Case 3.

1
Senate Minority Leader
Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona
G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator
Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of
20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming
the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for
Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for
him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party
numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he
was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators,
stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By
virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona
as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a
petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of
whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the
allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over
the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support

from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from
practices of the Upper House. The term “majority,” when referring to a certain
number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than
half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates
that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting
more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority,
who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that
the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President

and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting
the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says
under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each House shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary.” The method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by
the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed
by the Senate itself, not by the Court.

Case 3.2 ConCon Delegate

Angara v. Electoral Commission
G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

FACTS: Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of
office as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth
Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a
resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
 On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed
an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of
the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any
election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly,

the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral
Commission however denied his motion.

ISSUE:

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction

in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of
the National Assembly?

RULING:

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of

its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its

constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed
by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and
that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll
the time for filing election protests against members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of
the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests

relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power
by the National Assembly. xxx.
 [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate
rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence
of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed
in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Case 3.3 Bus Permit

Pangasinan Transport Co. vs. Public Service Commission
GR NO. 47065, June 26, 1940
FACTS:
This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner
Pangasinan Transportation Co.Inc (Pantranco). The petitioner has been
engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting passengers
in the province of Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On
August 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC)
an application to operate 10 additional buses. PSC granted the application
with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply also on their existing
business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public
Service Commission. Since it was denied, Pantranco then filed a petition/
writ of certiorari.

ISSUES:
Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:
- is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation
- constitutes undue delegation of powers
HELD:
The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and
constitutional because it is a proper delegation of legislative power, so called
“Subordinate Legislation”. It is a valid delegation because of the growing
complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws. All that has been delegated to the Commission is the
administrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of
the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public
interests in a proper and suitable manner.The Certificate of Public
Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property
rights and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control for
the good of the public. PSC has the power, upon notice and hearing, “to
amend, modify, or revoked at any time any certificate issued, whenever the
facts and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never
heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings.In addition,
the Court ruled that, “the liberty and property of the citizens should be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only must the
party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented. When private property is affected with a public
interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private use only

Case 3.4 E.O 1088 Pilotage Rate

Philippines Interisland Shipping Association vs CA

Facts:
It came to pass that a response from a clamor of harbor pilots for an increase
in pilotage rates was given by the then President Marcos through the
issuance of an E.O No. 1088“PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED
RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICESRENDERED TO FOREIGN AND
COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLICPORTS. The
executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees
previously fixed by the PPA.” During that time the President was exercising
legislative power and was authorized

However, PPA was reluctant to enforce the same arguing that it was issued
hastily and it was just an Administrative Order whereby PPA has the power
to revised EO 1088 which it did so by issuing A.O. No. 43-86, which fixed
lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid for
pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract..
Actually Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines is
just an intervenor in the factual milieu that lead us to this issue. For Purposes
of Admin Law we should not care about it.

Issue:
Is E.O. No. 1088 an Administrative Order and by virtue of which PPA has the
power to modify the same.

Held:
EO 1088 is a law.
The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power is no basis for petitioners'
argument that rate fixing is merely an exercise of administrative power, that
if President Marcos had power to revise the rates previously fixed by the PPA
through the issuance of E.O. No. 1088, the PPA could in turn revise those
fixed by the President, as the PPA actually did in A.O. No. 43-86,which fixed
lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid for
pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract. The orders previously
issued by the PPA were in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated
by it in the exercise of delegated power. As such these could only be
amended or revised by law, as the President did by E.O. No. 1088.It is not
an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute
because that would imply the withdrawal of power from the PPA. What
determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its
form but its nature. Here, as we have already said, the power to fix the rates
of charges for services, including pilotage service, has always been regarded
as legislative in character.(Note: Bold letters are copied from the Original
Supreme Court decision)

Case 3.5 EPIRA

GEROCHI vs.DOE (ERC),
G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007
Facts:
RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001 (EPIRA), which sought to impose a universal charge on all end-users
of electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCOR’s projects, was enacted
and took effect in 2001.
Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that the
imposition of the universal charge on all end-users is oppressive and
confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation for not giving
the consumers a chance to be heard and be represented.
Issue:
W/N the universal charge is a tax
Ruling:
NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the
exercise of the State’s police power. That public welfare is promoted may be
gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA, which enumerates the policies of the
State regarding electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust Fund feature of
the universal charge reasonably serves and assures the attainment and
perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal charge is imposed (e.g. to
ensure the viability of the country’s electric power industry), further boosting
the position that the same is an exaction primarily in pursuit of the State’s
police objectives.If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and
regulation is merely incidental, the impositionis a tax; but if regulation is the
primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make
the imposition a tax.The taxing power may be used as an implement of police
power. The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from
necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting
the general welfare and well-being of the people

Case 3.6 Deregulation Bus Fare Rate

KMU vs. GARCIA-LTFRB
G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994

FACTS :
Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular
No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing
provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15%
above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.
This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No.
92-009 providing, among others, that “The existing authorized fare range
system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall
be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be
replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare
range.”
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the
deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect
plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a
petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing,
announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB
opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed
for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus
operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later
increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over
and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the
purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.

HELD:
Yes.
Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to
the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public
services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise
vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987.
x x x However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the
regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that
power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.

Case 3.7 Executive Order Creating 33 Municipalities

Pelaez v Auditor General

FACTS:

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the

Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities
pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds
thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive
orders. Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel
Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person
acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.

ISSUE:

Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the
President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power
has been vested in the legislative department.

RULING:

Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:

“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus
or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may
be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the
officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied
by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are
concerned. Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an
executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power
than what was vested in him by the Constitution.

The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio
and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or
any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

Case 3.8 ACT 4221 Parole Probation Office

People v Vera

FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He
filed a motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were
denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review,
which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-
Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the
court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the
application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended
denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for
hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu
Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it
has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private
prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative
power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution).

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper
and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and
is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.The challenged section of Act
No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for
the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided
for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office." The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not
at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely
placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not
wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline
to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.The
clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the
whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely
upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through
appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than
those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the
various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into
provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces
— and this is the actual situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for
the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be
illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can
there be a probation officer without the probation system.

Case 3.9 Rice Dealer (Act No. 2868)

US v Ang Tang Ho

Facts:
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and
approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and
Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary
circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the
necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such
products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive
Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed
the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a
rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty
centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO.
The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was
charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was
sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the
sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the
Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he
committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex
post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a
violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law
and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide
definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could
be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others
without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to
matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The
law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment
of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in
form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be
left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any
prescribed fact or event.

Case 3.10
RA 9337- VAT Reform Act
Abakada Guro Party List, et al vs Exec. Sec. Ermita

Facts: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or
the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court
issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response
to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning
the constitutionality of the new law.

The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections
4, 5 and 6: “That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax
to 12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);

or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of

theprevious year exceeds one and one-half percent (1½%)”

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to

increase the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to
tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI
Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods
and services which can’t be included within the purview of tariffs under the
exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute
payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to
cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the
conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are
made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the
recommendation.

Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to

increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power
granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power? NO

Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those
which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative
power which can never be delegated is theauthority to make a complete law-
complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be
applicable, and to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature
of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which
determines the validity of its delegation.

The exceptions are:

(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution

(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution

(c) delegation to the people at large

(d) delegation to local governments

(e) delegation to administrative bodies

For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard.
A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a
specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of
the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No
discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of
discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso.
The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion.

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the

12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress.
This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive
to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.

Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the
existence of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as
a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
one and 1½%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary
of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the
President.

In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of

the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of
the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its
expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the
means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information
and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function
is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information
and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.

Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of
his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which
the legislative process can go forward.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion

as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionallypermissible. Congress did
not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.