ANGLO-NORWEGIAN FISHERIES CASE
ICJ REPORTS 1951 was or was not contrary to international law.
FACTS:
The United Kingdom requested the court
to decide if Norway had used a legally
acceptable method in drawing the baseline from
which it measured its territorial sea. The
United Kingdom argued that customary
international law did not allow the length of a
baseline drawn across a bay to be longer than
ten miles. Norway argued that its delimitation
method was consistent with general principles
of international law.
In past centuries British fisherman had made
incursions in the waters near the Norwegian coast. As
a result of complaints from the King of Norway,
they abstained from doing so at the beginning
of the 17th century and for 300 years. But in
1906 British vessels appeared again.
These were trawlers equipped with improved
and powerful gear. The local population became
perturbed, and measures were taken by Norway with a
view to specifying the limits within which fishing was
prohibited to foreigners.
Incidents occurred became more and more
frequent, and on July 12th 1935, the Norwegian
government delimited the Norwegian fisheries zone
by decree. Negotiations had been entered into
by the two governments; they were pursued after
the decree was enacted, but without success.
A considerable number of British trawlers
were arrested and condemned in 1948 and 1949. It
was then that the United Kingdom government
instituted proceedings before the court.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland against Norway brought the fisheries
case before the court.
By a Decree of July 12th 1935,
the Norwegian government had, in the northern part
of the country (North of the Arctic Circle)
delimited the zone in which the fisheries were
reserved to its own nationals. The United Kingdom
asked the Court to state whether this delimitation
In, its judgment the court found that
neither the method employed for the
delimitation by the decree, nor the lines
themselves fixed by the said decree, are contrary to
international law; the first finding is adopted by
ten votes to two, and the second by eight votes
to four.
ISSUE: WON the delimitation was contrary to
international law (Whether the lines laid down by
the 1935 Decree for the purpose of delimiting the
Norwegian fisheries zone have or have not been
drawn in accordance with international law).
HELD:
NO. The judgment concludes that
the method employed by the Decree of 1935 is
not contrary to international law; and that the
baselines fixed by the Decree are
not contrary to international law either. (These lines,
called base-lines, are those from which the belt of the
territorial sea is reckoned)
The first principle put forward
by the United Kingdom is that the base-
line must be low-watermark. This indeed is
the criterion generally adopted in the practice of
States. The parties agree as to this criterion, but they
differ as to its application.
Drawn between appropriate points
on this low-water mark, departing from the physical
coastline to a reasonable extent, the base-line can only
be determined by means of a GEOMETRIC
CONSTRUCTION. Straight lines will be drawn
across well-defined bays, minor curvatures of the
coastline, and sea areas separating islands, islets and
reefs, thus giving a simpler form to the belt
of territorial waters. The drawing of such lines
does not constitute an exception to a rule; it is this
rugged coast, viewed as a whole, that calls for
the method of straight base-lines.
 Thus the court, confining itself to the
conclusions of the United Kingdom, finds that
the 1935 delimitation does not violate international
law. But the delimitation of sea areas has always an
international aspect since it interests States
other than the coastal State; consequently, it
cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the
latter.
In this connection certain basic
considerations inherent in the nature of the
territorial sea bring to light the following criteria
which can provide guidance to Courts:
1. Since the territorial sea is closely
dependent upon the land domain, the
baseline must not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general
direction of the coast: certain waters are
particularly closely linked to the land
formations which divide or surround
them (an idea which should be liberally
applied in the present case, in view of the
configuration of the coast);
2. It may be necessary to have regard to
certain economic interests peculiar to a
region when their reality and importance
are clearly evidenced by a long usage.
Norway puts forward the 1935 Decree as the
application of a traditional system
of delimitation in accordance with international law.
In its view, international law takes into account the
diversity of facts and concedes that the
delimitation must be adapted to the special
conditions obtaining indifferent regions.
ANGLO-FRENCH ARBITRATION
ICJ REPORTS 1979
FACTS:
The purpose of the arbitration was to
draw the seabed boundary between the United
Kingdom and France in the English Channel
area, the two States having failed to reach
agreement despite negotiations lasting over a
decade. The boundary to be delimited more
specifically layoff the entire southern coast of
England and Cornwall, from just east of the Isle
of Wight, and thence westwards into the
Atlantic as far as the 1000 meter isobath. For
various reasons, the Tribunal found it
convenient to break the delimitation into three
components:
1. the areas to the immediate east and
west of the Channel Islands (as there
was substantial agreement between the
parties as to the method of delimitation
in those areas);
2. the area to the north and north-west
of the Channel Islands (there being a
dispute as to whether the islands were
'special circumstances'). The parties had
agreed to exclude the area to the
immediate east and south of the Islands
from the Arbitration; and
3. the Atlantic sector (where there was
again a dispute as to the effect of islands
in the justification of a boundary other
than one based on equidistance).
 Both the United Kingdom and France are
parties to the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf (hereafter referred to as the
1958 Convention).
However, France had made a number of
reservations 3 (which the Tribunal in this case
adjudged to be valid) to the delimitation
provisions of that Convention (Art 6). The
United Kingdom had in turn lodged various
objections to the French reservations and the
Tribunal thus found it necessary not only to
judge the validity of the reservations but also
the effect of objections to reservations. Without
going into the substantive law on which this
decision was based, it should be noted that the
Tribunal founds that the effect of the
reservations and objections was to render some
parts of the delimitation area subject to the
regime of Article 6 of the 1958 Convention and
others to the equitable principles of customary
international law.
Equidistance/Special Circumstance Rule
One of the ultimate effects of this case was
perhaps to stress the paramountcy of equitable
principles in delimitation, both under multilateral
treaty law and customary international law. It
was this fundamental principle which enabled
the Tribunal to minimize the arguments for and
against strict application of Article 6 of the 1958
Convention to the area to be delimited. It will
also probably be this finding of the Tribunal
which will be taken as firm support for the
current delimitation provisions in the ICNT (Arts
74, 83), though it will receive criticism from
those nations wishing to see the primacy of a
clear equidistance rule incorporated into the
future Law of the Sea Convention. In reaching
its conclusion, the Tribunal first noted that, if
Article 6 of the 1958 Convention was applicable,
the use of an equidistance line or another
boundary justified by 'special circumstances' did
not imply that there were two separate rules.
They were only the two aspects of a single
rule,7 and this meant 'that the question whether
"another boundary is justified by special
circumstances" is an integral part of the rule
providing for application of the equidistance
principle'. After referring to the records of the
1958 U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea
which produced the Continental Shelf
Convention, the Tribunal noted that Article 6
was so worded as to avoid inequitable
delimitations through rigid application of
equidistance in situations of peculiar
configurations.
In short, the role of the "special
circumstances" condition in Article 6 is to ensure
an equitable delimitation; and the combilled
"equidistances-special circumstances rule", in
effect gives particular expression to a general
norm that, failing agreement, the boundary
between states abutting on the same
continental shelf is to be determined on
equitable principles'. 8 Although equidistance is
only one of many possible ways of equitably
delimiting a boundary under customary law, the
Tribunal noted on several occasions that it was
the method most readily applicable where the
geographical conditio,ns of the states were
generally comparable. However, other
considerations might require another method or
combination of methods to achieve an equitable
result. 9 So too with Article 6, the Tribunal held.
Lack of definition of 'special circumstances' in
Article 6 indicated that even under the 1958
Convention, 'the question whether the use of
the equidistance principle or some other method
is appropriate for achieving an equitable
delimitation is very much a matter for
appreciation in the light of the geographical and
other circumstances'. 10 Time and· again the
Tribunal emphasized that use of equidistance
was not a controlling legal norm but was only
one element amongst other relevant
considerations to be taken into account.
ISSUE: The applicability of the equidistance
principle in the delimitation of the shelves of
the United Kingdom and France.
HELD:
 Article 6, does not formulate the
equidistance principle and special circumstances
as two separate rules. The rule there stated in
each of the two cases is a single one, a
combined equidistance-special circumstance
rule.

Article 6 makes the application of the

equidistance principle a matter of treaty
obligation for Parties tothe Convention. But
the combined character of the equidistance
principle-special circumstance rule means
that the obligation to apply equidistance
principle is always one qualified by the condition
unless another boundaryline is justified by
special circumstances...
3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES of LAW RECOGNIZED
BY CIVILIZED NATIONS
Restatement as
general principles of law recognized by or
common to the world s majorlegal systems.
This has reference not to principles
of international law but to principles of
municipal lawcommon to the legal system of the
world.

In maritime boundary claims, the equidistance

principle or principle of equidistance is a legal
concept that a nation's maritime boundaries should
conform to a median line equidistant from the shores
of neighboring nation-states. This concept was
developed in the process of settling disputes where
the borders of adjacent nations were located on a
contiguous continental shelf.
An equidistance line is one for which every point on
the line is equidistant from the nearest points on the
baselines being used. The equidistance principle is a
methodology that has been endorsed by
the UNCLOS treaty, but predates the treaty and has
been used by the Supreme Court of the United
States, states, and nations to equitably establish
boundaries.[1]