Professional Documents
Culture Documents
YULIA TYMOSHENKO;
ALEXANDER TYMOSHENKO;
ANDREY VAVILOV
Defendants
I. SUBJECT MATTER.
1. The present Amended Complaint is for collection of two federal judgments. The
first judgment was entered by the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on July 7,
2005 and registered in this Court under 28 U.S.C. §1963 on July 19, 2011, Docket No.11mc249.
The second judgment was entered by the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on
April 9, 2012 and registered in this Court on May 15, 2012, Docket No. 12mc165. The present
action is also for damages caused by the garnishees for withholding the judgment debtors’
corporate assets from collection (under the turn-over statutes) and for other causes. The first
Defendant is currently serving a prison sentence, the second Defendant is wanted by Interpol to
stand trial, and the third Defendant is a person of interest in several criminal investigations.
II. PARTIES.
organized under the laws of the State of Massachusetts in 1993. It has been in good standing
ever since. UTICo is the judgment creditor for the judgment debt of $18,344,480 due from the
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assets of United Energy Systems of Ukraine, PFG ("UESU"), a Ukrainian corporation, whose
president was Yulia Tymoshenko. Aided by her husband Alexander Tymoshenko, she had put
the assets of UESU under her personal control. UTICo is also the judgment creditor under a
sister judgment for $23,085,465 due from the assets of Bassington Inc. (“Bassington”), UESU’s
offshore parent and holding company for Yulia and Alexander Tymoshenko.
Ukrainian national, with a substantial nexus to New York. Having founded UESU in 1995,
Tymoshenko has become a garnishee, unlawfully holding the assets of UESU and of its parent
Bassington under her control. Apart from her business activities, Tymoshenko has been a
politician in Ukraine, twice rising to the position of Prime Minister, while at the same time using
the public offices to advance UESU’s interests. Both times Tymoshenko was fired amidst
including charges of bribery, conversion and fraud. She was convicted in October of 2011. In
several cases awaiting trial, she was further charged with financial crimes as the principal of
UESU, as well as with contract murders. Ukrainian law enforcement alleges that Tymoshenko
has been effectively the owner of UESU. As a member of the racketeering enterprise,
Tymoshenko has used agents in New York. Tymoshenko has made wire transfers through banks
in New York for over $101 million, associated with UESU’s kickbacks. Tymoshenko
furthermore directed an illegal $10 million payment to Andrey Vavilov in New York. Her
present address is: c/o Karachanovskaya Prison No. 54, Vishnevy Per. 16, Kharkov, Ukraine.
Ukraine’s charges indicate that Alexander had been assisting Tymoshenko in money laundering
to conceal the assets of UESU and Bassington and to transfer kickbacks. Alexander has faced
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UESU’s kickbacks. Since 2011, having absconded from Ukraine, Alexander is a fugitive from
justice, settling in Chechia. Alexander’s present address is: c/o Na Kohoute 804/14, 40010 Ústí
nad Labem, Czech Republic. As a member of the racketeering enterprise, Alexander has had
in New York. Vavilov’s current address is: Time Warner Tower South, 10 Columbus Circle,
Penthouse, 78th Fl., New York, NY, 10023. From October of 1992 to March of 1997, Vavilov
was the Assistant Minister of Finance of Russia. In 1996-1997, Vavilov engaged in a conspiracy
with the Tymoshenkos and others, to convert $450 million in UESU’s debt settlements. That
scheme was intended to secrete UESU’s assets from creditors, most of the assets ending up on
offshore accounts. On information and belief, Vavilov received a $10 million bribe from
UESU’s assets, directed by the Tymoshenkos through New York, for which he acquired an
apartment in New York for about $5 million. While that $10 million bribe was illegal, the title to
such assets did not transfer from UESU. Vavilov is a garnishee of UESU’s assets for $10
million, which may be used to partially satisfy the UESU judgment. Vavilov is a Defendant
6. Judgment debtors UESU and Bassington are being notified of this action, though
neither has responded to the judgments at issue. The designation of Defendants herewith is
without prejudice to joining any additional parties, John Does from 1 to 10.
III. JURISDICTION.
7. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1963. Under the laws of New
York, a judgment debt may be collected from garnishees, NY CPLR §5201, et seq., such as the
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8. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties because of the diversity
reside in, and are citizens of, Ukraine, Czechia and New York. Plaintiff, as a corporation under
the laws of Massachusetts, is a citizen of Massachusetts. The claims exceed $75,000, the
9. This Court also has jurisdiction pursuant to the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §1961, et seq., with particular reference to 18
10. The facts herein show more than five such agents in New York, including Vavilov
and non-parties Alex Rovt, Imre Pakh, Igor Boyko and Alexandre Levtchenko. Reference is also
11. The Tymoshenkos have undertaken illegal business activities in New York,
including money laundering transactions using New York banks. The Tymoshenkos directed, as
a part of UESU’s scheme, kickbacks and bribes for the total of about $101,078,339, through
correspondent accounts in New York, to former Prime Minister of Ukraine Pavlo Lazarenko
(“Lazarenko”), convicted in the U.S. As mentioned above, the Tymoshenkos also made a $10
million wire transfer through a New York account as a bribe to Vavilov, who invested a portion
12. As a U.S. person within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1952, §1956, Tymoshenko
Furthermore, according to Ukrainian law enforcement, Tymoshenko paid about $2,479,000 for
contract murders, that passed accounts in New York banks. These activities fall within the
prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. §1958, for which the statute of limitations does not apply.
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13. Apart from those kickbacks, the Tymoshenkos transacted business in New York
by directing numerous other transactions effected through New York bank accounts (Bank of
New York, Chase, Bankers Trust, Citibank, Credit Suisse). The Tymoshenkos also engaged
public relations and consulting firms in New York and elsewhere in the U.S.
14. Additionally, the grounds for the judgments, being collected herewith, were
Tymoshenko’s actions and representations, as the president of UESU and individually, effecting
15. The underlying action, UESU v. UTICo, Docket No. 97cv12180, was filed by
UESU in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in 1997. UESU was involved
in the distribution of natural gas in Eastern Europe and was controlled by Tymoshenko and
Lazarenko, who was her undisclosed partner. UESU’s claims, aimed at enjoining UTICo’s
cooperation with Ukrainian authorities at the time, were dismissed by the Court with prejudice.
16. UESU’s submission to the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court allowed UTICo
17. The judgment in favor of UTICo, of July 7, 2005, followed litigation that lasted
almost 8 years. During that time, UTICo undertook discovery in a number of jurisdictions,
including several offshore jurisdictions, using Letters Rogatory and otherwise. That discovery
exposed numerous facts relating to fraudulent schemes and accounts, described below.
18. In that litigation, UESU failed to respond to discovery requests. UESU’s default
was finally entered on February 22, 2005. After the Court assessed UTICo’s damages, a
19. The judgment has not been satisfied. During the litigation, UESU’s assets were
fraudulently transferred under the Tymoshenkos’ and their privies’ personal control.
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20. A related action against UESU’s offshore parent, captioned UTICo v. Bassington
Ltd., was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in December of 2011,
Docket No. 11cv12212. Bassington was served in the British Virgin Islands pursuant to the
1965 Hague Convention for Service Abroad of Judicial and Non-judicial Documents in Civil and
Commercial Matters, but declined to appear in the U.S. District Court. As a result, a default
proceeds fraudulently transferred from UESU under Tymoshenko’s illegal control amounted to
approximately $2,271,221,873. To avoid creditors and frustrate the recovery of these assets,
those assets, including the holdings through the Tymoshenkos’ Bassington, have been secreted in
V. UNDERLYING FACTS.
22. The Tymoshenkos first contacted UTICo in July of 1993, when Tymoshenko
headed a Ukrainian company, Cube, Ltd. (“Cube”), which was UESU’s predecessor. Cube held
a $113 million government contract with a Ukrainian agricultural agency for bartering exports of
ferrous metals for imported oil. During their first shipment, which was transacted through Indian
intermediaries whom the Tymoshenkos selected, Cube claimed a loss of approximately half the
23. In April of 1994, Tymoshenko signed for Cube an agreement with UTICo and
issued a power of attorney, to collect the alleged debt due from the Indian and Chinese buyers.
24. In 1995-1996, UTICo was initially able to recover $661,000 from the Indian
intermediaries. The Tymoshenkos routed those recovered proceeds to the account of Somolli
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recovered by UTICo, from Sayani Enterprises Ltd. at the American Express Bank in New York.
On February 10, 1995, the Tymoshenkos received $100,000 recovered by UTICo, from the
through UTICo’s collection efforts several more wire transfers, cleared through correspondent
accounts at Chase Manhattan Bank and Citibank in New York, for the total of $661,000.
Tymoshenko holding 33.4%, Alexander 33.3%, and the remaining 33.3% held in the name of
for smuggling undeclared cash (4 million karbovantsy, the Ukrainian currency, and $26,000).
Tymoshenko was released through Lazarenko’s intervention. In July of 1995, the Tymoshenkos
were arrested at a Moscow airport, again attempting to smuggle undeclared cash, $100,000.
responsibilities included energy supplies, mostly imported from Russia. Using his government
corporation, Boston Trade Connections, Inc. (“BTC”), for $5 million ($1.5 million on November
7, 1995 and $3.5 million on December 13, 1995). These two transfers were unauthorized in
Ukraine. BTC was connected with certain high-ranking Ukrainian officials and, on information
and belief, the $5 million represented a portion of an illegal payment to obtain UESU’s license.
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30. As the evidence shows, Lazarenko paid a bribe of $7 million to the then
Ukrainian Prime Minister Yevghen Marchuk, to license UESU for the natural gas business and
distribution in Ukraine.
31. Tymoshenko and Lazarenko were the masterminds of the UESU scheme. On
November 8, 1995, Lazarenko wrote to the Russian authorities proposing that UESU should
become an intermediary for natural gas imports from Russia to Ukraine. Using his government
32. In November of 1995, the Tymoshenkos arranged for the creation of UESU that
she controlled. UESU was created after Lazarenko wrote to the Russian authorities proposing it.
33. The incorporation of UESU on November 20, 2005 involved fraud. The Minutes
No. 2-1/95 of the shareholders’ meeting stated that it was attended by Andreas Petrou (“Petrou”),
34. In fact, Petrou never attended that meeting in Ukraine and was unaware that any
minutes were prepared citing his “presentation”. The Tymoshenkos fraudulently used Petrou’s
35. According to Petrou’s testimony, the only time he saw the Tymoshenkos was in
1992, when the Tymoshenkos walked into his wife’s travel agency in Cyprus. Petrou referred
them to an attorney and never saw the Tymoshenkos again or heard back from them. At Petrou’s
deposition, Petrou declared that his signature on UESU’s documents was forged.
36. In December of 1995, Lazarenko used his position as First Deputy Prime Minister
to have UESU licensed as the distributor of natural gas imports into Ukraine. State enterprises in
several regions were compelled to purchase the imported gas from UESU.
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37. Lazarenko and Tymoshenko negotiated a delivery contract for 1996 between the
Russian gas supplier OAO Gazprom (“Gazprom”) and UESU, via Gazprom’s chairman Rem
38. UESU was set up as a subsidiary of United Energy International, Ltd. (“UEIL”),
which was based in London, U.K. UEIL, as a shell entity, was established in October of 1995
and was controlled by the Tymoshenkos through Somolli. As a nominee shareholder, UEIL held
85 percent of UESU and employed a sole director in London, a Turkish national, Ekrument
(C) Proceeds Transferred by Rovt and Pakh Used to Fund the UESU Scheme.
39. On November 25, 1995, two days after UEIL opened its account at National West
Bank in London, Alex Rovt (“Rovt”), a businessman residing in New York, and his partner Imre
Pakh (“Pakh”), made the transfer of $2,222,988, to fund that account. Rovt is a Ukrainian
national and Pakh, a Hungarian national (later becoming U.S. citizens), operated out of New
York, using their entities IBE Trade Corp. (IBE being an acronym for ‘international barter
exchanges”) and World Wide Chemicals, Inc. The payment was made to the Tymoshenkos
through the Bank of New York (where Pakh’s wife worked as a vice president).
40. The initial transfer was followed by subsequent transfers from Rovt and Pakh to
the UEIL Account: (1) $2,906,988 on December 4, 1995; (2) $999,988 on January 25, 1995; (3)
$1,399,988 on February 1, 1996; and (4) $999,988 on February 14, 1996. Rovt and Pakh also
made transfers to the Somolli Account: (1) $2,708,990 on March 1, 1996; (2) $1,178,586 on
August 21, 1996; and (3) $1,599,986 on September 2, 1996. The total of these wire transfers to
the Tymoshenkos, directed by Rovt and Pakh from New York, amounted to approximately
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information and belief, that Rovt and Pakh obtained a licensed access to the port facilities of the
City of Odessa in Ukraine. Rovt, assisted by Pakh, obtained the access to operating the terminal
42. Using Lazarenko’s and Tymoshenko’s backing, Rovt’s entities raided the
fertilizers’ facilities in the port of Odessa, particularly on March 3-7, 1996, converting the title to
the fertilizers stored by the Russian suppliers (located in Togliatti). Rovt, assisted by Pakh,
43. On information and belief, a portion of the payments, paid by Rovt and Pakh into
the accounts in London and Cyprus, controlled by the Tymoshenkos, represented kickbacks for
the sale of those bulk fertilizers, illegally taken from the port storage.
(D) UESU Obtaining, through Conspiracy of Tymoshenko and Lazarenko, Contracts for
Natural Gas Imports.
44. Abusing his government position, Lazarenko enabled UESU to obtain contracts
with Gazprom, including Contracts Nos. 4GU and No. 70, both dated December 29, 1995.
45. Consumers of natural gas in Ukraine were compelled to pay for the distributed
gas to UESU’s and UEIL’s accounts. The Tymoshenkos arranged for the proceeds of gas sales
to be routed mostly to: (a) the UEIL Account at National Westminster Bank, 208 Picadilly,
London, Nos. 140/0/04329791 and 06010644; (b) UESU’s Account at Golden Union (offshore)
Bank, P.K. 466- Lefcosa, Mersion 10, Turkey, No. 1073601 LSCB, #59-13710; and (c) the
46. Lazarenko, who became Prime Minister in May of 1996, was UESU’s principal
promoter, abusing his official power. As the evidence shows, Lazarenko conspired with
Tymoshenko where he received 50% of UESU’s net revenue, which Tymoshenko forwarded to
Gazprom’s chairman Viakhirev, through his nominees Lucky Star Enterprises, Ltd. ($1.4 million
on June 5, 1996) and Eagle Enterprises, Ltd. ($1,280,000 on June 11, 1996), both accounts being
invoices in the name of Somolli. They hired a Macedonian national, Donco Stojanovski
Stojanovski testified, he was compelled, for free housing and a small salary, to sign blank pages
on Somolli’s letterhead. Stojanovski did not know what then became of those blank documents.
49. Aksoy, a nominee director of UEIL, who resided in London at that time, later
Most of the payment instructions were to transfer proceeds from UEIL’s account at National
50. As various banking records show, the Tymoshenkos used U.S.-based banks to
make numerous transactions relating to their illegal schemes. For example, the Tymoshenkos
directed transfers from UEIL to their Somolli Account through Chase Manhattan Bank in New
York and Corestates Bank in Philadelphia. According to U.S. government experts, those
51. As a part of the illegal market sharing, Lazarenko and Tymoshenko made
arrangements with Semion Mogilevich (“Mogilevich”), who had interest in the natural gas
distribution in Ukraine. Mogilevich was a senior member of the Russian organized crime group,
which materialized several illegal schemes in the USA (including a money laundering scheme
through the Bank of New York with the turnover of over $7 billion).
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Igor Fisherman, holding a U.S. passport, who at some point resided in Buffalo, New York, as his
official advisor. After Mogilevich and Fisherman were declared wanted by the FBI,
Tymoshenko developed market-sharing conflict with Mogilevich (on the FBI’s Top Ten list).
53. Tymoshenko and Lazarenko conspired with Vavilov to obtain personally UESU’s
assets using a fictitious settlement scheme, later declared criminal. As the Assistant Minister of
Finance of Russia, Vavilov master-minded a scheme involving UESU, that entailed a $10
million bribe that came under his control to a New York account.
54. On November 26, 1996 Vavilov and Tymoshenko, among others, signed the first
illegal protocol on the settlement of UESU’s debt to Gazprom, for $250 million. Under that
scheme, instead of paying Gazprom for natural gas deliveries, UESU converted its debt into an
obligation to supply the Russian Army with various goods, including construction materials and
55. The funds, $250 million, were transferred within one day among the several
accounts in Moscow. That scheme resulting in the cancellation of UESU’s debt in exchange for
UESU’s obligation to supply goods to the Russian Army, which proved to become
unenforceable. At the beginning, UESU started to deliver those goods to the Russian Army.
56. Vavilov was involved in numerous other suspect deals. On February 3, 1997,
Vavilov’s car was exploded by a bomb, but he was not in it. That crime has remained unsolved.
57. On March 3, 1997, the second protocol concerning UESU’s debt was signed by
Vavilov and Tymoshenko, among other parties, for a second installment of cancellation, $200
million, with the same fictitious transfers passing through the accounts in Moscow.
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58. The total of the transactions, effectively canceling of UESU’s debt to Gazprom
for the natural gas, already delivered, was now $450 million. UESU’s debt was canceled against
59. On March 30, 1997, within weeks of the second Gazprom settlement deal, the
Tymoshenkos directed $10 million from the UEIL Account in London, through Aksoy, to
account No. 608211194, at Republic National Bank in New York, maintained by Louis D’Or
60. The nominal recipient of that transfer was Angora Management Ltd. (“Angora”),
registered in the Bahamas. Angora’s beneficiary was, on information and belief, Vavilov.
61. As investigation has shown, Louis D’Or was controlled by Vavilov’s co-
friend, Nadezhda Kossareva, managed Louis D’Or, with a nominee office at Musson Bldg, 2nd
Floor, Hincks St., Bridgetown, Barbados. Louis D’Or was owned by nominee Titan (Isle of
Man) Ltd, which was controlled by Vavilov’s agent, the vice chairman of Unikombank, Andrey
62. Shortly after that bribe was paid to Angora’s sub-account at Republic National
Bank in New York, on information and belief, Vavilov bought a $5 million apartment in New
York. As a government official, Vavilov was prohibited from obtaining any income other than
his salary. Title to the $10 million bribe did not transfer to Vavilov, the title still vests in UESU.
63. Within a few weeks of Vavilov’s ouster from the Russian government, UESU
slowed down the deliveries of goods to the Russian Army. After Lazarenko was removed from
the position of the Prime Minister in July of 1997, UESU stopped all further deliveries.
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64. As a result, the natural gas supplies were converted by UESU’s principals, the
Tymoshenkos and Lazarenko. The net result that out of $450 million, $327 million became
65. The Tymoshenkos’ and Lazarenko’s conspiracy allowed UESU to generate over
$11 billion in turnover in 1996, its first year of operations. As banking records show, UESU’s
proceeds were secretly distributed to Tymoshenko, who directed 50% as kickbacks to Lazarenko.
66. On December 31, 1996, Lazarenko, abusing his position as Prime Minister,
compelled a member of his cabinet to sign a state guarantee, primarily to secure Gazprom’s
deliveries of natural gas to UESU, for $200 million per month in the event of UESU’s default,
67. Somolli was no longer adequate for the Tymoshenkos’ concealing their offshore
assets. In December of 1996, the Tymoshenkos approached Credit Suisse Trust AG. Credit
68. To frustrate their creditors’ claims, in December 1996, 90% of UEIL stock was
transferred to Bassington, Ltd. (“Bassington”), a shell company established in the British Virgin
Islands (“BVI”), IBC No. 203394, administered by an agent, Mossack & Fonseca in the BVI.
69. Bassington was set up by Credit Suisse’s employees in Guernsey, the Channel
Islands, namely Pamela Le Cheminant, Julia Church and Denise Corbet. These trust officers
70. The Tymoshenkos directed two separate wire transfers to New York, for a total of
$460,000 on January 21-22, 1997, from the Somolli Account to Bassington’s sub-account in
New York. These wire instructions, signed by Alexander, were for $270,000 and $190,000 on
the next day. Both instructions said: “Credit Suisse New York, Tower 49, 12 East 49th St., New
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York, 10017, SWIFT Code: CRESUS 33, a/c Credit Suisse (Guernsey) Limited, Number
Bassington’s authorized capital from 50,000 to 1 million shares. That increase was paid for by
check No. 6270 in the name of Credit Suisse (Guernsey) Ltd, showing the Federal Reserve’s ID,
1-260/917/01; the routing No. 026009179, registered by Credit Suisse First Boston.
72. The Tymoshenkos’ trustees at Credit Suisse directed the agent for Bassington in
the BVI, Mossack & Fonseca, to increase Bassington’s authorized capital to 1 million shares, at
$1.00 each. The Tymoshenkos’ trustees wrote to Mossack & Fonseca, that Bassington’s 451,872
Guernsey existed only as paper records of the Tymoshenkos’ trustees, without the actual transfer
74. The $460,000 that was transferred by the Tymoshenkos to Credit Suisse in New
York, continues to be located in New York, with accrued interest since 1997, available for
75. As mentioned above, according to banking records, the Tymoshenkos used banks
in New York to transfer kickbacks and bribes to Lazarenko for about $101,079,339. Alexander
signed, on the Somolli letterhead, most of those transfer instructions to New York.
76. The Tymoshenkos’ bribes to Lazarenko were in part transferred through New
York, from Somolli/UESU to the account in the name of Orphin S.A. (“Orphin”) at a Polish
bank, called American Bank in Poland (“ABP”). Orphin, a dissolved Bahamian entity, was
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The total of those wire transfers in 1996 amounted to $49,929,347. As an investigation showed,
ABP effected its U.S. dollar transactions through its correspondent account at Bankers Trust Co.
in New York, and in reality these proceeds were not transferred from New York to Poland.
Credit Suisse Bank. This account was used to pay kickbacks, which were transferred via New
York, from Somolli/UESU to Lazarenko. The total of these transfers amounted to $39.2 million,
account No. 21383 at Credit Suisse (initially at Banque Populaire Suisse, which later merged into
Credit Suisse). That account was credited with $23,049,386 from Somolli, which was
transferred to Lazarenko’s personal coded account, named ‘NIHPRO’, also at Credit Suisse.
79. The total for wire transfers to the NIHPRO Account at Credit Suisse amounted to
$40,447,000 in 1996 alone. That included the proceeds directly from the Somolli Account, as
well as $4,086,000 through Kiritchenko’s another account at Credit Suisse, in the name of GHP
Corp. (Panama), and $16,099,894 through Orphin’s account at ABP. Lazarenko’s account
NIHPRO at Credit Suisse was the source from which over $105 million was routed, through
80. The Tymoshenkos also used Kiritchenko’s account in the name of Wilnorth Inc.
(Panama) for the kickbacks, which were executed by Alexander and transferred through New
York from Somolli/UESU to Lazarenko. Those wire instructions were executed by Alexander.
The total of these wire transfers amounted to $14,099,636, received by Credit Suisse in New
York, SWIFT CRESUS. Those and other proceeds were then routed to Lazarenko’s another
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81. From May 27 to June 11, 1997, the Tymoshenkos caused UESU to make wire
82. These transfers were made at the direction of the Tymoshenkos at Slaviansky
Bank in Ukraine, where UESU proceeds were deposited through Somolli. Those proceeds were
transferred through an account in the name of First Trading Bank, incorporated in Nauru,
servicing the Tymoshenkos. The proceeds were wire transferred to the Bankers Trust account in
New York and then to Eurofed’s correspondent account at Pacific Bank in San Francisco.
83. This series of bribes to Lazarenko from UESU’s assets included the following
payments in 1997: (1) $2,998,000 on May 27; (2) $1,662,000 on May 29; (3) $394,000 on May
30; (4) $2,200,000 on June 2; (5) $1,530,000 on June 3; (6) $499,970 on June 4; (7) $170,000 on
June 5; (8) $1,000,000 on June 6; (9) $510,000 on June 9; (10) $2,000,000 on June 10; (11)
84. These proceeds of UESU were transferred from Orphin’s account #151897 at
approximately $2,479,000 from UESU’s accounts at Bankers Trust and Chase Manhattan in New
York. These charges allege that as a result of those payments to a criminal group headed by
Alexander Milchenko (“Milchenko”) and Eugene Kushnir (“Kushnir”), at least 4 people were
86. The victims included Eugene Scherban (“Scherban”), the head of a company
named Industrial Union of Donbas that competed with UESU and hindered UESU’s deliveries to
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the Donbas region in Ukraine. Scherban’s family lived in the U.S. and Scherban had business in
New York, Overseas United Partners, Inc., at 750 7th Av., Ste 20-B, New York, NY.
video link from the U.S., on the next day after the killings at the Donetsk airport, Lazarenko,
taking from his safe box, gave $500,000 in cash to Kiritchenko to deliver to Milchenko, with the
promise to pay the balance of the agreed $3 million, which Tymoshenko was to pay.
88. As Kiritchenko testified, Tymoshenko then refused to pay, telling Kiritchenko she
doubted that Scherban was killed actually by the Milchenko group. According to that testimony,
then Milchenko threatened, through Kiritchenko, that if the contract murders were not paid for in
full ($3 million), his group would then retaliate by targeting both Tymoshenko and Lazarenko.
89. Tymoshenko then agreed to pay, securing several installments through two
UESU proceeds, for the contract murders included the wire transfers to Milchenko’s account of
$500,000 on May 20, 1997 and $979,000 on September 9, 1997. As investigation showed one
installment, $150,000 was wired on September 30, 1997 through New York to Kushnir’s account
at Raiffaisen Bank in Vienna, Austria, and used to buy machine guns and ammunitions.
Additionally, $850,000 was paid on Milchenko’s account on February 26, 1998. All these
90. The Ukrainian government has charged Lazarenko and Tymoshenko of the
contract murders, whereas Tymoshenko paid the moneys to the accounts of Milchenko and
Kushnir, from the UESU proceeds. This money in the total of $2,479,000 was originated from
the Somolli Account and sent through the accounts in New York.
91. Ukraine’s charges also include Lazarenko’s alleged order to murder Igor Bakay
(“Bakay”), the principal of Respublika, another entity competing with UESU in the gas
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distribution business, but it was aborted. Altogether, the surviving members of the Milchenko-
(I) Conspiracy to Obfuscate the Money Trail and Launder UESU’s Proceeds.
92. The kickbacks from the Tymoshenkos to Lazarenko were further subject to steps
to cut the money trail. In particular, the conspirators used the bearer checks Nos. 1409 and 1410,
each for $48 million, issued by SCS Alliance Bank in Geneva, to Lazarenko, drawn on Credit
Suisse-New York, with the same address as for the Bassington payments above: Credit Suisse,
93. Those two checks for $96 million were followed by the bearer checks Nos. 1414
and 1415 also drawn on Credit Suisse in New York, both in the same amount of $196,100.
94. The four bearer checks, for the total amount of $96,392,200, were used to
liquidate Lazarenko’s coded account CARPO 5353 at SCS Alliance Bank. Having laundered
those proceeds through Credit Suisse in New York, Lazarenko then deposited those checks on
his two nominee accounts at SCS Alliance Bank in the Bahamas. The testimony at Lazarenko’s
trial showed that the bearer checks canceled in New York were to cut the “money trail.”
95. In 1996 and 1997, the Tymoshenkos used several shell entities and accounts in the
96. The Tymoshenkos wired transferred the total of $6,274,737 from the Somolli
to the Ukrainian criminal proceedings, Tymoshenko has controlled Greendale and used these
proceeds, via the account in New York, for bribery in the UESU scheme.
97. The Tymoshenkos wire transferred the total amount of $850,000 from the Somolli
Account to the account of Luxor United, Inc. (“Luxor”) incorporated in New York, with the
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registered address: 97 Corbin Place, Brooklyn, New York. The investigation of Luxor showed it
had no real business. Tymoshenko, who is believed to have exercised control over Luxor, was
98. The Tymoshenkos made wire transfers, in the total of $2,245,000 from the
Somolli Account to the account of Astra World-Wide Enterprises, Inc. (“Astra-NY”), a New
York corporation, with offices at 1745 West 6th St., Brooklyn, New York. Tymoshenko, who is
believed to have exercised control over that entity, was not authorized in Ukraine to make these
99. The Tymoshenkos made wire transfers in the total of $1,908,600 from the Somolli
Account to Astra Consulting, Inc. (“Astra-FL”), a Florida corporation, with offices at 1250 E.
Hallandale Beach Blvd, 501-A, Hallandale, FL. Tymoshenko, who is believed to have exercised
control over that entity, was not authorized to make these transfers going to Citibank.
100. The Tymoshenkos received two wire transfers in the total amount of $7,205,646
on the Somolli Account, from Omaha Conagra Inc. in Nebraska. These proceeds, not reported
proceeds were received for UESU’s exports and were laundered on the Somolli Account.
101. The Tymoshenkos made the wire transfers in the total of $1,699,842 from the
Somolli Account to Opus International Corp. (“Opus”), incorporated in Delaware with the
registered address at Chemical Bank Plaza, Ste 1600, 1201 North Market St., Wilmington, DE.
Tymoshenko, who is believed to have controlled that entity through her banker Mark Boldyrev
102. The Tymoshenkos made wire transfers in the total of $250,000 from the Somolli
Account to M. Invest Agency Inc. (“M. Invest”), incorporated in Delaware with the registered
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address at: 19 Kris Court, Newark, DE. The Tymoshenkos, who are believed to have controlled
that entity through Boldyrev, were unauthorized in Ukraine to make these transfers.
103. The Tymoshenkos used wires passing the accounts in New York for movement of
104. The Tymoshenkos made the wire transfers in the total of $2,370,000 from the
Somolli Account through State Street Bank in New York to the account at Royal Bank of
Scotland, in the name of Monroe S.A.R.L. incorporated in Jersey, Channel Islands. The
Tymoshenkos, who are believed to have exercised control over that entity, were not authorized in
105. The Tymoshenkos made the wire transfers in the total of $2,013,500 from the
Somolli Account through Bankers Trust Co. in New York to the account at Leu Bank in
Switzerland in the name of Oriana Overseas Ltd. incorporated in Ireland. The Tymoshenkos,
who are believed to have exercised illegal control over that entity, were not authorized in
106. The Tymoshenkos made wire transfers in the total of $4,235,000, from the
Somolli Account through Chase Manhattan Bank in New York to the account at Swiss Bank
Corp., in the name of Allasey Management S.A. The Tymoshenkos, who are believed to have
exercised illegal control over that entity, were not authorized in Ukraine to make these transfers
107. The Tymoshenkos made a wire transfer of $500,000 from the Somolli Account to
the account of Word Wide Partners, Ltd. in Washington, D.C. Tymoshenko was not authorized
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108. The Tymoshenkos paid $30,000 from the Somolli Account to the account of
Boldyrev, mentioned above, at Dean Witter (Morgan Stanley) in New York. Boldyrev operated
for Tymoshenko an offshore bank named First Trading Bank, incorporated in Nauru, used for the
109. The Tymoshenkos made a wire transfer $100,000 from the Somolli Account to
the Wells Fargo account of Afriko International Inc. incorporated in California. The
Tymoshenkos were not authorized in Ukraine to make that transfer, without a legitimate purpose.
110. The Tymoshenkos wire transferred $300,000 from the Somolli Account to
Alexandre Levtchenko (“Levtchenko”), with office in New York. On information and belief,
Levtchenko provided services in New York in the financial sector. The Tymoshenkos were not
authorized in Ukraine to make that transfer, which was not for a legitimate business purpose.
111. The Tymoshenkos transferred more than $1.1 million from Somolli Account,
through Bankers Trust Co. in New York to pay for Tymoshenko’s credit card statements.
Tymoshenko’s trial for tax evasion in Ukraine is pending, showing these unauthorized
transactions passing New York (used for purchasing fur coats, shoes).
112. The Tymoshenkos made the wire transfers of $110,000, directed by Tymoshenko,
listed address 314 Commerce St., Alexandria, Virginia. The funds were paid from the Somolli
113. The Tymoshenkos directed the wire transfer of $500,000 to Clifford Chance, the
law firm operating in the U.S., U.K. and other countries. That wire transfer, passing Bankers
Trust Co. in New York, was not reported and unauthorized in Ukraine.
114. Tymoshenko also operated as a president and chairman of her own Ukrainian
bank, called Pivden Bank. In that capacity Tymoshenko controlled two correspondent accounts
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in New York, at Bankers Trust Co. and the Bank of New York. Pivden Bank was identified by
(L) The Tymoshenkos’ Acquisition of Real Estate in the USA for UESU Proceeds.
115. The Tymoshenkos also conspired to acquire for $1.1 million the realty in
Virginia, namely the office building at: 1012 Cameron St., Alexandria, VA. That acquisition
occurred within a month after Tymoshenko’s visit to the U.S. in April of 1997, when she, on
International Ltd., identical to the name of the London parent of UESU, as a Virginia
corporation, with the registered address at: 314 Commerce St., Alexandria, VA 22314. The
Tymoshenkos directed the payment of $1.1 million for the office at 1012 Cameron St.,
Alexandria, VA 22314, in that name and arranged for its account at Virginia Commerce Bank.
117. The monies for the realty were paid, per orders of the Tymoshenkos, through
(M) Lazarenko’s Dismissal for Corruption, UESU’s Removal from Energy Market.
118. In parallel with her managing UESU, since January of 1997 Tymoshenko became,
119. Amidst the public outcry against Lazarenko’s apparent amassing a criminal
fortune based on UESU and other schemes, in July of 1997 Lazarenko was removed from the
120. In August of 1997, upon the inquiries of UTICo concerning the legitimacy of the
Somolli Account, to which the Tymoshenkos routed the proceeds collected by UTICo under the
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London. When that meeting took place, one of UTICo’s directors was threatened that he would
be eliminated if UTICo complained to the law enforcement. UTICo reported the appearance of
UESU’s malfeasance to Ukrainian authorities. That led to the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s
Office (“UPGO”) contracting UTICo in May of 1998 to provide assistance outside of Ukraine.
121. UESU’s operations in the gas distribution were audited in Ukraine. Pursuant to
the new Ukrainian Government’s audit published by June of 1998, UESU was fined for the
123. The prosecutor of Guernsey was approached by a Guernsey law firm Collas Day
Rowland, acting on behalf of the Tymoshenkos, Bassington, UESU, and UEIL. In the
application on July 23, 1998 said law firm sought to stop discovery in light of their appeal.
124. The Tymoshenkos, Lazarenko, UESU, UEIL and Bassington filed an appeal in
Guernsey from the release of banking records to the investigators. Credit Suisse blocked the
assets related to UESU (of which $143 million was controlled by Lazarenko). However,
Tymoshenko was able to block the disclosure of her trust, called the BL Trust, at Credit Suisse.
125. Ukraine’s civil claims for UESU proceeds were initiated since August of 1999 by
UPGO that filed a case in the Ukrainian court, to declare void UESU’s “gas contracts” and to
freeze the proceeds of UESU. As a result, the amount of 3,682,273,549 hryvnas (Ukrainian
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her appointment as an Assistant Prime Minister in charge of the energy sector. Using that
position, according to the subsequent charges, Tymoshenko staged additional corrupt schemes.
127. In August of 2000, Alexander and his associate were arrested on the charges of
fraud concerning UESU. A year later they were released without standing trial, under suspect
128. In January of 2001, Tymoshenko was removed from the position of the Assistant
Prime Minister amidst the allegations of corruption. Tymoshenko was detained on charges of
129. After Tymoshenko was in detention for about 7 weeks, in March of 2001 a judge
of the municipal court in Kyiv unexpectedly released Tymoshenko, which the public interpreted
as a result of bribery (that judge was later convicted on unrelated charges). When the appellate
court reversed Tymoshenko’s release, the remand was unusually cancelled by the then chairman
of the Supreme Court of Ukraine Vitaly Boiko (“Boiko”), who later, upon retirement, became
Tymoshenko’s consultant.
130. From March to November of 2001, three new criminal cases against UESU
principals were opened in Ukraine, charging Tymoshenko, Alexander and Lazarenko of bribery
from UESU proceeds, for about $87 million. Likewise, in 2001 the prosecutor’s office in Russia
131. In July of 2002, the UPGO petitioned the Parliament to strip Tymoshenko of
immunity to stand charges in connection with the UESU frauds. The vote was blocked by
Tymoshenko’s allies.
132. In September of 2002, the new Prosecutor General, Sviatoslav Piskun, filed a new
petition to parliament to strip Tymoshenko of immunity, to allow charges and trial related to
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UESU. According to the audit cited by the criminal investigation, the Tymoshenkos converted
approximately $2,271,221,873.
133. Four financial managers of UESU, including Alexander’s father, fled Ukraine.
They were declared wanted by Interpol on charges of a conspiracy to conceal UESU’s assets.
By October of 2002, those four managers were located in Turkey, arrested by Turkish
134. When the Tymoshenkos were both summonsed by the Ukrainian authorities for
June 23 and 24, 2003, per request of the U.S. Department of Justice, to be questioned in
Lazarenko’s matter, Alexander absconded from Ukraine. Tymoshenko appeared but essentially
gave on June 24, 2003 her letter to the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. District Court,
claiming that Lazarenko was wrongly charged, demanding his release. Tymoshenko’s
136. In March of 2003 Kiritchenko and later in July of 2003 Lazarenko, both fugitives
from Ukrainian justice, filed lawsuits in the Ukrainian courts against UPGO, claiming that
UPGO’s contracts with UTICo interfered with their rights in Ukraine. Kiritchenko’s claim was
dismissed, but with dicta favoring him, and Lazarenko’s claim was satisfied. Namely, on
made an unusual ruling in favor of Lazarenko, without notice to UTICo. (Later Strizhevska was
charged in an unrelated matter and removed from judgeship). However, that decision was
137. In light of the mounting criminal investigations of UESU frauds, in 2003 the
Tymoshenkos’ co-conspirator Vavilov liquidated his assets in the Russian oil sector for about
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$600 million and began to relocate those to the U.S. On January 5, 2004 Vavilov’s private jet
was forced by U.S. authorities to land in Miami, where Vavilov was questioned by the FBI
138. In May of 2004, Tymoshenko was charged with a conspiracy to bribe members of
the Supreme Court of Ukraine seeking to release the four financial officers of UESU and to close
the mater. As the evidence shows, Tymoshenko gave a $125,000 bribe to the intermediary, but
he refused to hand over the money and reported on her. According to surveillance video, she
139. Prior to Lazarenko’s trial in the U.S., Tymoshenko engaged the former chairman
of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, Boiko (who acted for Tymoshenko in escaping from
incarceration and trial in 2001), to serve as Lazarenko’s expert witness. Boiko claimed that
Lazarenko did not break any laws in Ukraine. Against the fact that Lazarenko was named in the
media No. 8 in the “Top Ten” most corrupt leaders, Boiko’s discrediting the Ukrainian judiciary
140. Lazarenko’s trial by jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, Docket No. 04cr0284, ended with the guilty verdict on June 4, 2004. Even though
Lazarenko was convicted on charges not associated with UESU, Tymoshenko was identified in
141. In August of 2004, Tymoshenko was charged in Russia of bribing officers of the
Russian Army to cover up the failed deliveries by UESU of goods under the $450 million
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Oleynik, the head of the logistics for the Russian Army involved in the UESU settlements, was
sentenced to five years in prison. However, Vavilov, who was a key organizer of that fraudulent
144. In October of 2004, a presidential election took place in Ukraine, where the then
145. In November of 2004, the second round of the presidential elections took place,
which resulted in Yanukovich’s victory. However, that outcome caused political unrest, largely
financed by Tymoshenko, using the UESU proceeds. In December of 2004, another round of
voting occurred as a result of the unrest and Yuschenko was declared the president.
146. Once Yuschenko was sworn into office on January 24, 2005, he appointed
Tymoshenko, whom he owed the secretive electoral campaign funding, as Prime Minister. On
147. Once Tymoshenko got the powers of Prime Minister, she essentially made her
corruption, Tymoshenko made her cut a condition of access to the business opportunities in
Ukraine, particularly with large enterprises, in which the government held interest.
148. As an example of shadow deals with New York businessmen, Rovt and Pakh,
who first relied on Yuschenko, obtained interest in the Azot enterprise in Severodonetsk,
Ukraine. Rovt and Pakh staged a sham bankruptcy of Azot and then acquired 60% of its stock in
exchange for their commitment to invest more than $100 million, which they never did. Rovt
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and Pakh ultimately came to a deal with Tymoshenko. Relying on Tymoshenko’s power, Rovt
and Pakh then obtained the remaining 40% of Azot, completing their raiding of Azot.
149. Upon UESU’s failure to comply with discovery in the action UESU v. UTICo, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, ongoing since September of 1997, the Court
ultimately entered a default against UESU. It coincided with the timing when Tymoshenko first
became Prime Minister. As soon as Tymoshenko assumed the position of the Prime Minister,
she used her new powers to prevent UTICo’s collection of UESU’s assets.
150. In a radio interview on Radio Liberty, President Yuschenko confirmed that, upon
her nomination, Tymoshenko immediately approached him asking to order the Supreme Court’s
Chairman Vasyl Maliarenko (“Maliarenko”) to close UESU’s criminal and civil cases. As
Yuschenko stated, Tymoshenko approached him about UESU’s matter seven times. Maliarenko
asked Yuschenko to protect him from Tymoshenko’s pressurizing him concerning UESU.
151. Tymoshenko appointed her political ally, Roman Zvarych (“Zvarych”), as the
Minister of Justice in her Cabinet. Zvarych, born in Yonkers, New York, moved in 1993 to
Ukraine, relinquished the U.S.-citizenship, swapped for Ukrainian, to serve as the Minister.
152. Using Zvarych, who oversaw the courts, judges’ appointments, salaries and the
judges, Tymoshenko illegally used the courts, under her indirect control, for her interests.
153. In February of 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court overturned the lower
court’s decision on a lien, from April 19, 2001, against UESU’s assets, for about $657.5 million,
154. In May of 2005 UESU filed a lawsuit in the court in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine, for
refund of what had been paid in fines imposed on UESU and to release 351,955,988 hryvnas to
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July 7, 2005 the U.S. District Court issued a judgment in favor of UTICo for $18,344,480.
UTICo intended to seek the collection of that judgment from UESU’s assets in Ukraine.
156. However, after that judgment, Tymoshenko abused her government position to
preempt UTICo’s efforts to collect the UESU judgment. Tymoshenko accelerated the
the contractual rights of UTICo under its contract with UPGO from 1998. In that connection, on
July 7, 2005 Tymoshenko interfered, through Zvarych’s office, with the regular judicial
proceedings. As a result, in Lazarenko’s case a decision in Lazarenko’s favor was made in the
Court of Appeals in Kyiv. That unusual hand-written ruling on many pages reversed the ruling
of the same court concerning the validity of assignment of UPGO to UTICo. Tymoshenko’s
motive was to damage UTICo by all means, disrupting its contractual relationship with the
Ukrainian law enforcement and interfering with the collection by UTICo of the judgment debt.
158. On August 19, 2005 upon Tymoshenko’s abusing her powers, the Ukrainian court
made a decision on the reversal of the lien on UESU accounts, allowing refund the above $62.8
million from the seized funds, back to UESU. Tymoshenko pursued cutting off for UTICo an
of having converted through UESU 8 billion hryvnas, or $1.6 billion. However, Tymoshenko
being fired, her privies in the Ukrainian Security Service destroyed all 13 volumes of the
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criminal file of Mogilevich. UPGO brought the charges against the perpetrators, but those were
above. Tymoshenko’s faction then nominated Strizhevska to the Kyiv Court of Appeal, but that
nomination was defeated. Strizhevska was subject to a criminal investigation for fraud in that
case, removed from judgeship and ultimately began to act as Tymoshenko’s consultant.
161. Tymoshenko’s subordinate Zvarych also lost the portfolio of Minister of Justice
in her Cabinet. Still, Tymoshenko remained the second most powerful person in Ukraine,
controlling enormous financial means and interfering with the Ukrainian courts.
162. For example, on November 4, 2005 Tymoshenko called the chairman of the
Supreme Economic Court in Kyiv, Dmitry Prityka, and demanded to issue a court decision
favorable to her. In that conversation, intercepted and published, it transpired that Tymoshenko
expected favorable rulings from Malyarenko, the chairman of the Supreme Court.
163. On November 18, 2005, the Supreme Court of Ukraine closed, under
Tymoshenko’s pressure, all cases against Tymoshenko, her husband and UESU. Tymoshenko
used that decision to release the liens on UESU’s assets. She then proceeded to conceal UESU’s
assets released in Ukraine, cutting off for UTICo an opportunity of collecting the judgment debt.
164. In March of 2006, a bloc of political parties headed by Tymoshenko, received the
second largest number of votes at the parliamentary election in Ukraine, despite her dismissal for
the budgetary committee of the parliament to continue acting to conceal UESU’s assets.
London, UESU’s nominee parent company, to be dissolved after it failed to submit corporate
filings. UEIL failed to send out the mandatory notices to creditors, including UTICo.
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166. In April of 2007, Yuschenko ordered the dissolution of Parliament and set the
new parliamentary elections to be held. The election ultimately took place in September of
2007. Tymoshenko’s political bloc again became the second largest faction in the Parliament.
UESU, UTICo applied in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts for the
168. On May 24, 2007, such Letter Rogatory was filed with the administration in
interfered with the execution of the Letter Rogatory. As a result of such unlawful interference,
2007 she was voted in the Parliament as Prime Minister, again. Several parties accused
Tymoshenko of having bribed a number of the parliamentarians for that vote. As Prime
Minister, she quickly resumed her racketeering activities abusing a public office. Tymoshenko
routinely handicapped or destroyed the businesses that declined to pay off to her privies and
170. For example, Tymoshenko initially supported the bid by Vanco Energy (a Texas
company) to get an oil exploration license in the Black Sea. Then, apparently, no kickbacks
were forthcoming from Vanco Energy, and Tymoshenko abruptly became the fierce critic of the
171. As another example, Igor Boyko (“Boyko”), a U.S. citizen born in Ukraine,
residing in New York, became one more agent for Tymoshenko’s racketeering enterprise.
Earlier, in 2006, Boyko was hired by two Ukrainian-born U.S. citizens, residing in New York, to
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manage locally a candy factory in the City of Zhitomir, Ukraine, in which they had, in their
estimate, invested more than $100 million and in which they held a controlling stake.
172. Boyko developed contacts with Tymoshenko and others in her team for engaging
Tymoshenko and using the local courts to legitimize raiding, Boyko staged a change of control in
that factory, and ultimately illegally took over the controlling stake. In return, Boyko provided
173. Having reached the top governmental position, Tymoshenko obtained, again, an
illegal opportunity to interfere with the judiciary and she illegally forced the courts’ decisions to
174. In January of 2009, Tymoshenko engineered an illegal deal with Russian gas
exporter Gazprom, targeting to shield UESU’s assets under her control. As a part of that deal,
Tymoshenko imposed on Ukraine an extraordinarily high price for imports of the natural gas
from Gazprom. Those prices were higher than the prices for Western European countries which
imported the natural gas through the same pipeline passing Ukraine. On information and belief,
the Russian authorities promised Tymoshenko, who acted pursuing her own personal agenda, not
to activate the criminal case against her concerning the illegal $450 million settlement and
bribery and to shield UESU’s proceeds from the Russian government’s claims.
directing the U.S.-Ukrainian company, Beutaga Ltd. (“Beutaga”), operating from 1998. Beutaga
is as a stone quarry company in Ukraine producing granite tiles and exporting those, inter alia, to
the U.S. and other countries. Tymoshenko has been Beutaga’s true principal, directing it through
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her aunt. Beutaga was originally funded from UESU’s U.S.-based funds. According to
Beutaga’s materials, it controls the quarries with an estimated total value of over $1 billion.
(“Kornyichuk”), aligned with Tymoshenko’s party Batkivschina, as the First Deputy Minister of
Justice. Kornyichuk had studied law at the Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas, and
was the consul of Ukraine in New York in 1992-1997. Kornyichuk worked at Magister and
Partners with a practice concerning U.S. businesses. He was consultant to White and Case LLP,
Latham Watlkins, and Linklater LLP, all having offices in New York, regarding the issue of over
177. Furthermore, Kornyichuk was the son-in-law of Tymoshenko’s close ally Vassily
Onopenko (“Onopenko”), who in 2002 was elected to parliament as No. 4 on the ticket of
Tymoshenko’s bloc Batkivshina. In the same year Onopenko, backed by Tymoshenko, was
appointed a member of the Supreme Court of Ukraine and he unusually combined the functions
of a legislator and a judge. In September of 2006 Onopenko finally resign from parliament, and
178. By March of 2008 Tymoshenko, abusing powers as the Prime Minister and
supported by Onopenko acting for the Supreme Court, forced UPGO to close the cases against
UESU and to lift the claims to the assets of UESU. That act was later disavowed as illegal. On
information and belief, Tymoshenko used that to gradually withdraw UESU’s assets from
179. The result of Tymoshenko’s forcing the dissolution of the liens on UESU’s assets
in Ukraine was that UTICo’s ongoing attempts to recover the judgment from those proceeds
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in the absence of the Minister of Justice, signed a letter No. 2-41/TIP to Lazarenko’s attorney,
issuing it as the Acting Minister of Justice of Ukraine. In that letter, Kornyichuk injured
used it in the court proceedings in the U.S. District Court for Northern District of California,
assignment from UPGO, were dismissed on the finding of invalidity of the assignment from
182. Using the Government powers at her disposal as Prime Minister, Tymoshenko
illegally acted, through Kornyichuk and other appointees, to make sure that UTICo could not
collect the judgment debt against UESU in Ukraine nor could do any business within Ukraine,
183. As Prime Minister, Tymoshenko, raising racketeering to the level of high public
office, made it extraordinary difficult for American and other western businesses to do business
in Ukraine unless through illegal secretive arrangements with her. That was the case with Viktor
Vekselberg (“Vekselberg”), born in Ukraine, with links to New York, whom she obligated to
184. Vekselberg has been a prominent Russian and international entrepreneur, with a
residency in New York and Connecticut, among other places, often directing his businesses out
of New York. His partner Leonard Blavatnik (“Blavatnik”), also born in Ukraine, a U.S. citizen,
has been operating primarily out of New York. Their joint business, Renova Management AG,
expanded into the oil and gas businesses in Russia and then Ukraine.
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developing the gas stations’ business. By 2005, Vekselberg got the backing of the then president
Yuschenko. Vekselberg, assisted by Blavatnik, was able to acquire control over the Ukrainian
unlawful deal. Vekselberg was required to secretly finance Tymoshenko’s electoral needs per
(“Complex Energy Systems Holdings”), would be granted lease of the designated gas pipelines
187. When Tymoshenko was unable to deliver her part of the deal, Vekselberg
demanded compensation and stated that he holds secret documents, signed by Tymoshenko,
concerning their deal. It was illegal for Tymoshenko to require funding by Vekselberg, assisted
188. Using her position, Tymoshenko accumulated substantial financial means to fund
her bid at the presidential election in Ukraine. In the first round of the elections in January of
189. For example, on February 4, 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court, granting
reconsideration of UPGO’s cassation concerning UESU’s assets, reversed the court decisions of
April 4, 2006, as a result of which the liens on UESU assets were released.
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190. On February 14, 2010, the second round of presidential election took place, and
April of 2010, the new Prime Minister Nikolai Azarov declared that Tymoshenko’s Cabinet
caused damages in excess of 100 billion hryvnas (about $16 billion). By October of 2010, an
audit by U.S. firms estimated that the damage caused by Tymoshenko totaled $7.6 billion.
report prepared by Akin Gump Strauss Hauer Feld LLP and Kroll Inc.
192. In May of 2010, UPGO reopened the case against Tymoshenko for the attempted
bribery ($125,000) of the Supreme Court judges for the release of UESU’s top financial officers.
193. Several more bribery schemes were uncovered, resulting in new charges against
Tymoshenko. For example, in January 2011 Tymoshenko was charged with conspiring to
overcharge the Ukrainian government for medical supplies, ordered through an entity
shell company, Olden Group LLC (“Olden”), to launder money, in excess of $19 million.
194. Tymoshenko was ultimately charged also with abusing her powers to conclude in
January of 2009 the gas import contracts with Gazprom. Those imposed extraordinary prices, at
the expense of Ukraine, securing that Gasprom would not press with Tymoshenko’s criminal
case and would not pursue UESU’s debts for gas supplies.
195. Meanwhile Tymoshenko ordered several public relations firms in the USA to
stage a media campaign to counter the criminal charges against her. For example,
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196. Since 2011, the Tymoshenkos have used the lobbying services of Wiley Rein LLP
Tymoshenko”. The Tymoshenkos retained Wiley Rein LLP in January of 2012 and have paid
that firm at least $150,000 a year. The correspondence of the Tymoshenkos’ daughter, Eugenia,
by e-mail, illegally hacked and published, showed the participation of former congressman (until
1995, from Kansas) James Slattery, who at one point flew to Prague to meet with Alexander.
197. The Tymoshenkos retained Covington Burling LLP in New York and BDO
Consulting, also in New York, to craft her public image in the U.S.
198. Tymoshenko has used the services of New York-based public relations expert
Murphy was a member of the teams accompanying Tymoshenko on her international trips
before. The above-mentioned e-mail correspondence of Eugenia shows that Murphy wrote and
edited numerous articles praising Tymoshenko that then appeared under various names of
Western journalists. Those activities were undertaken in, and out of, New York.
199. Despite Tymoshenkos’ politicizing the charges by all means, that had little effect
in the Ukraine criminal cases against Tymoshenko. On October 11, 2011, Tymoshenko was
convicted of fraud and abuse of power and sentenced to seven years imprisonment for
engineering the above mentioned suspicious deal with Gazprom. As mentioned above,
Tymoshenko’s imposing an unauthorized high price for the natural gas imports to Ukraine, was
200. On October 12, 2011, a new criminal case was opened against Tymoshenko in
Ukraine, concerning her attempting to dissolve UESU’s liability for its debts, in the total of $405
million. That was based on the $450 million settlement engineered by Tymoshenko and
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Vavilov, who obtained the $10 million bribe. As a part of the criminal cases, Tymoshenko’s
paying for contract murders has been subject to the testimony of at least five witnesses.
access through agents the offshore accounts under her control, from which various payments are
made. The offshore entities, in whose name Tymoshenko reportedly holds secret accounts,
include reportedly the following: (i) Helix Assets Ltd. (BVI); (ii) Foxdale Business Group (BVI);
(iii) Glasspoint Inc. (Panama); (iv) Fidfun Consulting Ltd. (Cyprus); (v) Sanmax Enterprises Ltd.
(Hong Kong); (vi) Bestmax Ltd. (New Zealand); (vii) Bennet Group Enterprises Ltd. (New
Finance Minister of Russia, including the $10 million bribe obtained from the Tymoshenkos, as
203. Since 2007, Vavilov has been residing in New York, where he has been offering
financial services. In 2009, Vavilov contracted to buy two penthouses in the Plaza Hotel in
Manhattan, in the name of his corporations, Penthouse 2009, Inc. and Penthouse 2011, Inc., for a
total of $53.5 million, but aborted the purchase of one of those units. Vavilov then bought a
penthouse in the Time Warner Tower building for $37.5 million where he resides.
204. Due to his living in New York, Vavilov, has been avoiding criminal proceedings
in Russia concerning the UESU scheme and other schemes, and he has continued, on information
and belief, to avoid providing evidence, thus acting in the interests of Tymoshenko.
205. After Tymoshenko’s election loss and removal from office, her New York-based
allies Rovt and Pakh started to liquidate their Ukrainian assets, including their stake in Azot, a
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206. After liquidating those Ukrainian assets, in part created through the corrupt
practices imposed by Tymoshenko, Rovt and Pakh accumulated considerable cash funds. Rovt
invested those assets primarily in Manhattan real estate, acquiring about 10 properties. The
largest of those acquisitions was Rovt’s purchase of 14 Wall St., a 37-floor tower building (once
occupied by Bankers Trust), across the street from the New York Stock Exchange.
207. After Tymoshenko was removed from power, another backer of Tymoshenko,
Vekselberg, assisted by Blavatnik, started to liquidate their assets in Ukraine. In part those assets
realtor and businessman, born in Ukraine, now a U.S. citizen and resident of Brooklyn.
imprisoned in August of 2011, her daughter Euvgenia started to act for her. On information and
belief, Chechetkin has been assisting in managing Tymoshenko’s affairs in New York.
209. The judgment creditor incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-6, 15-208 above.
210. Acting directly and through nominees, the Tymoshenkos exercised control over
UESU and initiated the litigation UESU v. UTICo, Docket No. 97cv12180 filed in Massachusetts
in September of 1997.
211. In its counterclaim, UTICo alleged joint and several liability against UESU and
the Tymoshenkos. UTICo claimed $12,711,490 plus other damages against the Tymoshenkos.
212. The counterclaims and thousands of pages of exhibits from that action clearly
demonstrated the Tymoshenkos’ liability. In particular, Counts 9, 11, and 13-16 in UTICo’s
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Second Amended Counterclaim sought to hold the Tymoshenkos jointly and severally liable for
213. In the action UTICo v. Bassington, Docket 11cv12212, also in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, it was shown that Bassington was the Tymoshenkos’
214. At present, the Tymoshenkos hold UESU’s and Bassington’s assets under their
personal control. That includes the $460,000 the Tymoshenkos wire transferred to the
Bassington Account in New York, which, as the evidence shows, has never left New York. That
215. In addition, Vavilov controls the assets originated from the $10 million bribe from
UESU proceeds, to which he has no title. As the evidence shows, Vavilov invested at least $5
million into New York realty, from which the judgment may be collected, in light that Vavilov,
as the high official in Russia at the time, never got title to the fruits of his corruption.
UESU. The Tymoshenkos controlled UESU proceeds, concealing those from collection, and
they should be held personally liable for UESU’s uncollected debt as garnishees.
217. As to Bassington, it has been a money laundering vehicle that holds the
Tymoshenkos’ assets. The Tymoshenkos should be compelled to disgorge the assets held in the
218. UESU’s and Bassington’s corporate veils should be pierced for purposes of
satisfying the accumulated judgment debt as they were alter egos for the Tymoshenkos.
219. Furthermore, the corporate veil of Angora, a Bahamas company, the conduit of
the $10 million bribe from UESU’s proceeds directed to New York, should also be pierced.
Vavilov declared Angora’s alter ego for purposes of satisfying the judgment debt.
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220. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1963, NY CPLR 5201 et seq. and other law, UTICo is
222. Judgment creditor incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-6, 9-13, 15-208 above.
turnover of over $300 million in the U.S. Summarizing the facts, the Tymoshenkos:
Somolli, through Chase Manhattan Bank in New York and Corestates Bank in
Philadelphia;
York accounts;
c) transferred UESU’s bribe of $10 million to Vavilov through a New York account;
d) controlled eight U.S.-based shell companies, including two in the State of New York;
g) directed over $20 million to offshore entities via correspondent accounts in the U.S.;
correspondent accounts;
i) funded from UESU’s assets and managed the U.S.-Ukrainian company Beutaga.
the UESU scheme in U.S. v. P. Lazarenko. To summarize, Tymoshenko and Lazarenko, the
latter abusing his powers as the Ukrainian First Vice-Premier and then the Prime Minister, set up
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UESU and agreed to split the illegal revenues 50/50. Lazarenko arranged for UESU to receive a
license for importing Russian natural gas into Ukraine and selling it domestically. The proceeds
from these transactions were diverted for Tymoshenko’s and Lazarenko’s accounts.
225. Tymoshenko conspired with her husband Alexander to launder money and
commit other criminal acts through their Somolli Account, which they set up in Cyprus in 1992.
Somolli was secretly owned and controlled by the Tymoshenkos. Somolli was a criminal entity,
through which Lazarenko had obtained more than over $200 million in kickbacks through his
whereas Petrou, a resident of Cyprus, purportedly represented 85% of UESU’s voting stock.
227. When the U.S. Government attempted to depose Tymoshenko, she refused to
cooperate, mocking the U.S. Assistant Attorney by responding: “the answer is the same as
before,” and giving the letter demanding to cancel Lazarenko’s criminal trial.
the UESU money laundering scheme perpetrated in the U.S. and elsewhere.
229. The Tymoshenkos also operated, for money laundering purposes, UESU’s
nominee parent, UEIL, incorporated in the U.K. and operated by Aksoy as a conduit of UESU’s
(B) Racketeering Enterprise’s Operating Three Offshore Banks for Money Laundering.
230. As shown above, the members of the enterprise operated three offshore banks,
through which the Tymoshenkos laundered money, concealing UESU’s assets. All these three
offshore banks were used to wire transfer UESU’s assets into the U.S., for illegal purposes.
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(i) First Trading Bank (Nauru), Used for Wiring UESU Proceeds to U.S.
231. As cited above, the Tymoshenkos used for wire transfers of $14 million to New
York a Nauru-registered First Trading Bank. It was nothing a fictitious bank, operating on the
(ii) Louis D’Or Bank (Nauru), Used for Wiring Bribe Proceeds to the U.S.
232. The Tymoshenkos used Louis D’Or, an offshore bank in Barbados, for directing a
$10 million bribe to Vavilov, a Russian government official at the time, from the UEIL account
in London. That transfer was directed to Louis D’Or’s correspondent bank account at Republic
National Bank in New York. According to public allegations, Louis D’Or was used to launder
approximately $1 billion for organized crime in Russia, laundering money in New York. Louis
manager of Louis D’Or, absconded from Russia to avoid charges, residing now in California.
(iii) Eurofed Bank (Antigua) Used for Laundering UESU Proceeds in U.S.
233. The co-conspirators further used Eurofed Bank, a bogus Antigua license, with no
Kiritchenko, in May of 1997. At some point, Eurofed accumulated $150 million for Lazarenko
on his six nominee accounts, mostly resulting from Tymoshenko’s kickbacks from UESU assets.
234. As mentioned above, the Tymoshenkos directed payments to the Somolli Account
through two U.S. banks, Chase Manhattan in New York and Corestates Bank in Philadelphia,
amounting to $148,498,982 in 1996 and $49,996,483 in 1997, for the total of about
$198,495,465.
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235. The Tymoshenkos wired $49,929,349 to Lazarenko through a New York account
of ABP. Alexander’s wire instructions directed UESU’s proceeds to be sent to the correspondent
236. On information and belief, those U.S. dollar amounts never reached Poland,
where ABP was registered, and remained in New York, until Kiritchenko, acting in a conspiracy,
New York account of Orphin at Credit Suisse Bank. The banking instructions signed by
Alexander show that those wire transfers were sent through account 101-75-06000238 at
Wilnorth’s account, also controlled by Kiritchenko. These kickbacks were again paid through
239. A series of eleven kickback transfers for a total of $13,999,970 was made by the
Tymoshenkos from the Somolli Account at Slaviansky Bank, which Tymoshenko controlled in
Ukraine. On the Tymoshenkos’ instructions, unsigned telex instructions were sent in the name
of Somolli, within the same bank building, which the Tymoshenkos’ subordinate signed off as
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240. These money laundering transfers went from an account at Slaviansky Bank to
including the accounts at two U.S. banks. These wires were sent in the name of First Trading
Bank (Nauru), from the account in the name of Somolli, sent through Bankers Trust Co. in New
York. On one occasion such transfer was made through the Bank of New York, No.
1150645038 (for $1,530,000). The destination for $13,999,970 was the Orphin Account and
(D) The Tymoshenkos Used Shell Companies for Money Laundering in the U.S.
241. As the evidence shows, the Tymoshenkos used at least eight U.S shell companies
to launder money (of which two were incorporated in New York), as follows.
242. In an effort to conceal the UESU assets, the Tymoshenkos transferred at least
$2,245,000 from the Somolli Account to the Citibank account of Astra-NY, mentioned above, a
New York corporation at 1745 West 6th St., Brooklyn, New York. Astra-NY is believed to have
been under the Tymoshenkos’ control, dissolved after laundering proceeds. Tymoshenko was
not authorized in Ukraine to make these transfers to Astra-NY, on the account at Citibank in
New York, these payments were a part of the conspiracy to conceal UESU’s assets.
243. In an effort to conceal the UESU assets, the Tymoshenkos transferred at least
$850,000 from the Somolli Account to the account of Luxor, located at: 97 Corbin Place,
Brooklyn, NY, without a legitimate business purpose. That entity’s manager was Artur Eresko.
Tymoshenko did not report these unlawful transfers without consideration to Luxor, on
information and belief, under her control until it was dissolved. Tymoshenko was not authorized
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244. In April of 1997, immediately after one of her visits to the U.S, the Tymoshenkos
incorporated a shell company in Virginia called United Energy International Ltd. (the same name
as UESU’s parent in London). The Tymoshenkos acquired from UESU’s assets the office realty
in that shell name, using the correspondent accounts in New York. That shell entity in Virginia
was funded with $1.1 million by UESU using New York-based accounts.
245. The Tymoshenkos paid from the Somolli Account at least $1,908,600 to Astra-
FL, mentioned above, a Florida corporation located at: 1250 E Hallandale Beach Blvd 501-A,
Hallandale, FL. There was no business justification for wiring funds to a second “Astra” shell
corporation. The Tymoshenkos, who were, on information and belief, in control of that entity,
were not authorized in Ukraine to make these transfers, through Citibank in New York.
Delaware corporation, registered at 5 Starboard Center Rt 1, Ste 20, Bethany Beach, DE. The
Tymoshenkos directed at least $6,274,737 from their Somolli Account to the account in
mentioned above, was a conduit to conceal UESU’s assets and to pay bribes.
247. The Tymoshenkos paid from their Somolli Account at least $1,699,842 to the
account of Opus, a Delaware corporation, located at Chemical Bank Plaza, Ste 1600, 1201 North
Market St., Wilmington, DE. There was no consideration for those wires. The Tymoshenkos
were not authorized in Ukraine to make these transfers to Opus, believed to be under
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248. The Tymoshenkos paid from their Somolli Account at least $250,000 to M.
Invest, a Delaware company, located at 19 Kris Ct., Newark, DE. The Ukrainian law
enforcement alleges that M. Invest has been operated for the Tymoshenkos by their banker
Boldyrev, mentioned above. There was no legitimate business reason for those payments. M.
Invest is believed to be a shell company under Tymoshenko’s control. Those transfers were also
249. Tymoshenko used a U.S. “dummy” company for illegal purposes named Olden
Group LLC, an Oregon company, located at 942 Windemere Dr. NW, Salem, Oregon. Using it
under her latest premiership in 2007-2010, Tymoshenko caused over $19 million in kickbacks
250. The Ukrainian government retained Akin Gump Strauss Hauer Feld LLP and
Kroll Inc. to conduct an investigation and prepare a report regarding these and other kickbacks
paid to Tymoshenko while in government. Olden had no assets and was owned by two offshore
entities. As mentioned above, Ukraine also sued Olden in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Oregon, case Ukravakhsina v. Olden Group LLC, No.10-cv-06297, which resulted in a RICO
(E) Criminal Proceedings against the Tymoshenkos and Their Agent Vavilov.
251. As mentioned above, by March of 1997 (after a bomb exploded in his vehicle in
Moscow), Vavilov was subject to a mounting public outcry demanding his ouster. Following his
dismissal as Assistant Minister of Finance of Russia in July of 1997 Vavilov was charged with a
series of crimes committed while in public office. However, the efforts to bring Vavilov to
justice have been ineffective. Investigators had made statements that Vavilov threatened them,
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referring to his protectors in high government positions. Residing since 2007 in New York,
Vavilov has been abating the inquiries from Russia to question him.
252. Alexander, who barely escaped trial in 2002, was released after Tymoshenko
obstructed his criminal proceedings. Those charges, however, were reinstated after Tymoshenko
was removed as Prime Minister in March of 2010. Before he could be questioned and detained,
Alexander absconded from Ukraine and ended up in Czechia where he now resides.
253. Tymoshenko continues to serve a seven year sentence and has been subject to a
number of pending criminal proceedings and trials. Among various criminal cases, Tymoshenko
is charged with paying for contract murders through Kiritchenko’s intermediary entity Orphin.
As the evidence shows, Tymoshenko in conspiracy with Lazarenko caused to pay $2,474,000 for
contract murders, passing correspondent accounts at Bankers Trust Co. in New York.
7, 2005, Tymoshenko intensified her efforts to circumvent its collection, acting on behalf of
UESU. Among other things, Tymoshenko paid, according charges against her, $125,000 to an
intermediary to bribe the judges of the Supreme Court to close UESU’s matter and release liens.
As it follows from Tymoshenko’s criminal investigation, she paid other bribes and/or exercised
255. As mentioned above, in 2005 Tymoshenko used her position as Prime Minister to
approach President Yuschenko at least seven times, to illegally compel the Chairman of the
Supreme Court Malyarenko to dismiss UESU’s cases and release liens. Malyarenko complained
256. While illegally interfering with the judiciary in Ukraine, Tymoshenko obtained on
August 19, 2005 a decision, lifting the government’s lien on UESU’s assets for about $62.8
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million. On November 18, 2005 Tymoshenko illegally forced the Supreme Court’s
257. Using these decisions and abusing her governmental powers, in 2008
Tymoshenko further illegally forced UPGO to close the cases against her and UESU, thus lifting
the hurdle for removing UESU’s assets from the freeze and for placing those proceeds under her
control outside of Ukraine. In 2009, Tymoshenko made an illegal deal with Gazprom (for which
she is now convicted), targeting to protect UESU’s assets under her control from creditors.
258. To achieve her goals, Tymoshenko as Prime Minister appointed as the Minister of
Justice a former U.S. citizen, Zvarych, in her Cabinet in 2005. Likewise, upon becoming Prime
259. The Tymoshenkos’ actions constituted a pattern, including her attempted bribery
of Supreme Court judges in Ukraine, illegal interference into the judiciary, cover-up, and other
illegal acts. That pattern included a number of predicate acts under RICO, including under 18
U.S.C. §1952, §1956, where Tymoshenko was a U.S. person for purposes of those statutes.
260. As a result of these actions, the Tymoshenkos made the UTICo’s judgment
uncollectible. UESU’s assets were secreted and personally controlled by the Tymoshenkos,
whereas virtually no assets were left in the name of UESU for collection. The Tymoshenkos
personally benefitted from circumventing UTICo’s collection because they held UESU’s
261. As mentioned above, the RICO enterprise, comprising of the Tymoshenkos and
their agents, carried out a pattern of racketeering activity comprising over 100 instances of wire
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and mail fraud, as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, for over 15 years to date. Wire and mail
262. 18 U.S.C. §1961(5) defines a pattern of racketeering activity as two or more acts
of racketeering activity within a ten year period. The RICO enterprise described herein far
263. The RICO enterprise, which was an open-ended enterprise spanning more than 15
years, engaged in money laundering, falling within the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. §§1956(a)(2),
1957, which also comprised the racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. §1961(1)(B).
264. The hundreds of transactions caused by the Tymoshenkos in the U.S. constituted
money laundering as a part of that enterprise’s racketeering activity, exceeding the minimum
other things, the Tymoshenkos laundered over $101 million through New York banks to pay
bribes to Lazarenko at the time when he was the First Deputy Premier and then Prime Minister
265. The Tymoshenkos, acting in conspiracy, received money and further transferred
such funds, in separate transactions, in excess of $5,000 each, knowing the same to have been
stolen, unlawfully converted or taken, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1956 and 1957. In most
instances, the same actions undertaken by the Tymoshenkos also fell under the definitions of
mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§1341 and 1343, without limitations.
266. Furthermore, the Tymoshenkos received and transported money in the U.S., or in
transactions either ending or beginning in the U.S., in excess of the statutory minimum of
$5,000, knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted or taken, all also in
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267. Most of the transactions involving U.S. banks, as described above, were also
subject to the prohibitions under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. §1952. The Tymoshenkos are to be
transactions in excess of $300 million, which either originated or ended in the U.S.
268. As mentioned above, Tymoshenko is presently being tried for allegedly paying
$2,479,000 for contract murders in Donetsk, Ukraine. Those payments were made using
correspondent accounts in New York and fall within the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. §1958. The
family of the victim, Scherban, lived in New York, where he had sizeable business. Lazarenko
has also been charged with those murders, which were paid for from UESU’s proceeds. The
Tymoshenkos are also persons of interest in several other contract murders. As mentioned
269. In August of 1997, one of UTICo’s directors who was invited to travel from the
U.S. to London for a meeting was assaulted by a group of UESU’s executives, including
Alexander and Aksoy, who threatened his safety unless UTICo stopped cooperating with
Ukrainian law enforcement. Such threats fall within the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. §1959.
270. The Tymoshenkos organized an enterprise with UESU and others within the
meaning of RICO. Tymoshenko was the mastermind and leader of that enterprise. She was
aided by Alexander, Lazarenko, Vavilov and several other members of that enterprise. The
Tymoshenkos used their allies and cronies to illegally push through the decisions in Ukraine
shielding UESU from judgment creditors, particularly UTICo, the judgment creditor in the U.S.
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271. The enterprise continues into today. For example, as the evidence shows, even
being imprisoned in Ukraine, Tymoshenko has continued to communicate through agents with
Lazarenko, who, upon his release from the federal prison in 2012, is currently in the immigration
272. The Tymoshenkos continue to have access to the accounts in the name of offshore
entities at the present time, which contain, on information and belief, in a large part, the proceeds
originated from UESU. Those offshore entities reportedly controlled by Tymoshenko now
include: Helix Assets Ltd. and Foxdale Business Group (both incorporated in the BVI);
Sanmax Enterprises Ltd. (incorporated in Hong Kong); Bestmax Ltd. Bennet Group Enterprises
Ltd. and Starfox Ventures Ltd. (all three incorporated in New Zealand).
273. As mentioned above, the Tymoshenkos set up United Energy International, Ltd.
in the State of Virginia, in whose name they purchased office property in Alexandria, VA, for
$1.1 million.
274. As shown above, at all times since the judgment of July 7, 2005 was entered
against UESU, UTICo has been unable to have it satisfied. The Tymoshenkos, their agents and
co-conspirators have used their racketeering enterprise to obstruct collection of the judgment.
supervising the local courts in Ukraine, to secure, upon suits by fugitives from justice Lazarenko
and Kiritchenko the ex parte court decisions adverse to UTICo. Through Tymoshenko’s
dominating the proceedings in Ukraine when she was Prime Minister, UTICo was never notified.
Tymoshenko intended such decisions for use by Lazarenko in courts in the U.S.
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276. Similarly, after UTICo obtained a judgment against Bassington on April 9, 2012,
the Tymoshenkos, their agents and co-conspirators again used their racketeering enterprise to
277. The uncollected statutory interest on both judgments has surpassed $5 million.
Due to the Tymoshenkos’ racketeering activities, UTICo has been deprived of the opportunity to
278. The judgment creditor is entitled to relief, allowed by 18 U.S.C. §§1341, 1343,
279. The judgment creditor incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-7, 67-186, 202-204
above.
280. At all times relevant here, the Tymoshenkos unjustly enriched themselves using
281. As mentioned above, the UPGO asserted that Tymoshenko unjustly enriched
herself for the amount of approximately $2,271,221,873, converting UESU’s proceeds and
282. As mentioned above, Vavilov was unjustly enriched by a bribe from UESU for
$10 million, illegally invested into the realty in New York, for which proceeds Vavilov has no
title. Vavilov was unjustly enriched at the expense of UESU, and the $10 million at issue, from
283. In the latest instance, the Tymoshenkos enriched themselves while blocking the
collection of the judgment debt against Bassington, arising on April 9, 2012. As described above,
285. The judgment creditor incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-6, 15-186, 202-204
above.
286. As previously described, at all relevant times the Tymoshenkos asserted personal
control over UESU’s assets using a sophisticated scheme of offshore holdings, including
Bassington, operated through the BL Trust (Guernsey). The judgment against Bassington, dated
287. The Tymoshenkos, who have retained control over UESU’s proceeds and
Bassington’s holdings, should be deemed to be holding those assets in a constructive trust, and
288. In addition, Vavilov’s assets in New York should be adjudged, up to $10 million,
originated from UESU, to be held in constructive trust for UESU, with equitable lien.
290. The judgment creditor incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-6, 15-186 above.
291. The Tymoshenkos, Vavilov, and their agents and accomplices used fraudulent
conveyances and transfers to convert UESU’s assets for their personal use within the meaning of
New York’s Fraudulent Conveyances law and/or analogous statutes and laws in other
jurisdictions. That included Vavilov’s fraudulent transfers of $10 million, as the evidence
292. Due to the international scope of the UESU scheme, the transfers cited above
were simultaneously fraudulent under the laws of several jurisdictions. Those should be undone
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294. The judgment creditor incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-6, 15-186 above.
295. As described herein, the Tymoshenkos conspired with others to make UTICo’s
judgments uncollectible and to conceal their beneficial interest in UESU through a series of
296. Tymoshenko, abusing governmental powers, illegally interfered with the judiciary
in Ukraine, conspiring with other individuals to secure, through fraudulent court decisions, the
release of UESU’s frozen assets and make UTICo’s judgment uncollectible. Tymoshenko’s
activities continued even after deprived from using the powers of the Prime Minister’s office on
a) To declare that Defendants Tymoshenkos are jointly and severally liable for the
judgment debt pursuant to UTICo’s judgment of July 7, 2005 against UESU, including but not
limited to a portion from $460,000 located presently in New York, under their control;
b) To declare Vavilov liable for up to $10 million on the UESU judgment (the
amount of the bribe from UESU, thereafter invested into the New York real estate);
c) To declare that Defendants Tymoshenkos jointly and severally liable for the
judgment debt under UTICo’s judgment of April 9, 2012 against their holding entity Bassington;
d) To order the Tymoshenkos to pay the judgment amounts from their BL Trust at
Credit Suisse Bank in Guernsey and/or from the assets of Bassington and/or from any other
for purposes of satisfying the judgment debt from the assets held for the benefit of the
assets to the Tymoshenkos, their accomplices and privies, including the transfer of $10 million to
Vavilov in New York, staged for avoiding the payment of the judgment debt owed to UTICo,
including but not limited, under the State law, common law and foreign law as applicable;
an equitable lien, writs of attachment, injunctive relief, deposits into the Court and appointing a
receiver;
j) To pay attorneys' fees, costs and such other relief, without limitation, towards
collection of the judgment debt, as the Court deems just and proper.
The present Complaint is without prejudice to any and all other remedies available to the
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Respectfully submitted,
/s/___________________
George Lambert, Esq.
D.C. bar #979327, pro hac vice
Law Offices of Leonard Suchanek
1025 Connecticut Ave., #1000 NW
Washington, D.C., 20036
Tel. (202) 640 1897, Fax (800) 952 1950
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