Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Introduction
It is now being recognised that international exchange of goods and services, like
equivalent domestic exchange, takes place both through hierarchies and on markets. The
growth of management contracts, technical assistance agreements, licensing rrangements,
etc. probably implies the expansion of non-market hierarchical influences even upon
`arms length' market transactions. The increasingly problematic role of the market as the
main instrument in the allocation of resources which these tendencies imply, seems to be
the result of increases in mechanisation, organisational scale and R and D activities which
are the basis of the joint production operations so characteristic of modern capitalism.
They often make the market irrelevant even for the distribution of end products, as prices
which earlier operated as equilibrating mechanisms now are merely accounting devices to
serve corporate objectives. It is not surprising therefore that many ostensibly arms' length
transactions can now easily take on some of the characteristics of intra-firm trade.
Opportunities for the pursuit of `restrictive business practices' within intra-firm trade
(however defined) are certainly great. The practices which are conventionally so
described, when undertaken within transnational corporate hierarchical systems are
considered the basics of good transnational corporate management. This contradiction in
approach (of the state on the one hand and private corporate entities on the other), is
reflected in their respective strategies of operation vis-a-vis each other, often to the
detriment of the economy as a whole.
Transfer pricing is one such practice, which refers to prices used for `internal' sales of
goods, services and technology between divisions and/or associated companies of a
business enterprise. The concept relates not only to trade operations proper, but also to
other intra-firm transactions, such as those relating to transfer of technology, dividend
remittances, royalties and technical fees payments. These transactions are mostly market
transactions between unrelated parties (ie. from arms' length prices). However transfer
pricing may also arise in transactions between unrelated parties, for eg. where one
company supplies an LDC company with more than one item, and receives more than
one kind of payment. In such cases (eg.when machinery and parts are supplied along with
know-how) payments for one item may be artificially attributed to another, for tax or
other reasons. The scope for transfer pricing in such transactions also increases in cases
with `tie-in' clauses in licensing agreements or technical/ financial collaborations which
require the purchase of goods from the licensor or party designated by the licensor.
In keeping with this broad definition of transfer pricing, in this essay we outline the
variety of forces which influence the inception, use, regulation, control and estimation of
such pricing practices. In doing so we attempt to move towards a framework within
which to analyse and check transfer pricing by large international corporations in
developing countries.
By virtue of their international spread TNCs can avail simultaneously of complex tax
laws, corporate structural and other organisational laws to achieve the overall goal of
profit maximisation. Taxation of foreign income provides a legal incentive to invest
abroad and also the proliferation of `unfair' transactions and financial manipulations.
Operationally the financial manipulations for transfer pricing take the form of false
invoicing. This practice is defined by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs (1976), as
`a transaction intended to evade tax by putting taxable objects outside the reach of
national tax authorities by means of an invoice that does not accord with economic facts.'
This objective is achieved through both under and over invoicing (of imports and
exports), often by the same company.
Over invoicing of imports occurs in those commodities with low or zero import tariffs,
mostly for illegal repatriation of capital to head offices; and also in sectors with internal
price control to increase the cost of production so that higher official prices/ subsidies can
be obtained. Under invoicing may be found in imports of products with high tariffs or
sales tax. Over invoicing of exports is found to be practiced by transnationals, which
produce or assemble manufactured products. The objective may be to obtain a greater
value from government export incentive schemes. Under invoicing may be undertaken to
avoid foreign exchange stipulations of domestic banking authorities.
Typically the issue of transfer pricing arises because of the existence of intra-firm trade
across national borders; but direct foreign investment, licensing agreements, joint
ventures (both technical and financial), often also provide ample scope for transfer
pricing, not only to circumvent adverse government policies, but also as a part of the
corporate strategy and organisational structure of transnational entities.
Policy induced motivation for transfer-pricing manipulations may arise because of both
tax and non-tax factors. Corporate tax rates and fiscal provisions, exchange rate
fluctuations and import duties as also labor laws, policies restricting monopolies and
restrictive trade practices, laws governing profit repatriation in particular and foreign
capital in general and import substituting/export promoting policies; all influence (and in
turn are affected by) the nature and extent of transfer pricing by transnational
corporations. But such manipulations can occur even in the absence of government
policies designed to advance domestic economic and social goals, often in variance with\
those of TNCs. Structural motivation for replacing arms length market transactions in
the acquisition of inputs, or disposal of outputs by non market devises, may arise out of
considerations of security (with respect to both prices and access to supplies, especially in
cases of long gestation period investments), transaction costs, externalities and the need
for secrecy.
Such a motivation for transfer pricing, cannot in practice be separated from policy related
inducements as both together form the framework within which TNCs operate in order to
minimise tax payments and maximise profits. However a TNC may transfer price even in
the absence of adverse government policy, in order to: maintain its market power, sustain
a high rate of self-financed DFI for further expansion, hide information from competitors,
finance R and D projects, compensate losses of one or more subsidiaries, finance
portfolio investments in other firms or sectors, finance joint ventures, provide for losses
due to nationalisation etc.
The existence of` unexplained' corporations in the organisation, which do not seem to
have a valid function, may also be a vehicle for tax avoidance. The same may be true in
the case of the operation of permanently loss making units and transactions between
companies which are under common control but which do not belong to the same
corporate group.
In the Balance Sheet, loans to foreign affiliates may represent the repatriation of foreign
profits in an attempt to avoid domestic payment of dividends, as also may, excessive
balances with affiliates. Write-off of inter-company debt may be attempted to reduce
balances that may have resulted from non arms length transactions. Omissions in the
balance sheet of expected assets or liabilities may indicate transfer or sale of intangible
assets like patents, knowhow etc. to tax haven affiliates.
In the Profit and Loss Account, R and D expenditures may be hidden, pooled or
distributed among companies to avoid taxes; royalties may be excessive and may go to
unlikely recipient affiliates; patents and trademarks may be charged for at monopolistic
rates, or involve reciprocal benefits and may be priced even after their expiry. In the case
of payments, for both royalties and patents and trademarks, to affiliates, the charges may
not meet with the arms length criterion. Payments for home-office administrative support,
R and D etc., may be excessive and may contain hidden profits, which are not assessed in
the country of receipt. Sales of partly finished goods, third party commissions or
discounts to foreign affiliates, unexpected purchases or sales, rentals, office and travel
expenses, changes in the pattern of accounts, liquidation and sales of foreign affiliates
etc., also provide ample opportunity for transfer pricing and consequently tax avoidance.
Thus merely by being true to themselves the TNCs can come in conflict with the state
which considers that it has suffered losses of tax revenue and see in this a challenge to its
sovereignty; and with domestic firms which see it as a serious distortion of competition
and one of the chief reasons for the expansion of TNCs. This attitude of the state reflects
the structural and resource constraints faced by most LDCs and determines the nature of
regulations to which the activities of TNCs in host economies, are subjected. The
predominance of anti-monopoly and taxation related measures to deal with TNC
operations in general and transfer pricing manipulations in particular, seem to be a
response to factors endemic to LDCs. The effectiveness of these measures depends on the
extent to which they take into account the tendency of TNCs to maximise global profits.
Rules and regulations affecting transfer pricing activities of any corporate entity are
usually a combination of preventive, penalisation and adjustment measures to minimize
the impact of such manipulations on the economy. One set is concerned with
restricting/preventing such pricing manipulations. This would require the creation of an
economic environment in which the incentive to indulge in transfer pricing is minimised.
Given the intrinsic propensities of large corporations on the one hand, and the structural
constraints faced by LDCs on the other, such measures may prove difficult to implement.
Others help in identifying such manipulations and in penalisation once they have been
found to exist.Such regulation usually takes the form of either information disclosure
requirements at various levels, or valuation rules in cases of ambiguous related party
transactions.
The impact of TNCs on world output arises partly from the extent to which these
enterprises are themselves more efficient, as a result of their multinationality, and partly
by the response of such companies to government policies designed to advance their own
economic and social goals. Wherever they occur, the response of TNCs and their
affiliates to the economic environment of which they are a part, or to changes in that
environment, will, to some extent be different from other (similar) firms. This along with
the fact that some of the output generated by the affiliates in one country will accrue to
owners of resources in other countries causes both international allocation of resources
and the distribution of economic welfare to be affected. Although in a world context
transfer pricing is primarily a distributional matter, from the point of view of a particular
country, it would influence efficiency of resource usage and share of output produced. In
a mixed economy like ours this could mean a misallocation of resources (away from
planned priorities), accompanied by an adverse redistribution of incomes away from
national entities and the related BOP effects. Besides dealing with transfer pricing before
it can occur (preventive measures) and after it has occurred (penalisation measures),
policy regulation is therefore also required, to deal with its macro and micro economic
consequences. The adverse impact on host government foreign exchange inflows and
hence on the balance of payments; the growth of a parallel (black) market for foreign
exchange; revenue losses and the consequent implications for internal resource
mobilisation; distortion in the functioning of specific policy instruments resulting in the
non-achievement of plan targets; all call for an active role of the state. Similarly, at the
micro level the proliferation of market concentration and oligopolistic practices require
state intervention.
The policy environment in most LDCs, characterised as it is by greater protection
of domestic industry and closer regulation of TNC operations, is thought to be conducive
to the practice of transfer pricing manipulations. Rules regarding corporate taxation,
import duties and exchange controls, (including restrictions on repatriation of returns on
foreign investment), usually prompted by weak BOP positions and overvalued currencies,
often create incentives for transfer pricing.
ensure that they are balanced by export earnings over a period of time, may be extremely
difficult to implement. These factors together with the problems of the existing legal
provisions, discussed later in this section, could exacerbate the tendency for transfer
pricing manipulations. Thirdly, the new policy statement may not be a significant
departure from earlier statements, at least as far as foreign investment is concerned.
Foreign equity upto 80 per cent in high-tech areas and upto 100 per cent in 100 per cent
EOUs was allowed for even in the 1977 Industrial Policy Statement. Freedom for
remittances of royalties, dividends and profits, for all approved foreign investments,
under given rules, was also allowed for in this statement. The only change in the 1991
policy is in terms of freeing remittances of lumpsum payments upto 1 crore from the
requirement of prior official approval.
For assessing the possible impact of changes in corporate taxes, customs duties and
exchange rates on transfer pricing manipulations by TNCs, one has to look at the budget
proposals for 1991-92.
In India nominal corporate tax rates have been higher even than tax rates in
developing countries. This together with taxes on repatriated dividends, interest and
royalties may have increase tax burdens on TNC affiliates operating in India and hence
encouraged under invoicing of sales and rerouting funds to tax haven affiliates. If this be
the case then the proposals in the current budget will only exacerbate this tendency.
Corporate tax rates have been increased by 5 percentage point and now range from 45 to
50 per cent of profits for all companies. This is not inclusive of the 15 per cent surcharge
which will still be levied. Besides this, depreciation allowance on fixed capital has been
decreased from 33.33 per cent to 25 per cent. These changes increased both the taxable
funds and the tax rates faced by foreign affiliates.
The existence of customs duties on imports, (especially ad valorem duties), as they
increase the price of imported goods, provide great scope for transfer pricing
manipulations through the under invoicing of imports. Tariffs are often a multi target
policy instrument in LDCs, used not only as protective devices to nurture `infant
industries' but also as a major source of revenue for the government and as an instrument
to achieve BOP equilibrium.
As such they are considered to be very high (relative to home country rates) in most
LDCs including India. In the recent budget proposals the preoccupation of the
government with considerations of resource mobilisation, has caused the customs duty
structures to remain almost unchanged. Specific duties such as those on import of
machinery for marine products industry and finished leather industry have been reduced
to encourage exports from these industries. Import duties on capital goods and
components have also been reduced by 5 percentage points. These changes may be too
insignificant to cause a decline in the incentive to under invoice imports. Similarly the
elimination of tariff peaks above 150 per cent affects imports of a limited number of
product, and leaves comparative tariff rates still to high relative to home country rates, at
least from the point of view of importing
TNCs affiliates. In other words, these policy proposals may not provide a policy
environment which will limit the illegal transfer of funds. Further, in the absence (at
present) of a nominal tariff structure if one relies on the budget to provide collection
rates, for the stated revenue targets to be achieved, these rates would have to go up by
about 9 to 12 per cent, on policy dependent imports. This would mean a even higher
increase in nominal tariff rates, as exemptions etc. would have to be included, in their
calculation.
Currency risks, as denoted by fluctuations in exchange rates, faced by TNCs in
trade transactions in foreign (LDC) currencies, are also conducive to transfer pricing
manipulations. To avoid exchange losses TNCs often convert assets in a currency which
is expected to weaken into a stronger one, before devaluation occurs. This is done by
accelerating prospective payments in weak currencies (`leading') and delaying payments
in strong currencies (`lagging'). Transfer pricing manipulations reshuffle cash balances
between units of TNCs but cannot avoid exchange risks. If however, such manipulations
are grafted on to successful leading or lagging moves they could amplify the outcome as
more funds in weak currency could be converted into the strong currency or less units of
the strong currency could be exchanged into the weak one.9 The recent two stage
devaluation of rupee may have provided an incentive for such leading-cum-transfer
pricing manipulations combinations.
It is important to note that given these temptations for transfer pricing manipulations
which the policy environment provides, such practices can only be indulged in to the
extent governments are unable to monitor them. Therefore, the specific measures to
scrutinise relative party transactions have great significant. In India, provisions under the
Companies Act, Customs Act, Income Tax Act, and FERA exist to regulate such
transactions. Sections 212, 594 and 615 of the Companies Act require disclosure of
information about operations and finances of subsidiaries of all units falling under the
purview of the Act. Section 14 1(A) and 14 1(B) of the Customs Act, the Customs
Valuation Rules and the Customs Valuation Act (1988), all provide for customs
valuation of transactions which are not arms length; Sections 112 and 114 (or Section
167(8) of the Sea Customs Act), penalise `improper' trade transactions and Section 111,
allows for their confiscation. Over- as well as under invoicing of imports(section 112)
and exports(section 114) are recognized as punishable economic offenses. The taxation of
various sources of income (viz. dividends, royalties, technical fees), of foreign companies
and non-residents falls under Section 115 A, of the Income Tax Act; while section 44 D
of the act and Rules 10, 11 (Income Tax Rules), relate to the computation of this income.
Sections 92, 93 deal with cases of tax avoidance in related party transactions involving
nonresidents, and Section 173 with the recovery of these taxes. The domestic and
unilateral powers regarding discovery, production of evidence or attendance of any
person (Section 131); search and seizure (Section 132); requisition of books of accounts
(Section 132A); calling for information (Section 133); survey (Section 133A); collection
of information (Section 133B); inspection of registers of companies (Section 134);
inquiry before assessment (Section 142, 143(2), 143(3)), are ineffective in obtaining
overseas information. The Income Tax Act does not provide any investigative power to
tax administrators to have access to information relating to an international transaction. A
foreign company cannot be compelled to produce relevant books and records kept by it
abroad and foreign nationals cannot be compelled to give evidence or produce
documents. This underlies the need for international cooperation. Such cooperation is
sought and extended through double taxation agreements. Sections 90, 91 relate to the
existence of double taxation agreements with different nations, according to the UN
model (1980). Article 26(1) of this model provides for the exchange of relevant
information between tax administrators of the contracting states. The Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act, covers foreign exchange violations of RBI directives. Section 12 (1)
requires exporters to declare the full value of goods to be exported. Violation of this
section is dealt with invoking Section 19, which gives powers of inspection and Section
22, which penalises false statements; Section 23 (1A), punishes any contravention to the
provisions of the Act for which no penalty is expressly provided.
While laws/rules do exist for dealing with malpractices in related party transactions, they
do not seem to be based on an understanding of the intrinsic logic of these manipulations.
This leads not only to inadequate coverage of intra-firm transactions at the detection
stage but also to a lack of coordination between the various statutory authorities at the
implementation stage. Each set of rules is implemented in isolation from the others and
fulfills a separate objective. The Customs Rules deal only with goods traded across the
national border and focus on their `arms length' valuation; FERA regulations are
concerned with the violation of RBIs foreign exchange directives and prevention of
undue foreign exchange losses therefrom; and the income tax laws deal with the taxation
aspect of nonresident remittances abroad. Any specific malpractice, in this case transfer
pricing, is thus approached in a fragmented and disintegrated manner. For example, either
from the tax angle or the valuation angle or the FERA violation angle.
Overall the general policy towards foreign investment does not recognise TNCs as
tangible legal entities. Rather subsidiaries of transnationals are treated in isolation from
their global operations. Such an approach precludes the possibility of detection (and
hence monitoring) of a large number of related party transactions; both within the
economy and in trade/investment transactions with the international economy.
In contrast to the national level where legal/professional requirements for disclosures
about amounts transferred and accounting policies used are sparse, at the international,
inter-government level, the UN (UNCTAD, UNCTC), OECD and EEC have been for
many years attempting to standardise accounting methods and information disclosure
norms world wide. The global reach of TNCs is sought to be countered by global
regulations. To this end, the UN proposals (1977, 1988, 1989) and the OECD guidelines
(1976, 1979, 1984, 1988), recommended disclosures of the volume and value of transfer
pricing and/or related party transactions, as well as of the accounting methods used to
determine their prices, both for the TNC as a whole and its individual sub-groups. The
Report of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (OECD, 1979), even attempts to set out
detailed guidelines for actually determining arms length prices in transactions between
associated enterprises.
More generalised formulations, regarding harmonisation of divergent accounting
standards (UN Commission on Transnational Corporations,1989), use of market/arms
length prices in intra-corporate transactions (UNCTC, Code of Conduct for TNCs), and
Customs valuation of goods in conformity with commercial realities (GATT, Article VII)
also exist as part of the global efforts to regulate transfer pricing policies of TNCs.
However, what seems to be required is a more integrated, coordinated and consistent
approach towards related party transactions based on a deeper understanding of the
specific structural factors underlying them. Both at the policy level and at the
implementation level, there is a need to try not only to improve but also to move beyond
the information disclosure- market valuation approaches; towards a regulatory framework
which incorporates the specific structural factors endemic to LDCs on the one hand and
transnational affiliates on the other.
The Finance Act 2001 introduced the detailed Transfer Pricing Regulations (T.P.R.) in
India w.e.f.1stApril 2001 corresponding to the assessment year 2002-2003. The rules for
transfer pricing have been notified on August 21, 2001.
A need was felt for a detailed and separate regulation for administering transfer pricing
with globalisation of Indian economy. Absence of such Regulations not only results in
litigation but loss of revenue to the exchequer. In absence of Transfer Pricing
Regulations, India was losing its legitimate share of revenue.
Globally several methods of detecting transfer pricing have been set out to check whether
transactions between related parties have been at arm's length.
The transaction method relies directly or indirectly on information of prices at which
similar transactions have been entered into by unrelated parties. This method is further
divided into the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method and the cost plus (C+)
method.
Prices charged in similar business transactions between two independent parties is the
yardstick adopted under the CUP method. Whereas under the C+ method, an arm's length
price is determined by applying an appropriate mark-up on the costs incurred.
The transactional profit method, as the name indicates, is transaction-specific: it
examines whether or not profits from a particular deal are reasonable.
Import of raw material, semi-finished goods for assembling and most important of all,
intellectual property such as know-how and technology are areas prone to transfer
pricing. Such goods or services can be sent to associate companies in India either at a
higher or lower rate than prices charged to unrelated parties to secure a global tax
advantage.
In a high-tech age, Indian companies often rely on technology and know-how from their
foreign joint venture partners: thus strict regulations are very important.
The important sections relating to transfer pricing in the Income Tax Act 1961 are set in
section 40A(2), section 80 1A(9) and section 80 IA (10). The first enables tax authorities
to disallow any expenditure made to a related party which they feel is excessive. Certain
tax benefits are available under section 80 1A such as a tax holiday for a certain number
of years. If transfer pricing is suspected then the tax authorities can deny such tax
holidays.
The most important provisions in the tax laws is section 92. Here, if owing to a close
connection between an Indian entity and a foreign party, the Indian tax authorities feel
that the prices charged in a transaction were not at an arm's length they can adjust the
taxable income of the Indian party. In other words, taxable income can be enhanced if the
transaction has led to a lower profits for the Indian party.
Transfer pricing regulations are extremely stringent in developed countries such as the
United States of America, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Germany.
In these countries, the tax payer has to maintain extensive records of all transactions with
related parties. In the UK, such disclosures have to be made in the self assessment returns
filed with tax authorities. In India, though provisions relating to transfer pricing
regulations are there in the Income Tax Act, 1961, they are not very effective as tax
payers are not required to maintain detailed documents or voluntarily disclose
information of related party transactions.
1. For the purposes of this section and sections 92, 92B, 92C, 92D, 92E and 92F,
"associated enterprise", in relation to another enterprise, means an enterprise--
a. which participates, directly or indirectly, or through one or more
intermediaries, in the management or control or capital of the other
enterprise ; or
2. Two enterprises shall be deemed to be associated enterprises if, at any time during
the previous year,--
a. one enterprise holds, directly or indirectly, shares carrying not less than
twenty-six per cent. of the voting power in the other enterprise ; or
d. one enterprise guarantees not less than ten per cent. of the total borrowings
of the other enterprise ; or
f. more than half of the directors or members of the governing board, or one
or more of the executive directors or members of the governing board, of
each of the two enterprises are appointed by the same person or persons ;
or
h. ninety per cent. or more of the raw materials and consumables required for
the manufacture or processing of goods or articles carried out by one
enterprise, are supplied by the other enterprise, or by persons specified by
the other enterprise, and the prices and other conditions relating to the
supply are influenced by such other enterprise ; or
1. For the purposes of this section and sections 92, 92C, 92D and 92E, "international
transaction" means a transaction between two or more associated enterprises,
either or both of whom are non-residents, in the nature of purchase, sale or lease
of tangible or intangible property, or provision of services, or lending or
borrowing money, or any other transaction having a bearing on the profits,
income, losses or assets of such enterprises and shall include a mutual agreement
or arrangement between two or more associated enterprises for the allocation or
apportionment of, or any contribution to, any cost or expense incurred or to be
incurred in connection with a benefit, service or facility provided or to be
provided to any one or more of such enterprises.
2. A transaction entered into by an enterprise with a person other than an associated
enterprise shall, for the purposes of sub-section (1), be deemed to be a transaction
entered into between two associated enterprises, if there exists a prior agreement
in relation to the relevant transaction between such other person and the
associated enterprise ; or the terms of the relevant transaction are determined in
substance between such other person and the associated enterprise.
2. The most appropriate method referred to in sub-section (1) shall be applied, for
determination of arm's length price, in the manner as may be prescribed :
Provided that where more than one price may be determined by the most
appropriate method, the arm's length price shall be taken to be the arithmetical
mean of such prices.
3. Where during the course of any proceeding for the assessment of income, the
Assessing Officer is, on the basis of material or information or document in his
possession, of the opinion that--
c. the information or data used in computation of the arm's length price is not
reliable or correct ; or
d. the assessee has failed to furnish, within the specified time, any
information or document which he was required to furnish by a notice
issued under sub-section (3) of section 92D,
the Assessing Officer may proceed to determine the arm's length price in
relation to the said international transaction in accordance with sub-
sections (1) and (2), on the basis of such material or information or
document available with him :
Provided that no deduction under section 10A or section 10B or under Chapter
VI-A shall be allowed in respect of the amount of income by which the total
income of the assessee is enhanced after computation of income under this sub-
section :
1. Every person who has entered into an international transaction shall keep and
maintain such information and document in respect thereof, as may be prescribed.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), the Board may
prescribe the period for which the information and document shall be kept and
maintained under that sub-section.
3. The Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) may, in the course of any
proceeding under this Act, require any person who has entered into an
international transaction to furnish any information or document in respect
thereof, as may be prescribed under sub-section (1), within a period of thirty days
from the date of receipt of a notice issued in this regard :
i. "accountant" shall have the same meaning as in the Explanation below sub-
section (2) of section 288 ;
ii. "arm's length price" means a price which is applied or proposed to be applied in a
transaction between persons other than associated enterprises, in uncontrolled
conditions ;
a. where the assessee is a company, the 31st day of October of the relevant
assessment year ;
b. in any other case, the 31st day of July of the relevant assessment year ;
Section 271(1)
Explanation 7
Where in the case of an assessee who has entered into an international transaction defined
in section 92B, any amount is added or disallowed in computing the total income under
sub-section (4) of section 92C, then, the amount so added or disallowed shall, for the
purposes of clause (c) of this sub-section, be deemed to represent the income in respect of
which particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished,
unless the assessee proves to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer or the
Commissioner (Appeals) that the price charged or paid in such transaction was computed
in accordance with the provisions contained in section 92C and in the manner prescribed
under that section, in good faith and with due diligence.".
Section 271AA. Penalty for failure to keep and maintain information and document
in respect of international transaction
Without prejudice to the provisions of section 271, if any person fails to keep and
maintain any such information and document as required by sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2) of section 92D, the Assessing Officer or Commissioner (Appeals) may direct
that such person shall pay, by way of penalty, a sum equal to two per cent. of the value of
each international transaction entered into by such person."
271G. Penalty for failure to furnish information or document under section 92D
If any person who has entered into an international transaction fails to furnish any such
information or document as required by sub-section (3) of section 92D, the Assessing
Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) may direct that such person shall pay, by way of
penalty, a sum equal to two per cent. of the value of the international transaction for each
such failure.".
The Group began by studying the laws and practices relating to transfer pricing in India
and abroad.
The following conclusions can be drawn
(a) Indian and global tax authorities have armed themselves with substantial powers to
plug the tax evasion that arises from creative transfer pricing.
(b) Transactions between related parties come under the ambit of Accounting Standard
AS 18 in India and IAS 24 internationally. These standards require disclosure of certain
aspects of such transactions.
(c) Neither in India nor elsewhere in the world have company law authorities prescribed
transfer pricing methods or disclosures.
(d) The methodologies for determining arm’s length transfer prices (Comparable
Uncontrolled Price, Resale Price Method etc.) are broadly the same in India and abroad.
The Group also looked at current corporate practices related to transfer pricing in India.
While some Indian companies have no doubt set high standards of corporate governance
and fairness in this area, many Indian companies have more to do. Several members of
the Group observed that in the course of their professional life, they had come across
companies that have resorted to unhealthy practices in the area of transfer pricing.
Considerable anecdotal evidence is also found in the financial press. Annexure 4
summarises some of the transfer pricing abuses that have given rise to concerns among
shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders about transfer pricing regulation.
This analysis suggests the need for a transfer price guideline under the Companies Act to
ensure the fairness of transfer prices from a shareholder/creditor perspective. At the same
time, the Group is well aware that the current regulatory regime in India is similar to that
elsewhere in the world. In most jurisdictions in the world, the company law is yet to
regulate transfer prices. All over the world, this appears to have been left to company
management alone to determine in accordance with the business judgement rule.
In today’s environment where we are attempting to incorporate global best practices in all
our laws and regulations, introducing a new regulation that is yet to be introduced
anywhere else in the world is not something to be done lightly. The Group debated this
issue at length. A number of factors swung the Group’s thinking in favour of such a
guideline despite this concern:
2002 in the United States and elsewhere. Regulators in many jurisdictions are
rethinking their approach towards regulation and contemplating measures to tighten
the laws regarding corporate abuses. In this situation where global regulatory
practices are evolving, there is scope for countries like India to innovate and set new
standards of disclosure and transparency that leapfrog current global best practices.
2. There have been corporate governance abuses in India too. Many observers
believe that violations of investor and creditor rights have damaged the financial
system severely. On the one hand, the erosion of investor confidence has dealt a body
blow to our capital markets. On the other hand, mounting corporate delinquencies
have debilitated the banking system. In this situation, it could be argued that there is a
case for a regulatory regime to check transfer-pricing abuses.
After extensive discussion and deliberations, the Group came to the conclusion that
transfer pricing guidelines should be framed under the Companies Act. The Group noted
that the Companies Act (S 209 and S 211) requires that the books of account of the
company as well as its Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account present a true and fair
view of the affairs of the company. The Group believes that the “true and fair view”
obligation requires substantial disclosures of transfer pricing policies. It also requires a
mechanism to ensure that transfer prices approximate arm’s length prices.
The need for transfer pricing guidelines therefore arises for all users of the financial
statements of the company who rely on these statements for a true and fair view:
creditors who wish to ascertain the credit worthiness of the company and monitor
compliance with debt covenants
revenue authorities who may rely partly or wholly on the financial statements to
determine tax liability
other government authorities who may rely on the financial statements to monitor
compliance with various laws and regulations (for example, exchange control) or
for statistical purposes (for example, price indices or GDP statistics)
other stakeholders (for example, employees, customers, suppliers) who may use
the financial statements for various purposes
For some of these purposes the requirement of arms length transfer prices applies to inter-
divisional transfers within the same legal entity. For example, shareholders need a true
and fair view of segment revenues and profits as different valuation and performance
benchmarks may apply to different segments. Revenue authorities may also require this
when different tax rates apply to different segments.
The Group recommends that the proposed transfer pricing guidelines be guided by the
following core principles:
All transactions between a company and a related party or between two business
segments of a company shall be at arm’s length transfer prices except as provided
below.
Remarks It must be emphasised that even a transfer price more favourable to the
company than an arm’s length price is problematic. This is so because (a)
valuation is impacted by the possibility that the related party may demand an
arm’s length price in the future and (b) the threat to charge an arm’s length
price in future could become a form of poison-pill/blackmail.
In exceptional cases, the company may decide to use a non-arm’s length transfer price
provided:
The Board of Directors as well as the audit committee of the Board are satisfied for
reasons to be recorded in writing that it is in the interest of the company to do so, and
The use of a non-arms length transfer price, the reasons therefore, and the profit impact
thereof are disclosed in the annual report
Remarks: Examples of such exceptional cases could be a company giving an interest free
loan to a loss making subsidiary or a company accepting the offer of a
controlling shareholder to work as the CEO on a nominal salary.
The company shall prepare a Statement on Transfer Price Policy (the “Policy Statement”)
and a Report on Implementation of Transfer Price Policy (the “Implementation Report”).
The Policy Statement would explain the specific transfer pricing methods used for
different classes of transactions with different parties with special emphasis on those
transactions where a Comparable Uncontrolled Price/Transaction (CUP/CUT) method
could not be adopted.
The Implementation Report would document the compliance with the Policy Statement
and would include the actual detailed computation of an arm's length price for every
material transaction with a related party or internal business segment.
The Policy Statement and the Implementation Report would be placed before the Audit
Committee for approval
The Policy Statement would also be placed before the Board for approval
Related party transactions should be undertaken only after the Policy Statement relating
to that party has been approved by the Audit Committee and the Board.
The Transfer Pricing Policy Statement would be annexed to and form part of the
Directors’ Report.
The Directors’ Report would also certify that the Transfer Pricing Guidelines have been
complied with and that transactions entered into are at arm’s length unless otherwise
stated and are not prejudicial to the company.
The Directors’ Report would disclose any use of a non-arms length transfer price, the
reasons therefor, and the profit impact thereof.
The Auditors would certify that they have examined the implementation of the transfer
pricing policy and found it to be in conformity with the Transfer Pricing Guidelines and
with the Policy Statement.
The Annual Report would contain the disclosures required under the Transfer Pricing
Guidelines as well as the disclosures required in AS 18. These disclosures would appear
together in the Annual Report in order to be more meaningful and to enhance ease of
understanding.
Remarks: Though the Implementation Report is not disclosed to the shareholders, the
auditors’ certification, which is based on their audit of the Implementation
Report, provides substantial comfort to them.
Name of the related party and nature of the related party relationship where control exists
should be disclosed irrespective of whether or not there have been transactions between
the related parties.
If there have been transactions between related parties, during the existence of a related
party relationship
With globalisation, transfer pricing became an unwanted reality. Price charged by one
company in Country A to another company in Country B is reflected in the profit and loss
By resorting to transfer pricing, related entities can reduce the global incidence of tax by
transferring higher income to low-tax jurisdictions or greater expenditure to those
jurisdictions where the tax rate is very high.
For example, the current tax rate on domestic companies in India is 35 per cent.
Company A is located in India and Company B in Country XYZ. Both belong to the same
group. If tax rate in Country XYZ is 15 per cent, then Company B will transfer raw
material to Company A at slightly higher prices. This will enable Company A to show a
higher expenditure and reduce its taxable profits. On the other hand, slightly higher
income will not harm Company B much as the tax rate in its country is very low. Thus the
global group as a whole will benefit from tax savings.
Some of the related party transactions, which are usually resorted to for diversion of
funds are detailed below.
(c) Sales at below market rates to an unnecessary “middle man” related party, who
in turn sells to the ultimate customer at a higher price with the related party (and
ultimately its principals) retaining the difference.
(e) Use of trade names or patent rights at exorbitant rates even after their expiry or
at a price much higher than the price, which can not be described as reasonable.
(h) Selling real estate at a price that differs significantly from its appraised value.
The parent unit is supplying raw materials to its 100% EOU subsidiary located
separately at an estimated cost which covers raw material costs and variable
conversion charges. The EOU unit reckons this cost as its purchase cost of raw
materials and adds value to the raw material to produce the final product which is
exported from this unit. Since the 100% EOU is exempt from customs duty and
excise duty on finished product there is no payment of duty on this account by the
100% EOU. The transfer of raw materials from the parent unit being below the
full cost of the product there is an inbuilt mechanism to divert profits from the
main company to the 100% EOU unit which enjoys exemption from various
duties and taxes.
The FOB value of exports being approximately Rs100 crores in a given year the
impact of taxes can be worked out.
The parent company is giving loans to its subsidiary companies on an interest free
basis which remains unpaid for more than 5 years now. The amount of interest
free loans given to its subsidiaries totals Rs1500 crores. The parent company is a
flag ship company and has a wide range of products in manufacturing and
trading. Some of the subsidiary companies have not taken off at all and some of
them have become defunct and there is no action for recovery by the parent. The
annual loss on interest to the parent company on a notional basis at 15% p.a. is
estimated at Rs220 cr. This is a clear suppression of profits arising from evasion
of legitimate income resulting from the diversion of borrowed funds by pledging
of assets by the parent company. Since the company is making profits, no queries
are raised by outside agencies as they get regular interest payments and repayment
of loans without a default. This is a case where diversion of funds and transfer of
funds at below cost is resorted to in order to avoid a legitimate return to the
shareholders.
companies in the same management. Many of them do not go for public finances
as the holding company takes care of the entire financial structuring for these
related companies. These companies mostly do not trade in the open market by
listing, as the shares are closely held by the parent company. The surpluses of the
subsidiary go back to the parent company in the form of high rates of dividends.
The investment of funds gets a good return to the parent company which has
several baskets of companies to set off profits against losses and minimize the
payment of taxes to the authorities. This is a very clear case of legitimate tax
avoidance beyond the legal net. This type of promoter controlled business is
widely resorted to as a corporate strategy to avoid taxes by the holding company
and this is well within the laws of land. The question before the public is how is
the profit suppression by business conglomerates to be addressed. As more and
more MNCs are stepping into our country the flight of foreign exchange by
diversion of funds is a serious concern to the country. The disclosures will not
serve any purpose as there is no violation of the accepted form of investment.
What is required is to consider payment of dividends to holding companies as a
related party transaction and to regulate such payments, which may be beyond the
prescribed investment norms.
For technology transfer the Company ‘A’ is paid a hefty amount as technical fees
by Company ‘B’ based on volume of sales. The Company ‘A’ treats the supply of
plant and machinery as their share of the JV investments. Company ‘B’ pays
dividends treating the value of plant and machinery as equity participation apart
from paying royalty and technical knowhow fees for technology transfer.
The issue before the public is denying genuine Indian investors of the advantage
of equity participation by company ‘A’ getting additional rights issue and bonus
issues for no consideration and beyond the value of plant and machinery supplied.
Over the years it could be found that Company A’s share of equity and royalty
payments far exceed the value of the assets invested by the company. There is
flight of capital as dividends paid for expanded capital not to forget payments as
technology transfer which is difficult to measure.
The company was established over 50 years ago and is listed on the BSE. The
sector in which the company operated was reserved for the small scale industry. In
order to maintain its market leadership, the company had to find new methods of
holding on to its manufacturing base and expanding it to keep pace with market
demand.
The company continued to invest heavily in R&D and Plant and Machinery. It
floated joint ventures and/or companies where the major shareholder was its
distributor in each region. It transferred its old plant and machinery to the new
companies at a price just below the Rs. 20 lakh ceiling then in force for a
company to qualify as an SSI unit. The management and operational control of
each of these smaller manufacturing entities rested entirely with the MNC.
1. In the first mode, all Raw Material and Packing Material was supplied by
the parent company to each manufacturing facility. The finished product
was shipped to company warehouses and distributor godowns for onward
movement in the company’s supply chain.
The units operating under the second method were found to have vastly superior
manufacturing efficiencies.
Over the next 30 years the company continued to maintain its leadership position
in the market and its share continues to remain one of the most valuable shares in
the Indian stock market. The recent deregulation of the sector in which the
company operates may see a marked change in manufacturing strategy.
A major plant, with a capacity of more than 0.60 Million TPA used to sell surplus
Clinker to Grinding units. Generally, every Cement plant keeps higher capacity
upto clinker stage, in order to ensure continuous supply of Cement in the market
even during Kiln shut down for periodical maintenance. The surplus clinker is
sold to various other small grinding units. In the instant case the close relatives of
Promoters got other Small / Mini Cement Plants to which the clinker is sold @
Rs.250/- to Rs.300/- per ton where as they use to sell @ Rs. 950/- to Rs.1000/- in
the market, the cost of production works out to more than Rs. 800/- per ton. This
practice is prevalent in many Cement units. In the instant case, the Cement unit
became Sick and FIs & Banks have to forge substantial amounts
Coal and Cement transport are generally done by outside transport contractors for
a Cement unit. Many of the Promoters also promote transport companies under
benami names or through relatives who are given contract for transport of Coal,
Cement or other Raw materials. Rates of the transport very substantially from
period to period, on questioned for such variations they are explained as market
exigencies are the reasons for higher payments during some periods. Some times
even the lean season rates are unjustifiably & very higher- nothing but diversion
of funds.
Paper is sold through a large dealer network. Most of the dealers are either
relatives or relatives of relatives under benami Partnerships. Paper is sold to the
related parties at a much discounted / lower rates.
Similarly the transport of various Materials & Paper is also done through related
party transport companies. Major chemicals for e.g. Lime (high purity) is also
purchased from related party companies having Lime Kilns.
Third party Loan Licensing for manufacturing and system of distribution / selling
agencies for Sales are very common. The final rates for various conversion jobs
are fixed as a part of profit planning exercise. It is also observed that substantial
year-end journal vouchers are passed giving rebates / discounts / reimbursement
of special expenses etc., for Selling Agencies / Distributors in related party
accounts.
Various multinational brands have certain ingredients which give the flavour /
fragrance / taste, to their brand patents. The cost of purchase of such items
changes from period to period, even some times quarter to quarter. The invoices
and other documentations are built up and journal vouchers are passed at the
period end against advanced payments made from time to time. Such entries are
made even for Technical Services rendered on adhoc basis in the name of a
Technical Up-gradation, Consultancy Fees etc., in addition to huge Royalty and
Sales commission.
This Act relates to This Act relates to This Act relates to This Standard covers
International transactions transactions relating to related party
Transactions. relating to Captive consumption transactions. These
exportation and of goods and related transactions involve
These transactions importation in the party transactions. transfer of resources
has been defined course of or obligations
under Section 92B International between related
of the Act. Trade. parties, regardless of
whether or not a
(However, the term price is charged.
International Trade This Standard
has not been became effective in
defined under the respect of
Act) accounting periods
commencing on or
after 1.4.2001.
AS-18 is mandatory
only in respect of
following enterprises
and not all
enterprises as at
present :
(i) (i)
Enterprises
whose equity or
debt securities
are listed on a
recognized stock
exchange in
India, and
enterprises that
are in the process
of issuing equity
or debt securities
that will be listed
on a recognized
stock exchange
in India as
evidenced by the
Board of
All other
commercial,
industrial and
business reporting
enterprises, whose
turnover for the
accounting period
exceeds Rs.50
crores.
The term This Act provides The Act provides for Accounting
“Associated for the definition the definition of the Standard-18
enterprise has been of the term Related term related person provides for the
defined under person under Rule under Section 4 (3)(b) definition of the
Section 92A of the 2 (2) of the which provides- term ‘related party’
Act. As per this Customs Valuation as per which parties
Section- (Determination of Persons shall be are considered to be
Price of Imported deemed to be "related" related if any time
(1)"associated Goods) Rules, if- during the reporting
enterprise", in 1988. As per this (i) they are inter- period one party has
relation to another rule— connected the ability to control
enterprise, means undertakings; the other party or
an enterprise - Persons shall be exercise significant
deemed to be (ii) they influence over the
(a)which "related" only if - are relatives; other party in
participates, making financial
directly or (i) they are officers (iii) amongst them and/or operating
indirectly, or or directors of the buyer is a decisions.
through one or one another's relative and a
more businesses; distributor of the The term control
intermediaries, assessee, or a sub- means :
in the (ii) they are legally distributor of such
management or recognised distributor; or (a)ownership,
control or partners in (iv) they are so directly or
capital of the business; associated that they indirectly, of
other have interest, more than one
enterprise; or (iii) they are directly or half of the voting
- participation
(d) one enterprise
in the policy making
guarantees not
process,
less than ten per
cent of the total - material inter-
borrowings of company
the other transactions,
enterprise; or
- interchange of
(e) more than half managerial
of the Board of personnel, or
directors or
members of the - dependence on
governing technical
board, or one or information.
more executive
directors or For the purposes of
executive this standard an
members of the associate is an
governing enterprise in which
such Hindu
undivided
family, or by a
relative of a
member of such
Hindu
undivided
family, or
jointly by such
member and his
relative; or
subsidiaries); or
(viii) if not less than one-fourth of the total
voting power in relation to each of the two
bodies corporate is exercised or controlled
by the same individuals belonging to a
group or by the same bodies corporate
belonging to a group, or jointly by such
individual or individuals and one or more
of such bodies corporate; or
if the directors of the one such body corporate
are accustomed to act in accordance with the
directions or instructions of one or more of the
directors of the other, or if the directors of both
the bodies corporate are accustomed to act in
accordance with the directions or instructions of
an individual, whether belonging to a group or
not.
Explanation II provides that if a group exercises
control over a body corporate, that body
corporate and every other body corporate,
which is a constituent of or controlled by, the
group shall be deemed to be under the same
management.
Explanation III to clause provides that if two or
more bodies corporate under the same
management hold, in the aggregate, not less
than one-fourth equity share capital in any
other body corporate, such other body corporate
shall be deemed to be under the same
management as the first mentioned bodies
corporate.
It is further provided in Explanation IV that in
determining whether or not two or more bodies
corporate are under the same management, the
shares held by financial institutions in such
bodies corporate shall not be taken into account.
The Act defines the term Group under section
2(ef) as per wghich `group’ means a group of –
(i) two or more individuals, associations of
individuals, firms, trusts, trustees or bodies
corporate (excluding financial institutions) or
any combination thereof, which exercises, or is
established to be in a position to exercise,
control, directly or indirectly, over any body
corporate, firm or trust; or
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 642, read with
clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 209 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of
1956), the Central Government hereby makes the following guidelines, namely ;-
2. Application.-
These guidelines shall apply to such transactions, which a company may enter
into with its related party or within its segments per se.
Provided that nothing contained herein shall apply to those transactions where
the transaction price is fixed by any Government department or authority
pursuant to any Law or Act of Parliament.
3. Definitions.-
committee of the Board are satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that
it is in the interest of the company to do so. In all such cases, the use of a non-
arms length transfer price, the reasons therefor, and the profit impact thereof
shall be disclosed in the annual report.
5. Methods Of Computation Of Arm’s Length Price
The arm’s length price shall be determined by any of the following methods,
being the most appropriate method, having regard to the nature of transaction
or class of transaction, namely :-
(1) Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method
(2) Resale Price Method
(3) Cost Plus Method
(4) Profit Split Method
(5) Transactional Net Margin Method
Any other basis approved by the Central Government, which has the
effect of valuing such transaction at arm’s length price.
The price at which the goods purchased or services obtained from a related
party is resold or is provided to an unrelated entity shall be identified. Such
resale price shall be reduced by the amount of a normal gross profit margin
accruing to the enterprise or to an unrelated enterprise from the purchase and
resale of the same or similar goods or services in a comparable uncontrolled
transaction or a number of such transactions. The price so arrived at shall be
further reduced by the expenses incurred by the enterprise in connection with
the purchase of goods or services. Such price shall be further adjusted to take
into account the functional and other differences including differences in
accounting practices, if any, between the related party transaction and the
comparable uncontrolled transactions or between the enterprises entering into
such transactions, which could materially affect the amount of gross profit
margin in the open market. The adjusted price shall be taken as arm’s length
The combined net profit of the related parties arising from a transaction in
which they are engaged shall be determined. This combined net profit shall be
partially allocated to each enterprise so as to provide it with a basic return
appropriate for the type of transaction in which it is engaged with reference to
market returns achieved for similar types transactions by independent
enterprises. The residual net profit, thereafter, shall be split amongst the related
parties in proportion to their relative contribution to the combined net profit.
This relative contribution of the related parties shall be evaluated on the basis
of the function performed, assets employed or to be employed and risks
assumed by each enterprise and on the basis of reliable market data which
indicates how such contribution would be evaluated by unrelated enterprises
performing comparable functions in similar circumstances. The combined net
profit will then be split amongst the enterprises in proportion to their relative
contributions. The profit so apportioned shall be taken into account to arrive at
an arm’s length price
This method would normally be adopted in those transactions where integrated
services are provided by more than one enterprise or in the case multiple inter-
related transactions which cannot be separately evaluated.
The net profit margin realised by the enterprise from a related party transaction
shall be computed in relation to costs incurred or sales effected or assets
employed or to be employed by the enterprise or having regard to any other
relevant base. The net profit margin realised by the enterprise or by an
unrelated enterprise from a comparable uncontrolled transaction or a number of
such transactions, shall also be computed having regard to the same base. This
net profit margin shall be adjusted to take into account the differences, if any,
between the related party transaction and the comparable uncontrolled
transactions or between the enterprises entering into such transactions, which
could materially affect such net profit margin in the open market. The cost of
production referred to above increased by the adjusted profit mark-up shall be
taken as arm’s length price. The adjusted net profit margin shall be taken as
arm’s length price.
This method would normally be adopted in the case of transfer of semi finished
goods.; distribution of finished products where resale price method cannot be
adequately applied; and transaction involving provision of services.