The interpretation of any intuitionistically valid formula in the infinite

Heyting algebra described above results in the top element,

representing true, as the valuation of the formula, regardless of what
values from the algebra are assigned to the variables of the formula.[7]
Conversely, for every invalid formula, there is an assignment of
values to the variables that yields a valuation that differs from the top
element.[8][9] No finite Heyting algebra has both these properties.[7]
Kripke semantics[edit]
Main article: Kripke semantics
Building upon his work on semantics of modal logic, Saul Kripke
created another semantics for intuitionistic logic, known as Kripke
semantics or relational semantics.[10]
Tarski-like semantics[edit]
It was discovered that Tarski-like semantics for intuitionistic logic
were not possible to prove complete. However, Robert Constable has
shown that a weaker notion of completeness still holds for
intuitionistic logic under a Tarski-like model. In this notion of
completeness we are concerned not with all of the statements that
are true of every model, but with the statements that are true in the
same way in every model. That is, a single proof that the model
judges a formula to be true must be valid for every model. In this
case, there is not only a proof of completeness, but one that is valid
according to intuitionistic logic.[11]
Relation to other logics[edit]
Intuitionistic logic is related by duality to a paraconsistent logic known
as Brazilian, anti-intuitionistic or dual-intuitionistic logic.[12]
The subsystem of intuitionistic logic with the FALSE axiom removed
is known as minimal logic.
Relation to many-valued logic[edit]
Kurt Gödel in 1932 showed that intuitionistic logic is not a finitely-
many valued logic. (See the section titled Heyting algebra semantics
above for a sort of "infinitely-many valued logic" interpretation of
intuitionistic logic.)
Relation to intermediate logics[edit]
Any finite Heyting algebra which is not equivalent to a Boolean
algebra defines (semantically) an intermediate logic. On the other
hand, validity of formulae in pure intuitionistic logic is not tied to any
individual Heyting algebra but relates to any and all Heyting algebras
at the same time.
Relation to modal logic[edit]
Any formula of the intuitionistic propositional logic may be translated
into the normal modal logic S4 as follows:
⊥ =⊥
∗
A =◻A if
∗ A
is prime (a positive literal)
(A∧B =
) A
∗ ∗
∧
B
∗
(A∨B =
) A
∗ ∗
∨
B
∗
(A→B =◻
) (
∗ A
∗
→
B
∗
)
(¬A =◻(¬( ¬ A := A → ⊥
) A
∗ ∗
))
{\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}\bot ^{*}&=\bot \\A^{*}&=\Box
A&&{\text{if }}A{\text{ is prime (a positive
literal)}}\\(A\wedge B)^{*}&=A^{*}\wedge B^{*}\\(A\vee
B)^{*}&=A^{*}\vee B^{*}\\(A\to B)^{*}&=\Box
\left(A^{*}\to B^{*}\right)\\(\neg A)^{*}&=\Box (\neg
(A^{*}))&&\neg A:=A\to \bot \end{aligned}}}

and it has been demonstrated[13] that the translated formula is valid in

the propositional modal logic S4 if and only if the original formula is
valid in IPC. The above set of formulae are called the Gödel–
McKinsey–Tarski translation.
There is also an intuitionistic version of modal logic S4 called
Constructive Modal Logic CS4.[14]
Lambda calculus[edit]
There is an extended Curry–Howard isomorphism between IPC and
simply-typed lambda calculus.[14]
Disjunction versus implication:
• (
ϕ
∨
ψ
)
→
(
¬
ϕ
→
ψ
)


{\displaystyle (\phi

\vee \psi )\to (\neg \phi \to \psi )} 



• (
¬
ϕ
∨
ψ
)
→
(
ϕ
→
ψ
)


{\displaystyle (\neg
 \phi \vee \psi )\to (\phi \to \psi )} 


Universal versus existential quantification:
• (
∀
x

ϕ
(
x
)
)
→
¬
(
∃
x

¬
ϕ
(
x
)
)



{\displaystyle (\forall x\ \phi (x))\to \neg (\exists x\ \neg

\phi (x))} 


• (
∃
x

ϕ
(
x
)
)
→
¬
(
∀
x

¬
ϕ
(
x
)
)



{\displaystyle (\exists x\ \phi (x))\to \neg (\forall x\ \neg

\phi (x))} 


• (
∃
x

¬
ϕ
(
x
)
)
→
¬
(
∀
x

ϕ
(
x
)
)



{\displaystyle (\exists x\ \neg \phi (x))\to \neg (\forall x\
 \phi (x))} 


• (
∀
x

¬
ϕ
(
x
)
)
↔
¬
(
∃
x

ϕ
(
x
)
)



{\displaystyle (\forall x\ \neg \phi (x))\leftrightarrow \neg

(\exists x\ \phi (x))} 



So, for example, "a or b" is a stronger propositional formula than "if
not a, then b", whereas these are classically interchangeable. On the
other hand, "not (a or b)" is equivalent to "not a, and also not b".
If we include equivalence in the list of connectives, some of the
connectives become definable from others:
• (
ϕ
↔
ψ
)
↔
(
(
ϕ
→
ψ
)
∧
(
ψ
→
ϕ
)
)



{\displaystyle (\phi \leftrightarrow \psi )\leftrightarrow
((\phi \to \psi )\land (\psi \to \phi ))} 



• (
ϕ
→
ψ
)
↔
(
(
ϕ
∨
ψ
)
↔
ψ
)


{\displaysty
le (\phi \to \psi )\leftrightarrow ((\phi \lor \psi
 )\leftrightarrow \psi )} 


• (
ϕ
→
ψ
)
↔
(
(
ϕ
∧
ψ
)
↔
ϕ
)


{\displaysty
le (\phi \to \psi )\leftrightarrow ((\phi \land \psi

)\leftrightarrow \phi )} 


• (
ϕ
∧
ψ
)
↔
(
(
ϕ
→
ψ
)
↔
ϕ
)


{\displaysty
le (\phi \land \psi )\leftrightarrow ((\phi \to \psi

)\leftrightarrow \phi )} 


• (
ϕ
∧
ψ
)
↔
(
(
(
ϕ
∨
ψ
)
↔
ψ
)
↔
ϕ
)



{\displaystyle (\phi \land \psi )\leftrightarrow (((\phi \lor
\psi )\leftrightarrow \psi )\leftrightarrow \phi )} 


In particular, {∨ , ↔, ⊥} and {∨ , ↔, ¬} are complete bases of
intuitionistic connectives.
As shown by Alexander Kuznetsov, either of the following
connectives – the first one ternary, the second one quinary – is by
itself functionally complete: either one can serve the role of a sole
sufficient operator for intuitionistic propositional logic, thus forming an
analog of the Sheffer stroke from classical propositional logic:[5]
a (
(
p
∨
q
)
∧
¬
r
)
∨
(
¬
p
∧
(
q
↔
r
)
)
,



{\displaystyle ((p\lor q)\land \neg r)\lor (\neg p\land

(q\leftrightarrow r)),} 


b p
→
(
q
∧
¬
r
∧
(
s
∨
t
)
)
.


{\displaystyle

p\to (q\land \neg r\land (s\lor t)).} 



Semantics[edit]
The semantics are rather more complicated than for the classical
case. A model theory can be given by Heyting algebras or,
equivalently, by Kripke semantics. Recently, a Tarski-like model
theory was proved complete by Bob Constable, but with a different
notion of completeness than classically.
Unproved statements in intuitionistic logic are not given an
intermediate truth value (as is sometimes mistakenly asserted). One
can prove that such statements have no third truth value, a result
dating back to Glivenko in 1928.[6] Instead they remain of unknown
truth value, until they are either proved or disproved. Statements are
disproved by deducing a contradiction from them.
A consequence of this point of view is that intuitionistic logic has no
interpretation as a two-valued logic, nor even as a finite-valued logic,
in the familiar sense. Although intuitionistic logic retains the trivial
propositions
{
⊤
,
⊥
}
{\displaystyle \{\top ,\bot \}}

from classical logic, each proof of a

propositional formula is considered a valid propositional value, thus
by Heyting's notion of propositions-as-sets, propositional formulae
are (potentially non-finite) sets of their proofs.
Heyting algebra semantics[edit]
In classical logic, we often discuss the truth values that a formula can
take. The values are usually chosen as the members of a Boolean
algebra. The meet and join operations in the Boolean algebra are
identified with the ∧ and ∨ logical connectives, so that the value of a
formula of the form A ∧ B is the meet of the value of A and the value
of B in the Boolean algebra. Then we have the useful theorem that a
formula is a valid proposition of classical logic if and only if its value is
1 for every valuation—that is, for any assignment of values to its
variables.
A corresponding theorem is true for intuitionistic logic, but instead of
assigning each formula a value from a Boolean algebra, one uses
values from an Heyting algebra, of which Boolean algebras are a
special case. A formula is valid in intuitionistic logic if and only if it
receives the value of the top element for any valuation on any
Heyting algebra.
It can be shown that to recognize valid formulas, it is sufficient to
consider a single Heyting algebra whose elements are the open
subsets of the real line R.[7] In this algebra we have:
Value =∅
[⊥]
Value =
[⊤] R
Value =
[A∧B] Value
[A]∩
Value
[B]
Value =
[A∨B] Value
[A]∪
Value
[B]
Value =
[A→B] int
(
Value
[
A
]
C
 ∪
Value
[
B
]
)
{\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}{\text{Value}}[\bot
]&=\emptyset \\{\text{Value}}[\top ]&=\mathbf {R}
\\{\text{Value}}[A\land B]&={\text{Value}}[A]\cap
{\text{Value}}[B]\\{\text{Value}}[A\lor
B]&={\text{Value}}[A]\cup
{\text{Value}}[B]\\{\text{Value}}[A\to
B]&={\text{int}}\left({\text{Value}}[A]^{\mathrm {C} }\cup
{\text{Value}}[B]\right)\end{aligned}}}

where int(X) is the interior of X and XC its complement.

The last identity concerning A → B allows us to calculate the value of
¬A:
Value =
[¬A] Value
[A→⊥]
=
int
(
Value
[
A
 ]
C
∪
Value
[
⊥
]
)
=
int
(
Value
[
A
]
C
∪
∅
)
=
int
(
Value
[
A
]
C
)
{\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}{\text{Value}}[\neg
A]&={\text{Value}}[A\to \bot
]\\&={\text{int}}\left({\text{Value}}[A]^{\mathrm {C} }\cup
{\text{Value}}[\bot
]\right)\\&={\text{int}}\left({\text{Value}}[A]^{\mathrm {C}
}\cup \emptyset
\right)\\&={\text{int}}\left({\text{Value}}[A]^{\mathrm {C}
}\right)\end{aligned}}}

With these assignments, intuitionistically valid formulas are precisely

those that are assigned the value of the entire line.[7] For example, the
formula ¬(A ∧ ¬A) is valid, because no matter what set X is chosen
as the value of the formula A, the value of ¬(A ∧ ¬A) can be shown to
be the entire line:
Value =
[¬(A∧¬A)] int
(
Value
[
A
∧
¬
A
]
C
)
=
int
(
(
Value
[
A
]
 ∩
Value
[
¬
A
]
)
C
)
=
int
(
(
Value
[
A
]
∩
int
(
Value
[
A
]
C
)
)
C
)
=
int
(
(
X
 ∩
int
(
X
C
)
)
C
)
=
int
(
∅
C
)

=
int
(
R
)
=
R
{\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}{\text{Value}}[\neg (A\land \neg
A)]&={\text{int}}\left({\text{Value}}[A\land \neg
A]^{\mathrm {C} }\right)&&{\text{Value}}[\neg
B]={\text{int}}\left({\text{Value}}[B]^{\mathrm {C}
}\right)\\&={\text{int}}\left(\left({\text{Value}}[A]\cap
{\text{Value}}[\neg A]\right)^{\mathrm {C}
}\right)\\&={\text{int}}\left(\left({\text{Value}}[A]\cap
{\text{int}}\left({\text{Value}}[A]^{\mathrm {C}
}\right)\right)^{\mathrm {C}
}\right)\\&={\text{int}}\left(\left(X\cap
{\text{int}}\left(X^{\mathrm {C} }\right)\right)^{\mathrm {C}
}\right)\\&={\text{int}}\left(\emptyset ^{\mathrm {C}
}\right)&&{\text{int}}\left(X^{\mathrm {C} }\right)\subset
X^{\mathrm {C} }\\&={\text{int}}(\mathbf {R} )\\&=\mathbf
{R} \end{aligned}}}

Negation[edit]
If one wishes to include a connective
¬
{\displaystyle \lnot }

for negation rather than consider it an

abbreviation for
ϕ
→
⊥
{\displaystyle \phi \to \bot }
 , it is enough to add:
• NOT-1': (
ϕ
→
⊥
)
→
¬
ϕ


{\displaystyle (\phi \to

\bot )\to \lnot \phi } 



• NOT-2': ¬
ϕ
→
(
ϕ
→
⊥
)


{\displaystyle \lnot \phi

\to (\phi \to \bot )} 



There are a number of alternatives available if one wishes to omit the
connective
⊥
{\displaystyle \bot }
 (false). For example, one may replace the
three axioms FALSE, NOT-1', and NOT-2' with the two axioms
• NOT-1:
(
ϕ
→
χ
)
→
(
(
ϕ
→
¬
χ
)
→
¬
ϕ
)


{\
displaystyle (\phi \to \chi )\to ((\phi \to \lnot \chi )\to \lnot

\phi )} 


• NOT-2: ϕ
→
(
¬
ϕ
→
χ
)


{\displaystyle \phi \to

(\lnot \phi \to \chi )} 



as at Propositional calculus#Axioms. Alternatives to NOT-1 are
(
ϕ
→
¬
χ
)
→
(
χ
→
¬
ϕ
)
{\displaystyle (\phi \to \lnot \chi )\to (\chi \to \lnot \phi )}

or
(
ϕ
→
¬
ϕ
)
→
¬
ϕ
{\displaystyle (\phi \to \lnot \phi )\to \lnot \phi }
 .
Equivalence[edit]
The connective
↔
{\displaystyle \leftrightarrow }

for equivalence may be treated as an

abbreviation, with
ϕ
↔
χ
{\displaystyle \phi \leftrightarrow \chi }

standing for
(
ϕ
→
χ
)
•