Quelnan vs VHF : 138500
Quelnan‘s Omnibus Motion-Motion for Reconsideration of the January 17, 1999
Petitioner Andy Quelnan purchased from respondents VHF Philippines, Inc. (VHF)
and Vicente Tan a unit 15-0 of Legaspi Tower condominium for which he made an
overpayment. Moreover, he claims that under a verbal agreement with VHF, the
said overpayment shall be applied to the purchase of Unit 20-G for which, the
balance, he would pay before the end of June 1991 without any interest thereon.
Pursuant to the verbal agreement, he immediately took possession of Unit 20-G
and made several payments therefor. However, in May 1991 when he offered to
settle his remaining balance, he was informed that Unit 20-G was mortgaged in
favor of Philippine Trust Company and that he was being charged by VHF the
interest and penalties due on the mortgage obligation. VHF claimed that it
merely leased said unit to Quelnan and since he failed to pay, the respondents
VHF, et al. filed an ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
The MeTC ordered the ejectment of Quelnan. He did not appeal said decision, thus
he was ejected from said unit.
Close to two years later, Quelnan filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a
complaint for rescission of the alleged verbal contract of sale and damages against
VHF from which a pre-trial of the case was set. However, during the scheduled pre-
trial on January 17, 1997, Quelnan and his counsel (despite that he was given a
Special Power of Attorney to represent Quelnan) did not show up, thus, the
presiding judge dismissed the complaint.
Quelnan‘s counsel, instead of filing an appeal, moved to file a Manifestation and
Ex-parte motion to set aside the said dismissal invoking excusable negligence —
that he overlooked to transfer from his 1996 diary the entry regarding the
scheduled pre-trial conference on January 17, 1997 to his 1997 diary. When the
motion was denied, he filed an Omnibus motion (Notice of appeal) but the same
was denied by order of March 12, 1997 upon the holding of the trial court that it
was filed out of time. As a result, Quelnan filed a petition for mandamus before the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA however, treated the said action as one for
certiorari, as in essence, the petition alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court thus denying Quelnan‘s petition on the ground that the order of
the trial court is not appealable.
The CA moreover, assails that since it was the Order of March 12, 1997 denying
order of dismissal, and not the latter order, which was appealed, said Order of
January 17, 1999 had long attained finality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the notice of appeal was seasonably filed
HELD:
The timeliness of the filing of a notice of appeal determines whether the trial
court‘s giving due course to it is ministerial. If the notice of appeal is filed within the
reglementary period, it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to give it due
course. If not, the trial court cannot be compelled by mandamus to do so.
Quelnan‘s counsel received the January 17, 1997 Order declaring Quelnan non-
suited and accordingly dismissed the complaint on February 12, 1997. When
Quelnan‘s counsel filed a Manifestation and Ex-Parte Motion on January 24, 1997,
prior to his receipt on February 12, 1997 of the January 17, 1997 Order, the 15-day
period to appeal did not begin to run, for such period is reckoned from notice of
such judgment or final order or any subsequent amendment thereof, and it
is interrupted by the timely filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.
When Quelnan‘s counsel received then on February 12, 1997 a copy of the January
17, 1997 Order declaring him non-suited, and filed on February 24, 1997 an
Omnibus Motion to set aside said order, 12 days of the 15-day period had elapsed.
The filing of the Omnibus Motion interrupted the period of appeal, and it began to
run again when, on March 19, 1997, Quelnan‘s counsel received a copy of the
Order of March 12, 1997 denying Quelna‘s Omnibus Motion.
The appellate court noted, however, that since it was the Order of March 12, 1997
denying Quelnan‘s Omnibus Motion-Motion for Reconsideration of the January 17,
1997 Order of dismissal, and not the latter order, which was appealed, said Order
of January 17, 1999 had “long attained finality.”
Philippine Amanah Bank (Now Al-manah Islamic Investment Bank of the
Philippines) v. Evangelista Contreras
1
Facts
On July 21, 1981, the respondent filed a complaint for annulment of real estate
mortgage, cancellation of original certificate of title, reconveyance, recovery of
possession and damages before the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City against spouses
Calinico and Elnora Ilogon and the petitioner bank.
Respondent alleged that he was the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 19316-D, a 640
square meter parcel of land located in Cagayan de Oro City. On August 1, 1980, the
respondent went to the house of his brother-in-law, Calinico Ilogon, to seek
assistance in obtaining a loan from the petitioner bank since he (Calinico) is a friend
of the bank’s Chief of the Loan Division. The respondent brought with him the
documents of the subject lot, and told Calinico that he was willing to mortgage this
property as security for the loan. Three days later, Calinico told the respondent that
the petitioner bank could grant a loan up to P200,000.00 if the subject property
would be titled.
On August 3, 1980, the respondent and Calinico, upon the suggestion of the Chief
of the petitioner bank’s Loan Division, entered into a Deed of Confirmation of Sale
under which they transferred the title of the land to Calinico who, in turn,
mortgaged it to the petitioner bank. On October 25, 1980, Calinico and the
respondent executed an Agreement stating, among others, that the deed of sale
they executed was for the purpose of securing a loan with the petitioner bank.
On May 20, 1981, the respondent wrote a letter and went to the petitioner bank
directing the latter’s manager not to release the loan to Calinico. The next day, the
respondent again went to the petitioner bank, but was informed that the loaned
amount of P50,000 had already been given to Calinico earlier that morning. The
respondent thereafter learned that the petitioner released another P50,000 as loan
to Calinico.
That petitioner bank subsequently extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage due to
the Ilogon spouses’ failure to pay the loan. On January 9, 1989, the Provincial
Sheriff sold the mortgaged property at public auction to the petitioner bank as the
highest bidder. On October 31, 1989, the Provincial Sheriff issued a Certificate of
Sale in favor of the petitioner bank.
For the mortgagor’s failure to redeem the mortgaged property within the period
prescribed by law, the title to the property was consolidated in the petitioner
bank's name. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-20348 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-63331was issued in the petitioner bank's name.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that the petitioner bank
was not aware of the agreement between the respondent and the Ilogon spouses,
and that the respondent failed to present any evidence as basis to annul the
mortgage contract. The respondent moved to reconsider this decision, but the RTC
denied his motion for having been filed out of time. Accordingly, the RTC declared
its September 13, 1993 decision final and executory.
The respondent appealed to the CA. The CA set aside the RTC’s July 1, 1994 order,
and declared the real estate mortgage null and void. It also ordered the petitioner
bank to reconvey the land covered by TCT No. T-63331 to the respondent within
sixty (60) days from entry of judgment.
It further directed the petitioner bank to pay the equivalent monetary value of the
land based on the price of the property at the public auction, with 6% interest per
annum from the date of the sheriff’s auction sale or the amount of the sale of the
lot by the bank to third persons plus 6% interest per annum, in the event that the
property had already been conveyed by the petitioner bank to third persons.
The CA held that while the respondent was late in filing his motion for
reconsideration, the rules of procedure should be relaxed since the matters he
raised in his petition were meritorious.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari
In the present petition, the petitioner bank alleged that the respondent’s petition
for relief from judgment is unmeritorious as it was filed only after the lapse of
2
ninety-one (91) days from his (respondent’s) notice of the adverse judgment. The
bank also claimed that the failure of the respondent’s counsel to file a timely
motion for reconsideration from the RTC’s judgment did not constitute excusable
negligence so as to warrant the granting of the respondent’s petition.
The petitioner bank further maintained that the real estate mortgage over the land
was valid because: (1) its validity was never raised as an issue before the trial court;
and (2) the petitioner bank is exempted from the 5-year prohibitory period since it
is a Government branch, unit or institution.
In his comment, the respondent, represented by his heirs, maintained that his
counsel’s negligence was excusable, and that the petitioner bank was a mortgagee
in bad faith.
Held
After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition.
RTC judgment already final and executory
We note at the outset that the RTC’s September 13, 1993 decision which dismissed
the respondent’s complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage, cancellation of
original certificate of title, reconveyance, recovery of possession and damages had
already become final and executory due to the failure of his counsel to file a timely
motion for reconsideration. Both the law and jurisprudence hold that the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is
mandatory. Failure to conform to the rules on appeal renders the judgment final,
executory and unappealable.
The Petition for Relief was filed out of time
We sustain the trial court’s denial of the respondent’s petition for relief from
judgment to challenge its final and executory decision.
A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2)
reglementary periods: first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from
knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and second,
within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other
proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is required because a petition for
relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which
remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a
judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order
to put an end to litigation.
wlawlibrary
In the present case, the respondent’s counsel received a copy of the RTC’s decision
dated September 13, 1993 on September 15, 1993. Thus, the petition for relief
from judgment should have been filed on or before November 14, 1993. However,
the records showed that the petition was filed only on December 15, 1993, or
ninety-one (91) days later.
The respondent’s cited circumstances are not the proper subject of a petition for
relief from the judgment
Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that [w]hen a
judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken
against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in the same court and in the same case praying
that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Relief from judgment is a remedy provided by law to any person against whom a
decision or order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. It is a remedy, equitable in character, that is allowed only in
3
exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a
party has another remedy available to him, which may either be a motion for new
trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence from filing such
motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail of the remedy of petition for
relief.17crala
wlawlibrary
In the present case, the respondent alleged that he had been prevented from
moving for the timely reconsideration of the trial court’s decision or to appeal this
decision on time due to the death of his wife on September 13, 1993. He explained
that his counsel, Atty. Valmorida, was the brother of his deceased wife, and could
not bear to tell him that he had lost his case in the RTC given the circumstances.
Atty. Valmorida only informed him of the court’s adverse decision thirty-seven (37)
days after his (Atty. Valmoria's) receipt of the adverse decision. This circumstance,
according to the respondent, was a clear case of excusable negligence on the part
of his counsel, warranting relief from judgment.
We are aware of the rule that banks are expected to exercise more care and
prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered
lands, since their business is impressed with public interest. The rule that persons
dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of title does not
apply to banks.19 Simply put, the ascertainment of the status or condition of a
property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable
part of a bank’s operations.20cralawlawlibrary
In the present case, however, nothing in the documents presented by Calinico
would arouse the suspicion of the petitioner bank to prompt a more extensive
inquiry. When the Ilogon spouses applied for a loan, they presented as collateral a
parcel of land evidenced by OCT No. P-2034 issued by the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Cagayan de Oro, and registered in the name of Calinico. This document
did not contain any inscription or annotation indicating that the respondent was
the owner or that he has any interest in the subject land. In fact, the respondent
admitted that there was no encumbrance annotated on Calinico’s title at the time
of the latter’s loan application. Any private arrangement between Calinico and the
respondent regarding the proceeds of the loan was not the concern of the
petitioner bank, as it was not a privy to this agreement. If Calinico violated the
terms of his agreement with the respondent on the turn-over of the proceeds of the
loan, then the latter's proper recourse was to file the appropriate criminal action in
court.
The respondent also failed to prove its allegation that the petitioner bank knew,
thru a letter sent by the former’s lawyer, Atty. Crisanto Mutya, Jr., that the sale of
the subject land between him and Calinico was made only for loan purposes, and
that failure of Calinico to turn over the proceeds of the loan will invalidate the sale.
Clearly, the respondent testified on matters not of his own personal knowledge,
hence hearsay. Corollarily, the respondent’s son was never presented in court.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the petitioner bank received a copy
of Atty. Mutya’s letter,22 it was still well-within its discretion to grant or deny the
loan application after evaluating the documents submitted for loan applicant. As
earlier stated, OCT No. P-2034 issued in Calinico’s favor was free from any
encumbrances. The petitioner bank is not anymore privy to whatever
arrangements the owner entered into regarding the proceeds of the loan.
Finally, we point out that the petitioner bank is a government owned or controlled
corporation. While OCT No. P-2034 (issued in favor of Calinico by virtue of the deed
of confirmation of sale) contained a prohibition against the alienation and
encumbrance of the subject land within five (5) years from the date of the patent,
the CA failed to mention that by the express wordings of the OCT itself, the
prohibition does not cover the alienation and encumbrance “in favor of the
Government or any of its branches, units or institutions.”cralawlaw
Priscilla Alma Jose v. Ramon C. Javellana, et al
G.R. No. 158239 January 25, 2012
Facts:
Margarita sold for consideration of P160,000.00 to Ramon Javellana by
deed of conditional sale two parcels of land in Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that
Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance
of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens
System (the registration being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period
4
of time); and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-
fact, Juvenal, and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the
payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration.
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita
However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of
the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the
properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the
parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision.
Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and
damages against her in the RTC Malolos, Bulacan. Javellana averred that he had
paid the full consideration and that in 1996, Priscilla had called to inquire about the
mortgage constituted on the parcels of land; and that he had told her then that the
parcels of land had not been mortgaged but had been sold to him. Javellana prayed
for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from
dumping filling materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to
institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his
favor.
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already
barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action. RTC
initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss. However, upon her motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and granted the motion to dismiss, opining
that Javellana had no cause of action against her due to her not being bound to
comply with the terms of the deed of conditional sale for not being a party thereto;
that there was no evidence showing the payment of the balance; that he had never
demanded the registration of the land from Margarita or Juvenal, or brought a suit
for specific performance against Margarita or Juvenal; and that his claim of paying
the balance was not credible.
Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending that the presentation of
evidence of full payment was not necessary at that stage of the proceedings; and
that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action, the facts alleged in the complaint were hypothetically admitted and only
the allegations in the complaint should be considered in resolving the motion. RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any reason to disturb the order.
Javellana filed a notice of appeal which the RTC gave due course to, and
the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).Priscilla countered that the
order was not appealable; that the appeal was not perfected on time; and that
Javellana was guilty of forum shopping.
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA assail to orders dismissing his complaint. However, the CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari, finding that the RTC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the orders, and holding that it only committed, at
most, an error of judgment correctible by appeal in issuing the challenged orders.
CA reversed and set aside the dismissal of Civil Case remanding the
records to the RTC "for further proceedings in accordance with law." CA denied the
MR, hence this petition.
Issues:
WON Javellana committed forum shopping
No, Javellana did not commit forum shopping.
According to the SC, forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against
whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly
getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special
civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more
pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and
identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is
forum shopping.
Here, pending the resolution of the appeal on the RTC decision, Javellana
filed a petition for certiorari in CA assailing RTC upon granting of the motion to
dismiss filed by Alma Jose and the denial of the motion for the consideration to
disturb the latter. For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes
of action, subject matter and issues. Hence, forum shopping is not committed by
Javellana as he questioned different orders, two distinct causes of action and issues
were raised, and two objectives were sought.
I
5
 Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal was a final order and appealable
First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing more to
be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It
was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one
The distinction between a final order and an
interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the
subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except
to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the
latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves
something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order
deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet
to be held and the judgment
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in
the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or
judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is
II
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA
Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal
out of time.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely
motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)
The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however,
considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals,[25] by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse
judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration,
Consequently, we rule that Javellanas notice of appeal was timely filed
pursuant to the fresh period rule.
MACAPAGAL
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the
crime of Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount
of P800,000.00, which is the value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry.
Petitioner received the decision on
January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise
denied in an Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on
July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal. On August 3, 2009, but the
same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time.
Issue:
Whether or not the regional trial court of manila, Branch 9 gravely erred in denying
the notice of appeal filed by the herein petitioner.
Held:
The Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities
which this Court cannot ignore and are fatal to petitioner’s cause. It appears that
petitioner assails not only the denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal but likewise
seeks the reversal of her conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be discussed
below, the petition is bound to fail, because of petitioner’s complete disregard of
the procedural rules and the orders of the Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her
notice of appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken.
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still
dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this
should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which an application will be directed. Direct resort to this
Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly
and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.
Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an
appeal of the trial court’s decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so
for yet another fatal procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated
6
earlier, petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of
appeal but also the Decision convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her Issue
motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of procedure, petitioner
attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of
appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true For our resolution is whether the appellate court was in error when it dismissed
copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her
petitioners Petition for Certiorari on the ground that appeal was the appropriate
motion for reconsideration. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the remedy under Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and not a
assailed decision, final order or judgment. Failure to comply with such requirement
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 thereof.

Strongworld vs Perello
The Courts Ruling
Facts: (Strongworld) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
construction. Members of the Board of Directors of petitioner Strongworld. On 31
October 1997, petitioners filed a Complaint[3] for Sum of Money and Damages with From the foregoing, it is evident that under Section 1(h), Rule 41, no
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against private respondents First Peoples Bank. In appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. Thus,
their complaint they alleged that the subject checks were not deposited to the
account of petitioner Strongworld. Private respondent First Peoples Bank filed a the question is: was the Order of the RTC, dated 7 May 1998, reviving the 9 January
Motion to Dismiss[11] on the grounds that petitioners Gamolo and Molo had no 1998 Order, which dismissed the Complaint, an order dismissing an action without
legal capacity to sue, and that the Complaint stated no cause of action. The court a
prejudice?
quo rendered an Order[13] dismissing the Complaint
We distinguish a dismissal with prejudice from a
Therefore, Plaintiff Leo Cleto A. Gamolo and Reynaldo P. Molo, although,
dismissal without prejudice. The former disallows and bars the refiling of the
admittedly are officers of the corporation appear to have instituted this
action for and in behalf of the corporation, yet their authority to sue or complaint; whereas, the same cannot be said of a dismissal without
defend the corporation has not been shown in this COMPLAINT
prejudice.[38] Likewise, where the law permits, a dismissal with prejudice is subject
petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] which was opposed to the right of appeal.[39]

the trial court granted petitioners Motion for Reconsideration,

The trial court declared that the case should remain dismissed on the ground that
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 9 January 1998,
dismissing the Complaint, was not served on private respondents Bank of
Commerce, as no proof of service to private respondents was shown therein, and
the same lacked a notice of hearing and no proof of service thereof. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeal .
Jurisprudence states that if the suit is not brought in the name of, or
against, the real party in interest, a Motion to Dismiss may be filed on the ground
that the Complaint states no cause of action.[43] Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure allows the filing of a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the Complaint states no cause of action. Thus, in Aguila, Jr. v. Court of

Appeals,[44] we pronounced:

7
A real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment,
or who is entitled to the avails of the suit.
Logically, the nature of the dismissal founded on any of the preceding
grounds is with prejudice because the dismissal prevents the refiling of the same
action or claim. Ergo, dismissals based on the rest of the grounds enumerated are
without prejudice because they do not preclude the refiling of the same action.
Considering the heretofore discussion, we can say that the order of
dismissal was based on the ground that the Complaint states no cause of
action. For this reason, the dismissal of petitioners Complaint cannot be said to be
a dismissal with prejudice which bars the refiling of the same action.
As has been earlier quoted, Section 1(h), Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that no appeal may be taken from an order
dismissing an action without prejudice. The same section provides that in such an
instant where the final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Republic vs Sunvar
DOCTRINE:
The mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 is to achieve an expeditious
and inexpensive determination of the cases subject of summary procedure. To
achieve this, rules like Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure were
created to bar petitions for relief from judgment, or petitions for certiorari,
mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court in
order to avoid what former Chief Justice Panganiban calls a “sorry spectacle” of a
“counterproductive ping pong” every time a party is aggrieved by an interlocutory
order.
FACTS:
Petitioners Republic and NAPOCOR are registered co-owners of a parcel of
land which they leased to the Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI)
for a period of 25 years ending on December 31, 2002. The TRCFI was given the
right to sublease this land, which it did, to Sunvar, through sublease agreements
with the common provision that their sublease agreements were going to expire on
December 31, 2002, the date that the TRCFI’s lease agreements with the
petitioners would expire.
In 1987, when the government was reorganized, the TCFRI was replaced with
the Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation (PDAF). Before the expiration
date, Sunvar wrote to PDAF and expressed its desire to renew the sublease over
the subject property and proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period of
another 25 years. PDAF forwarded the letter to petitioners. By June 25, 2002, PDAF
had informed Sunvar of petitioners’ decisions not to renew the lease.
When the lease contract and the sublease agreements expired, petitioners
recovered all the rights over the subject property. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar
continued to occupy the property.
Six years after the expiry date, petitioner Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), advised respondent Sunvar to vacate the subject property.
Although Sunvar duly received the Notice, it did not vacate the property. Almost a
year after the first notice, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final
notice to vacate within 15 days. When the period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again
refused to vacate the property.
Petitioners then filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati City. Sunvar moved to dismiss the complaint, questioning the
jurisdiction of the MeTC as the action was supposed to an accion publiciana rather
than one for unlawful detainer. The MeTC denied respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration and required Sunvar to submit their
Answer.
8
 Despite filing an Answer, Sunvar still filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with
the RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss. To answer this petition, petitioner’s questioned the RTC’s jurisdiction and
prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition. The RTC denied the motion for
dismissal and granted the Rule 65 Petition, directing the MeTC to dismiss the
Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Did the RTC violate the Rules on Summary Procedure when it took
cognizance and granted the certiorari petition filed by Sunvar?
HELD: YES
RATIO:
 The RTC should have dismissed Sunvar’s petition outright for being a
prohibited pleading.
 Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule
65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary
proceeding is a prohibited pleading.
 According to former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, the proper
remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on
the merits incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would
result in the ‘sorry spectacle’ of a case being subject of a
counterproductive ping pong to and from the appellate court as often as
a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory
rulings.
 The Court mentioned only two cases in which they allowed exceptions to
this rule1 and since Sunvar could not substantiate its claims of
extraordinary circumstances that would allow those same exceptions to
apply to his case, the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 remains, for
him, a prohibited pleading.
 If the Court were to relax the interpretation of the prohibition against the
filing of certiorari petitions under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, the RTCs may be inundated with similar prayers from
adversely affected parties questioning every order of the lower court and
completely dispensing with the goal of summary proceedings in forcible
entry or unlawful detainer suits.
Banares v Balising
Facts: A, B, C, D, and E were accused of estafa. They filed a motion to dismiss. The
trial court dismissed the criminal case without prejudice. After more than 2
months, private complainants sought the revival of the criminal case. When the
trial court allowed revival of the case, the accused questioned the order, claiming
that the prior dismissal had already become final and executory.
Issue: Whether the said order became final and executory
Held:
Remedial Law; Actions; Dismissals; Definition of “Final Order”and“Interlocutory
Order.
”—A “final order” issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the
subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court. As distinguished therefrom, an “interlocutory order” is
one which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be
adjudicated upon.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final
order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a
final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. In
Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals, we stated, thus: The dismissal without
prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that said dismissal order was any
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less final. Such Order of dismissal is complete in all details, and though without
prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It was not merely an
interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order
becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court
which rendered it to further amend or revoke
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15)days from his receipt of
the court’s decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or
move to reconsider the same. After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order
becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court
which rendered it to further amend or revoke. A final judgment or order cannot be
modified in any respect, even if the modification sought is for the purpose of
correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court which rendered the same. After
the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become finals and therefore
becomes outside the court’s power to amend and modify, a party who wishes to
reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The foregoing rule applies not only to civil cases but to
criminal cases as well.
—Contrary to private respondents’ claim, the foregoing rule applies not only to
civil cases but to criminal cases as well. In Jaca vs. Blanco, the Court defined a
provisional dismissal of a criminal case as a dismissal without prejudice to the
reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final or to the
subsequent filing of a new information for the offense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rules regarding finality of judgments also apply to
cases covered by the rules on summary procedure —
A careful examination of Section 18 in relation to Section 22 of the 1991 Revised
Rule of Summary Procedure and Rule 40, Section 2 in relation to Rule 13, Sections 9
and 10, and Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
leads to no other conclusion than that the rules regarding finality of judgments also
apply to cases covered by the rules on summary procedure. Nothing in Section 18
of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure conflicts with the prevailing rule
that a judgment or order which is not appealed or made subject of a motion for
reconsideration within the prescribed fifteen-day period attains finality.
Same; Presidential Decree No. 1508; It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case
for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in
nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to
dismiss.
—
The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of petitioners
and the municipal trial court that the non-referral of a case for barangay
conciliation as required under the Local Government Code of 1991 may be raised in
a motion to dismiss even after the accused has been arraigned. It is well-settled
that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under
the law is not jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not
raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. The Court notes that although petitioners
could have invoked the ground of prematurity of the causes of action against them
due to the failure to submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as
soon as they received the complaints against them, petitioners raised the said
ground only after their arraignment. However, while the trial court committed an
error in dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners on the ground that the
same were not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing thereof in court although
said ground was raised by them belatedly, the said order may no longer be revoked
at present considering that the same had already become final and executory, and
as earlier stated, may no longer be annulled by the Municipal Trial Court, nor by
the Regional Trial Court or this Court.
Bihag vs. Bathan, G.R. No. 181949, April 23, 2014
REMEDIAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGMENT: The doctrine of finality of
judgment dictates that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments or orders must
become final at some point in time.
REMEDIAL LAW; NOTICE; BEST EVIDENCE: In this case, petitioners, through their
counsel, received a copy of the assailed January 5, 2007 Order, under Registry
Receipt No. E-0280, on January 22, 2007, as evidenced by the Certification of the
assistant postmaster. As such, petitioners should have filed their motion for
reconsideration within 15 days, or on or before February 6, 2007, but they did not.
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Instead, they filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals on October
10, 2007. At this time, the RTC’s January 5, 2007 Order denying the Notice to
Appeal had long become final and executory. Petitioners’ mere denial of the
receipt of the assailed Order cannot prevail over the Certification issued by the
assistant postmaster as we have consistently declared that "[t]he best evidence to
prove that notice was sent would be a certification from the postmaster, who
should certify not only that the notice was issued or sent but also as to how, when
and to whom the delivery and receipt was made."

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