UCOL, JEAN PAULINE I.

UCOL
JD-1D
CRIMINAL LAW 1

RENNIE DECLARADOR
vs.
HON. SALVADOR S. GUBATON, Presiding Judge, Branch 14, Roxas City, and FRANK
BANSALES

G.R. No. 159208 August 18, 2006

FACTS:
The Information filed charged Frank Bansales with murder for the death of Yvonne Declarador. During
trial, the prosecution showed that at around 9:45 am on July 25, 2002, inside a classroom in Cabug-Cabug
National High School in President Roxas, Capiz, accused Bansales attacked, assaulted and stabbed with a
knife victim Declarador. Consequently, the accused inflicted 15 fatal stab wounds in the different parts of
the body which caused the immediate death of Declarador. The trial court convicted Bansales of murder
since the crime was committed with the attendance of the qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength considering the accused carried a long knife along with him
from his house to the school and used it against the victim who was unarmed and defenseless at that time.
However, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603 (P.D. No. 603), the court suspended the sentence of the
accused and ordered his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth at Concordia, Nueva
Valencia, Guimaras on the ground that he was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime.

Petitioner Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the trial court's decision of suspending the sentence of the accused
and committing him to the rehabilitation center. Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of P.D. No.
603, as well as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the benefit of a suspended sentence does
not apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.

Bansales avers that Section 32 of Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law entitles the accused to an
automatic suspension of sentence and allows the court to commit the juvenile to the youth center; hence,
the court did not abuse its discretion in suspending the sentence of the accused.

ISSUE:
Is respondent Bansales entitled to the automatic suspension granted by P.D. No. 603?

RULING:
No. The accused was found guilty of murder, a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is
clear from the words of Section 32 of P.D. No. 603 that a person who is convicted of an offense
punishable by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing the benefits of
a suspended sentence. The word "punishable" does not mean "must be punished," but "liable to be
punished" as specified. The term refers to the possible, not to the actual sentence. It is concerned with the
penalty which may be, and not which is imposed. The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime
charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is
not the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which determines the disqualification of a juvenile.
Despite the disqualification of Bansales, respondent Judge Salvador Gubaton, nevertheless, ordered the
suspension of the sentence meted against him. By this act, respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Thus, the Court granted the petition.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
REY MONTICALVO y MAGNO

G.R. No. 193507 January 30, 2013

FACTS:
In the afternoon of 9 December 2002, AAA and her friend, Analiza, were in front of the sarisari store of
AAA's mother, BBB, while appellant was inside the fence of their house adjacent to the said sari-sari
store.

Appellant invited AAA to go with him to the kiln at the back of their house. AAA acceded and went
ahead.

Upon seeing appellant and AAA going to the kiln, Analiza, followed them. Analiza saw appellant undress
AAA by removing the latter's shorts and panty. Appellant, however, glanced and saw Analiza.

Frightened, Analiza ran away and went back to the sari-sari store of BBB without telling BBB what she
saw Appellant proceeded to satisfy his bestial desire.

After undressing AAA, appellant made her lie down. He then placed himself on top of AAA and made
push and pull movements.

Afterwards, appellant stopped, allowed AAA to sit down for a while and then sent her home.

When AAA arrived at their house around 7:30 p.m., she was asked by her mother, BBB, where she came
from and why she came home late. AAA replied that she was at the back of their house as appellant
brought her there and had sexual intercourse with her.

Defense witness, presented appellant's Certificate of Live Birth to prove that the latter was only 17 years
old during the commission of the crime, 9 December 2002

Appellant Rey Monticalvo y Magno was charged with raping AAA who is suffering from mental disorder
or is demented or has mental
Disability, thereby imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua

ISSUE:
Whether there is merit in the appellant’s assertion of his minority during the commission of the crime

RULING:
Yes, At the time of the commission of the crime charged on 9 December 2002, appellant was only 17
years old, a minor. Thus, he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to
Article 68 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.

Applying the privileged mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty upon appellant is
reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua — the penalty prescribed by law
for simple rape. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," took effect.
Section 68 thereof specifically provides for its retroactive application.

Suspension of the sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of
21 years old. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment
of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was
still of tender age.

At present, appellant is already 27 years of age, and the judgment of the trial court was promulgated prior
to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9344. Therefore, the application of Sections 38 and 40 of the said
law is already moot and academic

Therefore, the ruling of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified as follows: (1) appellant is found guilty
of rape under subparagraph (b) of Article 266-A (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and not
under subparagraph (d) thereof; (2) in view of the privileged mitigating circumstance appreciated in favor
of appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua is reduced to reclusion temporal
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ROLANDO MANLULU AND DANTE SAMSON

G.R. No. 102140 April 22, 1994

FACTS:
Alfaro, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot in a drinking spree. His drinking companions, Manlulu
and Samson were arrested nineteen hours after the incident. Patrolman Perez arrested Manlulu on the
information given by Manlapaz, who was also drinking with the accused and the victim. Patrolman Perez
seized from Manlulu the .45 cal. Pistol and Casio wristwatch said to belong to Alfaro, without a warrant
and without informing Manlulu of his right to counsel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest and seizure of the gun and the watch was valid.

RULING:
The warrantless arrest was invalid. The killing took place at one o’clock in the morning. The arrest and
the consequent search and seizure came at around seven o’clock that evening, some nineteen hours
later. This instance cannot come within the purview of a valid warrantless arrest. Paragraph (b) Sec. 5,
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the arresting officer must have “personal
knowledge” nor was the offense “in fact just been committed.” While Pat. Perez may have
personally gathered the information which led to the arrest of Manlulu, that is not enough. The law
requires “personal knowledge”. Obviously, “personal gathering of information” is different from
personal knowledge. The rule requires that the arrest immediately follows the commission of the offense,
not some nineteen hours later.

However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot in view of the eyewitness account of Manlapaz
which the Court found credible. In spite of the nullification of the arrest of accused Manlulu, and the
exclusion of real evidence, as well as his extra-judicial confession which was taken in violation of the
Constitution, still the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.