Mangila vs CA (Remedial Law)

Anita MANGILA V. CA and Loreta Guina

G.R. No. 125027 | AUGUST 12, 2002
FACTS:
Anita Mangila is an exporter of seafoods and doing business under the name of Seafoods Products. Private respondent Loreta Guina
is the President and General Manager of Air Swift International, a single registered proprietorship engaged in the freight forwarding
business.
In January 1988, Mangila contracted the freight forwarding services of Guina for shipment of petitioner’s products, such as crabs,
prawns and assorted fishes, to Guam (USA) where petitioner maintains an outlet. Mangila agreed to pay cash on delivery. Guina’s
invoice stipulates a charge of 18 percent interest per annum on all overdue accounts, and in case of suit, stipulates attorney’s fees
equivalent to 25 percent of the amount due plus costs of suit.
On the first shipment, Mangila requested for 7 days within which to pay private Guina. However, for the next three shipments,
March 17, 24 and 31, 1988, petitioner failed to pay private respondent shipping charges amounting to P109, 376.95.
Despite several demands, Mangila never paid. Thus, on June 10, 1988, Guina filed before the RTC Pasay City an action for collection
of sum of money.
The Sheriff’s Return showed that summons was not served on Mangila. A woman found at Mangila’s house informed the sheriff that
petitioner transferred her residence to Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff found out further that petitioner had left the Philippines for
Guam.
Thus, on September 1988, construing petitioner’s departure from the Philippines as done with intent to defraud her creditors, Ginua
filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment, which the court subsequently granted. A Writ of Preliminary Attachment was thereafter
issued.
Through the assistance of the sheriff of RTC Pampanga, the Notice of Levy with the Order, Affidavit and Bond was served on
Mangila’s household help in San Fernando, Pampanga on October 1988.
On November 1988, Mangila filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment without submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court. She pointed out that up to then, she had not been served a copy of the Complaint and the summons. Hence, petitioner
claimed the court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person.
After the hearing on the motion, RTC granted the same on January 13, 1989 upon filing of petitioner’s counter-bond. The trial court,
however, did not rule on the question of jurisdiction and on the validity of the writ of preliminary attachment.
Thereafter, Guina applied for an alias summons and on January 26, 1989 summons was finally served on petitioner.
On February 1989, Mangila moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue, claiming that as stipulated in the
invoice of Guina’s freight services, the venue in case a complaint is filed would be in Makati and not Pasay. For her part, Guina
explained that although “Makati” appears as the stipulated venue, the same was merely an inadvertence by the printing press
whose general manager executed an affidavit admitting such inadvertence. Moreover, Guina claimed that Mangila knew that private
respondent was holding office in Pasay City and not in Makati.
The RTC ave credence to Guina’s Opposition, denied the Motion to Dismiss, and gave petitioner 5 days to file her Answer. Petitioner
filed an MR but this too was denied. Thus she filed her Answer on June 1989, maintaining her contention that the venue was
improperly laid.
The case was set for pre-trial. Meanwhile, Guina filed a Motion to Sell Attached Properties but the trial court denied the motion.
On motion of Mangila, the RTC reset the pre-trial but Mangila failed to appear on the rescheduled date. Without declaring Mangila
to be in default, the court allowed Guina to present evidence ex parte.
Mangila filed an MR of the order terminating the pre-trial, and argued that there was no order decalring him in default and that his
attorney was only late but not absent during the rescheduled pre-trial.
Nevertheless, the RTC ruled in favor of Guina and ordered petitioner to pay respondent P109,376.95 plus 18 percent interest per
annum, 25 percent attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Mangila appealed to the CA while Guina filed a Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal but the trial court denied the same.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the issuance of the writ of attachment and sustained
the filing of the action in the RTC of Pasay. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the declaration of default on petitioner and concluded
that the trial court did not commit any reversible error.

ISSUES:
WON the CA erred in affirming the validity of the issuance of the writ of Preliminary Attachment

WON the venue was improperly laid

HELD:
1) Yes, because there was no proper service of summons, order, and the writ of attachment.

*Improper Issuance and Service of Writ of Attachment. In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified the
actual time when jurisdiction should be had:
“It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
defendant – issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment – these do not and cannot bind and affect the
defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons or
other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the court’s authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer
commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the
applicant’s affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the
summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint xxx.”
Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the
order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is
implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained.
However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for
without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from
the Court will not bind the defendant.

2) Yes.

*Improper Venue. The Rules of Court provide that parties to an action may agree in writing on the venue on which an action should
be brought. However, a mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other
venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show the parties’ intention to
restrict the filing of a suit in a particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any venue, as long as jurisdictional
requirements are followed. Venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid and enforceable, do not as a rule supersede the
general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be
considered merely as an agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
In the instant case, the stipulation does not limit the venue exclusively to Makati. There are no qualifying or restrictive words in the
invoice that would evince the intention of the parties that Makati is the “only or exclusive” venue where the action could be
instituted. We therefore agree with private respondent that Makati is not the only venue where this could be filed.

The case was dismissed without prejudice.

MANGILA VS CA:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108,Pasay City. The trial court upheld the writ of attachment and
the declaration of default on petitioner while ordering her to pay private respondent P109,376.95 plus 18 percent interest per
annum, 25percent attorney’s fees and costs of suit. On December 15, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the
decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the issuance of the writ of attachment and sustained the filing
of the action in the RTC of Pasay. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the declaration of default on petitioner and concluded that the
trial court did not commit any reversible error.
Issues
WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE WRIT OFATTACHMENT WAS IMPROPERLY ISSUED AND
SERVED;WHETHER THERE WAS IMPROPER VENUE.
HELD:
The petition is
GRANTED
on the grounds of improper venue and invalidity of the service of the writof attachment. The decision of the Court of Appeals and
the order of respondent judge denying themotion to dismiss are
REVERSED
and
SET ASIDE
.the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues theorder granting the application;
second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order grantingthe writ; and third, the writ is implemented.

For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the
implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction,
the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the
defendant. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on petitioner without first obtaining jurisdiction over her person.
The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether by
personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of
summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of
a belated service. The rules on venue, like other procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice
or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding. Obviously, this objective will not be attained if the
plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to choose where to file the complaint or petition.
Distinction should be made between issuance and implementation of the writ of attachment. It is
necessary to distinguish between the two to determine when jurisdiction over the defendant should be
acquired to validly implement the writ.

The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves 3 stages:

1. the court issues the order granting the application;

2. the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and
3. the writ is implemented.
For the initial 2 stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the defendant be first obtained. However,
once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against
the defendant. Any order issuing from the court will not bind the defendant.

The alias summons belatedly served cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement
of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process without obtaining jurisdiction over the
defendant.

The preliminary writ of attachment must be served before or simultaneous with the service of
summons. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction
because the law does not allow retroactivity of belated service.
TORRES VS. SATSATIN
GR 166759
NOVEMBER 25, 2009

Facts:
Siblings Torres (petitioners) each owned adjacent 20,000 square meters track of land in Dasmariñas, Cavite. Nicanor
Satsatin, through petitioners’ mother Agripina Aledia, was able to convince the siblings to sell their property and authorize
him via SPA, to negotiate for its sale. Nicanor offered to sell the properties to Solar Resources, to which Solar allegedly
agreed to buy the three parcels of land plus the property of one Rustica Aledia for P35, 000,000. Petitioners claimed that
Solar has already paid the entire purchase price, however Nicanor only remitted P9, 000,000 out of the P28, 000,000
sum they are entitled to and that Nicanor had acquired a house and lot and a car (which he registered in the names of his
children). Despite the repeated verbal and written demands, Nicanor failed to remit the balance prompting the petitioners
to file a complaint for sum of money against the family Satsatin.

Petitioners filed an Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, alleging among other things, that
respondent was about to depart the country and that they are willing to post a bond fixed by court. After filing a Motion
for Deputation of Sheriff, which the RTC granted, it issued a Writ of Attachment (WOA) on November 15. On November
19, after serving a copy of the WOA upon the Satsatins, the sheriff levied their real and personal properties. On November
21, the summons and copy of complaint was served upon the respondents. Respondents filed their answer and a Motion to
Discharge Writ of Attachment, claiming, among others, that: the bond was issued before the issuance of WOA, the WOA
was issued before the summons was received. Respondents posted a counter-bond for the lifting of WOA, which was
denied along with MR. Aggrieved, they filed with CA a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction and TRO under Rule 65. CA ruled in favor of respondents and denied petitioners’ MR hence the
petition for review on certiorari with the SC.

Issue:
W/N CA erred in finding that RTC was guilty of GADALEJ in the issuance and implementation of the WOA

Held:
No. A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is
pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff
as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured in the said action by the attaching creditor
against the defendant.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the bond posted by petitioners despite the fact that not all the
requisites for its approval were complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its
approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected.

Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction between the issuance and
the implementation of the writ of attachment is of utmost importance to the validity of the writ. The distinction is
indispensably necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in order to
validly implement the writ of attachment upon his person.
In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three
stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the
order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court
must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to
act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.
At the time the trial court issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly to do so since the motion for
its issuance can be filed “at the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment.” However, at the
time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent since no
summons was yet served upon them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the
implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon the respondents in order for the trial court
to have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have binding effect. Consequently, even if the writ of
attachment was validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect the
respondents.
Moreover, again assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was validly issued, although the trial court later acquired
jurisdiction over the respondents by service of the summons upon them, such belated service of summons on
respondents cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial
court cannot enforce such a coercive process on respondents without first obtaining jurisdiction over
their person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service
of summons on the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as
warranted by the circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive
acquisition of jurisdiction

SIEVERT VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Feliciano, J. | December 22, 1988

FACTS:
- Sievert was a citizen and resident of the Philippines. He received by mail a Petition for issuance of a
Preliminary Writ of Attachment filed with the RTC.
- Sievert had not properly received any summons and a copy of the complaint against him.
- On the date of trial, Sievert’s counsel entered an appearance for the limited purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court. They prayed for the denial of the petition on the ground that the court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Sievert.
- TC: denied the objection of Sievert.
- CA: affirmed the TC
ISSUE:
- WON a court which has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in the main case, may bind
such defendant or his property by issuing a writ of preliminary attachment.
HELD:
- NO.
RATIO:
- The issue posed in this case is not to be resolved by determining when an action may be regarded as having
been commenced. The critical time, which must be identified, rather, is when the trial court acquires authority
under the law to act coercively against the defendant or his property.
- The SC holds, therefore, that the critical time is the time of the vesting of jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant in the main case.
- Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own sake but rather to enable the attaching party to
realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action. A court, which has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, cannot bind the defendant whether in the main case or
in the any ancillary proceeding such as attachment proceedings.
- The service of a petition for preliminary attachment without the prior or simultaneous service of summons and
a copy of the
- complaint in the main case, does not confer jurisdiction upon the issuing court over the person of the
defendant.

Facts:
On June 1976, a Cimarron PUJ owned by Nelia Enriquez, and driven by Cosme Casas, was travelling from Cebu City to
Danao City. While passing through Liloan, Cebu, the Cimarron PUJ collided with a private jeep owned by the late Calixto
Palmes (husband of private respondent Primitiva Palmes) who was then driving the private jeep. The impact of the
collision was such that the private jeep was flung away to a distance of about thirty (30) feet and then fell on its right side
pinning down Calixto Palmes. He died as a result of cardio-respiratory arrest due to a crushed chest. The accident also
caused physical injuries on the part of 2-year-old Adeudatus Borbon.

Private respondents Primitiva and Honorato Borbon, Sr. (father of Adeudatus) filed a complaint against Cosme and Nelia
before the then Cebu CFI claiming actual, moral, nominal and exemplary damages as a result of the accident. The claim of
Borbon, Sr. was excluded from the complaint due to jurisdiction.

The CFI ruled in favor of Primitiva, ordering common carrier Nelia to pay her damages and attorney’s fees. The judgment
of the trial court became final and executory and a writ of execution was issued, which however, returned unsatisfied,
prompting the court to summon and examine Nelia. She declared that the Cimarron PUJ was covered by a third-party
liability insurance policy issued by petitioner Perla.
Palmes then filed a motion for garnishment praying that an order of garnishment be issued against the insurance policy
issued by petitioner in favor of the judgment debtor. Respondent Judge then issued an Order directing the Provincial
Sheriff or his deputy to garnish the third-party liability insurance policy. Petitioner filed for MR and quashal of the writ of
garnishment on the ground that Perla was not a party to the case and that jurisdiction over its person had never been
acquired by the trial court by service of summons or by any process. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion.An Order
for issuance of an alias writ of garnishment was subsequently issued.
More than two (2) years later, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed with this Court alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Ramolete in ordering garnishment of the third-party liability
insurance contract issued by petitioner Perla in favor of the judgment debtor, Nelia Enriquez. The Petition should have
been dismissed forthwith for having been filed way out of time but, for reasons which do not appear on the record, was
nonetheless entertained.

Issue:
W/N there is GADALEJ on the part of the respondent judge

W/N there insurance policy may be subject to garnishment

Held:
1. No. The SC found no grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of or without jurisdiction on the part of respondent
Judge Ramolete in ordering the garnishment of the judgment debtor’s third-party liability insurance.
2. Yes. Garnishment has been defined as a species of attachment for reaching any property or credits pertaining or
payable to a judgment debtor. In legal contemplation, it is a forced novation by the substitution of creditors: the judgment
debtor, who is the original creditor of the garnishee is, through service of the writ of garnishment, substituted by the
judgment creditor who thereby becomes creditor of the garnishee. Garnishment has also been described as a warning to a
person having in his possession property or credits of the judgment debtor, not to pay the money or deliver the property to
the latter, but rather to appear and answer the plaintiff’s suit.
In order that the trial court may validly acquire jurisdiction to bind the person of the garnishee, it is not
necessary that summons be served upon him. The garnishee need not be impleaded as a party to the case.
All that is necessary for the trial court lawfully to bind the person of the garnishee or any person who has
in his possession credits belonging to the judgment debtor is service upon him of the writ of
garnishment.
Rule 39, Section 15 and Rule 57, Section 7(e) of the ROC themselves do not require that the garnishee be served with
summons or impleaded in the case in order to make him liable.

In the present case, there can be no doubt, therefore, that the trial court actually acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Perla
when it was served with the writ of garnishment of the third-party liability insurance policy it had issued in favor of
judgment debtor Nelia Enriquez. Perla cannot successfully evade liability thereon by such a contention.

In a third-party liability insurance contract, the insurer assumes the obligation of paying the injured third party to whom
the insured is liable. The insurer becomes liable as soon as the liability of the insured to the injured third person attaches.
Prior payment by the insured to the injured third person is not necessary in order that the obligation of the insurer may
arise. From the moment that the insured became liable to the third person, the insured acquired an interest in the
insurance contract, which interest may be garnished like any other credit.

A separate action is not necessary to establish petitioner’s liability.

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed out of time and for lack of merit.
Judgment AFFIRMED.