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In Partial Fulfillment
By
Ramal Lamar
October, 2012
PLATONISM IN MODERN MATHEMATICS
By
Ramal Lamar
Date:
INTRODUCTION
In this thesis we investigate the existence of Platonic ideas in the concepts and
foundations of modern mathematics. Platonism refers to the viewpoint that the objects
and entities constructed and defined in the work of mathematics actually exist
independent of our sense preception. In the first chapter, we look at how Platonism itself
has been interpreted differently by modern thinkers and how this leads to confusion at
constructed by Plato and showing their analogs in today’s mathematical notation, we can
speak of ‘mathematical Platonism.’ For example, numbers are not just figments of the
problems with implications in the applied areas of science and technology. Also in this
thesis, we describe the various schools of mathematical thought. Each school tackles its
own philosophical problem and we highlight some of the major contributions associated
ground mathematics proper in the rules of logic. Frege tried to deduce arithmetic from the
rules of logic. Whitehead and Russell remedied the flaw of Frege’s system with type
theory. For the nominalists, mathematical objects exist in space and time and logic’s
business is to approximate reality. Nominalists such as Carnap and Quine equate logic
ii
with physics. The formalist school holds the view that every mathematical problem is
solvable by finite proof methods, thus a new field of studying the structure, or syntax and
mathematical arguments and proof, was developed in this school known as mathematics.
Thus, the meaning of mathematical symbols are removed, and a math proof is analyzed
by deriving such a proof from a series of formal axioms and rules of inference performed
in a series of logical steps. The intuitonist school of mathematics simply assumes that
logic is not math, but logic itself is an area of mathematical study, and in no way do they
Finally, set theorists describe all mathematical objects as sets. Cantor developed
this school with his studies in the infinite. When he showed that there are certain infinite
sets that can not map to infinite numbers, this led to the analysis of infinity in modern
mathematics. All the schools of mathematics at times share and refine each other’s
techniques, and set theory itself has been revised on numerous occasions to work within a
given school.
In the third chapter, we look more closely at each of the philosophical questions
posed by each school and determine how Platonism is used in articulating or solving the
problem. From the offset we see in logicism the axiom of comprehension and
schools criticizing logicists as being too Platonic. ‘Type theory,’ the lasting contribution
mathematical objects, to avoid loops and paradoxes. The empirical and naturalistic focus
iii
of nominalism as a way of avoiding naming ‘universals’ has in its approach inherent
Platonism, especially in its use of set theory and logicists’ notation to construct new
formal systems to achieve such a goal. Quine’s initial critique of claiming there was
essentially no distinction between subject and object in logic sounds very Platonic. The
intuitionist constructs universal mathematical objects from some of the same Platonic
tools used by the nominalists. The formalists with their whole metamathematics program
introducing an entirely new idea to the study of mathematics, however finitary they want
it to be, are very Platonic, with their focus on the structure of math sentences. Set theory,
with its emphasis on the infinite, axioms of choice, and ability to describe all of
mathematics, is the most Platonic of them all. Important to note is how set theory is used
In the conclusions of the thesis, we enumerate the key Platonic ideas inherent in
modern mathematics. We trace these ideas through time and see how they ended up as
basic mathematical objects. Then we show how maieutics and dialectics lead to the
Logos and knowledge, from the world of the intelligible, fall in line with intuitionists’
prescription of mathematics as being primarily a mental activity and with the nominalists’
requirement that logic describe natural reality. Thus talking about infinity does indeed
complicate the tasks of the nominalists, but there are many ways to describe reality.
show that it is impossible to prove all the truths of a theory within the given theory. Logic
iv
must be somehow extended to capture all truths, and this extension cannot be just by
merely adding new axioms. Godel constructed a true but unprovable mathematical
sentence, using the diagonalization method that Cantor used to show the uncountability
of real numbers. The intuitionist Brouwer constructed mathematical objects that were not
only used by formalists, but were actually applied to solve real world phenomena. All too
often mathematics follows the vicious-circle principle. And this vicious-circle principle is
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
vi
Axioms of Set Theory ............................................................................. 60
R and Decimal Numbers ......................................................................... 62
Godel’s Platonism ................................................................................... 62
Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 63
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 77
vii
1
concepts central to the notion of Platonism and show how each of these concepts shows
up in the logic of modern mathematics through symbolic notation. In this manner we aim
to show how, in Plato’s works, the notion of logos sets the foundation of modern
critics and by modern Platonists. The central claim is that there is little agreement as to
numerated, and commented upon. We then explore the relationships between the themes
development through time and space of Platonic notions of idea, forms (universal
knowledge and its negation, existential knowledge), maieutics (induction, inference, and
illustrating how these concepts have come to shape what we now know constitutes
mathematical logic.
To begin, let us consider the connection of Plato’s original ‘idea’ and the
‘universal quantifier’ used in mathematical logic. The term ‘idea’ is synonymous with
2
form. According to the original notion articulated by Plato, an idea (or form) is a
knowledge and opinion. From Plato’s original theory of forms, the idea is a universal
form. In modern logic, Plato’s ‘idea’ is synonymous with the ‘universal quantifier.’
In modern mathematics and logic, both universal and existential quantifiers are
an upside down letter A, ( ∀) which means ‘every’ or ‘for all.’ We use the universal
in notation as a backwards capital E, and ∃ means, ‘there exists’ or ‘there is.’ So the
So (∃x ∈ S)( p(x)) says there is an x in the universe of discourse S where p(x)
holds. Notice that in both the universal and existential casex is the bounded dependent
variable and the independent variable y is equivalent to the open sentence p(x) (namely
that y = p(x)).
3
The universal and existential forms are categories of being known also as genera
switches the value of the quantifier to its opposite value. For example, by negating a
mathematics and vice versa. So the universal quantifier is equivalent to (or defined as)
Maieutics
concepts were defined by maieutics (the art of delivering truth) via induction, procedure,
and dialectics (types of generalization of inference, along with irony and induction), thus
Even today, as is admitted by many detractors, induction is ever present in logic and the
methodology of science. Related to induction are the terms irony, inference, and
maieutics. Naturally, induction is a tool of the mind and is fundamental to the purpose of
philosophy. When we consider logic, among other things, as the “rules of correct
thinking” 1 and explore Plato’s claim that “the mind is knowledge,” 2 the mind
1
Kant, Logic (1801: translated by Hartman and Schwartz), p.13.
2
Dumitiru, A History of Logic, vol. 1, p.25.
4
(inductively) knows and is, hence, the foundation of knowledge. The mind implies to
know.
How does this relate to mathematics and logic? First and foremost, induction has
been delineated as the most basic type of logic, evolving later into more refined logic
types resulting into inference, dialectics, and more formalized proof methods. Nowadays,
just as at the dawn of logic and philosophy (since logic is considered a sub-discipline of
philosophy), the sole objective mathematical logic is the formation of general concepts; it
is in the general concepts where ‘truth’ is found. In this process, a distinction between
Prior to the symbolism of modern logic, the aim and goal of philosophy, and logic
in particular, was articulated “by the ancients with the analogy of delivering a baby
(maieutics)” 3 . Hence, the art of delivering truth was symbolically represented by the art
of delivering a baby. Truth was found in general definition from an induction procedure.
Maieutics eventually took shape through the method of asking questions (irony)
leading to the inference that given a formal system Φ that is complex enough to produce
whole numbers, there are logical statements φ that are true but unprovable within the
formal system Φ.
3
Ibid., p.26.
5
Induction
used in today’s formal methods, the so called mathematical induction. Define P(n): = An
open mathematical sentence. Define P(n) as the math equation n+2n = 3n, for every
So P(n) holds for n=1. Now we assume P(n) = n + 2n holds for some particular natural
So P(n) is n + 2n = 3n.
Now add 3 to both sides of the equation to obtain P(n+1). So P(n+1) holds for all n+1.
Notice that we did not simply use arithmetic to show that n + 2n = 3n, but that we used
the principle of induction; if the special case for unity (n = 1) was true, then we needed to
show if induction worked for some natural number, then (n+1) + 2(n+1) = 3(n+1). This
method is valid since the set of all natural numbers is an inductive set of numbers, the
first natural number is 1 and all other natural numbers can be found by repeatedly adding
1 to the first natural number. This made our proof become a general statement. Even
though this illustration is of a modern type, the ideas and elements of this math induction
go back through time to around the origins of philosophy, logic, and math itself.
6
purpose of generalizing from a special basis. Once a specific case was known to be true,
one could generalize (assume the case more generally) by adding (or conjoining) a
specific to a general; a new special general was developed (similar to Cantor’s countable
Dialectics
N, this distribution of objects into general and specifics was known as ‘dialectics.’
induction and inference, objects were distributed into general (ideas) and specific
(things). Such objects were defined and concepts were constructed in discussions with
Dialectics, as a method of maieutics, took place mainly through the art of asking
questions (irony). The actual dialogue, or argumentation, taking place between two
orators, was known as physical dialectics, where “material implied a factual position of
driving adversaries into contradictions; thereby compelling one to accept the victor’s
Metaphysical dialectics referred to the more general method of finding the intelligible
upon the existent, which formed into a theory of being. It was from metaphysical
4
Ibid., p.18.
7
dialectics that we arrived at modern mathematics, via logic in the form of scientific
method.
dialectics, rooted in Plato’s original philosophy and how they relate to Godel’s later math
Recall that the results of the seven step skeleton of Godel’s proof predicate of
Peano Arithmetic states the following: ‘Every proof of a theorem of N is not shown by a
value for y will yield a truth value of the proof predicate of the formal system (in our case
Peano Arithmetic). The negation of such a proof predicate will result in a statement that
does not yield a true/false value, but nonetheless holds, ultimately, as a true statement
in the words of Klein, mathematics has lost its certainty; because there exist mathematical
truths that cannot be proved within the given theory, you must go outside of the theory to
prove the theorems. It is like needing to be in three dimensions to totally understand the
two dimensional world. Throwing out Platonic forms means limiting math in such a way
mathematics?”) math is not simply formal methods. To say that math is also informal
methods arriving to truth opens logic to the original metaphysical enterprise that
modernists tried to avoid. (At this stage, math is whatever we want it to be, except, of
course, formal.)
General Definition
In philosophy as a method, initial elements are general notions with a well defined
of ideas (logoi) and not things (pragmata), philosophy arrives at truth (the essence of a
concepts. There are two types of science, the indirect science (dianoia), which includes
dialectics and the direct science (intuition) which includes intelligence (essence). Thus,
science is knowledge of the intelligible world, the universe, if you will, of discourse used
in mathematical logic.
into species, and species into subspecies, stopping when division is no longer possible
and the individual is reached. This methodology is similar to the original arithmetical
We have identified six key concepts that constitutes Platonism: namely, ideas,
quantifiers, maieutics, induction, dialectics, and general definition. These concepts are
used in virtually every branch of mathematics. However, there remains the question of
how these key concepts are forms of knowledge and logos, and how Plato’s articulations
9
around these forms constitute the basis for mathematical logic. In the next section, we
will pay close attention to the relationship between knowledge, form, and logos to gain
clarity around how they help us to delineate between the different interpretations of
modern mathematics.
First, we will examine closely what Plato says about logos. We will also show the
intend to show modern Platonic views of, as well as ancient critiques of, ‘logos’ and
‘ideas.’ We will also cite two examples from Meno and the Symposium of what Plato
says about the logos and the ideas. We conclude by showing that there is much
Given A, A is knowable. So, there is no logos, only names in the first elements of which
all things (matter) are composed. That is, things composed of elements are defined as
being complex. Elements are named and the combined names of elements are in a logos.
Thus, logoi (being unknowable) are not members of elements. Instead, such elements
imply perception. So complexes relate to the knowable (that which is statable), so that
Concerning logos, Plato says, “Whenever then anyone gets hold of the true notion
of everything without a logos, his soul thinks truly of it; but he does not know it, for if
one cannot give and receive a logos of anything, one has no knowledge of that thing; but
10
when he has acquired a logos, then all things are realized and he is fully equipped for
knowledge.” 5 Coupled with this quote, consider the conditional statement in modern
mathematical logic. For elements p and q, where p is the subject and q is the predicate,
the condition ‘if p then q’ is logically equivalent (in set theory) to A < B (‘A is a subset of
B’ or ‘for every x in A, A is a subset of B’). Note that ‘if’ is really a universal quantifier
and p, the logical subject, is an element, and q:= the logical predicate. Note that the
universe of discourse U has an element x, such that every x in some subset A in U (we
can call the subset A the subject or hypothesis) is moved, through the implication
connective of an open sentence p(x), to set B in U (we can call B the predicate or
conclusion).
Platonists. One modern theory of Platonism states that logos is just the composite (name)
of names of knowable elements. A second theory is that logos is more than just the nouns
out of which knowable elements are composed. Logos is a new linguistic unit that
conveys something more than what is conveyed by bare enumeration of individual names
in it. The problem is that both of these theories hold that logos would not convey
knowledge. Another theory between the problem and criticism of Socrates’ dream in
Thaetetus is that there is a relation with logical atomist theories of words and sentences
Even though considered a weak claim, forms imply verbs, adjectives, and nouns,
and constitute the names of simple nameables. Hence, if form implies the logical subject
5
Theaetetus: (202), cited in Allen, Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, p.14.
11
of predication, then verbal expression of form is equivalent to name, not sentence. Thus,
Refuting the old critique of the theory of ideas would say that it is related to
perception, which is Plato’s concern. For unknowable elements, which are perfected
simples, there is a relation between argument (that holds every simple nameable as either
damaging to the theory of forms but kept them anyway. No one is prepared to say that
Plato abandoned forms. Logos does not entail knowledge; there is alogo implying
knowledge if there is all knowledge. Plato’s favorite doctrine was ‘knowledge entails
Γ ={roses are red, violets are blue}, S1 = “roses are red and violets are blue,” S2 =
Citing Cross’ and Ryles’ views of Platonism shows that most of these arguments
of what constitutes Platonism have not been settled. 7 If Plato still holds a doctrine after
interpretation of Platonism that says that verbs, adjectives, and nouns are themselves
6
Another way to say this is that Γ = {knowledge, logos}, S1 = "logos and knowledge," S2 = "logos"
Γ entails S2 since "S1" and ⌐"S1" are logically inconsistent.
7
For Cross and Ryles’s views, see Allen, Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics.
12
names of simple nameables, a tenet of the doctrine of forms. And since we are not sure if
Ryles’ interpretation of the theory of ideas states that proper names imply
particulars, and that other substantiative adjectives, verbs, prepositions are names of
forms. So there are a class of entities called ‘universals,’ entirely different from sensible
things. The language use implies such entities, like existence. So every word is not a
proper name, which implies that the name of something is one or many instances of
something. This also implies the form of immediate apprehension such that we are
directly acquainted with the term, which in turn implies a special faculty of knowledge
corroborated by Plato, but this would make the theory of forms less illuminating, since
such claims are orthodox to Platonism. But Plato had other things in mind. In Meno, a
specific definition is applied. Given a term, what is it? Is it a term? Notice that we use a
‘word’ as a ‘general term.’ Every one group of particulars is called by one name—‘virtue’
or ‘bee,’ for example—even though there are many different kinds of ‘virtues’ and ‘bees.’
Meno’s worry is about a special kind of ‘virtue’; he has difficulty that Socrates is
trying to discover what ‘virtue’ this one is. Socrates provides Meno with an example (a
answering “the only thing which follows a color.” So, “A man can’t understand the name
of a thing when he does not know what the thing is; he gives an illustration of the sort of
13
answer he wants....” 8 Meno later says, about mathematical roots: “just as you found a
single character to embrace these many roots, so now try to find a single logos that
applies to many kinds of knowledge.” 9 So back to the question, of “What is x?” Unless
the question is put into context, (specific) different answers could appear to be legitimate.
The real business for Meno is Plato trying to tell him that ‘ideas’ are ‘universals’ via the
In the Symposium, Plato says, “After long training, the soul sees beauty in
ordinary sense.” 10 Thus, with knowledge in its ordinary senses there exists a logos. And
experience’ (‘episteme’, ‘έπιστήμη’) belongs to the moment of ‘one admitted into the
The knowledge that Plato is usually concerned with is not ordinary. In his non-
enthusiastic moments, Plato is concerned with the knowledge that logos is involved in.
Cross’ opinion). 12
8
Allen. Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics (1965), p.20.
9
Ibid., p.21.
10
Plato’s Symposium, Jowett edition, (210e) and (212a).
11
Allen, Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, p.23.
12
Ibid., p.25.
14
speak of knowledge, forms, logos, the proper duties of a dialectician, and discussing
knowledge. So that for every beginning of (intellectual) exercise, exercise must not be
knowledge, since it can lack logos. Logos has also been shown to be synonymous with
various Platonic thinkers including Plato himself. Some theories state that logos is a
composite name of knowable elements. Others state that logos is a new linguistic unit, or
that logos is a relationship between words and sentences. We formalized Plato’s statement
that knowledge entails logos and showed how two leading Platonic thinkers of our era,
Cross and Ryles, both differ in their interpretations of Plato’s claim. These fundamentally
different views of forms are as follows. Cross thinks that formal knowledge is not
knowledge by acquaintance and Ryles thinks that forms are simply verbs, adjectives, and
nouns, especially names. The main point is that even today there is no consensus, outside
premise we can now delve into the origin of the term ‘logos’ to provide a commentary on
its etymology. Then we show a common theme in modern scholarship of how recent
translations of the term are not clean, which confuses the actual meaning of the term. We
show through such analysis how the question of naming arrives in the implicit meaning
of the term ‘logos,’ and how ‘idea’ leads analytically to the notion and utility of a
Etymologically ‘logos’ comes from the verb ‘legein,’ which means ‘to tell, state,
logos in the domain of language. Plato, in defining or describing logos, limits it to the
linguistic domain. Aristotle refers to Platonists as “thinkers who occupy themselves with
verbal discussions, tending to rank universals as substances (for they tend to describe as
makes the distinction between thinkers who get down colloquially to brass tacks of things
‘reason’ or ‘thought’ make difficult the clarification of Platonic conceptions. Consider the
(i) “I have better have discourse to the world of the mind and seek there the truth of
13
Ibid., p.26. A better translation by Cross is “through pursuing their inquiry by means of logoi.”
16
(ii) “In reference to thought and what may be called ideas” to: “In reference to those
(iii)“For immaterial things, which are the noblest and greatest, are shown only in
‘thought and idea’ and in no other way” to: “Are shown only in ‘discourse’ or
Recall that the idea is an object (nota) of intelligence (good, beautiful, etc.). Objects of
perception are ‘aestheta.’ Mental experiences (‘pathemata en ta psyche’) are high (gnosis
and dianoia) intelligible—the two modes of operation of the reasoning part of the soul,
and the low mental experiences are perception and belief. The mathematical sciences are
that is, reflection or intelligence or abstract thinking. Thus, gnosis and dianoia are distinct
movements of thoughts, and states of mind are grounds of distinction between gnosis and
dianoia.
and figures intermediate between ideas and sensible things. In the intelligible world,
education (schema) implies figures in moral and mathematical ideas and their truths.
Thus, moral ideas are not in a higher class reached by gnosis and math ideas are not in a
lower class reached by dianoia, since math objects can be also objects of gnosis when
14
Ibid., p.27.
17
Plato is given credit for discovering the method of analysis. Heath tells us,
But analysis and synthesis following each other are related in the same
way as upward and downward progressions in the dialectician’s
intellectual method. Plato observed the importance, from the point of view
of logical rigor, of the confirmatory synthesis following analysis. The
mind must possess the power of taking a step or leap upwards from the
conclusion to the premise implied in it. Prior truth can’t be deduced or
proved from conclusion; it must be grasped by an act of analytical
penetration, such an act is involved in the solution, by way of
hypothesis. 15
Thus, Proclus associated Plato’s method of dialectical ascent to genuine principles with
New interpretations of Platonism include the basis that forms are simple
question “What is a figure?” was asked, Plato asks for the idea of a figure and expects as
a proper answer to the question, to be given a statement. Thus, the idea of a figure is
displayed in the logos, and the form is displayed in the predicate of the logos. Theaetetus
found the idea of the mathematical roots, and Socrates replied, “just as you found a single
character to embrace all that multitude try to find a single formula that applies to many
kinds of knowledge.” 16 Thus, the idea is equivalent to the logos, that is, giving an idea
implies giving logos, which embodies a formula. So a form is like a formula, the logical
predicate in a logos, not the logical subject: what is said of something, not something
15
Proclus, "Commentary on the First Book of the Elements," in Heath, Greek Mathematics, p.211-218.
16
Allen, Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, pp.28-29.
18
It is incorrect when ‘we talk about ideas (form),’ but it is correct to say that when
‘we talk with ideas (form), logoi (pieces of talk) are necessary to display ideas (form)’ to
us. Thus, ‘idea’ is a logical predicate. So when asking “What is a figure?” the answer is to
produce a logos (in predicate form of which ‘idea’ is displayed). The idea of ‘figure’ is
expressed in the predicate of the statement ‘figure is...[the] boundary of [a] solid.’ So
what is the statement about? The logos is not about the form (displayed in the predicate)
(defining a word). Thus, we arrive at necessary statements; that is, logically necessary (or
self-contradictory) to deny, not truth about things, but logical truths of how we talk about
things. Plato knows that idea is a ‘thing’ question, and to reach certainty you must pay the
price.
The main point is that forms are logical predicates displayed in logoi and not
simple nameables known by acquaintance. This is not to deny that there exist things:
Plato says this can be construed to fit the ‘simple nameables’ view. Nor do we pretend
that the view of forms as logical predicates displayed in logoi is to be found explicitly
formulated in Plato. (But it does allow greater flexibility in more open interpretations,
such as views). Especially before exploring ‘logos’ and its notions of subject and
predicate, the view is there implicitly in how Plato develops the theory of forms. So we
Cross, a Platonist, put the theory of ideas in the context of language and logic.
Most puzzles of Plato’s time were logical puzzles of language. The Socratic method of
19
mathematical interest of ‘logoi’ and deductive procedures—not the simple entities known
by acquaintance—are the goal of Plato. So forms are not simple entities: how could they
either be premises or conclusions of any argument? Plato liked the material mode of
After examining the etymology of the term logos as meaning ‘to say,’ logos can
this. Not equating ‘logikos’ with ‘logos’ shows how bad translations have led to muddled
translators create around our understanding of ‘logos,’ ‘knowledge’ is the result of the
‘high intelligible.’ This shows ‘logos’ as the basis of the dialectics of abstract thinking, or
so-called ‘mathematical reasoning.’ In the light of this inquiry, we will next look at
mathematical symbolism. We have also looked into the intimate relationship between
logos, forms, and knowledge and used this relationship as a basis to show not only the
interpretative disagreements that exist among Platonic thinkers, but also to show how
these notions provide a basis for our understanding of what constitutes mathematical
17
Ibid., p.31.
20
thinking, or abstract reasoning. Next we will continue to explore the presence and
own school even though it developed out of logicism, the section under which it will be
discussed.
reducible to logic. In the early 1900’s, the laws of logic were accepted by almost all
mathematicians as a body of truths. Hence, the logicists contended that mathematics must
also be a body of truth. “And since truth is consistent, so they claimed, mathematics must
be.” 18 This school of thought began with Leibniz and Dedekind, was developed by Frege,
According to Leibniz,
18
Kline, Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty, p.216.
19
Ibid., p.217.
21
Klein continues, “Dedekind affirmed flatly that number is not derived from intuitions of
space and time, but is ‘an immediate emanation from the pure laws of thought. From
number we gain precise concepts of space and time.’ He started to develop this but did
not pursue it,” 20 attempting instead to build up (natural) numbers from logic.
Frege developed the symbolic notation used today in modern logic and is credited
with transforming logic from a rhetorical art to a deductive science by the means of his
calculus, bringing into fruition the goal of Leibniz’ philosophy as a universal science.
Frege’s work was then carried forward by Russell and Whitehead in their work
1902 received a letter from Russell informing him that his work involved a concept; the
set of all sets; that can lead to a contradiction.” This flaw, known as Russell’s Paradox,
provided a fatal blow to Frege’s logical system, since his axiomatic definition of what
(and Whitehead) attempted to resolve Frege’s flawed Axiom 5 via the Principia
Mathematica. This full attempt to reduce all of mathematics, numbers systems, algebra,
geometry, etc., to logical statements, was essentially based on Frege’s logical symbolism
and notation. The only addition was a ‘theory of types’ added to resolve Frege’s systemic
flaw. This theory of types arranged sets in a form of hierarchical classes, to avoid the
20
Ibid., p.218.
22
According to Klein,
Russell did know of course that Peano had derived the real numbers from
axioms about the whole numbers, and he was also aware that Hilbert had
given a set of axioms for the entire real numbers. However he remarked in
1919, in his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, ‘The method of
postulating what we want has many advantages; they are the same as the
advantages of theft over honest toil.’ 21
Russell’s real concern was that postulation of, say, 10 or 15 axioms about number
does not ensure the consistency and truth of the axioms. As he put it, it gives unnecessary
hostages to fortune. Whereas in the early 1900’s Russell was sure that principles of logic
were truths and therefore consistent, Whitehead cautioned in 1907, “There can be no
In his search for mathematical truth, Russell could not distinguish between
Euclidean and non-Euclidean concepts. That is, he could not affirm which was the truth.
But in his Essay in the Foundations of Geometry (1898), he did manage to find some
mathematical laws, such as that as physical space must be homogeneous (possess the
same properties everywhere); hence, he believed that mathematical laws were physical
truths.
type. But, if one attempts to build mathematics in accordance with type theory, the
Russell and Whitehead, two objects a and b are equal if every proposition and
21
Ibid., p.220.
22
Ibid., p.221.
23
propositional function that applies to or holds for a also holds for b, and conversely.
Hence, type theory introduces a complication also in the concept of the least upper bound
Consider that the least upper bound (l.u.b.) is defined as the smallest of all upper
bounds, so the l.u.b. is defined in terms of the set of real numbers, R. Hence the l.u.b.
Also, through the axiom of reducibility, in PM, every property p of higher type; p
is equivalent to one of first order. Through the axiom of reducibility, math induction is
supported in PM.
incompleteness theorems. Godel showed that any time one attempted to formalize
arithmetic, according to PM or any axiomatic system, there will be certain true arithmetic
statements that cannot be proven in that logical system. Godel qualifies as a logicist since
Critics of Logicism
The axiom of reducibility seems arbitrary, but no proof of its falsity has been
shown. It is a happy accident, but not a logical necessity. That is, “the axiom of infinity,
although it is couched in logical terms, thus seems to pose the problem of whether the
logic, then logic seemingly would have to include the axiom of infinity.
23
Ibid., p.222. See also Russell and Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, Chapter IX.
24
Ibid., p.225.
24
A philosophical critique of logicism by Weyl says that “if the logistic view is
correct, then all math is a purely formal, logico-deductive science whose theorems follow
from laws of thought. Just how deductive elaboration of the laws of thought can represent
wide varieties of natural phenomenon; the uses of N, the geometry of space acoustics,
the creation of math, perceptual or imaginative intuition must supply new concepts
whether or not derived from experience. Else, how could new knowledge arise? But in
Formalization apparently does not represent math in any real sense. It is the husk,
not the corn. Russell’s own statement, made in another context, that mathematics is the
subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are
Nominalism
theory and results from the discovery of the paradoxes. Nominalists oppose the view of
certain interpretations of math objects and are concerned with what object or objects are
25
Ibid., p.227.
26
Ibid., pp.227-28.
25
denoted by a single term. In set theory, for example, the nominalists criticized the revised
axiom of comprehension (that each mathematical entity is the element of a set). They
Quine’s Semantics
For example, Quine has a semantic approach to the natural deduction of formal
introduced “a logical system which enables philosophy to a totality of pure math without
appeal to any special axioms” 27 . Quine’s New Foundation (NF) and Mathematical Logic
(ML) are distinct from Fraenkel Skolem’s set theory (FS). His system (NF) is weaker
than (FS). Thus, consistency can be established by more elementary methods; and (FS)
Nominalistic logic denies that a universal term can be used to denote a multitude
of concrete objects. Nominalists feel that the collective usage of universal terms need not
justify the existence of some abstract entity; instead, universal terms of concrete objects
(‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘natural number,’ etc.) correspond to their original sense. Quine postpones
in his logical theory, as much as possible, the supposition of the existence of abstract
27
Beth, Foundations of Mathematics, p.507.
26
theory system (RZ) and Platonic background; it constructs a system of logic and math
unity. Beth tells us, “admission of this unity as a value of certain bound variables; implies
policy’ used in establishing pure math as a branch of logic. Even though he attempts to
avoid this axiom of comprehension, his logical systems New Foundations (NF) and
Mathematical Logic (ML) avoids Russell’s and Cantor’s paradox, but NF still falls victim
the Burali-Forti paradox. Quine retried ML to account for the Burali-Forti paradox, then
Rosser and Wang showed that NF cannot handle standard models and, thus, NF and ML
are hardly consistent, failing the initial program of logicism. So nominalism is a tendency
of universalism, with the philosophical implications that Godel’s result that ‘Zermelo-
Fraenkel’s axioms of set theory including the axiom of choice are consistent (Con(ZFC))’
Platonist and the nominalist accept the same modes. They just justify them differently.
application. The new nominalism involves itself with logic theory and applications. The
axiom of comprehension of Frege and Cantor states that sets are multitudes of
28
Ibid., p.508.
27
it is the source of many paradoxes of logic and set theory; it was also a source for
logicians and mathematicians turning away from and criticizing Platonism. Quine
axiom of infinity is an axiom of logic, and the use of the theory of types is for
proposition, p(x) = 2+3, for S ⊆ N. Nominalists include Quine, Tarski, and Henkin,
because they oppose the reducibility view to interpretations of math objects. But the
nominalists have a methodology and goal that are Platonic in essence; the only difference
Techniques of nominalist logic are used by logicians Godel, Quine, and Tarski in their
quest to ground logic in mathematics. These methods are consistent with the original
notion of ‘idea’ and the claim that the ‘logos’ constitutes the logical predicate of the idea
(or form).
knowledge.’ 29 For Kant, math intuition implies space and time; hence intuition is a theory
of reason. For Leibniz, intuition was ‘intuitive knowledge,’ ‘clear distinct and adequate.’
Godel’s intuition was a composite of Leibniz’s ‘intuitive knowledge’ and the modern
29
Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in Philosophical Works of Descartes, vol. 1, p.7.
28
synonymous with mathematical Platonism). Here the math objects we talk about exist
theory, type theory, and the idea of concepts as classes or categories, is equivalent to
Brouwer, mathematics is equivalent to synthetic, a priori truths where all numbers and
mathematics derive from intuition in time. So a math theorem constitutes empirical fact
construction (2+2 = 3+1) and is a source of logical principles. Thus, “it is in vain to hope
In intuitionist set theory, there is no law of the excluded middle, identity, non-
contradiction, and syllogism. Thus, all math cannot be solved, and there is no such thing
as disjunction like ‘p or ~p.’ So in general the properties of intuitionism are not the basis
for possible knowledge of the strongest math axioms. They are restricted to demand in its
abstract concepts in a central way, distinct from intuitive evidence. 31 Thus, all intuition is
knowledge, especially in propositions, and Kantian relations of objects are ‘an attitude of
30
Klein, Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty, pp.243-44.
31
See Charles Parsons, “Platonism and Mathematical Intuition in Kurt Godel’s Thought” in The Bulletin
of Symbolic Logic, vol.1, no. 1 (March 1995), pp.44-74.
32
Ibid., p.47.
29
that builds its own universe, independent of experience and restricted only insofar as it
must be based upon the fundamental mathematical intuition. This fundamental intuitive
concept must not be thought of as in the nature of an undefined idea, such as what occurs
in axiomatic theories, but rather as something in terms of which all undefined ideas are to
of logic. 33
Mathematical ideas are more deeply imbedded in the human mind than in
perceptions. To the latter world belongs language, where it serves the understanding of
common dealings. Language evokes copies of ideas in man’s mind, symbols and sounds.
The distinction is similar to that between climbing a mountain and describing it in words.
According to Klein,
In the realm of logic, there are some clear intuitively acceptable logical principles
or procedures that can be used to assert new theorems from old ones. These principles are
part of the fundamental mathematical intuition. Intuitionist Herman Weyl adds, “The
33
Klein, Mathematics: Loss of Certainty, p.234.
34
Ibid., p.236.
30
principle of excluded middle may be valid for God who surveys the infinite sequence of
actual numbers, as it were; with a glance; but not for human logic.” 35
Weyl observed that non-constructive existence proofs inform the world that a
treasure exists without disclosing its location. Such proofs cannot replace construction
without loss of significance and/or value. He also pointed out that adherence to the
fog. “Analysis,” he wrote in Das Kontinuum (1918), “is a house built on sand. One can be
2. For every real number in the math universe, p(r) holds if R is a class.
(−1)
p
Define N = 1+ , N = number.
10 p
(−1)
3
So the conclusion is that we are not sure if N exists. If N does not exist, N = 1. If N does
normal methods of creation and even on classical logic, even though intuitionists seek to
Thus, to demand ultimate reliance upon logical deduction from axioms, Brouwer
says that a system of axioms must be proven consistent by using interpretations or models
which are already known to be consistent. Hilbert and Bernays argue in their work on the
inability to answer the questions: (1) What concepts and reasoning may we rely upon if
correctness were to mean self-evidence to the human mind? And (2) where is truth
objectively valid for all human beings? Brouwer admits that intuitionistic mathematics is
useless for practical applications. He also rejects human domination over nature.
Regardless, Weyl says in 1951, “I think everybody has to accept Brouwer’s critique who
wants to hold to the belief that math propositions tell the sheer truth, truth based on
evidence.” 37
Cantor, they would not have to face Cantor’s peculiar puzzles, and he might perhaps have
argued that it was useless to spend time on the detailed discussion of an assumption
37
Ibid., p.242.
32
whose absurdity could be seen without references to paradoxes.” 38 The research program
of mathematical infinity was avoided not only due to the contradictions inherent in its
problems, but also because it would disturb the hierarchy of power amongst the leading
mathematician of the 19th century. For example, “At the beginning of 19th century, Gauss
said there was no place for talk of infinity, so Kroenecker conducted a campaign against
Cantor’s program.” 39
From Brouwer’s statement that “neo-intuitionism considers the falling apart of the
moments of life into qualitatively different parts, to be reunited only while remaining
separated by time, as the fundamental phenomena of the human intellect,” 40 we get the
intuition (of sets as being) of the betweenness which is not exhaustible by interposition of
new units and therefore cannot be thought of as a mere collection of units. Thus, there is
continuity, even though geometry is dependent upon the same intuition. There is no set
except denumerable; there are no transfinite cardinals except aleph-nought, (אo). Define
aleph-nought, אo, as the cardinal of a set whose members can be correlated one to one
with the sequence of N. Thus, there is no meaning to the set notation statement: ‘{For
In a Platonic sense, Brouwer rejects all connection to actual infinity and real
comprehended only by the law of number construction. The intuition of which they speak
is just the mind’s clear apprehension of what it has itself constructed. They assert that in
38
Kneale & Kneale, Development of Logic, p.673.
39
See Gauss’ Works, vol. 8, p.216.
40
Kneale & Kneale, Development of Logic, p.674.
33
mathematics all satisfactory proofs are constructive. They deny the dependence of math
on all special language, and also distrust formal techniques. Hence, constructive proofs
tradition of Kant, think that all math theorems are objective (valid for all intelligent
instant production. Thus, there is no use of excluded middle, implying that math is
derived from intuition. It does not imply a system of logic; instead math is equivalent to a
Intuitionistic Logic
Intutionistic logic is basically logic without the law of the excluded middle. Every
Let A be the formal statement: ¬(∃x )[Fx .¬Gx ] ⇒ (x )¬[Fx .Gx ] . Let B be another
Statement A holds in intuitionistic logic. It says, ‘there is not an x such that F(x)
and not G(x) implies that x and not F(x) and not G(x) if x and not F(x) or G(x).’
Statement B does not hold in intuitionistic logic, since it says that ‘not x, not (F
and G)(x) implies that there is an x such that F(x) and not G(x).’
abandoning the law of the excluded middle, eliminating double negation. Thus, to
reasoning. From constructive proofs one can, at least in principle, extract algorithms that
compute the elements and simulate the constructions whose existence is established in the
proof. Most forms of constructivism are compatible with classical mathematics, as they
are in general based on a stricter interpretation of the quantifiers and the connectives and
the constructions that are allowed, while no additional assumptions are made.
The logic accepted by almost all constructive communities is the same, namely
approximations. We saw an example of this for the intermediate value theorem in the
constructively in a similar way. The reason not to treat them any further here is that the
focus in this section is on those aspects of intuitionism that set it apart from other
For Hilbert and the formalists, one cannot deduce mathematics from logic because
41
See Beth, Foundations of Mathematics, p.644.
35
mathematics must be treated not as factual knowledge but as a formal discipline, abstract,
language, the unconscious use of intuitive knowledge (the main causes of mathematical
objectivity, Hilbert decided that all statements in logic and math must be expressed in
symbolic form. 42
The formalist believes that in the real world only a finite number of objects exists
and that matter is composed of a finite number of elements. Using an analogy from
number theory, the irrational number has no intuitive meaning as number. Even though
we can introduce lengths whose measures are irrational, the lengths themselves do not
furnish any intuitive meaning for irrational numbers. Yet the complex number ‘i’ as ideal
element is necessary even for elementary mathematics; this is why math used it even
without logical basis until the 1870’s when Hilbert (and the formalists) made some point
with respect to the set of complex numbers C, defining i = square root of -1. These have
no real immediate counterparts. Yet they make possible general theorems, such as that
Formalist Logic
Formalist logic is Plato’s logic via Aristotle’s logic. To the formalist then,
mathematics proper is a collection of formal systems, each building its own logic along
42
Klein, Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty, p.247.
36
with its mathematics, each having its own concepts, its own axioms, its own rules for
deducing theorems, and its own theorems. The development of each of these deductive
systems is the task of math. The formalist school, including Hilbert and his students,
Wilhelm Ackermann, Paul Bernays, and John von Neumann, gradually evolved into what
Hilbert proposed that a special logic be used, free from all objections. The logical
principles would be so obviously true all would accept them. Actually, they were very
methods he called finitary. For example, ‘if p = prime, then there exists prime larger than
p’ is a non-finitary math statement since it asserts about every integer m and n, where m,
n > p. But,‘if p = prime, then there is a prime between p and p+1’ is a finitary math
statement since every prime number p can be checked if p exists among the finite
concepts of existence. Hilbert maintained that “the existence of every entity was
Brouwer and the intuitionists, math rigor was found in the human intellect; to Hilbert and
the formalists, math rigor was found on paper. For the formalist, intuitionism is treason
43
Ibid., p.250.
44
Ibid., p.252.
37
intuitionistic principles were used.” 45 And by 1930, Russell and logicists agreed that
axioms of logic were not sound truths and consistency was not assumed. Intuitionists
maintained only soundness of their guaranteed consistency. The formalists had a well
systems made them confident they would succeed with showing natural numbers to be
and math, suggesting a new program for eliminating newly discovered paradoxes by
axiomatizing logic, number theory, analysis, and set theory. Thus, to call a formal
mathematical system consistent is to say that the application of the rules of inference to
the axioms can never lead to a pair of consequences, one of which is the negation of the
other. Apart from the problem of consistency, formalist techniques are appropriate for
questions about deductive systems, such as the completeness of axiom systems devising
When undertaking to axiomatize all math, the formalist assumes that his axioms
are postulates that determine the undefined symbols that he uses. Thus, a mathematical
entity to the formalist is just what his axioms allow, neither one or less. All math
numbers as a formalist will say ‘real number’ is any object satisfying certain conditions,
45
Ibid., p.253.
46
Kneale & Kneale, Development of Logic, pp.684-85.
38
assertions if you will. These axioms have certain consequences, so by virtue of their form
they will be truths of logic. Are formalists content with this conclusion? We are not sure.
mathematics he would be content to forget the difference and treat non-constructive math
the intuitionists. Hence, the formalist program can never be carried out in full. But the
formalists did stimulate the study of axiom sets that led to some interesting discoveries of
Though set theory is incorporated in the logicist approach to math, set theory
theory was first undertaken by Zermelo in 1908. He believed paradoxes arose because
Cantor did not restrict the concept of a set. His axiom system contained undefined formal
concepts of a set and the relation of one set being included in another. These and defined
In the axioms, there are infinite sets and operations like the union of sets and
formation of subsets as well as the axiom of choice. Fraenkel improved Zermelo’s axioms
since Zermelo failed to distinguish the property of a set and the set itself. ZF, named after
Zermelo/Fraenkel, is the most commonly used axiom system of set theory. Thus, for set
47
Ibid., pp.687-88.
39
theorists, mathematical logic was used but not specialized. Logical principles, to them,
Zermelo-Fraenkel Axioms
d. x ∪ y is a set (union).
h. Axiom of choice.
ZF axioms for set theory can build all mathematics. They are most general and
fundamental to build analysis and geometry. The Bourbakists, a radical and influential
school of mathematics, expressed their position on logic: “In other words, logic, insofar
which we use, a language which had to exist before the grammar could be constructed.” 48
48
Klein, Mathematics: Loss of Certainty, p.256.
40
mathematicians have been correcting their errors and seeing their science enriched and
not impoverished in consequence; and this gives them the right to contemplate their
future with equanimity.” 49 The Bourbakists have put forth about thirty volumes in their
Cantor’s original theory of sets was a logical theory of natural numbers prior to
Frege. The totality of the real numbers, R in the interval (0,1) is not denumerable
(countably infinite, or countable). To deal with this situation, Cantor elaborated set
theory. A set is defined as collection into one whole of definite distinct objects of our
perception or our thought, which are called elements of the set. The term ‘set’ is
equivalent to the terms ‘manifold,’ ‘ensemble,’ ‘totality,’ ‘aggregate,’ ‘class,’ etc. So the
sets S and T are equivalent if there is a one-to-one correspondence between them. The
cardinal set, S*, is defined as the general concept with the aid of our active intelligence
and results from a set when we abstract from the nature of its various elements and from
the order of their being given. For a finite S, S* is an element of N. S is infinite if and
only if there is a one-to-one correspondence with a proper subset. Thus, the set of Z+ can
S +T – logical sum
ST – inner product
49
Ibid., p.257.
41
S T – insertion of S into T
Cantor thought his work was a discovery of laws not made by man. He was just a scribe
with no claim to merit except for the style and economy of his exposition. 50
Following the development of logicism by Russell, the Vienna Circle, and Godel,
notation to modern mathematics and type theory. Nominalism tries to revise the
its development back from Descartes then splits accordingly to Kant through Brouwer on
one path and Leibniz to Godel on another path. For the formalist, the consistency of a
axiomatize all mathematics, the formalist assumes that his axioms are postulates that
determine the undefined symbols that he uses. In establishing set theory, Zermelo hoped
that clear and explicit axioms would clarify the meaning of a set and its properties.
Zermelo aimed to limit the size of possible sets. He had no philosophical basis, but only
We have shown that logicism attempts to build all mathematics from rules of
Intuitionists view mathematics as not bound to the rules of logic, but being a creative,
50
Kneale & Kneale. Development of Logic, p.689.
42
man-made enterprise. Formalists are concerned with using finite procedures to establish
proof methods, leading to a rich theory of metamathematics, analyzing the syntax of math
proofs. And set theorists express numbers as sets of objects and build modern
mathematics from such axioms and numbers. In the next chapter, we will look more
In this last chapter, we will explore logic from the classical viewpoint of Plato’s
view of logic as logos. Then we will see logos in relation to forms and knowledge. Then
we will look at some of the competing views of modern Platonists’ interpretation of what
Plato means by logos. We will examine what is known as mathematical Platonism, its
all of the schools of modern mathematical thought. Its origins lie in Plato’s beliefs in a
‘World of Ideas’ and that the everyday world imperfectly approximates an unchanging,
ultimate reality, as well as with the ancient Pythagoreans who believed that the world was
generated by numbers. According to Plato’s theories of ideas (or forms), the objects we
talk about do exist independently of our thoughts and knowledge of them. Such
interpretations are held for mathematical objects, to varying degrees. Throughout the
what actually constitutes Platonism. In this thesis, we assume that the main school of
modern logical thought has a common Platonic kernel but appears distinct only on the
43
mathematical entities exist, and how do we know about them? Is there a world,
completely separate from our physical one that is occupied by the mathematical entities?
How can we gain access to this separate world and discover truths about the entities?
Mathematical Platonism is ‘realism’ since it holds the view that mathematical entities
exist independently of the human mind that humans do not invent mathematics, but rather
discover it. So there is really one sort of mathematics that can be discovered.
and are eternal and unchanging. Most people have a Platonic conception of numbers.
Platonism also postulates a special kind of mathematical intuition that lets us perceive
perception. Certain principles of set theory could be directly seen to be true, but some
conjectures, like the continuum hypothesis, might be unprovable just on the basis of such
principles.
existence one takes mathematical entities to have, and how we know about them. In so-
44
called Platonism, dialogues are the source of the theory of ideas (eternal prototypes), and
application to natural phenomena (fact perceptible by senses). The things that we see
(phenomena of nature) are in the earthly realm, merely copies (idols) of the prototypes
(paradigms). Ideas and noumena exist in the heavenly realm; real and perfect, while the
phenomena is the unreal and imperfect. Thus, the purpose of philosophy is to enable the
mind to rise above contemplation of visible copies of ideas (idols) and advance to
knowledge of ideas.
Logicism in its development has elements of Platonism in it, especially in its aims
to situate the rules of clear thinking with number theory, as well as in Russell’s theory of
types. Godel considered Russell’s type theory as being ‘Platonic’ because it claimed the
because the results of his incompleteness theorem led to those ubiquitous—true but
Logicism
Logicism claims that mathematics is reducible to and a part of logic, and that
mathematics can be known a priori, but that our knowledge of mathematics is just part of
our knowledge of logic in general. Mathematics is thus analytic, not requiring any special
all mathematical statements are necessary logical truths. Carnap (1931) presents the
logicist thesis in two parts: (1) the concepts of mathematics can be derived from logical
45
concepts through explicit definitions; (2) the theorems of mathematics can be derived
Logicists use Platonic notions when they add new axioms to logic to reformulate
old ‘unworkable ones’ such as Russell’s axiom of reducibility that replaced Frege’s basic
law V and the axiom of comprehension. 51 Logicists use abstraction principles such as
Hume’s principle that the number of objects falling under the concept F equals the
number of objects falling under the concept G if and only if the extension of F and the
logic, then questions about mathematical objects reduce to questions about logical
objects. But what, one might ask, are the objects of logical concepts? In this sense,
those considered as fundamental and irreducible, to pure logic in order to prove theorems
of pure mathematics, starting with postulates, nothing but the basic principles of logic,
and applying only logical methods of proof. This tradition along with Frege holds the
view of “the possibility of deriving, the basic notions and the fundamental principles of
psychological data, and that a logical justification of pure mathematics does not
51
See Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic, p.45.
52
Kneale & Kneale, Development of Logic, p.403.
53
Ibid., p.413.
46
“mathematical symbols have a definite meaning of their own and need not be devoid of
Leibniz, who, influencing Dedekind, influenced Frege, down to Russell, who refined
Type Theory
In the logicist PM-system, Russell and Whitehead uses a theory of types to avoid
Accordingly, the definition of a number is a class, and PM builds the natural numbers N,
the real numbers R, the complex numbers C, related functions for such numbers systems
and analysis.
The axiom of reducibility and the theory of types in general are Platonic notions
because for propositions P: ‘Every P of a higher type is equivalent to one of 1st order.’
And for propositional functions f: ‘Every f such that f(x) or f (x,y) is coextensive with
f(x) and the same number or variables whatever the variable type’ (propositional
functions are used to justify mathematical induction in PM). Logicism is Platonic because
it corrects and adds new axioms (such as the axiom of reducibility). According to the type
solving the liar paradox, Russell states “The statement I am lying means ‘∃ proposition p
such that I am affirming p and it is false.’ So if p is of the nth order, then the assertion
54
Ibid., p.426.
55
Ibid., p.527.
56
Ibid., p.530.
47
participation of ideas. Thus, the nous is the world soul that acts as the mediator between
ideas and the natural phenomena; it is the cause of life, motion, order, and knowledge in
the universe. The idea retains its unity, unchangeableness, and perfections. It is the
element of reality in a thing, the concept by which a thing is known, thus implying the
element of reality in a thing, implying that the concrete thing itself in unreal. Thus, the
of the doctrine of opposites, also stated as heavenly realm/this world = being/not being.
Nominalism
In mathematics the term ‘nominal’ is synonymous with the term ‘data.’ Data is the
observations gathered from an experiment, survey, or observational study. Often the data
are a randomly selected sample from an underlying population. Numerical data are
discrete if the underlying population is finite or countably infinite and are continuous if
the underlying interval forms an interval, finite of infinite. 57 Data are descriptive and
have no natural order. Data specifying country of origin, type of vehicle, or subject
The nominalists have a methodology and goal that are Platonic in essence; the
only difference between them and traditional Platonists resides in their interpretations of
out which objects are denoted by universal terms. Thus, each singular term denotes a
57
Oxford’s Concise Dictionary of Mathematics.
48
certain substance or substantial unity. And all mathematical proof methods are valid and
does not make much distinction between pure and applied logic. Techniques of
nominalist logic have been used and developed by such logicians such as Godel, Quine,
and Tarski.
Naming Universals
number. ‘AC: The mathematical entities which share a certain property constitute a set of
which they are the elements and which is uniquely determined by a characteristic
property; Each set is a mathematical entity and thus may appear in its turn as an element
of a set; Two sets which contain the same elements are identical.’
sharing a certain property. Thus, turning a multitude into a unity is a compression. This
compression has been the source of many paradoxes in logic and set theory.
happen to inhere ‘by accident’ in one and the same individual object.” 58 For example,
‘the set of all morning stars’ and ‘the set of all evening stars’ have the same extension but
58
Beth, Foundations of Mathematics, p.466.
49
different intensions. The same could be said for mathematical expressions like Ex(x=2+2)
following manner: ‘Revised AC: (i) The mathematical entities which share a certain
property constitute a class of which they are the elements and which is uniquely
determined by the characteristic property; (ii) Classes satisfying such and such
conditions can be composed and are called sets; each set is a mathematical entity and
hence may appear as an element of a class; (iii) Two classes which contain the same
compression by (ii). But regardless of how the axiom of comprehension is revised, the
same impredicative definitions (in the original axiom) occur in all subsequent revisions.
classes and classes of classes whenever our symbolism suggests the possibility of such
dispense with any assumption about the existence of classes. In practice the three
59
Kneale & Kneale, Development of Logic, p.626.
50
naturalism. It denies that mathematics can be known a priori at all. It says that we
discover mathematical facts by empirical research, just like facts in any of the other
truths, which we can only learn by observing instances of two pairs coming together and
forming a quartet. For the empiricist, physics becomes the outlet to show and prove the
the argument that mathematics is indispensable to all empirical sciences. Thus, to believe
in the phenomena of reality described by the sciences, we ought also to believe in the
Since nature needs to talk about numbers in offering any of its explanations,
numbers must exist. In keeping with this view, Quine naturalistically argues for the
existence of mathematical entities as the best explanation for experience, thus stripping
If mathematics is just as empirical as the other sciences, then this suggests that its
results are just as fallible as theirs, and just as contingent. In Quine’s case, the empirical
justification comes indirectly through the coherence of our scientific theory as a whole.
Quine suggests that mathematics seems completely certain because the role it plays in our
web of belief is incredibly central, and that it would be extremely difficult for us to revise
60
Ibid., p.672.
51
Hilbert’s Program
about the consequences of certain string manipulation rules. For example, in the ‘game’
of Euclidean geometry (which is seen as consisting of some strings called ‘axioms,’ and
some ‘rules of inference’ to generate new strings from given ones), one can prove that the
Pythagorean theorem holds (that is, one can generate the string corresponding to the
numbers and sets and triangles and the like—in fact, they are not ‘about’ anything at all.
Pythagorean theorem is not an absolute truth, but a relative one: if one assigns meaning to
the strings in such a way that the rules of the game become true (i.e., true statements are
assigned to the axioms and the rules of inference are truth-preserving), then one has to
accept the theorem, or, rather, the interpretation one has given it must be a true statement.
The same is held to be true for all other mathematical statements. Thus, Platonic
formalism means that there exists some interpretation in which the rules of the game
hold. But it does allow the working mathematician to continue in his or her work and
leave such problems to the philosopher or scientist. Many formalists would say that in
practice, the axiom systems to be studied will be suggested by the demands of science or
program was intended to establish correspondence between semantic truth and syntactic
52
provability in first order logic and have no contradictions derived from the system
reached from the assumption that ‘finitary arithmetic’ (a subsystem of the usual
consistent.
Metamathematics
(i) Inclusive or: (φ ∨ψ) is a formula assigned truth value T under an interpretation of ℑ if
and only if φ is assigned a truth value T under ℑ of φ is assigned the truth value T under
ℑ.
(iii) Relation: Let ℑ = (U,β),be all interpretations such that ℑ╞ ∃xφ if and only if there is
Thus, to make precise the notion of a formula being true under an interpretation we use
the satisfaction relation. Fix a symbol set S, a simple formal system. For a set Ф of S-
Since Hilbert’s program of formalism deals mainly with the syntax of the formal
system of first order logic, we list the basic components of a first order formal system.
61
Ebbinghaus, Flum, and Thomas, Mathematical Logic, pp.32-35.
53
A = alphabet (symbols)
terms = formulas.
S-Terms are composed of variables, constants. If a string are S-terms and f is a n-ary
Origins of Intuitionism
Intuitionism is inherited from Kant; specifically, the notion that math intuition implies
space and time as forms of our sensibilities. Intuitionists treat logic and physics as
synonymous, since physics’ tasks of interpreting nature had been used as analogy for the
62
Beth, Foundations of Mathematics, p.410.
54
and Kant. Intuitionists say of math that ‘there are no non-experienced mathematical
truths.’ They seek “to reconstruct the foggy portions of mathematics in accordance with
objects arise from the a priori forms of the volitions that inform the perception of
empirical objects.” 63 Kroenecker said: “The natural numbers come from God, everything
else is man’s work.” These Platonists rejected the usefulness of formalized logic of any
sort for mathematics, and postulated an intuitionistic logic, different from the classical
Aristotelian logic; that logic does not contain the law of the excluded middle and
therefore frowns upon proofs by contradiction. The axiom of choice is also rejected in
the totality of integers (Z). If P is a predicate of Z, then either P is true of every integer or
there is at least one exception. Thus, disjunction (implying the law of the excluded
middle) is continually applied in analysis. For example, in the real numbers R: ‘for every
real number a and b given by the convergent series, either a = b, or a ≤ b, or b ≤ a.’ That
is, for some ordered integers p,n, where p ≤ n; f(n) is defined for very integer n where p ≤
n ≤ q: 64
(a) ∑f(n) ↔ f(p) +f(p +1)+ . . . +f(q), where n is a dummy index that can be placed by
63
Parsons, “Platonism and Mathematical Intuition,” p.542.
64
Rudin, Principles of Mathematical Analysis, p.8.
55
series with the terms x1, x2, .., xn, if the sequence s1=x, s2=x1+x2.., sn = x1+x2+ . . .
x2+ . . . +xn+ . . . is convergent with sum s. Thus, for two real numbers a and b; ∑xn ↔ a
decreasing.
rational such the number is smaller than all members of the sequence. {xn} → ∑xn = x1
+ x2+ . . . +xn+ . . .
So ∀a > 0∈R, ∃b > 0 such that |xn-A| < a iff 0 < |x-A| < b,
or (∀ε > 0)(a∈R)(b > a) so |xn -a| = |xn| = 1/a < ε, ∀a ≥ ai.
(ii) {xn}∈Q+, either {xn} → 0 or ∃q ≤ {x1 + x2 + . . . + xn}, q < xi, q < x2 . . . q ≤ xn.
Trivial disjunctions are subtle assumptions. Analysis is not content with such
Platonism; it reflects more with sets of numbers, sequences of numbers, and functions.
Analysis also abstracts from the possibility of giving definitions of sets, sequences, and
functions. Thus, in a quasi-combinatorial manner from infinite, to finite, and vice versa,
given a function (in N), where F(a) = b, there exists nⁿ functions, each obtained by n
determinations.
totality of such functions. Z is the set of the rest of infinitely many independent sets
deciding if every natural number should be included, and the totality of these sets.
56
Sequences and sets of R have the same analogy as Z, the constructive definition of
specific functions, sequences, and sets is the only way to pick out objects that exist
Platonic) in questions used in real analysis. Let M1, M2,..., be a sequence of nonempty
sets of R. Then there exists sequence m1,m2,..., such that for every natural number n,
has property P)’ depends on the assumption of the existence of ‘totality of sequences of
integers).
Real Numbers
The real numbers defined as ‘the union of rationals and irrationals’ are used to
show the fundamental theorem of real numbers that ‘a bounded set of S ⊄R always has a
least upper bound.’ 65 That is, for S ordered, E ⊄ S, E bounded above, there is a β ∈ S
Fundamental Theorem (1.11) 66 : Suppose S is an ordered set with the least upper
bound property, B ⊄ S, B ≠ 0 and B is bounded below. Let L = {all lower bounds of B},
then ∃α = supL ∈ S, α = inf B, inf B = S. Proof: Since B is bounded below, this implies
that L ≠∅; Since L includes all y ∈ S such that y ≤ x, ∀x ∈B, this implies that ∀x ∈ B is
65
Bernays, “Platonism in Mathematics,” p.5.
66
See Rudin, Principles of Mathematical Analysis, p.11.
57
but β ∉ L if β > α. (That is, α is a lower bound of B, but β is not if β > α. This means that
α = inf B.)
Set theory, as initially elaborated by Cantor, was considered by critics at the time
Cantor’s Theorem
collection, the well-known method of set theory. Thus, Platonic conception of analysis
Let A = set of all sequences whose elements are 0 and 1. Then A is uncountable. A
= [1,0,0,1,0,1,1,1,0,111,0,...].
Construct s: if nth digit in sn =1, let nth digit of s =1, vice versa. Then sequences differ
every countable subset E ∉ A is proper, thus A is uncountable (or A< A, which is false).
R is Uncountable
Cantor showed that there are infinite sets that cannot be put into one to one
correspondence with the infinite set of natural numbers. (This logic was later used by
58
infinite implies R and N have the same cardinality. (R~N) Let there exist a bijective f
from N onto R (f: N → R). We will show a contradiction that there is a real number x that
f(1) = a0.a1a2a3 . . .
f(2) = b0.b1b2b3. . .
f(3) = c0.c1c2c3 . . .
. . . . .* ...
. . . . . .*..
. . . . . . .*.
f(n)= z0.z1z2z3 . . . zn
numbers; we form the decimal a0.b1c2… zn to have same nth place as f(n). So x is the
anti-diagonal element, and it differs from diagonal decimal in every decimal place. Thus,
set theory, which refutes ‘extreme’ Platonism. Recall, restricted Platonism implies the
posits the existence of a world of ideal objects, contrary for all objects and relations of
paradox.
impossibility of extreme Platonism in set theory (objects and relations in math). The
paradox shows the impossibility of (i) the idea of totality of math objects and general
concept of sets and functions [totality = domain of elements for sets and functions] (ii)
function and to reject the idea of ‘infinity of independent determination.’ So the infinite
sequence of a decimal fraction can be given only by arithmetic laws. The continuum is a
The continuum hypothesis asks the question, are there any cardinalities between Q
and R? That is: ‘ (∃T ∈ R)(Q < T and T < R)’ and ‘ ¬ (∃T ∈ R)Q < T and T < R).’ 68 So the
questions are raised, are infinite sequence and decimal functions given only by N-laws?
67
Bernays, “Platonism in Mathematics,” p.5.
68
‘<’ = strict ordering. Fendel & Resek, Foundations of Mathematics, p.310.
60
certain conclusions are unfounded. For example, algebraic numbers are defined, but
Objects of analysis and set theory are viewed as elements of a totality such that,
whether some set E or ~E is an element of the totality which possesses this property.
When an object is viewed as itself, this is a form of mathematical Platonism. “The value
imagination. These stand out by their simplicity and logical strength. They form
Since it is possible to arithmetize geometry and physics, Cantor’s and Bernays’ focus on
Platonism shows itself in two ways. First, sets can be considered as domains or
theory). Secondly, these sets can be considered as arbitrary multitudes, to answer the
questions of whether and how they are defined. In the first case, we must accept that there
exist sets that we can never hope to find definitions for, in terms of the specific properties
of their elements. Even if a definition is found for such a set, it may involve
impredicative properties. And this second Platonic interpretation of set theory, involving
impredicative properties (that there are definitions that do not define a set) is a necessary
infinity, as opposed to the potential infinity attributed to Aristotle, from Eudoxus’ theory
of proportions. In the modern era, Cantor first offered a satisfactory positive solution to
the countability of the infinite by two methods: counting by cardinal numbers and
69
Bernays, “Platonism in Mathematics.”
62
Let x be a positive real number and let n0 be the largest integer where n0 ≤ x (the
existence of n0 in Z depends on the Archimedian property of R). Choose n0, n1, . . ., nk-
n1 nk
1, let nk be the largest integer such that n0 + + . . . = k ≤ x (k = 0,1,2,...). Then x =
10 10
sup E.
The decimal expansion of x is n0.n1n2n3... Thus, every infinite decimal has the form
n0.n1n2n3...,
n1 nk
the set E of numbers = n0 + + . . . = k is bounded above and n0.n1n2n3... is the
10 10
Godel’s Platonism
school of mathematical thought. His Platonism represents a unique combination of all the
and work in set theory and Platonism, provide the best examples of how Platonism is
inherit intuitionism from Kant, Godel’s philosophy articulates more clearly to Kant’s
intuitionism to develop a more robust realism, taking into account certain Leibnizian and
physics.
63
Given a formal language Φ, where φ1, φ2, ..., φn are formulas constructed from
elementary signs that form fundamental vocabulary, Φ has primitive formulas, called
axioms, that can be used to construct new formulas φi. Godel showed that it is possible to
incomplete.’ Godel constructed a demonstrable formula θ that says, ‘there is at least one
CONCLUSIONS
Platonism Defined
We have shown that key Platonic forms and ideas are expressed in modern logic
mathematics means tracing the development through time and space of such concepts as
philosophy, sense, intelligence, and categories. From such analysis we show how these
concepts are used to construct a method to define and shape such philosophical concepts
in what we now call mathematical logic, by showing the connection of Plato’s ‘idea’ and
the ‘universal quantifier’ ∀ used in mathematical logic. This operator, along with its
negation, the existential quantifier, is used to bind variables to quantify some condition in
a given universe of discourse. These universal and existential forms are categories of
70
For more details see Nagel, Godel’s Proof, p.76.
64
being known also as genera and species, ‘idea and things,’ or ‘logoi and pragmata.’
Maieutics
Since one of the objects of philosophy is to find truth, the definition and
does this relate to mathematics and logic? First and foremost, induction has been
delineated as the most basic type of logic, evolving later into more refined logic types
resulting in inference, dialectics, and more formalized proof methods. Prior to the
symbolism of modern logic, the aim and goal of philosophy, and logic in particular, was
Dialectics
induction, consider the most general case of induction used in today’s formal methods:
that is, so-called mathematical induction. Prior to the symbolism of modern mathematics,
philosophical induction served the same purpose of generalizing from a special basis.
Before modern math symbolically distinguished induction (1, n, n+1) in the natural
numbers (N), this distribution of objects into general and specifics was known as
‘dialectics.’ Dialectics, as a method of maieutics, took place mainly through the art of
Provability
and x, the actual proof of the formula, must be bounded by an existential quantifier.
Klein, mathematics has lost its certainty. Ontologically, in asking the question, “What is
mathematics?” or “What ‘be’ mathematics?” we can certainly state that math is not
simply formal methods. In philosophy as a method, initial elements are general notions
concepts. In defining objects, the method of philosophy expresses essence, divides genus
into species, and species into subspecies, stopping when division is no longer possible
Logicism
reducible to logic. According to Leibniz, “A truth is necessary when the opposite implies
developed the symbolic notation used today in modern logic and is credited with
transforming logic from a rhetorical art to a deductive science by the means of his
mathematics, Russell (and Whitehead) attempted to resolve Frege’s flawed Axiom 5 via
71
Klein, Mathematics: Loss of Certainty, p.60.
66
the Principia Mathematica (PM). Russell did know, of course, that Peano had derived the
real numbers from axioms about the whole numbers, and he was also aware that Hilbert
had given a set of axioms for the entire real numbers. Russell’s real concern was that
postulation of, say, 10 or 15 axioms about number does not ensure the consistency and
truth of the axioms. Russell could not distinguish between Euclidean and non-Euclidean
or affirm which was the truth. But in his Essay in the Foundations of Geometry (1898),
he did manage to find some mathematical laws, such as that physical space must be
homogeneous (possess the same properties everywhere), which he then believed were
physical truths.
type. Consider that the least upper bound (l.u.b.) is defined as the smallest of all upper
bounds, so the l.u.b. is defined in terms of the set of real numbers, R. Also, through the
first order. The PM system was then refuted and shown to be contradictory by Godel’s
especially in its aims to situate the rules of clear thinking with number theory, as well as
Critics of logicism: The axiom of reducibility seems arbitrary, but no proof of its
falsity has been shown. It is a happy accident, but not a logical necessity. A geometric
criticism of logicism is that, ‘by using analytic geometry one could do so’ (develop
geometry in PM). A philosophical critique of logicism says that ‘if the logistic view is
correct, then all math is a purely formal, logico-deductive science whose theorems follow
67
from laws of thought.’ Formalization apparently does not represent math in any real
sense. Nominalism is a spin off of logicism, and set theory interpreting and supposing
Intuitionism
The school of intuitionism traces its development back from Descartes to Kant
through Brouwer and also to a lesser extent from Descartes to Leibniz to Godel. Godel’s
intuitionism, which is a realism of abstract math objects extended to set theory, type
builds its own universe, independent of experience and restricted only insofar as it must
Mathematical ideas are more deeply imbedded in the human mind than in
perceptions. Mathematics is not bound to respect the rules of logic. In the realm of logic,
there are some clear intuitively acceptable logical principles or procedures that can be
used to assert new theorems from old ones. The intuitionist Herman Weyl said that non-
constructive existence proofs inform the world that a treasure exists without disclosing its
location. So the different types of intuitionists are those that: (1) Eliminate all set theory
and form only constructed concepts. (2) Hold that: ‘For every real number in the math
universe, p(r) holds if R is a class.’ That is, for every integer, z, in the math universe, p(z)
68
is a function. Existence proofs, axiom of choice, and the continuum hypothesis are non-
reliance upon logical deduction from axioms, Brouwer says that a system of axioms must
consistent. Regardless, Weyl says in 1951, “I think everybody has to accept Brouwer’s
critique who wants to hold to the belief that math propositions tell the sheer truth, truth
the manner of Cantor so that they can avoid Cantor’s peculiar puzzles. Then they might
argue and see that it was useless to detailed discussion of an assumption whose absurdity
could be seen without even referring to paradoxes. From Brouwer’s statement that “neo-
intuitionism considers the falling apart of the moments of life into qualitatively different
phenomena of the human intellect,” 73 we get the intuition of mathematically defined sets
as being of the betweenness which is not exhaustible by interposition of new units and
therefore can not be thought of as a mere collection of units. In a Platonic sense, Brouwer
rejects all connection to actual infinity and real numbers as an open interval. N is an open
manifold always in growth, unfinished, and comprehended only by the law of number
construction. Intuitionism shares a core part with most other forms of constructivism. The
logic accepted by almost all constructive communities is the same, namely intuitionistic
logic.
72
Ibid., p.319.
73
Kneale & Kneale, Development of Logic, p.673.
69
Formalism
This school begins with David Hilbert in 1900. For Hilbert and the formalists, one
cannot deduce math from logic because math is its own autonomous discipline, not a
consequence of logic. The formalist believes that in the real world only a finite number of
objects exist and that matter is composed of a finite number of elements. Formalist logic
is Aristotle’s logic. Hilbert proposed that a special logic be used free from all objections.
Like the logicist school of mathematics, the intuitionists objected to the formalist concept
foundations of logic and math, suggested a new program for eliminating newly
discovered paradoxes by axiomatizing logic, theory, analysis, and set theory. For the
mathematics is beside, not interior to, classical math, according to the intuitionists.
Set Theory
Set theory gradually gained adherents to their explicit program. Though set theory
is incorporated in the logicist approach to math, set theory prefers to approach math
directly through axioms. In the axioms, there are infinite sets and operations like the
union of sets and formation of subsets, as well as the axiom of choice. ZF axioms for set
theory can build all mathematics. The Bourbaki school renounces logicism, formalism,
and intuitionism. Cantor’s original theory of sets was a logical theory of natural numbers
prior to Frege. Cantor thought his work was a discovery of laws not made by man.
70
Knowledge
Whenever then anyone gets hold of the true notion of everything without a
logos, his soul thinks truly of it; but he does not know it, for if one cannot
give and receive a logos of anything, one has no knowledge of that thing;
but when he has acquired a logos, then all things are realized and he is
fully equipped for knowledge. 74
‘Logos’ is classically discussed by Plato but barely understood by the modern Platonists.
Even though considered a weak claim, forms imply verbs, adjectives, nouns, and
constitute names of simple nameables. Refuting the old critique of the theory of ideas
would say that knowledge is related to perception, which is Plato’s concern. Citing the
interpretations by two Platonists provides evidence that most of these arguments of what
constitutes Platonism are never settled. Ryles’ interpretation of theory of ideas states that
Symposium Plato says, “After long training, the soul sees beauty in itself.” 75 Knowledge
Plato is usually concerned with is not ordinary. It seems apparent that ‘knowledge by
Logos
Etymologically, ‘logos’ comes from the verb ‘legein,’ which means ‘to tell, state,
interpretations of Platonism include the basis that forms are simple nameables known
74
Theaetetus: (202), cited in Allen’s Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, p.62.
75
Symposium: (210e -212a) and Ryles cited in Allen’s Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, p.65.
71
ultimately by acquaintance. It is incorrect when we talk about idea (form), but it is correct
when we talk with idea (form), and logoi (pieces of talk) are necessary to display idea
(form) to us. The main point is that forms are logical predicates displayed in logoi and
not simple nameables known by acquaintance, and that Platonists put the theory of ideas
Mathematical Platonism
include: where and how do the mathematical entities exist, and how do we know about
and are eternal and unchanging. Mathematical Platonism suggests that quasi-empirical
assume such a conjecture. Logicism is the school of mathematics that associates with the
Logicists use Platonic notions when they correct and add new axioms in order to
reformulate old unworkable ones, such as the axiom of reducibility that replaced Frege’s
basic law V and the axiom of comprehension. Logicism’s main business is to define the
to pure logic, to prove theorems of pure mathematics, starting with postulates, nothing
but the basic principles of logic, and applying only logical methods of proof. In the
logicist PM-system, Russell and Whitehead use a theory of types to avoid the
axiom of reducibility and the theory of types in general are Platonic notions because for
propositions, ‘every p of a higher type is equivalent to one of 1st order.’ So the (imperfect)
internal criticisms include the question of naming universals. For example, Quine has a
to Quine’s interpretation of it, states the existence of logical and mathematical entities;
various views have been defended by specialists in math foundations. One nominalist
objection is the negation of the compression of multitudes into unity, but ‘admission of
compressed multitude.’ According to the logician Beth, “We are compelled to admit the
existence of sets for which we can’t hope ever to find a definition in terms of specific
properties of their elements, where for a set such a definition can be found, it may turn
one is sure if the axiom of infinity is an axiom of logic, and the use of the theory of types
76
Beth, Foundations of Mathematics, p.408.
73
Platonic Formalism
about the consequences of certain string manipulation rules. Another version of Platonic
was David Hilbert, whose program was intended to establish correspondence between
semantic truth and syntactic provability in first order logic and have no contradictions
especially with respect to finitary arithmetic. The main critique of formalism is that the
actual mathematical ideas that occupy mathematicians are far removed from the string
Objects of analysis and set theory are viewed as elements of a totality, such that
rational, such that the number is smaller than all members of the sequence. In the infinite
each m ∈ Z an n ∉ Z, such that we reason on the totality of such functions. The axiom of
analysis. Fundamental Theorem (1.11) 77 : Suppose S is an ordered set with the least upper
Platonic Intuition
which mental activity takes place. The weak N-Platonism used to illustrate formal
either comes as close as possible to zero or E, a positive rational, such the number is
smaller than all members of the sequence. In the infinite case, f ∞ (n) are functions
such that we reason on the totality of such functions. The axiom of choice is an
numbers defined as the union of rationals and irrationals are used to show the
fundamental theorem of real numbers that in ‘a bounded set of S ⊄ R always has a least
upper bound.’ According to intuitionism, the term ‘explicit construction’ is not cleanly
defined, and that has led to criticisms. Recall that the idea is an object (nota) of
intelligence (good, beautiful, etc.). Objects imply a division within intelligibles, not a
class of mathematical numbers and figures intermediate between ideas and sensible
things. Plato is given credit for discovering the method of analysis. Godel was a self-
thought. Godel is not a modest intuitionist such as Brouwer, since he inherits and
77
Rudin, Principles of Mathematical Analysis, p.13.
75
Cantor’s Theorem
So the questions are raised, are infinite sequence and decimal functions given only by N-
Cantor’s set theory, especially in light of the philosophical implication, Platonism shows
itself in two ways. For positive real numbers, r ∈ R, when constructing decimal numbers,
we let x be a positive real number and let n0 be the largest integer where n0 ≤ x. The
Platonism is inherent in all of mathematics in the same manner that all the schools
of mathematics share their techniques and strategies with each other in order to articulate
and solve more mathematical problems. For example, even though Brouwer is an
intuitionist, his fixed point theorem was used by the formalist von Neumann to develop
78
Bernays, “Platonism in Mathematics,” p.17.
76
game theory. Years later, Nash got a Nobel Prize in Economics for his work exploiting
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem to develop Nash’s equilibrium in game theory. The
application of mathematics in various fields and subdisciplines begins first with the
ideas exist in the realm of the intelligible, and only through intellect via logos are such
ideas reached.
77
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