The National Security Dilemma:

The Maoist Insurgency in India

Veena Thadani
New York University

Paper presented at 22nd IPSA World Congress in Madrid 2012

Preliminary draft; not for circulation

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“India is a roaring capitalist success story” was the lead article in the journal Foreign Affairs a
short while ago. In a similar vein, the covers of the Economist, Time Magazine and others hail
the rise of India as an economic superstar. Not so long ago though, India appeared in the western
press as a very poor, backward, often violent nation. The current image of India as a dynamic
economy and an emerging global power—“India Shining”—belies the reality of the abysmal
mass poverty that persists in the 10th largest economy in the world; India ranks 127th on the
United Nations Human Development Index, just two rungs above Burma, and more than 70
below Cuba and Mexico. And the image of “India Shining” belies the reality on an India riven
by internal insurgencies—in Kashmir, in the North east, and in eastern and central India.
It is the insurgency in eastern and central India, the Naxalite/Maoist insurgency, that is the topic
of this paper.

The Naxalite/Maoist1 insurgency in India, which re-emerged in the late 1990’s (from its
beginnings in the 1960s) is presented here as a case study of the risks posed to security—human
security, national and international security—by the conditions of widespread acute deprivation
and the failure of states to address them, allowing them to fester and serve as incubators of
violence. The spread of Naxalism is analyzed at two levels—the social, economic, political
structures that produce and perpetuate crushing poverty and exploitation and the consequences of
state failure and the lack of governance. The Naxalites are waging a violent insurgency in 20 of
India’s 28 states. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said that Naxalism is the
single most significant internal security threat facing the country.

The Naxalite/Maoist Insurgency

The Naxalite movement has its origins in the peasant uprising which took place in 1967 in the
district of Naxalbari (hence the name Naxalites) in the Darjeeling district of northern West
Bengal (Silguri subdivision). The issue sparking the uprising in this area of tea gardents was
land—the redistribution of land to landless peasants and tea plantation workers. These peasant
and plantation workers in Naxalbari were mainly “adivasi” (“tribal”) groups (Santhals, Oraons,
Rajbanshis)2; over 82 % were sharecroppers, landless peasants (Louis 2002:51).
The tea plantation workers and other landless peasants were the most deprived segment of rural
society; being landless sharecroppers, they were subject to arbitrary eviction. Local land tenure
systems and the economic and political power of landowners (doubly privileged in terms of both
class and caste) enabled them to impose various kinds of fees and exactions (such as the illegal
market fees (“hat tola”)—practices that enriched local landlords and their agents, and enabled

1
The Naxalites have adopted the “Maoist” label to identify with the Maoist/Chinese model of revolution with its
focus on the rural poor as the main revolutionary force, rather that the urban proletariat as in the Bolshevik
revolution. This armed extremist insurgency continues to be referred to as Naxals or Naxalites in public discourse in
India, which is the term used in this paper.
2
The term “tribe” is used in Indian policy discourse to identify groups that are specifically listed in the official
Schedule of Tribes, entitled to a system of preferential treatment/affirmative action in education and public
employment opportunities. Groups listed as “tribes” are defined by their geographic isolation, and their social,
cultural, linguistic distinctiveness—their “tribal characteristics”, such as “primitive background”, and “distinctive
cultures and traditions”. The adivasis (indigenous people) use the bow and arrow as an ethnic symbol, as a mark of
“primitiveness”.

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them to accumulate vast fortunes at the expense of their sharecropping tenants and tea plantation
workers, who as a consequence were “brewing with resentment” (Louis 2002:51).

The tea plantation workers and other peasants were mobilized for an armed agrarian struggle—to
seize land, overthrow the prevailing “semi-feudal” conditions in rural society, annhilate class
enemies—by a militant group of armed revolutionaries, former members of the Communist Party
of India.3
The uprising in Naxalbari lasted only a few months; it was suppressed with overwhelming force
by the government. Its impact, however, was far reaching; it was the inspiration for the rural
poor in many states to launch militant agrarian movements to overthrow the prevailing system
and their local oppressors, to seize power, not just land, through guerilla warfare and violent
terrorist attacks on local landlords and the institutions of government (Bannerjee 1984:92; Louis
2002: 61).
The 1990s saw the re-emergence of the Naxal movement in the poorest and least developed
districts of the states of Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and others—the
so-called “Red Corridor” stretching across central and eastern India (see Maps 1 and 2). While
the geographical reach of the Naxal movement is widespread, estimated to affect 40% of the
country, the extent of the insurgency varies by state and district, and is most marked in the areas
with a high concentration of India’s most deprived and underprivileged—the “dalits” (formerly
known as “untouchables”, also known as “scheduled castes”) and the “adivasis” (tribals). Dalits
and adivasis comprise about 25 % of India’s population (about 250 million people) and they are
the main base of support for the Naxalite movement (Report of an Expert Group 2008:3).4 The
states with relatively high concentrations of dalits and adivasis in their populations are also the
areas of greater Naxalite influence (Ibid).

States and Districts Affected by the Naxalites:

2003 2005 2007 2008

States 9 13 16 20
Districts 55 160 192 n.a.

(FICCI 2008: 35)

3
In the late 1960s, various factions of the communist movement in India challenged the vision and program of the
dominant party, the Communist Party of India. These factions, advocating the path of agrarian revolution,
established the Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist) in 1969. Other groups, with differing views on the
strategy of revolutionary struggle in the countryside included the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) and the People’s
War Group (PWG). It was these latter groups, the MCC and the PWG, whose declared objective was to abolish the
“feudal order” in rural India that led the insurgency against the Indian state in the 1990s. They have mobilized the
peasantry, particularly the “tribals” and landless poor in the heavily forested district of Andhra Pradesh, Madhya
Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and the conflict has escalated in recent years.
4
Dalits comprise about 16 % of India’s population, about 170 million; adivasis about 8 %, over 84 million. 80% of
dalits and 92 % of adivasis live in the rural areas (Report of an Expert Group 2008: 3).

2
In terms of the actual area of its operation, the, the Naxal insurgency extends over more territory
than the terrorist campaign in Kashmir, the Nagaland insurgency in the Northeast, and the
militancy in the Punjab, combined. In terms of the levels of violence, the spread of the conflict,
and the complexity of the struggle, the Naxal insurgency is the greatest internal security threat to
India.

Poverty and the Naxalite Insurgency

The Naxalites find their recruits among India’s poorest and most deprived. The Report of an
Expert Group, commissioned by the Government of India, asserts a “direct correlation” between
“extremism and poverty” and concludes that conditions –of acute poverty, deprivation,
oppression-- create a context for Naxalites and other extremist groups (2008:30).

The influence of the Naxalites is most evident in districts with the highest rates of poverty,
illiteracy, infant mortality (Ibid: 9; Barooah 2008:333). In the two states in which Naxal
influence is the strongest—Orissa and Chhattisgarh—over 55 % of the population live on less
than Rs 12/day, about 40 cents. The extent of exclusion and marginalization of the rural
peasantry—which makes them susceptible to the Naxalite insurgency—is reflected in their
conditions of life: in one of the districts of Chhattisgarh, half the people do not know what a
train is, do not know what it is like to ride a bus, and live without electricity (and therefore
without a radio or television (Chakravarty 2008: 42-43).

In addition to the deeply entrenched poverty of the “scheduled castes and tribes”—who are, in
law, entitled to special protections and rights—the dalits and adivasis are in fact subject to
egregious caste-based discrimination and all manner of atrocities in India’s age-old, caste-based
social order. The Report of the Expert Group refers to the “life of deprivation, servility, and
indignity” of the dalits and adivasis, the cultural humiliation and the “structure of oppression”;
the Report documents the growing levels of violence against these marginalized groups by
higher caste communities.5 In the districts where the incidence of atrocities has shown a
significant increase between 2001 and 2004, Naxal influence and mobilization has also shown
the greatest increase (2008: 7). As the Report states: “Poverty and…other factors like the denial
of justice, human dignity, cause alienation resulting in the conviction that relief can be had
outside the system by breaking the current order asunder”—a recognition of the connection
between the conditions of deprivation, grievance and the resort to violence ( Ibid:3).

These conditions create an opportunity for Naxals to win the support of the disenfranchised
dalits, adivasis, and the rural poor by addressing their grievances and vulnerabilities—declining
wage rates, growing poverty, caste issues—and drawing them into a violent terrorist movement
against the state and society that maintains the “semi-feudal” conditions in which they live. A
rural peasant conveys the struggle for dignity and justice that the Naxals proclaim as the cause

5
In Untouchability in Rural India, Shah records examples of caste violence, discrimination, and humiliation by
higher and intermediate castes against lower castes across rural India. The callous indifference of the authorities
provide the Naxals with the opportunity to channel the anger, rage, and resentment and bring it to the fore in their
mobilization efforts (2006).

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they champion: “to save the life of the poor and uphold their dignity” (garibon ke dharma karam
baachal ba, garibon ke izzat baachal ba) (Louis 2002: 259).

In promoting the awareness of injustice and the denial of dignity, the Naxals attempt to change
the consciousness of the rural poor, and mobilize them to revolt against economic exploitation
and social oppression. 6 In his description of how Naxals claim territory and the allegiance of the
people, Chakravarty writes, “(Maoists)…show they care, by chasing away forest guards,
moneylenders, petty traders, even police, the traditional scourge of tribals and other forest
dwellers…When they found they had enough influence, they introduced weapons, started
creating local “dalams” (guerilla squads). Then they created “sanghams” (groups of active
sympathizers) in villages….” (2008: 73-74). The “sanghams”, so-called active sympathizers are
a militia; they form a shadowy army, of indefinite size, providing shelter and logistical support
based on the distress—the hunger and anger—which the Naxals draw upon.7 It is by mobilizing
these sympathizers that the Naxals have created an infrastructure at the local level, which poses a
challenge unlike that of other insurgencies in India.

The Naxals attempt to gain the support of the disenfranchised by living, working, radicalizing,
and empowering the poorest segments of rural society. They provide assistance to meet needs
that the government has neglected—in the Gaya district of central Bihar, for example, after three
consecutive years of scarce rainfall and consequent water shortage, the Naxal cadres dug wells,
paid for repairs of handpumps, installed new ones, and ensured the equitable distribution of
water (Navlakha 2006). In Telengana, the Naxals built a dam in six months, implementing a
development program and exposing the neglect and ineffectiveness of the government
(Chakravarty 2008: 199).

The Naxals have also set up a system of dispensing justice; they have created “people’s courts”
to resolve disputes related to economic inequalities and exploitation. While disputes tend to be
resolved in a “rough and ready manner”, and have been characterized as sometimes “brutal”,
they are seen as a response to the need for forums of dispute resolution and mechanisms of
redress and to be legitimate in the “minds of the poor” (Report of an Expert Group 2008:17).

Seen as the party of the poor, “garibon ka party”, the Naxals have been successful in increasing
wages, obtaining some land distribution, and some rights to village common resources which
tend to be appropriated by the higher castes in the rural areas; and, equally important, they have
promoted the dignity of the dalits, adivasis, and landless rural peasants who have traditionally
been trod upon (Louis 2002: 9).

The Naxals are known for their meticulous preparations, the coherence of their plans—working
the lay of the land, the economy, and society. Their ideological unity, based on common goals,

6
One of the recruits to the Naxal campaign is quoted by Chakravarty: “Sir, I am from a lower caste. In my village
high caste people would not even permit…they wouldn’t even allow us to walk on their shadows. But now I sit on a
charpoy above them, and they sit on the ground. Because I am a Maobadi (Maoist)…Seeing this, other people have
also joined, become part of armed squads and militias” (2008:117).
7
The Naxals build local support and draw recruits by promising assistance to those in dire need: “a lot of poor
people have been told: Your father is not well, you don’t earn anything, you’ll never get married. We will organize
food for your family, we well find you a good wife or husband… money for the family, two square meals a day,
some pocket money—and power” (Chakravarty 2008:117).

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is adapted to each particular region and situation—in Bengal, extreme rural poverty; in Andhra
Pradesh and Bihar, issues of caste and landlord dominance; in Chhattisgarh and Orissa, tribal
destitution and displacement; in Karnataka, farmer indebtedness and caste exploitation. New
issues are taken up as they arise, such as that of genetically modified seeds, which has become a
contentious issue in the cotton growing states of Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka
(Chakravarty 2008: 117-118).

In an attempt to destroy the Naxals web of support, to deny them their assets—food, shelter, and
sympathizers—the state government launched a counter-insurgency strategy in 2005 in the
districts of the state of Chhattisgarh, considered to be the stronghold of the Naxals. The
program, Salwa Judum, which in the local Gondi dialect translates as “purification hunt” (but
which the government translates as “peace march”) was to co-opt the tribal people of
Chhattisgarh into a state-sponsored armed militia to fight against their fellow tribesmen, who
may be Naxal sympathizers. The tribal people, potential supporters of the Naxals were
preemptively moved to settlements where they could be “protected” from the Naxals (resembling
the “strategic hamlet” programs in the Vietnam war). The segregation and control of the rural
villagers was considered an essential element of a successful counter insurgency campaign; with
the creation of resettlement camps to protect the rural folk from Naxal indoctrination and to
destroy any possibility of village-level support for the Naxals (Chakravarty 2008: 17,55).

To cleanse the countryside of Naxal support, the Salwa Judum counter insurgency strategy set
off an internal war, tribal against tribal, a scorched earth policy which included the burning of
everything that could not be carried away--food, belongings, and such—to deny the Naxals these
resources. Trees and bushes were slashed and burned to eliminate the possibility of cover for the
Naxals (Navlakha 2006; Chakravarty 2008:53-58).8
The tribal villagers, accustomed to living in open habitats, with homesteads separated from each
other, have been resettled in camps. Their bare livelihoods, based on farming, tending cattle,
gathering forest produce, have been destroyed—in order for them to be kept away from the
Naxals and the Naxals to be kept away from winning their support. At least 70,000 tribal
villagers have been displaced by this policy of de-population of the rural countryside; they now
live as refugees by the roadside in flimsy tent camps, in clusters of slums (Kujur 2009).9

The uprooting of tribal villagers, the burning of their hamlets and homes, leaving dead villages
and wasted farms, and the sharp increase in violence and human right abuses has in fact
backfired and has allowed the Naxals to establish an elaborate political network (FICCI 2008:
33). The backlash created by the violence of the salwa judum campaign has driven people into
the Naxal movement. As the Asian Center for Human rights put it, the state-sponsored militias
in Chhattisgarh “which were responsible for gross human rights violations”, including torture
and extra-judicial killings “have helped fuel the Maoist insurgency” (2009).10 The salwa judum

8
Trees and bushes are slashed and burned to prevent Naxals from ambushing security forces on foot patrols and in
convoys, and to prevent them from setting off, with timers, their crude improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
9
Chakravarty describes the “tableau of grief, shame and desperate longing”—“it is heart-breaking to see…a dead
village. Huts large and small are silent, peeling, broken….their former homes and farms waste away” (2008:72).
10
This was also the conclusion of several other human rights groups in India, in their Report “Where the State
Makes War on its Own People: A Report on Violation of People’s Rights during the Salwa Judum Campaign in
Dantewade, Chhattisgarh” issued by People’s Union for Civil Liberties; People’s Union for Democratic Rights;
Association for the Protection of Democratic Rights; Indian Association of People’s Lawyers (April 2006).

5
anti-insurgency operation and its state-sponsored violence serves the Naxal in assuring them the
recruits they seek.

The violence of the salwa judum and the counter-violence by the Naxals has led to the escalation
of the conflict: “for deterrence or revenge, people have been raped, beaten, murdered by the
state, their homes reduced to ruin, foodstocks destroyed for even a tiny hint of collaboration--
ready or forced—with Maoist rebels. The Maoists too have done their dance, hacking to death
suspected informants, as well as innocents who happen to be at the wrong place at the wrong
time…Rebels match the state of Chhattisgarh in guile and brutality. It’s a dirty little war”
(Chakravarty 2008: 25-27).

Despite official recognition, as in the “Report of an Expert Group”, that the growth and spread of
Naxalism is indisputably connected to the conditions of acute poverty and deprivation, the
government’s main response has been a strategy of counter-terrorism rather than a program to
address the underlying conditions fuelling the insurgency. It is a policy that targets the poor,
rather than the conditions of poverty. A government report of the Administrative Reforms
Commission “Combating Terrorism” calls for Naxals to be considered as being similar to the
other terrorist insurgencies in India—the militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, the separatist
violence in the Northeast, and the secessionist movement for Khalistan in the 1980s.11 To
counter the subversive activities of the Naxals, a multi-pronged strategy that includes good
governance and socioeconomic development has been proposed, but the emphasis is on the force
and firepower needed for police and security forces—the arms, ammunition, helicopters (Phadke
2009). The latest weapons to be deployed against the Naxals are the unmanned aerial vehicles
(drones), equipped with cameras, data, and video links, each machine costing at least Rs 2
million (Barman 2009).

The application of military force and policies that pursue security primarily through the use of
military means raises the question of the extent to which the state has exacerbated the problem.
The state itself, in its counter-insurgency strategies such as salwa judum--and more recently,
Operation Greenhunt12-- has become a source of serious threats to the security of its most
marginalized citizens, as it triggers a spiral of violence and counter-violence.

A further illustration of the government’s policies that have contributed to exacerbating the
issues of poverty and deprivation is the displacement caused by a pattern of development, of
skewed development, that excludes and further marginalizes the most disadvantaged. The
poorest areas in which the Naxals are active are rich in mineral resources: 70% of India’s
unmined iron ore deposits lie in these areas; coal and bauxite are also abundant in these states
(Barman 2009).13 The state governments in the region have granted mining and land rights to

11
The Naxal movement is different from these other militant movements; it is not a separatist movement based on
ethnic, religious, or linguistic identity. The Naxal movement extends over several culturally diverse states, with at
least 6 different languages.
12
Operation Greenhunt is the most recent counterinsurgency offensive of the Indian government, launched in
November 2009; it calls for the use of police and paramilitary forces in the forests of Chhattisgarh to drive the
Naxalites into more remote forest areas, where they may be “contained”. A villager is quoted: “Earlier we used to
fear the tigers and wild boars. Now we fear the guns of the Naxalites and the police” (Yardley 2009).
13
It is estimated that the financial value of the bauxite deposits in one state alone—Orisssa—would be about $4
trillion, more than double India’s GDP (Roy 2009)

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Indian and transnational companies. In Chhattisgarh recently, the state government signed
“memoranda of understanding” and other agreements with transnational companies such as De
Beers Consolidated Mines, BHP Hilton, Rio Tinto and U.S. companies, such as Caterpillar,
which seek to sell equipment to the mining companies operating in the region (FICCI 2008: 36-
38).

These mining projects have led to the displacement of the rural inhabitants of the area as the
powerful corporations move into tribal area, cut down forests, and sell the timber as well as the
minerals under the ground (Barman 2009). The original claims of the Naxals that they would
protect the tribal rural folk from the (relatively) petty manipulation by traders and money lenders
has recently changed; the Naxals now claim that they protect the tribals from the land-grabs of
corporations, in concert with the state: “If the Maoists don’t protect them, nobody else will”
(Chakravarty 2008:30). The Naxal presence in the area serves to obstruct corporate exploitation
of the minerals, forests, water and land resources of the tribals and adivasis (Navlakha 2006).

The “development-induced-displacement” of the rural populations of these areas for projects

from which they derive little benefit, and the threat to their environment of mining and
construction operations creates an opportunity for Naxals to recruit from their ranks—fertile
ground, since the displacement and dispossession greatly exacerbates their conditions of
deprivation (FICCI 2008: 37-38).14

India: A Failing State?

India is among the group of 24 developing countries that the World Bank has termed the “new
globalizers” (Collier and Dollar 2002). Dramatic economic growth over recent decades has
contributed to the current image of India as a dynamic economy, a mature democracy, an
emerging global power. The counterpoint to this image, however, is that of a state that exhibits
the characteristics, if not quite of a “failing state”, of a semi-functional one, in certain, albeit
localized, areas of the country. The characteristics identified by Krassner and Pascual(2005) as
the marks of “failing states” are evident in eastern and central India where the Naxals hold sway:
internal unrest arising from extreme poverty and highly unequal income distribution, and the
absence of the institutions of governance and the consequent inability to deal with disaffected
groups. The writ of the state does not extend to these areas; state weakness is endemic. The
Indian government has no effective control in these Naxal-controlled areas. In these states of
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, and Andhra Pradesh, the Naxals have in effect “become
the state—running schools, digging wells, and administering justice through ‘people’s courts’”
(Ramesh 2006).15 This absence of governance is the defining feature of “failed states”:

14
In a study of the long history of tribal uprisings in the state of Andhra Pradesh from colonial times to present
decades, Rupavath finds a consistent pattern of encroachment on tribal land triggering tribal revolts. Tracing the
patterns of tribal land alienation and tribal uprisings, from the 1802 and 1879 uprisings in the Rampa area (in East
Godavari district), to the ones in post-Independence India—Telengana (1946-51) and Srikakulam (1968-70)-- the
underlying causes are found in the oppression of the tribal people: the policies that dispossess them of their lands
and their livelihoods and result in their growing impoverishment, factors that have led to their mobilization by
Naxals and to violent political movements directed against feudal landlords and the state (Rupavath 2009).
15
Ajai Sahni who runs the Institute for Conflict Management in New Delhi and the South Asia Terrorism Portal is
quoted as saying: “The point is if you don’t govern an area, it is not yours. Except on the maps, it is not part of

7
“incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within their borders, leaving their
territories governmentally empty” (Rotberg 2002:128).

The Indian state is also one that has failed its poorest citizens. Given the depredations of the
government—in its land seizures in mineral rich, but poverty-stricken areas of eastern and
central India, in its counter-insurgency military campaigns in the tribal belt—the state itself has
become a threat to the security of its own citizens. In this context, the heavy reliance on a
military approach to Naxalism appears to be a case of misplaced priorities. The militarized
response draws financial resources away from the underlying causes that generate extremist
violence. The pursuit of security would be better served by effective measures to alleviate the
poverty, deprivation and injustice that generate the distress, dispossession and grievance fuelling
the Naxal insurgency in place of the militarized approach that risks endangering rather than
advancing security. The militarized agenda will likely perpetuate a cycle of violence and
counter-violence that undermines security as it seeks –futilely-- to promote it, the classic paradox
of the security dilemma. As has become clear after 9/11, dysfunctional, failing states and their
internal insurgencies pose a threat not only to themselves but globally, in an interconnected
world of mutual vulnerability.

India. At least half of India today is not being governed. It is not in your control…You have to create a complete
society in which local people have very significant stakes. We’re not doing that. And that is giving the Maoists
space to move in….” (quoted in Chakravarty 2008:98).

8
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9
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