Fichamento molly mcdonnald – Hegel e psicanálise

Inicialmente essa muié que pra cada autor tem uma parte mais importante da FE, pro
hippolyte é uma, pro Kojeve é outra e pra outros são outras, isso é interessante.

FORÇA

The substances are “bonded by something quite other than what they are themselves” (
JS, 51). Hegel finds that above and beyond “causal linkage,” it is Force that “unites within
itself both of the essential sides of the relation, identity and separateness, and unites the
former precisely as identity of separateness or of infinity” ( JS , 54).

Hegel clearly affords Force a position of importance that goes beyond its place in the
physical sciences: “In that force thus expresses relationship in truth, it is no wonder that
the so-called discovery of attractive force [. . .] or of the force of chemical affinity has
been accounted such an enrichment of knowledge in general” ( JS, 56). I take this to mean
that Hegel saw the potential in the concept of Force to expand the ways in which we
know. In so doing, as readers we can begin to better understand his own expansion and
formulation of the interaction of two consciousnesses as a play of Forces that is found in
the Phenomenology

Secondly, we again find Force under the category of Relations and find simple language
for understanding the role of Force in the discussion of form and content that Hegel will
offer us in the Phenomenology. On the matter of form, we find that “the Whole, as the
inner active Form, is Force [ Kraft]. It has no external Matter as its condition but is in
Matter itself. Its condition is only an external impetus which solicits it. The latter is itself
the expression of a Force and requires to be solicited in order to be manifested” ( PP, 86).
13 Thirdly, what is key, Hegel posits, is that each side of the activity of solicitation is the
“ground of the activity, or the Expression of the other” ( PP, 132).

On the matter of content, we find that “Force in its expression exhibits what it is in-itself
since as Form it contains within itself its determinations and there is nothing in its
expression which is not in its Inner” ( PP , 86). 15 In other words, Force is its expression.

Jean Hyppolite writes: It is crucial to note that what is now given to consciousness, which
has become understanding, is the transition itself—the connection—which Hegel’s
Concept of Force in the Phenomenology of Spirit 29 previously occurred in it without its
knowledge and which was, therefore, external to its movements. Nonetheless, this
transition first appears to understanding as having an objective form; for understanding,
the transition will be force. 16

It is in this way that I ground my understanding of Force for the purposes of my work. I
will read the idea of Force as transition and connection to explore the concept of Force as
universal medium and binding substance.

Hegel considers Force to be the movement that occurs when “‘matters’ posited as
independent directly pass over into their unity and their unity directly unfolds its diversity,
and this once again reduces itself to unity” ( PS, 81). Force is thus the movement of
“matters,” of moments, of objects, that causes them to leave their individuality behind,
becoming one with the other(s), only to break this unity back up into its particularity and
then start the whole process again. Furthermore, Force is the “unconditioned universal
which is equally in its own self what it is for an other; or which contains the difference in
its own self—for difference is nothing else than being-foranother” ( PS, 82). This sets
forth Force as a neutral, but by no means static, property, one that belongs to the concept
of the Understanding. However, even in this belonging Force is not something that is
owned but is, rather, an entity that exists to serve as a medium, as this connection and
transitional quantity between consciousness and its object(s), between individual matters
and the unity of the unconditional universal.

The penultimate basic point is that there are two moments of Force: the “expression” of
Force and Force “proper.” The expression of Force is that moment which holds the
“dispersal of independent ‘matters,’” and the second moment, Force proper, is the
moment into which the independent matters have disappeared, or “Force which has been
driven back into itself from its expression” ( PS, 81). I will further investigate the idea of
expression and what it means to be driven back into itself in due course. For now it is
sufficient to understand that Force itself, even as a moment of transition and connection,
also requires a moment of mediation between its own two moments. In this case, it is its
own mediator.

As noted earlier, Force is “equally for its own self what it is for another” and thus
“contains its difference in its own self” ( PS, 85). In its dual form as the “expression” of
Force and of Force “proper” (as driven back into itself), Force exists as both a dispersal
of multiple facets of difference (itself) and as a unifying property. Yet we must take these
moments for what they are. In Hegel’s first use of the idea of vanishing moments with If
we are looking at the idea of subsistence in the most simplistic terms, then we must
consider Force (both the existence of and the employment of) as a sort of mechanism of
survival, as an agent of continuation, as a lifegiving property. Hegel wants to make
perfectly clear that Force is not simply a unity that is acted upon when he states: “We
must retract the assertion that Force is posited as a One, and that its essence is to express
itself as an ‘other’ which approaches it externally” ( PS, 83). For what solicits Force, what
lies behind its continued motion, is Force itself. It is thus the medium in which the
moments subsist as matters, that in which the moments are carried forward, that in which
they manage to survive. Without Force, the moments would have no connection, no
binding material, and no cause for momentum. relation to Force, he writes: “But Force is
also the whole, i.e. it remains what it is according to its Notion; that is to say, these
differences remain pure forms, superficial vanishing moments” ( PS, 82). It is made clear
here that whatever difference exists within Force is purely transitional and possesses a
form unto itself. Nevertheless, difference is an intrinsic and essential moment in the
movement. It is the existence and the subsequent vanishing of these differences that gives
rise to the properties of Force. The difference is fleeting, impermanent, and does not
penetrate or cause change in Force itself.

The last relationship regarding Force as a universal medium is that of the interconnection
between solicitation and negative unity. I have only lightly considered the idea of
negation, of the negative, in the present discussion, but it can always be found in the
shadows that my formulations cast, especially when we note that Hegel equates the idea
of “universal medium” with “negative unity” ( PS, 89–90). In Chapter Three I will
approach the concept of the negative through the work of André Green and in so doing
locate the negative as the “energy of thought” ( PS, 19). The work I am doing to puzzle
through the mechanisms of Force is necessary in order to understand that crucial
formulation and thus the potential for an economy, a way of thinking about an energetics
in Hegel. Hegel had previously defined Force as both a universal medium and a negative
unity in that “it is likewise the universal medium only through being solicited to be such;
and similarly, too, it is a negative unity, i.e. it solicits the retraction of Force [into itself],
only through being solicited to do so” ( PS, 84). Since my main interest is not to
interrogate the concept of the negative at present, I will puzzle briefly on what the idea of
a negative unity might actually be.
To begin with, in order better to conceive of repression in the Phenomenology, we must
bring ourselves back to the notion of solicitation. Recall the moment of “sheer” vanishing
of the two moments of Force as independent essences, wherein the result is the knowledge
that the two extremes simply find their existence in their contact with one another, in their
mediation. We can then move into the moment that directly follows when Hegel states:
“In this, there is immediately present both the repression within itself of Force, or its
being-for-self, as well as its expression: Force that solicits and Force that is solicited” (
PS, 85–86). Thus we see that repression is the being-forself of Force and can understand
repression not as something that is buried and thus lifeless but as an action that is an
intrinsic part of the movement of consciousness; it is the moment of grounding that gives
power to expression. Expression is formulated as that which is solicited, and repression
is given this power of solicitation. We must then begin to flesh out an understanding of
repression as an active agent. If we try to extricate ourselves from the standard idea of
repression as an act of inhibiting, containing, or suppressing and take it, as Hegel is
asking, a step further and equate the act of repression with that of Force driving back into
itself in order to call forth its expression, we can begin to infuse repression with generative
power. Instead of suppression, we find “supersession” ( Aufgehoben ).

Returning to the idea of supersession, then, we find that, similar to the activity of
solicitation, wherein that which solicits Force turns out to be Force itself, Force in its
expression is simply superseding itself. Hegel states: “The Notion of Force rather
preserves itself as the essence in its very actuality; Force, as actual, exists simply and
solely in its expression, which at the same time is nothing else than a supersession of
itself” ( PS, 86). Knowing that supersession is a simultaneous act of negation and
preservation, it is interesting to conceive of expression in the same manner, for one might
think that expression is simply the release, the externalising of the internal. This
formulation makes sense, however, when we recall that repression is intrinsically part of
expression and that repression can be seen as holding properties of preservation. More
than that, if Force exists solely in its expression and if this expression is only the
supersession of itself, then Force, as actual, can also be seen as surviving due to its own
negation and preservation. Hegel Hegel’s Concept of Force in the Phenomenology of
Spirit 47 writes: “In other words, Force supersedes its expression. But in fact Force is
itself this reflectedness-into-self, or this supersession of the expression” ( PS, 83). The
supersession of the expression must be the Force driven back into itself and must in some
ways be seen as part of the repression. Thus we can see another facet of repression as a
key component of a generative act.

Whereas, prior to this moment, language seemed always to be chasing after experience,
somehow just catching its tail before it moved off again, the “merely verbal” necessity
that is Explanation is now illustrated as having a particular power; it can take a law and
condense it into “Force as the essence of the law.” Two things are of particular importance
here. The first is that the process of Explanation has the ability to capture external realities
and turn them into internal laws, essences of governance. The second is that Force is the
essence of the law, meaning that we can conceive of law in the same manner in which we
have been conceptualising Force. “Law” takes on the possibility, then, of vanishing, of
being both expressed and repressed and as acting as a binding, universal medium. The
full ramifications of Hegel’s further assertion that “ Force is constituted exactly the same
as law” cannot be explored fully, but I take this to mean that Force can be known in the
explanation, in the law of it. However, the effect that the process of Explanation has on
Consciousness, via the Understanding, in changing and/ or creating the “law of the inner
world” is important to locate.

Here we see the potential strength that the process of explaining has for consciousness. It
has the ability to facilitate the transition of the movement (of change), which was present
only in the external world, into the inner world and thus to penetrate the supersensible
world. In so doing, consciousness changes its own form and makes the move from
experiencing its inner being as an object, but feeling no unity with this object, into the
realm of the Understanding, where it will begin the arduous and perpetual process that is
the reconciliation of this split.

This is not to equate the movements of expression and repression with the act of sublation
( Aufhebung), although we could understand the activity of reading the text as structured
like this negating, preserving, superseding movement. It is rather to suggest that there
might be more at stake in the activity of the play of language here and in the structure of
the Phenomenology itself. All of this we witness through Hegel’s use of language, with
his assiduous articulation of the process. Never are we more aware of the gap between
language and the immediate “truth” of existence and the process of becoming than when
we are involved in the process of reading about the 54 Hegel and Psychoanalysis
composition of this very truth itself. We could argue that a fundamental aspect of the
entire work of the Phenomenology is the attempt to put into language, to articulate, a way
of filling this gap.

As noted previously, it is Force that is the middle term uniting the Understanding and the
inner world.

This is one reason why there will always be a gap: because there must always be a
mediator present in order to bring the inner world into the realm of the outer world. We
cannot remain in the world of sense-certainty or perception alone and must move into the
realm of understanding via the action of Force.

In order, though, for it to be filled, it must first be a void, a space stripped of all
distinctions. It is the movement of Forces that allows for this void to exist, but it is also
the play of Forces that will ultimately provide it with the substances that fill it. It is the
production of appearances and reveries by consciousness itself that fills this void and this
inner world “comes into being” through the mediation of the world of appearances ( PS ,
89).

Thus, it follows that the expression of the inner world would be the reverse of this process.
If we, through a philosophical sleight of hand, inverted the process, then it follows that
Explanation could affect the change of the contents of the inner world, driving them back
out to penetrate the outer world. This brings another level of Understanding to the
becoming of consciousness, and it is only possible, clearly, when self-consciousness has
entered the picture.

É necessário estar doente de mundo, para vislumbrar como o mundo está doente; é
necessário sobre do mal do mundo, para ter uma noção de como o mundo vai mal. É o
que Drummond dizia, “tenho duas mãos e o sentimento do mundo”. Mas, o ser humano
nasce desamparado. O desamparo Freudiano tem, como seu radical, o conceito da mãe,
da mãe provedora que ampara ou supre a demanda da criança; posteriormente, a mãe que
ampara é suprida pelo conceito do pai. Em suma, existe algo que está acima da mãe, algo
que provê a mãe, a criança, conjecturando isso, nota que a figura da potência emana do
pai e aí chegamos ao conceito do pai como segunda instância do amparo. O pai freudiano
é, assim, a entidade para onde convergem os desejos de amparo. Bom, mas acima do
amparo, há o desamparo, o pai é, também, uma figura que protege contra o desamparo.
Vemos aí que essa proteção é defesa contra um algo além, é uma instância que media a
nossa relação com esse além do desamparo, é o pai. Assim, a estrutura da psiquê, é uma
estrutura produtora de ficções e essas ficções funcionam como um anteparo ao que eu
chamei ali em cima de doença ou de mal do mundo. O sujeito que sofre desse mal do
mundo, o sujeito do Drummond, é acometido por uma impotência frente a esse
desamparo. Impotência que, por um lado é estrutural, é coisa que se arruma, porém, por
outro, é coisa que dá-se jeito. Um fato simples, a libido que temos investida em nós
mesmos faz com que queiramos viver e, também, com que nos sintamos impotentes ante
a morte. Mas, há toda uma outra gama de situações em que, em tese, dá-se jeito. Ante a
hostilidade, a inibição, a violência e a impotência que, porventura, sintamos em
determinadas situações, com relação a esses sentimentos, algo pode ser feito para que
esse constrangimento advindo do contexto – diremos aqui, para que o constrangimento
do Outro (o Outro lacaniano) – seja mitigado.

Uma variável, contudo, se interpõe entre o sujeito e o Outro, entre o sofrimento ou o

sentimento do sujeito e o contexto que causa tal sofrimento. A escala.