due to
pulmonary tuberculosis that was already so far advanced with massive pleural adhesions. On cross, however, she
stated that a person with only one lung left, with proper medication, would still be able to live normally.

Disbelieving that cardiac arrest secondary to Tuberculosis was the cause of death of his son; Teofilo Gundran had
the victim's body re-autopsied, this time by the National Bureau of Investigation. The re-autopsy was conducted by
Dr. Arturo G. Llavore, a Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Regional Office, San
Fernando, La Union, on 11 October 1991, or eight days after the first autopsy. 18 Dr. Llavore's autopsy report stated:

AUTOPSY REPORT NO. 88-26-LU

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Cadaver, embalmed.
 I. Abrasions: Frontal region, left side. 0.9 x 0.2 cm.; Arm, left, upper third, anterior aspect, 2.0 x 0.6 cm.;
Forearm, right, upper third, anteromedial aspect, 0.2 x 0.2 cm.; Elbow, left, posterior aspect, 0.6 x 0.4 cm.,
and right, posters-medial aspect, 2.0 x 0.5 cm. in size.

II. Hematoma, Scalp, Interstitial; Fronto-tempero-parietal region, right side, 13.0 x 10.0 cms., massive,
extensive; Frontal region, slightly to the right of the anterior medial line, 2.0 x 1.6 cms., mild; Occipital region,
mid-aspect, 8.0 x 2.3 cms, moderate.

III. Brain, markedly congested, with flattening and widening of gyri and narrowing of the sulci. Cerebral blood
vessels markedly engorged.

IV. Lungs, Left lung intact; right lung previously dissected. Cut sections showed areas of fibrosis at the right
lung (focal) surrounded by atelectatic and emphysematous changes, (Pleural Adhesions, right. - B-2)19

V. Other internal visceral organs, markedly congested.

VI. Stomach, with approximately 60 cc of dark brownish fluid.

*** end ***

CAUSE OF DEATH: CEREBRAL EDEMA, SEVERE, SECONDARY TO TRAUMATIC INJURIES; HEAD/

REMARKS: Pls. see pathology Report No. P-88-339. Old healed scars noted at Chest, anterior and lateral
aspects, right. Scalp incision, postmortem, extending from above left ear, over the superior midline and
down to the front of right ear, 36.0 cms. long. Postmortem incision, Y-shaped, extending from anterior
superior portion of Chest to abdominal area, lower quadrant, 53.0 cms. long.

During the trial, prosecution witness Dr. Llavore testified that the cause of death of the victim was the collective effect
of all the injuries sustained by the latter on the head. He explained that the forces that could have caused the injuries
to the victim's head were also the same forces that could have caused the edema or swelling of the victim's brain. He
illustrated further that a human fist applied with "sufficient" force on the fronto-temporo-parietalregion of the head
could cause an injury the same as that sustained by the victim on his forehead. Similarly, the injury found at the back
of the head of the victim could have been caused by an edge of a palm applied with sufficient force or it could have
been caused by hitting his head on the edge of a table as the shape of said injury is somewhat elongated. On cross
examination, Dr. Llavore admitted that he did the re-autopsy seven (7)20 days after the victim died but that his
Autopsy Report failed to indicate that the cadaver had previously been autopsied by another physician; that the blow
inflicted on the head of the victim was strong enough to have injured the "moorings" of the brain causing the
destruction of the brain cells and the shifting of the fluid in the skull to one side; that the most serious wound between
the two injuries sustained by the victim on the head is the one found on his right forehead; and that the process of
swelling became irreversible when the compression of the brain had caused its center to become "imbalanced," so
that the victim's brain ceased to function.

After trial, in a Decision21 promulgated on 28 March 1996, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner Yadao guilty
of the crime of homicide, and sentencing him as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide as charged in the information, and after considering two (2) mitigating circumstances,
hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision correccional in its maximum period, as Minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor in
its minimum period, as Maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00 for the
death of Deogracias Gundran and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC held that:

 After a careful consideration and examination of the testimonies of both medico-legal officers, this Court is
inclined to give more weight on the testimony of Dr. Arturo Llavore that the cause of death of Deogracias
Gundran was "cerebral edema, severe, secondary to traumatic injuries, head" and not "Cardio respiratory
Arrest due to pulmonary tuberculosis. It is to be noted that Dra. Magdalena Alambra testified and even
admitted that a person even if he has no (sic) lungs can still live. Hence, the injuries which the victim
Deogracias Gundran sustained on his head caused his death as he did not immediately undergo medical
treatment. And as testified to by Dr. Arturo Llavore x x x the blow inflicted was fatal or very serious that "if no
medical intervention is made, it will be untreated (sic)" (T.S.N., September 25, 1991, p. 38).

x x x [g]ranting for the sake of argument that accused Artemio Yadao did not maul the victim but only
slapped him slightly which caused him to fall down as he was very drunk, still accused is liable for the
consequences of his act.

xxxx

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "Criminal
liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. x x x "Pursuant to this provision, "an accused is criminally responsible
for the acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
there from". (sic) x x x.

xxxx

Under paragraph 1, Article 4, revised Penal Code, a person committing a felony is still criminally liable even
if – "x x x

(c) the injurious result is greater than that intended-prater-intentionem. x x x

Indeed the act of the accused in slapping the victim Deogracias Gundran causing the latter to fall down
hitting his head which caused his eventual death is something which the accused cannot escape. This Court
does not favor making conjectures but looking at the body built (sic) of the accused who is tall and sturdy as
compared to the body built (sic) of the victim who was described to be tall and lanky, it is not hard to believe
that accused did not know that natural and inevitable result of the act of slapping the victim, considering the
fact that accused even admitted that the victim was then very drunk.

Aggrieved, petitioner Yadao appealed the aforequoted decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, in
itsDecision22 of 18 April 2001, affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC. The fallo of Court of
Appeals decision states that:

WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, there being no reversible error but instead being
in accordance with law and evidence, the appealed Decision dated March 28, 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union (sic) is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner Yadao's ensuing motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 13
November 2001, seeing as no "new matters or issues raised in (the) Motion for Reconsideration x x x." 23

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner Yadao seeks the reversal of the decision of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Essentially, it is his contention that the evidence presented by the
prosecution was not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the crime of
homicide. He maintains that the existence of two autopsy reports entirely differing as to the cause of death of the
victim is tantamount to reasonable doubt respecting his legal culpability thereto. Particularly, he argues that:
 x x x [t]he trial court's finding "that the blow inflicted was fatal and very serious" is not in accord with the
physical manifestations of Gundran in going to and while in the house of Carmelita. It is a matter of human
experience that when a person is struck with a fatal or serious blow in the head to such an extent that his
brain becomes swollen with its moorings injured as found by Dr. Llavore in this case, such person will suffer
serious, disabling or painful consequences. Either he will be rendered comatose or unconscious or suffer
severe pain in the head.

xxxx

And although Limon noticed a lump in (sic) his forehead, Gundran did not complain of any pain in the head
and when asked what he felt he told Limon that he felt pain in his chest and stomach because that was
where he was mauled.

The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, asserts that:

It is clear from the record that Dr. Alambra failed to notice the brain injury sustained by the victim because
she merely relied on "gross findings" of said organ during her autopsy. After opening the skull, she merely
took a look at the brain, felt it, and found nothing unusual about the organ. She testified that she could not
conduct further laboratory examinations on the victim's brain for lack of facilities (citation omitted).

This circumstance indicates that the findings of the two (2) medico-legal experts, although inconsistent, are
not necessarily irreconcilable.

The threshold issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner
Yadao beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, especially Dr.
Llavore's, and documentary evidence presented, i.e., the Dr. Llavore's Autopsy Report.

The petition has merit.

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines and punishes the crime of homicide, viz:

ART. 249. Homicide. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, 24 shall kill another
without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be guilty
of homicide and be punished by reclusión temporal.

From the abovequoted provision of law, the elements of homicide are as follows: 1) a person was killed; and 2) the
accused killed him without any justifying circumstance; 3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed;
and 4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or
infanticide.25

The Constitution demands that every accused be presumed innocent until the charge is proved. Before an accused
can be convicted of any criminal act, his guilt must first be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 26 In this jurisdiction,
proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error;27 it is that
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy
upon the certainty of guilt.28

Basic is the principle in criminal law that the evidence presented must be sufficient to prove the corpus delicti – the
body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has been actually
committed.29 The corpus delicti is a compound fact composed of two things: 1) the existence of a certain act or
aresult forming the basis of the criminal charge, and 2) the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or
result.30 In all criminal prosecutions, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the body or substance of the crime. In
the case at bar, was the prosecution able to prove the two components of the corpus delicti?

We think not.
Though it was established that petitioner Yadao slapped the victim, and as a result of which the latter fell down and
struck his head on the edge of a table, the prosecution nonetheless failed to show the nexus between the injury
sustained by the victim and his death. It failed to discharge the burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
death of the victim resulted from the use of violent and criminal means by petitioner Yadao.

The fact that the victim herein was wounded is not conclusive that death resulted therefrom. To make an offender
liable for the death of the victim, it must be proven that the death is the natural consequence of the physical injuries
inflicted. If the physical injury is not the proximate cause 31 of death of the victim, then the offender cannot be held
liable for such death.

It has been established in this case that on the afternoon of 1 October 1988, at around 3:45 p.m., petitioner Yadao
slapped the victim once. This is based from the unrebutted testimonies of defense witnesses – the only eyewitnesses
to the assault. It is also undisputed that the victim died on 3 October 1988, or two days later. What is in dispute,
however, is the cause of the latter's death.

In convicting Petitioner Yadao, the RTC and the Court of Appeals principally relied upon the testimony of Dr. Llavore
in addition to the latter's autopsy report, both essentially stating that the injury sustained by the victim in the head
caused massive hematoma and/or cerebral edema. However, we find said testimonial and documentary evidence
utterly insufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction for homicide. To our mind, his testimony, as well as
the Autopsy Report containing his findings, vis-à-vis the first autopsy conducted by Dr. Alambra and the factual
circumstances surrounding the conduct of two autopsies done on said cadaver, do not engender a moral certainty,
much less a belief, that the injury sustained was the cause of his death. This Court's doubt is brought about by Dr.
Llavore's failure to account the effects of the following facts: 1) that the cadaver had previously been autopsied; 2)
that during the first autopsy, Dr. Alambra opened up the skull of the victim to physically examine his brain and did not
see anything out of the ordinary, neither blood clot and/or pooling nor any swelling; 3) that the cadaver of the victim
had already been embalmed; 4) that it had not been established for how long the embalming fluid was supposed to
stave off or delay the decomposition of the cadaver of the victim; 5) that the re-autopsy was conducted eight (8) days
after the death of the victim; 6) that when the cadaver of the victim was re-autopsied, decomposition may have
already set in despite the body having been embalmed; and 7) that the only hematoma noted inside of the cadaver's
head was that on the "suboponeurotic layer of the scalp rt. fronto parietal region," 32or "scalp, interstitial; Fronto-
temporo-parietal region, right side."33 In layman's terms, the hematoma, noted by both physicians, was merely on the
scalp, just below the skin, of the frontal right side of the head – nowhere near the brain as the area was still outside of
the skull. Even Dr. Llavore recognized such fact as clearly stated in his Autopsy Report and testified to in open
court, viz:

COURT:

Now, could you tell us – could you tell this Court what is the cause of that trauma?

xxxx

Witness:

A x x x the cause of the trauma on the head is physical contact as shown in paragraph 3, there were injuries
to these areas on the right side and actually there were two (2) and one (1) at the back of the head and the
force or violence that was applied to these areas caused the brain to move suddenly also and the
displacement of the substances, the brain substances, because the brain is very fragile, it is very soft, once
they are displaced from their place, because they move, there is breaking of very minute blood vessels – the
very minute blood vessels if the force is stronger, it could create breakage or rupture of larger blood vessels
which you can say grossly as hemorrhage, but in this case, there is no hemorrhage – there is no gross
hemorrhage, there is only minute blood vessels and since there is destruction of the very minute blood
vessels, they swell individually, they swell and collectively, the swelling becomes so great because it already
involves the whole brain and the brain becomes swollen, it expands, it tries to expand, but it cannot.
Therefore, it compresses in itself.

Consequently, the post mortem report and testimony of Dr. Alambra should not be easily discounted. The same is
significant in that the testimony and the report on the autopsy, which was done immediately after the death,
establishes the nature and extent of the "injury," sustained as a result of the assault, as well as the state of the brain
and the surrounding area at the time of death. The significance of said evidence will lead to the precise nature of the
injury sustained by the victim. From a legal perspective, therefore, the examination of a wound should lead to the
determination as to the degree of danger of the wound and the danger it poses to the life or bodily function of the
victim when the wound was inflicted.

Wharton and Stille's discussion on the importance of a thorough and painstaking post-mortem examination or
assessment of the degree of injury sustained by the victim is highly instructive, it reads:

x x x [a] careful post-mortem examination will usually show the violent cause of death, and it is the duty of
the physician whose opinion is desired, to make that examination most carefully, and to base his
opinion entirely upon the findings of this examination; not upon previous notions of the probable
nature and effects of the wound. Moreover, it is necessary not merely to make an examination of the
regions apparently involved in the injury, but also a thorough examination of the entire body; for,
notwithstanding the immediate cause of death may be evident, it is still advisable to be sure that there was
no cause of death in any other part. [Emphasis supplied.]

This Court recognizes the fact that the most critical aspect of head trauma is what happens to the brain; that the
immediate brain damage that results from head trauma is dependent upon the force applied to the head, the area of
its application, and whether the head is fixed or freely movable; that when viable tissue receives an application of
force strong enough to be injurious, it (the body) responds by alteration in intracellular and extracellular fluid content,
by extravasation of blood, by increasing blood supply to the local area, and by mobilization of cells capable of
removing cellular debris and repairing any disruption. 34 Moreover, it is acknowledged that tissues of the nervous
system, the brain being one of its components, and like any other tissue of the body, responds to injury by the
formation of edema or the retention of fluid.35 Hence, it is not quite farfetched that the victim may have had cerebral
edema as a result of the injury he sustained in the head. But just the same, such a conclusion, as stated in the
second post mortem report, does not necessarily preclude the fact that the swelling or edema noted in the tissues of
the brain may have been due to other factors i.e., such as decomposition or the fact that the cadaver of the victim had
already been embalmed. The foregoing uncertainty is all the more reinforced by the testimony of Dr. Alambra and her
findings stated in the First Autopsy Report stating that there were no signs of damage to the brain, external or
internal. This, by itself, is very much inconsistent with the allegation that the cerebral edema was the cause of death
of the victim, which if it were so, would have already been manifest at the time of death.

From a medical perspective, the abovediscussed issues are essentially significant and must be established first
before any correlation of the injury to the victim's cause of death is done. It is an established fact that during
decomposition, numerous cellular changes occur in the body. A microscopic examination of the tissues (of the body)
under the influence of "autolytic enzymes"36 enzymes shows disintegration, swelling or shrinkage, vacuolization and
formation of small granules within the cytoplasm of the cells. 37 Therefore, the swelling of the brain, along with the
other organs of the victim as stated in the Pathology Report38 by the NBI, which reads:

FINDINGS

MICROSCOPIC DESCRIPTIONS:

Brain (cerebral cortex): and cerebellum) : sections show markedly widened spaces in the virchow in the
white matter of the cerebrum and collapsed walls of the capillaries. Cloudy swelling of neurons and
interstitial edema, marked.

Kidneys: sections show focal infiltrations of chronic inflammatory cells in the interstitium accompanied by
tubular atrophy and glomeruler sclerosis. Cloudy swelling of tubules in the cortex, moderate. Medullary
congestion, moderate. The cerebellum shows

Liver: sections show moderate congestion of red blood cells in the sinusoids and cloudy swelling of liver
cells.

Lungs: sections show marked congestion of pulmonary septae exhibiting numerous macrophages
containing hemusiderin pigments. Alternating atelectatic and hyperinflated lung alveoli with emphysematous
and bullae formation can be noted. Fibrosis in diffuse in other areas with calcifications. The small bronchi
are irregularly dilated.
 Myocardium: congestion of capillaries and cloudy swelling of muscle fibers, moderate.

x x x x [Emphasis supplied.]

may have also been due to the decomposing state of the cadaver of the victim and not just that caused by the head
injury he sustained from the hands of petitioner Yadao.

Additionally, to delay the onset of decomposition, cadavers are embalmed. Embalming is the artificial way of
preserving the body after death by injecting 6 to 8 quarts of antiseptic solutions of formalin, perchloride or mercury or
arsenic, which is carried into the common carotid and the femoral arteries. 39 However, a dead body must not be
embalmed before the autopsy.40 The embalming fluid may render the tissue and blood unfit for toxicological
analyses.41 The embalming may alter the gross appearance of the tissues or may result to a wide variety of
artifacts that tend to destroy or obscure evidence.42 Thus, in the case at bar, even if the cadaver of the victim may
not have started decomposing at the time of the re-autopsy, all the same, the fact that such had already been
embalmed, any examination will likely lead to findings or conclusion not at all accurate as to the true status of the
tissues of the body of the victim.

From the above, absent further clarifications, Dr. Llavore's conclusion that the victim's cause of death is cerebral
edema is nothing but conjecture, being tenuous and flawed. Consequently, the findings as stated in said autopsy
report is not decisive of the of the issue of whether or not injury sustained by the victim in his head when he was
slapped by petitioner Yadao and/or when the victim hit his head on the edge of the table were the sole cause of the
cerebral edema observed in the latter's brain during the re-autopsy conducted eight (8) days after his death. Again, it
could have been caused by other factors, one of which could have been the decomposition or the breakdown of the
cellular tissues of the body naturally occurring after death, or the fact that the cadaver of the victim had already been
previously embalmed.

Dr. Llavore's testimony that the cause of death of the victim was the collective effect of the blow sustained by the
latter's head; that the blow was strong enough to have caused the displacement of the brain from its moorings and
the resultant swelling. Such conclusion was brought about by the doctor's external and internal examination of the
brain of the victim. The records of the case, however, is again bereft of any indication that the said inference or
conclusion took into account the fact that the cadaver of the victim had been previously autopsied, more importantly,
that his brain had been already been removed from its "moorings" by Dr. Alambra in order for her to take the same
out of the skull when she examined it.

Indeed, the evidence of the defense might not, by itself, suffice to emphatically negate the causal relationship
between the actions of petitioner Yadao causing injury to the victim and the cause of his death, but the same must be
considered in conjunction with the weakness of the evidence given by the prosecution's witness discussed above.
Defense witness Dr. Alambra's Autopsy Report, on top of her testimony that upon opening the skull of the victim, she
found nothing out of the ordinary in the brain, tend to reinforce the doubt already engendered by the weakness of the
prosecution's evidence about the fundamental correlation of the injury and the cause of death. It was incumbent upon
the prosecution to demonstrate petitioner Yadao's culpability beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of whatever
the defense has offered to exculpate the latter. Conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's evidence,
not merely on conjectures or suppositions, and certainly not on the weakness of the accused's defense; otherwise,
the phrase "constitutional presumption of innocence" will be reduced to nothing but an innocuous grouping of words;
worse, to a conspicuous exercise in futulity. As a rule, findings of fact of trial courts are accorded great weight, even
finality, on appeal, unless the trial court has failed to appreciate certain facts and circumstances that, if taken into
account, would materially affect the result of the case.43 In this case, prescinding from the above discussion, it is
arrantly manifest that the RTC, as well as the Court of Appeals, overlooked material and relevant facts that could
affect the outcome of the case. The constitutional presumption of innocence aforementioned requires us to take "a
more than casual consideration" of every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused as court have
the imperative duty to "put prosecution evidence under severe testing." 44

The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not
synonymous with guilt.45 The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment.46 If the evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted.47The
overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.48 If there exist even one iota of doubt, this Court is "under a long standing legal
injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of herein accused-petitioner."49
From the foregoing, the inevitable conclusion is that the guilt of petitioner Yadao has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The facts of the case, the autopsy reports, as well as the testimony of Dr. Llavore do not definitely
establish that the assault was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that the blow inflicted on the head of the victim resulted in an edematous condition of the brain, petitioner
Yadao would still not be held liable for the death as the prosecution failed to present proof that said act was
the efficient and proximate cause of the victim's demise. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even
though the accused's innocence may be doubted.50 It is better to free a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one
whose guilt has not been proved by the required quantum of evidence. For only when there is proof beyond any
shadow of doubt that those responsible should be made answerable. 51

The heirs of the victim, however, have not completely lost their case. Settled in jurisprudence is the principle that a
court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil damages in the same case. 52 In this
case, though petitioner Yadao is acquitted, nonetheless, his liability for damages is not considered extinguished since
the judgment of acquittal is not based on a pronouncement that the facts from which civil claims might arise did not
exist. Accordingly, this Court awards P50,000.00 as civil damages to the heirs of the victim.

WHEREFORE, the 28 March 1996 Decision of the Regional Tial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, as well as
the 18 April 2001 Decision and 13 November 2001 Resolution both of the Court of Appeals are
herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Artemio Yadao is ACQUITTED of the charge of homicide on the
ground of reasonable doubt. His immediate release from custody is hereby ordered unless he is being held for other
lawful causes. However, Petitioner Artemio Yadao is ordered to pay the heirs of victim Deogracias Gundran in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Chairman, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.

Footnotes

1 Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

2Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole with Associate Justices Fermin A.
Martin, Jr. and Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos concurring; Annex "A" of the Petition; rollo, pp. 52-64.

3 Annex "C" of the Petition; rollo, p. 79.

4Penned by Hon. Fortunato V. Panganiban, Presiding Judge, RTC Bauang, La Union, Branch 33; Annex "D"
of the Petition; rollo, pp. 80-97.

5 Dispositve of the RTC Decision, p. 18; rollo, p. 97.

6
Id.

7 Records, p. 2.

8 42 yr. old resident of Dili, Bauang, La Union; she testified that Gundran is considered a close family friend,
the latter being a "kabarkada" of her brother.

9
The father of the victim.

10 Local Civil Registrar of San Fernando, La Union.

11
The NBI physician who conducted the 2nd autopsy on the body of the victim.
12
A guest at petitioner Yadao's birthday party.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Deogracias Gundran happened to be a nephew of petitioner Yadao's wife.

16
Records, pp. 43-45.

17 Hematoma is the extravasation or effusion of blood in a newly formed cavity underneath the skin. It usually
develops when the blunt instrument is applied in part of the body where bony tissue is superficially located,
like the head, chest and anterior aspect of the legs. The force applied causes the subcutaneous tissue to
rupture on account of the presence of a hard structure underneath. The destruction of the subcutaneous
tissue will lead to the accumulation of blood causing it to elevate.

18 Records, p. 12.

19 Handwritten by Dr. Llavore.

20 It was actually eight days after the first autopsy, or on 11 October 1988.

21 Supra at note 4.

22
Supra at note 2.

23
Supra at note 3.

24
The article in the RPC defining and punishing the crime of parricide.

25 L. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book Two, p. 470 (15th ed., 2001).

26
Calimutan v. People, G.R. No. 152133, 9 February 2006, 482 SCRA 44, 57.

27 REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Section 2.

28
People v. Dramayo, 149 Phil. 107, 112-113 (1971).

29 R. Francisco, BASIC EVIDENCE, p. 38 of the Supplement (1999).

30 23 C.J.S. 264.

31Proximate cause is that cause, which in natural and continuous sequence of events, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces injury or death, and without which the result would not have occurred.

32 Dr. Alambra's autopsy report.

33 Dr. Llavore's autopsy report.

34 S. I. Schwartz, et al., PRINCIPLES OF SURGERY, p. 1787 (4th ed., 1984).

35 Id. at 1790.
 36
Enzymes that digests the cell in which it is produced, usually marking the death of the cell. It is produced
during autolysis – the process by which a cell, in dying tissues, self destructs (the cell then, in effect, digests
itself).

37 Id. at 136.

38 By NBI pathologist Dr. Nieto M. Salvador; Records, p. 182.

39 P. Solis, LEGAL MEDICINE, p. 220 (Revised ed., 1987).

40 Id. at 169.

41
Id.

42
Id.

43 People v. Batidor, 362 Phil. 673, 681-682 (1999).

44 People v. Bautista, 368 Phil. 100, 120 (1999).

45 Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 150439, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 190, 215.

46 People v. Mejia, 341 Phil. 118, 145 (1997).

47 People v. Manambit, 338 Phil. 57, 100 (1997).

48 People v. Vasquez, 345 Phil. 380, 399 (1997).

49 Supra at note 43.

50
People v. Fronda, 384 Phil. 732, 743 (2000).

51
People v. Vidal, G.R. No. 90419, 1 June 1999, 308 SCRA 1.

52 Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39999, 31 May 1984.

G.R. No. 198400 October 7, 2013

FE ABELLA y PERPETUA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 from the Decision2 and Resolution3 dated October 26, 2010 and August 11,
2011, respectively, of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00336-MIN affirming with modifications the
conviction4 by the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 39 of Fe Abella y
Perpetua petitioner) for the crime of frustrated homicide committed against his younger brother, Benigno Abella
Benigno). The RTC sentenced the petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six 6) years and one 1) day to eight
8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to ten 10) years and one 1) day to twelve 12) years of prision mayor as
maximum, and to pay Benigno ₱100,000.00 as consequential damages, ₱10,000.00 for the medical expenses he
incurred, plus the costs of suit.5 The CA concurred with the RTC’s factual findings. However, the CA modified the
penalty imposed to six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as maximum. The CA also deleted the RTC’s award in
favor of Benigno of (a) ₱10,000.00 as actual damages corresponding to the medical expenses allegedly incurred; and
(b) ₱100,000.00 as consequential damages. In lieu of the preceding, the CA ordered the petitioner to pay Benigno
₱30,000.00 as moral damages and ₱10,000.00 as temperate damages. 6

Antecedent Facts

On October 7, 1998, the petitioner, who at times worked as a farmer, baker and trisicad driver, was charged with
frustrated homicide in an Information7 which reads:

That on or about September 6, 1998, at 11:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any
justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to kill, attack, assault, harm
and hack one, BENIGNO ABELLA y PERPETUA, with the use of a scythe, hitting the latter’s neck, thereby inflicting
the injury described below, to wit:

• hacking wound left lateral aspect neck; and

• incised wound left hand dorsal aspect thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause or
causes independent of the will of the accused, that is the timely and able intervention of the medical
attendance rendered to the said victim.

Contrary to Article 249 in relation to 250 of the RPC.8

After the Information was filed, the petitioner remained at large and was only arrested by agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation on October 7, 2002.9

During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Pre-trial and trial thus proceeded.

The Prosecution offered the testimonies of: (a) Benigno;10 (b) Amelita Abella11 (Amelita), Benigno’s wife; (c) Alejandro
Tayrus12 (Alejandro), with whom the petitioner had a quarrel; and (d) Dr. Roberto Ardiente13 (Dr. Ardiente), a surgeon
from J.R. Borja Memorial Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, who rendered medical assistance to Benigno after the latter
was hacked by the petitioner.

The Prosecution evidence established that on September 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m., Benigno was watching
television in his house. A certain Roger Laranjo arrived and asked Benigno to pacify the petitioner, who was stirring
trouble in a nearby store. Benigno and Amelita found the petitioner fighting with Alejandro and a certain Dionisio
Ybañes (Dionisio). Benigno was able to convince the petitioner to go home. Benigno and Amelita followed suit and
along the way, they dropped by the houses of Alejandro and Dionisio to apologize for the petitioner’s conduct.

Benigno and Amelita were in Alejandro’s house when the petitioner arrived bringing with him two scythes, one in
each of his hands. Benigno instructed Alejandro and Dionisio to run away and the latter two complied. The petitioner
wanted to enter Alejandro’s house, but Benigno blocked his way and asked him not to proceed. The petitioner then
pointed the scythe, which he held in his left hand, in the direction of Benigno’s stomach, while the scythe in the right
hand was used to hack the latter’s neck once.14 Benigno fell to the ground and was immediately taken to the
hospital15 while the petitioner ran to chase Alejandro.16 Benigno incurred an expense of more than ₱10,000.00 for
hospitalization, but lost the receipts of his bills.17 He further claimed that after the hacking incident, he could no longer
move his left hand and was thus deprived of his capacity to earn a living as a carpenter. 18

Dr. Ardiente testified that Benigno sustained: (a) a "hacking wound left lateral aspect neck 11 cm"; and (b) an "incised
wound left hand dorsal aspect 4 cm".19 Benigno was initially confined in the hospital on September 6, 1998 and was
discharged on September 23, 1998.20 From Dr. Ardiente’s recollection, since the scythe used in the hacking was not
sterile, complications and infections could have developed from the big and open wounds sustained by Benigno, but
fortunately did not.21
The defense offered the testimonies of: (a) the petitioner; 22 (b) Fernando Fernandez23 (Fernando), a friend of the
petitioner; and (c) Urbano Cabag24 (Urbano).

The petitioner relied on denial and alibi as defenses. He claimed that from September 2, 1998 to October 2002, he
and his family resided in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City, where the hacking
incident occurred, is about four (4) hours drive away. Fernando testified that on September 6, 1998, he saw the
petitioner gathering woods to make a hut.25 Later in the evening, at around 5:00 p.m., Urbano spotted the petitioner
drinking tuba in the store of Clarita Perpetua.26

The RTC Ruling

On July 13, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime charged. The fallo of the Judgment 27 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to prove the
guilt of the [petitioner] beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is rendered finding petitioner Fe Abella GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide as defined and penalized by Article 249 in relation to Article 50
and Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, petitioner Fe Abella is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to Ten (10)
years and One (1) day to Twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum; to indemnify offended-party complainant
Benigno Abella the sum of Ten Thousand ([P]10,000.00) Pesos for the medical expenses incurred; to pay the sum of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ([P]100,000.00) PESOS as consequential damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.28

The RTC found the petitioner’s defenses of alibi and denial as weak. No disinterested witnesses were presented to
corroborate the petitioner’s claim that he was nowhere at the scene of the hacking incident on September 6, 1998.
Fernando and Urbano’s testimonies were riddled with inconsistencies. The RTC accorded more credence to the
averments of the prosecution witnesses, who, without any ill motives to testify against the petitioner, positively,
categorically and consistently pointed at the latter as the perpetrator of the crime. Besides, medical records show that
Benigno sustained a wound in his neck and his scar was visible when he testified during the trial.

The RTC awarded ₱10,000.00 as actual damages to Benigno for the medical expenses he incurred despite the
prosecution’s failure to offer receipts as evidence. The petitioner was likewise ordered to pay ₱100,000.00 as
consequential damages, but the RTC did not explicitly lay down the basis for the award.

The petitioner then filed an appeal29 before the CA primarily anchored on the claim that the prosecution failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence the existence of intent to kill which accompanied the single hacking blow made on
Benigno’s neck. The petitioner argued that the hacking was merely accidental especially since he had no motive
whatsoever which could have impelled him to hurt Benigno, and that the infliction of merely one wound negates intent
to kill.

The CA Ruling

On October 26, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision 30 affirming the petitioner’s conviction for the
crime of frustrated homicide ratiocinating that:

Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission
of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed;
and (e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.

Here, the intent to kill was sufficiently proven by the Prosecution. The petitioner attacked Benigno with deadly
weapons, two scythes. The petitioner’s blow was directed to the neck of Benigno. The attack on the unarmed and
unsuspecting Benigno was swift and sudden. The latter had no means, and no time, to defend himself.

Dr. Roberto Ardiente, Jr., who attended and issued the Medical Certificate, testified that Benigno suffered from a hack
wound on the left neck, and an incised wound on the left hand palm. He said that the wounds might have been
caused by a sharp, pointed and sharp-edged instrument, and may have resulted to death without proper medical
attendance. Benigno was hospitalized for about a month because of the injuries. The location of the wound (on the
neck) shows the nature and seriousness of the wound suffered by Benigno. It would have caused his death, had it
not been for the timely intervention of medical science.31 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

However, the CA modified the sentence to "imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as
maximum."32 The CA explained that:

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for the crime of consummated homicide is reclusion
temporal , or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Under Article 50 of the same Code, the penalty
for a frustrated crime is one degree lower than that prescribed by law. Thus, frustrated homicide is punishable by
prision mayor , or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from
the medium period of prision mayor . To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, prision mayor should
be reduced by one degree, which is prision correccional , with a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty may be taken from the full range of prision correccional. 33 (Citation
omitted)

The CA also deleted the RTC’s order for the payment of actual and consequential damages as there were no
competent proofs to justify the awards. The CA instead ruled that Benigno is entitled to ₱30,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱10,000.00 as temperate damages,34 the latter being awarded when some pecuniary loss has been
incurred, but the amount cannot be proven with certainty. 35

Issue

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari36 anchored on the issue of whether or not the RTC and the CA
erred in rendering judgments which are not in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence and which if not
corrected, will cause grave injustice and irreparable damage to the petitioner. 37

In support thereof, the petitioner avers that the courts a quo failed to appreciate relevant facts, which if considered,
would justify either his acquittal or the downgrading of his conviction to less serious physical injuries. The petitioner
points out that after the single hacking blow was delivered, he ran after Alejandro and Dionisio leaving Benigno
behind. Had there been an intent to kill on his part, the petitioner could have inflicted more wounds since at that time,
he had two scythes in his hands. Further, the CA erred in finding that the hacking blow was sudden and unexpected,
providing Benigno with no opportunity to defend himself. Benigno saw the petitioner arriving with weapons on hand.
Benigno could not have been unaware of the danger facing him, but he knew that the petitioner had no intent to hurt
him. Benigno thus approached the petitioner, but in the process, the former was accidentally hit with the latter’s
scythe.

The petitioner also cites Pentecostes, Jr. v. People38 where this Court found the downgrading of a conviction from
attempted murder to physical injuries as proper considering that homicidal intent was absent when the accused shot
the victim once and did not hit a vital part of the latter’s body. 39

Further, as per Dr. Ardiente’s testimony, no complications resulted from Benigno’s hacking wound in the neck and
incised wound in the hand. Such being the case, death could not have resulted. The neck wound was not "so
extensive because it did not involve a big blood vessel on its vital structure" while the incised wound in the hand,
which only required cleansing and suturing, merely left a slight scarring. 40 Besides, Benigno was only confined for
seventeen (17) days at the hospital and the injuries he sustained were in the nature of less serious ones.

In its Comment,41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the dismissal of the instant petition. The OSG
stresses that the petitioner raises factual issues, which call for a re-calibration of evidence, hence, outside the ambit
of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the petitioner’s argument that the development of
infections or complications on the wounds is a necessary factor to determine the crime committed is specious. The
petitioner’s intent to kill Benigno can be clearly inferred from the nature of the weapon used, the extent of injuries
inflicted and the circumstances of the aggression. Benigno could have died had there been no timely medical
assistance rendered to him.

If it were the petitioner’s wish to merely get Benigno out of the way to be able to chase Alejandro and Dionisio, a kick,
fist blow, push, or the use of a less lethal weapon directed against a non-vital part of the body would have been
sufficient. However, the petitioner hacked Benigno’s neck with an unsterile scythe, leaving behind a big, open and
gaping wound.

This Court’s Ruling

The instant petition raises factual issues which are beyond the scope of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

Century Iron Works, Inc. and Benito Chua v. Eleto B. Bañas42 is instructive anent what is the subject of review in a
petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, viz:

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal from a ruling of a lower tribunal on pure questions of law.
It is only in exceptional circumstances that we admit and review questions of fact.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question
of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the
question must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it
is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.43 (Citations
omitted)

In the case at bar, the challenge is essentially posed against the findings of the courts a quo that the petitioner had a
homicidal intent when he hacked Benigno’s neck with a scythe and that the wounds the latter sustained could have
caused his death had there been no prompt medical intervention. These questions are patently factual in nature
requiring no less than a re-calibration of the contending parties’ evidence.

It is settled that the general rule enunciated in Century Iron Works, Inc. and Benito Chua admits of exceptions, among
which is, "when the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts or a failure to notice certain
relevant facts that would otherwise justify a different conclusion x x x." 44 However, the factual backdrop and
circumstances surrounding the instant petition do not add up to qualify the case as falling within the exceptions.

Even if this Court were to be exceptionally liberal and allow a review of factual issues, still, the instant petition is
susceptible to denial.

To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt:
(1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the
accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the
acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical
intervention or attendance.45

In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s life. The prosecution has
to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill
is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of
wounds he inflicted on his victim.46

The petitioner now wants to impress upon this Court that he had no motive to attack, much less kill Benigno. The
petitioner likewise invokes the doctrine in Pentecostes, Jr. 47 to argue that homicidal intent is absent in a case where
the accused shot the victim only once when there was an opportunity to do otherwise. The petitioner belabors his
claim that had he intended to kill Benigno, he could have repeatedly hacked him to ensure the latter’s death, and not
leave right after the blow to chase Alejandro instead.

The analogy is flawed.

In Pentecostes, Jr., the victim was shot only once in the arm, a non vital part of the body. The attending physician
certified that the injury would require medical attendance for ten days, but the victim was in fact promptly discharged
from the hospital the following day.
In Benigno’s case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the neck and a 4-cm long incised wound in
his left hand caused by the unsterile scythe used by the petitioner. Dr. Ardiente testified that "it is possible to have
complications resulting from these injuries because the wounds were extensive and they were big and they were
open wounds, so there is a possibility of infections resulting from these kinds of wounds, and the instrument used
was not a sterile instrument contaminated with other things." 48 No complications developed from Benigno’s wounds
which could have caused his death, but he was confined in the hospital for a period of 17 days from September 6,
1998 to September 23, 1998.

From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the use of a scythe against Benigno’s
neck was determinative of the petitioner’s homicidal intent when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require
imagination to figure out that a single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to decapitate
a person and leave him dead. While no complications actually developed from the gaping wounds in Benigno’s neck
and left hand, it perplexes logic to conclude that the injuries he sustained were potentially not fatal considering the
period of his confinement in the hospital. A mere grazing injury would have necessitated a lesser degree of medical
attention.

This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioner’s claim that an intent to kill is negated by the fact that he
pursued Alejandro instead and refrained from further hacking Benigno. What could have been a fatal blow was
already delivered and there was no more desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die from the hacking incident by
reason of a timely medical intervention provided to him, which is a cause independent of the petitioner’s will. 1âwphi1

All told, this Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the RTC’s conviction of the petitioner of
the crime charged.

The Court modifies the award of damages.

As to the civil liability of the petitioner, the CA was correct in deleting the payment of the consequential damages
awarded by the trial court in the absence of proof thereof. Where the amount of actual damages cannot be
determined because of the absence of supporting receipts but entitlement is shown by the facts of the case,
temperate damages may be awarded.49 In the instant case, Benigno certainly suffered injuries, was actually
hospitalized and underwent medical treatment. Considering the nature of his injuries, it is prudent to award temperate
damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00, in lieu of actual damages. 50

Furthermore, we find that Benigno is entitled to moral damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00. 51 There is sufficient
basis to award moral damages as ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that such wounds inflicted
on Benigno would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injury. 52

WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated October 26, 2010 and August 11
2011, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00336-MIN are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
The petitioner, Fe Abella y Perpetua is ORDERED TO PAY the offended party moral damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00 and temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00. Further, the monetary awards for damages shall
be subject to interest at the legal rate of six percent ( 6%) p r annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.53

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Acting member per Special Order No 1545 Revised, dated September 16, 2013.

1 Rollo pp. 11-31.

2Penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello
and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring; CA rolla pp. 74-82.

3
Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices Abraham B. Borreta and
Melchor Quirino C. Sadang, concurring; id. at 112-116.

4 Issued by Judge Downey C. Valdevilla, id. at 31-43.

5
Id. at 43.

6
Id. at 81.

7 Original Records, p. 1-2.

8 Id. at 1.

9 Id. at 10.

10 TSN, February 20, 2003, pp. 2-20.

11 TSN, January 23, 2003, pp. 2-21.

12 Id. at 21-35.

13 TSN, May 12, 2003, pp. 3-12.

14 TSN, January 23, 2003, pp. 9, 17.

15 Id. at 13-14.

16
Id. at 17-18.

17
CA rollo, p. 33.
18
Id.

19TSN, May 12, 2003, p. 7; see also Medical Certificate and Clinical Cover Sheet, Original Records, pp. 69-
70.

20
Original Records, p. 70; TSN, May 12, 2003, p. 9.

21 TSN, May 12, 2003, pp. 9-11.

22 TSN, April 26, 2004, pp. 1-26.

23 TSN, January 22, 2004, pp. 1-32.

24 TSN, October 27, 2004, pp. 1-27.

25 TSN, January 22, 2004, p. 13.

26 TSN, October 27, 2004, pp. 5-6.

27
CA rollo, pp. 31-43.

28 Id. at 43.

29 Id. at 19-30.

30 Id. at 74-82.

31
Id. at 79-80.

32 Id. at 81.

33 Id. at 80.

34 Id. at 81.

35
Id., citing Premiere Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, 471 Phil. 704, 719 (2004).

36 Rollo, pp. 11-31.

37 Id. at 19.

38 G. R. No. 167766, April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 504.

39 Id. at 516-517.

40 Rollo, pp. 25-27.

41 CA rollo, pp. 129-150.

42 G. R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013.

43 Id.
 44
Rollo, p. 20, citing Fuentes v. CA, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168 (1997).

45People v. Badriago, G.R. No. 183566, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 820, 832, citing SPO1 Nerpio v. People,
555 Phil. 87, 94 (2007); People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 176385, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 671, 695.

Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 266, 275-276, citing People v.
46

Pagador, 409 Phil. 338, 351 (2001); Rivera v. People, 515 Phil. 824, 832 (2006).

47 Supra note 38.

48 TSN, May 12, 2003, p. 9.

49Esqueda v. People, G.R. No. 170222, June 18, 2009 589 SCRA 489, 512-513; Article 2224 of the CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES provides: "Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal
but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the Court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty."

50 Esqueda v. People, id; Serrano v. People, G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 20 0, 623 SCRA 322, 341.

People of the Philippines v. Rodel Lanuza y Bagaoisan, G.R. No. 188562, August 17, 2011; People of the
51

Philippines v. Jesus Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2 2009 580 SCRA 436.

52 Esqueda v. People, supra note 49, at 513.

53 Please see People of the Philippines v. Jonathan Uto Veloso Rama, G.R. No. 188849, February 13, 2013.

ARTEMIO YADAO, G. R. No. 150917

Petitioner,

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

PEOPLE OF Promulgated:
THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondent. September 27, 2006
x----------------------------------------x

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For Review [ 1 ] is the 18 April 2001 Decision [ 2] and 13 November
2001 Resolution [ 3 ] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19818,
affirming in toto the 28 March 1996 Decision [ 4] of the Regional Trial
Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 1042 -
BG.

Petitioner Artemio Yadao (Yadao) prays for the reversal of the

decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide as charged in the information x x x, [ 5] defined and penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code for the death
of Deogracias Gundran (Gundran), and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its maximum period, as
Minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor in its minimum
period, as Maximum, x x x. [ 6 ]
On 21 April 1989, petitioner Yadao was charged with the crime
of homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La
Union, Branch 33, for allegedly mauling one Deogracias Gundran,
in an Information, [ 7] the accusatory portion of which states:

That on or about the 1 s t day of October, (sic) 1989, in the

Municipalit y of Bauang, Province of La Union, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above -named
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfull y, unlawfull y
and feloniousl y attack, assau lt and maul one DEOGRACIAS
GUNDRAN, thereby inflicting upon said victim several injuries on
the different parts of his body which directl y caused his death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victims.

CONTRARY TO ART. 249 of the Revised Pena l Code.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1042 -BG.

Upon arraignment, petitioner Yadao with assistance of a

counsel de parte, pleaded Not Guilty to the crime charged. Thus, trial
ensued, with the prosecution presenting four witnesses, namely 1)
Carmelita Limon, [ 8 ] 2) Teofilo Gundran, [ 9 ] 3) Napoleon Estigoy [ 1 0 ] and
4) Dr. Arturo Llavore, [ 1 1 ] to establish petitioner Yadaos culpability
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

To counter the evidence abovementioned, the defense offered

the testimonies of the following defense witnesses: 1)
petitioner Artemio Yadao, 2) Reynaldo Feratero, [ 1 2 ] 3) Dr.
Magdalena Alambra, [ 1 3 ] 4) Calixto Chan [ 1 4 ] and 5) Evelyn Uy, as
well as documentary evidence, i.e., the Autopsy Report of
Dr. Alambra.

From a review of the record of the case, we cull the following

established facts:

It was petitioner Yadaos birthday on 1 October 1988. As such, he had

a few guests over at his house to help him celebrate it. The guests
included defense witnesses Reynaldo Feratero, Calixto Chan and
Evelyn Uy. At around 9:00 a.m., petitioner Yadao noticed the
victim, Gundran, [ 15 ] albeit not invited, to be milling around with the
guests and was already drinking gin. At around 3:45 p.m. of the said
day, while petitioner Yadao was sitting on one end of a bench, the
victim, who happened to be lying down on the other end of the same
bench, suddenly stood up. Because no one else was sitting on the
middle, said bench tilted due to the weight of petitioner Yadao, thus,
causing him to fall to the ground. Upon seeing him fall to the ground,
the victim went over to petitioner Yadao and began boxing him on the
stomach. Petitioner Yadaos wife tried to pacify her nephew but this
merely enraged the latter who then got a can opener and tried to stab
petitioner Yadao with it. The latter deflected said attempt and
delivered a slap on the face of the victim in or der to knock some sense
into him. But because he was already intoxicated, as he had been
drinking since early that morning, the victim lost his balance, hit his
head on the edge of a table and fell to the ground landing on his
behind. The other guest helped the victim to stand up and proceeded to
show him to the door.

The victim, Gundran, left the house of petitioner Yadao,

between 4:00 to 5:00 p.m., and proceeded to the house of Carmelita
Limon who was the sister of one of his friends. At that time, Limon
was inside her house doing the laundry. Upon seeing him, Limon
noticed a one-inch in diameter lump on the victims forehead. The
victim told her that he came from the birthday party of
petitioner Yadao and that the latter mauled him. While she treated the
wound with kutsay, an herb, the victim complained of pain on his
breast/stomach area, the area where he claimed to have been hit by
petitioner Yadao.

Two days later, or on 3 October 1988, Teofilo Gundran, the

father of the victim was informed by his granddaughter that his son,
the victim, was having difficulty breathing. Teofilo Gundran then
proceeded to where the victim was, which happened to be in his (the
victims) sisters house, a short distance away from Limons house.
When he got to the house, Teofilo Gundran saw the victim sitting on
an arinola gasping for breath. He then held the victims two hands until
the latter expired.

On the same day that he died, the body of the victim was
autopsied by Dr. Magdalena Alambra, Medical Specialist II of the
Rural Health Unit ofBauang, La Union. In her Autopsy Report, she
made the following findings:

PERTINENT PHYSICAL FINDINGS:

1. Hematoma suboponeurotic layer of the scalp rt. Fronto parietal

area 10 cm. in length and 9 cm. in width.

2. Fibrocaseous necrosis of the right lung with loss of

lung parenchymal tissue and pleural adhesion of the rt.
Lateral wall of the chest.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardio respiratory arrest due to pulmonary

tuberculosis. Far advanced with massive pleural adhesi on rt.
side. [ 1 6 ]
During the trial of the case, Dr. Alambra testified for the
defense. She stated under oath that immediately after the death of
the victim, she conducted the autopsy of the body of said victim;
that during the procedure, she made an internal, as well as
external, examination of the body of the victim;
thatfibrocaseous meant that half of the victims lungs, the right one
in particular, was already gone; that she was only told that the
victim had been mauled and that the latter became weak
thereafter; that although a hematoma [ 1 7 ] was present on the
victims forehead, she did not consider it as the cause of death
as hematoma alone will not cause the death of a person especially
seven to eight days later; and, that when she opened the skull of
the victim to study the latters brain, she did not see anything
unusual. Dr. Alambra then confirmed that the cause of death of the
victim was cardio-respiratory arrest due to pulmonary
tuberculosis that was already so far advanced with massive pleural
adhesions. On cross, however, she st ated that a person with only
one lung left, with proper medication, would still be able to live
normally.

Disbelieving that cardiac arrest secondary to Tuberculosis

was the cause of death of his son; Teofilo Gundran had the victims
body re-autopsied, this time by the National Bureau of
Investigation. The re-autopsy was conducted by Dr. Arturo
G. Llavore, a Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Regional Office, San Fernando, La Union, on 11
October 1991, or eight days after the first
autopsy. [ 1 8 ] Dr. Llavoresautopsy report stated:

AUTOPSY REPORT NO. 88-26-LU

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Cadaver, embalmed.
 I. Abrasions: Frontal region,
left, upper third, anterior aspect,
upper third, anteromedial aspect,
posterior aspect, 0.6 x 0.4 cm., and
x 0.5 cm. in size.
left side. 0.9 x 0.2 cm.; Arm,
2.0 x 0.6 cm.; Forearm, right,
0.2 x 0.2 cm.; Elbow, left,
right, posters -medial aspect, 2. 0

II. Hematoma, Scalp, Interstitial; Fronto-tempero-

parietal region, right side, 13.0 x 10.0 cms., massive, extensive;
Frontal region, slightl y to the right of the anterior medial line, 2.0 x
1.6 cms., mild; Occipital region, mid-aspect, 8.0 x 2.3 cms,
moderate.

III. Brain, markedl y congested, with flattening and widening

of gyri and narrowing of the sulci. Cerebral blood vessels markedl y
engorged.

IV. Lungs, Left lung intact; right lung previousl y

dissected. Cut sectio ns showed areas of fibrosis at the right lung
(focal) surrounded by atelectatic and emphysematous changes,
(Pleural Adhesions, right. - B-2) [ 1 9 ]

V. Other internal visceral organs, markedly congested.

VI. Stomach, with approximatel y 60 cc of dark brownish

fluid.

*** end ***

CAUSE OF DEATH: CEREBRAL EDEMA, SEVERE, SECONDARY

TO TRAUMATIC INJURIES; HEAD/

REMARKS: Pls. see pathology Report No. P-88-339. Old healed

scars noted at Chest, anterior and lateral aspects, right. Scalp
incision, postmortem, extending from above left ear, over the
superior midline and down to the front of right ear,
36.0 cms. long. Postmortem incision, Y -shaped, extending from
 anterior superior portion of Chest to abdominal area, lower
quadrant, 53.0 cms. long.

During the trial, prosecution witness Dr. Llavore testified that

the cause of death of the victim was the collective effect of all the
injuries sustained by the latter on the head. He explained that the
forces that could have caused the injuries to the victims head were
also the same forces that could have caused the edema or swelling
of the victims brain. He illustrated further that a human fist
applied with sufficient force on the fronto-temporo-parietalregion
of the head could cause an injury the same as that sustained by the
victim on his forehead. Similarly, the injury found at the back of
the head of the victim could have been caused by an ed ge of a palm
applied with sufficient force or it could have been caused by
hitting his head on the edge of a table as the shape of said injury is
somewhat elongated. On cross examination, Dr. Llavore admitted
that he did the re-autopsy seven (7) [ 2 0 ] days after the victim died
but that his Autopsy Report failed to indicate that the cadaver had
previously been autopsied by another physician; that th e blow
inflicted on the head of the victim was strong enough to have
injured the moorings of the brain causing the destruction of the
brain cells and the shifting of the fluid in the skull to one side; that
the most serious wound between the two injuries s ustained by the
victim on the head is the one found on his right forehead; and that
the process of swelling became irreversible when the compression
of the brain had caused its center to become imbalanced, so that
the victims brain ceased to function.

After trial, in a Decision [ 2 1 ] promulgated on 28 March 1996,

the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner Yadao guilty of the
crime of homicide, and sentencing him as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court, finding

the accused guilt y beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide as charged in the information, and after considering two
(2) mitigating circumstances, hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its maximum period, as
Minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor in its minimum
period, as Maximum, and to indemnify the heirs o f the deceased the
sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Deogracias Gundran and to pay
the costs.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC held that:

After a careful consideration and examination of the testimonies of

both medico-legal officers, this Court is inclined t o give more
weight on the testimony of Dr. Arturo Llavore that the cause of
death of Deogracias Gundran was cerebral edema, severe, secondar y
to traumatic injuries, head and not Cardio respiratory Arrest due to
pulmonary tuberculosis. It is to be noted that Dra.
Magdalena Alambra testified and even admitted that a person even
if he has no (sic) lungs can still live. Hence, the injuries which the
victim Deogracias Gundran sustained on his head caused his death
as he did not immediatel y undergo medical treatme nt. And as
testified to by Dr. Arturo Llavore x x x the blow inflicted was fatal
or very serious that if no medical intervention is made, it will be
untreated (sic) (T.S.N., September 25, 1991, p. 38).

x x x [g]ranting for the sake of argument that

accused Artemio Yadao did not maul the victim but onl y slapped
him slightl y which caused him to fall down as he was very drunk,
still accused is liable for the consequences of his act.

x x x x

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal

Code, which provides that Criminal liabilit y shall be incurred:
(1) By any person committing a felony ( delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. x x x Pursuant to this provision, an accused is criminall y
responsible for the acts committed by him in violation of law and
for all the natural and logical consequences resulting there
from. (sic) x x x.

x x x x

Under paragraph 1, Article 4, revised Penal Code, a person

committing a felony is still criminall y liable even if x x x
 (c) the injurious result is greater than that intended -prater-
intentionem . x x x

Indeed the act of the accused in slapping the

victim Deogracias Gundran causing the latter to fall down hitting
his head which caused his eventual death is something which the
accused cannot escape. This Court does not favor making
conjectures but looking at the body built (sic) of the accused who is
tall and sturdy as compared to the body built (sic) of the victim who
was described to be tall and la nky, it is not hard to believe that
accused did not know that natural and inevitable result of the act of
slapping the victim, considering the fact that accused even admitted
that the victim was then very drunk.

Aggrieved, petitioner Yadao appealed the aforequoted decision

to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, in its Decision [ 22 ] of 18
April 2001, affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction rendered by
the RTC. The fallo of Court of Appeals decision states that:

WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED,

there being no reversible error but instead being in accordance with
law and evidence, the appealed Decision dated March 28, 1996 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union (sic)
is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused -appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner Yadaos ensuing motion for reconsideration was denied

by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 13 November 2001, seeing
as no new matters or issues raised in (the) Motion for Reconsideration
x x x. [ 2 3 ]

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner Yadao seeks the reversal of the decision of the RTC,

as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Essentially, it is his
contention that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not
sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the
perpetrator of the crime of homicide. He maintains that the existence
of two autopsy reports entirely differing as to the cause of death of t he
victim is tantamount to reasonable doubt respecting his legal
culpability thereto. Particularly, he argues that:

x x x [t]he trial courts finding that the blow inflicted was

fatal and very serious is not in accord with the physical
manifestations of Gundran in going to and while in the house of
Carmelita. It is a matter of human experience that when a person is
struck with a fatal or serious blow in the head to such an extent that
his brain becomes swollen with its moorings injured as found by
Dr. Llavore in this case, such person will suffer serious, disabling
or painful consequences. Either he will be rendered comatose or
unconscious or suffer severe pain in the head.

x x x x

And although Limon noticed a lump in (sic) his

forehead, Gundran did not complain of any pain in the head and
when asked what he felt he told Limon that he felt pain in his chest
and stomach because that was where he was mauled.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, asserts that:
It is clear from the record that D r. Alambra failed to notice
the brain injury sustained by the victim because she merel y relied
on gross findings of said organ during her autopsy. After opening
the skull, she merel y took a look at the brain, felt it, and found
nothing unusual about the or gan. She testified that she could not
conduct further laboratory examinations on the victims brain for
lack of facilities (citation omitted).
This circumstance indicates that the findings of the two (2)
medico-legal experts, although inconsistent, are not necessarily
irreconcilable.

The threshold issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the

prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner Yadao beyond
reasonable doubt on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, especially Dr . Llavores, and documentary evidence
presented, i.e., the Dr. LlavoresAutopsy Report.

The petition has merit.

 Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines and
punishes the crime of homicide, viz:

ART. 249. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, [ 2 4 ] shall kill another without the
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next
preceding article, shall be guilt y of homicide and be punished
b y reclusin temporal .

From the abovequoted provision of law, the elements of

homicide are as follows: 1) a person was killed; and 2) the accused
killed him without any justifying circumstance; 3) the accused had the
intention to kill, which is presumed; and 4) the killing was not
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that
of parricide or infanticide. [ 25 ]

The Constitution demands that every accused be presumed

innocent until the charge is proved. Before an accused can be
convicted of any criminal act, his guilt must first be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. [ 2 6] In this jurisdiction, proof beyond reasonable
doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand
absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error; [ 2 7] it is
that engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an
inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt. [ 2 8 ]

Basic is the principle in criminal law that the evidence presented

must be sufficient to prove the corpus delicti the body or substance of
the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has
been actually committed. [ 2 9 ] The corpus delicti is a compound fact
composed of two things: 1) the existence of a certain act or
a result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and 2) the existence
of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. [ 3 0 ] In all
criminal prosecutions, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the
body or substance of the crime. In the case at bar, was the prosecution
able to prove the two components of the corpus delicti?
 We think not.

Though it was established that petitioner Yadao slapped the

victim, and as a result of which the latter fell down and struck his
head on the edge of a table, the prosecution nonetheless failed to show
the nexus between the injury sustained by the victim and his death. It
failed to discharge the burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the death of the victim resulted from the use of violent and criminal
means by petitioner Yadao.

The fact that the victim herein was wounded is not conclusive
that death resulted therefrom. To make an offender liable for the death
of the victim, it must be proven that the death is the natural
consequence of the physical injuries inflicted. If the physical injury is
not the proximate cause [ 3 1 ] of death of the victim, then the o ffender
cannot be held liable for such death.

It has been established in this case that on the afternoon of 1

October 1988, at around 3:45 p.m., petitioner Yadao slapped the
victim once. This is based from the unrebutted testimonies of defense
witnesses the only eyewitnesses to the assault. It is also undisputed
that the victim died on 3 October 1988, or two days later. What is in
dispute, however, is the cause of the latters death.

In convicting Petitioner Yadao, the RTC and the Court of

Appeals principally relied upon the testimony of Dr. Llavore in
addition to the latters autopsy report, both essentially stating that the
injury sustained by the victim in the head caused
massive hematoma and/or cerebral edema. However, we find said
testimonial and documentary evidence utterly insufficient on which to
anchor a judgment of conviction for homicide. To our mind, his
testimony, as well as the Autopsy Report containing his findings, vis--
vis the first autopsy conducted by Dr. Alambra and the factual
circumstances surrounding the conduct of two autopsies done on said
cadaver, do not engender a moral certainty, much less a belief, that the
injury sustained was the cause of his death. This Courts doubt is
brought about by Dr. Llavores failure to account the effects of the
following facts: 1) that the cadaver had previously been autopsied; 2)
that during the first autopsy, Dr. Alambra opened up the skull of the
victim to physically examine his brain and did not see anything out of
the ordinary, neither blood clot and/or pooling nor any swelling; 3)
that the cadaver of the victim had already been embalmed; 4) that it
had not been established for how long the embalming fluid was
supposed to stave off or delay the decomposition of the cadaver of the
victim; 5) that the re-autopsy was conducted eight (8) days after the
death of the victim; 6) that when the cadaver of the victim was re -
autopsied, decomposition may have already set in despite the body
having been embalmed; and 7) that the only hematoma noted inside of
the cadavers head was that on thesuboponeurotic layer of the scalp
rt. fronto parietal region, [ 3 2 ] or scalp, interstitial; Fronto-temporo-
parietal region, right side. [ 3 3] In laymans terms, the hematoma, noted
by both physicians, was merely on the scalp, just below the skin, of
the frontal right side of the head nowhere near the brain as the area
was still outside of the skull. Even Dr. Llavore recognized such fact as
clearly stated in his Autopsy Report and testified to in open court, viz:

COURT:

Now, could you tell us could you tell this Court what is the cause of
that trauma?

x x x x

Witness:

A x x x the cause of the trauma on the head is physical contact as

shown in paragraph 3, there were injuries to these areas on
the right side and actuall y there were two (2) and one (1) at
the back of the head and the force or violence that was
applied to these areas caused the brain to move suddenl y also
and the displacement of the substances, the brain substances,
because the brain is very fragile, it is very soft, once they are
displaced from their place, because they move, there is
breaking of very minute blood vessels the very minute blood
vessels if the force is stronger, it could create breakage or
rupture of larger blood vessels which you can say grossl y as
hemorrhage, but in this case, there is no hemorrhage there is
no gross hemorrhage, there is onl y minute blood vessels and
 since there is destruction of the very minute blood vessels,
they swell individuall y, they swell and collectivel y, the
swelling becomes so great because it alre ady involves the
whole brain and the brain becomes swollen, it expands, it
tries to expand, but it cannot. Therefore, it compresses in
itself.

Consequently, the post mortem report and testimony of

Dr. Alambra should not be easily discounted. The same is significant
in that the testimony and the report on the autopsy, which was done
immediately after the death, establishes the nature and extent of the
injury, sustained as a result of the assault, as well as the state of the
brain and the surrounding area at the time of death. The significance
of said evidence will lead to the precise nature of the injury sustained
by the victim. From a legal perspective, therefore, the examination of
a wound should lead to the determination as to the degree of danger of
the wound and the danger it poses to the life or bodily function of the
victim when the wound was inflicted.

Wharton and Stilles discussion on the importance of a thorough

and painstaking post-mortem examination or assessment of the degree
of injury sustained by the victim is highly instructive, it reads:

x x x [a] careful post-mortem examination will usuall y show

the violent cause of death, and it is the dut y of the physician whose
opinion is desired, to make that examination most carefully, and
to base his opinion entirely upon the findings of this
examination; not upon previous notions of the probable nature
and effects of the wound . Moreover, it is necessary not merel y to
make an examination of the regions apparentl y involved in the
injury, but also a thorough examination of the entire body; for,
notwithstanding the immediate cause of death may be evident, it is
still advisable to be sure that there was no cause of death in any
other part. [Emphasis supplied.]

This Court recognizes the fact that the most critical aspect of
head trauma is what happens to the brain; that the immediate brain
damage that results from head trauma is dependent upon the force
applied to the head, the area of its application, and whether the head is
fixed or freely movable; that when viable tissue receives an
application of force strong enough to be injurious, it (the body)
responds by alteration in intracellular and extracellular fluid content,
by extravasation of blood, by increasing blood supply to the local
area, and by mobilization of cells capable of removing cellular debris
and repairing any disruption. [ 3 4] Moreover, it is acknowledged that
tissues of the nervous system, the brain being one of its components,
and like any other tissue of the body, responds to injury by the
formation of edema or the retention of fluid. [ 3 5] Hence, it is not quite
farfetched that the victim may have had cerebral edema as a result of
the injury he sustained in the head. But just th e same, such a
conclusion, as stated in the second post mortem report, does not
necessarily preclude the fact that the swelling or edema noted in the
tissues of the brain may have been due to other factors i.e., such as
decomposition or the fact that the c adaver of the victim had already
been embalmed. The foregoing uncertainty is all the more reinforced
by the testimony of Dr. Alambra and her findings stated in the First
Autopsy Report stating that there were no signs of damage to the
brain, external or internal. This, by itself, is very much inconsistent
with the allegation that the cerebral edema was the cause of death of
the victim, which if it were so, would have already been manifest at
the time of death.

From a medical perspective, the abovediscussed issues are

essentially significant and must be established first before any
correlation of the injury to the victims cause of death is done. It is an
established fact that during decomposition, numerous cellular changes
occur in the body. A microscopic examination of the tissues (of the
body) under the influence of autolytic enzymes [ 3 6 ] enzymes shows
disintegration, swelling or shrinkage, vacuolization and formation of
small granules within the cytoplasm of the cells. [ 3 7 ] Therefore, the
swelling of the brain, along with the other organs of the victim as
stated in the Pathology Report [ 3 8] by the NBI, which reads:

F I N D I N G S
 MICROSCOPIC DESCRIPTIONS:

Brain (cerebral cortex): and cerebellum ) : sections show markedl y

widened spaces in the virchow in the white matter of the cerebrum
and collapsed walls of the capillaries. Cloudy swelling of neurons
and interstitial edema, marked.
Kidneys: sections show focal infiltration s of chronic inflammatory
cells in the interstitium accompanied by tubular atroph y
and glomeruler sclerosis. Cloudy swelling of tubules in the cortex,
moderate. Medullary congestion, moderate. The cerebellum shows
Liver: sections show moderate congestion o f red blood cells in the
sinusoids and cloudy swelling of liver cells.
Lungs: sections show marked congestion of
pulmonary septae exhibiting numerous macrophages
containing hemusiderin pigments.
Alternating atelectatic and hyperinflated lung alveoli with
emphysematous and bullae formation can be noted. Fibrosis in
diffuse in other areas with calcifications. The small bronchi are
irregularl y dilated.
M yocardium: congestion of capillaries and cloudy swelling of
muscle fibers, moderate.

x x x x [Emphasis supplied.]
may have also been due to the decomposing state of the cadaver of the
victim and not just that caused by the head injury he sustained from
the hands of petitioner Yadao.

Additionally, to delay the onset of decomposition, cadavers are

embalmed. Embalming is the artificial way of preserving the body
after death by injecting 6 to 8 quarts of antiseptic solutions of
formalin, perchloride or mercury or arsenic, which is carried into the
common carotid and the femoral arteries. [ 3 9 ] However, a dead body
must not be embalmed before the autopsy. [ 4 0 ] The embalming fluid
may render the tissue and blood unfit for toxicological
analyses. [ 4 1 ] The embalming may alter the gross appe arance of the
tissues or may result to a wide variety of artifacts that tend to destroy
or obscure evidence. [ 4 2 ] Thus, in the case at bar, even if the cadaver of
the victim may not have started decomposing at the time of the re -
autopsy, all the same, the fact that such had already been embalmed,
any examination will likely lead to findings or conclusion not at all
accurate as to the true status of the tissues of the body of the victim.
From the above, absent further clarifications,
Dr. Llavores conclusion that the victims cause of death is cerebral
edema is nothing but conjecture, being tenuous and flawed.
Consequently, the findings as stated in said autopsy report is not
decisive of the of the issue of whether or not injury sustained by the
victim in his head when he was slapped by petitioner Yadao and/or
when the victim hit his head on the edge of the table were
the solecause of the cerebral ede ma observed in the latters brain
during the re-autopsy conducted eight (8) days after his death. Again,
it could have been caused by other factors, one of which could have
been the decomposition or the breakdown of the cellular tissues of the
body naturally occurring after death, or the fact that the cadaver of the
victim had already been previously embalmed.

Dr. Llavores testimony that the cause of death of the victim was
the collective effect of the blow sustained by the latters head; that the
blow was strong enough to have caused the displacement of the brain
from its moorings and the resultant swelling. Such conclusion was
brought about by the doctors external and internal examination of the
brain of the victim. The records of the case, however, is aga in bereft
of any indication that the said inference or conclusion took into
account the fact that the cadaver of the victim had been previously
autopsied, more importantly, that his brain had been already been
removed from its moorings by Dr. Alambra in order for her to take the
same out of the skull when she examined it.

Indeed, the evidence of the defense might not, by itself, suffice

to emphatically negate the causal relationship between the actions of
petitionerYadao causing injury to the victim and t he cause of his
death, but the same must be considered in conjunction with the
weakness of the evidence given by the prosecutions witness discussed
above. Defense witness Dr. Alambras Autopsy Report, on top of her
testimony that upon opening the skull of t he victim, she found nothing
out of the ordinary in the brain, tend to reinforce the doubt already
engendered by the weakness of the prosecutions evidence about the
fundamental correlation of the injury and the cause of death. It was
incumbent upon the prosecution to demonstrate
petitioner Yadaosculpability beyond a reasonable doubt, independently
of whatever the defense has offered to exculpate the latter. Conviction
must rest on the strength of the prosecutions evidence, not merely on
conjectures or suppositions, and certainly not on the weakness of
the accuseds defense; otherwise, the phrase constitutional presumption
of innocence will be reduced to nothing but an innocuous grouping of
words; worse, to a conspicuous exercise in futulity. As a rule, findings
of fact of trial courts are accorded great weight, even finality, on
appeal, unless the trial court has failed to appreciate certain facts and
circumstances that, if taken into account, would materially affect the
result of the case. [ 4 3 ] In this case, prescinding from the above
discussion, it is arrantly manifest that the RTC, as well as the Court of
Appeals, overlooked material and relevant fac ts that could affect the
outcome of the case. The constitutional presumption of innocence
aforementioned requires us to take a more than casual consideration of
every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused as
court have the imperative duty to put prosecution evidence under
severe testing. [ 44 ]

The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the
bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with
guilt. [ 4 5] The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. [ 4 6 ] If the
evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the
accused must be acquitted. [ 4 7 ] The overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the innoce nce of the accused but whether it
entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. [ 48 ] If there exist even one
iota of doubt, this Court is under a long standing legal injunction to
resolve the doubt in favor of herein accused -petitioner. [ 4 9 ]

From the foregoing, the inevitable conclusion is that the guilt of

petitioner Yadao has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The
facts of the case, the autopsy reports, as well as the testimony of
Dr. Llavore do not definitely establish that the assault was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim. Even assuming for the sake
of argument that the blow inflicted on the head of the victim resulted
in an edematous condition of the brain, petitioner Yadao would still
not be held liable for the death as the prosecution failed to present
proof that said act was the efficient and proximate cause of the
victims demise. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper
even though the accuseds innocence may be doubted. [ 5 0 ] It is better to
free a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has
not been proved by the required quantum of evidence. For only when
there is proof beyond any shadow of doubt that those responsible
should be made answerable. [ 5 1 ]

The heirs of the victim, however, have not completely lost their
case. Settled in jurisprudence is the principle th at a court may acquit
an accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil
damages in the same case. [ 5 2 ] In this case, though petitioner Yadao is
acquitted, nonetheless, his liability for damages is not considered
extinguished since the judgment of acquittal is not based on a
pronouncement that the facts from which civil claims might arise did
not exist. Accordingly, this Court awards P50,000.00 as civil damages
to the heirs of the victim.

WHEREFORE, the 28 March 1996 Decision of the

Regional Tial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, as well as the 18
April 2001 Decision and 13 November 2001 Resolution both of the
Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Artemio Yadao is ACQUITTEDof the charge of
homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt. His immediate release
from custody is hereby ordered unless he is being held for other lawful
causes. However, Petitioner Artemio Yadao is ordered to pay the heirs
of victim Deogracias Gundran in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairman

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
P e ti tio n f o r Re v ie w o n Ce r tio ra ri u nd er R ul e 4 5 o f t he R e vi sed R u le s o f Co ur t.
[2]
P e n n ed b y Co ur t o f Ap p ea l s As so c ia te J u st ice Me rced e s Go zo - D ad o le wi t h As so cia te
J u st ice s F er mi n A. Mar t in , J r. and P o rt ia Alio - Ho r mac h u elo s co nc ur ri n g; An n e x A o f
th e P et it io n; ro llo , p p . 5 2 -6 4 .
[3]
An n e x C o f t h e P et it i o n; ro llo , p . 7 9 .
[4]
P e n n ed b y Ho n. Fo r t u nato V . P a n ga n ib a n, P res id i n g J ud ge, RT C B a ua n g, La U n io n,
B ran c h 3 3 ; An n e x D o f t he P eti tio n ; ro l lo , p p . 8 0 -9 7 .
[5]
Di sp o si t ve o f t he RT C Dec i sio n, p . 1 8 ; ro llo , p . 9 7 .
[6]
Id .
[7]
R eco rd s, p . 2 .
[8]
4 2 yr. o ld r e sid e nt o f Di li, B a ua n g, La U nio n; s h e t e st i fied t ha t G u nd ra n i s co n s id ered a
clo se fa mi l y fr i e nd , t he lat ter b ei n g a ka b a rka d a o f h er b ro t her.
[9]
T he fa t her o f t h e vi ct i m.
[10]
Lo c al C i vi l Re g is tr a r o f S a n F er na nd o , La U nio n .
[11]
T he NB I p h ys i ci a n wh o co nd uc ted t he 2 n d a uto p s y o n t he b o d y o f t h e v ic ti m.
[12]
A g u e st at p eti tio n er Yad ao s b ir t hd a y p ar t y.
[13]
Id .
[14]
Id.
[15]
D eo grac ia s G u nd r a n hap p e ned to b e a nep he w o f p e ti tio n er Y ad ao s wi fe .
[16]
Reco rd s, p p . 4 3 -4 5 .
[17]
H e ma to ma is t h e e x t r av a sat io n o r e ffu sio n o f b lo o d i n a n e wl y fo r m ed ca v it y u nd er ne at h
th e s ki n . I t u s ua ll y d e ve lo p s wh e n t h e b l u nt i n st ru me n t i s ap p li ed i n p ar t o f t he b o d y
wh er e b o n y ti s s ue i s s u p er fic ia ll y lo ca ted , li k e t he he ad , c h es t a nd a nt erio r a sp ect o f
th e le g s. T he fo r ce ap p l i ed ca u se s t he s ub c ut a ne o u s ti s s ue to r up t ure o n acco u nt o f t he
p res e nce o f a h ar d str u ct ur e u nd er nea t h. T he d es tr uct io n o f t h e s ub c ut an eo us ti s s u e
wi l l lead to t he a cc u mu l atio n o f b lo o d ca u si n g it to e le va te.
[18]
Reco rd s, p . 1 2 .
[19]
H a nd wr it te n b y Dr . Lla vo r e .
[20]
It wa s act u al l y e i g ht d a ys a ft er t h e fi rs t a u to p s y, o r o n 1 1 O cto b er 1 9 8 8 .
[21]
S up ra a t no te 4 .
[22]
S up ra a t no te 2 .
[23]
S up ra a t no te 3 .
[24]
T he art ic le i n t h e RP C d e f i ni n g a nd p u n is h i n g t he c ri me o f p arr ic id e.
[25]
L. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book Two, p. 470 (15 th ed., 2001).
[26]
Ca l imu ta n v. Peo p le , G. R. No . 1 5 2 1 3 3 , 9 F eb rua r y 2 0 0 6 , 4 8 2 S C R A 4 4 , 5 7 .
[27]
REV ISE D R U LE S O F CO U RT , R u le 1 3 3 , S e ctio n 2 .
[28]
Peo p le v. D ra ma yo , 1 4 9 P hi l. 1 0 7 , 1 1 2 -1 1 3 ( 1 9 7 1 ).
[29]
R. Fra nc i sco , B AS I C EVI DEN CE , p . 3 8 o f t h e S up p le me n t (1 9 9 9 ) .
[30]
2 3 C.J . S. 2 6 4 .
[31]
P ro xi ma te c a us e i s t ha t ca u se, wh ic h i n na t ura l a nd co nt i n uo us s eq ue nc e o f e v e nt s,
u nb r o ke n b y a n e f f ic ie nt i n ter v e ni n g ca u se, p ro d uc e s i nj ur y o r d ea t h , a nd wi t ho ut
wh ic h t he r e s ul t wo u ld no t ha ve o cc urr ed .
[32]
Dr . Ala mb r as a uto p s y r ep o r t.
[33]
Dr . Ll a vo r e s a u to p s y r ep o r t.
[34]
S . I. Sc h war tz, et al. , P RI NC I P LES O F SU R GE R Y, p . 1 7 8 7 (4 t h ed ., 1 9 8 4 ).
[35]
Id. at 1790.
[36]
E nz y me s t ha t d i ge st s t h e ce ll i n wh ic h it i s p ro d uc ed , u s ua ll y ma r ki n g t he d ea t h o f t h e
cel l. I t i s p r o d uc ed d ur i n g a u to l ys i s t h e p ro ce s s b y wh i c h a c ell , i n d yi n g t i ss u es , se l f
d es tr uct s ( t he ce ll t he n, in e f fe ct, d i ge s ts i ts el f) .
[37]
Id . at 1 3 6 .
[38]
B y NB I p at ho lo gi s t Dr . N ie to M . S al v ad o r; Re co rd s , p . 1 8 2 .
[39]
P . So li s, LE G AL ME DI CI NE , p . 2 2 0 ( R e vi se d ed ., 1 9 8 7 ).
[40]
Id . at 1 6 9 .
[41]
Id .
[42]
Id .
[43]
Peo p le v. Ba tid o r , 3 6 2 P hi l. 6 7 3 , 6 8 1 -6 8 2 (1 9 9 9 ).
[44]
Peo p le v. Ba u ti sta , 3 6 8 P hi l. 1 0 0 , 1 2 0 (1 9 9 9 ) .
[45]
D ela C ru z v. Peo p le , G. R. No . 1 5 0 4 3 9 , 2 9 J u l y 2 0 0 5 , 4 6 5 S C R A 1 9 0 , 2 1 5 .
[46]
Peo p le v. Me jia , 3 4 1 P hi l. 1 1 8 , 1 4 5 (1 9 9 7 ).
[47]
Peo p le v. Ma n a mb it , 3 3 8 P h il. 5 7 , 1 0 0 (1 9 9 7 ).
[48]
Peo p le v. Va sq u e z , 3 4 5 P hi l. 3 8 0 , 3 9 9 (1 9 9 7 ) .
[49]
S u p ra a t no t e 4 3 .
[50]
Peo p le v. F ro n d a , 3 8 4 P hi l. 7 3 2 , 7 4 3 (2 0 0 0 ) .
[51]
Peo p le v. V id a l , G. R . No . 9 0 4 1 9 , 1 J u n e 1 9 9 9 , 3 0 8 S C R A 1 .
[52]
Pa d i lla v. Co u rt o f Ap p ea l s , G. R. No . L-3 9 9 9 9 , 3 1 Ma y 1 9 8 4 .

GIOVANI SERRANO y G.R. No. 175023

CERVANTES,
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,

ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent.
July 5, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari[1] the decision[2] dated July 20,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29090, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Giovani Serrano y Cervantes. The CA modified the decision
dated October 25, 2004[3] of the Regional Trial Court[4] (RTC), Branch 83, Quezon
City, and found petitioner Giovani Serrano y Cervantes (petitioner) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, instead of frustrated homicide.

THE FACTS
The case stemmed from a brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two (2) rival
groups that occurred at the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City
(UP) on the evening of March 8, 1999. The incident resulted in the stabbing of
Anthony Galang (victim). Pinpointed as the victims assailant, the petitioner was
charged on March 11, 1999,[5] with frustrated homicide in an Information that
reads:
That on or about the 8th day of March 1999, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
ANTHONY GALANG Y LAGUNSAD, by then and there stabbing him on the
stomach with a bladed weapon, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of homicide, as a consequence but which
nevertheless did not produce it, by reason of some causes independent of the will
of the accused; that is the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said
ANTHONY GALANG Y LAGUNSAD which prevented his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

On March 20, 2000, the petitioner pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial,
the prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with the testimonies of SPO2
Isagani dela Paz and the records custodian of East Avenue Medical Center on the
basis of the following stipulations: (1) SPO2 dela Paz was the one who conducted
the investigation; (2) SPO2 dela Paz took the statement of the victim at the East
Avenue Medical Center; (3) the victim was able to narrate the story of the incident
to SPO2 dela Paz before he underwent surgery; (4) SPO2 dela Paz prepared a
referral-letter to the city prosecutor; (5) SPO2 dela Paz had no personal knowledge
of the incident; and (6) the victim was confined for treatment at the East Avenue
Medical Center from March 8, 1999, and the documents referring to his
confinement and treatment were duly executed and authenticated.[7] After these
stipulations, trial on the merits immediately followed.

The Prosecutions Evidence

The prosecution presented the victim, Arlo Angelo Arceo, Sgt. Rolando Zoleto,
and SPO2 Roderick Dalit.
These witnesses testified that, at around 9:30 p.m. of March 8, 1999, the victim and
his two friends, Arceo and Richard Tan, were on their way to Fatima II in Pook
Dagohoy, UP Campus when they came across Gener Serrano, the petitioners
brother, who was with his group of friends. The victim, Arceo and Tan approached
Gener and his friends to settle a previous quarrel between Gener and Roberto
Comia. While the victim and Gener were talking, Comia suddenly appeared and
hurled invectives at Gener. Irked, Gener challenged Comia to a fistfight to settle
their quarrel once and for all; Comia rose to the challenge.

It was at this point that the petitioner appeared with other members of his
group. He was a guest at a party nearby, and was informed that a fight was about to
take place between his brother and Comia. Members of the victims group also
started to show up.

The petitioner watched Gener fight Comia. When Gener lost the fight, the
petitioner sought to get back at the victim and his friends. Thus, the one-on-one
escalated into a rumble between the members of the two groups. During the
rumble, and with the aid of the light emanating from two Meralco posts, the victim
and Arceo saw that the petitioner had a knife and used it to chase away the
members of their group. The petitioner also chased Arceo away, leaving the victim
alone; the petitioners group ganged up on him.

The petitioner went to where the victim was being beaten by Gener and
one Obet Orieta. It was then that the victim was stabbed. The petitioner stabbed the
left side of his stomach while he was standing, with Gener and Orieta holding his
arms. The petitioner, Gener and Orieta thereafter continued to beat and stone the
victim until he fell into a nearby creek. The petitioner and his group left him there.

From his fallen position, the victim inspected his stab wound and saw that a
portion of his intestines showed. On foot, he went to find help. The victim was
initially taken to the UP Infirmary, but was referred to
the East Avenue Medical Center where he underwent surgery. The victim stayed at
the hospital for a week, and thereafter stayed home for one month to recuperate.
 In the investigation that immediately followed, the victim identified the
petitioner as the person who stabbed him. In court, the victim likewise positively
identified the petitioner as his assailant.
The Defenses Evidence

The defense presented the testimonies of the petitioner, Gener, and George
Hipolito.

The petitioner denied that he stabbed the victim. While he admitted that he
was present during the fistfight between Gener and Comia, he claimed that he and
Gener left as soon as the rumble started. The petitioner testified that as he and
Gener were running away from the scene (to get back to the party), bottles and
stones were being thrown at them.

Hipolito, a participant in the rumble and a member of the petitioners group,

narrated that the rumble happened fast and he was too busy defending himself to
take note of everything that happened. He testified that he did not see the petitioner
and Gener during the fight. He also testified that the place where the rumble took
place was near a steel manufacturing shop which provided some light to the area.
He further testified that the victim was left alone at the scene and he alone faced
the rival group.

THE RTC RULING

After considering the evidence, the trial court found the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide. It held, thus:

The bare statement of Giovani Serrano that he did not stab Anthony and he really
does not know who might have stabbed Anthony is outweighed by the positive
identification by Anthony that Giovani stabbed him frontally while they faced
each other and also the circumstantial evidence pointing to him as the wielder of
the knife. Naturally, Giovani Serrano would feign ignorance as to who stabbed
Anthony but there is no way that he can avoid said direct and circumstantial
evidences.[8]
Accordingly, the RTC decision disposed:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of accused
GIOVANI SERRANO Y CERVANTES of the offense of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY thereof and
 hereby sentences him to undergo imprisonment of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor as maximum.

Accused Giovani Serrano is hereby ordered to reimburse to complainant

Anthony Galang the medical expenses incurred by the latter in his hospitalization
and treatment of his injuries in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P15,000.00) and loss of income for one (1) month in the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) or the total amount of NINETEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P19,000.00).

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The petitioner appealed to the CA. He claimed that the inconsistencies in the
victims testimony rendered it incredible, but the RTC disregarded the claim. The
RTC also disregarded the evidence that the dimness of the light in the crime scene
made it impossible for the victim to identify his assailant.

THE CA RULING

In its decision, the CA agreed with the RTC that the petitioner had been
positively identified as the victims assailant. The CA, however, ruled that the crime
committed was attempted homicide, not frustrated homicide. The CA ruled that the
prosecution evidence failed to conclusively show that the victims single stab
wound was sufficient to cause death without timely medical intervention. In
support of its conclusion, the CA said that:
Thus, in Paddayuman v. People (G.R. No. 120344, 23 January 2002), appellants
conviction for attempted homicide was upheld because there was no evidence
that the wounds suffered by the victim were fatal enough as to cause her
demise. Thus:

x x x petitioner stabbed the victim twice on the chest, which is

indicative of an intent to kill. x x x This can be gleaned from the
testimony of Dr. Pintucan who did not categorically state whether
or not the wounds were fatal. x x x (I)n People v. Pilones, this
Court held that even if the victim was wounded but the injury was
not fatal and could not cause his death, the crime would only be
attempted.
 Similarly, in the case of People v. Costales (G.R. No. 141154, 15 January 2002),
where the offense charged was frustrated murder, the trial court rendered a verdict
of guilty for attempted murder because the prosecution failed to present a
medical certificate or competent testimonial evidence which will prove that the
victim would have died from her wound without medical intervention.
Citing People v. De La Cruz, the Supreme Court sustained the trial court and
stressed that:

x x x the crime committed for the shooting of the victim

was attempted murder and not frustrated murder for the reason
that his injuries, though no doubt serious, were not proved
fatal such that without timely medical intervention, they would
have caused his death.[10]

Thus, the CA modified the RTC decision. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that:

1) Appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime

of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of SIX (6) MONTHSof arresto mayor as minimum
to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision
correccional, as maximum;

2) The actual damages is REDUCED to P3,858.50; and

3) The award of loss earnings is DELETED,

The appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.[11]
Undaunted, the petitioner filed this present petition.

THE ISSUES

The petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH

AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND
 INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE

TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE
PROSECUTION, WHICH WERE BASED ON MERE
SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THE STABBING
INCIDENT OCCURRED IN THE MIDDLE OF A STREET
BRAWL, WHERE ANYBODY OF THE NUMEROUS
PARTICIPANTS COULD HAVE BEEN THE ASSAILANT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[12]

The petitioner claims that the lower courts decisions were erroneous based on two-
pronged arguments first, he cannot be convicted because he was not positively
identified by a credible testimony; and second, if he is criminally culpable, he can
only be convicted of serious physical injuries as the intent to kill the victim was not
sufficiently proven.

THE COURT RULING

We do not find merit in the petitioners arguments, and accordingly hold that
the petition is devoid of merit.

At the outset, we clarify that we shall no longer deal with the correctness of the
RTC and the CAs appreciation of the victims identification of the petitioner as his
assailant. This is a question of fact that we cannot entertain in a Rule 45 review,
save for exceptional reasons[13] that must be clearly and convincingly shown. As a
rule, we accord the greatest respect for the findings of the lower courts, especially
the evaluation by the trial judge who had the distinct opportunity to directly hear
and observe the witnesses and their testimonies. As we explained in People v.
Lucena[14]

[It] has been consistently held by this Court that the matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by
the trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and
to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected in the
record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact
and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the
angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty
blanch these can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his
teeth.[15]

In this regard, the petitioner cites an exception the lower courts

misappreciation of the testimonial evidence. Due consideration of the records,
however, does not support the petitioners position. We find that the RTC and the
CA did not err in their appreciation of the evidence.

The petitioner was positively identified

The RTCs and CAs conclusions on the petitioners positive identification are
supported by ample evidence. We consider in this regard the following pieces of
evidence of the prosecution: (1) the manner of attack which was done frontally and
at close range, thus allowing the victim to see his assailant; (2) the lighting
conditions at the scene of the stabbing, provided by two Meralco posts; [16] the
scene was also illuminated by white, fluorescent type light coming from a steel
manufacturing shop;[17] and (3) that the victim and the petitioner knew each other
also allowed the victim to readily identify the petitioner as his assailant.

The victims credibility is further strengthened by his lack of improper motive to

falsely accuse the petitioner of the crime. Human experience tells us that it is
unnatural for a victim to accuse someone other than his actual attacker; in the
normal course of things, the victim would have the earnest desire to bring the
guilty person to justice, and no other. We consider, too, that the victim consistently
and positively, in and out of court, identified the petitioner as his assailant. The
victim testified that the petitioner was a neighbor who lived just a few houses away
from his house.

We also take into account the evidence that the petitioner was the only one seen in
possession of a knife during the rumble. The victim testified that he saw the
petitioner holding a knife which he used to chase away others.[18] Prosecution
witness Arceo testified that he also saw the petitioner wielding a knife during the
rumble.

Based on these considerations, we find the victims identification of the

petitioner as his assailant to be positive and conclusive.

In contrast, we find the inconsistencies attributed to the victim to be minor and

insufficient to discredit his testimony. These inconsistencies refer to extraneous
matters that happened during the rumble, not directly bearing on the
stabbing. They do not likewise relate to the material elements of the crime.

We also cannot give any credit to the petitioners position that the victims
failure to identify the weapon used to stab him discredited his testimony. The
victims failure to identify the weapon is irrelevant under the circumstances,
considering that the identity of the weapon is not an element of the crime charged.

The intent to kill was sufficiently established

The petitioner posits that he can only be held liable for serious physical injuries
since the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as homicide,
was not sufficiently proven. The assailants intent to kill is the main element that
distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of homicide. The crime
can only be homicide if the intent to kill is proven.

Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through
external manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the
assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,[19] we considered the
following factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used
by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after
the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. We also consider motive and the
words uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as
additional determinative factors.[20]
In this case, the records show that the petitioner used a knife in his assault. The
petitioner stabbed the victim in the abdomen while the latter was held by Gener
and Orieta. Immediately after the stabbing, the petitioner, Gener and Orieta beat
and stoned the victim until he fell into a creek. It was only then that the petitioner,
Gener and Orieta left. We consider in this regard that the stabbing occurred at
around 9:30 p.m. with only the petitioner, Gener, Orieta, and the victim as the only
persons left in the area. The CA aptly observed that a reasonable inference can be
made that the victim was left for dead when he fell into the creek.

Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the petitioner, in stabbing,

beating and stoning the victim, intended to kill him. Thus, the crime committed
cannot be merely serious physical injuries.

Frustrated homicide versus attempted homicide

Since the victim did not die, the issue posed to us is the stage of execution of the
crime. The lower courts differed in their legal conclusions.

On one hand, the RTC held that the crime committed reached the frustrated
stage since the victim was stabbed on the left side of his stomach and beaten until
he fell into a creek.[21] The RTC also took into account that the victim had to be
referred by the UP Infirmary to the East Avenue Medical Center for medical
treatment.[22]

On the other hand, the CA ruled that the crime committed only reached the
attempted stage as there was lack of evidence that the stab wound inflicted was
fatal to cause the victims death.[23] The CA observed that the attending physician
did not testify in court.[24] The CA also considered that the Medical Certificate and
the Discharge Summary issued by the East Avenue Medical Center fell short of
specifying the nature or gravity of the wound.[25]
 Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended defines the stages of a
felony in the following manner:

ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated

felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its

execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a

felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. [Emphasis and italics supplied.]

In Palaganas v. People,[26] we made the following distinctions between

frustrated and attempted felony as follows:

1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the
offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and
does not perform all the acts of execution.

2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is
some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in
attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or
accident other than the offenders own spontaneous desistance.[27]

The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which
must be supported by independent proof showing that the wound inflicted
was sufficient to cause the victims death without timely medical intervention.

In discussing the importance of ascertaining the degree of injury sustained

by a victim and its importance in determining criminal liability, the Court
in People v. Matyaong, said:[28]

In considering the extent of injury done, account must be taken of the injury to the
function of the various organs, and also the danger to life. A division into mortal
and nonmortal wounds, if it could be made, would be very desirable; but the
unexpected complications and the various extraneous causes which give gravity to
 the simplest cases, and, on the other hand, the favorable termination of some
injuries apparently the most dangerous, render any such classification
impracticable. The general classification into slight, severe, dangerous, and mortal
wounds may be used, but the possibility of the slight wound terminating with the
loss of the persons life, and the apparently mortal ending with only a slight
impairment of some function, must always be kept in mind. x x x

The danger to life of any wound is dependent upon a number of factors: the extent
of the injury, the form of the wound, the region of the body affected, the blood
vessels, nerves, or organs involved, the entrance of disease-producing bacteria or
other organisms into the wound, the age and constitution of the person injured,
and the opportunities for administering proper surgical treatment.

When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal without
medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt; under
this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved in favor
of the petitioner. Thus, the crime committed should be attempted,
not frustrated, homicide.[29]

Under these standards, we agree with the CAs conclusion. From all
accounts, although the stab wound could have been fatal since the victim testified
that he saw his intestines showed, no exact evidence exists to prove the gravity of
the wound; hence, we cannot consider the stab wound as sufficient to cause death.
As correctly observed by the CA, the victims attending physician did not testify on
the gravity of the wound inflicted on the victim. We consider, too, the CAs
observation that the medical certifications issued by
the East Avenue Medical Center merely stated the location of the wound.[30] There
was also no proof that without timely medical intervention, the victim would have
died.[31] This paucity of proof must necessarily favor the petitioner.

The view from the frustrated stage of the crime gives the same results. The
elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained
fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance;
and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.[32] Since the prosecution failed to
prove the second element, we cannot hold the petitioner liable for frustrated
homicide.
 THE PENALTY

Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that the

imposable penalty for an attempted crime shall be lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony.

Under Article 249, the crime of homicide is punished by reclusion temporal.

Applying Article 61 (Rules of graduating penalties) and Article 71 (Graduated
scales), two (2) degrees lower of reclusion temporal is prision correccional which
has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the

indeterminate sentence shall be taken, in view of the attending circumstances that
could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.[33]Thus, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence shall be taken within the range of prision correccional,
depending on the modifying circumstances. In turn, the minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the penalty one degree
lower of prision correccional, that is arresto mayor with a duration of one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months.

In the absence of any modifying circumstance, the maximum term of the

indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision
correccional or two (2) years and four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years
and two (2) months.[34] The minimum term shall be taken within the range
of arresto mayor. Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA against the petitioner of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum term of the indeterminate penalty, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty, is correct.
THE CIVIL LIABILITY
We modify the CA decision with respect to the petitioners civil liability. The
CA ordered actual damages to be paid in the amount of P3,858.50. This is
erroneous and contrary to the prevailing jurisprudence.
 In People v. Andres,[35] we held that if the actual damages, proven by
receipts during the trial, amount to less than P25,000.00, the victim shall be
entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, in lieu of actual
damages. The award of temperate damages is based on Article 2224 of the New
Civil Code which states that temperate or moderate damages may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot
be proven with certainty. In this case, the victim is entitled to the award
of P25,000.00 as temperate damages considering that the amount of actual
damages is only P3,858.50. The amount of actual damages shall be deleted.

Lastly, we find that the victim is also entitled to moral damages in the
amount of P10,000.00 in accordance with settled jurisprudence.[36] Under Article
2219, paragraph 1 of the New Civil Code, the victim is entitled to moral damages
in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition. The decision, dated July 20,
2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29090, finding petitioner
Giovani Serrano y Cervantes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted
Homicide, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The petitioner
is ORDERED to PAY the victim, Anthony Galang, the following amounts:

(1) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and

(2) P10,000.00 as moral damages.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice


Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 27-42. Penned by CA Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, with Presiding CA Justice (now
retired Supreme Court Associate Justice) Ruben T. Reyes and CA Associate Justice (now retired) Monina
Arevalo-Zearosa concurring.
[3]
Criminal Case No. Q-99-81784; id. at 46-73.
[4]
Penned by Judge Estrella T. Estrada.
[5]
Rollo, p. 46.
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
Id. at 47.
[8]
Id. at 72.
[9]
Id. at 73.
[10]
Id. at 37-38.
[11]
Id. at 41-42.
[12]
Id. at 9-10.
[13]
They are: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on
which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence
on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and, (11) such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both parties; Pelonia v. People, G.R. No. 168997, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 207.
[14]
408 Phil. 172, 183 (2001).
[15]
Id. at 183.
[16]
Rollo, p. 33.
[17]
Id. at 34.
[18]
Id. at 48.
[19]
G.R. No. 166326, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 188, 197, citing People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003).
[20]
Epifanio v. People, G.R. No. 157057, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 552, 562.
[21]
Rollo, p. 68.
[22]
Id. at 69.
[23]
Id. at 32.
[24]
Ibid.
[25]
Ibid.
[26]
G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 533.
[27]
Id. at 535.
[28]
411 Phil. 938, 948 (2001), cited in Epifanio v. People, supra note 21, at 563.
[29]
Epifanio v. People, supra note 21, at 563-564; also see Paddayuman v. People, G.R. No. 120344. January 23,
2002, 374 SCRA 278, 288.
[30]
Rollo, p. 40.
[31]
Ingles v. CA, G.R. No. 117161, March 3, 1997, 269 SCRA 122, 130.
[32]
Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 737, 758.
[33]
Section 1.
[34]
Applying Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
[35]
G.R. Nos. 135697-98, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 141, 152.
[36]
People v. Flores, G.R. Nos. 143435-36, November 28, 2003, 416 SCRA 612.

[G.R. Nos. 140393-94. February 4, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARCOS ASUELA,

JUANITO ASUELA, ALBERTO ASUELA, ROGER ASUELA,
TEOFILO BOYET CAPACILLO, JUN-JUN ASUELA (at large) and
MIGUEL ASUELA (at large), accused.
MARCOS ASUELA, JUANITO ASUELA, ALBERTO ASUELA, ROGER
ASUELA and TEOFILO BOYET CAPACILLO, appellants.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Where the evidence fails to show conclusively that the wounds inflicted on the
offended party were fatal or serious and where the medical treatment -- which lasted
less than nine days in the present case -- were merely first aid in nature, appellants may
be convicted only of slight physical injuries, not frustrated murder.

The Case

Before us is an appeal from the July 20, 1999 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal (Branch 76) in Criminal Cases Nos. 3365 and 3366. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered in these cases as

follows:

1) In Crim. Case No. 3366, finding accused Juanito Asuela, Marcos Asuela,
Alberto Asuela, Roger Asuela, and Teofilo Boyet Capacillo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, as defined and penalized under Art. 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Wilfredo Villanueva in the amount of
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

2) In Crim. Case No. 3365, finding accused Juanito Asuela, Marcos Asuela,
Alberto Asuela, and Teofilo Boyet Capacillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of frustrated murder as defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment of fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal and to pay the costs.

As against accused Jun-jun Asuela and Miguel Asuela, who have, to date, remained
at-large, let a warrant of arrest be issued against them and let these cases be, in the
meantime, sent to the archives without prejudice to their reinstatement upon
apprehension of the said accused. [2]

This case originated from the September 24, 1997 Information[3] signed by Third
Assistant Prosecutor Nestor V. Gapuzan, charging Appellants
Marcos Asuela, Juanito Asuela, AlbertoAsuela, Rogelio
Roger Asuela and Teofilo Boyet Capacillo with frustrated murder, allegedly committed
[4]

as follows:

That on or about the 7th day of September 1997 in the Municipality of San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, armed with a lead [pipe] and pieces of wood, with
intent to kill and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack assault and stab one ANTHONY A.
VILLANUEVA on his body, thus performing all the acts of execution which could
have produced the crime of murder as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce
it by reason of cause independent of his will, that is, due to the timely and able
medical attendance rendered to said ANTHONY A. VILLANUEVA which prevented
his death.
[5]

That same day, the same prosecutor filed against appellants another
Information,[6] this time for murder, as follows:

That on or about the 7th day of September 1997 in the Municipality of San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, armed with a lead [pipe] and pieces of wood, with
intent to kill employing means to weaken the defense of the victim, one WILFREDO
VILLANUEVA, by spraying him with [tear gas] in the eyes and taking advantage of
their superior strength did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab one WILFREDO VILLANUEVA, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds which directly caused his death. [7]

When arraigned on separate dates, appellants pleaded not guilty.[8] After trial in due
course, the RTC convicted them.
 The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief,[9] the Office of the Solicitor General summarized the prosecutions version
of the facts in this wise:

In the early evening of September 7, 1997, prosecution eyewitness-victim Anthony

Villanueva was in their house at Valleyview Subdivision, Gulod Malaya, San
Mateo, Rizal, with his brother Mark, his sister Hayen, and their mother Magdalena
Villanueva. They were at that time celebrating the birthday of their
father, Wilfredo Villanueva. While his father Wilfredo was cooking food, Anthony
saw appellants and the accused Jun-jun Asuelaand Miguel Asuela in a drinking spree
in front of the house of appellant Juanito Asuela, situated at about five (5) meters
away from the house of the Villanuevas. Appellants and their co-accused were later
joined by their neighbors.

At about 6:30 oclock in the evening of the same day, Anthony heard and saw
appellant Juanito call up his father. Thereafter, Anthony saw his father being pulled
near the gate of their house and x x x appellants MarcosAsuela, Alberto Asuela,
Roger Asuela, Teofilo Boyet Capacillo, Juanito Asuela and co-accused Jun-
jun Asuela and Miguel Asuela stabbed and/or struck with a knife and a blunt
instrument Wilfredo Villanueva. AppellantBoyet Capacillo sprayed [tear gas] on the
eyes of Wilfredo; appellant Juanito stabbed Wilfredos eyes and cheek him eight (8)
times with a knife; Roger hit three (3) times Wilfredos back with a lead pipe; co-
accused Jun[-]jun stabbed Wilfredos chest four (4) times with a knife; appellant
Alberto stabbed Wilfredo with a pointed bamboo while the latter lay on the ground;
appellant Marcos also hit him at the back with a lead pipe; and co-accused Miguel
stabbed Wilfredo four (4) times with a knife.

In further details, Anthony stated that when appellant Juanito stabbed Wilfredo,
appellant Boyet was at the back of Juanito. Then, appellant Boyet sprayed [tear gas]
on the eyes of Wilfredo and thereafter, appellant Roger went [behind] Wilfredo and
hit the latter with a lead pipe. At that precise moment, co-accused Jun-jun went in
front of Wilfredo and immediately hit him on the chest with the knife. Then, appellant
Marcos, instead of going to the barangay office for assistance, picked up a lead pipe
and hit Wilfredo. Co-accused Miguel who positioned himself as the lookout, also
stabbed Wilfredo in reaction to the inquiry of appellant Roger if Wilfredo was still
alive; and when appellants and the two (2) co-accused left the scene of the crime,
appellant Alberto went back and stabbed Wilfredo with a pointed bamboo
pole. Anthony knew that appellant Alberta is the father of accused Miguel, and
Albertos brothers are appellants Juanito, Marcos, Roger, and co-accused Jun-
jun. Appellant Boyet Capacillo is their brother-in-law, Boyets wife being the sister of
the Asuela brothers. When his fatherWilfredo was being ganged up[on] by appellants
and their co-accused, Anthony tried to help his father but Anthony fell down from the
sudden blow on his back.

While on the ground, Anthony was hit on the head with a lead pipe by appellants
Roger and Marcos and then appellant Juanita hit Anthony three (3) times at his left
eyebrow, right side of his neck, and at the left side of his body in between his left
armpit and left nipple. Before Anthony could run for his safety, accused Jun-jun and
Miguel stabbed him with a knife. Roger chased him, while appellant Alberta was
looking for him with a pointed bamboo. Anthony was treated of his injuries at
the Amang Rodriguez Hospital by Dr. Aladdin Bongco who issued a medico-legal
certificate. He was also medically attended to at the Health Center
of Gulod Malaya.Anthony Villanueva further stated that from a distance of five (5)
meters, he saw appellant Alberto arrive at the scene of the crime and
stab Wilfredo with a pointed bamboo while the latter was still lying prostrate on the
gutter of the street. Appellant Alberta also spat on the body of Wilfredo.

Prosecution eyewitness Hayen Villanueva, daughter of Wilfredo Villanueva, testified

that at about 7:30 oclock in the evening of September 7, 1997, she was with her father
in the kitchen of their house. Her mother, brothers, sisters, and her sister-in-law were
also in their house. It was her fathers birthday and the latter was cooking food for the
occasion. Then, Hayen heard and saw appellant Juanito call up her father. While her
father was at the gate of their yard, Hayen saw from the distance of seven (7) meters,
appellant Juanito stab her father. [From] the same distance, Hayen also saw
appellant Boyet Capacillo spray [tear gas] on the eyes of [her] father. Hayenfully
corroborated the testimony of her brother Anthony on how appellants and their co-
accused fatally ganged up on their father. She said that appellant Alberta Asuela tried
to stab her with a pointed bamboo; however, she was able to run
away. Then, Hayen saw appellants Alberto and Marcos thr[o]w stones at their house
until the police authorities arrived. Hayen also saw Anthony trying to help their father
but was chased by appellants Marcos, Roger, and co-accused Jun-jun. She clearly saw
the incident because the scene of the crime was illuminated by fluorescent bulbs from
the well owned by the Asuelas (situated at a distance of about six (6) arms-length
from the crime scene), from the Santos residence (situated at about seven (7) arms-
length away) and from the residence of the [Evangelios], (situated at about nine (9)
arms-lengths away).

Prosecution eyewitness Magdalena Villanueva, widow of victim Wilfredo Villanueva,

corroborated her childrens testimonies. According to her, while she peeped through
the window of their house and saw the criminal incident, as it transpired from a
distance of four (4) arms-length.
Dr. Ma. Cristina B. Freyra, medico legal officer of PNP Crime
Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City, conducted an autopsy examination on the
cadaver of Wilfredo Villanueva. Dr. Freyra issued Medico-legal Report No. M-1291-
97 on the results of the examination. In the course of her examination,
Dr. Freyra found that Wilfredo sustained twelve (12) wounds, seven (7) of which
were fatal; that the stab wounds could have been caused by four (4) bladed
instruments considering the difference in the measurements of the wounds; the
lacerated wound at the right leg of the victim could have been caused by a pointed
sharp bamboo; that the fractured bones at the head could have been caused by a lead
pipe or a piece of wood. She opened the victims skull and found fractures and
bleeding below and above the brain. She also found that the victims right eyeball was
destroyed and have been caused by stabbing with the use of [a] pointed
instrument. Dr. Freyra issued a death certificate stating therein, among others, that the
cause of death was hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds, xx x.

Prosecution witness Dr. Jose Aladin Bongco, resident physician of

the Amang Rodriguez Medical Center, examined and treated Anthony Villanueva of
his injuries on September 7, 1997. Dr. Bongco reduced his findings in a medico-legal
certificate. He found that Anthony Villanueva sustained a wound on the left frontal
parietal and lacerated wound at the right frontal. Dr. Bongco also found a stab wound
at the nipple area. He closed the wounds to stop the bleeding. He stated that the
lacerated wounds could have been caused by a blunt or any sharp object or by a lead
pipe, and the stab wound by a sharp blunt object. The three (3) wounds could have
been fatal if not for the medical treatment given. (Citations omitted)
[10]

Version of the Defense

In their Brief,[11] appellants submit their version of the events in these words:

All herein accused-appellants except accused Juanito Asuela interposed self-

defense[.]

MARCOS ASUELA testified that on 07 September 1997 at around 6:00 pm, a

commotion occurred in Barangay Gulod, Malaya, San Mateo, Rizal between
the Asuelas and Villanuevas; that he saw Mark Villanueva and Juanita Asuela talking
in front of the store of Aling Betty Santos, [a] distance of around 10 meters from the
place; that he did not hear what they were talking about but certainly, they conversed
for a while when Anthony Villanueva arrived and instructed Mark to leave the place
but the latter refused; [a] few moments later, Wilfredo Villanueva arrived with a
'karet and suddenly brushed/pushed his two Sons aside, and
hacked Juanito Asuelawith a karet inflicting in[j]uries on the latters head which
prompted him to immediately call the attention of barangay official[s] for assistance,
but when he returned together with Alberta Asuela, Kagawad Doromal, Police
Officer Rabina and Barangay Tanod Eddie Santos Wilfredo Asuela was already dead;
that he personally knows Julius Villanueva, son of the victim, who was involved in
a carnapping incident, and it was accused JuanitaAsuela who tipped Atty. Pozon,
owner of the vehicle, of Julius[] participation, hence, the latter was put behind bars;
that when he came back [to] the scene of the incident he saw Juanito Asuela a[l]so
injured; that he helped/assisted the policemen in carrying [to] or placing the cadaver
of Wilfredo Villanueva in the van; that he also helped Magdalena Villanueva
and Hayen Villanueva [in] boarding the vehicle; that he denied having hit Anthony
Villanueva with a lead pipe; that he went [to the] barangay hall on the following day,
08 September 1997[;] however SPO4 Armando Santiago told him to stay in that place
and when he (Santiago) returned accompanied by Magdalena Villanueva and her
daughter Hayen, they pointed to him as the one who hit Wilfredo Villanueva at the
latters back for there were no other persons inside the hall except him so he was
immediately placed under arrest under the pretext of custodial investigation[.]

Accused ALBERTO ASUELA, SR. testified that on 07 September 1997 at around

7:00 pm, he was in the house of Purok Leader Mang Dodong which [was] 500 meters
away from the house of [the] Villanuevas, attending to the birthday celebration of the
latters son Raffy together with [K]agawad Doromal, Mang Dodong and
Policeman Rabina; that he vehemently denied the accusations leveled against him;
that the incident happened on Sunday where Boyet and the latters wife were regularly
selling religious articles at the St. Joseph Church; that at noon of 07 September 1997,
he met Anthony Villanueva and they even played tong-its, after which he proceeded
to Dodongs place to have a drinking spree; that he denied having
struck Wilfredo Villanueva with a bamboo [pole] nor did he chase Anthony
Villanueva for he was at Dodongs place when the incident happened.

"Accused TEOFILO CAPACILLO alias Boyet testified that on 07 September 1997

x x x [h]e was at St. Joseph Church, Quezon City, helping his wife [sell] religious
articles and cigarettes; that there were persons who saw him in that very evening
selling said articles and named them as Sps. Elizabeth and Richard Martin. As a
security guard, he was issued a .38 caliber and was not issued any [tear gas]; that the
accusations levelled against him by Anthony, Magdalena and Hayen Villanueva were
[a] bunch of lies; that he only met Juanito Asuela with several companions at the St.
Joseph Church at around 9:00 pm on 07 September 1997 with blood oozing from his
head; that his wife even gave Juanito money for treatment.

Accused ALBERTO ASUELA, JR. testified that on 07 September 1997 he was at

Vicky Santos place when the incident happened; that he heard and
noticed Juanito Asuela and Mark Villanueva conversing about the apprehension of
Julius Vilanueva in [a] carnapping case, and he heard Anthony Villanueva [confront]
Juanita Asuela uttering the words:
[M]ay sama ako ng loob sa iyo at itoy matatapos lamang kung mailalabas mo si Julius
sa kulungan, and [a] few moments later, Wilfredo Vil[l]anueva arrived and brushed
aside his t[wo] sons (Mark and Anthony), and thereafter hit Juanito Asuela with
a karet; that he saw Juanito r[u]n towards his house already bloodied on the head
closely followed by Wilfredo Villanueva then [a] scuffle ensued between the duo; that
at the time [of] the incident, he did not see Marcos Asuela, Jun-
jun Asuela [or] Boyet Capacillo except his father.

Accused ROGELIO ASUELA alias Roger testified that on 07 September 1997 at

around 7:30 pm., while he together with his family were inside his house watching a
championship game in basketball between Alaska and Gordon Gins somebody
knocked at the door, and when his son Domingo opened the door, he saw one of his
nieces crying and informed him that her father, Juanito Asuela was full of blood, so he
immediately proceeded toJuanitos house and saw him full of blood sitting on the sofa;
that when he asked Juanito what really happened, Juanito did not answer instead he
pointed to him a certain direction which prompted him to go to the place pointed by
Juanita and there he saw Wilfredo Villanueva lying on the ground already dead and
his kumadre Magdalena Villanueva crying; and that when he approached
his kumare Magdalena, the latter uttered:
'[M]gahayop kayo, pagbabayaran ninyong lahat ito.

Accused JUANITO ASUELA alias Fernando Bonifacio, averred that on 07

September 1997 at about 7:00 pm., he was buying cigarette at the store of Mrs. Santos
when Mark Villanueva approached and talked to him regarding the carnapping case of
the latters brother Julius Villanueva whom he reported to Atty. Pozon to be the one
responsible for the carnapping of his car. Minutes later, Anthony Villanueva arrived
and shouted to Mark not to talk to him and uttered: [M]asyado kang mapapel. Kung
gusto mong magkaareglohan tayo, ilabas mo ang kapatid ko sa kulungan. Suddenly
and without any warning, Wilfredo Villanueva who was drunk attacked him but was
pacified by [the] latters son Mark who requested his father and Anthony to go home;
that Anthony boxed him on the head, and when Wilfredo arrived, he suddenly pushed
aside his two Sons and hacked him on the head with a karet; that when he ran towards
his house, he accidentally slipped and fell to the ground, and when he
saw Wilfredo about to attack him again, he picked a stone and threw it [at] the face
of Wilfredo; that he wrest[l]ed the 'karet from Wilfredo to avoid further injury, and in
the process, he felt a knife on the waist of Wilfredo, and he took it and used [it] in
stabbing Wilfredo several times; at this juncture, he saw Anthony coming out of their
house with a lead pipe about to hit him so he embraced Anthony and also stabbed the
latter; that at the time of the incident, his co-accused were not present, and he was
alone defending himself; that at the time he left the scene he noticed the karet still in
the hand of Wilfredo; that because of his bloodied head, he went home and thereafter,
with his sisters went to Boyet Capacillo at the St. Joseph Church. The following day,
he went to the Antipolo General Hospital where his wounds were treated by Dr.
Edwin Borja who issued a medical certificate marked as Annex '10'." [12]

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court gave full faith and credence to the prosecution witnesses because
they were at the crime scene, and their declarations were consistent in describing the
participation of appellants in the crimes charged. Despite their relationship to the
victims, these witnesses were not disbelieved, because no improper motive for testifying
falsely against appellants was proven.Also established was appellants conspiracy in
killing Wilfredo Villanueva and in fatally injuring his son Anthony.
The RTC also rejected the contention of Juanito that he had acted in self-defense --
he had stabbed the victim even after being able to subdue the latter; therefore, unlawful
aggression had ceased. Neither was there any reasonable necessity for Juanito to stab
Anthony, who was allegedly moving towards the former.
Moreover, the court a quo debunked the alibi of the other appellants, because they
had failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene.
Finally, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength in killing Wilfredo and
seriously injuring Anthony was appreciated because of the gross physical disparity
between the versions of appellants and the victims in terms of their number, the
weapons used and the force employed.
Hence, this appeal.[13]

Issues

Appellants submit the following assignment of errors for our consideration:

I

The trial court erred in concluding that there was conspiracy on the part of all the
accused-appellants, and in disregarding the justifying circumstance of self defense of
accused Juanito Asuela;

II

The trial court erred in totally disregarding the evidence of the defense and finding all
the accused guilty of the offenses charged beyond reasonable doubt;
 III

The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of murder by appreciating abuse of
superior strength as a qualifying circumstances. [14]

For purposes of clarity, we deem it wise to restate the assigned errors as follows:
(1) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence; (2) efficacy of self-defense, denial, alibi and
conspiracy; and (3) abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance. We will
discuss them in that order.

This Courts Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in according full faith and credence to
the testimonies of Prosecution Witnesses Anthony, Hayen and Magdalena - all
surnamed Villanueva -- because they had allegedly contradicted one
another. Hayen said that Boyet Capacillo had sprayed tear gas on the eyes of her
father, Wilfredo, before Juanito Asuela and his cohorts ganged up on the old man. On
the other hand, Magdalena maintained that the accused had first surrounded the
deceased before his eyes were sprayed by Capacillo with tear gas.
We are not convinced. Appellants attack on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses is misplaced. Nothing is more well-settled in law than the principle that the
trial courts evaluation of the testimony of witnesses is accorded the highest respect,
even finality, because it had the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and to
determine if they were telling the truth.[15] In the present case, the discrepancy between
the two versions on the sequence of the attack on the deceased does not disprove the
material fact that appellants did attack, maul and kill him.Inconsistencies in the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters
do not affect the substance, the veracity or the weight of the testimony.[16]
Preposterous is the contention of appellants that the Villanuevas filed the charges
against them because Juanito Asuela had implicated Julius Villanueva, one
of Wilfredos sons, in acarnapping incident. It is highly unlikely that
the Villanuevas would place the members of their family at risk in order to get Julius out
of prison. In the absence of proof that an improper motive impelled the witnesses to
wrongly implicate the accused in the commission of the crime, a court cannot refuse to
give due weight and probative value to their testimonies.[17]
 Second Issue:
Self-Defense, Denial, Alibi and Conspiracy

Self-Defense

Appellant Juanito Asuela claims self-defense.[18] Together with the other appellants,
he further alleges that Anthony confirmed his story: that the deceased had followed him
to Mrs. Santos store, which was 10 to 11 meters away from the gate of
the Villanuevas home; that Anthony had confronted him at the store regarding the case
of the formers brother; and that it was Wilfredo who had attacked him with a sickle.
Juanito also alleges that he was boxed on the head by Anthony. The former further
alleges that his two sons -- Anthony and Mark - were pushed aside and his head
hacked with a sickle byWilfredo. Injured by the attack, Juanito ran towards his house,
but slipped and fell to the ground. Wilfredo caught up and wrestled with him for the
sickle. In the process, Juanito felt, on the waist ofWilfredo, a knife which the former
used to stab the latter several times and also to stab Anthony, thereby getting an
opportunity to flee. Juanito then went home and got his sisters to accompany him to St.
Joseph Church to find Boyet Capacillo.
We are not persuaded. Juanitos testimony is self-serving and is not corroborated by
the evidence on hand. His allegations are easy to concoct, but difficult to verify.
Besides, for the resort to self-defense to succeed, the following elements must be
proven: (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
one defending oneself.[19] Self-defense must be proven by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the
person invoking it.[20] Such evidence is sorely lacking in this particular case. Without
adequate proof of unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot stand.

Denial

The other appellants deny their involvement in the crimes, because the altercation
was between Juanito and the deceased. Appellant Marcos Asuela insists that he
immediately called for the assistance of barangay officials when the deceased
hacked Juanitos head with a sickle. The rest contend that they were somewhere else
when the commotion occurred: Alberto was supposedly in the house of a
certain Mang Dodong, the purok leader, together with Kagawad Doromal and
Policeman Rabina; Teofilo Boyet Capacillo, at St. Joseph Church in Quezon City where,
together with his wife, he was selling religious items; and Rogelio Asuela, at home
watching a championship basketball game on television.
We are not convinced. Appellants denials cannot overcome the positive
identification by the three prosecution witnesses.[21] The latters testimonies clearly show
the formers participation in the mauling and the killing of Wilfredo. Besides,
unsubstantiated denials are negative, selfserving and have no weight in law. They
cannot be given greater evidentiary value than that given to testimonies of credible
witnesses on affirmative matters.[22]

Alibi

Alberto and Roger Asuela proffer the defense of alibi which is not tenable, either,
because they have failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crimes.[23]
Clearly, appellants alibis are tenuous. Mang Dodongs house, where
Alberto Asuela was allegedly engaged in a drinking spree, was only 500 meters from
the crime scene;[24] Roger Asuelashouse, only 30-40 meters away.[25] Because they were
not able to show that the crime scene was inaccessible from St. Joseph Church, they
therefore failed to establish that they were somewhere else when the crimes took place,
and that it was impossible for them to have been present at the situs of the crimes at the
time they were committed.[26]
We affirm the RTCs ruling that appellants alibi and denial cannot prevail over the
affirmative testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[27]

Conspiracy

We also hold that the trial court did not err in finding that conspiracy had attended
the crimes.
Surrounding and, in a concerted fashion, assaulting the unarmed victim proved that
appellants had intentionally and voluntarily acted together for the realization of a
common criminal intent to kill the victim.[28] Where the acts of the accused collectively
and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident. [29]

Criminal Case No. 3366-97

The conviction of appellants for the murder of Wilfredo Villanueva is sufficiently

supported by the evidence. On direct examination, Hayen narrated how appellants
collectively and individually mauled and killed her father, as follows:
Q Now, you said [a while] ago that you remember there was an unusual or untoward
incident that transpired[;] kindly inform this Honorable Court what was that unusual
incident that transpired[.]
A Juanito Asuela called my father, stabbed and tear[-] gased my father and they
helped each other, sir.
Q Where was Juanita Asuela when he called your father?
A He was outside our yard, in the street, sir.
Q And when your father was called by Juanito Asuela, did your father
approach Juanito Asuela?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in what place did Juanita Asuela stab your father, was it in the street or
somewhere else?
A He stabbed my father in the gate of our yard, sir.
Q You stated [a while] ago that he was tear[-]gas[s]ed, do you still remember?
xxx xxx xxx
Q By the way, x x x what part of your fathers body was tear[-
]gased by Boyet Capacillo?
A His eyes, sir.
Q And how many times did Juanito Asuela stab your father, if you saw it?
A As I remember, there were many stab blows, sir.
Q And was your father hit with those several stab blows by Juanito Asuela?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was your father hit?
A He was hit on his chest, sir.
Q Were you able to see that instrument used by Juanito Asuela in stabbing your
father?
A Yes, sir.
Q What kind of instrument did he use?
A A knife, sir.
Q What kind of knife was it, a kitchen knife, a balisong or what?
A A kitchen knife, sir.
Q And you also stated awhile ago in Tagalog, At siya po ay pinagtulungan,[] do you still
affirm that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Kindly inform this Honorable Court who were those other persons who ganged up
[on] your father?
A Marcos Asuela, Jun-Jun Asuela, Roger Asuela, Boyet Capacillo, Miguel Asuela and
Alberto Asuela, sir.
Q What did this Marcos Asuela do to your father?
A He hit my father with a lead pipe, sir.
PROS. RAMOLETE:
May I make it of record that my witness is crying.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Was your father hit with those blows delivered by Marcos Asuela with the use of a
lead pipe?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was your father hit?
A In his head, sir.
Q Kindly point to your head where your father was hit with those blows delivered by
Marcos Asuela?
A Here on his forehead, sir.
Q How many times did this Marcos Asuela club your father with that lead pipe?
A Many times, sir.
Q What part of his body was hit with those [that were] several times delivered by
Marcos Asuela [with the use of] that lead pipe?
A On his body, on his chest, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about this Roger Asuela, what did Roger Asuela do to your father?
A He hit my father with a lead pipe, sir.
Q How many times did this Roger Asuela hit your father with a pipe?
A Many times, sir.
Q And was your father hit with those blows delivered by Roger Asuela with that lead
pipe?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was your father hit?
A On the different parts of his body, sir.
Q Where in particular?
A He was hit on the upper part of his hip and left eyebrow, sir.
Q And where was this Roger Asuela positioned in relation to the position of your father
when he clubbed your father with that pipe?
A He was also in front of my father, sir.
Q Were you able to see this Roger Asuela[? W]here did he get that pipe which he used
in clubbing your father?
 A No, sir, because when they approached my father they were already carrying with
them those instruments, sir.
Q What about Marcos Asuela, were you able to see x x x where he got that lead pipe
which he used in clubbing your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where did he get that lead pipe?
A He got the lead pipe from the artesian well because the pipe there is detachable, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about this Alberto Asuela, what did he do to your father?
A My father was already dead then when Alberto Asuela got a pointed bamboo and
stabbed the right foot of my father and he even uttered bad words, sir.
Q Were you able to hear those bad words which Alberto Asuela uttered?
A Yes, sir, and he said, Wala iyan, mahina iyan, sisiw pala iyan, and he even spit on
my father, sir.
Q And how far were you when these Marcos Asuela, Juanita Asuela, Boyet Capacillo,
Jun-Jun Asuela, Roger Asuela, Miguel Asuela and Alberto Asuela were doing this
to your father?
A I was inside our house, sir.
Q How far?
A About six (6) arms[-]length, sir.
xxx xxx xxx.[30]

Criminal Case No. 3365-97

The Court is also convinced that appellants collectively and individually attacked
and injured Anthony, who testified as follows:
Q Now, upon seeing your father being ganged up [on] by these seven (7) accused,
what did you do?
A When I saw my father being ganged up [on] by them, I went near them to help my
father but Boyet said: Hayan pa ang isa.
Q And what else transpired, Mr. witness?
A When Boyet said hayan pa ang isa, suddenly, I felt that somebody hit me at my
back, sir.
Q And what else transpired, Mr. witness?
A When I was hit, I fell down, sir.
Q And then?
 A When I fell down, Roger hit me with a lead pipe on my head, sir.
Q And then, what else?
A Marcos also hit me with a lead pipe on my head, sir.
Q And what else transpired?
A I fell down and Juanito stabbed me on my neck, and also on the left side of my body,
sir.
FISCAL:
In between his left armpit and left nipple with visible scars, your Honor please.
Q How many times did Juanito Asuela stab you?
A Three (3) times, sir.
Q Where were you hit, in what part of your body were you hit by that stabbing blow
delivered by Mr. Juanita Asuela[? A]gain, will you point to this Court the exact
position where you were hit by that stabbing blow?
FISCAL:
Witness, you[r] Honor please, is pointing to his left eyebrow, right side of his neck with
a scar visible, and the other one at the left side of his body in between his left
armpit and left nipple with visible scars.
Q And after that, Mr. Witness, after Marcos Asuela hit you with that lead pipe hitting
you on your head and Roger also hitting you with that lead pipe on your head
and Juanito Asuela stabbing you 3 times, what else transpired, Mr. Witness?
A When I fell down and they were being pacified by my brother Mark Villanueva, that
was the time that I was able to run and Jonjon, Miguel and Roger chased me, sir.[31]
However, we are not convinced that appellants should be held liable for frustrated
murder. The evidence presented by the prosecution failed to show conclusively that the
wounds inflicted on Anthony were fatal or serious. Dr. Jose Aladin Bongco, the doctor
who had attended to Anthony at the Amang Rodriguez Medical Center, opined that all of
the latters wounds can be fatal,[32]implying that the former was not sure of their gravity.
The extent of the medical treatment Dr. Bongco gave the victim was limited to first aid --
stopping the flow of blood from the wounds -- as the latter had refused further medical
examination and treatment. On cross-examination, the doctor declared:
Q You stated that any of the three (3) wounds, you considered fatal, is that correct?
A It could be fatal, sir.
Q And you attest also below that the duration is less than nine (9) days, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Doctor, [a while] ago, you stated among others that the patient refuses to [have]
further treatment, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
 Q We noticed that below the medico-legal findings, Dr. Bongco, that [to] the patient
Anthony Villanueva, you recommended that the condition of his wounds may last
x x x nine (9) days [or less] unless [a] complication arises. Do you agree with me
that the wounds were slight injuries only?
A Externally, the wounds look like non-penetrate [sic] because of the limitation of
further work out[.] I cant tell [if] the patient is having penetrating injuries but based
on the external signs of the injuries, sir.[33] [Italics supplied]
He even reported his findings in the Medico-Legal Certificate as follows:

Lacerated wound 4 cms left fronto parietal

Stab wound 3 cm 4th ICS AAL left

Lacerated wound 3 cms right frontal

Positive alcoholic breath

xxx xxx xxx

The above mentioned conditions may last [for] x x x nine days [or less] unless
complications [arise]. [34]

In the absence of more convincing evidence, we hold that the prosecution failed to
prove that appellants had fatally wounded Anthony Villanueva. Thus, they should be
held liable only for slight physical injuries under Article 266 of the Revised Penal
Code.[35] This is because his injuries lasted less than nine days.

Third Issue:
Abuse of Superior Strength

From the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, it is clear that appellants abused
their superior strength. They used excessive force out of proportion to the means for
self-defense available to the person they attacked.[36] Aside from being numerically
superior to the unarmed Wilfredo and his son Anthony, the assailants were also armed
with knives, pointed bamboo poles, tear gas and lead pipes. And, equally important,
they used their superior number and weapons to their great advantage in methodically
attacking their prey.

Proper Penalty

The solicitor general contends that the trial court erred in refusing to impose on
appellants an indeterminate sentence for the murder of Wilfredo Villanueva.
 We disagree. Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as
amended) provides that it shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with
death penalty or life imprisonment; x x x. It must be noted that appellants were
convicted of murder which is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, in the absence of any proven aggravating circumstance,
they were correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision in Criminal Case
No. 3366-97 is AFFIRMED, while that in Criminal Case No. 3365-97 is MODIFIED;
appellants are found GUILTY of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES and are hereby
SENTENCED to twenty days of ARRESTO MENOR.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., abroad on official business.

[1]
Penned by Judge Jose C. Reyes Jr.; rollo, pp. 37-51.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 50-51; records, pp. 326-327.
[3]
Docketed as Crim. Case No. 3365-97.
[4]
Co-accused Jun-jun Asuela and Miguel Asuela remain at large.
[5]
Rollo, p. 13; records, p. 1.
[6]
Crim. Case No. 3366-97.
[7]
Supplemental records, p. 1.
[8]
Assisted by Atty. Hector Centeno, Marcos Asuela was arraigned on December 19, 1997 (Crim. Case
No. 3365-97; records, p. 48); and Teofilo Capacillo, on December 19, 1997 (Crim. Case No.
3366-97; records, p. 7). Assisted by Atty. Alfonso Capacillo, Roger Asuela was arraigned on April
7, 1998 (Crim. Case No. 3365-97; records, p. 99); Juanito, on May 29, 1998 (records, p. 116);
and Alberto, on November 18, 1998 (records, p. 187).
[9]
Appellees Brief was signed by Sol. Gen. Simeon V. Marcelo, Asst. Sol. Gen. Maria Aurora
P. Corts and Carminda O. Punzalan-Gaite for Sol. Evaristo M. Padilla.
[10]
Appellees Brief, pp. 4-10; rollo, pp. 124-130.
[11]
Signed by Atty. Eduardo C. Vallejo of Lapea and Associates.
[12]
Appellants Brief, pp. 8-12; rollo, pp. 82-86.
[13]
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 5, 2001, upon receipt by this Court
of appellees Brief. Appellants Brief was received by the Court on November 7, 2000. The filing of
a Reply Brief was deemed waived, as none had been submitted within the reglementary period.
[14]
Rollo, p. 12.
[15]
People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79, 88, January 14, 1998; People v. Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199, 212,
January 16, 1998; People v. Alfeche, 294 SCRA 352, 375, August 17, 1998; People v. Liaguno,
285 SCRA 124, 135, January 28, 1998; People v. Villamor, 292 SCRA 384, 394, July 10, 1998.
[16]
People v. Obello, supra, p. 89; People v. Alfeche, supra, p. 370; People v. Llaguno, supra, p.
140; People v. Tulop, 289 SCRA 316, 333, April 21, 1998.
[17]
People v. Lacatan, 295 SCRA 203, 213, September 7, 1998; People v. Lapay, 298 SCRA 62, 77-
78, October 14, 1998.
[18]
Ironically, appellants Brief (p. 8) seems to disclaim this defense when it states: All herein accused-
appellants except accused Juanito Asuela interposed self-defense. And yet, the text (pp. 13-17)
of the Brief discusses Juanitosclaim of self-defense.
[19]
People v. Vermudez, 302 SCRA 276, 284, January 28, 1999; People v. Santillan, 308 SCRA 104,
114, June 9, 1999.
[20]
People v. Sanchez, 308 SCRA 264, 284, June 16. 1999; People v. Bitoon Sr., 309 SCRA 209, 217-
218, June 28, 1999.
[21]
People v. Obello, supra; People v. Cabiles, supra, p. 217.
[22]
People v. Villamor, supra, p. 395; People v. Liaguno, supra, p. 139; People v. Tumaob Jr., 291 SCRA
133, 141, June 22, 1998; People v. Atop, 286 SCRA 157, 174, February 10, 1998.
[23]
People v. Galido, 326 SCRA 187, 195, February 22, 2000.
[24]
TSN, January 12, 1999, p. 4.
[25]
TSN, February 11, 1999, p. 3.
[26]
People v. Reduca, 301 SCRA 516, 534, January 21, 1999; People v. Villanueva, 302 SCRA 380, 393,
January 29, 1999; People v. Verde, 302 SCRA 690, 705, February 10, 1999.
[27]
People v. Reduca, supra; People v. Banela, 301 SCRA 84, 93, January 18, 1999; People v. Hilado,
307 SCRA 535, 554, May 24, 1999; People v. Macahia, 307 SCRA 404, 420, May 19, 1999.
[28]
People v. Gallo, 318 SCRA 157, 165, November 16, 1999.
[29]
People v. Bitoon Sr., supra, p. 220; People v. Hernando, 317 SCRA 617, 625, October 28, 1999.
[30]
TSN, March 27, 1998, pp. 4-9.
[31]
TSN, February 13, 1998, pp. 13-14.
[32]
TSN, February 6, 1998, p. 7.
[33]
Ibid., pp. 7-10.
[34]
Exh. A, Crim. Case No. 3365-97; records, p. 153.
[35]
Article 266(1) provides:
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:
1. By arresto menor, when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the
same period.
xxx xxx xxx
[36]
People v. Agsunod Jr., 306 SCRA 612, 630, May 3, 1999; People v. Ocumen, 319 SCRA 539,
564, December 2, 1999.
 THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 172608

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:
BERNARD MAPALO,
Accused-Appellant. February 6, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In its Decision[1] dated 27 October 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
32 of Agoo, La Union, in Criminal Case No. A-2871, found appellant Bernard
Mapalo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and imposed upon
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision[2] dated 21 November 2005, modifying the Decision of the RTC, and
finding Bernard Mapalo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated
Murder.

The Indictments

Appellant, together with Peter Doe, John Doe and Peter Doe, Jr., was
charged before the RTC of Agoo, La Union with the crime of Murder, said to have
been committed as follows:
 That on or about the 13th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of Aringay,
Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and being then armed with
lead pipes and bladed weapons and conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping each other, did then and there by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strength, wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on one
Manuel Piamonte y Ugay by clubbing him with the said pipes and stabbing him
several times with the said bladed weapons, and thereby inflicting on the
aforenamed victim fatal injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

Contrary to law.[3]

The RTC ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of the
appellant. No bail was recommended.[4] When the case was called, appellant filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation and Bail, which was granted.

On 27 March 1995, 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Manuel S. Oliva

filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information and for the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest for the Apprehension of the Other Accused,[5] alleging that a reinvestigation
was conducted and a prima facie case was found against the other accused. It was
prayed that an amended information be admitted and a warrant of arrest be issued
for the apprehension of Alejandro Fajardo, Jr., Jimmy Frigillana, and Rolando
Mapalo alias Lando. Finding the Motion to be well-taken, the RTC issued an
Order,[6] dated 27 April 1995, admitting the Amended Information, viz:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses BERNARD

MAPALO, ALEJANDRO FAJARDO, JR., JIMMY
FRIGILLANA and ROLANDO MAPALO alias Lando of the crime of
MURDER, committed as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of

Aringay, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and being then
armed with lead pipe and bladed weapons and conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping each other, did then and there by means of treachery and with
evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strength, wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on one
Manuel Piamonte y Ugay by clubbing him with the said pipe and stabbing him
several times with the said bladed weapons, and thereby inflicting on the
 aforenamed victim fatal injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.[7]

Consequently, a warrant of arrest was issued for the apprehension of

Alejandro Fajardo, Jr., Jimmy Frigillana, and Rolando Mapalo alias Lando. Only
Alejandro Fajardo, Jr. was apprehended; the other two remain at large.

On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.[8] Thereafter, trial on the

merits commenced.

After the prosecution had rested its case, Alejandro Fajardo, Jr. filed a
Demurrer to Evidence which was granted by the RTC, in its Order[9] dated 5
November 1998, on the ground that the prosecution did not present any evidence
against him. Thus, only accused Bernard Mapalo proceeded to present his
evidence. He was eventually found guilty.

The Case for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented Calixto Garcia (Garcia) as its lone eyewitness.

Garcia testified that on 12 February 1994, a pre-Valentine dance was held

in Sitio Baracbac, Brgy. Sta. Cecilia in Aringay, La Union. He watched the dance,
along with the appellant and Jimmy Frigillana.[10] In the early morning of 13
February 1994, at around 3:00 a.m., a fight erupted between Manuel Piamonte
(Piamonte) and the group of Lando Mapalo,[11] Jimmy Frigillana, and the
appellant.[12]

Garcia further testified that he witnessed the fight from a distance of more or
less five (5) meters. He claimed that he could see the incident very clearly because
of the light at the dancing hall.[13] He saw the appellant club Piamonte with a lead
pipe from behind, hitting him on the right side of the head.[14] The pipe was one
and a half (1 and ) feet in length, and one and a half (1 and ) inches in
diameter.[15] At that time when the appellant struck Piamonte with a lead pipe, he
saw Jimmy Frigillana and Lando Mapalo standing in front of Piamonte. Later, he
saw the dead body of Piamonte, which had suffered multiple stab wounds.[16] He
saw stab wounds on the left and right parts of the abdomen, and below the left
breast, as well as small wounds on the front part of his left hip.[17] Garcia disclosed
that he neither witnessed how Piamonte was stabbed, nor did he see the act of
stabbing Piamonte.[18] He does not know who stabbed the latter.[19] It was only
when Piamontes shirt was removed when he saw stab wounds on the formers dead
body.[20]
The Case for the Defense

Appellant testified that in the evening of 13 February 1994,[21] at

around 9:00 p.m., he, along with his wife, Caridad Mapalo, entertained several
guests at their residence, namely, Crispin Calderon, Noel Cordero, Ruel Mercado,
and Rolando Mapalo.[22] They drank wine.[23] Appellant knew that there was a
Valentines Day dance celebration at the dance hall, located northeast of his house
at a distance of about 20-30 meters.[24] At 12:30 a.m., after his guests had left the
house, he went to sleep.[25] At 3:00 a.m., his wife woke him up and was informed
that somebody had been stabbed. He said he came to know that Piamonte was the
person who was stabbed.[26] He added that he planned to go out of the house, but
his wife prevented him from doing so.[27] He, thereafter, returned to his room, and
went back to sleep.[28]

Corroborating the appellants defense of denial and alibi, his wife, Caridad
Mapalo, narrated that on 13 February 1994[29] at 8:00 p.m., she served brandy to
her husband and their guests at their residence. The celebration finished at
around 12:00 midnight.[30] Thereafter, she and her husband went to sleep, while
their guests proceeded to the dance hall. At 3:00 a.m., she awoke because of a
commotion from the dance hall.[31] She described that the dance hall is around 60
to 70 meters, southwest of their residence.[32] She went outside of their house, and
along with her sister-in-law, Marissa Dapit, proceeded to the edge of the dancing
hall.[33] She claimed that her husband did not go out and just stayed at their
house.[34] She explained that she and Marissa Dapit went out to see or to know the
name of the person who died at the commotion.[35] At the dancing hall, she saw the
body of Piamonte, lying face down.[36]

The Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision, dated 27 October 2004, finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

It ruled that appellants defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the lone eyewitness. As emphasized by the RTC, per admission of
appellant, the distance between his house and the dancing hall is only 20 to 30
meters, more or less. There was no physical impossibility for the appellant to be
present at the scene of the crime.Moreover, it found Garcias testimony to be
consistent and uncontradicted. On the other hand, the RTC considered the
testimony of Caridad Mapalo as defying the natural course of human reaction and
experience. The RTC found it strange that it was only Caridad Mapalo who was
awakened by the commotion, while the appellant remained asleep. Learning of the
same, Caridad Mapalo exposed herself to danger by proceeding to the dance hall to
see what the commotion was all about without even informing her husband. The
RTC conjectured that Caridad Mapalo proceeded to the dance hall not to see what
the commotion was all about, but because she was informed that her husband was
involved in a fight.[37]

Further, the RTC ruled that conspiracy was established by the

prosecution. According to the RTC, the appellant was clearly identified by Garcia
as the one who struck Piamonte on the head with a lead pipe, which alone is
sufficient manifestation of a concerted, common and united design with the other
accused to commit an unlawful and felonious act. The fact that the medical
certificate shows the cause of death as stab wounds was deemed by the RTC as
immaterial, in view of the presence of conspiracy. The RTC also appreciated the
attendance of abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance, on the
rationalization that the perpetrators were armed with bladed weapons and a lead
pipe that were out of proportion to the unarmed Piamonte.

The decretal portion of the RTC Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the accused BERNARD MAPALO is hereby found

Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Further, the accused is ordered to pay the heirs of Manuel Piamonte the
amount of Twelve Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos (P12,700.00) as actual
damages. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the death of
Piamonte and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.[38]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Before the appellate court, appellant challenged the credibility of the

prosecutions lone eyewitness. Appellant similarly assailed the ruling of the RTC
on the ground that it erred in convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[39]

The Court of Appeals found no adequate reason to disturb the findings of the
RTC in weighing the testimony of Garcia. It did not find significant the alleged
inconsistencies in Garcias affidavits as executed before the investigating police and
the prosecutor.[40] The appellate court did not accept the appellants defense of
alibi. The positive identification of the prosecution witness which was consistent
and categorical, and shown to be without ill-motive, has discredited appellants
defense.

The Court of Appeals, however, found reason to modify the findings of the
RTC. It convicted the appellant of frustrated murder only. It was not convinced
that the evidence on record established conspiracy among the appellant and his co-
accused. The appellate court rationalized that while the evidence shows that
Piamonte sustained stab wounds which caused his death,[41] the appellant was
never identified as the one who inflicted the stab wounds on the
deceased. According to the appellate court, the prosecutions evidence only
established that the appellant clubbed Piamonte with a lead pipe. However, the
prosecutions witness did not see the stabbing. He was not able to describe the
particular acts which caused Piamontes death. Hence, it cannot be inferred from
the account of the witness that the appellant and his co-accused came to an
agreement to commit a felony, or that they decided to commit the same, by
concerted acts.[42] The Court of Appeals made the following observations:

In the first place, the killing was the result of a fight that erupted suddenly
during the Valentine dance, which discourages the conclusion that the killing was
planned. Also, the witness did not see any stabbing. He did not see anyone else
perform any act of stabbing or hitting, other than the appellant delivering blows
with a lead pipe on the victim. There is no proof, therefore, of any concerted
action or common design to kill the victim that could be the basis for a finding of
conspiracy among several malefactors. Because of this, it could not be said that
conspiracy was proven attendant beyond reasonable doubt.[43]

In the absence of a conspiracy, the Court of Appeals said that the appellant
could only be held liable for the consequences of his own criminal act. It ruled that
when the appellant hit Piamonte in the head with the lead pipe, he performed all
the acts that would have brought about the death of the victim.[44] Piamontes death
however was due to some other supervening cause, independent of the appellants
will.[45]
 The fallo of the Court of Appeals Decision reads, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the lower courts Decision is hereby

MODIFIED, in that the accused-appellant Bernard Mapalo is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder. Accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum to 14 years,
8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Further, the accused is ordered to pay the heirs of Manuel Piamonte[,] the
amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages,
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as civil indemnity and Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence. (People v. Pacana, 345 SCRA 72 [2000]; People v. Givera, 349
SCRA 513 [2001]).[46]

The Issues

Appellant contends that:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN OPEN COURT; and

II
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF FRUSTRATED
MURDER INSTEAD OF FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE.[47]

The Ruling of the Court

In support of the first assignment of error, appellant raises, for the first time,
the defense that the witness for the prosecution failed to positively identify him
during the trial proceedings. Citing People v. Galera[48] and People v.
Hatton,[49] appellant submits that the prosecution failed to discharge its first duty,
which is the identification of the accused as the author of the crime
charged.[50] Witness Garcia did not identify the appellant in open court.
 Appellant further posits that Garcia did not deny drinking gin at around 9:00
p.m. on 13 February 1994 until 3:00 a.m. of the following day. Garcia was then
intoxicated if he had been drinking hard liquor continuously for six hours. At such
point, he can no longer positively determine a persons identity. It is argued that the
foregoing circumstances create doubts as to the identity of the appellant as one of
the perpetrators of the crime.

We first tackle the issue on the lack of in-court identification.

True that on the matter of identification, the Court in Hatton said:

More importantly, the accused-appellant was not positively identified in

court. True, his name was referred to by both Basierto and Ongue in their
respective direct testimonies. However, he was not identified in Court. The failure
of the prosecution witness to positively identify the assailant in court is fatal to the
prosecutions cause. Pre-trial identification is not sufficient.[51]

Verily, the records are bereft of proof that there was in-court identification
by the witness Garcia of the appellant. Indeed, Garcia did not point to the appellant
in the courtroom. Such fact can be gleaned from the pertinent portion of the
transcript of stenographic notes of the trial, reproduced hereunder, as follows:

Direct-examination by Prosecutor Rudio

of the witness Calixto Garcia

Q Do you know the accused Bernard Mapalo?

A I know, sir.

Q If that accused is inside the courtroom now will you please stand up and point
to him if he is inside the courtroom?

A No, he is not around.

COURT:

Q Was he notified for (sic) todays hearing?

INTERPRETER:
 Yes, he signed, sir.

COURT: O R D E R:
It appears that the accused Bernard Mapalo was being notified for (sic)
todays hearing and his wife came to Court and informed the Honorable Court that
her husband could not come to Court because he is sick.[52]

The same testimony, however, conspicuously reveals that there was no

identification in open court of the appellant because said appellant was not present
at the time, despite notice, as according to his wife, he was sick.

In a later case, this Court clarified that a physical courtroom identification is

essential only when there is a question or doubt on whether the one alleged to have
committed the crime is the same person who is charged in the information and
subject of the trial. In People v. Quezada,[53] this Court expounded, thus:

We do not see the absolute need for complainant to point to appellant in

open court as her attacker. While positive identification by a witness is required
by the law to convict an accused, it need not always be by means of a physical
courtroom identification. As the court held in People v. Paglinawan:

x x x. Although it is routine procedure for witnesses to point out the

accused in open court by way of identification, the fact that the witness x x x did
not do so in this case was because the public prosecutor failed to ask her to point
out appellant, hence such omission does not in any way affect or diminish the
truth or weight of her testimony.

In-court identification of the offender is essential only when there is a

question or doubt on whether the one alleged to have committed the crime is the
same person who is charged in the information and subject of the trial. This is
especially true in cases wherein the identity of the accused, who is a stranger to
the prosecution witnesses, is dubitable. In the present case, however, there is no
doubt at all that the rapist is the same individual mentioned in the Informations
and described by the victim during the trial. (Emphasis supplied.)[54]

We do not find herein a case where there is a question or doubt as to whether

the one alleged to have committed the crime is the same person charged in the
information and subject of the trial. In fact, appellant never denied that he is the
person indicted in the Information, and subject of the proceedings. His denial is
that he did not participate in the commission of the crime. Hence, in-court
identification is not indispensable in the case at bar.
 We are convinced that the identity of the appellant was sufficiently
established by the evidence on record.

The appellant is not a stranger to the witness Garcia. The identity of the
appellant to Garcia does not appear to be controvertible. In fact, appellant himself
admits that he and Garcia are friends. Thus:

Cross-examination by Prosecutor Lachica

of [appellant] Bernard Mapalo

Q Mr. Witness you said that you were informed by your counsel a while ago that
a certain Calixto Garcia testified against you in this case did I get you
right?

A Yes, sir.

Q And this Calixto Garica is a resident of the same Barangay as you are?

A Yes, sir.

Q In fact this Calixto Garcia is an acquaintance of yours?

A Yes, sir.

Q He is considered a friend?

A Yes, sir I consider him as such.

Q Prior to the incident which happened sometime on February 13, 1994, you have
never quarreled with this Calixto Garcia?

A No, sir.

Q Even after that incident that happened on February 13, 1994 you never
quarreled with Calixto Garcia?

A No, sir.

Q You know that this Calixto Garcia is not a relative of Piamonte the victim in
this case?

A I do not know whether he is a relative of the victim or not.

 Q You know for a fact that Calixto Garcia executed a statement before the police
pointing to you or pointing to you as the assailant of Paimonte did you
come to know that?

A No, sir.
Q You said that you know Calixto Garcia your friend according to you, did you confront
him when he testified against you in court?

A No, sir.

Q You did not tell your friend that he was mistaken in identifying you as the
assailant of Piamonte, correct?

A No, sir. [55]

The proper identification of the appellant is further bolstered by the fact that
appellants wife, Caridad Mapalo corroborated the testimony that the witness
Garcia is a family friend of the spouses. Thus:

Cross examination of Caridad Mapalo

by Prosecutor Lachica

Q Do you know a certain Calixto Garcia?

A Yes, sir.

Q He is your Barangay mate?

A Yes, sir.

Q His house is closed to your house, correct?

A Far, sir.

Q But he is staying within your barangay which is Sta. Cecilia?

A Yes, sir.

Q This Calixto Garcia whom you know is a friend of your family, correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q In fact, your family have (sic) never quarreled with Calixto Garcia?
 A None, sir.

Q Prior to the filing of this case, you know that Calixto Garcia being a friend will
not falsify his testimony regarding your husband?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. RIMANDO:
Objection, your honor.

COURT:
Objection overruled.

PROSECUTOR LACHICA:

Q Until now, this Calixto Garcia is your friend?

A Yes, sir.

PROSECUTOR LACHICA:
That would be all for the witness.

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY ATTY. RIMANDO:

Q This Calixto Garcia was your guest in that evening in your residence?

A No, sir.

Q Is your family close with (sic) this Calixto Garcia?

A Yes, sir.[56]

Moreover, we do not find herein the presence of factors[57] that could cause
the witness Garcia to misidentify the appellant. In People v. Limpangog,[58] this
Court enumerated several other known causes of misidentification, viz:

x x x Known causes of misidentification have been identified as follows:

Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a

crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event actually
occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the event. Third, the
witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of
unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for
whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information accurately,
they are limited by normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences.[59]
There is no question that the witness Garcia was at a close range of merely five
meters more or less from the scene of the incident.[60] Neither can it be said that the
illumination was poor. The dancing hall was lighted.[61] No improper motive was
attributed to the witness Garcia for testifying against the appellant. Moreover,
witness Garcia is familiar not only to appellant. Garcia was also familiar with the
deceased, Piamonte. Witness Garcia, in his testimony, referred to Piamonte as his
third cousin.[62]

On appellants submission that it is doubtful if witness Garcia can still have

positively identified him as one of the perpetrators of the crime considering that the
former admitted to drinking hard liquor from 9:00 p.m. on 13 February 1994 until
3:00 a.m. of the following day, we are not convinced that the same can overthrow
the trial courts evaluation of Garcias testimony. Beyond appellants bare
allegations, no evidence whatsoever was produced to show that Garcia suffered
from such a level of intoxication as to impair his facility and disable him to
identify appellant. In the case of People v. Dee,[63] the credibility of the surviving
victim therein as witness was disputed because he was under the influence of
liquor at the time of the incident. In Dee, the witness was even found positive for
alcoholic breath, but the Court ruled that such fact does not necessarily prevent
him from making a positive identification of his attackers, especially since his level
of intoxication was not shown to impair his faculties. The credibility of the witness
therein was not made to suffer on that score alone.[64]

The foregoing material considerations, taken together with the fact that
witness Garcia and the appellant are not strangers to each other, satisfy us that the
danger of Garcia misidentifying the appellant does not exist. Where the
prosecution eyewitness was familiar with both victim and accused, and where
the locus criminis afforded good visibility, and where no improper motive can be
attributed to the witness for testifying against the accused, his version of the story
deserves much weight.[65]

Hence, we do not find any reason to depart from the general rule that the
conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great
respect, viz:

The assessment of the credibility of witness and their testimony is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand; and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under
 examination. Its findings on such matters are binding and conclusive on appellate
courts unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.[66]

Appellants defense of alibi and denial cannot stand in the face of the positive
identification of the accused. We have unfailingly held that alibi and denial being
inherently weak cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime.[67] It is facile to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and is
generally rejected.[68]

For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be shown with clear and convincing
evidence that at the time of the commission of the crime charged, the accused is in
a place other than the situs of the crime such that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the situs criminis when the crime was committed.[69]

In the case at bar, appellant was not successful in invoking the defense of
alibi. Appellant insists that he was sleeping at his residence at the time when the
incident occurred. The RTC and the Court of Appeals consistently found that the
distance between appellants residence and the dance hall, or the situs criminis, is
20 to 30 meters, more or less.[70]Such a distance is negligible. In fact, appellants
wife testified that from their residence, she could see the people dancing at the
hall.[71] It was not highly impossible for the appellant to be physically present at the
dancing hall at the time of the occurrence of the incident. We, therefore, reject
appellants defense of alibi.

We shall now determine the criminal liability of the appellant.

To reiterate, the RTC, in convicting the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder, proceeded from a rationalization that there was conspiracy
among appellant and his co-accused. It also appreciated the attendance of abuse of
superior strength to qualify the crime to Murder.

The Court of Appeals was unable to agree with the RTC. It found that the
conspiracy was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It ruled that the witness
Garcia admitted to not being able to see the stabbing. He could only attest to the
clubbing of the victim by appellant with a lead pipe. No proof was shown as to the
concerted action of the malefactors of their common design to kill. It, thus,
modified the RTCs conviction, and, instead, found appellant guilty of frustrated
murder.
The Amended Information charged the appellant and his co-accused with
conspiracy in killing Piamonte.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. [72] Conspiracy as a
basis for conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral
certainty.[73] Considering the far-reaching consequences of criminal conspiracy, the
same degree of proof necessary in establishing the crime is required to support the
attendance thereof, i.e., it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself.[74] Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor
simultaneous actions is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy.[75]

We are, further, guided by the following pronouncement of the Court:

For conspiracy to exist, the participants must agree to the commission of the
felony and decide to commit it, which agreement may be deduced from the mode
and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from the acts that point
to joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of intent. x x x.[76]

While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, it is,

nonetheless, required that it be proved by clear and convincing evidence by
showing a series of acts done by each of the accused in concert and in pursuance of
the common unlawful purpose.[77]

There is a want of evidence to show the concerted acts of the appellant and his co-
accused in pursuing a common design - to kill the deceased, Piamonte. The sole
eyewitness for the prosecution, Garcia, was categorical and precise in declaring
that he did not see the act of stabbing Piamonte, nor the manner in which Piamonte
was stabbed. He later learned that Piamonte died from stab wounds when he saw
the latters dead body covered with stab wounds. The cause of death of Piamonte,
as found by the RTC and the Court of Appeals,[78] and as borne by the records, is
multiple stab wounds.[79] It was, thus, incumbent on the part of the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant and his co-accused acted in
concert with a unity of purpose to kill Piamonte. They must show to the
satisfaction of this Court the appellants overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity.[80] They must show that appellants act of striking Piamonte with a pipe
was an intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose.[81]
 The prosecution was unable to show, either by direct or indirect evidence,
proof of the agreement among the appellant and his co-accused to warrant
conspiracy as a basis for appellants conviction. No evidence was even adduced to
show implied conspiracy. Nothing has been shown that the appellant and his co-
accused were aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.[82]

This complete absence of evidence on the part of the prosecution to show the
conduct of the appellant and his co-accused, disclosing a common understanding
among them relative to the commission of the offense,[83] is fatal to the
prosecution. The prosecutions witness could not testify on the manner by which the
deceased Piamonte was stabbed, precisely because by his own admission, he did
not see the stabbing. No account of the stabbing which caused the death of the
deceased Piamonte was ever given nor shown. Unfortunately, no account of how
Piamonte died was ever given, except for the established fact that he died due to
stabbing. The appellants act of holding a lead pipe and hitting the deceased in the
head was not shown to be in furtherance of the common design of killing the
deceased. What transpired during the stabbing of the victim, which is material to
proving the fact of conspiracy, is, regrettably, left merely to speculation. This
Court must neither conjecture nor surmise that a conspiracy existed. The rule is
clear that the guilt of the accused must be proved with moral certainty. [84] All
doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. Thus, the time honored principle
in criminal law that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more
explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with
his guilt, the Court should adopt that which is more favorable to the accused for
then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty.[85]

Liability of the Accused Bernard Mapalo

There being no conspiracy, the liability of the appellant will revolve around
his individual participation in the event.[86]

In the case of Li v. People,[87] a street fight ensued resulting in the death of

the victim therein. No conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
liability of the accused Li who was shown to have struck the victims right arm with
a baseball bat, resulting in a contusion was, thus, determined by the Court in the
following manner:
 The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victims right arm
that resulted from Li striking [the victim] Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of
the victims supervening death from injuries which cannot be attributed to Li
beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion caused by Li are not mortal
or at least lie entirely in the realm of speculation. When there is no evidence of
actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required medical
attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries, penalized as follows:

xxxx

The duration of the penalty of arresto menor is from one day to thirty
days. The felony of slight physical injuries is necessarily included in the homicide
charges. Since the Information against Li states that among the means employed
to commit the felonious act was the use of the baseball bat, conviction on the
lesser offense or slight physical injuries is proper. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances established, the imposition of the penalty in its medium
period is warranted. Li was convicted by the RTC on January 5, 1994. Having
long served more than the imposable penalty, Li is entitled to immediate release
unless, of course, he is being lawfully detained for another cause.[88]

In the case at bar, no injury was shown to be attributable to the appellant. The only
medical evidence that appears on records is the deceased Piamontes death
certificate,[89] which indicates that the cause of death is massive
hypovolemia[90] secondary to multiple stab wounds. The factual findings of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals coincide to show that the cause of death of
Piamonte is multiple stab wounds. Nothing has been shown otherwise. Other than
the presence of multiple stab wounds, no other type of injury on the deceased was
established. No contusions or injury on the head of the victim or anywhere else in
his body caused by a lead pipe was shown. The witness Garcia, in his testimony,
merely pointed to stab wounds on the different parts of the body of the
deceased.[91] No proof on the injury that was sustained by the deceased that can be
attributable to appellants act was demonstrated. No other physical evidence was
proffered.[92]

We cannot convict appellant of Attempted or Frustrated Murder or Homicide. The

principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated homicide or murder is the
assailants intent to take the life of the person attacked.[93] Such intent must be
proved clearly and convincingly, so as to exclude reasonable doubt
thereof.[94] Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or
number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and
number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was
committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are
inflicted by him on the victim.[95]

In the case at bar, no motive on the part of appellant to kill Piamonte was
shown either prior or subsequent to the incident. Nor can such intent to kill be
inferred from his acts. It bears reiterating that no injury on the body of the
deceased was attributed to the appellants act of hitting the victim with a lead
pipe. On the nature of the weapon used, the lead pipe was described by Garcia as
one and a half feet in length, and one and a half inches in diameter. The relevant
testimony of Garcia on the incident follows:

Q Now you said that Bernard Mapalo clubbed this Manuel Piamonte. He
clubbed him from behind?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what did he use in clubbing the victim, is it lead pipe?

A Yes, sir.

Q How long is that lead pipe?

A Around this length. (Witness demonstrated 1 1/2 feet).

Q And how wide is the diameter?

A 1 inches.

Q What part of his body was hit?

A Right side of the head, sir. (Witness showing the right side of his
head.)[96]

Homicidal intent must be evidenced by the acts that, at the time of their
execution, are unmistakably calculated to produce the death of the victim by
adequate means.[97]We cannot infer intent to kill from the appellants act of hitting
Piamonte in the head with a lead pipe. In the first place, wounds were not shown to
have been inflicted because of the act. Secondly, absent proof of circumstances to
show the intent to kill beyond reasonable doubt, this Court cannot declare that the
same was attendant.

When the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury,
and without causing dishonor, the offense is Maltreatment under Article
266,[98] par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. It was beyond reasonable doubt that by
hitting Piamonte, appellant ill-treated the latter, without causing any injury. As we
have earlier stated, no proof of injury was offered. Maltreatment is necessarily
included in Murder, which is the offense charged in the Information. Thus:

ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:

xxxx
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos when
the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury.

The duration of the penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period is 1 day to 10
days.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 21 November 2005,

in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00408 is MODIFIED. Appellant Bernard Mapalo
is ACQUITTEDof the charge of MURDER for lack of evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. He is found GUILTY of the crime of MALTREATMENT, as
defined and punished by Article 266, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. He is
accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of arresto menor of
10 days. Considering that appellant has been incarcerated since 2004, which is
well-beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons is ordered to cause appellants IMMEDIATE RELEASE, unless
appellant is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court, within
five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the compliance therewith.

SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES SANTIAGO

Associate Justice
 Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Presiding Judge Samuel R. Martires; records, pp. 380-388.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Lucenito N.
Tagle, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 81-91.
[3]
Records, p. 1-a.
[4]
Id. at 6.
[5]
Id. at 35.
[6]
Id. at 41.
[7]
Id. at 36.
[8]
Id. at 62.
[9]
Id. at 243-250.
[10]
TSN, 15 July 1996, p. 7.
[11]
Referring to one of the accused, Rolando Mapalo alias Lando.
[12]
Supra note 10 at 8.
[13]
Id. at 10.
[14]
Id. at 13-14.
[15]
Id. at 14.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id.
[18]
Id. at 10.
[19]
Id.
[20]
Id. at 15.
[21]
There appears to be a confusion on the date. The incident transpired from the evening of 12 February 1994 to
early morning of 13 February 1994.
[22]
TSN, 28 June 1999, p. 3.
[23]
Id. at 4.
[24]
Id. at 3-4.
[25]
Id.
[26]
Id. at 6.
[27]
Id. at 5-6.
[28]
Id.
[29]
Supra note 21.
[30]
TSN, 23 February 1999, p. 5.
[31]
Id. at 7.
[32]
Id.
[33]
Id. at 8.
[34]
Id. at 10.
[35]
Id. at 9.
[36]
Id.
[37]
Records, p. 385.
[38]
Id. at 387-388.
[39]
CA rollo, p. 32.
[40]
Id. at 85.
[41]
Id. at 86.
[42]
Id. at 86-87.
[43]
Id. at 88.
[44]
Id.
[45]
Id.
[46]
Id. at 90.
[47]
Rollo, pp. 19 and 22.
[48]
345 Phil. 731 (1997).
[49]
G.R. No. 85043, 16 June 1992, 210 SCRA 1.
[50]
Supra note 45.
[51]
Supra note 49 at 17.
[52]
TSN, 15 July 1996, p. 6.
[53]
425 Phil. 877 (2002).
[54]
Id. at 889.
[55]
TSN, 28 June 1999, pp. 10-12.
[56]
TSN, 23 February 1999, pp. 13-15.
[57]
People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 141644, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 478, 503, citing PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-
WITNESS IDENTIFICACATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 74 (1965), thus:

A well-known authority in eyewitness identification made a list of 12 danger signals that exist independently of the
identification procedures investigators use. These signals give warning that the identification may be
erroneous even though the method used is proper. The list is not exhaustive. The facts of a particular case
may contain a warning not in the list. The list is as follows:

(1) the witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone;
(2) the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but made no accusation
against him when questioned by the police;
(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness original description and
the actual description of the accused;
(4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness erroneously identified some
other person;
(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused;
(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to identify him;
(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited opportunity to see the
accused;
(8) the witness and the person identified are of different racial groups;
(9) during his original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, the witness was
unaware that a crime was involved;
(10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness view of the criminal and his
identification of the accused;
(11) several persons committed the crime; and
(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification.
[58]
444 Phil 691 (2003).
[59]
Id. at 707.
[60]
TSN, 15 July 1996, p. 10.
[61]
Id.
[62]
TSN, 15 July 1996, p. 17.
[63]
396 Phil. 274 (2000).
[64]
Id. at 283.
[65]
Baldeo v. People, G.R. No. 152205, 5 February 2004, 422 SCRA 229, 239-240.
[66]
People v. Tampis, G.R. No. 148725, 31 July 2003, 407 SCRA 582, 591.
[67]
People v. Clores, Jr., G.R. No. 130488, 8 June 2004, 431 SCRA 210, 218.
[68]
People v. Prieto, 454 Phil. 389, 407 (2003).
[69]
People v. Aquinde, 457 Phil. 207, 232 (2003).
[70]
Records, p. 384; rollo, p. 10; TSN, 28 June 1999, p. 3.
[71]
TSN, 23 February 1999, p. 11.
[72]
Dado v. People, 440 Phil. 521, 532 (2002).
[73]
People v. Natividad, 458 Phil. 491 (2003).
[74]
Id. at 500.
[75]
Id. at 501.
[76]
People v. Saul, 423 Phil. 924, 935 (2001).
[77]
Timbal v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 617, 622 (2001).
[78]
We quote with approval the following observation made by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
The prosecutions sole eyewitness was incapable, or for some reason reticent, to identify who inflicted the
fatal stab wounds. He also failed to describe the particular acts that caused the victim to
sustain the stab wounds that were the proximate cause of his death. In fact, by his own
admission, he had concluded that the victim was stabbed several times because he saw
the stab wounds after the killing occurred, when the victim was already dead. (Rollo, p.
7.)
[79]
Records, p. 386.
[80]
People v. Bisda, 454 Phil. 194, 217-218 (2003).
[81]
Id. at 218.
[82]
Id. at 217.
[83]
People v. Garalde, 401 Phil. 174, 213 (2000).
[84]
People v. Garillo, 446 Phil. 163, 180 (2003).
[85]
People v. Duma, 230 Phil. 1, 17 (1986).
[86]
People v. Macatana, G.R. No. L-57061, 9 May 1988, 161 SCRA 235, 240.
[87]
G.R. No. 127962, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 217.
[88]
Id. at 235-236.
[89]
Records, p. 4.
[90]
Blood loss; See Harrisons Principles of Internal Medicine, (12th Ed., 1991), p. 233.
[91]
TSN, 15 July 1996, pp. 14-15; TSN, 9 October 1996, p. 6.
[92]
While it appears that 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria D. Catbagan of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in Agoo, La Union sent a Letter of Request to the Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 32 of
Agoo, La Union that a subpoena be issued to Dr. Armando Avena of RHU, Aringay La Union to bring the
death certificate of the deceased Piamonte and to testify thereon on 23 April 1998, nothing appears on
record with regard to the testimony or the appearance of the aforesaid Dr. Armando Avena in
court.; See Records, p. 205.
[93]
People v. Catbagan, G.R. Nos. 149430-32, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 535, 566.
[94]
Id.
[95]
People v. Caballero, 448 Phil. 514, 534 (2003).
[96]
TSN, 15 July 1996, p. 14.
[97]
Supra note 91 at 566.
[98]
Art. 266 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the
same period;
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the offender has caused
physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor
require medical attendance.
3.By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos when the offender
shall ill-treat another by deed without causing injury.